Case: S. KARTHIK & ORS Vs. N. SUBHASH CHAND JAIN & ORS


Decision reasoning: 0[ds]11. This Court in the case of Mathew Varghese (supra) has elaborately considered the provisions of Section 13(1), 13(8), 35 and 37 of the SARFAESI Act so also Rules 8 and 9 of the said Rules. We, therefore, do not wish to burden the present judgment by reproducing all those provisions since they have already been reproduced and considered in the case of Mathew Varghese (supra).12. Before adverting to the observations made by this Court in the case of Mathew Varghese (supra), it will be relevant to note the facts therein.The first and second respondents therein stood as guarantors in respect of a credit facility granted by the fourth respondent Bank therein in favour of a Company called Jerry Merry Exports Pvt. Ltd.. As guarantors, they created an equitable mortgage in favour of the fourth respondent Bank therein by depositing the title deeds of their property. When the transaction became a non- performing asset, the respondent-Bank issued notices under Section 13(2) and 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. The guarantors filed a Securitisation Application (S.A.) No.20 of 2007 before the DRT, Ernakulam, challenging the possession notice issued under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. After issuance of notices under Section 13(2) and 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, the respondent-Bank issued a notice on 14.8.2007 to the guarantors as well as others of its intention to sell the property under Rule 8(6) of the said Rules by fixing a reserve price of Rs.1,25,00,000/-. On 23.8.2007, the respondent-Bank published its notice of sale of property in Indian Express and Mathrubhoomi, inviting tenders-cum-auction from the public. The guarantors vide notice dated 30.8.2007 were informed by the respondent-Bank about the publication made on 23.8.2007. In pursuance of the tender notice, the appellant-Mathew Varghese and one M/s Kent Construction submitted their tenders on 30.8.2007 and 1.9.2007 respectively. The guarantors filed a writ petition being WP No.27182 of 2007 before the Kerala High Court challenging the proceedings initiated under the SARFAESI Act. The said writ petition was disposed of by a learned single judge of the Kerala High Court by order dated 20.9.2007. The High Court after taking note of the Original Application (OA) filed by the respondent-Bank as well as Securitisation Application (SA) filed by the guarantors, directed the DRT to hear the parties and dispose of the cases without any delay. While disposing of the writ petition, the High Court also gave liberty to the parties to settle the liability and directed the respondent-Bank to defer the sale posted on 25.9.2007 by six weeks. While doing so, the High Court imposed a condition on the guarantors to deposit a sum of Rs.10 lakh before the date of sale, i.e., 25.9.2007. As such, the sale, which was scheduled to be held on 25.9.2007, was postponed. Even after the expiry of period of six weeks prescribed in the order of the High Court dated 20.9.2007, the sale was not effected. It was the case of the guarantors that in pursuance of the order passed by the High Court, they had deposited a sum of Rs.10 lakh with the respondent-Bank. The said S.A. No.20 of 2007 came to be dismissed by the DRT vide order dated 27.12.2007. Immediately on the next day, i.e., 28.12.2007, the respondent-Bank accepted the tender of the appellant- Mathew Varghese and asked him to deposit 25% of the amount on that day itself, which was accordingly deposited. He was asked to pay the balance amount within 15 days. Mathew Varghese deposited the balance amount on 11.1.2008. After deposit of 25% of the bid amount on 31.12.2007 by Mathew Varghese, the fourth respondent- Bank confirmed the sale in his favour and granted him further time of 15 days for depositing the balance amount.13. It is only upon deposit of the balance amount by Mathew Varghese on 11.1.2008 and the confirmation of the sale in his favour, the fourth respondent-Bank informed the guarantors on 2.2.2008 about the confirmation of the sale in favour of Mathew Varghese and also the receipt of the entire consideration. The respondent-Bank directed the guarantors to collect the balance amount available with it. As such, the guarantors filed Review Petition in the Writ Petition, which was disposed of on 20.9.2007. The said review petition was dismissed on 12.2.2008 giving liberty to the guarantors to challenge the sale. The guarantors thereafter filed another Writ Petition being Writ Petition No.5876 of 2008 on 18.2.2008, challenging the vires of the 2002 Rules. It was their specific case that the respondent- Bank had acted surreptitiously in selling the property without informing them. The said writ petition was dismissed by the learned single judge of the High Court by order dated 12.6.2009. Being aggrieved thereby, an appeal was carried before the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court took the view that the sale was not conducted in a fair and proper manner inasmuch as when the sale was initially postponed by six weeks from 25.9.2007, the respondent-Bank ought to have renotified the sale or at least extended the time for receiving further tenders. The Division bench set aside the sale by imposing a condition that the guarantors furnish a demand draft of Rs.2,00,00,000/- from a local branch of a nationalized bank in favour of Mathew Varghese and hand over the same to him within a period of two months from the date of the order. The Division Bench further directed that if payment was not made, as directed, the sale in favour of Mathew Varghese would stand confirmed and the writ appeal would automatically