Case: Novartis AG  Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.


Decision reasoning: 0[ds]However, we, wish to make it clear that any attempt to challenge the IPAB order directly before this Court, side-stepping the High Court, needs to be strongly discouraged and this case is certainly not to be treated as a precedent in that regard.24. In connection with the case of the Appellant, the first and foremost thing that needs to be kept in mind is that it falls in the transitional period between two fundamentally different patent regimes. In 1998, when the application was made on behalf of the Appellant, the Patents Act, 1970, had a provision in Section 5 with the marginal heading, Inventions where only methods or processes of manufacture patentable that barred grant of patent to substances intended for use, or capable of being used, as food or medicine or drug, or prepared or produced by chemical processes. The application was then put in the mailbox and was taken out for consideration when many changes had been made in the Patents Act, 1970, with effect from January 1, 2005, to make the patent law in the country compliant with the terms of an international agreement entered into by the Government of India. Following the international agreement, the Patents Act, 1970, was subjected to large scale changes in three stages; and finally, by the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, Section 5 was altogether deleted from the Parent Act (Patents Act, 1970). Between January 1, 1995 and January 1, 2005, the Patents Act, 1970, underwent wide ranging changes, but if we are asked to identify the single most important change brought about in the law of patent in India as a result of the countrys obligations under the international agreement, we would unhesitatingly say the deletion of Section 5 from the Patents Act, which opened the doors to product patents in the country. It is, however, important to note that the removal of Section 5 from the statute book was accompanied by amendments in Clauses (j) and (ja) of Section 2(1), apart from some other ancillary clauses of Section 2(1), as well as amendments in Section 3, which redefined the concepts of invention and patentability.46. It is significant to note that Section 5 in chapter II of the Act expressly excluded product patents for substances intended for use and capable of being used as food or as medicine or drug, and substances prepared or produced by chemical process, and made these substances non-patentable. Section 4 similarly prohibited grant of patent in respect of an invention relating to atomic energy. The Act thus clearly recognized and maintained the distinction between invention and patentability.66. We have referred to the TRIPS Agreement and certain developments arising from it not to comment upon the fairness or otherwise of the Agreement nor to examine the correctness and wisdom of the decision of the Government of India to subscribe to the Agreement. That is farthest from our mind. We have referred to the Agreement as being the main reason behind the basic changes brought about in the patent law of the country by legislative action. We have also referred to the Agreement as being the cause of a good deal of concern not only in this country but also (as we shall see presently) in other parts of the world; the concern being that patent protection to pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products might have the effect of putting life-saving medicines beyond the reach of a very large section of people. In the following lines we shall see how the Indian legislature addressed this concern and, while harmonizing the patent law in the country with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, strove to balance its obligations under the international treaty and its commitment to protect and promote public health considerations, not only of its own people but in many other parts of the world (particularly in the Developing Countries and the Least Developed Countries).67. We have seen above that, simultaneously with the TRIPS coming into force, the Government of India had brought an Ordinance to comply with the provisions of Article 70 (8) and (9), but the Ordinance lapsed without being replaced by any enactment. Complaints were then filed on which pronouncements were made against India. On the complaint filed by the USA, the decision of the Appellate Body was rendered on December 19, 1997; and on the complaint filed by the European Communities, the report of the Panel came on August 24, 1998. Thus faced with the threat of trade sanctions, Parliament passed the Patents (Amendment) Act 1999 (Act No. 17 of 1999) on March 26, 1999, which amended the provisions of the Patents Act 1970 retrospectively, with effect from January 1, 1995, the date when the TRIPS Agreement came into force. By the Amendment Act of 1999, Section 5 of the Parent Act was amended to provide for making a claim for patent of an invention for a substance itself intended for use or capable of being used, as medicine or drug18. The Amendment Act further incorporated in the Parent Act, Chapter IVA, which contained provisions for grant of exclusive marketing rights in respect of pharmaceutical substances for which a claim for patent was made under Section 5 of the Act. The Amendment Act of 1999 thus complied with Article 70(8) and (9) of the TRIPS Agreement.74. The many amendments to and enlargement of the Parent Act by the Amendment Act of 2002 laid most of the ground-work, but India was yet to take the one final step to make its patent law compliant with the mandate of TRIPS. and that was to amend the Act to allow for grant of product patents for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical substances. Steps were taken to finally amend the Patents Act, 1970, but the draft Bill lapsed in February 2004. Further efforts were made but the legislature was unable to bring an enactment to make