Case: Lala Satyanarain Prasad Vs. Gadadhar Ram and Others

RAY, C.J.1. This appeal by certificate is from the judgment, dated May 9, 1961 of the High Court at Patna dismissing the appellants suit.2. The appellant field this suit for a declaration that the alienation by the appellants father by deeds of sale dated May 22, 1934 and October 29, 1934 are null and void. The appellant asked for the consequential relief of possession. The defendants to the suit were to two categories. Defendants Nos. 1 to 14 belong to the first category. Defendant No. 15 is the father of appellant and is in the second category. Defendants in the first category were the vendees to the deeds of sale and the appellants father was the vendor.3. The appellant challenged the need of sale on two principal grounds. First, the appellant Allahabad that the appellants father was a minor on the dates of the deeds of sale and therefore, the deeds were void. The second challenge to the deeds of sale was on the ground that there was no consideration and no legal necessity for alienation.4. The trial Court held that the deeds of sale were not genuine and there was no legal necessity. The trial Court also held that for a sum of Rs. 231 only out of the consideration of deed of the sale dated October 29, 1934, these was valid consideration. The trial Court decreed the suit subject to the condition that in respect of the deed of sale dated October 29, 1934, a sum of Rs. 231 was to be paid by the plaintiff appellant to the vendee within two months from the date of decree failing which the suit regarding second deed of sale was to be dismissed.5. The High Court accepted the appeal of the defendants and dismissed the appellants suit.6. On the question of alleged minority of the appellants father, the High Court came to the conclusion that the appellants father attained majority in 1931. The onus to prove minority lay on the appellant. The appellant relied on a certificate granted by the Head Master of Purnea Zila School dated January 3, 1951. The certificates was obtained by the appellant shortly before the institution of the suit. According to the certificate the appellants father was born on April 13, 1916. The certificates copy from the admission register.7. The High Court rightly did not place any reliance on the certificate. The truth of the contents of certificate could not be proved by a clerk who only proved the certificate. The Head Master, who issued the certificate, was not examined. The original admission register, who issued the certificate, was not examined. The original admission resister on the basis of which the certificate was given was not proved. The clerk, who proved the handwritings of the certificate, could not say who made the original entry in the admission register.8. The appellants father in his own evidence stated that he did not read in any other school before joining Purnea Zila School. A co-villager who knew the appellants father and other family members said that the appellants father read of Dhamdaha School before the appellants father joined Purnea Zila School. The appellants father did not deny the evidence given by the co-villager. A clerk of the Dhamdaha School also did not deny the fact that the appellants father read at that school. The appellants did not produce any records of Dhamdaha School. Some of the appellants witnesses and in particular the uncle of the appellant admitted that the appellants father as well as the appellant possessed horoscopes. Horoscopes were withheld by the appellant.9. In addition to these facts, the High Court held that appellants father was a major and not a minor when the decree in Money Suit No. 452 of 1932 was contested by the appellants father. The appellants father did not there plead minority. The pleader who appeared for the appellant in this suit also appeared for the appellants father in Money suit No. 452 of 1932.10. The High Court held that the appellants father managed his property after the death of his father in 1928 and executed certain registered documents. In all those documents the appellants father was described as a major. A bond death May 11, 1933, a second bond dated June 26, 1933 and a third bond dated July 12, 1933 were relied upon by the High Court to hold that the appellants father was a major before the impugned deeds of sale. The High Court also held that the appellants father sold lands to Bir Narain Chand and Shiva Sahay Ram under two different deeds of sale and executed a bond for payment of his fathers debts in 1933. In all those documents, the appellants father was described as a major. The appellants father said that he sold about 60 bighas of land to Bir Narain Chand in 1933 in satisfaction of his fathers debts amounting to rent suits of 1933. These rent suits were filed by the Darbhanga Raj against the appellants father. The High Court relied on summonses in certain suits. Those summonses were served upon the appellants father as major.11. On these facts the High Court rightly came to the conclusion that the appellants father was not a minor at the time the two deeds of sale were executed in the months of May and October, 1934.12. There is no legal infirmity in any of the findings arrived at by the High Court.13. The appellant challenged the deeds of sale on the ground of lack of consideration and want to legal necessity. The appellant in his own evidence said that his father lived an immoral life. The appellants father also said that he led immoral life. But that will not nullify the documents. The High Court found that the first deed of sale dated May 22, 1934 was executed by the appellants father for payment of antecedent debts. These antecedent debts comprised Rs. 1, 187 for payment of the mortgage dues which the appellants father had to pay to the vendee under the registered mortond dated July 12, 1933. That mortgage bond was executed by the appellants father for satisfying the decretal dues in Monegy Suit No. 452 of 1932 which was obtained by Baldeo Ram against the appellants father. A sum of Rs. 200 was borrowed by the appellants father for payment of other domestic needs. A sum of Rs. 163 out of his dues against the appellants father on a registered Sudharna bond dated May 11, 1933. On these facts the High Court rightly held that the deed of sale dated May 22, 1934 for Rs. 1, 350 was for payment of antecedent debts of appellants father and the appellant was thereby bound.14. The High Court relied on an endorsement dated August 15, 1934, where Tapesh Mishra acknowledged on the Sudbharna bond dated May 11, 1933 that he received the money dues under the bond from the vendee Baldeo Ram and made over the bond to him.15. The High Court found that the second deed of sale dated October 29, 1934 was executed by the appellants father for a consideration of Rs. 1, 995 for payment of the antecedent debts. A sum of Rs. 950 was borrowed for payment of decretal dues which the appellants father was liable to pay. Out of the said sum of Rs. 950, the vendee to the second deed of sale deposited a sum of Rs. 493/14/3 in a rent decree dated December 20, 1933, in Rent Suit No. 2909 of 1933. The High Court further found that the vendee deposited a sum of Rs. 290/2/- towards the decretal dues which the appellants father had to pay against the decree dated December 20, 1933 in Rent Suit No. 2919 of 1933. The vendee also paid a sum of Rs. 166/9/7 to the appellants father for payment of arrears of rent including cess. The vendee also paid to the appellants father Rs. 451 for payment to Nageshwar Jha in respect of his dues under a "handnote" dated November 11, 1934 executed by the appellants father in favour of Nageshwar Jha. The vendee also paid Rs. 594 to the appellants father for payment to the order creditors and of meeting the order domestic needs.16. On these facts, the High Court rightly found that the second deed of sale dated October 29, 1934 was for payment of antecedent debts and also for legal necessity.17.