stand dismissed. There were further directions to the sub-Registrar with regard to restoration of the property etc.14. The guarantors did not make the payment within the said date, as directed by the Division Bench. Instead, an application was filed by the guarantors, thereby seeking for further six weeks time to effect the payment of Rs.2,00,00,000/- to Mathew Varghese. In the said application, the Division Bench passed an order dated 18.6.2010 extending the time period till 20.6.2010. It appears that the guarantors had agreed to sell the property in favour of Mr. Koshi Phillip. The High Court therefore by the said order dated 18.6.2010 directed said Mr. Koshi Phillip to deposit an amount of Rs.2,03,00,000/- before the respondent-Bank and further directed that on such deposit being made, the sale made by the respondent-Bank in favour of Mathew Varghese stood cancelled and the respondent-Bank should effect the sale in favour of said Mr. Koshi Phillip. In this background, Mathew Varghese had approached this Court.15. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of Mathew Varghese (supra):29.1. A plain reading of sub-section (8) would show that a borrower can tender to the secured creditor the dues together with all costs, charges and expenses incurred by the secured creditor at any time before the date fixed for sale or transfer. In the event of such tender once made as stipulated in the said provision, the mandate is that the secured asset should not be sold or trans- ferred by the secured creditor. It is further reinforced to the effect that no further step should also be taken by the secured credi- tor for transfer or sale of the secured asset. The contingency stipulated in the event of the tender being made by a debtor of the dues inclusive of the costs, charges, etc., would be that such tender being made be- fore the date fixed for sale or transfer, the secured creditor should stop all further steps for effecting the sale or transfer. That apart, no further step should also be taken for transfer or sale.29.2. When we analyse in depth the stipu- lations contained in the said sub-section (8), we find that there is a valuable right recognised and asserted in favour of the borrower, who is the owner of the secured asset and who is extended an opportunity to take all efforts to stop the sale or trans- fer till the last minute before which the said sale or transfer is to be effected. Having re- gard to such a valuable right of a debtor having been embedded in the said sub-sec- tion, it will have to be stated in uncontro- verted terms that the said provision has been engrafted in the SARFAESI Act primar- ily with a view to protect the rights of a bor- rower, inasmuch as, such an ownership right is a constitutional right protected un- der Article 300-A of the Constitution, which mandates that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.29.3. Therefore, dehors the extent of bor- rowing made and whatever costs, charges were incurred by the secured creditor in re- spect of such borrowings, when it comes to the question of realising the dues by bring- ing the property entrusted with the secured creditor for sale to realise money advanced without approaching any court or tribunal, the secured creditor as a TRUSTEE cannot deal with the said property in any manner it likes and can be disposed of only in the manner prescribed in the SARFAESI Act.29.4. Therefore, the creditor should ensure that the borrower was clearly put on notice of the date and time by which either the sale or transfer will be effected in order to provide the required opportunity to the bor- rower to take all possible steps for retriev- ing his property or at least ensure that in the process of sale the secured asset de- rives the maximum benefit and the secured creditor or anyone on its behalf is not al- lowed to exploit the situation of the bor- rower by virtue of the proceedings initiated under the SARFAESI Act. More so, under Section 13(1) of the SARFAESI Act, the se- cured creditor is given a free hand to resort to sale of the property without approaching the court or Tribunal.30. Therefore, by virtue of the stipulations contained under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, in particular, Section 13(8), any sale or transfer of a secured as- set, cannot take place without duly inform- ing the borrower of the time and date of such sale or transfer in order to enable the borrower to tender the dues of the secured creditor with all costs, charges and ex- penses and any such sale or transfer ef- fected without complying with the said statutory requirement would be a constitu- tional violation and nullify the ultimate sale.31. Once the said legal position is ascer- tained, the statutory prescription contained in Rules 8 and 9 have also got to be exam-ined as the said Rules prescribe as to the procedure to be followed by a secured cred- itor while resorting to a sale after the is- suance of the proceedings under Sections 13(1) to (4) of the SARFAESI Act. Under Rule 9(1), it is prescribed that no sale of an im- movable property under the Rules should take place before the expiry of 30 days from the date on which the public notice of sale is published in the newspapers as referred to in the proviso to sub-rule (6) of Rule 8 or notice of sale has been served to the bor- rower. Sub-rule (6) of Rule 8 again states that the authorised officer should serve to the borrower a notice of 30 days for the sale of the immovable secured assets. Reading sub-rule (6) of Rule 8 and sub-rule (1) of Rule 9 together, the service of individ-ual notice to the borrower, specifying clear 30 days time-gap for effecting any sale of immovable secured asset is a statutory mandate. It