that final amendment in the Act by December 2004; thus, the Government of India had no option but to amend the law through an Ordinance. Therefore, in order not to default on its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, the Government brought the Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004 (Ordinance No. 7 of 2004) with effect from January 1, 2005. By this Ordinance, Section 5 of the Patents Act, 1970, which barred the grant of patent for substances intended for use or capable of being used as food or as medicine or drugs or substances prepared or produced by chemical processes was done away with, opening the doors for grant of patents to, amongst others, pharmaceutical products.75. But the troubles were far from over, because the Ordinance was to lapse on March 31, 2005. Hence, it was imperative for Parliament to pass an enactment, replacing the Ordinance before it lapsed on March 31, 2005. The pressure of time under which Parliament was obliged to deal with the matter and pass the Act, replacing Ordinance No. 7 of 2004 and amending the Patents Act, 1970, is best stated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005 (Act 15 of 2005).76. Parliament had an absolutely unenviable task on its hands. It was required to forge, within a very limited time, an Act that would be TRIPS compliant without, in any way, compromising on public health considerations. It is seen above that the TRIPS Agreement had aroused grave concerns about its impact on public health. India had learnt from experience the inverse relationship between product patents and the indigenous pharmaceutical industry, and its effects on the availability of essential drugs at affordable prices. It is also seen above that after the patent system in India barred the grant of patents for pharmaceutical and chemical substances, the pharmaceutical industry in the country scaled great heights and became the major supplier of drugs at cheap prices to a number of developing and under developed countries. Hence, the reintroduction of product patents in the Indian patent system through the TRIPS Agreement became a cause of alarm not only in this country but also for some international agencies. Our attention was invited to a letter of the HIV/AIDS Director of the WHO, dated December 17, 2004, to the Minister of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India.78. It was thus under the twin pressure of time and anxiety to safeguard the public health objectives that Parliament was called upon to deliberate over the amendments required to be made in the patent law to make it fully compliant with the TRIPS Agreement.82. It is interesting to note that in the Parliamentary debate, the names of the Appellant company (Novartis) and the drug (Gleevec) being the subject matter of this case were repeatedly mentioned, and the excessively high price fixed for the drug after the grant of exclusive marketing rights to the Appellant was expressly cited as the likely result of bringing in the product patent regime in pharmaceuticals. One of the members said:Sir, a company which obtains a patent by changing their chemicals, before the expiry of the patent, they will again apply for a patent and again get a patent. So, in this way, they will continue to get a patent for the same medicine. For example, the drug called Glevic (sic Gleevec/Glivec), is used for the treatment of Leukaemia. It is patented by Novartis. This was originally patented in 1993. The cost of the drug for the treatment of this disease comes to about Rs. 1,20,000 per month19 in India. At the same time, the generic versions are available in the country which cost only Rs. 8,000 to Rs. 10,000.86. Thus, after deliberations that took place for just four days, the Patents Act, 1970, came in a completely new avatar. The haste with which the Government was constrained to rush the Bill through Parliament to make the law compatible with the TRIPS Agreement perhaps explains the somewhat unclear drafting of some very important provisions, which called for much greater clarity; the presence of some terms and expressions in the definition section20 that are nowhere used in the Act; and a few loose ends that could have been properly tied up if more time and attention was given to the drafting.91. We have seen the meaning of invention; we have also seen earlier that the Patents Act, 1970, dealt with invention and patentability as two distinctly separate concepts. The duality of the two concepts is best illustrated by Section 4 of the Act, which prohibits the grant of patent (either process or product) in respect of inventions relating to atomic energy falling within Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, and which has not undergone any change since inception. It is, therefore, fundamental that for grant of patent the subject must satisfy the twin tests of invention and patentability. Something may be an invention as the term is generally understood and yet it may not qualify as an invention for the purposes of the Act. Further, something may even qualify as an invention as defined under the Act and yet may be denied patent for other larger considerations as may be stipulated in the Act.94. We have seen earlier that, in course of the debate in Parliament, an amendment (by way of addition) in Clause (d) of Section 3 was proposed by the Government in order to allay the fears of the members from the Opposition concerning the introduction of product patents for pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals, and it was on the Governments assurance that the proposed amendment in Section 3(d) (besides some other changes in the Act) would take care of the apprehensions about the abuse of product patent in medicines and agricultural chemical substances that the Bill was passed by Parliament. We once again examine here what was the amendment introduced in Section Atomic En by the amending Act of 2005.96. As may be seen, the