Case: Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Union Of India


Decision reasoning: 1[ds]8. To appreciate the submissions raised at the bar, let us first notice Article 129 of the Constitution9. The Article on its plain language vests this Court with all the powers of a court of record including the power to punish for contempt of itself.10. The expression Court of Record has not been defined in the Constitution of India. Article 129 however, declare s the Supreme Court to be a Court of Record, while Article 216 declares a High Court also to be a Court of Record.11. A court of record is a court, the records of which are admitted to be of evidentiary value and are not to be questioned when produced before any court. The power that courts of record enjoy to punish for contempt is a part of their inherent jurisdiction and is essential to enable the courts to administer justice according to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner and to uphold the majesty of law and prevent interference in the due administration of justice.14. All courts of record have an inherent jurisdiction to punish contempts committed in their face but the inherent power to punish contempts committed outside the court resides exclusively in superior courts of record.14. All courts of record have an inherent jurisdiction to punish contempts committed in their face but the inherent power to punish contempts committed outside the court resides exclusively in superior courts of record.15. Superior Courts of records have an inherent superintendent jurisdiction to punish contempts committed in connection with proceedings before inferior courts.16. The language of entry 77 of List I and entry 14 o f List III of the Seventh Schedule demonstrate that the legislative power of the Parliament and of the State legislature extends to legislate with respect to matters connected with contempt of court by the Supreme Court or the High Court, subject however, to the qualification that such legislation cannot denude, abrogate or nullify, the power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt under Articles 129 or vest that power in some other Court.Besides, Articles 129, the power to punish for contempt is also vested in the Supreme court by virtue of Article 142(2).An analysis of the above provision shows that sub-section (1) of Section 12 provides that in a case of established contempt, the contemner may be punished:(a) with simple imprisonment by detention in a civil prison; or(b) with fine, or(c) with both.27. A careful reading of sub-section (2) of Section 12 reveals that the Act places an embargo on the court not to impose a sentence in excess of the sentence prescribed under sub- section (1). A close scrutiny of sub-section (3) of Section 12 demonstrates that the legislature intended that in the case of civil contempt a sentence of fine alone should be imposed except where the court considers that the ends of justice make it necessary to pass a sentence of imprisonment also.28. Section 10 of the 1971 Act like Section 2 of the 1926 Act and Section 4 of the 1952 Act recognises the power which a High Court already possesses as a Court of Record for punishing for contempt of itself, which jurisdiction has now the sanction of the Constitution also by virtue of Article 215. The Act, however, does not deal with the powers of the Supreme Court to try or punish a contemner for committing contempt of the Supreme Court or the courts subordinate to it and the constitutional provision contained in Articles 142(2) and 129 of the Constitution alone deal with the subject.31. Thus, the recognised and accepted punishments for civil or criminal contempt of court in English Law, which have been followed and accepted by the courts in this country and incorporated in the Indian law in so far as, civil contempt, is concerned are:i) Sequestration of assets:iii) committal to prison32. The object of punishment being both curative and corrective these coercions are meant to assist an individual complainant to enforce his remedy and there is also an element of public policy for punishing civil contempt, since the administration of justice would be undermined if the order of any court of law is to be disregarded with impunity. Under some circumstances, compliance of the order may be secured without resort to coercion, through the contempt power.33. In so far as criminal contempt of court is concerned, which charge is required to be established like a criminal charge, it is punishable by(i) fine; or(ii) by fixed period of simple imprisonment or detention in a civil prison for a specified period; or34. In deciding whether a contempt is serious enough to merit imprisonment, the court will take into account the likelihood of interference with the administration of justice and the culpability of the offender. The intention with which the act complained of is done is a material factor in determining what punishment, in a given case, would be appropriate.The nature and types of punishment which a court of record can impose, in a case of established contempt, under the common law have now been specifically incorporated in the contempt of Courts Act, 1971 in so far as the High Courts are concerned and therefore to the extent the contempt of Courts Act 1971 identifies the nature of types of punishments which can be awarded in the case of established contempt, it does not impinge upon the inherent powers of the High Court under Article 215 either. No new type of punishment can be created or assumed.35. As already noticed, the parliament by virtue of Entry 77, List I is competent to enact a law relating to the powers of the Supreme Court with regard to contempt of itself and such a law may prescribe the nature of punishment which ma y be imposed on a contemner by virtue of the provisions of Article 129 read with Article 142(2). Since, no such law has been enacted by the parliament, the nature of punishment prescribed, under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, may act as a guide for the Supreme