Case: Central India Power Company, Nagpur Vs. Union of India & Others

R.M.S. KHANDEPARKAR, J.Heard. Rule. By consent, the rule is made returnable forthwith. The learned advocates for the respondents waive service.2.The facts which are not in dispute and which are relevant for the decision in the matter are under:-(A) In April, 1993, M/s. Nippon Denro Inpat Ltd., hereafter called as "the NIPPON CO.", the parent company of the petitioner - Central India Power Company, hereinafter called as "the CIPCO" or "the petitioner", submitted a proposal to the Government of Maharashtra for setting up 1000 MW thermal coal based Thermal Power Project at Umred - District, Nagpur. On 18th October, 1993, the Government of India communicated to NIPPON CO. that the screening committee in its meeting held on 27th September, 1993 had identified the three coalfield blocks of Lohare West, Baranj I to IV and Bander and had recommended the same for allotment to NIPPON for development as captive source for supply of coal to the proposed Umred Thermal Power Station. Consequently, by Gazette Notification under Section 3(3)(a)(iii)(4) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973, hereinafter called as "the said Act", was issued on 27th March, 1996 specifying as "an end use" the supply of coal from the said three coalfield blocks excluding Morpar by Central India Coal Company Limited, hereinafter called as "the CICCO", (which was formed by NIPPON) to undertake mining operations on an exclusive basis to CIPCO (which was also formed by NIPPON), for generation of thermal power subject to the condition that M/s. Inpat Urja Limited, hereinafter called as "the ISPAT", holds atleast 26% of voting equity share capital of the CICCO and of the CIPCO. on 11th September, 1998, an amended notification specifying supply of coal for thermal power generation by the CICCO, from the coal mines of Baranj I to IV, Manora Deep and Killoni to the CIPCO, the petitioner as "an end use" with the conditions mentioned in the notification, was issued. Accordingly, there was a change in the coalfield blocks from Lohara West and Bandar to Manora Deep and Killoni. On 19th June, 1999, coal supply through linkage of 4.5 million tonnes to Bhadravati TPS was granted to the CIPCO from Baranj I to IV, Killoni and Manora Deep subject to ratification of the Standing Linkage Committee (Long Term) of Ministry of Coal. The said coal linkage was to be from the mines to be developed by the Western Coalfield Limited, hereinafter called as "the WCL".(B) On 3rd August, 1999, the CICCO addressed a letter to Collector, Chandrapur informing that the CICCO had informed the Ministry of Coal that they could not undertake coal mining with restriction put by Ministry of Defence, and therefore, the petitioner had approached Ministry of Coal to provide alternative coal supply arrangement in view of the CICCOs inability to develop the mines and the land having been acquired by the WCL under the Coal Bearing Areas Act and in view of the said development, the CICCO would no longer be interested in developing coal mines and the Ministry of Coal had already granted linkage of 4.5 million tonnes per year from WCL and that therefore, the acquisition of the proceedings initiated for the benefit of the petitioner be cancelled. On 2nd September, 1999, the CICCO requested the Government of Maharashtra to withdraw the proposal for mining lease and informed the Ministry of Coal, Government of India accordingly. The same was followed by a letter from the Government of Maharashtra dated 17th September, 1999 to the Government of India for cancellation of proposal to grant mining lease for coal to CICCO. Under a letter dated 30th October, 1999 addressed to Deputy Commissioner of Labour, the CICCO informed that in the absence of any other alternative suitable for captive mining being available, the CICCO was constrained to withdraw all proposals relating to mining lease, land acquisition and decided to close down the proposed coal project, and therefore, they were surrendering the coal mining blocks as they were not planning to do the mining, further confirming that the project being abandoned, they had closed down their establishment at Sadar, Nagpur, with effect from 30th November, 1999.(C) On 26th March, 2002, this Court by its order directed that no further steps should be taken for implementation of Bhadravati Thermal Power Station without further order of the Court. The said order was passed in the Writ Petition No.2594 of 1998. The said interim order is still in force, and the said petition is still pending.(D) On 30th April, 2002, the Standing Linkage Committee (SLC) decided to cancel the coal linkage granted to the petitioner, making it clear that the cancellation was without prejudice to the petitioners right to apply for linkage as and when opportune along with the recommendations of Ministry of Power. The said decision about the cancellation of coal linkage was intimated to the petitioner by the Government under its letter dated 11th June, 2002. On 3rd July, 2002, the petitioner requested for linkage to be kept valid and further by letter dated 19th August, 2002 requested to Ministry of Coal for allotment of coal blocks.(E) On 6th June, 2003, the petitioner applied for allocation of coal blocks, Similarly, the respondent No.3 Karnataka Power Corporation Limited, hereinafter called as "the KPCL", has also applied for allocation of coal blocks for captive mining. Both the parties were heard in the 20th meeting of the Screening Committee held on 6th June, 2003.