Kushalkhemka/embedding-cve-nvd-dataset huggingface dataset:
CVE ID: CVE-2022-48995 State: PUBLISHED Published: 2024-10-21T20:06:11.482Z Last Updated: 2025-05-04T08:27:42.251Z Vendors: Linux Products: Linux Description: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: raydium_ts_i2c - fix memory leak in raydium_i2c_send() There is a kmemleak when test the raydium_i2c_ts with bpf mock device: unreferenced object 0xffff88812d3675a0 (size 8): comm "python3", pid 349, jiffies 4294741067 (age 95.695s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 11 0e 10 c0 01 00 04 00 ........ backtrace: [<0000000068427125>] __kmalloc+0x46/0x1b0 [<0000000090180f91>] raydium_i2c_send+0xd4/0x2bf [raydium_i2c_ts] [<000000006e631aee>] raydium_i2c_initialize.cold+0xbc/0
<0000000090180f91>] raydium_i2c_send+0xd4/0x2bf [raydium_i2c_ts] [<000000006e631aee>] raydium_i2c_initialize.cold+0xbc/0x3e4 [raydium_i2c_ts] [<00000000dc6fcf38>] raydium_i2c_probe+0x3cd/0x6bc [raydium_i2c_ts] [<00000000a310de16>] i2c_device_probe+0x651/0x680 [<00000000f5a96bf3>] really_probe+0x17c/0x3f0 [<00000000096ba499>] __driver_probe_device+0xe3/0x170 [<00000000c5acb4d9>] driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120 [<00000000264fe082>] __device_attach_driver+0xf7/0x150 [<00000000f919423c>] bus_for_each_drv+0x114/0x180 [<00000000e067feca>] __device_attach+0x1e5/0x2d0 [<0000000054301fc2>] bus_probe_device+0x126/0x140 [<00000000aad93b22>] device_add+0x810/0x1130 [<00000000c086a53f>] i2c_new_client_dev
1fc2>] bus_probe_device+0x126/0x140 [<00000000aad93b22>] device_add+0x810/0x1130 [<00000000c086a53f>] i2c_new_client_device+0x352/0x4e0 [<000000003c2c248c>] of_i2c_register_device+0xf1/0x110 [<00000000ffec4177>] of_i2c_notify+0x100/0x160 unreferenced object 0xffff88812d3675c8 (size 8): comm "python3", pid 349, jiffies 4294741070 (age 95.692s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 22 00 36 2d 81 88 ff ff ".6-.... backtrace: [<0000000068427125>] __kmalloc+0x46/0x1b0 [<0000000090180f91>] raydium_i2c_send+0xd4/0x2bf [raydium_i2c_ts] [<000000001d5c9620>] raydium_i2c_initialize.cold+0x223/0x3e4 [raydium_i2c_ts] [<00000000dc6fcf38>] raydium_i2c_probe+0x3cd/0x6bc [raydium_i2c_ts] [<00000000a310de16>] i2c_device
3e4 [raydium_i2c_ts] [<00000000dc6fcf38>] raydium_i2c_probe+0x3cd/0x6bc [raydium_i2c_ts] [<00000000a310de16>] i2c_device_probe+0x651/0x680 [<00000000f5a96bf3>] really_probe+0x17c/0x3f0 [<00000000096ba499>] __driver_probe_device+0xe3/0x170 [<00000000c5acb4d9>] driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120 [<00000000264fe082>] __device_attach_driver+0xf7/0x150 [<00000000f919423c>] bus_for_each_drv+0x114/0x180 [<00000000e067feca>] __device_attach+0x1e5/0x2d0 [<0000000054301fc2>] bus_probe_device+0x126/0x140 [<00000000aad93b22>] device_add+0x810/0x1130 [<00000000c086a53f>] i2c_new_client_device+0x352/0x4e0 [<000000003c2c248c>] of_i2c_register_device+0xf1/0x110 [<00000000ffec4177>] of_i2c_notify+0x100/0x160 Aft
ce+0x352/0x4e0 [<000000003c2c248c>] of_i2c_register_device+0xf1/0x110 [<00000000ffec4177>] of_i2c_notify+0x100/0x160 After BANK_SWITCH command from i2c BUS, no matter success or error happened, the tx_buf should be freed. Additional Analyst Notes: - CISA ADP Vulnrichment: References: - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a82869ac52f3d9db4b2cf8fd41edc2dee7a75a61 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/53b9b1201e34ccc895971218559123625c56fbcd - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/097c1c7a28e3da8f2811ba532be6e81faab15aab - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c9a59939deb4bfafdc451100c03d1e848b4169b
CVE ID: CVE-2022-48996 State: PUBLISHED Published: 2024-10-21T20:06:12.122Z Last Updated: 2025-05-04T08:27:43.323Z Vendors: Linux Products: Linux Description: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/sysfs: fix wrong empty schemes assumption under online tuning in damon_sysfs_set_schemes() Commit da87878010e5 ("mm/damon/sysfs: support online inputs update") made 'damon_sysfs_set_schemes()' to be called for running DAMON context, which could have schemes. In the case, DAMON sysfs interface is supposed to update, remove, or add schemes to reflect the sysfs files. However, the code is assuming the DAMON context wouldn't have schemes at all, and therefore crea
