Case: Shri Raghunathrao Ganpatrao Vs. Union of India


Decision reasoning: 0[ds]75. Therefore, there cannot be any justification in saying that the guarantees and assurances given to the Rulers were sacrosanct and that Articles 291 and 362 reflected only the terms of the agreements and covenants. In fact as soon as the Constitution came into force, the Memoranda of Agreements executed and ratified by the States and Union of States were embodied in formal agreements under the relevant articles of the Constitution and no obligation flowed from those Agreements and Covenants but only from the Constitutional provisions. To say differently, after the introduction of Articles 291 and 362 in the Constitution, the Agreements and Covenants have no existence at all. The reference to Covenants and Agreements was casual and subsidiary and the source of obligation flowed only from the Constitution. Therefore, the contention urged on the use of the words guaranteed or assured is without any force and absolutelyone cannot be allowed to say that the above said omitted articles and unamended clause were the essential part of the constitutional scheme. So they have to be read only in the context of a challenge made to the Presidential Order which sought to render nugatory certain rights guaranteed in the Constitution which were then existing. In any event, the constitutional bar of Article 363 denudes the jurisdiction of any Court in disputes arising from covenants and treaties executed by the Rulers. The statement of Objects and Reasons ofAmendment clearly points out that the retention of the above articles and continuation of the privileges and privy purses would be incompatible with the egalitarian society assured in theConstitution and, therefore, in order to remove the concept of rulership and terminate the recognition granted to Rulers and abolish the privy purses, this Amendment was brought on being felt necessary.The right to property even as a fundamental right was not a part of the basic structure and even assuming that the right to privy purse is a property, it is a right capable of being extinguished by authority of law vide ArticleNeedless to emphasise, according to t he rules laid down in KesavanandaBharati4 that even the fundamental right can be amended or altered provided the basic structure of the Constitution is not damaged in any way.96. Permanent retention of the privy purse and the privileges of rights would be incompatible with the sovereign and republican form of Government. Such a retention will also be incompatible with the egalitarian form of our Constitution. That is the opinion of the Parliament which acted to repeal the aforesaid provisions in exercise of its constituent power. The repudiation of the right to privy purse privileges, dignities etc. by the deletion of Articles 291 and 362, insertion of Articleand amendment of clause (22) of Article 366 by which the recognition of the Rulers and payment of privy purse are withdrawn cannot be said to have offended Article 14 or 19(g) [sic 19(1)(f) and we do not find any logic in such a submission. No principle of justice, either economic, political or social is violated by theAmendment. Political justice relates to the principle of rights of the people, i.e. right to universal suffrage, right to democratic form of Government and right to participation in political affairs. Economic justice is enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution. Social justice is enshrined in Article 38. Both are in the directive principles of the Constitution. None of these rights are abridged or modified by this Amendment. We feel that this contention need not detain us any more and, therefore, we shall pass on to the next point in debate.97.A serious argument has been advanced that the privy purse was a just quid pro quo to the Rulers of the Indian States for surrendering their sovereignty and rights over their territories and that move for integration began on a positive promising note but it soon degenerated into a game of manoeuvre presumably as a deceptive plan or action.This argument based on the ground of breaking of solemn pledges and breach of promise cannot stand much scrutiny. To say that without voluntary accession, India i.e. Bharat would be fundamentally different from that Bharat that came into be ing prior to the accession is untenable much less inconceivable. We have already dealt with the necessity of the Rulers to accede to the integration of States with the Dominion of India in the earlier part of this judgment and, therefore, it is quite unnecessary to reiterate in this context, except saying that the integration could have been achieved even otherwise. One should not lose sight of the fact that neither because of their antipathy towards the Rulers nor due to anyxeno phobia, did the Indian Government entertain the idea of integration but because of the will of the people. It was the people of the States who were basically instrumental in the integration ofIndia.To say in other words, the States were free but not stable because of the stress and strain they underwent both from inside and outside. Though the process of integration and democratisation called as "unionization" in the words of Sardar Patel, was undertaken step by step at various stages, multiple forces, such as political, economic and geographic, more so the democratic movement within the States accelerated the process of integration. Therefore, it is a misnomer to say that the Rulers made their sacrifices for which they were given just compensation and assured permanent payment of privy purses. What was given to the Rulers was a political pension as rightly pointed out in Usmanali case on consideration of their past position. Hence there is no question of breaking of solemn pledges or breach of promises etc. given to the Rulers. Therefore, the repudiation of the same cannot be said to have amounted to any breach of those guarantees and promises resulting in alteration of the basic structure of theIn the light of the above principle, the Attorney General is right in saying that courts are seldom concerned with the morality which is the concern of the law makers.On a deep consideration of the entire scheme and content of the Constitution, we do not see any force in the above submissions. In the present case, there is no question of change of identity on account of the Twentysixth Amendment. The removal o f Articles 291 and 362 has not made any change in the personality of the Constitution either in its scheme or in its basic features, or in its basic form or in its character. The question of identity will arise only when there is a change in the form, character and content of the Constitution. In fact, in the present case, the identity of the Constitution even on the tests proposed by the counsel of the writ petitioners and interveners, remains the same and unchanged.After carefully going through the above decisions which relate to service matters, we are afraid that such an argument as one made by Mr Nariman could be substantiated on the principles laid down in these two decisions that Article 14 will be violated if unequals are treated as equals.16 In our considered opinion this argument is misconceived and has no relevance to the facts of the present case. One of the objectives of the Preamble of our Constitution is "fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the nation". It will be relevant to cite the explanation given by Dr Ambedkar for the word "fraternity" explaining that "fraternity means a sense of common brotherhood of all Indians". In a country like ours with so many disruptive forces of regionalism, communalism and linguism, it is necessary to emphasise andthat the unity and integrity of India can be preserved only by a spirit of brotherhood. India has one common citizenship and every citizen should feel that he is Indian first irrespective of other basis. In this view, any measure at bringing about equality should be welcome. There is no legitimacy in the argument in favour of continuance of princely privileges. Since we have held that abolition of privy purses is not violative of Article 14, it is unnecessary for us to deal with the cases, cited by Mr Nariman, which according to him go to say that any law violating Article 14 is equally violative of the basic structure of the Constitution, inasmuch as Article 14 is held to be a basic postulate of the Constitution.As repeatedly pointed out supra , theonly question is whether there is any change in the basic structure of the Constitution by deletion of Articles 291, 362 and by insertion of Articled amendment of clause (22) of Article 366.We have already answered this question in the negative observing that the basic structure or the essential features of the Constitution is/are in no way changed or altered by the impugned Amendment Act. We cannot make surmises on ifs and buts and arrive at any conclusion that Articles 291 and 362 should have been kept intact as special provisions made for minorities in the Constitution.It is but a step in the historical evolution to achieve fraternity and unity of the nation transcending all the regional, linguistic, religious and other diversities which are the bedrock on which the constitutional fabric has been raised. The distinction between the erstwhile Rulers and the citizenry of India has to be put an end to so as to have a common brotherhood.