(F) Under a letter dated 18th June, 2003, the Government of India informed the Government of Maharashtra that due to delay in achieving financial closure by the petitioner, the counter guarantee given by the Government of India had lapsed and that there were serious claimants for the coal blocks which had become free for re-allocation after surrender of the same by the petitioner and also subsequent cancellation of coal linkage and that considering the extremely slow progress of the Bhadravati TPP and lack of security about the support from the Government of Maharashtra for the said project, the Ministry of Coal was of the view that unless the project could make significant progress within one or two months thereafter and achieve financial closure, the allotment of coal blocks/coal linkage could not be recommended by the Ministry. The Government of Maharashtra, under its letter dated 15th July, 2003, informed the Government of India that it would be impossible to achieve financial closure of Bhadravati project within two months.(G) On 18th July, 2003, the present petition came to be filed by the petitioner against the Union of India and the State of Maharashtra complaining that the Screening Committee was in the process of allotment of coal blocks to some party outside the State of Maharashtra which could result in irreparable loss to the petitioner. On 26th August, 2003, when it came up for hearing for admission, on account of inability on the part of the petitioner to reveal further development in the matter, it was adjourned to further date while refusing interim relief which was then asked for. On 8th September, 2003, the Civil Application No.5587 of 2003 came to be filed by the petitioner for impleadment of the KPCL as the respondent No.3.(H) On 19th August, 2003, the Screening Committee decided to allocate the concerned coal blocks to KPCL while recording the reasons for acceptance of the claim of KPCL. On 10th November, 2003, the Government of India issued a letter to the KPCL allocating captive coal blocks for power generation in their proposed 1000 MW TPS at Bellary, Karnataka, which was followed by an intimation dated 18th/19th November, 2003 by the KPCL to the Secretary, Ministry of Coal, Government of India, that a joint venture company in the name of Karnataka Emta Coal Mines Limited, the respondent No.4 herein, had been incorporated with the main object to develop the captive mines allocated to the respondent No.3 KPCL and to produce coal for effecting exclusive supply to the Thermal Power Station of the respondent No.3.(I) On 8th December, 2003, pursuing its earlier request made under letter dated 7th October, 2003, the Petitioner requested the Ministry of Coal for alternative coal blocks as the Screening Committee had decided to allot the concerned coal blocks to the respondent No.3 for their proposed power project. In reply thereto, the Government of India on 19th January, 2004 informed the petitioner to approach the Ministry of power for their recommendations concerning the blocks alternatively claimed by the petitioner, while calling for various other information as was described in the said letter.(J) On 16th July, 2004, a notification under Section 3(3)(a)(iii)(4) under the said Act came to be issued specifying as "an end use" the supply of coal from the concerned coal mines by the respondent No.4 on exclusive basis to the respondent No.3 for generation of thermal power in their proposed TPS at Bellary, Karnataka, under the conditions specified thereunder. The notification reads thus:-"In exercise of the powers conferred by item (4) of sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 (26 of 1973) the Central Government hereby specifies as an end use the supply of coal from the coal mines of Kiloni, Manoradeep and Baranj I-IV blocks by the Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Limited on an exclusive basis to the Karnataka Power Corporation Limited for generation of thermal power in their proposed 1000 MW (2 x 500 MW) TPS at Ballary, Karnataka subject to condition that the Karnataka Power Corporation Limited holds atleast 26 per cent of voting equity share capital of the Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Limited at all times."(K) Under the letter dated 31st August, 2004, the State Government sought approval of Ministry of Coal under Section 5 of the Mines & Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957, hereinafter called as "the MMDR Act of 1957", while enumerating the various relevant events concerning the petitioners project. Under the letter dated 6th January, 2006, the Government of Maharashtra requested the Government of India for approval of proposal of the State Government to grant mining lease to the respondent No.4 which was favourably answered by the Government of India under its letter dated 31st January, 2006 on certain conditions which were required to be incorporated in the mining lease to be executed by the Government of Maharashtra in favour of the respondent NoA.(L) Under the order 21st February, 2006 passed in this petition, the respondent Nos.3 and 4 were added as party respondents. The petitioner sought for further amendment to the petition under the application dated 2nd May, 2006 complaining of violation of Section 3(3) of the said Act by the respondents in the matter of allocation of coalfield blocks for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 which amendment was allowed under the order dated 3rd May, 2006.3.The inevitable conclusions which follow from the above undisputed facts are:-(i) 1996 and 1998.Under notification of 1996, amended in 1998, coalfield blocks were allotted to the petitioners as captive source for supply of coal to the proposed power plant.