DENIED: January 24, 2012 
CBCA 2516 
RAFAEL PORTILLO, 
Appellant, 
v. 
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, 
Respondent. 
Rafael Portillo, pro se, Tracy, CA. 
Jay N. Bernstein, Office of General Counsel, General Services Administration, 
Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent. 
Before Board Judges SOMERS , POLLACK , and GOODMAN . 
SOMERS , Board Judge. 
This appeal involves a claim for unpaid rent under a lease agreement between 
appellant, Rafael Portillo, and the General Services Administration (GSA, respondent, or the 
Government). Appellant contends that GSA did not have the right to terminate the lease 
agreement, and seeks payment of $11,572.25 per month from July through October 2011, for 
a total of $46,289. 
Respondent has moved for summary relief on the ground that the terms of the lease 
permitted it to terminate the agreement with sixty days written notice. Appellant opposes 
the motion.  Based upon the unambiguous terms and conditions of the lease agreement, we 
conclude that respondent’s interpretation is correct and that the Government acted in 
accordance with the terms of the lease agreement when it terminated the lease. 

 
                
                
                  
       
            
               
              
                
            
   
                   
    
           
   
             
              
              
              
 
              
      
         
       
             
  
   
         
        
        
         
2 CBCA 2516 
Background 
On January, 28, 1998, GSA awarded a lease to Tony J. Dossi. The lease provided that 
GSA would rent office space in Sonora, California. The terms of the lease called for the 
Government to “. . . occupy the premises for a term of ten (10) years, eight (8) years firm, 
subject to termination and renewal rights.” 
The lease contained a termination clause, which permitted GSA to terminate the lease 
“. . . in full or in part at any time after 8 years by giving at least 60 days notice in writing to 
the lessor and no rental shall accrue after the effective date of termination.” Paragraph 
thirteen of the lease provided that “in the event of total vacancy, the rental rate will be 
reduced by $6.80 per square foot per annum.” 
Mr. Portillo purchased the property in 2006.  The lease transferred to Mr. Portillo as 
part of the transaction. At the time of the purchase, the lease was in the final year of the 
eight-year firm term. 
During the term of the lease, GSA issued several supplemental lease agreements 
(SLAs).  SLA number two, issued on December 8, 1998, revised the annual rent, described 
the lease space, and established that the ten-year, eight-year firm lease term would commence 
on October 26, 1998, and would expire on October 25, 2008, subject to termination rights. 
SLA number five, dated August 11, 2008, extended the lease term scheduled to end on 
October 25, 2008, to “October 25, 2010 unless terminated earlier under the terms of this 
Lease.” 
SLA number six, issued July 14, 2010, revised the lease term as follows: 
NOW THEREFORE, these parties for the considerations 
hereinafter mentioned covenant and agree that the said Lease is 
amended, effective upon execution by the Government, as 
follows: to extend the lease for one (1) year, six (6) month firm 
term. 
. . . . 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises with their 
appurtenances from the term beginning on October 26, 1998 
through October 25, 2011, inclusive; subject to termination and 
renewal rights as may be hereinafter set forth. 

 
               
                
         
          
              
           
         
        
             
                
             
                
              
             
              
            
             
          
              
               
            
             
  
               
 
               
               
  
3 CBCA 2516 
In sum, therefore, this SLA extended the lease for an additional year (from October 25, 2010, 
to October 25, 2011), with the first six months identified as the firm term. 
This SLA also revised the termination clause to state: 
The Government shall have the right to terminate this lease at 
any time on or after the firm term, in part or in whole, by giving 
at least sixty (60) calendar days written notice to the Lessor, and 
no rent shall accrue after the effective date of termination. 
Appellant agreed to and signed this SLA. 
On January 26, 2011, GSA notified Mr. Portillo by letter of the Government’s intent 
to terminate the lease effective April 27, 2011, more than sixty days after the date of the 
notice. GSA informed Mr. Portillo that the Government would totally vacate the leased 
space on March 11, 2011, and that in accordance with the lease, the rent would be reduced 
to $6.80 per square foot per annum commencing on the date that the Government vacated 
(i.e., on March 12, 2011) and would expire on the termination date. 
On March 4, 16, and 24, 2011, appellant wrote letters to GSA challenging the rent 
reduction, disputing GSA’s right to terminate the lease, and claiming that GSA was 
responsible for paying rent until October 25, 2011, and potentially responsible for paying rent 
for an eighteen-month term (i.e., until April 27, 2012). 
By letter dated April 5, 2011, GSA explained to appellant that GSA was acting in 
accordance with SLA number six. Mr. Portillo responded by a letter received by GSA on 
April 18, 2011, and demanded monthly rent until October 25, 2011. 
The contracting officer issued a final decision on June 6, 2011, rejecting Mr. Portillo’s 
claim.  The contracting officer stated that GSA had acted consistently with the terms of the 
lease, and that the lease authorized GSA to terminate the lease after the firm term had 
expired. 
Appellant filed an appeal on April 5, 2011. Appellant seeks rent for the months of 
July 2011 through October 2011, in the amount of $11,572.25 per month, for a total of 
$46,289. 