eflect the sysfs files. However, the code is assuming the DAMON context wouldn't have schemes at all, and therefore creates and adds new schemes. As a result, the code doesn't work as intended for online schemes tuning and could have more than expected memory footprint. The schemes are all in the DAMON context, so it doesn't leak the memory, though. Remove the wrong asssumption (the DAMON context wouldn't have schemes) in 'damon_sysfs_set_schemes()' to fix the bug. Additional Analyst Notes: - CISA ADP Vulnrichment: References: - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f98d1f2a36ad7ab48fb4cf73ca14e7b19482fd4d - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/95bc35f9bee5220dad4e8567654ab3288a181639
CVE ID: CVE-2022-48997 State: PUBLISHED Published: 2024-10-21T20:06:12.787Z Last Updated: 2025-05-04T08:27:44.392Z Vendors: Linux Products: Linux Description: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: char: tpm: Protect tpm_pm_suspend with locks Currently tpm transactions are executed unconditionally in tpm_pm_suspend() function, which may lead to races with other tpm accessors in the system. Specifically, the hw_random tpm driver makes use of tpm_get_random(), and this function is called in a loop from a kthread, which means it's not frozen alongside userspace, and so can race with the work done during system suspend: tpm tpm0: tpm_transmit: tpm_recv: error -52 tpm
ide userspace, and so can race with the work done during system suspend: tpm tpm0: tpm_transmit: tpm_recv: error -52 tpm tpm0: invalid TPM_STS.x 0xff, dumping stack for forensics CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5+ #135 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.0-20220807_005459-localhost 04/01/2014 Call Trace: tpm_tis_status.cold+0x19/0x20 tpm_transmit+0x13b/0x390 tpm_transmit_cmd+0x20/0x80 tpm1_pm_suspend+0xa6/0x110 tpm_pm_suspend+0x53/0x80 __pnp_bus_suspend+0x35/0xe0 __device_suspend+0x10f/0x350 Fix this by calling tpm_try_get_ops(), which itself is a wrapper around tpm_chip_start(), but takes the appropriate mutex. [Jason: reworked commit message, added me
itself is a wrapper around tpm_chip_start(), but takes the appropriate mutex. [Jason: reworked commit message, added metadata] Additional Analyst Notes: - CISA ADP Vulnrichment: References: - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d699373ac5f3545243d3c73a1ccab77fdef8cec6 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e0d6c687c925e27fd4bc78a2721d10acf5614d6 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/571b6bbbf54d835ea6120f65575cb55cd767e603 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25b78bf98b07ff5aceb9b1e24f72ec0236c5c053 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/23393c6461422df5bf8084a086ada9a7e17dc2ba
CVE ID: CVE-2022-48998 State: PUBLISHED Published: 2024-10-21T20:06:13.440Z Last Updated: 2025-05-04T08:27:45.734Z Vendors: Linux Products: Linux Description: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/bpf/32: Fix Oops on tail call tests test_bpf tail call tests end up as: test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 85 PASS test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 111 PASS test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 145 PASS test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 170 PASS test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 190 PASS test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1 BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xf1b4e000 Faulting instruction address: 0xbe86b710 Oops: Kernel access
Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xf1b4e000 Faulting instruction address: 0xbe86b710 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] BE PAGE_SIZE=4K MMU=Hash PowerMac Modules linked in: test_bpf(+) CPU: 0 PID: 97 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4+ #195 Hardware name: PowerMac3,1 750CL 0x87210 PowerMac NIP: be86b710 LR: be857e88 CTR: be86b704 REGS: f1b4df20 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.1.0-rc4+) MSR: 00009032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 28008242 XER: 00000000 DAR: f1b4e000 DSISR: 42000000 GPR00: 00000001 f1b4dfe0 c11d2280 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000002 00000000 GPR08: f1b4e000 be86b704 f1b4e000 00000000 00000000 100d816a f2440000 fe73baa8 GPR16: f2458000 00000000 c1941ae4 f1fe2248 00
