Case: Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj Vs. The State Of Rajasthan And Others


Decision reasoning: 0[ds]20. It is significant that this denomination does not recognise the existence of Sadhus or Swamis other than the descendants of Vallabha and it emphasises that it is unnecessary; to adopt ritualistic practices or to repeat Sanskrit Mantras or incarnations in worshiping the idols. Besides, another significant feature of this cult is that it does not believe in celibacy and does not regard that giving up wordly pleasures and the ordinary mode of a householders life are essential for spiritual progress. In fact Vallabha himself lived a house- holders life and so have all his descendants. This cult does not, therefore, glorify poverty and it teaches its followers that a normal house-holders life is quite compatible with the practice of Bhakti, provided of course, the devotee goes through the two ceremonies of initiation and lives up to the principles enunciated bywe are satisfied that neither the tenets nor the religious practices the Vallabha school necessarily postulate that the followers of the school must worship in a private temple. Some temples of this cult may have been private in the past and some of them may be private even today. Whether or not a particular temple is a public temple must necessarily be considered in the light of the relevant facts relating to it. There can be no general rule that a public temple is prohibited in Vallabha School. Therefore, thefirst argument urged by the learned Attorney-General in challenging the finding of the High Court that the Srinathji temple at Nathdwara is a publictemple, cannot bethe present proceedings, no such evidence has been led and it is, therefore, not shown that admission to the temple is controlled or regulated or that there are other factors present which indicate clearly that the temple is a private temple. Therefore, the case for the Tilkayat cannot rest on any such considerations which, if may have helped to establish either that the temple is private or is public.24. There are, however, certain ancient documents which show that the temple cannot be a private temple. We have already referred to the Firmans issued by Akbar and Shahjahan. These Firmans are strictly not material for the purpose of the present dispute because they have no relation to the temple at Nathdwara. However, as a matter of history, it may be worthwhile to recall that the Firman issued by Akbar on May 31, 1593 A. D. shows that Vithalrai had represented to the Darbar that he had purchased on paying its price land from the owners thereof in the Mowzah of Jatipura, situated in the Parganah, adjoining Gordhan and had caused to be built thereon buildings, gardens, cowsheds and Karkhanas (workshops) for the temple of Gordhan Nath, and that he was residing there. Having received this representation, Akbar issued an order that the above mentioned Mowzah had been given over tax-free into the possession of the above-mentioned Goswami from descendant to descendant. It would thus be seen that though the grant by which the land in question was exempted from payment of taxes is in the name of the Goswami, there can be no doubt that it was so named on the representation made by the Goswami that he had purchased the land and built structures on it for the temple of Gordhan Nath. Thus, in substance, the grant was made to the Goswami who was managing the temple of Gordhan Nath. The grant of Shah Jahan made in 1633 A. D. is to the same effect. These grants are in reference to the temple built by Vithalrai in Jatipura. We have already seen that the idol of Shrinathji was removed from the said temple and brought to Nathdwara in aboutit must be held that the Firman issued by the Maharana of Udaipur in 1934 is a law by which the affairs of the office Nathdwara. Temple and succession to the office of the Tilkayat were governed after itsour opinion, this argument is clearly misconceived. Whatever may be the genesis of the Firman and whatever may be the nature of the mischief which it was intended to redress, the words used in the Firman are clear and as provisions contained in statute they must be given full effect. There can be little doubt that after this Firman was issued, it would not be open to anyone to contend, that the Shrinathii temple was a private temple belonging to the Tilkayat Maharaj of the day. This law declares that it has always been and would always be a public temple. The validity of this law was not then and is not now open to any challenge when it seeks to declare that that the temple in question has always been a publicwe have already indicated, this question is really concluded by the Firman of 1934 and so, the temple must be held to be a public temple and in consequence the challenge to the validity of the Act on the basis that the Act has interfered with the Tilkayats rights of ownership over his private property cannot succeed.Reading these five sections together, it seems to us clear that the legislature has provided for, the appointment of a Board to look after the administration of the property of the temple and manage its secular affairs as well as the religious affairs of the temple but in regard to those religions affairs consisting of the worship, services, festivals asked other ceremonies, the custom prevailing: in the temple consistently with the tenets of Vallabha Philosophy are to be respected. The learned Attorney-General no doubt attempted to read Sections 3 and 4 in a very wide manner and he sought to place a narrow construction on S. 22, thereby indicating that even religious ceremonies and rights and festivals would remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board without reference to the traditional custom or usage. We do not thinly that it would be appropriate to adopt such an approach in construing the relevant provisions of the Act. We have no doubt that when rules are framed under Section 30 of the Act, they would be framed bearing in mind these essential features of the material provisions of the Act and will help to carry out the object of the Act in keeping the religious part of the services and worship at the temple apart from the secular part of the administration of the temple properties. Broadly stated, the former will be carried out according to the traditional usage and custom and the latter according to the