is also stipulated that no sale should be affected before the expiry of 30 days from the date on which the public no- tice of sale is published in the newspapers. Therefore, the requirement under Rule 8(6) and Rule 9(1) contemplates a clear 30 days individual notice to the borrower and also a public notice by way of publication in the newspapers. In other words, while the pub- lication in newspaper should provide for 30 days clear notice, since Rule 9(1) also states that such notice of sale is to be in accordance with the proviso to sub-rule (6) of Rule 8, 30 days clear notice to the bor- rower should also be ensured as stipulated under Rule 8(6) as well. Therefore, the use of the expression or in Rule 9(1) should be read as and as that alone would be in consonance with Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act.32. The other prescriptions contained in the proviso to sub-rule (6) of Rule 8 relates to the details to be set out in the newspa- per publication, one of which should be in vernacular language with sufficient circu- lation in the locality by setting out the terms of the sale. While setting out the terms of the sale, it should contain the de- scription of the immovable property to be sold, the known encumbrances of the se- cured creditor, the secured debt for which the property is to be sold, the reserve price below which the sale cannot be effected, the time and place of public auction or the time after which sale by any other mode would be completed, the deposit of earnest money to be made and any other details which the authorised officer considers ma- terial for a purchaser to know in order to judge the nature and value of the property.33. Such a detailed procedure while resort- ing to a sale of an immovable secured asset is prescribed under Rules 8 and 9(1). In our considered opinion, it has got a twin objective to be achieved:33.1. In the first place, as already stated by us, by virtue of the stipulation contained in Section 13(8) read along with Rules 8(6) and 9(1), the owner/borrower should have clear notice of 30 days before the date and time when the sale or transfer of the se- cured asset would be made, as that alone would enable the owner/borrower to take all efforts to retain his or her ownership by tendering the dues of the secured creditor before that date and time.33.2. Secondly, when such a secured asset of an immovable property is brought for sale, the intending purchasers should know the nature of the property, the extent of liability pertaining to the said property, any other encumbrances pertaining to the said property, the minimum price below which one cannot make a bid and the total liability of the borrower to the secured creditor. Since, the proviso to sub-rule (6) also mentions that any other material as- pect should also be made known when ef- fecting the publication, it would only mean that the intending purchaser should have entire details about the property brought for sale in order to rule out any possibility of the bidders later on to express ignorance about the factors connected with the asset in question.33.3. Be that as it may, the paramount ob- jective is to provide sufficient time and op- portunity to the borrower to take all efforts to safeguard his right of ownership either by tendering the dues to the creditor before the date and time of the sale or transfer, or ensure that the secured asset derives the maximum price and no one is allowed to exploit the vulnerable situation in which the borrower is placed.16. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the creditor should ensure that the borrower was clearly put on notice of the date and time by which either the sale or transfer will be effected in order to provide the required opportunity to the borrower to take all possible steps for retrieving his property or at least to ensure that in the process of sale, the secured asset derives the maximum benefit, and that the secured creditor or anyone on its behalf, is not allowed to exploit the situation of the borrower. This Court held that Rule 9(1) of the said Rules prescribed that no sale of an immovable property under the said Rules should take place before the expiry of 30 days from the date on which the public notice of sale was published in the newspapers or notice of sale has been served to the borrower. This Court further held that the expression or in Rule 9(1) should be read as and and as such there should be clear notice of 30 days between the notice of sale to the borrower so also the publication in the newspaper and the actual date of sale. This Court held that this would serve twin purpose. Firstly, the owner/borrower should have clear notice of 30 days before the date and time when the sale or transfer of the secured asset would be made inasmuch as, that would enable the owner/borrower to take all efforts to retain his or her ownership by tendering the dues of the secured creditor before that date and time. Secondly, when such a secured asset of an immovable property is brought for sale, the intending purchasers should know the nature of the property, the extent of liability pertaining to the said property, any other encumbrances pertaining to the said property, the minimum price below which one cannot make a bid and the total liability of the borrower to the secured creditor. This Court further held that the purpose of the Rule is to ensure that the secured asset derives the maximum price, and no one is allowed to exploit the vulnerable situation in which the borrower is placed.17. After referring to the judgment of this Court in the case of Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam and another (1977) 3 SCC 247,  this Court in the case of Mathew