Case: Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd Vs. State of Haryana

S.P. Bharucha, J. These writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India challenge the constitutionality of Section 5(4) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, as amended by the Punjab Municipal (Haryana Amendment and Validation) Act (Haryana Act No. 41 of 1971), in so far as it has the effect of imposing octroi upon that area of the local limits of the municipality of Sonepat in which the petitioners factories are situated. 2. The relevant facts of the first writ petition may be noted. On 3rd November 1942 a notification was issued under Section 62(10) of the Punjab Municipal Act (hereinafter called "the said Act") which stated that the Municipal Committee of Sonepat had imposed a tax called `Octroi on the articles mentioned in the Schedule to the notification when imported into the octroi limits of Sonepat municipality. On 11th February 1948 it was notified that the limits of Sonepat municipality for the purpose of collection of octroi would be the boundaries of the municipality as fixed from time to time. On 15th September, 1966 a notification was issued in pursuance of the provisions of Section 5(1) of the said Act whereby the intention of including the areas specified in the Schedule thereto within the municipal limits of Sonepat was declared and the inhabitants of the municipality and of the local area in respect of which the notification was published were invited to submit objections in writing to the proposed inclusion. The area upon which the factories of the petitioners are situated was proposed to be included within the municipal limits of Sonepat. On 3rd November, 1966 the petitioner filed objections to the inclusion of the proposed areas within the municipal limits of Sonepat. The petitioner stated that it understood that the proposed inclusion was intended to increase the income of the Sonepat municipality by bringing the different industries around Sonepat within its limits thereby making them pay all municipal taxes. Such additional taxes would add considerably to the cost of production of the petitioners bicycles and the octroi alone would be Rs. 1.30 per bicycle manufactured. The petitioner was "already groaning under the heavy Central and State taxes. If saddled with additional local taxes, the burden will become unbearable." The petitioner therefore asked that the proposed inclusion of the industrial area within the municipal limits of Sonepat should be dropped. On 11th August, 1967 a notification was issued under Section 5(3) of the said Act by the Governor of Haryana. (This was because the State of Haryana had been created on 1st November, 1966 by bifurcation of the State of Punjab). The notification under Section 5(3) included within the municipal limits of Sonepat the area upon which the factories of both the petitioners stood. On and from 18th August 1967 octroi was levied upon materials imported by them into the municipal limits of Sonepat. 3. In 1968 the Manufacturers Association of Sonepat, of which the petitioners were members, made a representation, consequent upon which the Sonepat municipality reduced the rate of octroi chargeable upon cycles, tyres, tubes and parts imported, inter alia, by the petitioners. 4. In 1967 the petitioners filed writ petitions in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana for writs of mandamus restraining the municipality of Sonepat from levying against and collecting from them any octroi in respect of raw materials, components and parts imported by them into their factories situated in the industrial area of Sonepat. The High Court having dismissed the writ petitions, appeals were filed in this Court. This Court based its judgment Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana, 1972(1) SCR 127 upon the provisions of Section 5(4) of the said Act, as it then read. Section 5(4), as it then read, spoke of rules, bye-laws, orders, directions and powers. It did not mention notifications. Notifications under the said Act were the only authority and mandate for the imposition and charge of taxes. Notifications were not made applicable to included areas under Section 5(4). Therefore, the appeals were allowed and the Sonepat municipality was restrained from levying against and collecting from the petitioners any octroi in respect of raw materials, components and parts imported by them into their factories. 5. Consequent upon this judgment the petitioners were refunded the octroi that had been collected from them. 6. On 15th November, 1971 was passed the Punjab Municipal (Haryana Validation and Amendment) Act (hereinafter called "the Validation and Amendment Act") which amended Section 5(4) to include within it the word `notification. The Validation and Amendment Act also validated with retrospective effect and levy and collection of octroi in these terms : "4. Validation. (1) Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court or other authority to the contrary, any assessment, re-asessment, levy or collection of any tax made or purporting to have been made at the rate of fifteen per centum instead of twelve and-a-half per centum and any octroi levied, charged or collected or purporting to have been levied, charged or collected before the commencement of this Act and any action taken or thing done before such commencement in relation of the principal Act and the rules made thereunder shall be deemed to be as valid and effective as if such assessment, re-assessment, levy or collection or action or thing had been made, taken or done under the principal Act as amended by this Act and the rules and bye-laws made thereunder...." 