(ii) 1999.The petitioners of their own, surrendered the coalfield blocks allotted to them ascaptive source for supply of coal for their proposed power generation plant.(iii) 1999.The petitioners then applied for coal linkage from WCL.(iv) 1999.The petitioners themselves further informed the Government their inability to implement the project for power plant and closure of their establishment in Nagpur.(v) 2002.On account of inability of the petitioners to go ahead with the project, the coal linkage was cancelled leaving option to the petitioners to apply for linkage as and when opportune.(vi) 2003.Thereafter, the coalfield blocks were allotted to the respondent No.3.(vii) 2006.Even today there is no progress of whatsoever nature in relation to power plant by the petitioners and their plant neither figured in the 10th five years plan nor figures in 11th five years plan.4.In the background of above factual matrix, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner fairly submitted that in the changed scenario, consequent to the issuance of notification dated 16th July, 2004, various grounds raised and reliefs sought for, at the time of filing of the petition, no more survive and the petition is now restricted to the challenge to the above quoted impugned notification dated 16th July, 2004 and the consequential reliefs, while requiring interpretation of Section 3(3)(a)(iii)(4) of the said Act. Consequently, the judgment shall deal with the challenges which are argued before this Court on behalf of the petitioner as all other challenges and reliefs have been abandoned by the petitioner.5.The challenge to the impugned notification is three-fold; Firstly, that under the provision of law under which the impugned notification has been issued the same does not permit coal mining by any private company. The respondent No.4 is a private company. Secondly, that the coal mining operation can allowed to be done only by the companies engaged in the activities specified under Section 3(3)(a) of the said Act and not the company like the respondent No.4 who is engaged in merely supply of coal to other company, can be said to be one to whom the right to operate coal mining can be granted. Thirdly, that the impugned notification has been issued in respect of the concerned coalfield blocks without cancelling the notification in respect of the same blocks which was earlier issued in favour of the petitioner, and therefore, the impugned notification is bad in law, as, at one and the same time, the two notifications in favour of the two different parties in relation to the same coalfield blocks cannot be enforceable.6.The learned counsel for the petitioner drawing our attention to the Section 3 of the said Act submitted that the object of the said Act is to vest the ownership and control of coal mines in the State so that the resources are distributed as best to subserve the common good. This very object is sought to be defeated by permitting a private company to operate in the coalfield blocks by assigning their right in that regard under the impugned notification. The contention is sought to be countered on behalf of the respondents by submitting that the sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the said Act was substituted by the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 1993 (47 of 1993) with the object of encouraging participation of private sector in power generation projects, and therefore, it was proposed to offer the coal to the power stations in private sector for the purpose of captive end use, and this, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, is revealed from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the said Amendment Act. Being so, permitting excavation of coal by a private company for the purpose of exclusive utilisation of such coal for power generation cannot be said to be in violation of the provisions of Section 3 of the said Act. Further that the impugned notification specifically provides that the supply of coal from the concerned blocks would be on exclusive basis to the respondent No.3 for the generation of thermal power.7.Sub-section (3) of Section (3) of the said Act reads thus:-"3(3) On and from the commencement of Sec.3 of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 1976-(a) no person, other than -(i) the Central Government or a Government company or a corporation owned, managed or controlled by the Central Government, or(ii) a person to whom a sub-lease, referred to in the proviso to Cl.(c) has been granted by any such Government, company or corporation, or(iii) a company engaged in - (1) the production of iron and steel, (2) generation of power,(3) washing of coal obtained from a mine, or(4) such other end use as the Central Government may, by notification, specify, shall carry on coal mining operation in any form."8.It cannot be disputed that the said Act was brought into force essentially to provide for acquisition and transfer of the transfer of the right, title and interest of the owners in respect to the coal mines specified in the schedule with a view to re-organise and re-construct those coal mines to ensure rational, co-ordinated and scientific development and utilisation of coal resources consistent to meet the growing requirements of the country, and for that purpose, the ownership and control of such resources were sought to be vested in the State so that the resources could be distributed as best to subserve the common good. Obviously, the main object has been to have scientific