Court but the extent of punishment as prescribed under that Act can apply only to the High Courts, because the 1971 Act ipso facto does not deal with the contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, except that Section 15 of the Act prescribes procedural mode for taking cognizance of criminal contempt by the supreme Court also. Section 15, however, is not a substantive provision conferring contempt jurisdiction. The judgment in Sukhdev Singhs case (supra) as regards the extent of maximum punishment which can be imposed upon a contemner must, therefore, be construed as dealing with the powers of the High Courts only and not of this Court in that behalf. We are, therefore, doubtful of the validity of the argument of the learned solicitor General that the extent of punishment which the supreme Court can impose in exercise of its inherent powers to punish for contempt of itself and/or of subordinate courts can also be only to the extent prescribed under the contempt of Courts Act, 1971. We, however, do not express any final opinion on that question since that issue strictly speaking, does not arise for our decision in this case. The question regarding the restriction or limitation on the extent of punishment, which this Court may award while exercising its contempt jurisdiction may be decided in a proper case, when so raised.Suspending the licence to practice of any professional like a lawyer, doctor, chartered accountant etc. When such a professional is found guilty of committing contempt of court, for any specified period, is not a recognised or accepted punishment which a court of record either under the common law or under the statutory law can impose, on a contemner, in addition to any of the other recognised punishments.36. The suspension of an Advocate from practice and his removal from the State roll of advocates are both punishments specifically provided for under the Advocates Act, 1961, for proven professional misconduct of an advocate. While exercising its contempt jurisdiction under Article 129, the only cause or matter before this Court is regarding commission of contempt of court. There is no cause of professional misconduct, properly so called, pending before the Court. This Court, therefore, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 129 cannot take over the jurisdiction of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of the State or the Bar Council of India to punish an advocate by suspending his licence, which punishment can only be imposed after a finding of professional misconduct is recorded in the manner prescribed under the Advocates Act and the Rules framed thereunder.37. When this Court is seized of a matter of contempt of court by an advocate, there is no case, cause or matter before the Supreme Court regarding his professional misconduct even though, in a give n a case, the contempt committed by an advocate may also amount to an abuse of the privilege granted to an advocate by virtue of the licence to practice law but no issue relating to his suspension from practice is the subject matter of the case. T he powers of this Court, under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution, being supplementary powers have to be used in exercise of its jurisdiction in the case under consideration by this Court. Moreover, a case of contempt of court is not stricto senso a cause or a matter between the parties inter se. It is a matter between the court and the contemner. It is not, strictly speaking, tried as an adversarial litigation. The party, which brings the contumacious conduct of the contemner to the notice of the court, whether a private person or the subordinate court, is only an informant and does not have the status of a litigant in the contempt of Court case.The contempt of court is a special jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly and with caution, whenever an act adversely effects the administration of justice or which tends to impede its course or tends to shake public confidence in the judicial institutions. This jurisdiction may also be exercised when the act complained of adversely effects the Majesty of Law or dignity of the courts. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the Courts of law. It is an unusual type of jurisdiction combining the jury, the judge and the hangman and it is so because the court is not adjudicating upon any claim between litigating parties. This jurisdiction is not exercised to protect the dignity of an individual judge but to protect the administr ation of justice from being maligned. In the general interest of the community it is imperative that the authority of courts should not be imperiled and there should be no unjustifiable interference in the administration of justice. It is a matter between the court and the contemner and third parties cannot intervene. it is exercised in a summary manner in aid of the administration of justice, the majesty of law and the dignity of the courts. No such act can be permitt ed which may have the tendency to shake the public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the administration of justice. The power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt of court, though quite wide, is yet limited and cannot be expa nded to include the power to determine whether an advocate is also guilty of Professional misconduct in a summary manner, giving a go bye to the procedure prescribed under the Advocates Act. The power to do complete justice under Article 1 42 is in a way, corrective power, which gives preference to equity over law but it cannot be used to deprive a professional lawyer of the due process contained in the Advocates Act 1961 by suspending his licence to practice in a summary manner, while dealing with a case of contempt of court.After recognising that the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India to take action for professional misconduct is different from the jurisdiction of the courts to take action against the advocates for the contempt of court, how