provisions of theour words; it is not open to the Tilkayat to claim that he has rights of a Mahant or a Shebait; his rights are now defined and he can no claim any higher rights after the Firman was issued.There can be no doubt that the right to have the Custody of the property such as the Custodian has or the right to manage the property such as the manager possesses, or the right to administer the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiary which the Trustee can do, cannot be regarded as a right to property under Article 19 (1) (f) and for the same reason, it does not constitute property under Article 31 (2). If it is held that the Tilkayat was no more than a Custodian, Manager and Trustee properly so called, there can no doubt that he is not entitled to rely either on Article 19 (1) (f) or on Article 31 (2).Therefore, on this construction of clause 1 of the Firman, the short answer to the pleas raised by the Tilkayat under Articles 19 (1) (f) and 31 (2) is that the rights such as possesses under the said clause cannot attract Article 19 (1) (f) or Article 31a Tilkayat he has a right to reside in the temple; as such Mahant he has a right to conduct or arrange for and supervise the worship of the idol in the temple and the services rendered therein in accordance with the traditional custom and usage. He has also the right to receive bhents on behalf of the idol and distribute Prasad in accordance with the traditional custom and usage. So far as these rights are concerned, they have not been affected by the Act and so, no argument can be raised that in affecting the said rights the Act has contravened either Article 19(1)(f) or Article 31(2). It is, however, argued that as a Mahant, the Tilkayat had the right to manage the properties of the temple to lease them out and in case of necessity, to alienate them for the purpose of the temple; and it is suggested that these rights constitute a right to property under Article 19(1)(f) and property under Article 31(2). The learned Attorney-General fairly conceded that there was no evidence to show that the right to alienate had ever been exercised in this case, but he contents that the existence of the right cannot be denied. It is also conceded that the right to manage the properties was subject to the strict and absolute supervision of the Darbar, but it is suggested that even so, it is a right which must be regarded as a right to property. In dealing with this argument, it is necessary to hear in mind that the extent of the rights available to the Tilkayat under clause I of the Firman cannot be said to have become larger by virtue of the fact that the Constitution came into force in 1950. It is only the rights to property which subsisted in the Tilkayat under the said Firman that would be protected by the Constitution, provided of course, they are rights which attract the provisions of Article 19(1) (f) or Articleis clear that the Tilkayat never used any income from the property of the temple for his personal needs or private purpose. it is true that the learned Attorney-General suggested that this consistent course of conduct spreading over a large number of years was the result of what he described as self-abnegation on the part of the Tilkayats from generation to generation and from Tilkayats point of view, it can be so regarded because the Tilkayat thought and claimed that the temple and his properties together constituted his private property. But once we reach the conclusion that the temple is a public temple and the properties belonging to it are the properties of the temple over which the Tilkayat has no title or right, we will have to take into account the fact that during the long course of the management of this temple, the Tilkayat has never claimed any proprietary interest to any part of the usufruct of the properties of the temple for his private personal needs, and so, that proprietary interest of which Mr. Justice Ameer Ali spoke in dealing with the position of the Mahant and the Shebait and to which this Court referred in the case of Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments Madras, 1954 SCR 1005  : (AIR 1954 SC 282  ), is lacking in the present case. What the Tilkayat can claim is merely the right to manage the property, to create leases in respect of the properties in a reasonable manner and the theoretical right to alienate the property for the purpose of the temple; and be it noted that these rights could be exercised by the Tilkayat under the absolute and strict supervision of the Darbar of Udaipur. Now, the right to manage the property belonging to the temple, or the right to create a lease of the property on behalf of the temple, or the right to alienate the property for the purpose of the temple under the supervision of the Darbar cannot in our opinion, be equated with the totality of the powers generally possessed by the Mahant or even the Shebait, and so, we are not prepared to hold that having regard to the character and extent of the rights which can be legimately claimed by the Tilkayat even on the basis that he was a Mahant governed by the terms of the Firman, amount to a right to property under Article 19(1)(f) or constitute property under Articleour opinion, what the Act purports to do is to extinguish the secular office vesting in the Tilkayat by which he was managing the properties of the temple. It is well known that a Mahant combines in himself both a religious and a secular office.This latter office has been extinguished by the Act, and so, it cannot be said that the rights vesting in the Tilkayat to administer the properties have been compulsorily acquired. Acquisition of property, in the context, means the extinction of the citizens rights in the property and the conferment of the said rights in the State or the State owned corporation. In the present case, the Act extinguishes the Mahants rights and then creates another body for the purpose of administering the properties of the temple. In other words, the office of one functionary is brought to an end and another functionary has come into existence in its place. Such a process cannot be said to constitute the acquisition of the extinguished office or of the rights vesting in the person holding that office.53. Besides, there is another way in which this question may perhaps be considered. What the Act purports to do is not to acquire the