7. Thereupon the present writ petitions were filed. 8. To be able to better appreciate the arguments which have been advanced the relevant provisions of the said Act are set out. Section 5 (after inclusion of the word `notification in sub-section (4) thereof) read, so far as is material for our purposes, thus : "5(4) When any local area has been included in a municipality under sub-section (3) of this Section, this Act, and, except as the State Government may otherwise by notification direct, all rules, notification, bye-laws, orders directions and powers made, issued or conferred under this Act and in force throughout the whole municipality at the time, shall apply to such area." Section 61 of the said Act empowered the Committee of a municipality to impose in the whole or any part of a municipality the taxes set out therein subject to any general or special orders which the State Government might make in this behalf and to the Rules. The power was circumscribed by stating that the imposition should be for the purposes of the said Act and in the manner directed by it. The taxes mentioned in sub-section (1) did not include octroi. For the purpose of octroi the relevant provision of Section 61 is sub-section (2) which reads thus :- "61(2). Save as provided in the foregoing clause, with the previous sanction of the State Government any other tax which the State Legislature has power to impose in the State under the State under the Constitution." Section 62 deals with the procedure to impose taxes and reads thus : "62. Procedure to impose taxes. - (1) A Committee may, at a special meeting, pass a resolution to propose the imposition of any tax under Section 61. (2) When such a resolution has been passed the committee shall publish a notice, defining the class of persons or description of property proposed to be taxed, the amount or rate of the tax to be imposed, and the system of assessment to be imposed, and the system of assessment to be adopted. (3) Any inhabitant objecting to the proposed tax may, within thirty days from the publication of the said notice, submit his objection in writing to the committee; and the committee shall at a special meeting take his objection into consideration. (4) If the committee decides to amend its proposals or any of them, it shall publish amended proposals along with a notice indicating that they are in modification of the previously published for objection. (5) Any objections which may within thirty days be received to the amended proposals shall be dealt with in the manner prescribed in sub-section (3). (6) When the committee has finally settled its proposals it shall, if the proposed tax falls under clauses (b) to (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 61 direct that tax be imposed, and shall forward a copy of its order to the effect through the Deputy Commissioner to the State Government and if the proposed tax falls under any other provision, in shall submit its proposals together with the objection if any made in connection therewith to the Deputy Commissioner. (7) If the proposed tax falls under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 61, the Deputy Commissioner, after considering the objections received under sub-sections (3) and (5) may either refuse to sanction the proposals or return them to the committee for further consideration, or sanction them without modification or with such modification not involving an increase of the amount to be imposed, as he deems fit, forwarding to the State Government a copy of the proposals and his order of sanction; and if the tax falls under sub-section (2) of Section 61, the Deputy Commissioner shall submit the proposals and objections with his recommendation to the State Government. (8) The State Government on receiving proposals for taxation under sub-section (2) may sanction or refuse to sanction the same, or return them to the committee for further consideration. (9) (Omitted by Government of India (Adaptation of Laws) Order, 1937.) 10(a) When a copy of order under sub-sections (6) and (7) has been received, or (b) when a proposal has been sanctioned under sub-section (8) the State Government shall notify the imposition of the tax in accordance with such order or proposal, and shall in the notification specify a date nor less than one month from the date of the notification, on which the tax shall come into force. (11) A tax leviable by the year shall come into force on the first day of January or on the first day of April or on the first day of July or on the first day of October in any year, and if it comes into force on any other than the first day of the year by which it is leviable, shall be leviable by the quarter till the first day of such year then next ensuing. (12) A notification of the imposition of a tax under this Act shall be conclusive evidence that the tax has been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act." Sections 70 and 71 empower the committee and the State Government respectively to, inter alia, exempt in whole or in part from the payment of any tax any person or class of persons or any property or description of property. 9. Mr. Salve, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the right of representation was an important safeguard and he relied upon the judgments of this Court in Prakash Chandra Mehta v. Commissioner and Secretary, Government of Kerala, 1985(3) SCR 697, and Baldev Singh v. State of H.P., 1987(2) SCC 510 : 1988(1) RRR 491 (SC). There can be no doubt about the correctness of this proposition. 