amendment (i) adds the words the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or at the beginning of the provision; (ii) deletes the word mere before new use; and (iii) adds an explanation at the end of the clause.97. A perusal of the Parliamentary debate would further reveal that the whole debate centered on medicines and drugs. It would not be an exaggeration to say that eighty per cent of the debate was focused on medicines and drugs and the remaining twenty per cent on agricultural chemicals. In the entire debate, no substance of any other kind came under discussion.98. The aforementioned amendment in Section Atomic En is one of the most crucial amendments that saw the Bill through Parliament and, as noted, the amendment is primarily in respect of medicines and drugs and, to some extent, agricultural chemical substances.102. The submission may appear plausible if the scrutiny of the law is confined only to the Act as it stands today after undergoing the amendments in 2005. But examined in the larger perspective of the development of the law of patent over the past 100 years and especially keeping in mind the debates in the Parliament preceding the 2005 amendment, it would appear completely unacceptable. We find no force in this submission that Section Atomic En is a provision ex majore cautela. To our mind, the submission completely misses the vital distinction between the concepts of invention and patentability - a distinction that was at the heart of the Patents Act as it was framed in 1970, and which is reinforced by the 2005 amendment in Section Atomic En.103. We are clearly of the view that the importance of the amendment made in Section Atomic En, that is, the addition of the opening words in the substantive provision and the insertion of explanation to the substantive provision, cannot be under-estimated. It is seen above that, in course of the Parliamentary debates, the amendment in Section Atomic En was the only provision cited by the Government to allay the fears of the Opposition members concerning the abuses to which a product patent in medicines may be vulnerable. We have, therefore, no doubt that the amendment/addition made in Section Atomic En is meant especially to deal with chemical substances, and more particularly pharmaceutical products. The amended portion of Section Atomic En clearly sets up a second tier of qualifying standards for chemical substances/pharmaceutical products in order to leave the door open for true and genuine inventions but, at the same time, to check any attempt at repetitive patenting or extension of the patent term on spurious grounds.104. We have so far seen Section Atomic En as representing patentability, a concept distinct and separate from invention. But if Clause (d) is isolated from the rest of Section 3, and the legislative history behind the incorporation of Chapter II in the Patents act, 1970, is disregarded, then it is possible to see Section Atomic En as an extension of the definition of invention and to link Section Atomic En with Clauses (j) and (ja) of Section 2(1). In that case, on reading Clauses (j) and (ja) of Section 2(1) with Section Atomic En it would appear that the Act sets different standards for qualifying as inventions things belonging to different classes, and for medicines and drugs and other chemical substances, the Act sets the invention threshold further higher, by virtue of the amendments made in Section Atomic En in the year 2005.105. Admittedly, the genesis of this patent application lies in one of the derivatives of N-phenyl-2- pyrimidine-amine in free base called Imatinib28, vide example 21 of the Zimmermann patent. According to the Appellant, beginning with Imatinib, the subject product, i.e., Imatinib Mesylate in beta crystalline form, was brought to being by not one but two inventions.. The first invention lies in selecting example 21 out of the 37 examples given in the Zimmermann patent and then choosing methanesulfonic acid to produce the methanesulfonic acid addition salt of the free base Imatinib, called Imatinib Mesylate.108. The subject product admittedly emerges from the Zimmermann patent. Hence, in order to test the correctness of the claim made on behalf of the Appellant, that the subject product is brought into being through inventive research, we need to examine in some detail the Zimmermann patent and certain developments that took place on that basis123. It is noted above that the Appellant had made an application No. 09/463, 097 in the USA for grant of patent for beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate. The application was rejected by the examiner and, against the examiners decision, the Appellant preferred an appeal (that is, appeal No. 2003-0919) before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. The Board of Patent Appeals, by its judgment and order dated November 23, 2003, allowed the Appellants appeal and reversed the examiners decision, rejecting claims 1 through 8, 10, and 13 through 16. Dealing with the examiners rejection of Appellants claim 14 under 35 USC § 112, the Board of Patent Appeals referred to claims 21 and 22 of the Zimmermann patent. With reference to those claims in the Zimmermann patent, the Board of Patent Appeals observed and held as under:Under the provisions 35 U.S.C. § 282, a patent shall be presumed valid; and each claim of a patent shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims.Accordingly, claims 21 and 22 of the U.S. Patent No. 5, 521, 184 (the Zimmermann patent), shall be presumed valid. We may presume, therefore, that claims 21 and 22 are based on an enabling disclosure; and that the specification of the Zimmermann patent teaches any person skilled in the art how to use a compound of formula I, or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, in a pharmaceutical composition for treating tumours or in a method of treating warm-blooded animals suffering from a tumoral