Tilkayats rights but to require him to share those rights with the other members of the Board. We have already seen that the Act postulates that the Mahant for the time being has to be a member of the Board and so, the administration of the properties which was so long carried on by the Mahant alone would hereafter have to be carried on by the Mahant along with his colleagues in the Board. This again cannot, we think, be regarded as a compulsory acquisition of the Tilkayats rights. It is not suggested that the effect the relevant provisions of the Act is to bring about the requisitioning of the said rights. Therefore, even if it is assumed that the rights claimed by the Tilkayat constitute property under Article 31(2) we do not think that the provisions of Article 31 (2) apply to the Act. But as we have already held the rights in question do not amount to a right to hold property under Article 19(l)(f) or to property under Art.our opinion, there is no substance in this argument. We have referred to the historical background of the present legislation. At the rime when ordinance No. II of 1959 was issued, it had come to the knowledge of the Government of Rajasthan that valuables such as jewelleries, ornaments, gold and silver ware and cash had been removed by the Tilkayat in the month of December, 1957, and as the successor of the State of Mewar, the State of Rajasthan had to exercise its rights of supervising the due administration of the properties of the temple. There is no doubt that the shrine at Nathdwara holds a unique position amongst the Hindu shrines in the State of Rajasthan and no temple can be regarded as comparable with it. Besides, the Tilkayat himself had entered into negotiations for the purpose of obtaining a proper scheme for the administration of the temple properties and for that purpose, a suit under Sections 92 of the Code had in fact been filed. A Commission of Enquiry had to be appointed to investigate into the removal of the valuables. If the temple is a public temple and the legislature thought that it was essential to safeguard the interests of the temple by talking adequate legislative action in that behalf, it is difficult to appreciate how the Tilkayat can seriously contend that in passing the Act, the legislature has been guilty of unconstitutional discrimination: As has been held by this Court in the case of Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S. R. Tendolkar, 1959 SCR 279     at p. 297: (AIR 1958 SC 538   at pp. 547-548) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to other, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself. Therefore the plea raised under Article 14 fails.In this connection, it cannot be ignored that what is protected under Arts. 25(1) and 26(b) respectively are the religious practices and the right to manage affairs in matters of religion. If the practice in question is purely secular or the affairs which is controlled by the statute is essentially and absolutely secular in character it cannot be urged that Art. 25(1) or Art. 26(b) has been contravened. The protection is given to the practice of religion and to the denominations right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. Therefore, whenever a claim is made on behalf of an individual citizen that the impugned statute contravenes his fundamental right to practice religion or a claim is made on behalf of the denomination that the fundamental right guaranteed to it to manage its own affairs in matters of religion is contravened, it is necessary to consider whether the practice in question is religious or the affairs in respect of which the right of management is alleged to have been contravened are affairs in matters of religion. If the practice is a religious practice or the affairs are the affairs in matter of religion, then, of course, the right guaranteed by Art. 25(1) and Article 26(b) cannot be contravened.We have no hesitation in rejecting this argument. The right to manage the properties of the temple is a purely secular matter and it cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as a religious practice so as to fall under Article 25(1) or as amounting to affairs in matters of religion. It is true that the Tilkayats have been respected by the followers of the denomination and it is also true that the management has remained with the Tilkayats, except on occasions like the minority of the Tilkayat when the Court of Wards stepped in. If the temple had been private and the properties of the temple had belonged to the Tilkayat, it was another matter. But once it is held that the temple is a public temple, it is difficult to accede to the argument that the tenets of the Vallabha cult require as a matter of religion that the properties must be managed by the Tilkayat. In fact, no such tenet has been adduced before us. So long as the denomination believed that the property belonged to the Tilkayat temple, there was no occasion to consider whether the management of the property should he in the hands of anybody else. The course of conduct of the denomination and the Tilkayat based on that belief may have spread for many years, but, in our opinion, such a course of conduct cannot be regarded as giving rise to a religious practice under Art. 25 (1). A distinction must always be made between a practice which is religious and a practice in regard to a matter which is purely secular and has no element of religion associated with it. Therefore, we are satisfied that the claim made by the denomination that the Act impinges on the rights guaranteed to it by Articles 25 (1) and 26 (b) must bethe very large mass of Vallabhs followers who constitute the denomination can be represented on the Board of management only by a proper nomination made by the State Government, and so, we are not impressed by the plea that the management by the Board constituted under the Act will not be the management of the denomination. In this connection, we may refer to clause (1) of the Firman which vested in the Darbar, absolute right to supervise the management of the property. As a successor-in-interest of the Darbar, the State of Rajasthan can be trusted to nominate members on the Board who would fairly represent the denomination. Having regard to all the relevant circumstances of this case, we do not think that the legislature could have adopted and other alternative for the purpose of