 
            
            
             
             
             
       
              
              
          
       
             
               
               
              
             
             
    
            
            
              
               
             
      
    
            
              
            
                 
             
                
                
                 
         
4 CBCA 2516 
Discussion 
Respondent has submitted a motion for summary relief, seeking denial of the appeal. 
Summary relief is appropriate when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law, based on undisputed material facts. The moving party bears the burden of 
demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of material fact. All justifiable inferences must 
be drawn in favor of the non-movant. Government Marketing Group v. Department of 
Justice , CBCA 964, 08-2 BCA ¶ 33,955. 
The issue presented to us involves the interpretation of various provisions of the lease 
agreement. Pure contract interpretation is a question of law that may be resolved on 
summary relief. Electronic Data Systems, LLC v. General Services Administration , 
CBCA 1552, 10-1 BCA ¶ 34,316 (2009). 
In interpreting the language of a contract, reasonable meaning must be given to all 
parts of the agreement so as not to render any portion meaningless, or to interpret any 
provision so as to create a conflict with other provisions of the contract. Parkview Engraving 
LLC v. Department of Veterans Affairs , CBCA 1564, 10-1 BCA ¶ 34,372, at 169,729 (citing 
Fortec Constructors v. United States , 760 F.2d 1288, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 1985); United States 
v. Johnson Controls, Inc. , 713 F.2d 1541, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Electronic Data Systems , 
10-1 BCA at 169,505).  An interpretation that gives reasonable meaning to all parts will be 
preferred to one which leaves a portion of the contract useless, inoperative, inexplicable, 
void, insignificant, meaningless, superfluous, or achieves a weird and whimsical result. Id. 
(citing Gould, Inc. v. United States , 935 F.2d 1271, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Johnson 
Controls , 713 F.2d at 1555; Arizona v. United States , 575 F.2d 855, 863 (Ct. Cl. 1978); 
Electronic Data Systems , 10-1 BCA at 169,505). Contract language should be given the 
plain meaning that would be derived by a reasonably intelligent person acquainted with the 
contemporaneous circumstances. Id. (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States , 
444 F.2d 547, 551 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Hol-Gar Manufacturing Corp. v. United States , 
351 F.2d 972, 975 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Electronic Data Systems , 10-1 BCA at 169,505). 
In defining the lease term, the original solicitation specified that the Government had 
sixty days notice termination rights, “in whole or in part on or after the firm term.” The 
original lease clarified the language of the solicitation, which indicated that the parties agreed 
that the term of the lease would be through ten years, eight years firm, subject to termination 
and renewal rights as detailed in the lease. The lease stated in a subsequent paragraph that 
the Government could terminate the lease in full or in part at any time after eight years by 
giving at least sixty days notice in writing. 

 
               
             
                  
      
               
               
                
      
            
                
                
                    
                 
          
             
              
         
            
      
            
      
         
               
                
               
             
              
            
          
            
             
             
             
          
5 CBCA 2516 
When the parties entered into SLA number six, they extended the term of the lease for 
one year, from October 26, 2010, through October 25, 2011, and included a termination 
clause. Appellant does not dispute that he agreed to the terms of SLA number six. Nor does 
appellant dispute the fact that GSA gave him written notice on January 26, 2011, that GSA 
would terminate the lease on April 26, 2011, more than sixty calendar days after January 26. 
Rather, appellant contends that SLA number six extended the lease for a firm term of one 
year and six months (meaning a firm term of eighteen months), and that GSA had no right 
to terminate during the lease period.
1 
We find that appellant’s interpretation is contrary to the plain and unambiguous terms 
of the lease agreement. 2 As noted above, paragraph 2 of SLA number six extended the lease 
for one year subject to termination rights. Paragraph 4 of the SLA states that the Government 
shall have the right to terminate the lease at any time on or after the firm term. The firm term 
as identified in the SLA is for the period of six months, after which the Government had the 
option to terminate the lease upon sixty days notice. 
The contract is clear and unambiguous. The Government complied with the terms of 
the contract. Appellant has not established that he is entitled to any greater compensation 
than he received under the terms of the lease agreement.
3 
1 Appellant appears pro se in this appeal. In correspondence presented by an 
attorney representing appellant prior to the filing of this appeal, the attorney suggested that 
the language could be considered ambiguous. Appellant has neither clarified nor pursued 
this argument in this appeal. 
2 Under appellant’s current interpretation, the original lease, which provided for 
a term of “ten (10) years, eight (8) years firm,” would have created an eighteen-year lease 
term. The fact that the Government issued SLA number five to extend the original lease term 
to October 25, 2010, and thereafter issued SLA number six to extend the lease term to 
October 25, 2011, reflects the parties’ understanding that the stated term was not cumulative, 
but, instead, included a “firm” period (eight years in original lease), and a subsequent period 
during which the Government could terminate the agreement with sixty days notice. 
3 In his opposition to respondent’s motion for summary relief, appellant alleged 
that the Social Security Administration owes him overtime related to utilities, but provides 
no information, facts, or other evidence concerning this allegation. To this extent that 
appellant opposes the motion for summary relief, he must do more than present bare 
allegations.  He must present specific evidence which sets forth a genuine issue of material 
fact. See Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co. , 833 F.2d 1560, 1562-63 
(Fed. Cir. 1987). This he did not do. 

 
             
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6 CBCA 2516 
Decision 
Respondent’s motion for summary relief is granted and the appeal is DENIED . 
JERI KAYLENE SOMERS 
Board Judge 
We concur: 
HOWARD A. POLLACK ALLAN H. GOODMAN 
Board Judge Board Judge