development and proper organisation of the coal mines so that the coal resources are utilised to subserve the common good in the best possible manner and with that view in the mind, the ownership and control of the coal mines has been vested in the State. That by itself cannot lead to a conclusion that the private sector has no role to play in operation of the mines or in scientific development thereof or for the best utilisation of such resources to subserve the common good in the best possible manner. The petitioner has not been able to point out a single provision in the said Act which would disclose total prohibition or even an indication of any bar having been provided for private sector from taking part in the operation of coal mining or scientific development thereof as well as relating to bar on utilisation of coal resources for the best of the common good. Undoubtedly, the Section 3(3)(a)(i) and (ii) of the said Act provides for the operation of such mines by the Government company or Corporation owned managed and controlled by the Central Government as well as the companies engaged in production of iron and steel, generation of power, washing of coal obtained from a mine or such other end use as the Central Government may satisfy. However, the sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 3 of the said Act nowhere gives any indication that the company which can engage in carrying on mining operations should necessarily be a government company or Corporation owned, managed and controlled by the Central Government. There is conscious differentiation made by the legislature in its wisdom between the companies referred to in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) in contradiction to those mentioned in sub-clause (iii). While in the first two sub-clauses, the same specifically refer to the Government company or Corporation, whereas sub-clause (iii) merely refers to a company. Being so, merely because the respondent No.4 has been allowed to carry on coal mining operations, that by itself cannot be said to be contrary to the provisions of Section 3(3)(a)(iii) of the said Act, when such operation is permitted subject to the condition that the coal extracted should be supplied to the respondent No.3 for the exclusive use of power generation. Besides, the sub-clause (iii) was introduced in the clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the said Act by the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 1993 (47 of 1993) by way of substitution to the existing sub-clause. The statement and objects and reasons of the said Amendment Act clearly stated thus:"Considering the need to augment power generation and create additional capacity during the eighth plan, the government have taken decision to allow private sector participation in the power sector. Consequently, it has become necessary to provide for coal linkages to power generating units coming up in the private sector. Coal India Limited and Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited, the major producers of coal and lignite in the public sector, are experiencing resource constraints. A number of projects cannot be taken up in a short span of time. As an alternative, it is proposed to offer now coal and lignite mines to the proposed power stations in the private sector for the purpose of captive and use. The same arrangement is also considered necessary for other industries who would be handed over coal mines for captive end use. Washeries have to be encouraged in the private sector also to augment the availability of washed coal for supply to steel plants, power houses, etc."With the said objects in mind, it was further stated therein that:-"In order to allow private sector participation in coal mining for captive use for purpose of power generation as well as for other captive end uses to be notified from time to time and to allow the private sector to set up coal washeries, it is considered necessary to amend the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973."Apparently, therefore, the private company can also be allowed to operate the coal mining subject to conditions as may be prescribed and bearing in mind the object of the said Act.9.The second ground of challenge is that the respondent No.4 by itself is not a company, either engaged in production of iron and steel, or generation of power, or washing of coal obtained from a mine. But, apparently, it is a company merely to carry on coal mining operations and then to supply the same to the respondent No.3. Incidentally, the respondent No.3 may be engaged in generation of power, but the right to coal mining operations has been given to the respondent No.4 which is not a company engaged in generation of power. Undoubtedly, it is not in dispute that the respondent No.4 is not engaged in power generation. However, it is pertinent to note that the notification specifically provides that "an end use the supply of coal" shall be to the respondent No.3 "on an exclusive basis...... for generation of thermal power." In other words, the notification specifically permits the coal mining operation by the respondent No.4 exclusively for the purpose of utilisation of the coal for generation of thermal power by the respondent No.3 and not for any other purpose or by any other company. The "end use" of the coal has to be by the respondent No.3 for "exclusive" use thereof "for generation of thermal power". Obviously, it satisfies the requirement of Section 3(3)(a)(iii)(2) of the said Act.10. The contention on behalf of the petitioner, however, is that the respondent No.4 is not engaged in power generation which is allowed to operate the coal mine and the clause (iii) specifically requires that the company to be able to operate the coal mine must be one engaged in generation of power. In that connection, it is further argued that the Section 3(3)(a)(iii)(4) of the said Act does not permit the Central Government to allow the end use of the coal resources for the purpose other than the purposes enumerated under item nos.1 to 3 of the sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of the sub-section (3) of Section 3 of he said Act. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the expression "such other end use" in item no.4 of the sub-clause (iii) has to be read ejusdem generis with the expressions used in the preceding items of the said sub-clause and having so read, the grant of right to coal mining can be only in favour of the companies engaged in utilising the coal resources for the purposes similar to one identified under the preceding clauses and not for any other purpose like "supply" thereof to some other company. In other words, it is sought to be contended that the identity requirement in consonance with the activity of the companies enumerated under the preceding clauses is required to be satisfied in relation to the company to whom rights are to be given for the end use of the product by exercising powers under the said sub-clause. The contention is sought to be countered by the learned advocate for the respondents while contending that the principle of ejusdem generis has no application at all to the matter in hand. Drawing attention to the decision of the Apex Court in Amar Chandra Chakraborty Vs. The Collection of Excise, Govt. of Tripura, Agartala & Ors., reported in AIR 1972 SC 1863 , it was sought to be contended that the principle can be applied only in case where a statute contains an enumeration of specific words, subject whereof constitutes a class by itself and such enumeration being not exhaustive followed by the general term and there being absence of indication of different legislative intent. Referring to the sub-clause (iii), the learned counsels submitted that while the first three items in the sub-clause refer to three different types of industries, which do not form species of any particular genus and the fourth sub-clause gives ample powers to the Government to permit coal mining operations by a company subject to the end use being specified by the Central Government which obviously has to be determined in consonance with the object of the said Act and for the best utilisation of the coal resources to subserve the common good.11.The word engaged in Section 3(3)(a)(iii) of the said Act has to be understood in the context in which it has been used in the said Section. It cannot be read in narrow sense and this is further clear from the item (4) of sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of Section 3(3) of the said Act, which clearly authorises the Central Government to allot the coal mining operation for "such other end use" as may be specified in the authorisation to be issued in that regard by the Central Government in favour of a company. The contention which is sought to be advanced, if accepted, would virtually amount to legislate upon the said sub-clause (iii) resulting in imposing unreasonable restriction upon the power of the Government to utilise the natural resources for the best use for common good. Besides, the word `engaged in the said sub-clause is not restricted to the companies set up for production for iron and steel or for generation of power or for washing of coal obtained from a mine but it also refers to the companies which are engaged in utilising the coal resources for "end use" specified by the Central Government. Obviously, the word `engaged has been used in the Section 3(3)(a)(iii) in wide sense and not in a narrow sense. The expression "such other end use" would take into its sweep all such industries engaged in the end use of coal resources for the object for which the said Act has been brought into force. The expression which needs to be stressed upon is "end use". The prefix to it "such other" could not be read in narrow sense as any such attempt would virtually impose restrictions on the utilisation of natural resources for the best of the public good and in the interest of national economy, albeit without perforating and violating the environmental rules and regulations. No expression in a statute can be read so as to render the provision to be otiose.12.It cannot be disputed that the question of applicability of ejusdem generis cannot arise in case of collection of words which are heterogeneous as in that case, they do not belong to same genus. The law in that regard has been well settled. Besides,in Allen Vs. Amerson, 1944 (1) All England Report 344, it was clearly ruled that the tendency of more modern authorities is to attenuate the application of rule of ejusdem generis.13.The Apex Court in Tribhuban Parkash Nayyar Vs. The Union of India, reported in AIR 1970 SC 540 had held that the ejusdem generis rule being one of the rules of interpretation, only serves, like all such rules, as an aid to discover the legislative intent,it is neither final nor conclusive and is attracted only when the specific words enumerated, constitute a class, which is not exhausted and are followed by general terms and when there is no manifestation of intent to give broader meaning to the general words. And in the Mangalore Electric Supply Co. Ltd. Vs. The C.I.T. West Bengal, Calcutta, reported in AIR 1978 SC 1272 , it was held that unless one finds