disease. In claim 23, Zimmermann recites imatinib, a specific compound within the scope of formula I, or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof. In light of 35 U.S.C. § 282, therefore, we may presume that the specification of the Zimmermann patent teaches any person skilled in the art how to use imatinib, or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, in a pharmaceutical composition for treating tumours or in a method of treating warm-blooded animals suffering from a tumoral disease. On these facts, we disagree that the examiner has set forth adequate reasons or evidence to doubt the objective truth of statements in applicants specification that an effective amount of the β-crystal form of imatinib mesylate may be administered to a patient as the manipulative step in a method for treating tumour disease in a patient.The rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is reversed.124. From the above passage from the judgment, it is evident that, according to the Board of Patent Appeals, the Zimmermann patent teaches any person skilled in the art how to use Imatinib, a compound of formula I, or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, in a pharmaceutical composition for treating tumours or in a method of treating warm-blooded animals suffering from a tumoral disease. However, the Board of Patent Appeals held that the teaching in the Zimmermann patent did not go beyond Imatinib Mesylate and did not extend to beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate, which represented a manipulative step36 in a method of treating tumor disease in a patient.125. Further, NATCO Pharma Ltd., one of the Objectors to the grant of patent to the Appellant in this country, had marketed a drug called VEENAT 100 (capsules) in the UK. A legal notice on behalf of the Appellant was given to NATCO Pharma Ltd. on February 13, 2004. The notice stated that the Appellant was the proprietor of European patent EP-A-0 564 409 (the Zimmermann patent) and that this patent claimed, among other things, the compound Imatinib and acid addition salts of that compound such as the Mesylate salt. In the notice it was pointed out that NATCO Pharma Ltd. was selling, in the UK market, VEENAT 100 capsules, the active pharmaceutical ingredient of which was Imatinib Mesylate as claimed in the Zimmermann patent. The importation, sale and offer to sell VEENAT 100 capsules in the UK market infringed the Zimmermann patent and NATCO Pharma Ltd. was therefore warned to immediately cease the importation, sale and promotion of VEENAT 100 capsules and other pharmaceutically substances containing Imatinib. The matter was finally settled out of court, we are told, at considerable expense to NATCO Pharma Ltd. which of course had to stop marketing its drug VEENAT 100 capsules in the UK.126. From the above discussion it would be clear that the drug Gleevec directly emanates from the Zimmermann patent and comes to the market for commercial sale. Since the grant of the Zimmermann patent, the Appellant has maintained that Gleevec (that is, Imatinib Mesylate) is part of the Zimmermann patent. It obtained drug approval for Gleevec on that basis. It claimed extension of the term of the Zimmermann patent for the period of regulatory review for Gleevec, and it successfully stopped NATCO Pharma Ltd. from marketing its drug in the UK on the basis of the Zimmermann patent. Not only the Appellant but the US Board of Patent Appeals, in its judgment granting patent for beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate, proceeded on the basis that though the beta crystal form might not have been covered by the Zimmermann patent, the Zimmermann patent had the teaching for the making of Imatinib Mesylate from Imatinib, and for its use in a pharmacological compositions for treating tumours or in a method of treating warm-blooded animals suffering from a tumoral disease. This finding was recorded by the US Board of Patent Appeals, in the case of the Appellant itself, on the very same issue that is now under consideration. The Appellant is, therefore, fully bound by the finding and cannot be heard to take any contrary plea.127. We have looked, so far, at the Zimmermann patent and the developments that have taken place on its basis. We now propose to take a look at certain publications. A journal called Cancer Research, in its issue of January 1996, published an article under the title Inhibition of the Abl Protein-Tyrosine Kinase in Vitro and in Vivo by a 2-Phenylaminopyrimidine Derivative. This article was authored by several people, including JÜrg Zimmermann. In this article there is a detailed discussion about the anti-tumoral properties of Imatinib and its methanesulfonate salt, i.e., Imatinib Mesylate.130. Another article was published in Nature Medicine magazine of the year 1996 under the title Effects of a selective inhibitor of the Abl tyrosine kinase on the growth of Bcr-Abl positive cells. This article, too, was authored by several people, including JÜrg Zimmermann. In this article also, there is a discussion about Imatinib as a compound designed to inhibit Abl protein tyrosine kinase.131. In the face of the materials referred to above, we are completely unable to see how Imatinib Mesylate can be said to be a new product, having come into being through an invention that has a feature that involves technical advance over the existing knowledge and that would make the invention not obvious to a person skilled in the Article Imatinib Mesylate is all there in the Zimmermann patent. It is a known substance from the Zimmermann patent.132. That Imatinib Mesylate is fully part of the Zimmermann patent is also borne out from another circumstance. It may be noted that after the Zimmermann patent, the Appellant applied for, and in several cases obtained, patent in the US not only for the beta and alpha crystalline forms of Imatinib Mesylate, but also for Imatinib in a number of