constituting the Board. Therefore, we must hold that the challenge to the validity of the Act on the round that it contravenes Articles 25 (1), 26 (b) and 26 (d) must beconsidering this arguments, we must have regard to the fact that the Mukhia and the Asstt. Mukhia are not only concerned with the religious worship in the temple, but are also required to handle jewellery and ornaments of a very valuable order which are put on the idol and removed from the idol every day, and the safety of the said valuable jewellery, is a secular matter within the jurisdiction of the Board. That is why it was necessary that the Board should be given jurisdiction over those officers in so far as they are concerned with the property of a temple. We have no doubt that in working out the Act, the Board will act reasonably and fairly by the Tilkayat and nothing will be done to impair his status or to affect his authority over the servants of the temple in so far as they are concerned with the religious part of the worship in the temple. Since the worship in the temple and the ceremonies and festivals in it are required to be conducted according to the custom and usages of the denomination by Section, 16, the authority of the Tilkayat in respect of the servants in charge of the said worship and ceremonies and festivals will have to be respected. It is true that soon after the Act was passed and its implementation began, both parties appeared to have adopted unhelpful attitudes. We were referred at length to the correspondence that passed between the Tilkayat and the Committee in respect of some of these matters. We do not think it necessary to consider the merits of that controversy because we are satisfied that once the Act is upheld, it will be implemented by the Board consistently with the true spirit of the Act without offending the dignity and status of the Tilkayat as a religious head in charge of the temple and the affairs in matters of religion connected with the temple. Therefore, we do not think it would be right to strike down any part of Section 21 as suggested by the learned Attorney-General.We are satisfied that the power of inspection which the State Government may confer upon any person under Section 27 is intended to safeguard the proper administration of the properties of the temple and nothing more. Therefore, we do not think that Section 27 suffers from any constitutional infirmity. In this connection, we may add that a similar provision contained in the Madras Religious Endowments Act has been upheld by this Court in the case of Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, 1954 SCR 1005   : (AIR 1954 SC 282  ).The next Section is 30(2) (a) it confers on the State Government the power to make rules in respect of the qualifications for holding the office of and the allowances payable to the Goswami. This sub-section has struck down by the High Court and the learned Solicitor-General does not quarrel with the conclusion of the High Court. He has, however, fairly conceded that though the first part of Section 30(2) (a) may be struck down the latter part need not be struck down. This latter part allows rules to be framed by the State Govt. in regard to the allowances payable to the Goswami. We think it is but fair that this part should be upheld so that a proper rule can be made by the State Government determining the quantum of allowances which should be paid to the Goswami and the manner in which it should be so paid. We would, therefore, strike down the first part of Section 30(2)(a) and uphold the latter part of it which has relation to the allowances payable to the Goswami. The two parts of the said sub-section are clearly severable and so, one can be struck down without affecting the other.77. In regard to Section 36, the High Court thought that it gives far too sweeping powers to the Government and so, it has struck it down. Section 36 merely empowers the Government to give such directions as may be necessary to carry out the objects of the Act in case a difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of the Act. We may in this connection, refer to the fact that a similar provision is contained in Section 36 of the Jagannath Temple (Orissa Act 11 of 1955). The object of Section 36 in the Act is merely to remove difficulties in the implementation of the Act. It is in that sense that the section must be narrowly construed and the scope and ambit of the power conferred on the State Government be circumscribed. If the section is so construed, it would not be open to any serious objection. Therefore, we are satisfied that the High Court was in error in striking down in this section on the ground that the powers conferred on the State Government are too wide.78. that takes, us to section 37 which has been struck down by the High Court on the ground that it can be utilised as a defence to a suit under Section 31. We have already noticed that Section 31 empowers a person having an interest to institute a suit for obtaining any of the reliefs specified in clauses (a) to (e) of that section. The High Court thought that section 37 may introduce an impediment against a suit brought by a private individual under Section 31. We are satisfied that the High Court was in error in taking this view. All that this section purports to do is to provide for a bar to any suits or proceedings against the State Government for anything done or purported to be done by it under the provisions of the Act. Such provisions are contained in many Acts, like for instance, Acts in regard to Local Boards and Municipalities. It is true that Section 37 does not require that the act done or purported to be done should be done bona fide, but that is presumably because the protection given by Section 37 is to the State Government find not to the officers of the State. The effect of the section merely is to save acts done or purported to be done by the State under the provisions of the Act; it cannot impinge upon the rights of a citizen to file a suit under Section 31 if it is shown that the citizen is interested within the meaning of Section 31 (1). We are inclined to hold that the High Court has, with respect, misjudged the true scope and effect of the provisions of Section 37 when it struck down the said section as being invalid. We must accordingly reverse the said conclusion of the High Court and uphold the validity of Sec. 37.