Case: Mahalakshmi Sugar Mills Co.Ltd.  Vs. Union Of India


Decision reasoning: 1[ds]61. We are not unmindful of the fact that the learned counsel for the appellant in Mahalakshmi before the High Court confined its case only to SAP but then in Hari Nagar Sugar Mills, the Delhi High Court accepted the contentions which have been raised before us.62. When the legislative policy is reflected in a statutory provision, the Court, while being called upon to determine as to whether the same has been complied with or not, must apply the rule of purposive construction. It is idle, in a case of this nature, to contend that as the element of additional price paid under Clause 5A of the Order and SAP had not been specifically provided for in Section 3(3C), they should be kept out of consideration for the purpose of determination of the price of levy sugar. If the actual price payable to the cane growers is absolutely relevant for determining the price of levy sugar, we have no doubt in our mind that consideration of the said elements would come either under clause (b) or clause (d) of Section3(3C) of theAct. It was so held in Malaprabha-I. It is interesting to note that the Constitution Bench of this Court in UP Coop. Cane Unions Federations rejected a contention raised by the parties that in the event the State is held to have the legislative competence to impose the same, it will have an adverse effect on the price of levy sugar required to be determined under Section3(3C) of theAct as noticed supra.63. Clauses (b) and (d) of Section 3(3C) were, therefore, clearly held to be attracted by the Constitution Bench also.64. The importance of applying the Rule of purposive construction has recently been noticed by this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia [2007 (14) SCALE 556 ] in the following linessSection 5 of the Act, on a plain reading, would place the entire onus upon a noticee. It, in no uncertain terms, states that once a notice under Section 4 is issued by the Estate Officer on formation of his opinion as envisaged therein Page 0183 it is for the noticee not only to show cause in respect thereof but also adduce evidence and make oral submissions in support of his case. Literal meaning in a situation of this nature would lead to a conclusion that the landlord is not required to adduce any evidence at all nor it is required even to make any oral submissions. Such a literal construction would lead to an anomalous situation because the landlord may not be heard at all. It may not even be permitted to adduce any evidence in rebuttal to the one adduced by the noticee nor it would be permitted to advance any argument. Is this contemplated in law? The answer must be rendered in the negative. When a landlord files an application, it in a given situation must be able to lead evidence either at the first instance or after the evidence is led by the noticee to establish its case and/ or in rebuttal to the evidence led by the noticee.49. The literal interpretation of the statute, if resorted to, would also lead to the situation that it would not be necessary for the landlords in any situation to plead in regard to its need for the public premises. It could just terminate the tenancy without specifying any cause for eviction. 50. Except in the first category of cases, as has been noticed by us hereinbefore, Sections 4 and 5 of the Act, in our opinion, may have to be construed differently in view of the decisions rendered by this Court. If the landlord being a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India is required to prove fairness and reasonableness on its part in initiating a proceeding, it is for it to show how its prayer meets the constitutional requirements of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. For proper interpretation not only the basic principles of natural justice have to be borne in mind, but also principles of constitutionalism involved therein. With a view to read the provisions of the Act in a proper and effective manner, we are of the opinion that literal interpretation, if given, may give rise to an anomaly or absurdity which must be avoided. So as to enable a superior court to interpret a statute in a reasonable manner, the court must place itself in the chair of a reasonable legislator/author. So done, the rules of purposive construction have to be resorted to which would require the construction of the Act in such a manner so as to see that the object of the Act fulfilled; which in turn would lead the beneficiary under the statutory scheme to fulfill its constitutional obligations as held by the court inter alia in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. (supra).51. Barak in his exhaustive work on Purposive Construction explains various meanings attributed to the term purpose. It would be in the fitness of discussion to refer to Purposive Construction in Baraks words:Hart and Sachs also appear to treat purpose as a subjective concept. I say appear because, although Hart and Sachs claim that the interpreter should imagine himself or herself in the legislators shoes, they introduce two elements of objectivity: First, the interpreter should assume that the legislature is composed of reasonable people seeking to achieve reasonable goals in a reasonable manner; and second, the interpreter should accept the non-rebuttable presumption that members Page 0184 of the legislative body sought to fulfill their constitutional duties in good faith. This formulation allows the interpreter to inquire not into the subjective intent of the author, but rather the intent the author would have had, had he or she acted reasonably.(Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (2007) at pg. 87)52. In Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Maddula Ratnavalli and Ors. [(2007) 6 SCC 81] , this Court held:The Parliament moreover is presumed to have enacted a reasonable statute (see Breyer, Stephen (2005): Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution, Knopf (Chapter on Statutory Interpretation - pg. 99 for Reasonable Legislator Presumption).53. The provisions of the Act and the Rules in this case, are, thus required to be construed in the light of the action of the State as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. With a view to give effect thereto, the doctrine of purposive construction may have to be taken recourse to. [See Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Brij Mohan and Ors. [2007 (7) SCALE 753 ].We are of the opinion that the same principle should be applied herein.66. That is how the Central Government itself understood the decision of this Court in Malaprabha-I. It explicitly said so in the counter affidavit filed in Bharat Sugar Mills. Indisputably, for the purpose of determination of the price of levy sugar, it called for the relevant materials from each of the owner of the sugar mill. It is, therefore, too late in the day for the Central Government to contend contra.67. Rules of executive construction in a situation of this nature may also be applied where a representation is made by the maker of legislation at the time of introduction of the Bill or construction thereupon is put by the executive upon its coming into force, the same carries a great weight.68. In this regard, we may refer to the decision of the House of Lords in the matter of R.V. National Asylum Support Service [(2002) 1 W.L.R.2956] and its interpretation of the decision in Pepper v. Hart [(1993) A.C. 593]. on the question of executive estoppel. In the former decision, Lord Steynexceptionally there is found in the Explanatory Notes a clear assurance by the executive to Parliament about the meaning of a clause, or the circumstances in which a power will or will not be used, that assurance may in principle be admitted against the executive in proceedings in which the executive places a contrary contention before a court.A similar interpretation was rendered by Lord Hope of Craighead in Wilson v. First County Trust Ltd., [2004] 1 A.C. 816, wherein it wasI understand it [Pepper v. Hart], it recognized a limited exception to the general rule that resort to Hansard was inadmissible. Its purpose is to prevent the Executive seeking to place a meaning on words used in legislation which is different from that which ministers attributed to whose words when promoting the legislation in Parliament.See for a detailed analysis of the rule of executive estoppel in a writing of Francis Bennion entitled "Executive Estoppel: Pepper v. Hart revisited", published in Public Law, Spring 2007 issue, pg. 1.71. Reliance placed by the learned Additional Solicitor General on Malaprabha-III is not apposite. This Court therein found the action of the Central Government to be not an act of contempt presumably because the directions were held to have been substantially complied with. We are not exercising any contempt jurisdiction. Contempt is a matter between the Court and the contemnor. We are herein called upon to determine as to which view of Delhi High Court in Hari Nagar or Mahalakshmi is correct. We cannot refuse to lay down the law having been called upon to do so. We must lay down a law for the future. We, therefore, while directing the Central Government to refix the price of levy sugar, would keep this direction confined only to the parties before us including the interveners. The reason therefor is that the other mill owners were not aggrieved thereby. The parties before us are fighting their grievance for more than 22 years. They should not be allowed to go empty handed.We are not unmindful of the fact that the learned counsel for the appellant in Mahalakshmi before the High Court confined its case only to SAP but then in Hari Nagar Sugar Mills, the Delhi High Court accepted the contentions which have been raised before us.62. When the legislative policy is reflected in a statutory provision, the Court, while being called upon to determine as to whether the same has been complied with or not, must apply the rule of purposive construction. It is idle, in a case of this nature, to contend that as the element of additional price paid under Clause 5A of the Order and SAP had not been specifically provided for in Section 3(3C), they should be kept out of consideration for the purpose of determination of the price of levy sugar. If the actual price payable to the cane growers is absolutely relevant for determining the price of levy sugar, we have no doubt in our mind that consideration of the said elements would come either under clause (b) or clause (d) of Section3(3C) of theAct. It was so held inIt is interesting to note that the Constitution Bench of this Court in UP Coop. Cane Unions Federations rejected a contention raised by the parties that in the event the State is held to have the legislative competence to impose the same, it will have an adverse effect on the price of levy sugar required to be determined under Section3(3C) of theAct as noticed supra.