a category, there is no room for the application of ejusdem generis doctrine and where the words are clearly wide in their meaning they ought not to be qualified on the ground of their association with other words.14.In Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. & Anr. Vs. The Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board & Anr., reported in AIR 1989 SC 788 , the Apex Court while dealing with the expression "any other relevant factors" in Section 49(3) of the Electricity Act, 1910, held that it could not be considered ejusdem generis because there was no genus of the relevant factors. Section 49(1) of the Electricity Act related to the terms and conditions of the agreement between the parties and conferred the power on the board to supply electricity upon such terms and conditions as it thinks fit and conditions included the power of the board to enhance the rates, while sub-section (3) thereof permitted the board to fix different rates for supply of electricity having regard to certain conditions mentioned in therein and "any other relevant factor". While rejecting the argument about the applicability of rule of ejusdem generis to the expression, the Apex Court had held that the said rule has no application as there was no genus of relevant factors disclosed.15.It is also pertinent to note that under the letter dated 18th/19th November, 2003 by the respondent No.3 to the Secretary, Ministry of Coal, Government of India, it was specifically informed that a joint venture company in the name and style of "Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Limited" has been incorporated with the main object to develop the captive mines of the respondent No.3 and produce coal for effecting supply of such coal wholly or exclusively to the Thermal Power Stations of the respondent No.3. It was further informed in the said letter that the joint venture company, the respondent No.4, will be operating the said captive coal blocks allotted to the respondent No.3 to produce coal for effecting exclusive supply to the thermal power plants of the respondent No.3. Obviously, therefore, the operation of coal blocks is not only for the respondent No.3 but also by the respondent No.3 through a joint venture constituted specifically for the purpose of operation only with the sole objective of utilising the resources exclusively for the respondent No.3.16.Indeed, the company engaged in the production of iron and steel, the one engaged in generation of power and the other engaged in washing of coal obtained from a mine cannot be said to be forming species of one genus. Being so, the rule of ejusdem generis can have no application while understanding the scope of the expression "such other end use" in item no.4 in sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the said Act.17.As regards the third ground of challenge that the impugned notification has been issued without revocation of the earlier notifications dated 27th March, 1996 and 11th September, 1998 in favour of the petitioner in support of the same coal blocks and that therefore, the impugned notification is bad in law is concerned, it is the contention on behalf of the petitioner that unless the earlier notifications were withdrawn, those coalfield blocks which were already allotted to the petitioner, could not have been allotted to the respondent No.3 or 4. According to the petitioner, withdrawal has necessarily to be in the manner required under the law and only the procedure known to law in that regard is by way of issuance of notification, and no such notification withdrawing the earlier notifications has been issued, and the impugned notification does not refer to supersession of the earlier notifications. Being so, the action on the part of the respondents issuing the impugned notification is wholly arbitrary.18.The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, relying upon the decision in the matter of Municipal Council, Palai, through the Commissioner of Municipal Council, Palai Vs. T. J. Joseph, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1561 submitted that even the repugnancy between the two notifications will be sufficient to hold that the earlier notification cannot stand to be effective, and therefore, merely because no notification has been issued revoking earlier notifications that will not render the impugned notification to be bad in law. Besides, referring to the conduct of the petitioner and specific communications by the petitioner under the various letters to the concerned authorities that they have abandoned the project and they have no plan to do mining clearly disclose that the party had decided not to act upon the earlier notifications and this is further confirmed from the fact that the petitioners was fully aware of the proceedings which were initiated for grant of mining operation rights in the concerned coalfield blocks and the proceedings in that regard before the Screening Committee wherein the petitioner as well as the respondent No.3 were heard and therefore, it is too late for the petitioner to contend that the impugned notification is bad-in-law for technical ground of non-issuance of notification of revocation of the earlier notifications in respect of the concerned coalfield blocks.19.As observed above, it is not in dispute that the captive mining right which was granted to the petitioners in respect of the concerned coalfield blocks was surrendered by the petitioner itself and they had opted for coal linkage from WCL. Further, under the letter dated 30th October, 1999, the petitioner had clearly informed about the closing down of their proposed coal project and surrendering the coal mining blocks as they did not do any mining. The petitioners had also informed the Collector to cancel the acquisition proceedings and factually there was nothing before the authority disclosing any efforts on the part of the petitioner to revive the said project in near future. As clarified by the learned Advocate General, their projects neither figured in 10th five year plan nor in 11th five year plan. The coal resources are the national resources. The power generation is essentially for over all development of the county. The activities in that regard are in national and public interest. The Court cannot ignore this important aspect of the matter while dealing with a case relating to the utilisation of national resources like coal which are utilised for the purpose of power generation. Considering the same, as rightly submitted by the learned advocates for the respondents, failure on the part of the respondent/ Government to issue notification revoking the earlier notifications is a mere technicality and that cannot come in the way of enforcement of the impugned notification, nor it would disclose any arbitrariness on the part of the respondents in issuing the impugned notification.20.In any case, once the petitioners themselves had surrendered their claim to carry on the mining operation in the concerned blocks and had informed the authorities about closure of their project and thereafter the Screening Committee, after going through the relevant entire materials has decided to allot the concerned coalfield blocks to the respondent No.3 and consequently, the impugned notification having been issued, the earlier notifications deemed to have been revoked for all purposes.21.In T.J. Josephs (supra), while considering the power of legislature to repeal by implication and determine the well settled principle of law that there is a presumption against an implied repeal, it was held that such presumption is rebuttable if the provisions of the new Act are so inconsistent with the old one that the two cannot stand together. Even though the said principle may not strictly be applicable to the cases of issuance of notifications granting certain rights of the parties, taking into consideration the conduct of the petitioner and clear admission on the part of the petitioner about giving up of their claim to the concerned coalfield blocks, it is too late for the petitioners to seek to get the impugned notification quashed and set aside on such a technical ground.22. Taking into consideration the facts of the case which apparently disclose that the petitioner by its letter dated 3rd August, 1999 had informed the Collector, Chandrapur, that the petitioner was not interested in developing the coal mines in the concerned coalfield blocks and acquisition proceedings be cancelled, and consequent thereto, the respondents having taken further steps for proper utilisation of the coal resources, no fault can be found with the impugned action on the part of the respondents. Merely because in future, the petitioners may reconsider about establishment of their project that by itself cannot be a justification to restrain the respondents from utilising the national wealth in the best possible manner for the public good and in the interest of the national economy. There is absolutely no substance in the grievance made by the petitioner and apart from the points which are considered herein, no other points have been canvassed in the matter. The petition, therefore, is liable to be dismissed.23.A feeble attempt was made to contend that the mining operation would be contrary to the opinion expressed by the committee headed by Scientific Adviser to the Defence Ministry. However, it has been clearly pointed out on behalf of the respondents that the mining operations would be carried out beyond the area demarcated on the basis of the said report by the said Committee. Being so, no fault can be found with the respondents permitting the mining operations in the area in question.

Decision reasoning: 0[ds]22. Taking into consideration the facts of the case which apparently disclose that the petitioner by its letter dated 3rd August, 1999 had informed the Collector, Chandrapur, that the petitioner was not interested in developing the coal mines in the concerned coalfield blocks and acquisition proceedings be cancelled, and consequent thereto, the respondents having taken further steps for proper utilisation of the coal resources, no fault can be found with the impugned action on the part of the respondents. Merely because in future, the petitioners may reconsider about establishment of their project that by itself cannot be a justification to restrain the respondents from utilising the national wealth in the best possible manner for the public good and in the interest of the national economy. There is absolutely no substance in the grievance made by the petitioner and apart from the points which are considered herein, no other points have been canvassed in the matter. The petition, therefore, is liable to be dismissed.23.A feeble attempt was made to contend that the mining operation would be contrary to the opinion expressed by the committee headed by Scientific Adviser to the Defence Ministry. However, it has been clearly pointed out on behalf of the respondents that the mining operations would be carried out beyond the area demarcated on the basis of the said report by the said Committee. Being so, no fault can be found with the respondents permitting the mining operations in the area in question.