Decision reasoning: 1[ds]7. The High Court rightly did not place any reliance on the certificate. The truth of the contents of certificate could not be proved by a clerk who only proved the certificate. The Head Master, who issued the certificate, was not examined. The original admission register, who issued the certificate, was not examined. The original admission resister on the basis of which the certificate was given was not proved. The clerk, who proved the handwritings of the certificate, could not say who made the original entry in the admission register.8. The appellants father in his own evidence stated that he did not read in any other school before joining Purnea Zila School. Awho knew the appellants father and other family members said that the appellants father read of Dhamdaha School before the appellants father joined Purnea Zila School. The appellants father did not deny the evidence given by theA clerk of the Dhamdaha School also did not deny the fact that the appellants father read at that school. The appellants did not produce any records of Dhamdaha School. Some of the appellants witnesses and in particular the uncle of the appellant admitted that the appellants father as well as the appellant possessed horoscopes. Horoscopes were withheld by the appellant.9. In addition to these facts, the High Court held that appellants father was a major and not a minor when the decree in Money Suit No. 452 of 1932 was contested by the appellants father. The appellants father did not there plead minority. The pleader who appeared for the appellant in this suit also appeared for the appellants father in Money suit No. 452 of 1932.On these facts the High Court rightly came to the conclusion that the appellants father was not a minor at the time the two deeds of sale were executed in the months of May and October, 1934.The appellant challenged the deeds of sale on the ground of lack of consideration and want to legal necessity. The appellant in his own evidence said that his father lived an immoral life. The appellants father also said that he led immoral life. But that will not nullify the documents. The High Court found that the first deed of sale dated May 22, 1934 was executed by the appellants father for payment of antecedent debts. These antecedent debts comprised Rs. 1, 187 for payment of the mortgage dues which the appellants father had to pay to the vendee under the registered mortond dated July 12, 1933. That mortgage bond was executed by the appellants father for satisfying the decretal dues in Monegy Suit No. 452 of 1932 which was obtained by Baldeo Ram against the appellants father. A sum of Rs. 200 was borrowed by the appellants father for payment of other domestic needs. A sum of Rs. 163 out of his dues against the appellants father on a registered Sudharna bond dated May 11, 1933. On these facts the High Court rightly held that the deed of sale dated May 22, 1934 for Rs. 1, 350 was for payment of antecedent debts of appellants father and the appellant was thereby bound.The High Court found that the second deed of sale dated October 29, 1934 was executed by the appellants father for a consideration of Rs. 1, 995 for payment of the antecedent debts. A sum of Rs. 950 was borrowed for payment of decretal dues which the appellants father was liable to pay. Out of the said sum of Rs. 950, the vendee to the second deed of sale deposited a sum of Rs. 493/14/3 in a rent decree dated December 20, 1933, in Rent Suit No. 2909 of 1933. The High Court further found that the vendee deposited a sum of Rs. 290/2/towards the decretal dues which the appellants father had to pay against the decree dated December 20, 1933 in Rent Suit No. 2919 of 1933. The vendee also paid a sum of Rs. 166/9/7 to the appellants father for payment of arrears of rent including cess. The vendee also paid to the appellants father Rs. 451 for payment to Nageshwar Jha in respect of his dues under a "handnote" dated November 11, 1934 executed by the appellants father in favour of Nageshwar Jha. The vendee also paid Rs. 594 to the appellants father for payment to the order creditors and of meeting the order domestic needs.16. On these facts, the High Court rightly found that the second deed of sale dated October 29, 1934 was for payment of antecedent debts and also for legal necessity.