could the court invest itself with the jurisdiction of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council to punish the concerned Advocate for professional misconduct in addition to imposing the punishment of suspended sentence of imprisonment for committing contempt of court.41. The plenary powers of this court under Article 142 of the Constitution are inherent in the court and are complementary to those powers which are specifically conferred on the court by various statutes though are not limited by those statutes. These powers also exist independent of the statutes with a view to do complete justice between the parties. These powers also exists independent of the statutes with a view to do complete justice between the parties. These powers are of very wide amplitude and are in the nature of supplementary powers. This power, exists as a separate and independent basis of jurisdiction, apart from the statutes. It stands upon the foundation, and the basis for its exercise may be put on a different and perhaps even wider footing, to prevent injustice in the process of litigation and to do complete justice between the parties. This plenary jurisdiction is, thus, the residual source of power which this Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so and in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to do complete justice between the parties. This plenary jurisdiction is, thus, the residual source of power which this court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so and in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to do complete justice between the parties, while administering justice according to law. There is no doubt that it is an indispensable adjunct to all other powers and is free from the restraint of jurisdiction and operates as a valuable weapon in the hands of the court to prevent clogging or obstruction of the stream of justice. It, however, needs to be remembered that the powers conferred on the court by Article 142 being curative in nature cannot be construed as powers which authorise the court to ignore the substantive rights of a litigant while dealing with a cause pending before it. this power cannot be used to supplant substantive law applicable to the case or cause under consideration of the court. Article 142, even with the width of its amplitude, cannot be used to build a new edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with a subject and thereby to achieve something indirectly which cannot be achieved directly. Punishing a contemner advocate, while dealing with a contempt of court case by suspending his licence to practice, a power otherwise statutorily available only to the Bar Council of India, on the ground that the contemner is also an advocate, is, therefore, not permissible in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142. The construction of Article 142 must be functionally informed by the salutary purpose of the Article viz. to do complete justice between the parties. It cannot be otherwise. As already noticed in a case of contempt of court, the contemner and the court cannot be said to be litigating parties.The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 has the power to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justicebetween the parties in any cause or matter pending before it. The very nature of the power must lead the court to set limits for itself within which to exercise those powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory provision covering a subject, except perhaps to balance the equities between the conflicting claims of the litgating parties by ironing out the creases in a cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of restricted jurisdiction of only dispute settling. it is well recognised and established that this court has always been a law maker and its role travels beyond merely dispute settling. It is a problem solver in the nebulous areas. (See. K. Verraswami vs. Union of India but the substantive statutory provisions dealing with the subject matter of a given case, cannot be altogether ignored by this court, while making an order under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional powers can not, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions but at the same time these powers are not meant to be exercised when their exercise may come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in statute dealing expressly with the subject.46. As we shall presently see, there is nothing said in either Delhi Judicial Service Associations case (supra) or the Union Carbides case supra) from which it may be possible to hold that the law laid down in Prem Chand Gargs case (supra) is no longer a good law. Besides, we also find that in Mohd. Anis case referred to by the Bench, there is no reference made to Prem Chand Gargs case at all.43. Dealing with the powers of this court under Article 142, in Prem Chand Garg vs. Excise Commissioner, U.P., Allahabad, it was said by the Constitution Bench:In this connection, it may be pertinent to point out that the wide powers which are given to this court for doing complete justice between t he parties, can be used by this court for instance, in adding parties to the proceedings pending before it, or in admitting additional evidence, or in remanding the case, or in allowing a new point to be taken for the first time. It is plain that in exercise these and similar other powers, this Court would not be bound by the relevant provisions of procedure if it is satisfied that a departure from the said procedure is necessary to do complete justice between the parties.That takes us to the second argument urged by the Solicitor- General that Art. 142 and Art. 32 should be reconciled by the adoption of the rule of harmonious construction. In this connection, we ought to bear in mind that though the powers conferred on this Court by Art. 142(1) are very wide, and the same can be exercised for doing complete justice in any case, as we have already observed this Court cannot even under