different forms. The Appellant, however, never asked for any patent for Imatinib Mesylate in non-crystalline form, for the simple reason that it had always maintained that Imatinib Mesylate is fully a part of the Zimmermann patent and does not call for any separate patent.133. We thus find no force in the submission that the development of Imatinib Mesylate from Imatinib is outside the Zimmermann patent and constitutes an invention as understood in the law of patent in India.138. The submissions of Mr. Andhyarujina and Mr. Subramanium are based on making a distinction between the coverage or claim in a patent and the disclosure made therein. The submissions on behalf of the Appellant can be summed up by saying that the boundary laid out by the claim for coverage is permissible to be much wider than the disclosure/enablement/teaching in a patent.139. The dichotomy that is sought to be drawn between coverage or claim on the one hand and disclosure or enablement or teaching in a patent on the other hand, seems to strike at the very root of the rationale of the law of patent. Under the scheme of patent, a monopoly is granted to a private individual in exchange of the invention being made public so that, at the end of the patent term, the invention may belong to the people at large who may be benefited by it. To say that the coverage in a patent might go much beyond the disclosure thus seem to negate the fundamental rule underlying the grant of patents.152. The Court seems to have taken the view that the amorphous form did not exist at the time of the patent application and therefore, that the patentee could not have been expected to claim the amorphous form at that time. The Court further took the view that the broad claim for a solid polymer would satisfy the enablement requirement under the state of the art, as that was known at the time of the filling of the patent application, because the amorphous form was not known at that time.153. The polypropylene case in the US gave rise to an extraordinary legal precedent for the enablement requirement, according to which a patentee is free to claim a genus that includes unknown species that may be discovered in the future, if the specification describes and enables all the species that are known at the time of filing the patent application. The rationale on which the decision is based is described by Professors Merges and Duffy as the temporal paradox41. The professors explain that, approached in this way, the description and enablement requirements for the genus are determined as of the date of filling the patent, and the patentee gets the benefit of any addition to the genus discovered later.154. It needs to be noted here that even in the US, Hogan represents a decision given in the context of the special set of facts and circumstances of the litigation over polypropylene. In later decisions, the Federal Circuit appears to have drastically narrowed Hogans scope as a precedent. InPlant Genetics System, N.V. v. DeKalb GeneticsCorporation 315 F. 3d 1335 : 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2003) the effect of Hogan was considerably constricted and its effect is virtually eliminated in Chiron Corporation v. Genentech, Inc 363 F. 3d 1247 : 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Since Chiron, the Federal Circuit has not referred to Hogan in any of its cases that involve claims to a genus where a single species was enabled.But it is already found and held earlier that Imatinib Mesylate is a known substance from the Zimmermann patent. The finding that Imatinib Mesylate is a known substance from the Zimmermann patent is not based on the conduct of the Appellant alone, as objected to by Mr. Andhyarujina, but the finding has been arrived at on an objective consideration of all the material facts and circumstances. In view of that finding, we fail to see any application of the Hogan decision to the facts of the case. We have also considered the two decisions relied upon by Mr. Andhyarujina. Those two decisions also have no application to the facts of the present case, for the same reason as in case of Hogan.156. However, before leaving Hogan and proceeding further, we would like to say that in this country the law of patent, after the introduction of product patent for all kinds of substances in the patent regime, is in its infancy. We certainly do not wish the law of patent in this country to develop on lines where there may be a vast gap between the coverage and the disclosure under the patent; where the scope of the patent is determined not on the intrinsic worth of the invention but by the artful drafting of its claims by skillful lawyers, and where patents are traded as a commodity not for production and marketing of the patented products but to search for someone who may be sued for infringement of the patent.157. In light of the discussions made above, we firmly reject the Appellants case that Imatinib Mesylate is a new product and the outcome of an invention beyond the Zimmermann patent. We hold and find that Imatinib Mesylate is a known substance from the Zimmermann patent itself. Not only is Imatinib Mesylate known as a substance in the Zimmermann patent, but its pharmacological properties are also known in the Zimmermann patent and in the article published in the Cancer Research journal referred to above. The consequential finding, therefore, is that Imatinib Mesylate does not qualify the test of invention as laid down in Section 2(1)(j) and Section 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act, 1970.158. This leaves us with the beta crystal form of Imatinib Mesylate, which, for the sake of argument, may be accepted to be new, in the sense that it is not known from the Zimmermann patent. (Whether or not it involves an inventive step is another matter, and there is no need to go into that aspect of the matter now). Now, the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate being a pharmaceutical substance and moreover a polymorph of Imatinib Mesylate, it directly runs into Section 3(d) of the Act with the explanation appended to the provision.159. There is no sanction to construe the expression known in Section Atomic En in the manner suggested by Mr. Subramanium, and the submission is unacceptable both in law and on facts. It may be noted here that Clauses (e) and (f) of Section 64(1) of the Act, which contain two of the grounds for revocation of patents, also use the expression publicly known. The expression publicly known may normally be construed more widely than known, and in that sense it is closer to the submission made by Mr. Subramanium. But even the expression publicly known received quite the opposite interpretation by this Court in Monsanto Co. v. Coramandal Indag Products (P) Ltd. (1986) 1 SCC 642. In paragraph 6 of the judgment, Justice Chinnappa Reddy, speaking for the Court, held and observed as under:...To satisfy the requirement of being publicly known as used in Clauses (e) and (f) of Section 64(1), it is not necessary that it should be widely used to the knowledge of the consumer public. It is sufficient if it is known to the persons who are engaged in the pursuit of knowledge of the patented product or process either as men of science or men of commerce or consumers. The section of the public, who, as men of science or men of commerce, were interested in knowing about Herbicides which would destroy weeds but not rice, must have been aware of the discovery of Butachlor. There was no secret about the active agent Butachlor as claimed by the Plaintiffs since there was no patent for Butachlor, as admitted by the Plaintiffs. Emulsification was the well-known and common process by which any herbicide could be used. Neither Butachlor nor the process of emulsification was capable of being claimed by the Plaintiff as their exclusive property. The solvent and the emulsifier were not secrets and they were admittedly not secrets and they were ordinary market products. From the beginning to the end, there was no secret and there was no invention by the Plaintiffs. The ingredients, the active ingredients the solvent and the emulsifier, were known; the process was known, the product was known and the use was known. The Plaintiffs were merely camouflaging a substance whose discovery was known through out the world and trying to enfold it in their specification relating to Patent Number 125381. The patent is, therefore, liable to be revoked....160. On facts also we are unable to accept that Imatinib Mesylate or even Imatinib was not a known substance with known efficacy. It is seen above that Imatinib Mesylate was a known substance from the Zimmermann patent. In the NDA submitted by the Appellant before the US FDA, it was clearly stated that the drug had undergone extensive preclinical, technical and clinical research. The clinical studies included one multiple dose tolerability/dose-finding study (Phase I) and three large open, uncontrolled efficacy and safety studies (Phase II); and a total of 1,234 patients with CML and other Ph+ leukemias were enrolled in the studies. The efficacy of Imatinib was equally known, as is evident from the Zimmermann patent itself, besides the two articles referred to above.161. The subject product, that is, beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate, is thus clearly a new form of a known substance, i.e., Imatinib Mesylate, of which the efficacy was well known. It, therefore, fully attracts Section Atomic En and must be shown to satisfy the substantive provision and the explanation appended to it.It is noted, in the earlier part of judgment, that the patent application submitted by the Appellant contains a clear and unambiguous averment that all the therapeutic qualities of beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate are also possessed by Imatinib in free base.163. Now, when all the pharmacological properties of beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate are equally possessed by Imatinib in free base form or its salt, where is the question of the subject product having any enhanced efficacy over the known substance of which it is a new form?164. It may also be stated here that while going through the Zimmermann patent one cannot but feel that it relates to some very serious, important and valuable researches. The subject patent application, on the other hand, appears to be a loosely assembled, cut-and-paste job, drawing heavily upon the Zimmermann patent. As a matter of fact, Mr. Kuhad, learned Additional Solicitor General, submitted before us a tabular chart showing over a dozen statements and averments made in the subject application that are either lifted from the Zimmermann patent or are very similar to corresponding statements in the Zimmermann patent. The aforesaid chart is appended at the end of the judgment as Appendix II.165. It further needs to be noted that, on the issue of Section Atomic En, there appears to be a major weakness in the case of the Appellant. There is no clarity at all as to what is the substance immediately preceding the subject product, the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate. In course of the hearing, the counsel appearing for the Appellant greatly stressed that, in terms of invention, the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate is two stages removed from Imatinib in free base form. The same is said in the written notes of submissions filed on behalf of the Appellant. But this position is not reflected in the subject application, in which all the references are only to Imatinib in free base form (or to the alpha crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate in respect of flow properties, thermodynamic stability and lower hygroscopicity). On going through the subject application, the impression one gets is that the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate is derived directly from Imatinib free base. This may, perhaps, be because once the beta crystalline form of the methanesulfonic acid salt of Imatinib came into being, the Imatinib free base got seeded with the nuclei of Imatinib Mesylate beta crystalline form and, as a result, starting from Imatinib one would inevitably arrive directly at the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate. But all this is nowhere said in the subject application.170. It is to be noted that the higher solubility of the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate is being compared not to Imatinib Mesylate but, once again, to Imatinib in free base form. The whole case of the Appellant, as made out in the subject application and the affidavits, is that the subject product, the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate, is derived from Imatinib, and that the substance immediately preceding the beta crystalline form is not Imatinib Mesylate but Imatinib in free base form. This position is sought to be canvassed in the subject application and the affidavits on the premise that the Zimmermann patent ended at Imatinib in free base and did not go beyond to Imatinib Mesylate. Not only is this premise unfounded as shown earlier, but the Appellant itself appears to take a somewhat different stand, as before this Court it was contended that the subject product, in terms of invention, is two stages removed from Imatinib in free base, and the substance immediately preceding the subject product is Imatinib Mesylate (non-crystalline).171. That being the position, the Appellant was obliged to show the enhanced efficacy of the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate over Imatinib Mesylate (non-crystalline). There is, however, no material in the subject application or in the supporting affidavits to make any comparison of efficacy, or even solubility, between the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate and Imatinib Mesylate (non-crystalline).172. As regards the averments made in the two affidavits, for all one knows the higher solubility that is attributed to the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate may actually be a property of Imatinib Mesylate itself. One does not have to be an expert in chemistry to know that salts normally have much better solubility than compounds in free base form. If that be so, the additional properties that may be attributed to the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate would be limited to the following:i. More beneficial flow properties,ii. Better thermodynamic stability, andiii. Lower hygroscopicity173. The aforesaid properties, (physical attributes according to Manley), would give the subject product improved processability and better and longer storability but, as we shall see presently, on the basis of those properties alone, the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate certainly cannot be said to possess enhanced efficacy over Imatinib Mesylate, the known substance immediately preceding it, within the meaning of Section Atomic En of the Act.174. We have so far considered the issue of enhanced efficacy of the subject product in light of the finding recorded earlier in this judgment that Imatinib Mesylate (non-crystalline) is a known substance from the Zimmermann patent and is also the substance immediately preceding the patent product, that is, Imatinib Mesylate in beta crystalline form.175. Let us now consider the case of the Appellant as made out in the subject application and the supporting affidavits, and examine the issue of enhanced efficacy of the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate vis-à-vis Imatinib in free base form. It is seen above that all the pharmacological effects of Imatinib Mesylate in beta crystalline form are equally possessed by Imatinib in free base form. The position is not only admitted but repeatedly reiterated in the patent application. Mr. Subramanium, with his usual fairness and candour, explained the position by stating that Imatinib free base is actually the active therapeutic ingredient, but in free base form Imatinib has very little or no solubility. It is, therefore, not capable of being administered as a drug to human beings. In the words of Mr. Subramanium, if given in solid dosage form, Imatinib free base would sit in the stomach like a brick and would pass out with no therapeutic effect. The invention of methanesulfonic acid addition salt of Imatinib makes the therapeutic ingredient (that continues to be the same) highly soluble, and therefore very suitable for being administered as a drug to humans. The further invention of the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate adds to its properties and makes it an even better drug than Imatinib Mesylate. The subject product, that is, the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate, thus demonstrates a definite and tangible enhancement of efficacy over Imatinib in free base form.176. The way in which the case is presented by Mr. Subramanium is an entirely new case made before this Court for the first time. Nevertheless, let us consider the case of the Appellant as presented by Mr. Subramanium.Efficacy means42 the ability to produce a desired or intended result. Hence, the test of efficacy in the context of Section Atomic En would be different, depending upon the result the product under consideration is desired or intended to produce. In other words, the test of efficacy would depend upon the function, utility or the purpose of the product under consideration. Therefore, in the case of a medicine that claims to cure a disease, the test of efficacy can only be therapeutic efficacy.With regard to the genesis of Section Atomic En, and more particularly the circumstances in which Section Atomic En was amended to make it even more constrictive than before, we have no doubt that the therapeutic efficacy of a medicine must be