8: f1b4e000 be86b704 f1b4e000 00000000 00000000 100d816a f2440000 fe73baa8 GPR16: f2458000 00000000 c1941ae4 f1fe2248 00000045 c0de0000 f2458030 00000000 GPR24: 000003e8 0000000f f2458000 f1b4dc90 3e584b46 00000000 f24466a0 c1941a00 NIP [be86b710] 0xbe86b710 LR [be857e88] __run_one+0xec/0x264 [test_bpf] Call Trace: [f1b4dfe0] [00000002] 0x2 (unreliable) Instruction dump: XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This is a tentative to write above the stack. The problem is encoutered with tests added by commit 38608ee7b690 ("bpf, tests: Add load store test
ite above the stack. The problem is encoutered with tests added by commit 38608ee7b690 ("bpf, tests: Add load store test case for tail call") This happens because tail call is done to a BPF prog with a different stack_depth. At the time being, the stack is kept as is when the caller tail calls its callee. But at exit, the callee restores the stack based on its own properties. Therefore here, at each run, r1 is erroneously increased by 32 - 16 = 16 bytes. This was done that way in order to pass the tail call count from caller to callee through the stack. As powerpc32 doesn't have a red zone in the stack, it was necessary the maintain the stack as is for the tail call. But it was not anticipat
have a red zone in the stack, it was necessary the maintain the stack as is for the tail call. But it was not anticipated that the BPF frame size could be different. Let's take a new approach. Use register r4 to carry the tail call count during the tail call, and save it into the stack at function entry if required. This means the input parameter must be in r3, which is more correct as it is a 32 bits parameter, then tail call better match with normal BPF function entry, the down side being that we move that input parameter back and forth between r3 and r4. That can be optimised later. Doing that also has the advantage of maximising the common parts between tail calls and a normal function
imised later. Doing that also has the advantage of maximising the common parts between tail calls and a normal function exit. With the fix, tail call tests are now successfull: test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 53 PASS test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 115 PASS test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 154 PASS test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 165 PASS test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 101 PASS test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1 141 PASS test_bpf: #6 Tail call error path, max count reached jited:1 994 PASS test_bpf: #7 Tail call count preserved across function calls jited:1 140975 PASS test_bpf: #8 Tail call error path, NULL target jited:1 110 PASS test_bpf: #9 Tail call error pa
alls jited:1 140975 PASS test_bpf: #8 Tail call error path, NULL target jited:1 110 PASS test_bpf: #9 Tail call error path, index out of range jited:1 69 PASS test_bpf: test_tail_calls: Summary: 10 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [10/10 JIT'ed] Additional Analyst Notes: - CISA ADP Vulnrichment: References: - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/747a6e547240baaaf41874d27333b87b87cfd24c - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89d21e259a94f7d5582ec675aa445f5a79f347e4
CVE ID: CVE-2022-48999 State: PUBLISHED Published: 2024-10-21T20:06:14.118Z Last Updated: 2025-05-04T08:27:46.832Z Vendors: Linux Products: Linux Description: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: Handle attempt to delete multipath route when fib_info contains an nh reference Gwangun Jung reported a slab-out-of-bounds access in fib_nh_match: fib_nh_match+0xf98/0x1130 linux-6.0-rc7/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:961 fib_table_delete+0x5f3/0xa40 linux-6.0-rc7/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1753 inet_rtm_delroute+0x2b3/0x380 linux-6.0-rc7/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:874 Separate nexthop objects are mutually exclusive with the legacy multipath spec. Fix fib_nh_match to return if t
