MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED: November 17, 2017
CBCA 4078-R
AFFILIATED WESTERN, INC.,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent.
Paul H. Sanderford of Sanderford & Carroll, P.C., Temple, TX, counsel for Appellant.
Mary A. Mitchell, Office of General Counsel, Department of Veterans Affairs,
Houston, TX, counsel for Respondent.
Before Board Judges SOMERS (Chair), HYATT, and GOODMAN.
SOMERS, Board Judge.
In Affiliated Western, Inc. v. Department of Veterans Affairs, CBCA 4078, 17-1 BCA
¶ 36,808, we found that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) properly terminated
Affiliated Western, Inc. (AWI) for default.  We held that the VA’s contracting officer had
a reasonable belief that there was no likelihood of timely completion under the contract.  Id.
at 179,400.  Our decision was based on evidence that showed AWI did not adequately assure
the contracting officer of its diligent performance.  We therefore denied AWI’s request to
overturn the VA’s termination for default and convert it to a termination for convenience. 
AWI now seeks reconsideration.

CBCA 4078-R 2
We deny AWI’s request.  “Motions for reconsideration are committed to the
considerable discretion of the Board.”  URS Energy & Construction, Inc. v. Department of
Energy, CBCA 2260-R, 12-2 BCA ¶ 35,147, at 172,522 (citing Beyley Construction Group
Corp. v. Department of Veterans Affairs, CBCA 5-R, et al., 08-1 BCA  ¶ 33,784, at 167,203). 
We reconsider our decisions under the limited circumstances set out in Board Rule 26 (48
CFR 6101.26 (2016)).  As we have stated:  
[R]econsideration may be granted for any of the following reasons . . . :  newly
discovered evidence which could not have been earlier discovered, even
through due diligence; justifiable or excusable mistake,  inadvertence, surprise,
or neglect; fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
the decision has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior decision upon
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, and it is no longer
equitable that the decision should have prospective application; the decision
is void, whether for lack of jurisdiction or otherwise; or any other ground
justifying reconsideration, including a reason established by the rules of
common law or equity applicable as between private parties in the courts of the
United States. 
Bryan Concrete & Excavation, Inc. v. Department of Veterans Affairs, CBCA 2882-R, 16-1
BCA ¶ 36,549, at 178,031 (citing Oregon Woods, Inc. v. Department of the Interior, CBCA
1072-R, 09-1 BCA ¶ 34,063, at 168,431-32, aff’d sub nom. Oregon Woods, Inc. v. Salazar,
355 F. App’x 403 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see Universal Home Health & Industrial Supplies, Inc.
v. Department of Veterans Affairs, CBCA 4012-R, et al., 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,530, at 177,947
(“Reconsideration is not a vehicle for retrying a case or introducing arguments that have been
made previously” (citing Ryll International, LLC v. Department of Transportation, CBCA
1143-R, 12-1 BCA ¶ 35,029, at 172,144)).  Significantly, Rule 26(a) also cautions that
“[a]rguments already made and reinterpretations of old evidence are not sufficient grounds
for granting reconsideration, for altering or amending a decision, or for granting a new
hearing.”   
Here, AWI argues that our prior decision contained flawed legal analysis and failed
to consider important, undisputed facts.  AWI further alleges that we misapplied the burden
of proof for delay damages, and it contests its obligation to prove excusable delay.  AWI
emphasized its entitlement to an extension of the contract completion date following a
unilateral modification that extended phases 1 and 2.  According to AWI, the Board denied
its appeal in part because we failed to appreciate the factual significance of the contract
phases corresponding with definite weekly durations, which AWI believed contractually
entitled them to an extension of the overall contract commensurate with those durations. 

CBCA 4078-R 3
On the contrary, we found that the contracting officer possessed sufficient evidence
to support his decision to terminate for default on the basis that AWI’s timely performance
of the contract was imperiled.  When the contracting officer issued the notice terminating
AWI for default, AWI was approximately three weeks behind schedule on phase 2, with
approximately 50% of the work completed on that phase.  AWI fell behind on two extended
milestones (phases), had completed a negligible percentage of work on those delayed phases
at the time of termination, had created uncertainties regarding its subcontractor, and
displayed continual shortcomings with its scheduling and project management.  AWI’s
numerous failures to assure the contracting officer following delays and other shortcomings
with its performance controlled this case.
In sum, AWI simply takes issue with the factual and legal findings of the Board’s
prior decision.  Ultimately, however, AWI has not presented grounds to justify
reconsideration of our decision to uphold the VA’s decision to terminate for default.   
Decision
For the reasons set forth above, AWI’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.  
_____________________________
JERI K. SOMERS
Board Judge
We concur:
____________________________ _____________________________
CATHERINE B.  HYATT ALLAN H.  GOODMAN
Board Judge Board Judge