MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED: May 1, 2012 
CBCA 1143-R 
RYLL INTERNATIONAL, LLC, 
Appellant, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Respondent. 
Marlene Ryll, President of Ryll International, LLC, Greenville, SC, appearing for 
Appellant. 
Rayann L. Speakman, Office of Division Counsel, Federal Highway Administration, 
Department of Transportation, Vancouver, WA, counsel for Respondent. 
Before Board Judges DANIELS (Chairman), STEEL , and KULLBERG . 
STEEL , Board Judge. 
In Ryll International, LLC v. Department of Transportation , CBCA 1143, 11-2 BCA 
¶ 34,809, we denied Ryll International, LLC’s (Ryll) appeal of the contracting officer’s (CO) 
decision to terminate for cause a contract to crush and stockpile borrow and surface course 
aggregate in Katmai National Park, Alaska. The CO terminated the contract because Ryll 
was not able to complete the work within the period specified. In upholding the decision to 
terminate, the Board found that the failure to perform was not excusable and that the 
Government had a reasonable, contract-related basis to support its termination for cause. 

 
            
  
              
              
            
             
          
    
               
           
           
            
          
       
          
            
             
          
          
           
            
              
              
            
           
        
             
             
            
           
           
              
               
       
2 CBCA 1143-R 
Appellant now seeks reconsideration of the Board’s decision. Familiarity with that decision 
is presumed. 
Appellant argues that because of errors of law and fact in the Board’s decision, the 
decision should be reconsidered and the appeal granted. Following a careful review of the 
numerous allegations made in support of appellant’s motion, the Board finds that the 
allegations are either incorrect or immaterial to the decision. We deny appellant’s request 
for reconsideration because the grounds submitted by appellant do not warrant 
reconsideration under the Board’s Rules. 
Review of a motion to reconsider is governed by the standards set out in the Board’s 
Rule 26 (48 CFR 6101.26 (2011)). As the Board has stated, 
The Board’s Rule 26 explains that reconsideration may be granted for any of 
the following reasons set out in Rule 27(a): newly discovered evidence which 
could not have been earlier discovered, even through due diligence; justifiable 
or excuable mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect; fraud, 
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; the decision has 
been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior decision upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, and it is no longer equitable that 
the decision should have prospective application; the decision is void, whether 
for lack of jurisdiction or otherwise; or any other ground justifying 
reconsideration, including a reason established by the rules of common law or 
equity applicable as between private parties in the courts of the United States. 
Oregon Woods, Inc. v. Department of the Interior , CBCA 1072-R, 09-1 BCA ¶ 34,063, at 
168,431-32, aff’d sub nom . Oregon Woods, Inc. v. Salazar , 355 F. App’x 403 (Fed. Cir. 
2009); see also W.G. Yates & Sons Construction Co. v. General Services Administration, 
CBCA 1495-R (Nov. 9, 2011); Springcar Co. v. General Services Administration , CBCA 
1310-R, et al., 10-2 BCA ¶ 34,534, at 170,332. 
Reconsideration is not a vehicle for retrying a case or introducing arguments that have 
been made previously. Confederated Tribes of Coos, Lower Umpqua, & Siuslaw Indians v. 
Department of Health and Human Services , CBCA 237-ISDA-R, 10-2 BCA ¶ 34,476, at 
170,043. Significantly, Rule 26(a) also cautions that “[a]rguments already made and 
reinterpretations of old evidence are not sufficient grounds for granting reconsideration, for 
altering or amending a decision, or for granting a new hearing.” See Beyley Construction 
Group Corp. v. Department of Veterans Affairs , CBCA 5-R, et al., 08-1 BCA ¶ 33,784, at 
167,203. As the Board observed in Beyley : 

 
           
         
        
          
          
           
            
          
         
          
            
             
               
             
       
     
                
                 
              
                
       
            
           
            
               
             
              
              
         
  
            
             
               