Art. 142(1) make an order plainly inconsistent with the express statutory provisions of substantive law, much less, inconsistent with any Constitutional provision. There can, therefore be no conflict between Art. 142(1) and Art. 32. In the case of K.M. Nanavati v. The State of Bombay (1961) 1 S.C.R. 497) on which the solicitor-General re lies, it was conceded, and rightly, that under Art. 142(1) this Court had the power to grant bail in cases brought before it, and so, there was obviously a conflict between the power vested in this court under the said Article and that vested in the Governor of the State under Art. 161. The possibility of a conflict between these powers necessitated the application of the rule of harmonious construction. The said rule can have no application of the present case, because on a fair construction of Art. 142(1), this Court has no power to circumscribe the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 32. The existence of the said power is itself in dispute, and so, the present is clearly distinguishable from the case of K.M. Nanavati. *46. As we shall presently see, there is nothing said in either Delhi Judicial Service Associations case (supra) or the Union Carbides case supra) from which it may be possible to hold that the law laid down in Prem Chand Gargs case (supra) is no longer a good law. Besides, we also find that in Mohd. Anis case referred to by the Bench, there is no reference made to Prem Chand Gargs case at all.It may be noticed that in prem Chand Gargs and Antulays case (supra) observations with regard to the extent of this Courts power under Article 142(1) were made in the context of fundamental rights. Those observations have no bearing on the question in issue as there is no provision in any substantive law restricting this Courts power to quash proceedings pending before subordinate court. This Courts power under Article 142(1) to do complete justice is entirely of different level and of a different quality. Any prohibition or restriction contain ed in ordinary laws cannot act as a limitation on the constitutional power of this Court. Once this Court has selling of a cause or matter before it, it has power to issue any order or direction to do complete justice in the matter. This constitutional power of the Apex Court cannot be limited or restricted by provisions contained in statutory law.Thus, a careful reading of the judgments in Union Carbide Corporation &Ors. Vs. Union of India &Ors. the Delhi judicial Services Association case and Mohd. Anis Case (supra) relied upon in V.C. Mishras case (supra) show that the court died not actually doubt the correctness of the observations in Prem Chand Gargs case (supra). As a matter of fact, it was observed that in the established facts of these cases, the observations in Prem Chand Gargs case had no relevance. This Court did not say in any of those cases that substantive statutory provisions dealing expressly with the subject can be ignored by this Court while exercising powers under Article 142.52. As a matter of fact, the observations on which emphasis has been placed by us from the Union Carbides case, A. R. Antulays case and Delhi Judicial Services Association case (supra) go to show that they do not strictly speaking come into any conflict with the observations of the majority made in Prem Chand Gargs case (supra). It is one thing to say that prohibitions or limitations in a statute cannot come in the way of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 to do complete justice between the parties in the pending cause or matter arising out of that statute, but quite a different thing to say that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 142, this Court can altogether ignore the substantive provisions of a statute, dealing with the subject and pass orders concerning an issue which can be settled only through a mechanism prescribed in another statute. This Court did not lay so in Union Carbides case either expressly or by implication and on the contrary it has been held that the apex court will take note of the express provisions of any substantive statutory law and regulat e the exercise of its power and discretion accordingly. We are, therefore, unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the observations of the Bench in V.C. Mishras case that the low laid down by the majority in Prem Chand Gargs case is no longer a good law.In a given case, an advocate found guilty of committing contempt of court may also be guilty of committing professional misconduct depending upon the gravity or nature of his contumacious conduct, but th e two jurisdictions are separate and distinct and exercisable by different forums by following separate and distinct procedures. The power to punish an Advocate, by suspending his licence or by removal of his name from the roll of the Stat e bar Council, for proven professional misconduct, vests exclusively in the statutory authorities created under the Advocates Act, 1961, while the jurisdiction to punish him for committing contempt of court vests exclusively in the courts.53. After the coming into force of the Advocates Act, 1961, exclusive power for punishing an advocate for professional misconducthas been conferred on the concerned state Bar Council and the Bar Council of India. That Act contains a detailed and complete mechanism for suspending or revoking the licence of an advocate for his professional misconduct. since, the suspension or revocation of licence of an advocate has not only civil consequence but also penal consequence, the punishment being in the nature of penalty, the provisions have to be strictly construed. Punishment by way of suspending the licence of an advocate can only be imposed by the competent statutory body after the charge is established against the Advocate in a manner prescribed by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder.However, by virtue of Section 50 of the Advocates Act, with effect from the date when a State Bar Council is constituted under the Act, the