10. Mr. Salve submitted that the petitioners had been deprived of the right to make a representation under Section 62(3) against imposition of octroi upon the area in which their factories were situated. The petitioners had, therefore, been discriminated against so that the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution were violated and Section 5(4), in so far as it had the effect of imposing octroi upon those areas, was unconstitutional. 11. Great emphasis was laid by learned counsel upon the judgment of this Court in Visakhapatnam Municipality v. Kandregula Nukaraju, 1976(10 SCR 544. In exercise of powers contained in the District Municipalities Act, 1920, the Government of Andhra Pradesh had declared its intention to include within the limits of the Visakhapatnam municipality the local area comprised in the villages of Ramakrishnapuram and Sriharipuram. The District Municipalities Act, 1920 was repealed by the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1965 which came into force on 2nd April, 1965. On 24th March, 1966 the Government of Andhra Pradesh, acting in exercise of powers conferred by Section 3(3) of the 1965 Act, issued a notification including within the limits of the appellant municipality the area comprised in the villages of Ramakrishnapuram and Sriharipuram with effect from 1st April, 1966. On 24th March, 1970 and 10th June, 1970 the Municipal Council declared its intention to levy property tax in the areas newly included within the municipal limits and, after considering objections, passed a resolution on 28th August, 1970 confirming the levy of property tax on lands and buildings situated within the municipal limits from 1st October, 1970. However, it issued notices to the contesting respondents demanding property tax from them not from 1st October, 1970 but from 1st April, 1966, that is to say, from the date when the villages of Ramakrishnapuram and Sriharipuram were included within the municipal limits. The contesting respondents filed the writ petition asking for a declaration that the levy of property tax for the period prior to 1st October, 1970 was illegal. The inclusion of the villages of Ramakrishnapuram and Sriharipuram within the limits of the appellant municipality was found by the Court to be in order. The true question for the Courts consideration, it said, was whether property tax which could be levied under the 1920 Act could be lawfully levied under that Act, after the repeal of that Act, on property situated in the areas included within the municipal limits after the constitution of the municipality. Section 391(1) of the 1965 Act expressly repealed the 1920 Act from which it would follow, ordinarily, that no action could be taken under the 1920 Act, but the appellant municipality contended that clause 12 of Schedule IX of the 1965 Act kept the repealed enactment alive for tax purposes and, therefore, the municipality had the authority to impose the tax under the 1920 Act. It was found, upon an analysis of clause 12, that it had no application. The Court then proceeded to consider the provisions of the 1965 Act in so far as they obliged the Municipal Councils to impose certain kinds of taxes. Under Section 81(1)(a) every Municipal Council was obliged to levy the taxes therein stated. Under sub-section (2) the Municipal Council was obliged to set out in its resolution determining to levy tax the rate at which and the date from which it would be levied. The first proviso to this sub-section required that "before passing a resolution imposing a tax for the first time" or increasing the rate of an existing tax the Municipal Council shall publish a notice in the prescribed manner declaring its intention and inviting objections thereto, which it was obliged to consider. Thereafter, by reason of Section 83, when a council determined, subject to the provisions of Section 81, to levy any tax for the first time or at a new rate, its Secretary had forthwith to publish a notification in the prescribed manner specifying the rate at which, the date from which and the period of levy, if any, for which, such tax would be levied. Section 83 was thus expressly subject to section 81 and under the latter provisions, no tax could be imposed "for the first time" unless the procedure prescribed therein was followed. Since the procedure prescribed therein had not been followed. Since the procedure prescribed therein had not been followed in the case before the Court in regard to the period prior to 1st October, 1970, the levy of property tax on the properties of the contesting respondents for that period was without authority of law. The Court said that the municipality might have been levying property tax since long on property situated within its limits. But, until 1st April, 1966, the villages of Ramakrishnapuram and Sriharipuram were outside those limits. Qua the area newly included within the municipal limits the tax was being imposed for the first time and, therefore, it was incumbent on the municipality to follow the procedure prescribed by the first proviso to Section 81(2). The residents and tax prayers of those areas never had had an opportunity to object to the imposition of the tax and that valuable opportunity could not be denied to them. It was obligatory upon the municipality not only to invite objections to the proposed tax, but also to consider the objections received by it within a specified period. The policy of the law was to afford to those likely to be affected by the imposition of the tax a reasonable opportunity to object to the proposed levy. According to the appellant municipality, the residents of Ramakrishnapuram and Sriharipuram had an opportunity to