nd.c:874 Separate nexthop objects are mutually exclusive with the legacy multipath spec. Fix fib_nh_match to return if the config for the to be deleted route contains a multipath spec while the fib_info is using a nexthop object. Additional Analyst Notes: - CISA ADP Vulnrichment: References: - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc3cd130ecfb8b0ae52e235e487bae3f16a24a32 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b5394229ebae09afc07aabccb5ffd705ffd250e - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25174d91e4a32a24204060d283bd5fa6d0ddf133 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb20a2ae241be846bc3c11ea4b3a3c69e41d51f2 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/61b91eb33a69c3be11b259c5ea484505cd79f883
CVE ID: CVE-2022-49000 State: PUBLISHED Published: 2024-10-21T20:06:14.753Z Last Updated: 2025-05-04T08:27:47.892Z Vendors: Linux Products: Linux Description: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/vt-d: Fix PCI device refcount leak in has_external_pci() for_each_pci_dev() is implemented by pci_get_device(). The comment of pci_get_device() says that it will increase the reference count for the returned pci_dev and also decrease the reference count for the input pci_dev @from if it is not NULL. If we break for_each_pci_dev() loop with pdev not NULL, we need to call pci_dev_put() to decrease the reference count. Add the missing pci_dev_put() before 'return tr
not NULL, we need to call pci_dev_put() to decrease the reference count. Add the missing pci_dev_put() before 'return true' to avoid reference count leak. Additional Analyst Notes: - CISA ADP Vulnrichment: References: - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/10ed7655a17f6a3eaecd1293830488259ccd5723 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6eea8b2e858a20ad58ac62dc2de90fea2413f94 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/17f67414718e6aba123335a33b7d15aa594fff34 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/afca9e19cc720bfafc75dc5ce429c185ca93f31d
CVE ID: CVE-2022-49001 State: PUBLISHED Published: 2024-10-21T20:06:15.443Z Last Updated: 2025-05-04T08:27:48.957Z Vendors: Linux Products: Linux Description: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: fix race when vmap stack overflow Currently, when detecting vmap stack overflow, riscv firstly switches to the so called shadow stack, then use this shadow stack to call the get_overflow_stack() to get the overflow stack. However, there's a race here if two or more harts use the same shadow stack at the same time. To solve this race, we introduce spin_shadow_stack atomic var, which will be swap between its own address and 0 in atomic way, when the var is set, it
ce spin_shadow_stack atomic var, which will be swap between its own address and 0 in atomic way, when the var is set, it means the shadow_stack is being used; when the var is cleared, it means the shadow_stack isn't being used. [Palmer: Add AQ to the swap, and also some comments.] Additional Analyst Notes: - CISA ADP Vulnrichment: References: - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac00301adb19df54f2eae1efc4bad7447c0156ce - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/879fabc5a95401d9bce357e4b1d24ae4a360a81f - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e1864332fbc1b993659eab7974da9fe8bf8c128
CVE ID: CVE-2022-49002 State: PUBLISHED Published: 2024-10-21T20:06:16.093Z Last Updated: 2025-05-04T08:27:50.143Z Vendors: Linux Products: Linux Description: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/vt-d: Fix PCI device refcount leak in dmar_dev_scope_init() for_each_pci_dev() is implemented by pci_get_device(). The comment of pci_get_device() says that it will increase the reference count for the returned pci_dev and also decrease the reference count for the input pci_dev @from if it is not NULL. If we break for_each_pci_dev() loop with pdev not NULL, we need to call pci_dev_put() to decrease the reference count. Add the missing pci_dev_put() for the error
