Case: Shrirampur Municipal Council,Shrirampur Vs. Satyabhambai Bhimaji Dawkher


Decision reasoning: 0[ds]20. In our view, there is no conflict between the judgments of the two-Judge Bench in Dr. HakimwadiAssociation (supra) and the majority judgment in Girnar Traders (II). In both the cases, this Court emphasized that if any private land is shown as reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose specified in any Development plan, the same may be acquired within ten years either by agreement or by following the procedure prescribed under the 1894 Act, and if proceedings for the acquisition of land are not commenced within that period and a further period of six months from the date of service of notice under Section 127 of the 1966 Act, then the land shall be deemed to have been released from such reservation, allotment, etc. In Dr. HakimwadiAssociation (supra), notice under Section 127 was issued on 1.7.1977. The State Government did not take any steps for the acquisition of land within next six months. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court held that in terms of second part of Section 127, the reservation of land for recreation ground will be deemed to have lapsed. This Court unequivocally approved the view expressed by the High Court (paragraphs 10 and 11). The majority judgment in Girnar Traders (II) appears to suggest that the question considered and decided in Dr. HakimwadiAssociation (supra) was slightly different, but having carefully gone through paragraphs 10 and 11 of the first judgment, we are convinced that the question involving interpretation of Section 127 was very much considered and decided by the two-Judge Bench in favour of the landowner and there is no conflict in the opinion expressed in the two judgments.21. We are further of the view that the majority in Girnar Traders (II) had rightly observed that steps towards the acquisition would really commence when the State Government takes active steps for the acquisition of the particular piece of land which leads to publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act. Any other interpretation of the scheme of Sections 126 and 127 of the 1966 Act will make the provisions wholly unworkable and leave the landowner at the mercy of the Planning Authority and the State Government.22. The expressionused in Section 127 of the 1966 Act has to be read in the context of the provisions of the 1894 Act and mere passing of a resolution by the Planning Authority or sending of a letter to the Collector or even the State Government cannot be treated as commencement of the proceedings for the acquisition of land under the 1966 Act or the 1894 Act. By enacting Sections 125 to 127 of the 1966 Act, the State Legislature has made a definite departure from the scheme of acquisition enshrined in the 1894 Act. But a holistic reading of these provisions makes it clear that while engrafting the substance of some of the provisions of the 1894 Act in the 1966 Act and leaving out other provisions, the State Legislature has ensured that the landowners/other interested persons, whose land is utilized for execution of the Development plan/Town Planning Scheme, etc., are not left high and dry. This is the reason why time limit of ten years has been prescribed in Section 31(5) and also under Sections 126 and 127 of the 1966 Act for the acquisition of land, with a stipulation that if the land is not acquired within six months of the service of notice under Section 127 or steps are not commenced for acquisition, reservation of the land will be deemed to have lapsed. Shriinterpretation of the scheme of Sections 126 and 127, if accepted, will lead to absurd results and the landowners will be deprived of their right to use the property for an indefinite period without being paid compensation. That would tantamount to depriving the citizens of their property without the sanction of law and would result in violation of Article 300A of the Constitution.23. Before concluding, we may notice the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Girnar Traders (III) on which reliance was placed by Shri Shekhar Naphade. The main question decided in that case was whether Section 11A of the 1894 Act is applicable to the acquisition of land made under the 1966 Act. The Constitution Bench referred to the provisions of the 1966 Act (as amended) including Chapter VII thereof and held that Section 11A of the 1894 Act cannot be bodily lifted and read into the scheme of the 1966 Act. At the same time, it held that if any land is reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose specified in the Regional plan or Development plan and the same is not acquired by agreement within 10 years from the date of enforcement of such plan or the declaration under sub-section (2) or (4) of Section 126 of the 1966 Act is not published in the Official Gazette within that period, the owner or any person interested in the land may serve notice upon the Planning Authority etc. and if within 12 months of the service of notice the land is not acquired or no steps, as aforesaid are commenced for its acquisition, the reservation etc. will automatically lapse. All this is evinced from paragraphs 125-129, 132-134, 136 and 138 of the Constitution Bench judgment, which are extractedIn terms of Section 126(1)(c) of the MRTP Act, the application to the State Government has to be made for acquiring such land under the Land Acquisition Act. Such land refers to the lands which are required only under the provisions of the MRTP Act. Section 126(2) refers to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act only for the purpose of format in which the declaration has to be made. In terms of Section 126(3), on publication of the declaration, the Collector shall proceed to take order for acquisition of the land under the State Act i.e. for the purpose of acquisition of land; the procedure adopted under the Land Acquisition Act shall be adopted by the Collector and nothing more. The aforereferred provisions of the State Act clearly frame a scheme for planned development with limited incorporation of some of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.126. The provisions of the State Act were amended last in point of time and, therefore, the State Legislature was aware of the relevant existing laws including Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act. The intent of the legislature to exclude the application of Section 11-A clearly emerges from the fact that while amending Section 127 of the MRTP Act, it made no reference, generally or specifically, to the said provision rather it deleted reference to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act from the unamended provisions of Section 127. Reference to Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act in the State Act, under Section 128(3) of the State Act, is again relatable to the acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, as under Section 83 of the State Act, the land could vest in the Planning Authority even at the threshold and it is vesting of a different kind than contemplated under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act. The purpose and intent of Section 129 of the MRTP Act is akin to the provisions of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act and from linguistic point of view, there is similarity in the two sections but still the State Act has provided for a complete scheme with regard to possession and compensation payable to the owner of the land in cases of urgency. Thus, it is clear that there is no general reference to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and they shall not apply as such or even mutatis mutandis to the MRTP Act. On the contrary, reference to the Central Act, wherever is made in the State Act, is specific and for a definite purpose.127. Another argument