object to the imposition of tax when the State Government issued a notification under Section 3(1) of the 1965 Act declaring its intention to include the two villages within the limits of the municipality. The Court did not find it possible to accept this submission. When the State Government issued a notification under this proviso any resident of the local area concerned could "object to anything therein contained" meaning thereby anything contained in the notification. Such notification contained only the declaration of the Governments intention "to include within a municipality any local area in the vicinity thereof and defined in such notification". The right of objection would, therefore, be limited to the question whether a particular area should, as proposed, be included within the municipal limits. It would be premature at that stage to offer objections to the imposition of any tax because it was only after the final notification was issued under Section 3(3) that the question would arise about the imposition of a tax on the newly included areas. A notification under Section 3(3) had to be followed by a resolution under Section 81(2) if the municipality wanted to impose a tax and, for the resolution to be effective, the procedure prescribed by the first proviso to Section 8(2) had to be followed. The appellant municipality was found to have short-circuited the mandatory procedure and thereby deprived the contesting respondents of the valuable right of objecting to the imposition of the tax. 12. Mr. Salve submitted, accordingly, that octroi had been imposed for the first time on the area in which the petitioners factories were situated without giving to the petitioners the valuable right of representation there against provided by Section 62 of the said Act, an opportunity which had been given to residents of the original area of the municipality when octroi was imposed upon that area. Accordingly, the petitioners had been discriminated against and there had been a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. 13. In the alternative, Mr. Salve submitted, at the very least, the retrospective imposition was bad under Article 14 because it singled out those who were affected by the retrospectivity and denied them the opportunity of representation. The submission may be explained thus : when the area of the municipality was extended to include that upon which the petitioners factories stood, Section 5(4) did not contain the word `notification and, therefore, the imposition of octroi within that area was bad. When Section 5(4) was amended to include the word `notification octroi was imposed retrospectively but the petitioners had, in the circumstances, no opportunity to represent then against such imposition. 14. Mr. Manmohan, learned counsel for the respondents, drew our attention to the judgment in Hindustan Gum and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Haryana, 1985(4) SCC 124. In this case the appellant had a factory which, prior to 10th August, 1965, was situated outside the local limits of the Bhiwani Municipal Committee but with effect from that date, by reason of the extension of the local limits of the Municipal Committee by a notification issued under Section 5(3) of the said Act, the factory premises of the appellant had come within the municipal limits of Bhiwani. The appellant filed a writ petition questioning the imposition of octroi, inter alia, on the ground that it was not open to the Municipal Committee to levy octroi without complying with the legal formalities necessary for its imposition in the extended area. This Court noted its earlier judgment in Atlas Cycle industries Limited v. State of Haryana and Anr (ibid) and the fact that the Validation and Amendment Act had included the word `notification in Section 5(4) of the Act and validated the levy of octroi retrospectively. The Court held that "if the expression `notification had been there in that sub-section on the date on which the municipal limits were extended, this Court would have upheld the levy and collection of octroi in its judgment in Atlas Cycle industries Ltd. case. This Court found that sub-section (4) of Section 5 which did not contain the word `notification was inadequate for the purpose of upholding the levy and collection of octroi in the extended local area. Since the word `notification had now been inserted in Section 5(4) of the Act with retrospective effect, the basis on which the said decision was rendered had been removed because the deficiency in Section 5(4), noticed by this Court, had been made good and the levy and collection of octroi had also been validated. The Amending Act satisfied the tests laid down by this Court in its decision in Sri Prithvi Cotton Mills case for overcoming an earlier decision of a Court in such circumstances. The Amending Act thus neutralised the effect of the decision in the case of Atlas Cycle Industries Limited which could no longer be relied upon by the appellant after the amendment of the Act as stated above. There was no other contention urged by the appellant in support of its appeal. "The levy and collection of octroi in the area which was included within the municipal limits of Bhiwani with retrospective effect from August 10, 1965 in accordance with the notification issued earlier, are, therefore, no longer open to question." (Emphasis supplied). 15. Mr. Manmohan submitted that having regard to what the Court had said, as emphasised above, the levy and collection of octroi was no longer open to question by the petitioners. 