Varghese (supra) observed thus:38. On a reading of the above para- graphs, we are able to discern the ratio to the effect that a mere conferment of power to sell without intervention of the court in the mortgage deed by itself will not deprive the mortgagor of his right to redemption, that the extinction of the right of redemption has to be subse- quent to the deed conferring such power, that the right of redemption is not extin- guished at the expiry of the period, that the equity of redemption is not extin- guished by mere contract for sale and that the mortgagors right to redeem will survive until there has been completion of sale by the mortgagee by a registered deed. The ratio is also to the effect that the power to sell should not be exercised unless and until notice in writing requir- ing payment of the principal money has been served on the mortgagor. The above proposition of law of course was laid down by this Court in Narandas Karson- das [(1977) 3 SCC 247]  while construing Section 60 of the TP Act. But as rightly contended by Mr Shyam Divan, we fail to note any distinction to be drawn while applying the abovesaid principles, even in respect of the sale of secured assets created by way of a secured interest in favour of the secured creditor under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, read along with the relevant Rules. We say so, inasmuch as, we find that even while setting out the principles in respect of the redemption of a mortgage by apply- ing Section 60 of the TP Act, this Court has envisaged the situation where such mortgage deed providing for resorting to the sale of the mortgage property with- out the intervention of the Court. Keep- ing the said situation in mind, it was held that the right of redemption will not get extinguished merely at the expiry of the period mentioned in the mortgage deed. It was also stated that the equity of redemption is not extinguished by mere contract for sale and the most important and vital principle stated was that the mortgagors right to redeem will survive until there has been completion of sale by the mortgagee by a registered deed. The completion of sale, it is stated, can be held to be so unless and until notice in writing requiring payment of the prin- cipal money has been served on the mortgagor. Therefore, it was held that until the sale is complete by registration of sale, the mortgagor does not lose the right of redemption. It was also made clear that it was erroneous to suggest that the mortgagee would be acting as the agent of the mortgagor in selling the property.39. When we apply the above principles stated with reference to Section 60 of the TP Act in respect of a secured interest in a secured asset in favour of the secured creditor under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act and the relevant Rules applicable, under Section 13(1), a free hand is given to a secured creditor to re- sort to a sale without the intervention of the court or tribunal. However, under Section 13(8), it is clearly stipulated that the mortgagor i.e. the borrower, who is otherwise called as a debtor, retains his full right to redeem the property by ten- dering all the dues to the secured credi- tor at any time before the date fixed for sale or transfer. Under sub-section (8) of Section 13, as noted earlier, the secured asset should not be sold or transferred by the secured creditor when such ten- der is made by the borrower at the last moment before the sale or transfer. The said sub-section also states that no fur- ther step should be taken by the secured creditor for transfer or sale of that se- cured asset. We find no reason to state that the principles laid down with refer- ence to Section 60 of the TP Act, which is general in nature in respect of all mortgages, can have no application in respect of a secured interest in a secured asset created in favour of a secured creditor, as all the abovestated principles apply on all fours in respect of a transac- tion as between the debtor and secured creditor under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act.18. It could thus be seen that this Court observed that the equity of redemption is not extinguished by mere contract for sale and that the mortgagors right to redeem will survive until there has been completion of sale by the mortgagee by a registered deed. This Court further observed that applying the principles stated with reference to Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act in respect of a secured interest in a secured asset in favour of the secured creditor under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act and the relevant Rules applicable, a free hand is given to a secured creditor to resort to a sale without the intervention of the court or tribunal. It has, however, been held that under Section 13(8), it is clearly stipulated that the mortgagor, i.e., the borrower, who is otherwise called as a debtor, retains his full right to redeem the property by tendering all the dues to the secured creditor at any time before the date fixed for sale or transfer. This Court further held that if the tender is made by the borrower at the last moment before the sale or transfer, the secured asset should not be sold or transferred by the secured creditor. This Court held that there was no reason as to why the general principle laid down by this Court in the case of Narandas Karsondas (supra) with reference to Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act could not have application in respect of a secured interest in a secured asset created in favour of a secured creditor. It has been held that the said principles will apply on all fours in respect of a transaction as between the