provisions of the Letters patent of any High Court and of any other law in so far as they related to the admission and enrollment of a legal practitioner or confer on the legal practitioner the right to practice in any court or before any authority or a person as also the provisions relating to the suspension or removal of legal practitioners, whether under the letters patent of any High Court or of any other law, have been repealed. These powers now vest exclusively, under the Advocates Act, in the Bar Council of the Concerned State. Even in England the Courts of justice are now relieved from disbarring advocates from practice after the power of calling to the Bar has been delegated to the Inns of Court. The power to disbar the advocate also now vests exclusively in the Inns of Court and a detailed procedure has been laid therefore.69. This Court is indeed the final appellate authority under Section 38 of the Act but we are not persuaded to agree with the view that this Court can in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, under Section 38 of the Act, impose one of the punishments, prescribed under that Act, while punishing a contemner advocate in a contempt case. Professional misconduct of the advocate concerned is not a matter directly in issue in the contempt of court case. while dealing with the contempt of court case, this court is obliged to examine whether the conduct complained of amounts to contempt of court and if t he answer is in the affirmative, than to sentence the contemner for contempt of court by imposing any of the recognised and accepted punishments for committing contempt of court. Keeping in view the elaborate procedure prescribed under the Advocates Act 1961 and the Rules framed thereunder it follows that a complaint of professional misconduct is required to be tried by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council, like the trial of a criminal case by a court of law and an advocate may be punished on the basis of evidence led before the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council after being afforded an opportunity of hearing. The delinquent advocate may be suspended from the rolls of the advocates or imposed any other punishment as provided under the Act. The enquiry is a detailed and elaborate one and is not of a summary nature. It is therefore, not permissible for this court to punish an advocate for professional misconduct in exercise of t he appellate jurisdiction by convening itself as the statutory body exercising original jurisdiction. Indeed, if in a given case the concerned Bar Council on being apprised of the contumacious and blame worthy conduct of the advocate by the High Court or this Court does not take any action against the said advocate, this court may well have the jurisdiction in exercise of its appellate powers under Section 38 of the Act read with Article 142 of the Constitution to proceed suo moto and send for the records from the Bar Council and pass appropriate orders against the concerned advocate. in an appropriate case, this Court may consider the exercise of appellate jurisdiction even suo moto provided there is some cause pending before the concerned Bar Council, and the Bar Council does not act or fails to act, by sending for the record of that cause and pass appropriate orders.However, the exercise of powers under the contempt jurisdiction cannot be con fused with the appellate jurisdiction under Section 38 of the Act. The two jurisdictions are separate and distinct. We are, therefore, unable to persuade ourselves to subscribe to the contrary view expressed by the Bench in V.C. Mishra s case because in that case the Bar Council had not declined to deal with the matter ad take appropriate action against the concerned advocate. Since there was no cause pending before the Bar Council, this court could not exercise its appellate jurisdiction in respect of a matter which was never under consideration of the bar councils.70. Thus, to conclude we are of the opinion that this court cannot in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 read with Article 129 of the Constitution, while punishing a contemner for committing contempt of court, also impose a punishment of suspending his licence to practice, where the contemner happens to be an Advocate. Such a punishment cannot even be imposed by taking recourse to the appellate powers under Section 38 of the Act while dealing with a case of contempt of court (and not an appeal relating to professional misconduct as such). To that extent, the law laid down in Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra, is not good law and we overrule it.71. An Advocate who is found guilty of contempt of court may also, as already noticed, be guilty of professional misconduct in a given case but it is for the Bar Council of the State or Bar Council of India to punish that Advocate by either debarring him from practice or suspending his licence, as may be warranted, in the facts and circumstances of each case.We do not entertain any doubt that the Bar Council of the State or Bar Council of India, as the case may be, when apprised of the established contumacious conduct of an advocate by the High Court or by this Court, would rise to the occasion , and take appropriate action against such an advocate. Under Article 144 of the Constitution all authorities civil and judicial, in the territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court. The Bar Council which performs a public duty and is charged with the obligation to protect the dignity of the profession and maintain professional standards and etiquette is also obliged to act in aid of the Supreme Court. It must, whenever, facts warrant rise to the occasion and discharge its duties uninfluenced by the position of the contemner advocate. It must act in accordance with the prescribed procedure, whenever its attention is drawn by this Court to the contumacious and unbecoming conduct o f an advocate which has the tendency to interfere with due administration of justice. It