16. Mr, Manmohan urged that Sections 5 and 62 of the said Act operated in different fields. Sub-sections (1) to (3) of Section 5 dealt with the procedure that had to be followed when the local limits of a municipality were proposed to be extended and, once that had been done, the consequences that followed were set out in sub-section 4. Under the provisions of Section 5 the State Government was concerned with determining whether or not the local area of the municipality should be extended and objections were invited and considered in that regard. Section 62 of the said Act set out the procedure which was required to be followed by the committee of a municipality when it proposed to impose a tax under Section 61 and objections were invited and considered by the Committee and the State Government in this regard. In Mr. Manmohans submission, therefore, there was no hostile discrimination against the petitioners. He submitted that, in any event, it was open to a party within the proposed extended limits of the municipality to represent there against on the ground that the levy of municipal tax upon that area would have adverse consequences; and he pointed out that the petitioners had, in fact, made such a representation. 17. Mr. Manmohan also drew our attention to the power of the committee and the State Government to grant exemption from payment of municipal taxes in appropriate cases and he said that the petitioners had actually availed of such exemption. 18. Learned counsel distinguished the judgment in the Visakhapatnam Municipality case by pointing out that the scheme of the said Act was quite different from that of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1965. 19. Section 61 of the said Act empowers the committee of a municipality to impose a tax. A tax may be so imposed only after the committee has passed a resolution at a special meeting as required by sub-section (1) of Section 62. Thereafter the committee is obliged, by sub-section (2) of Section 62, to publish a notice defining the class of persons or the description of the property to be taxed, the amount or rate of the proposed tax and the system of assessment proposed to be adopted. Any inhabitant, that is to say, any person ordinarily residing or carrying on business or owning or occupying immovable property within the municipality is entitled, by reason of sub-section (3), to submit objections to the proposed tax to the committee and the committee is obliged to take such objections into consideration. When the committee has finally settled its proposals, after considering the objections received, it is obliged to forward its proposals and all objections received to the Deputy Commissioner or, through him, to the State Government, as the nature of the tax may require, who may sanction or refuse the same. Upon sanction being given, the State Government must notify the imposition of the tax and such notification is, by reason of sub-section (12) of Section 62, conclusive evidence that it has been imposed upon the municipality in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. It is, therefore, the committee of a municipality which imposes a tax. Before it imposes a tax, it is obliged to set-forth its proposals in regard to the same in a notice and any inhabitant of the municipality is entitled to raise objections thereto, which the committee is bound to consider the object of the inquiry under Section 62 is, hence, to determine whether or not it is feasible and desirable to impose the tax. 20. Section 5 of the said Act empowers the State Government to declare by notification its intention to include within the municipality any local area in the vicinity and defined in the notification. To such proposal any inhabitant of the municipality and of the local area proposed to be included may object and the state Government is obliged to take that objection into consideration. If, having considered all objections, the State Government decides to include that local area in the municipality, it may do so by notification. Sub-section (4) of Section 5 (as amended as aforementioned) sets out of consequence of the extension of the municipality by inclusion within it of such local area and it says that all rules, notification, bye-laws, order, directions and powers made under the said Act in force throughout the whole municipality at the time would apply to such local area. It is the State Government, therefore, which has to decide whether or not any local area in the vicinity of the municipality should be included within the municipality. The object of the inquiry under Section 5 is to determine the feasibility and desirability of so doing. In the event that a local area in the vicinity of the municipality, is included in the municipality, that local area becomes subject to all rules, notifications, bye-laws, orders, directions and power then in force in the municipality. The local area, therefore, becomes subject to all taxes imposed within the municipality. 21. The object of the inquiry under Section 5 is different from the object of the inquiry under Section 62. There is, therefore, in our view, no scope for the plea that the petitioners have been discriminated against in that they were given no opportunity to object to the imposition of octroi under Section 62. 22. The object of the inquiry under Section 5 is bar broader. It would be open to an inhabitant of the local area proposed to be included within the municipality to object under Section 5 to such inclusion even upon the ground that a municipal tax should not be imposed upon that local area. In fact, the petitioners had raised the objection, under the provisions of Section 5, that the inclusion of the local area upon which their factories were situated within the municipality would make them liable to any octroi which they would be ill able to afford. This re-inforces our conclusion that they have not been discriminated against. 