ev not NULL, we need to call pci_dev_put() to decrease the reference count. Add the missing pci_dev_put() for the error path to avoid reference count leak. Additional Analyst Notes: - CISA ADP Vulnrichment: References: - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d47bc9d7bcdbb9adc9703513d964b514fee5b0bf - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71c4a621985fc051ab86d3a86c749069a993fcb2 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/876d7bfb89273997056220029ff12b1c2cc4691d - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cbdd83bd2fd67142b03ce9dbdd1eab322ff7321f - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a5c65cd56aed027f8a97fda8b691caaeb66d115e - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bdb613ef179ad4bb9d56a2533e9b30e434f1dfb7 - https://git.kernel.org/stable
1caaeb66d115e - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bdb613ef179ad4bb9d56a2533e9b30e434f1dfb7 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a8f7b90681472948de172dbbf5a54cd342870aa - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4bedbbd782ebbe7287231fea862c158d4f08a9e3
CVE ID: CVE-2022-49003 State: PUBLISHED Published: 2024-10-21T20:06:16.737Z Last Updated: 2025-05-04T08:27:51.238Z Vendors: Linux Products: Linux Description: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme: fix SRCU protection of nvme_ns_head list Walking the nvme_ns_head siblings list is protected by the head's srcu in nvme_ns_head_submit_bio() but not nvme_mpath_revalidate_paths(). Removing namespaces from the list also fails to synchronize the srcu. Concurrent scan work can therefore cause use-after-frees. Hold the head's srcu lock in nvme_mpath_revalidate_paths() and synchronize with the srcu, not the global RCU, in nvme_ns_remove(). Observed the following panic
_revalidate_paths() and synchronize with the srcu, not the global RCU, in nvme_ns_remove(). Observed the following panic when making NVMe/RDMA connections with native multipath on the Rocky Linux 8.6 kernel (it seems the upstream kernel has the same race condition). Disassembly shows the faulting instruction is cmp 0x50(%rdx),%rcx; computing capacity != get_capacity(ns->disk). Address 0x50 is dereferenced because ns->disk is NULL. The NULL disk appears to be the result of concurrent scan work freeing the namespace (note the log line in the middle of the panic). [37314.206036] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050 [37314.206036] nvme0n3: detected capacity c
6] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050 [37314.206036] nvme0n3: detected capacity change from 0 to 11811160064 [37314.299753] PGD 0 P4D 0 [37314.299756] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [37314.299759] CPU: 29 PID: 322046 Comm: kworker/u98:3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W X --------- - - 4.18.0-372.32.1.el8test86.x86_64 #1 [37314.299762] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R720/0JP31P, BIOS 2.7.0 05/23/2018 [37314.299763] Workqueue: nvme-wq nvme_scan_work [nvme_core] [37314.299783] RIP: 0010:nvme_mpath_revalidate_paths+0x26/0xb0 [nvme_core] [37314.299790] Code: 1f 44 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 53 48 8b 5f 50 48 8b 83 c8 c9 00 00 48 8b 13 48 8b 48 50 48 39 d3 74 20 48 8d 42
90] Code: 1f 44 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 53 48 8b 5f 50 48 8b 83 c8 c9 00 00 48 8b 13 48 8b 48 50 48 39 d3 74 20 48 8d 42 d0 48 8b 50 20 <48> 3b 4a 50 74 05 f0 80 60 70 ef 48 8b 50 30 48 8d 42 d0 48 39 d3 [37315.058803] RSP: 0018:ffffabe28f913d10 EFLAGS: 00010202 [37315.121316] RAX: ffff927a077da800 RBX: ffff92991dd70000 RCX: 0000000001600000 [37315.206704] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff92991b719800 [37315.292106] RBP: ffff929a6b70c000 R08: 000000010234cd4a R09: c0000000ffff7fff [37315.377501] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffabe28f913a30 R12: 0000000000000000 [37315.462889] R13: ffff92992716600c R14: ffff929964e6e030 R15: ffff92991dd70000 [37315.548286] FS: 0000000000000
000000 [37315.462889] R13: ffff92992716600c R14: ffff929964e6e030 R15: ffff92991dd70000 [37315.548286] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92b87fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [37315.645111] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [37315.713871] CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000002208810006 CR4: 00000000000606e0 [37315.799267] Call Trace: [37315.828515] nvme_update_ns_info+0x1ac/0x250 [nvme_core] [37315.892075] nvme_validate_or_alloc_ns+0x2ff/0xa00 [nvme_core] [37315.961871] ? __blk_mq_free_request+0x6b/0x90 [37316.015021] nvme_scan_work+0x151/0x240 [nvme_core] [37316.073371] process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360 [37316.121318] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0 [37316.168227] worker_thread+0x30/0
7316.073371] process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360 [37316.121318] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0 [37316.168227] worker_thread+0x30/0x390 [37316.212024] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0 [37316.258939] kthread+0x10a/0x120 [37316.297557] ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 [37316.347590] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 [37316.390360] Modules linked in: nvme_rdma nvme_tcp(X) nvme_fabrics nvme_core netconsole iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp dm_queue_length dm_service_time nf_conntrack_netlink br_netfilter bridge stp llc overlay nft_chain_nat ipt_MASQUERADE nf_nat xt_addrtype xt_CT nft_counter xt_state xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_comment xt_multiport nft_compat nf_tables libcrc32c nfnetlink dm_multipath t
_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_comment xt_multiport nft_compat nf_tables libcrc32c nfnetlink dm_multipath tg3 rpcrdma sunrpc rdma_ucm ib_srpt ib_isert iscsi_target_mod target_core_mod ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm intel_rapl_msr iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support dcdbas intel_rapl_common sb_edac x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel ipmi_ssif kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul mlx5_ib ghash_clmulni_intel ib_uverbs rapl intel_cstate intel_uncore ib_core ipmi_si joydev mei_me pcspkr ipmi_devintf mei lpc_ich wmi ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter ex ---truncated--- Additional Analyst Notes: - CISA ADP Vulnrichment: Re
ei lpc_ich wmi ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter ex ---truncated--- Additional Analyst Notes: - CISA ADP Vulnrichment: References: - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/787d81d4eb150e443e5d1276c6e8f03cfecc2302 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b566d09ab1b975566a53f9c5466ee260d087582 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/899d2a05dc14733cfba6224083c6b0dd5a738590
CVE ID: CVE-2022-49004 State: PUBLISHED Published: 2024-10-21T20:06:17.410Z Last Updated: 2025-05-04T08:27:52.326Z Vendors: Linux Products: Linux Description: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: Sync efi page table's kernel mappings before switching The EFI page table is initially created as a copy of the kernel page table. With VMAP_STACK enabled, kernel stacks are allocated in the vmalloc area: if the stack is allocated in a new PGD (one that was not present at the moment of the efi page table creation or not synced in a previous vmalloc fault), the kernel will take a trap when switching to the efi page table when the vmalloc kernel stack is accessed,
lloc fault), the kernel will take a trap when switching to the efi page table when the vmalloc kernel stack is accessed, resulting in a kernel panic. Fix that by updating the efi kernel mappings before switching to the efi page table. Additional Analyst Notes: - CISA ADP Vulnrichment: References: - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa7a7d185ef380546b4b1fed6f84f31dbae8cec7 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96f479383d92944406d4b3f2bc03c2f640def9f1 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f105a742725a1b78766a55169f1d827732e62b8
CVE ID: CVE-2022-49005 State: PUBLISHED Published: 2024-10-21T20:06:18.143Z Last Updated: 2025-05-04T12:44:09.760Z Vendors: Linux Products: Linux Description: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: ops: Fix bounds check for _sx controls For _sx controls the semantics of the max field is not the usual one, max is the number of steps rather than the maximum value. This means that our check in snd_soc_put_volsw_sx() needs to just check against the maximum value. Additional Analyst Notes: - CISA ADP Vulnrichment: References: - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e46adadf19248d59af3aa6bc52e09115bf479bf7 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4a95a49f26308782b4056401989ec