judged strictly and narrowly. Our inference that the test of enhanced efficacy in case of chemical substances, especially medicine, should receive a narrow and strict interpretation is based not only on external factors but there are sufficient internal evidence that leads to the same view. It may be noted that the text added to Section Atomic En by the 2005 amendment lays down the condition of enhancement of the known efficacy. Further, the explanation requires the derivative to differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy. What is evident, therefore, is that not all advantageous or beneficial properties are relevant, but only such properties that directly relate to efficacy, which in case of medicine, as seen above, is its therapeutic efficacy.181. While dealing with the explanation it must also be kept in mind that each of the different forms mentioned in the explanation have some properties inherent to that form, e.g., solubility to a salt and hygroscopicity to a polymorph. These forms, unless they differ significantly in property with regard to efficacy, are expressly excluded from the definition of invention. Hence, the mere change of form with properties inherent to that form would not qualify as enhancement of efficacy of a known substance. In other words, the explanation is meant to indicate what is not to be considered as therapeutic efficacy.182. We have just noted that the test of enhanced therapeutic efficacy must be applied strictly, but the question needs to be considered with greater precision. In this connection, we take note of two slightly diverging points of view urged before this Court.186. We have taken note of the submissions made by Mr. Grover and Prof. Basheer in deference to the importance of the issue and the commitment of the counsel to the cause. However, we do not propose to make any pronouncement on the issues raised by them, as this case can be finally and effectively decided without adverting to the different points of view noted above.187. In whatever way therapeutic efficacy may be interpreted, this much is absolutely clear: that the physico-chemical properties of beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate, namely (i) more beneficial flow properties, (ii) better thermodynamic stability, and (iii) lower hygroscopicity, may be otherwise beneficial but these properties cannot even be taken into account for the purpose of the test of Section Atomic En of the Act, since these properties have nothing to do with therapeutic efficacy.188. This leaves us to consider the issue of increased bioavailability. It is the case of the Appellant that the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate has 30 per cent increased bioavailability as compared to Imatinib in free base form. If the submission of Mr. Grover is to be accepted, then bioavailability also falls outside the area of efficacy in case of a medicine.189. Thus, even if Mr. Grovers submission is not taken into consideration on the question of bioavailability, the position that emerges is that just increased bioavailability alone may not necessarily lead to an enhancement of therapeutic efficacy. Whether or not an increase in bioavailability leads to an enhancement of therapeutic efficacy in any given case must be specifically claimed and established by research data. In this case, there is absolutely nothing on this score apart from the adroit submissions of the counsel. No material has been offered to indicate that the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate will produce an enhanced or superior efficacy (therapeutic) on molecular basis than what could be achieved with Imatinib free base in vivo animal model.190. Thus, in whichever way Section Atomic En may be viewed, whether as setting up the standards of patentability or as an extension of the definition of invention, it must be held that on the basis of the materials brought before this Court, the subject product, that is, the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate, fails the test of Section Atomic En, too, of the Act.191. We have held that the subject product, the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate, does not qualify the test of Section Atomic En of the Act but that is not to say that Section Atomic En bars patent protection for all incremental inventions of chemical and pharmaceutical substances. It will be a grave mistake to read this judgment to mean that Section Atomic En was amended with the intent to undo the fundamental change brought in the patent regime by deletion of Section 5 from the Parent Act. That is not said in this judgment.193. Coming back to the case of the Appellant, there is yet another angle to the matter. It is seen above that in the US the drug Gleevec came to the market in 2001. It is beyond doubt that what was marketed then was Imatinib Mesylate and not the subject product, Imatinib Mesylate in beta crystal form. It is also seen above that even while the Appellants application for grant of patent lay in the mailbox awaiting amendments in the law of patent in India, the Appellant was granted Exclusive Marketing Rights on November 10, 2003, following which Gleevec was marketed in India as well. On its package46, the drug was described as Imatinib Mesylate Tablets 100 mg and it was further stated that each film coated tablet contains: 100 mg Imatinib (as Mesylate). On the package there is no reference at all to Imatinib Mesylate in beta crystalline form. What appears, therefore, is that what was sold as Gleevec was Imatinib Mesylate and not the subject product, the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate.194. If that be so, then the case of the Appellant appears in rather poor light and the claim for patent for beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate would only appear as an attempt to obtain patent for Imatinib Mesylate, which would otherwise not be permissible in this country.