Case: Bangalore Development Authority Vs. Air Craft Employees Coop.Society Ltd&Ors


Decision reasoning: 1[ds]36. In our view, the High Court committed serious error by recording a finding that Section 32(5A) is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. While deciding the issue relating to constitutionality of the Section, the High Court overlooked the well-established principle that a statutory provision is presumed to be constitutionally valid unless proved otherwise and burden lies upon the person who alleges discrimination to lay strong factual foundation to prove that the provision offends the equality clause enshrined in the Constitution.Though, in the writ petitions filed by them, the respondents pleaded that Section 32(5A) is discriminatory, no factual foundation was laid in support of this plea and in the absence of such foundation, the High Court was not at all justified in recording a conclusion that the impugned provision is violative of the equality clause contained in Article 14 of the Constitution.The principle which can be deduced from the above noted precedents is that while examining challenge to the constitutionality of a statutory provision on the ground of excessive delegation, the Court must look into the policy underlying the particular legislation and this can be done by making a reference to the Preamble, the objects sought to be achieved by the particular legislation and the scheme thereof and that the Court would not sit over the wisdom of the legislature and nullify the provisions under which the power to implement the particular provision is conferred upon the executivewill be apposite to observe that apart from the Preamble and the objects of the 1961 and 1976 Acts and the scheme of the two enactments, the expression "such portion of the expenditure as the Authority may determine towards the execution of any scheme or work for augmenting water supply, electricity, roads, transportation and such other amenities" supplies sufficient guidance for the exercise of power by the BDA under Section 32(5A) and it is not possible to agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that the section confers unbridled and uncanalised power upon the BDA to demand an unspecified amount from those desirous of forming private layouts. It is needless to say that the exercise of power by the BDA under Section 32(5A) is always subject to directions which can be given by the State Government under Section 65.We may add that it could not have been possible for the legislature to make provision for effective implementation of the provisions contained in the 1961 and 1976 Acts for the development of the Bangalore Metropolitan Area and this task had to be delegated to some other agency/instrumentality of the32(5A) does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation and the legislative guidelines can be traced in the Preamble of the 1961 and 1976 Acts and the object and scheme of the two legislations.If the conditions imposed by the BDA requiring the respondents to pay for augmentation of water supply, electricity, transport, etc. are scrutinized in the light of the principles laid down in Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A.P. (supra), Kishan Lal Lakhmi Chand v. State of Haryana (supra) and I.T.C. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (supra), it cannot be said that the demand made by the BDA amounts to levy of tax and is ultra vires Article 265 of the Constitution.So far as the levy of supervision charges, improvement charges, examination charges, slum clearance development charges and MRTS cess is concerned, it is appropriate to mention that the High Court has not assigned any reason for declaring the levy of these charges to be illegal. Therefore, that part of the impugned order cannot be sustained. Nevertheless, we feel that the State Government should take appropriate decision in the matter of levy of these charges as well and determine whether the same were disproportionate to the expenses incurred by it, the BDA or any other agency/instrumentality of the State.