               
3 CBCA 1143-R 
Reconsideration is a matter within the discretion of the Board. Flathead 
Contractors, LLC v. Department of Agriculture , CBCA 118-R, 07-2 BCA 
¶ 33,688 at 166,778.  In exercising our discretion, and in evaluating a request 
for reconsideration, a tribunal must “strike a delicate balance between two 
countervailing impulses: the desire to preserve the finality of judgments and 
the incessant command of the [tribunal’s] conscience that justice be done in 
light of all the facts.” Advanced Injection Molding, Inc. v. General Services 
Administration , GSBCA 16504-R, 05-2 BCA ¶ 33,097 at 164,063, cited in 
Flathead Contractors , 07-2 BCA at 166,778; see also Tidewater Contractors, 
Inc. v. Department of Transportation , CBCA 50-R, 07-2 BCA ¶ 33,618. 
In its motion for reconsideration, as counted by the Government, appellant sets forth 
fifteen arguments as to why the Board’s decision should be reconsidered, based on evidence 
already in the record. All but two arguments were raised in appellant’s or the Government’s 
post-hearing brief. The issues raised by appellant were mostly ones of interpretation of 
evidence and application of the law, about which it had thoroughly presented its arguments 
before the decision was issued. 
In a couple of instances, appellant noted that the Board had made factual errors: that 
appellant’s first visit to the site was July 18, 2007, not August 18, and that the parties had 
first discussed modifying the contract so as to extend the completion date into the following 
spring on October 19, not October 30, as the Board stated. These statements are correct, but 
have no impact on the analysis or result. 
Two arguments were semantic. For example, citing testimony that the CO declined 
to characterize her discussions with appellant and its subcontractor as “mediating” between 
the parties, appellant argued that the Board’s finding that the CO “mediated” negotiations 
was erroneous. In context, the Board meant not that the CO served as a alternative dispute 
resolution mediator, but that she urged Ryll and its subcontractor to resolve their differences 
so that the contract could be completed. Likewise, appellant argues that the Board erred 
when it stated, “sent a notice to its suppliers” (although the referenced letter itself contained 
the caption “Letter to Suppliers”) when the letter in question was arguably sent to only one 
supplier. 
These factual and semantic differences, however, even if viewed in the light most 
favorable to appellant, are not material to the question of whether the Government was 
justified in terminating the contract for cause and would not alter the Board’s decision on the 
merits. None of these errors were offered by the Board as material to its decision. 

 
              
              
             
             
  
               
                
               
     
              
            
            
   
   
                
         
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4 CBCA 1143-R 
The Oregon Woods case is instructive here. In that case, the appellant raised nine 
issues, also suggesting errors in dates cited in the decision and asserting that the Board 
overlooked or ignored disputed material facts in reaching its decision. Specifically, as the 
Oregon Woods Board stated regarding the incorrect dates at issue, “Oregon Woods correctly 
points out that modification 2 was issued on October 12, 2007, not on September 12, 2007. 
The date of the modification is immaterial to our decision, however, so changing it does not 
merit reconsideration.” 09-1 BCA ¶ 34,063 at 168,432 n.2. With regard to other facts and 
arguments, the Board found that none of the reasons given by Oregon Woods met Rule 26’s 
standards of good grounds for reconsideration: 
The best that might be said for any of them is that they establish disagreements 
about immaterial facts. As we held in granting the agency’s motion for 
summary relief, only genuine issues of material fact will defeat such a motion. 
Id. at 168,432. 
In the instant case, the Board finds that none of the arguments made by appellant go 
to issues sufficiently material that they would cause the Board to alter its decision. 
Decision 
Accordingly, the motion to reconsider the Board’s decision is DENIED . 
CANDIDA S. STEEL 
Board Judge 
We concur: 
__________________________________ _____________________________ 
STEPHEN M. DANIELS H. CHUCK KULLBERG 
Board Judge Board Judge