CWE-273: Improper Check for Dropped Privileges (Base)

Description: The product attempts to drop privileges but does not check or incorrectly checks to see if the drop succeeded.

Extended Description: If the drop fails, the product will continue to run with the raised privileges, which might provide additional access to unprivileged users.

Background Details: ::In Windows based environments that have access control, impersonation is used so that access checks can be performed on a client identity by a server with higher privileges. By impersonating the client, the server is restricted to client-level security -- although in different threads it may have much higher privileges.::


Applicable Platforms: ::LANGUAGE CLASS:Not Language-Specific:LANGUAGE PREVALENCE:Undetermined::

Modes of Introduction: ::PHASE:Implementation:NOTE:REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic. This issue is likely to occur in restrictive environments in which the operating system or application provides fine-grained control over privilege management.::



Common Consequences: ::SCOPE:Access Control:IMPACT:Gain Privileges or Assume Identity:NOTE:If privileges are not dropped, neither are access rights of the user. Often these rights can be prevented from being dropped.::SCOPE:Access Control:SCOPE:Non-Repudiation:IMPACT:Gain Privileges or Assume Identity:IMPACT:Hide Activities:NOTE:If privileges are not dropped, in some cases the system may record actions as the user which is being impersonated rather than the impersonator.::

Detection Methods: ::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis:DESCRIPTION:Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect sources (origins of input) with sinks (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.):EFFECTIVENESS:High::

Potential Mitigations: ::PHASE:Architecture and Design:STRATEGY:Separation of Privilege:DESCRIPTION:Compartmentalize the system to have safe areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.::PHASE:Implementation:DESCRIPTION:Check the results of all functions that return a value and verify that the value is expected.:EFFECTIVENESS:High::PHASE:Implementation:DESCRIPTION:In Windows, make sure that the process token has the SeImpersonatePrivilege(Microsoft Server 2003). Code that relies on impersonation for security must ensure that the impersonation succeeded, i.e., that a proper privilege demotion happened.::

Observed Examples: ::REFERENCE:CVE-2006-4447:DESCRIPTION:Program does not check return value when invoking functions to drop privileges, which could leave users with higher privileges than expected by forcing those functions to fail.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-4447::REFERENCE:CVE-2006-2916:DESCRIPTION:Program does not check return value when invoking functions to drop privileges, which could leave users with higher privileges than expected by forcing those functions to fail.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-2916::


Affected Resources: ::System Process::