is possible for the High Courts also to draw the attention of the Bar Council of the State to a case of professional misconduct of a contemner advocate to enable the State Bar Council to proceed in the manner prescribed by the Act and the rules framed thereunder. There is no justification to assume that the Bar Councils would not rise to the occasion, as they are equally responsible to uphold the dignity of the courts and the majesty of the and prevent any interference in the administration of justice. Learned counsel for the parties present before us do not dispute and rightly so that whenever a court of record, records its findings about the conduct of an Advocate while finding him guilty of committing contempt of court and desires or refers the matter to be considered by the concern Bar Council, appropriate action should be initiated by the concerned Bar Council in accordance with law with a view to maintain the dignity of the courts and to uphold the majesty of law and professional standards and etiquette. Nothing is more destructive of public confidence in the administration of justice than incivility, rudeness or disrespectful conduct on the part of a counsel towards the court or disregard by the court of the privileges of the bar. In case the Bar Council, even after receiving reference from the court, fails to take action against the concerned advocate, this court might consider invoking its powers under Section 38 of the Act by sending for the record of the proceedings from the Bar Council and passing appropriate orders. Of Course the appellate powers under Section 38 would be available to thi s Court only and not to the High Courts. We, however hope that such a situation would not arise.In a given case it may be possible, for this Court or the High Court, the prevent the contemner advocate to appear before it till he purges himself of t he contempt but that is much different from suspending or revoking his licence or debarring him to practice as an advocate. In a case of contemptuous, contumacious, unbecoming or blameworthy conduct of an Advocate-on-Record, this court possesses jurisdiction, under the Supreme Court Rules itself, to withdraw his privilege to practice as an Advocate-an-Record because that privilege is conferred by this court and the power to grant the privilege includes the power to revoke or suspend it. The withdrawal of that privilege, however, does not amount to suspending or revoking his licence to practice as an advocate in other courts or Tribunals.72. We are conscious of the fact that the conduct of the contemner of VC Misras case was highly contumacious and even atrocious. It was unpardonable. the contemner therein had abused his professional privileges while practising as an advocate. he was holding a very senior position in the Bar Council of India and was expected to act in a more reasonable way. He did not. these factors appear to have influenced the bench in that case to itself punish him by suspending his licence to practice also while imposing a suspending sentence of imprisonment for committing contempt of court but while doing so this court vested itself with a jurisdiction where none exists. The position would, have been different had a reference been made to the Bar Council and the Bar Council did not take any action against the con cerned advocate. In that event, as already observed, this court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 38 of the Act read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India, might have exercised suo moto powers and sent for th e proceedings from the Bar Council and passed appropriate orders for punishing the contemner advocate for professional misconduct after putting him on notice as required by the proviso to Section 38In that event, as already observed, this court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 38 of the Act read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India, might have exercised suo moto powers and sent for th e proceedings from the Bar Council and passed appropriate orders for punishing the contemner advocate for professional misconduct after putting him on notice as required by the proviso to Section 38which reads thus:-Provided that no order of the disciplinary committed of the Bar Council of India shall be varied by the Supreme Court so as to prejudicially affect the person aggrieved without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. *but it could not have done so in the first instance.73. In V.C. Mishras case, the Bench, relied upon its inherent powers under Article 142, to punish him by suspending his licence, without the Bar Council having been given any opportunity to deal with his case under the Act. We cannot persuade ourselves to agree with that approach.It must be remembered that wider the amplitude of its power under Article 142, the greater is the need of care for this Court to see that the power is used with restraint without pushing back the limits of the constitution so as to function within the bounds of its own jurisdiction. To the extent, this Court makes the statutory authorities and other organs of the State perform their duties in accordance with law, its role is unexceptionable but it is not permissible or the Court to take over the role of the statutory bodies or other organs of the State and perform their functions.In Re: V.C. Mishras case (supra), while imposing the punishment of suspended simple imprisonment, the Bench, as already noticed, punished the contemner also by suspending his licence to practice as an advocate for a specified period. The Bench dealing with that aspect opined:38. It is not disputed that suspension of the advocate from practice and his removal from the State roll of advocates are both punishments. There is no restriction or limitation on the nature of punishment that this Court may award while exercising its contempt jurisdiction and the said punishments can be the punishments the Court may impose while exercising the said jurisdiction. ( Emphasis supplied)39. In taking