debtor and secured creditor under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act.19. The most relevant observation of this Court could be found in paragraph 53 of the judgment in the case of Mathew Varghese (supra), which reads thus:53. We, therefore, hold that unless and until a clear 30 days notice is given to the borrower, no sale or transfer can be re- sorted to by a secured creditor. In the event of any such sale properly notified after giving 30 days clear notice to the borrower did not take place as scheduled for reasons which cannot be solely at- tributable to the borrower, the secured creditor cannot effect the sale or trans- fer of the secured asset on any subse- quent date by relying upon the notifica- tion issued earlier. In other words, once the sale does not take place pursuant to a notice issued under Rules 8 and 9, read along with Section 13(8) for which the entire blame cannot be thrown on the borrower, it is imperative that for ef- fecting the sale, the procedure pre- scribed above will have to be followed afresh, as the notice issued earlier would lapse. In that respect, the only other provi- sion to be noted is sub-rule (8) of Rule 8 as per which sale by any method other than public auction or public tender can be on such terms as may be settled between the parties in writing. As far as sub-rule (8) is concerned, the parties referred to can only relate to the secured creditor and the bor- rower. It is, therefore, imperative that for the sale to be effected under Section 13(8), the procedure prescribed under Rule 8 read along with Rule 9(1) has to be necessarily followed, inasmuch as that is the prescrip- tion of the law for effecting the sale as has been explained in detail by us in the earlier paragraphs by referring to Sections 13(1), 13(8) and 37, read along with Section 29 and Rule 15. In our considered view any other construction will be doing violence to the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, in par- ticular Sections 13(1) and (8) of the said Act.20. This Court, in unequivocal terms, held that unless and until a clear 30 days notice is given to the borrower, no sale or transfer can be resorted to by a secured creditor. It further held that in the event of any such sale properly notified after giving a 30 days clear notice to the borrower did not take place as scheduled for reasons, which cannot be solely attributable to the borrower, the secured creditor cannot effect the sale or transfer of the secured asset on any subsequent date by relying upon the notification issued earlier. This Court held that once the sale does not take place pursuant to a notice issued under Rules 8 and 9, read with Section 13(8) for which the entire blame cannot be thrown on the borrower, it is imperative that for effecting the sale, the procedure prescribed will have to be followed afresh.22. It is not in dispute that an equitable mortgage in favour of the respondent-Bank guaranteeing the loan taken by the borrower was in respect of four properties.23. It can thus be seen that the properties at Items B and C in the Schedule of Properties in First Sale Notice dated 21.1.2012 have been sold through a private treaty, and as such, the said sales are not impugned in the present appeals. It is only the properties at Items A and D in the Schedule of Properties in First Sale Notice dated 21.1.2012, which have been sold consequent to Second Sale Notice dated 9.7.2012 by public auction in favour of the auction purchaser, are impugned.56. It will be relevant to note that this Court in the case of Mathew Varghese (supra) itself has held that in the event of any such sale properly notified after giving a 30 days clear notice to the borrower does not take place as scheduled for the reasons, which are not solely attributable to the borrower, then the secured creditor cannot effect the sale and he will have to initiate the procedure de novo.57. It could be seen that immediately after the notice was issued on 21.1.2012, the guarantors approached the DRT, Chennai, by way of S.A. No.69 of 2012. The guarantors gave an impression to the DRT, Chennai, that they can sell the property within 15 days and make the payment of the entire consideration within 15 days, and that the balance amount could be settled within one month. Acting on the representation of the guarantors, the DRT, Chennai, vide order dated 27.2.2012 granted interim stay for a period of 30 days, restraining the respondent-Bank from proceeding further, pursuant to the sale notice dated 21.1.2012. However, this was subject to deposit of 50% of the outstanding amount within the said period. It could thus be seen that the sale as per the notice dated 21.1.2012, which was scheduled to take place on 27.2.2012, could not take place on the scheduled date on account of interim orders passed by the DRT, Chennai, which were passed on the representation of the guarantors.58. It is not in dispute that notice dated 21.1.2012 clearly provided a 30 days period as prescribed in the said Rules. It is also not in dispute that as per the representation made to the DRT, Chennai, on 27.2.2012, the appellants did not settle the entire amount within a period of one month. It appears that S.A. No.69 of 2012 was pending till 2.7.2012 and it came to be dismissed on the said date, i.e., 2.7.2012. In the meanwhile, the appellants had sold the property at Item B in the Schedule of Properties in the First Sale Notice dated 21.1.2012 through a private treaty for an amount of Rs.12.25 crore, and the said amount was deposited with the respondent- Bank. However, it is not in dispute that the entire claim of the respondent-Bank was not satisfied till 2.7.2012 on which date the DRT, Chennai, dismissed S.A. No.69 of 2012.59. After dismissal of S.A. No.69 of 2012 on 2.7.2012 by the DRT, Chennai, a fresh notice dated 9.7.2012 (Second Sale Notice) came to be issued by the respondent-Bank to the appellants. In the said notice, the Schedule of Properties was the same as that in the First Sale Notice dated 21.1.2012, except the property at Item B, which was sold through a private treaty. Therefore, in the Second Sale Notice dated 9.7.2012, the property at Item C became Item B and the property at Item D became Item C. The amount claimed in the Second Sale Notice dated 9.7.2012 was Rs.11,99,53,926/-, i.e., the amount claimed in the First Sale Notice dated 21.1.2012 minus the amount realized from the sale of property at Item B through a private treaty.60. It could thus be seen that the Second Sale Notice dated 9.7.2012 was in continuation of the proceedings of the First Sale Notice dated 21.1.2012, which sale could not be effected only on account of the interim orders passed by the DRT, Chennai, on the representation made by the appellants and respondent Nos. 2 to 4. It could further be seen that even in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Mathew Varghese (supra), since the sale scheduled on 27.2.2012, as per the First Sale Notice dated 21.1.2012, could not be held due to the reasons attributable solely to the guarantors, there was no necessity of again following the same procedure of providing a 30 days clear notice. In any case, the respondent-Bank issued a fresh Second Sale Notice on 9.7.2012 to the appellants, scheduling the sale on 20.7.2012. There is a substantial distinction of facts in the present case as compared to those in the case of Mathew Varghese (supra). In the case of Mathew Varghese (supra) after the dismissal of S.A., the respondent-Bank had surreptitiously accepted the tender of the auction purchaser on the very next day of dismissal of S.A. without issuing a notice to the guarantors/borrowers and also confirmed the sale, and only after the confirmation of sale and receipt of the entire amount, informed the borrowers/guarantors about the sale being confirmed. It is not the case here. In the present case, after the S.A. was dismissed on 2.7.2012, the respondent-Bank again issued a fresh Notice on 9.7.2012 scheduling the sale on 20.7.2012.61. The facts in the case of Mathew Varghese (supra) are also distinguishable inasmuch as though between the date of publication of notice in the newspapers and the date scheduled for sale, a clear 30 days period was provided, but insofar as the individual notice to the borrowers/guarantors and the date scheduled for sale, a 30 days clear period was not provided. And this was with regard to the very first notice. On the aforesaid premise, this Court in the case of Mathew Varghese (supra) held that the word or used in Rule 9 of the said Rules will have to be read as and, and that there should be a clear 30 days period between the date of publication of notice in the newspapers as well as individual notice to the borrower/guarantor and the date scheduled for sale. Clearly, in the present case, there has been compliance with the same, insofar as the first notice is concerned, whereas in the case of Mathew Varghese (supra), there was no 30 days period between individual notice and the date of sale.62. The matter does not rest at that. Immediately after the Second Sale Notice dated 9.7.2012 is issued, the appellants along with respondent Nos. 2 to 4 filed S.A. No.227 of 2012 challenging the notice dated 9.7.2012. There is some dispute between the parties with regard to the date on which the said S.A. No.227 of 2012 was filed. However, in the light of the view that we are taking, the same would not be relevant.64. It is not in dispute that in pursuance of the said order dated 7.8.2012, the appellants have not deposited the amount of Rs.4.80 crore within 30 days. It is to be noted that the order dated 7.8.2012 was self-operative. On failure on the part of the appellants to deposit the amount of Rs.4.80 crore prior to 7.9.2012, the interim injunction stood automatically vacated. It could thus be seen that even on this occasion, the appellants had an opportunity for redemption of the mortgage and clearing their properties from encumbrances. However, the appellants, even during this period, did not avail of the said opportunity.65. It is to be noted that in the meanwhile, the auction purchaser had bid for the properties at Items A and C in the Schedule of Properties in the Second Sale Notice dated 9.7.2012 (i.e. the properties at Items A and D in the Schedule of Properties in the First Sale Notice dated 21.1.2012). In the said sale, which was held on 20.7.2012, the auction purchaser was the successful bidder having bid for Rs.1,45,66,000/- and Rs.3,40,55,000/- respectively, in all totaling to Rs.4,86,21,000/-. Upon payment of the entire amount, the sale was confirmed on 21.7.2012. Not only that, the sale was duly registered on 14.9.2012 after the auction purchaser had spent a sum of Rs.38,89,880/- towards the registration charges. It is to be noted that the appellants instead of complying with the directions, had filed I.A. No.437 of 2012 in S.A. No.227 of 2012 seeking certain directions with regard to deposit of the amount in some other account. The DRT, Chennai, vide order dated 12.9.2012, dismissed the said I.A. No.437 of 2012, and thereby, granted liberty to the respondent-Bank to proceed with the sale. It is only thereafter, that the sale came to be registered in favour of the auction purchaser on 14.9.2012. It is, thus, clear that the sale came to be registered in favour of the auction purchaser in view of the liberty granted by the DRT, Chennai, in its order dated 12.9.2012.66. Even