DISMISSED IN PART FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION:  April 26, 2007 
CBCA 91 
ALL STAR METALS, LLC., 
Appellant, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Respondent. 
William  M. Dozier of Vandeventer Black LLP, Norfolk, VA, counsel for Appellant. 
Eric Colin Crane, Office of the Chief Counsel, Maritime Administration, Department 
of Transportation, Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent. 
Before Board Judges Stern, Fennessy, and Somers. 
FENNESSY , Board Judge. 
This appeal arises from contract no. DTMA1P04057 between the Maritime 
Administration, Department of Transportation (MARAD), and All Star Metals, LLC (All 
Star) for towing, dismantling, and remediating the materials and components of the vessel 
PROTECTOR.   We have before us respondent’s motion to partially dismiss Claim I of the 
complaint and to dismiss Claim III in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction based upon 
appellant’s failure to submit a claim to the contracting officer for a decision.  Appellant 
opposes the motion as to Claim I but does not object to the dismissal without prejudice of 
Claim III.  For the reasons set forth below, we grant the motion in part. 

                                                                                                                            
 
 
         
 
   
 
           
            
    
       
   
   
    
  
2CBCA 91 
 Background 
On September 10, 2004,  MARAD awarded the contract to All Star.  The period of 
performance was 110 days beginning on September 13, 2004, and ending on January 1, 2005. 
At some time, undeterminable from the record before us, the completion date was extended 
by agreement to January 20, 2005. 
By an e-mail message dated January 25, 2005, to the contracting officer’s technical 
representative, All Star requested an extension of the completion date, claiming 172 days 
of excusable delay attributable to a variety of causes.  On September 7, 2005, All Star 
notified MARAD that it had stopped work because All Star had found a radioactive device 
in a radio room.  MARAD made arrangements for removal of the item and ordered All Star 
to cordon off the affected area and otherwise to resume the work. By letter dated 
September 15, 2005, All Star requested an extension of the performance period until 
October 15, 2005. The contract was not completed until November 29, 2005.  All Star did 
not submit any monetary claims to the contracting officer. 
On June 7, 2006, MARAD’s contracting officer rendered a decision granting All Star 
a three-day extension of the performance period to January 23, 2005, as a result of the 
September 2005 discovery of the radioactive material.  Otherwise, the contracting officer 
found that there was no excusable delay.  Additionally, the contracting officer asserted a 
claim by MARAD against All Star for $52,379 for costs incurred by MARAD for 
environmental monitoring of the PROTECTOR and for administering the contract during the 
period of unexcused delay.  
Appellant commenced a timely appeal of that decision. In its complaint, All Star 
asserted three claims: one for an extension of the performance period to November 29, 2005, 
plus compensation for all government-caused delays (Claim I); another for recission of the 
$52,379 in damages assessed by the contracting officer and release of $36,887.86 of contract 
funds retained by MARAD (Claim II); and a third for an equitable adjustment of $256,319.84 
for costs incurred by All Star for a stop work period due to discovery of radioactive material 
on the vessel and the discovery, after contract completion, of a radioactive substance in a rail 
car filled with scrap from the vessel (Claim III).   
Respondent moves to dismiss without prejudice a portion of Claim I and  all of Claim 
III for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because All Star did not submit a monetary claim 

                                                                                                                            
 
 
        
      
   
  
  
  
   
       
  
  
      
   
 
 
3 CBCA 91 
to the contracting officer. 1 All Star does not oppose dismissal of Claim III without prejudice 
because All Star has not submitted to the contracting officer a claim for the costs involved 
in that claim.  However, it opposes the motion as to Claim I because it says that Claim I does 
not assert a monetary claim. 
Discussion 
Pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act (CDA), the Board possesses jurisdiction to 
entertain claims involving any express or implied contract for the procurement of property 
or services.  41 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-613 (2006) . For jurisdiction to vest in the Board there must 
be both a valid claim and a contracting officer’s decision on that claim (or a deemed denial 
of the claim).  Id. §
§ 605(a), 606; James M. Ellett Construction Co. v. United States, 93 F.3d 
1537, 1541-42 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Paragon Energy Corp. v. United States, 645 F.2d 966 (Ct. 
Cl. 1981).  The question of this Board’s jurisdiction, therefore, first turns on whether a 
contracting officer has rendered a decision denying a valid contractor claim  (or is deemed 
to have rendered such a decision) or asserting a Government claim. 
All Star states that respondent misunderstands Claim I, arguing that All Star did not 
assert a monetary claim in Claim I. Rather, All Star states that Claim I merely contests the 
contracting officer’s decision that there was no excusable delay other than the three days 
granted in the final decision and seeks an extension of the contract period.  While that may 
have been All Star’s intent, the contractor’s request for “compensation for all delays” 
indicates that it seeks monetary relief and not just an extension of the performance period. 
All Star has not submitted a monetary claim to the contracting officer for compensable 
delay. Accordingly, only All Star’s appeal of the contracting officer’s decision that there 
were only three days of excusable delays is within the Board’s jurisdiction.  To the extent that 
Claim I seeks monetary compensation for delay it is DISMISSED FOR LACK OF 
JURISDICTION . 
All Star has not opposed the motion as to Claim III, having acknowledged that its 
failure to submit a claim for the costs it seeks to recover renders it outside the Board’s 
jurisdiction.  It too is DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. 
1 Respondent also requested partial dismissal of Claim II but has withdrawn that 
portion of its motion because MARAD’s retention ofcontract funds was to offset MARAD’s 
$52,379 damages claim.  As such, appellant’s request for the release of the retainage is 
within the scope of the contracting officer’s decision and is properly before the Board.  See 
Placeway Construction Corp. v. United States, 920 F.2d 903, 906 (Fed. Cir. 1990).   

                                                                                                                            
 
4 CBCA 91 
Decision 
The motion is GRANTED in part 
___________________________ 
EILEEN P. FENNESSY 
Board Judge 
We Concur: 
________________________ ____________________________ 
JAMES L. STERN JERI K. SOMERS 
Board Judge Board Judge