DENIED:  August 23, 2022
CBCA 6814
CARING HANDS HEALTH EQUIPMENT & SUPPLIES, LLC,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent.
Edward J. Tolchin of Offit Kurman, PA, Bethesda, MD, counsel for Appellant.
Neil S. Deol, Office of General Counsel, Department of Veterans Affairs, Decatur,
GA; and Donald C. Mobly, Office of General Counsel, Department of Veterans Affairs,
Denver, CO, counsel for Respondent.
Before Board Judges, RUSSELL, GOODMAN and CHADWICK.
GOODMAN, Board Judge.
Appellant, Caring Hands Health Equipment & Supplies, LLC (Caring Hands), has
appealed a decision by a contracting officer of respondent, Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA). The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment as to entitlement.  We
grant respondent’s motion, deny appellant’s motion, and deny the appeal.
Background
Appellant and respondent entered into sixteen contracts, performed from 2014 through
2017, for appellant to deliver Government-owned home medical equipment (HME) from the
VA’s warehouse to beneficiaries of designated Veterans Affairs Medical Centers (VAMCs)


CBCA 6814 2
within a specific geographic area as defined in each contract.  Appellant’s motion for
summary judgment divides the contracts into two groups, each containing eight contracts,
which the parties refer to as the “2014 contracts” and the “2015 contracts.”
The 2014 Contracts
The 2014 contracts were nos. VA247-14-D-0323 (VAMC Columbia SC);
VA247-14-D-0324 (VAMC Atlanta GA); VA247-14-D-0325 (VAMC Augusta GA),
VA247-14-D-0327 (VAMC Birmingham AL); VA247-14-D-0328 (VAMC CAVHCS
Montgomery/Tuskegee AL); VA247-14-D-0329 (VAMC Charleston SC);
VA247-14-D-0331 (VAMC Dublin GA); and VA247-14-D-0333 (VAMC Tuscaloosa AL).
The period of performance for these contracts was August 1, 2014, through July 31,
2015.  According to appellant, each of the 2014 contracts referred to a statement of work
(SOW) on its first page, but no SOW was attached.1
The 2014 contracts contained the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Indefinite
Quantity clause (48 CFR 52.216-22 (2014) (FAR 52.216-22)), which reads in relevant part: 
INDEFINITE QUANTITY (OCT 1995)
(a) This is an indefinite-quantity contract for the supplies or services
specified, and effective for the period stated, in the Schedule.  The quantities
of supplies and services specified in the Schedule are estimates only and are
not purchased by this contract.
(b) Delivery or performance shall be made only as authorized by orders
issued in accordance with the Ordering clause.  The Contractor shall furnish
to the Government, when and if ordered, the supplies or services specified in
the Schedule up to and including the quantity designated in the Schedule as the
“maximum.”  The Government shall order at least the quantity of supplies or
services designated in the Schedule as the “minimum.”
1 Appellant alleges that the SOW would have been the same as that used in the
2015 contracts.  Appellant supports this allegation by the deposition testimony of Kevin
Warren, VA Contract Specialist.  Respondent disputes this statement, as Mr. Warren stated
in his deposition: “[B]ut I can’t say that it would be [the same] . . . because it was . . . a year
earlier.”  Deposition of Kevin Warren (June 21, 2021) at 29-30.  Appellant’s assertion that
the SOW in these contracts would have been identical to those in the 2015 contracts is
therefore speculative and not relevant to the disposition of this case.

CBCA 6814 3
(c) Except for any limitations on quantities in the Order Limitations clause
or in the Schedule, there is no limit on the number of orders that may be
issued.  The Government may issue orders requiring delivery to multiple
destinations or performance at multiple locations.
The 2014 contracts also contained the Orders Limitation clause (FAR 52-216-19),
which reads in relevant part:
(a) Minimum order.  When the Government requires supplies or services
covered by this contract in an amount of less than ___________ [insert dollar
figure or quantity],[2] the Government is not obligated to purchase, nor is the
Contractor obligated to furnish, those supplies or services under the contract.
(b) Maximum order.  The Contractor is not obligated to honor–
(1) Any order for a single item in excess of ___________
[insert dollar figure or quantity];
(2) Any order for a combination of items in excess of
___________ [insert dollar figure or quantity]; or
(3) A series of orders from the same ordering office within
___________ days that together call for quantities exceeding the
limitation in paragraph (b)(1) or (2) of this section.[3]
(c) If this is a requirements contract (i.e., includes the Requirements clause
at subsection 52.216-21 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)), the
Government is not required to order a part of any one requirement from the
Contractor if that requirement exceeds the maximum-order limitations in
paragraph (b) of this section.
(Emphasis added.)
The 2014 contracts did not contain the Requirements clause (FAR 52.216-21), but the
following language was included in the General Requirements:
2 Appellant states there is a material difference in four of the eight 2014
contracts which contained an error stating “an amount less than 1 order,” as there cannot be
a number of orders less than 1.  This alleged error was obvious before award of the contracts.
3 The dollar amounts in (b)(1)–(3) are not relevant to the resolution of this case.

CBCA 6814 4
B.3.1  The contractor shall furnish all labor, transportation, materials, tools,
equipment and supervision required to provide Home Medical Equipment
services to beneficiaries of VA medical centers located in the [designated]
catchment areas.  Service shall include the assembly, delivery, pick up,
cleaning, repairing and storage of Government-owned HME.  The contractor
shall provide onsite telephone and warehouse coverage during normal business
hours.  Service hours will be accomplished by travel to and from beneficiary
residences in the medical centers’ primary service areas (PSA) and other
combination zones (CZ).  Combination zones are areas outside the medical
center’s PSA that are primarily serviced by other VA Medical Centers.  The
medical center may occasionally place orders for service in these combination
zones that the contractor will be required to complete.
The designated catchment areas in the first sentence of the above provision were as
follows, by contract number:  VA247-14-D-0323 (VAMC Columbia SC) Catchment area –
Columbia SC VA; VA247-14-D-0324 (VAMC Atlanta GA) Catchment area – Atlanta VA;
VA247-14-D-0325 (VAMC Augusta GA) Catchment area – Augusta VA;
VA247-14-D-0327 (VAMC Birmingham AL) Catchment area – Birmingham VA;
VA247-14-D-0328 (VAMC CAVHCS Montgomery/Tuskegee AL [Central Alabama])
Catchment area – Atlanta (sic)4; VA247-14-D-0329 (VAMC Charleston SC) Catchment area
– Charleston, SC VAMC; VA247-14-D-0331 (VAMC Dublin GA) Catchment area – Dublin
GA VAMC; and VA247-14-D-0333 (VAMC Tuscaloosa AL) Catchment area – Tuscaloosa
AL VAMC.
Clause B.3.1 defines a specific geographic area within which “[t]he contractor shall
furnish all labor, transportation, materials, tools, equipment and supervision required to
provide Home Medical Equipment services to beneficiaries of VA medical centers located
within it, i.e., the VAMC’s catchment area specified in each contract.  Central to the
understanding of clause B.3.1 are the definitions of catchment area, primary service area, and
combination zone.  Respondent, as drafter of this clause, has explained these terms.5 
According to respondent, the terms catchment area and primary service area (PSA) are
synonymous.  A catchment area’s boundaries are determined by the application of
geographic principles, which result in a map of each catchment area.  Veterans Health
4 Respondent states that this was a scrivener’s error which should have stated the
CAVHCS (Central Alabama VA Healthcare System) catchment area as opposed to the
Atlanta catchment area.  While appellant did not clarify this error prior to award, nor dispute
this characterization after the fact, the error does not create a disputed issue of material fact.
5 Respondent provided these explanations during the briefing of the motions in
response to this Board’s inquiries. 

CBCA 6814 5
Administration (VHA) facilities within a specified catchment area fall under the
administrative jurisdiction of the leadership at the parent facility in the area, which is
typically a VAMC.  Hence, the first sentence of clause B.3.1 designates a catchment area by
naming a specific VAMC.  Respondent explains by example:  “The Atlanta catchment area
would fall under the administrative jurisdiction of the Atlanta Medical Center and includes
VHA facilities in the greater Atlanta area as well as its environs.”  Additionally, respondent
states that certain counties in the geographic vicinity of a VAMC are designated as being
within that VAMC’s catchment area.
A “combination zone” is an area which falls outside of a particular VAMC’s
catchment area.  An example would be a patient who is a beneficiary of the Birmingham
VAMC catchment area, based on the patient’s county of residence, who temporarily travels
to Atlanta and is in need of HME while in that temporary travel status.  In that circumstance,
Atlanta would be the combination zone and the HME provided via a warehouse in the
Atlanta catchment area, though the cost of the HME would be funded in the patient’s
traditionally-assigned catchment area, Birmingham.
The 2015 Contracts
The 2015 contracts were contract nos. VA247-15-D-0257 (VAMC Atlanta GA);
VA247-15-D-0258 (VAMC Colombia SC); VA247-15-D-0259 (VAMC Augusta GA);
VA247-15-D-0260 (VAMC Dublin GA); VA247-15-D-0261 (VAMC Birmingham AL);
VA247-15-D-0262 (VAMC Charleston SC); VA247-15-D-0263 (VAMC Montgomery AL);
and VA247-15-D-0264 (VAMC Tuscaloosa AL).
The period of performance for these contracts was August 2015 to January 2017. 
These contracts provided no award amounts or quantities, did not contain the Indefinite
Quantity clause (FAR 52.216-22), the Orders Limitation clause (FAR 52-216-19), or the
Requirements clause (FAR 52.216-21). 
The contracts contained a SOW with clause C, “General Requirements,” as follows:
1. The volumes or amounts shown in the Contract Line Item Numbers
(CLINS) are estimates only and impose no obligation on the VA.  The contract
shall be for the actual requirements of the VA as ordered by the VA during the
life of the contract.  The Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) or
designee shall provide (fax, or verbally) the contractor with notification to
initiate individual Patient service requirements, including the Patient’s
equipment, supplies and services to be provided including date and place of
delivery.

CBCA 6814 6
2. The contractor shall furnish all labor, transportation, materials, tools,
equipment and supervision required to provide Home Medical Equipment
services to beneficiaries of the VA medical center located in [the designated],
VAMC.  Service shall include the assembly, delivery, pick-up, cleaning,
repairing and storage of Government-owned D[urable] M[edical]
E[quipment].[6]  The contractor shall provide onsite telephone and warehouse
coverage during normal business hours (normal business hours are Monday
through Friday 8:00 am – 4:30 pm). Service will be accomplished by travel to
and from beneficiary residences in the medical centers’ primary service areas
(PSA) and other combination zones (CZ).  Combination zones are areas
outside the medical center’s PSA that are primarily serviced by other VA
Medical Centers.  The medical center may occasionally place orders for a
service in these combination zones that the contractor will be required to
complete.  Counties that fall under ___ VAMC are:  [a list of named counties
divided into three zones follow in each contract].
The specific, designated cities in the first and last sentence in clause C.2 were as
follows, by contract number:  VA247-15-D-0257 (VAMC - Atlanta GA) – first sentence,
Atlanta, Georgia, last sentence, Atlanta; VA247-15-D-0258 (VAMC Columbia SC) – first
sentence, Columbia, Georgia (sic), last sentence, Columbia; VA247-15-D-0259 (VAMC
Augusta GA) – first sentence, Augusta, Georgia, second sentence, Augusta;
VA247-15-D-0260 (VAMC Dublin GA) – first sentence, Dublin, Georgia, second sentence,
Dublin; VA247-15-D-0261 (VAMC Birmingham AL) first sentence, Birmingham, Georgia
(sic), second sentence, Birmingham; VA247-15-D-0262 (VAMC Charleston SC) first
sentence, Charleston, Georgia (sic), second sentence, Charleston; VA247-15-D-0263
(VAMC Montgomery AL) – first sentence, Montgomery, Georgia (sic), second sentence,
Montgomery; and VA247-15-D-0264 (VAMC Tuscaloosa AL) – first sentence, Tuscaloosa,
Georgia (sic), second sentence, