Case: Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation Vs. Jabar Singh


Decision reasoning: 1[ds](29) In the present case, it is admitted on both sides that the work of the respondents consisted of "cutting of trees by axe and changing the shape of the timber into logs by usingsaw". In our view the process of cutting by axe and changing the shape by saw both squarely fall within the definition of the first part of the manufacturing process as cutting would be included in the processes of making" and "breaking up" included in the said definition. Further, the changing of shape by saw would be included in the processes of "altering" and "adapting" of the trees. Admittedly, trees and logs both fall within the meaning of "any article or substance", the second part of the definition. Lastly, the conversion of trees into logs is admittedly for the purpose of sale, disposal, use and last but not the least for transport, all of which fall within the third part of the definition.(30) It is noteworthy that this Court in Ardeshir Bhiwandiwala case (supra) has specifically held that salt prepared by evaporation of brine in salt packs spread over an area of 254 acres would also constitute a manufacturing process so as to include the salt works in the definition of factory. This Court in Lal Mohd. case (supra) has held that construction of a railway line over a length of 54 miles would also constitute a manufacturing process and all the patches of land on which actual work is taking place from time to time to build rail line would be a factory for the purpose of section 2(m). This Court also gave the example of construction of electricity transmission lines which would be a manufacturing process though the process of actual transmission of electricity may not bethe establishment of the appellant Corporation would, in our opinion, fall within the definition of industrial establishment as contained in sectionand, therefore, sectionwould be applicable to the establishment of the appellant Corporation. It is also submitted that though Uttaranchal Forest Corporation is covered by the provisions of the U. P. Act, however, in terms of the 1976 Rules sectionof the Industrial DisputesAct is applicable to the State of Uttaranchal and, therefore, to the establishment of the appellantWith regard to theof the writ petition and the contention that the writ petition by the respondents was barred by laches, Mr. Mehta submitted that the availability of alternative remedy is only a rule of prudence and in a case like the present one where there were no disputed questions of fact, he submitted that the High Court was justified in entertaining the writ petition. Mr. Bharat Sangal also made his submissions that this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is entitled to mould the relief to be given to the workmen in the present case in view of the fact that sectionstatutorily provides all benefits to the workmen in case of illegal retrenchment; the workmen concerned in the present cases would be entitled to the said benefit without any modification or mould the relief by this Court. He, therefore, submitted that the civil appeals filed by the Corporation deserves to be dismissed in favour of the respondent workmen.(43) We are unable to countenance the above submission of Mr. Mehta and Mr. Sangal insofar as it relates to theof the writ petition and the delay and laches. It is not in dispute that the effective alternative remedy was not availed of by many of the workmen as detailed in paragraphs supra. The termination order was made in the year 1995 and the writ petitions were admittedly filed in the year 2005 after a delay of 10 years. The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in entertaining the writ petition on the ground that the petition has been filed after a delay of 10 years and that the writ petitions should have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground of laches. We have already referred to the decision of this Court in U. P. State Spg. Co. Ltd. vs. R. S. Pandey (supra). This Court speaking through Arijit Pasayat, J. has held in categorical terms that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained when the statutory remedy is available under the Act unless exceptional circumstances are made out.(44) In the instant case, the workmen have not made out any exceptional circumstances to knock the door of the High Court straightaway without availing the effective alternative remedy available under the Industrial Disputes Act. But the dispute relates to enforcement of a right or obligation under the statute and a specific remedy is, therefore, provided under the statute. The High Court should not deviate from the general view and interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution except when a very strong case is made out for making a departure. There are several decisions to the same effect. The respondents have not made out any strong case for making a departure. Accordingly, the conclusion is inevitable that the High Court was not justified in entertaining the writ petition.(45) We are, therefore, of the opinion that the writ petitioners (the respondents herein) who have not invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal are not entitled to any relief in the writ petitions. They are not entitled for any benefits of reinstatement, backwages and continuity of service.(46) On the other hand, the respondents in civil appeals arising out of special leave petitions as detailed infra who approached the Tribunal and the High Court are entitled for the relief of reinstatement, back wages and continuity of service in view of our finding that the appellant Corporation is an industrial establishment and that provisions of sectionof the Industrial DisputesAct are attracted.(47) Learned counsel appearing for the respondents in the other civil appeals have adopted the arguments of Mr. Dhruv Mehta and Mr. Bharat Sangal.(48) For the foregoing reasons, we hold thatthe provisions of sectionof the Industrial DisputesAct, 1947 are attracted andwith the said section makes retrenchment order illegal and non est.(49) We also hold that the appellant Corporation is an industrial establishment within the definition of sectionof the Industrial Disputes