thereafter, the guarantors continued with their effort to prolong the proceedings. Various orders came to be passed in the Civil Revision Petitions, which we have already referred to hereinabove. In one of the orders passed by the High Court, i.e., the order dated 30.4.2013, the appellants were also directed to deposit the amount collected by way of rent before the DRT, Chennai. Finally, finding that after the confirmation of sale and after the issuance of the sale certificate, the Court could not interfere, the said Civil Revision Petitions came to be dismissed on 29.7.2013.67. Being aggrieved thereby, the appellants approached this Court by way of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 28402 and 28403 of 2013, wherein this Court issued notice vide order dated 7.7.2014. The said Special Leave Petitions subsequently were permitted to be withdrawn by this Court vide order dated 17.4.2015. However, in view of the observations made by this Court in its order dated 7.7.2014, the M.A. No.70 of 2014, which was filed before the DRAT, Chennai, challenging the order of the DRT, Chennai dated 20.9.2013 refusing to restore the S.A. No.227 of 2012, which was dismissed in default, was heard on 10.7.2014 and the S.A. No.227 of 2012 was restored to the file. As already pointed out hereinabove, the said S.A. No.227 of 2012 was allowed by the DRT, Chennai, vide order dated 25.6.2018, which order was reversed by the DRAT, Chennai, vide order dated 6.9.2019, and the order of the DRAT, Chennai, dated 6.9.2019 was maintained by the High Court vide the impugned judgment and order dated 18.11.2019.68. It could thus be seen that the appellants had more than one opportunity for redemption of the mortgage. However, from their conduct, it appears that they were only interested in protracting the litigation. It is the appellants at whose intervention and on whose incorrect representation, the sale, which was scheduled to be held on 27.2.2012 in pursuance of the notice dated 21.1.2012, could not be held. Even after the dismissal of S.A. No.69 of 2012 on 2.7.2012, the respondent-Bank again issued a Second Sale Notice on 9.7.2012 scheduling the sale on 20.7.2012 in which the auction purchaser emerged as a successful bidder. It is thus clear that the appellants had enough time from 21.1.2012 till 2.7.2012 for redemption of their mortgaged properties. However, they did not avail of that opportunity. Even after the auction purchaser emerged successful in the bid and had paid the bid money, an opportunity was given by the DRT, Chennai, vide order dated 7.8.2012, to the appellants to deposit the amount of Rs.4.80 crore within one month. However, without complying with the same, the appellants continued with their dilatory tactics by filing an application being I.A. No.437 of 2012 in S.A. No.227 of 2012. Even thereafter, they continued with the proceedings before the High Court, wherein certain interim orders were passed, and finally, the High Court, finding that in view of the sale being confirmed and the sale being registered no interference could be warranted, dismissed the Civil Revision Petitions. Thereafter again, they approached this Court by way of Special Leave Petitions, which were subsequently withdrawn. Ideally, the litigation ought to have stopped at least at that stage.69. However, after the M.A. No.70 of 2014 was allowed and the S.A. No.227 of 2012 was restored, it gave fresh lease to the litigation, wherein the S.A. No.227 of 2012 was allowed by the DRT, Chennai. The order of the DRT, Chennai, was reversed by the DRAT, Chennai, which was in turn upheld by the High Court vide the impugned judgment.70. As we have already discussed hereinabove, the facts in the case of Mathew Varghese (supra) and the facts in the present case are totally different. In any case, in view of the observations made in paragraph 53 of the judgment of this Court in the case of Mathew Varghese (supra), we are of the view that since the sale scheduled on 27.2.2012 in pursuance to the notice dated 21.1.2012 could not be held on account of the reasons solely attributable to the appellants/guarantors, there was no necessity to provide 30 days period in the Second Sale Notice dated 9.7.2012, which was in continuation of the First Sale Notice dated 21.1.2012.71. Insofar as the reliance placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of J. Rajiv Subramaniyan (supra) is concerned, the said judgment relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of Mathew Varghese (supra). However, on facts, the issue in the said case was different. In the said case, the property was sold by the respondent-Bank through a private treaty. This Court found that there were no terms settled in writing between the borrowers and the Bank that the sale can be effected by a private treaty, and as such, it was in violation of the provisions of Rule 8 (8) of the said Rules.72. In the case of Vasu P. Shetty (supra), after the first notice was issued, the same was challenged before the High Court. Though the High Court did not grant stay against the scheduled auction, it granted stay against the confirmation of sale. It was the Banks case therein that in view of the partial stay order by the High Court, nobody came forward to participate in the auction and the exercise went into futility. After dismissal of the writ petition, it came to the notice of the Bank that there were other encumbrances on the property, which required the reserve price to be changed. Thereafter, there were proposals exchanged between the Bank and the borrower with regard to One Time Settlement (OTS). On failure to arrive at OTS, a fresh notice came to be issued. In the said notice, the mandatory period of 30 days from the date of