this view, the Bench relied upon Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution besides Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961. The Bench observed:Secondly, it would also mean that for any act of contempt of court, if it also happens to be an act of professional misconduct under the Bar Council of India Rules, the courts including this Court, will have no power to take action since the Advocates Act confers exclusive power for taking action for such conduct on the disciplinary committees of the State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India, as the case may be. Such a proposition of law on the face of it observes rejection for the simple reason that the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar council and the Bar Council of India to take action for professional misconduct is different from the jurisdiction of the Courts to take action against the advocates for the contempt of Court. The said jurisdiction co- exist court. The said jurisdiction co-exist dependently of each other. The action taken under one jurisdiction does not bar an action under the other jurisdiction.The contention is also misplaced for year another and equally, if not more, important reason. In the matter of disciplinary under the Advocates Act, this Court is constituted as the fina Appellate authority under Section 38 of the Act as pointed out earlier. In that capacity this court can impose any of the punishments mentioned in Section 35(3) of the Act including that of removal of the name of the Advocate from the State roll and of suspending him from practice. If that be so, there is no reason why his court while exercising its contempt jurisdiction under Article 129 read with Article 142 cannot impose any of the said punishments. The punishments so imposed w ill not only be not against the provisions of any statute, but in conformity with the substantive provisions of the advocates Act and for conduct which is both a professional misconduct as well as the contempt of Court. The argument has, therefore, to be rejected.40. These observations, as we shall presently demonstrate and we say so with utmost respect, are too widely stated and do not bear closer scrutiny.After recognising that the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India to take action for professional misconduct is different from the jurisdiction of the courts to take action against the advocates for the contempt of court, how could the court invest itself with the jurisdiction of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council to punish the concerned Advocate for professional misconduct in addition to imposing the punishment of suspended sentence of imprisonment for committing contempt of court.44. In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishras case (supra), the three the three judge Bench did notice the observations in Prem Chand Gargs case (supra) but opined:In view of the observations of the latter Constitution Bench on the point, the observations made by the majority in Prem Chand Gargs case (supra) are no longer a good law. This is also pointed out by this Court in the case of Mohammed Anis Vs. union of India &Ors. by referring to the decisions of Delhi judicial Services Vs. State of Gujarat (supra) and Union Carbide Corporation Vs. Union of India (supra) by observing that statutory provisions cannot override the constitutional provisions and Article 14 2(1) being a constitutional power it cannot be limited or conditioned by any statutory provision. The Court has then observed that it is, therefore, clear that the power of the Apex Court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution Cannot be diluted by statutory provisions and the said position in law is now well settled by the Constitution Bench decision in Union Carbides case (supra).45. Commenting upon the observations in Prem Chand Gargs case (supra) the Bench further opined:Apart from the fact that these observations are made with reference to the powers of this Court under Article 142 which are in the nature of supplementary powers and not with reference to this Courts power under Article 129, the said observation have been explained by this Court in its latter decisions in Delhi Judicial services Association v. State of Gujarat (supra) and Union Carbide corporation v. Union of India 1991 (4) SCC 574). In paragraph 51 of the former decision, it has been, with respect, rightly pointed out that the said observations were made in the context of fundamental rights. Those observations have no bearing on the present issue. No doubt, it was further observed there that those observations have n o bearing on the question in issue in that case as there was no provision in any substantive law restricting this Courts power to quash proceedings pending before subordinate courts. But it was also added there that this Courts power under Article 142(1) to do complete justice was entirely of different leave and of a different quality. *46. As we shall presently see, there is nothing said in either Delhi Judicial Service Associations case (supra) or the Union Carbides case supra) from which it may be possible to hold that the law laid down in Prem Chand Gargs case (supra) is no longer a good law. Besides, we also find that in Mohd. Anis case referred to by the Bench, there is no reference made to Prem Chand Gargs case at all.Thus, a careful reading of the judgments in Union Carbide Corporation &Ors. Vs. Union of India &Ors. the Delhi judicial Services Association case and Mohd. Anis Case (supra) relied upon in V.C. Mishras case (supra) show that the court died not actually doubt the correctness of the observations in Prem Chand Gargs case (supra). As a matter of fact, it was observed that in the established facts of these cases, the observations in Prem Chand Gargs case had no relevance. This Court did not say in any of those cases that substantive statutory provisions dealing expressly with the subject can be ignored by this Court while exercising powers under Article 142.