23. We may also note that there is power conferred by Section 70(2)(c) and Section 71 of the said Act upon the committee and the State Government respectively to exempt wholly or in part any person or class of persons or any property or description of property from payment of any tax. The petitioners, and other manufacturers, sought such exemption and were given partial exemption from the payment of octroi. 24. Having regard to what we have held in respect of the differences in the object of Section 62 and Section 5 and of the inquiries thereunder, there is no discrimination against the petitioners even in so far as the retrospective operation of Section 5(4) is concerned. Further, it should be noted that, it is not quite correct to say that the petitioners had no opportunity to represent against the levy of octroi from 18th August 1967. They had made a representation before that date against the inclusion within the municipality of the area upon which their factories stood on the ground that the levy of octroi was uneconomic for them. The representation had been considered but the area was included within the municipality, and octroi was levied. Thereafter this Court struck down the levy and the levy was validated by the Amendment and Validation Act. 25. The observations of this Court in the Visakhapatnam Municipality case (ibid) appear to us to have been made in the specific context of the provisions of the statute under consideration. Emphasis was laid in the judgment upon the fact that the proviso to the sub-section, which required the resolution of the council determining to levy tax to specify the rate at which and the date from which the tax would be levied, stated that "before passing a resolution imposing a tax for the first time" the council should publish a notice declaring that intention, to which objections were sought. There is no provision in the said Act which requires objections to be invited and considered before the committee of a municipality passes a resolution imposing a tax "for the first time".

Decision reasoning: 0[ds]9. Mr. Salve, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the right of representation was an important safeguard and he relied upon the judgments of this Court in Prakash Chandra Mehta v. Commissioner and Secretary, Government of Kerala, 1985(3) SCR 697, and Baldev Singh v. State of H.P., 1987(2) SCC 510 : 1988(1) RRR 491 (SC).There can be no doubt about the correctness of this proposition.The object of the inquiry under Section 5 is different from the object of the inquiry under Section 62. There is, therefore, in our view, no scope for the plea that the petitioners have been discriminated against in that they were given no opportunity to object to the imposition of octroi under Section 62.The object of the inquiry under Section 5 is bar broader. It would be open to an inhabitant of the local area proposed to be included within the municipality to object under Section 5 to such inclusion even upon the ground that a municipal tax should not be imposed upon that local area. In fact, the petitioners had raised the objection, under the provisions of Section 5, that the inclusion of the local area upon which their factories were situated within the municipality would make them liable to any octroi which they would be ill able to afford. This re-inforces our conclusion that they have not been discriminated against.We may also note that there is power conferred by Section 70(2)(c) and Section 71 of the said Act upon the committee and the State Government respectively to exempt wholly or in part any person or class of persons or any property or description of property from payment of any tax. The petitioners, and other manufacturers, sought such exemption and were given partial exemption from the payment of octroi.Having regard to what we have held in respect of the differences in the object of Section 62 and Section 5 and of the inquiries thereunder, there is no discrimination against the petitioners even in so far as the retrospective operation of Section 5(4) is concerned. Further, it should be noted that, it is not quite correct to say that the petitioners had no opportunity to represent against the levy of octroi from 18th August 1967. They had made a representation before that date against the inclusion within the municipality of the area upon which their factories stood on the ground that the levy of octroi was uneconomic for them. The representation had been considered but the area was included within the municipality, and octroi was levied. Thereafter this Court struck down the levy and the levy was validated by the Amendment and Validation Act.The observations of this Court in the Visakhapatnam Municipality case (ibid) appear to us to have been made in the specific context of the provisions of the statute under consideration. Emphasis was laid in the judgment upon the fact that the proviso to the sub-section, which required the resolution of the council determining to levy tax to specify the rate at which and the date from which the tax would be levied, stated that "before passing a resolution imposing a tax for the first time" the council should publish a notice declaring that intention, to which objections were sought. There is no provision in the said Act which requires objections to be invited and considered before the committee of a municipality passes a resolution imposing a tax "for the first time".