publication was not provided. The matter was proceeded in this background.73. The present case is totally on different facts. Though the appellants had ample opportunities for redemption of mortgage, they failed to avail of the said opportunities.74. Even if viewed from another angle, the claim of the appellants is not sustainable. The two-judges Bench of this Court in the case of Mathew Varghese (supra), has heavily relied on the judgment of the three-judges Bench of this Court in the case of Narandas Karsondas (supra). It has been held by this Court in the case of Narandas Karsondas (supra), that the right of redemption, which is embodied in Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, is available to the mortgagor unless it has been extinguished by the act of parties. It has been held, that only on execution of the conveyance and registration of transfer of the mortgagors interest by registered instrument, that the mortgagors right of redemption will be extinguished. In the present case, the DRT, Chennai, vide order dated 12.9.2012, had granted liberty to the respondent-Bank to proceed with the sale. The sale came to be registered in favour of the auction purchaser on 14.9.2012. As such, in any case, the mortgagors right of redemption stood extinguished on 14.9.2012. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court had, therefore, rightly dismissed the Civil Revision Petitions, vide order dated 29.7.2013. The said order of the Madras High Court dated 29.7.2013 came to be challenged before this Court by way of Special Leave Petitions. This Court, vide order dated 7.7.2014, had issued limited notice in the said Special Leave Petitions. However, vide order dated 17.4.2015, the said Special Leave Petitions came to be dismissed as withdrawn. It is in the third round of litigation, that the DRT, Chennai, allowed the S.A. No.227 of 2012, vide order dated 25.6.2018. Applying the law, as laid in the case of Narandas Karsondas (supra) and in the case of Mathew Varghese (supra), the order passed by the DRT, Chennai, dated 25.6.2018, was not sustainable insofar as setting aside the sale notice dated 9.7.2012 and the consequent sale. The DRAT, Chennai, has rightly reversed the same, which has been upheld by the High Court vide the impugned judgment.75. It is further relevant to note that, this Court in the case of Dwarika Prasad (supra) and in the case of Shakeena (supra) held that the right to redemption stands extinguished on the sale certificate getting registered.76. We will have to take into consideration the purpose with which the SARFAESI Act came to be enacted. Unlike international banks, the banks and financial institutions in India did not have power to take possession of securities and sell them. It was, therefore, noticed, that it had resulted in slow pace of recovery of defaulting loans and mounting levels of non-performing assets of banks and financial institutions. It was also noticed that there were certain areas in which the banking and financial sector did not have a level playing field as compared to other participants in the financial markets in the world. It was further noticed that the existing legal framework relating to commercial transactions had not kept pace with the changing commercial practices and financial sector reforms. As such, the SARFAESI Act was enacted with the purpose for securitization and empowering banks and financial institutions to take possession of the securities and to sell them without the intervention of the Court.77. If we look at the facts in the present case, it would show that, every attempt has been made to frustrate the purpose of the SARFAESI Act. The respondent-Bank was required to indulge in three rounds of litigations, out of which, the two have reached upto this Court.78. Though the auction purchaser emerged as the successful bidder, in the bids held on 20.7.2012, and though the sale was confirmed on 21.7.2012, and though the sale has been registered in his favour on 14.9.2012, for a period of last 9 years, he could not enjoy the fruits of the said sale. Not only that, but the appellants continued to enjoy the rent of the properties, the ownership of which vests in the auction purchaser.79. In that view of the matter, we do not find any merit insofar as the challenge to the notice dated 9.7.2012 is concerned.81. We find no merit in this submission. The property at Item B of the Schedule of Properties in First Sale Notice dated 21.1.2012 was sold through a private treaty during the pendency of the first round of litigation. The properties at Item A and Item D of the Schedule of Properties in First Sale Notice dated 21.1.2012 came to be sold in pursuance of the sale taken place on 20.7.2012, which was in pursuance of the Second Sale Notice dated 9.7.2012. As such, the only property left was the property at Item C belonging to the respondent No.3 in respect of which a third notice dated 27.9.2012 came to be issued. It is only in pursuance of the said notice dated 27.9.2012, that the property at Item C was sold by a private treaty to M/s. Redbrick Realtors Private Limited. As such, the excess amount, which remained with the respondent-Bank, has rightly been directed to be paid to respondent No.3 by the DRT, Chennai, which has been concurrently upheld by the DRAT, Chennai, as well as the High Court.82. Even on equitable grounds, rest of the guarantors are either the Promoters/Directors or their family members, it is only the respondent No.3, who happens to be outside the family and is only connected on account of her daughter being married in the family of one of the Promoters/Directors. As such, on equitable grounds, we do not find any reason to interfere with the said direction.