which had been vehemently advanced on behalf of the appellant is that the reference to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act in different provisions of the MRTP Act would require that the proceedings commence from Section 6 of the Central Act onwards and award is made in terms of Section 11 of that Act and as those provisions apply to these proceedings, Section 11-A would automatically come into play so would the other provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The expressionin Section 126(3) of the MRTP Act is sufficient indication that it is a legislation by reference and, thus, all subsequent amendments would apply. It was also contended that on a bare reading of Sections 126 and 127 of the MRTP Act, it is clear that it does not exclude the application of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act.128. We certainly are not impressed by this argument advanced on behalf of the appellants. Firstly, if we examine the acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, they commence only when a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act is issued. Section 5-A of the Central Act makes it incumbent upon the authorities to invite objections and decide the same before issuing declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. All these proceedings have specifically been given a go-by under the MRTP Act, where notification is to be issued under Section 126(2) in the manner provided under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Secondly, specific reference to various sections of the Land Acquisition Act in the MRTP Act necessarily implies exclusion of the provisions not specifically mentioned therein. Lastly, acquisition proceedings under the MRTP Act are commenced by issuance of a declaration under Section 126(2) and then the procedure prescribed under the Land Acquisition Act is followed up to the passing of award under Section 11 of that Act.129. Further, determination of compensation will again depend upon the principles stated in Sections 23 and 24 of the Land Acquisition Act but subject to Sections 128(2) and 129(1) of the MRTP Act. Statutory benefits accrued under Sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act would be applicable as held by this Court in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad. Vesting, unlike Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act which operates only after the award is made and compensation is given, whereas under the MRTP Act it may operate even at the initial stages before making of an award, for example, under Sections 126(1)(c) and 83.132. Besides this, another very important aspect of the present case is that if the provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act are applied or deemed to be incorporated by application of any doctrine of law into the provisions of the MRTP Act, it will have the effect of destroying the statutory rights available to the State Government and/or the Planning Authority. For instance, proviso to Section 126(2) of the State Act provides that where a declaration in the manner provided in Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the said land is not made within one year from the date of publication of draft regional plan, thereafter no such declaration shall be made. Section 126(4) makes an exception to the consequences stated in the proviso to Section 126(2) that the State Government, notwithstanding those provisions, can make a fresh declaration for acquiring the land under the Land Acquisition Act. However, the market value of the land shall be the market value at the date of declaration in the Official Gazette made for acquiring such land afresh. In other words, the rest of the machinery provided under the Act would not operate after the prescribed period.133. However, in terms of Section 127 of the MRTP Act, if any land reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose specified is not acquired by agreement within 10 years from the date on which final regional plan or final development plan comes into force or if a declaration under sub-section (2) or (4) of Section 126 of the MRTP Act is not published in the Official Gazette within such period, the owner or any person interested in the land may serve notice upon such authority to that effect and if within 12 months from the date of service of such notice, the land is not acquired or no steps, as aforesaid, are commenced for its acquisition, the reservation, allotment or designation shall be deemed to have lapsed and the land would become available to the owner for the purposes of development. The defaults, their consequences and even exceptions thereto have been specifically stated in the State Act. For a period of 11 years, the land would remain under reservation or designation, as the case may be, in terms of Section 127 of the MRTP Act (10 years + notice period).134. However, if the provisions of Section 11-A of the Central Act were permitted to punctuate a scheme of the State Act and the award is not made within two years from the date of declaration under Section 6 of the Central Act, the acquisition proceedings will lapse which will frustrate the rights of the State as well as the scheme contemplated under Section 126 as well as Section 127 of the State Act and that would not be permissible in law. This being legislation by incorporation, the general reference to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act shall stand excluded.136. Section 126(2) of the State Act refers to the manner of declaration as contemplated under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act but the legislature intentionally avoided making any reference to other features contained in Section 6 of the Central Act as well as the time-frame prescribed under that Act. On the contrary, proviso to Section 126(2) of the MRTP Act spells out its own time-frame whereafter such declaration cannot be made subject to the provisions of Section 126(4). The unamended provisions of Section 127 of the State Act though refer to the acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act but without making any reference to the time-frame prescribed under the said Act. In this section also, the specific time-frame and the consequences of default thereof have been stated. Sections 128 and 129 of the MRTP Act relate to acquiring land for the purpose other than for which it is designated in any plan or scheme and taking of possession of land in cases of urgency respectively.138. The provisions relating to planned development of the State or any part thereof, read in conjunction with the object of the Act, show that different time-frames are required for initiation, finalisation and complete execution of such development plans. The period of 10 years stated in Section 127 of the MRTP Act, therefore, cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable ex facie. If the provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, with its serious consequence of lapsing of entire acquisition proceedings, are bodily lifted and read into the provisions of the MRTP Act, it is bound to frustrate the entire scheme and render it ineffective and uncertain. Keeping in view the consequence of Section 11-A of the Central Act, every development plan could stand frustrated only for the reason that period of two years has lapsed and it will tantamount to putting an end to the entire development. In our view, the observations contained in paragraph 133 of Girnar Traders (III) unequivocally support the majority judgment in Girnar Traders (II).25. As a sequel to the above discussion, we hold that the majority judgment in Girnar Traders (II) lays down correct law and does not require reconsideration by a larger Bench. We further hold that the orders impugned in these appeals are legally correct and do not call for interference by this Court.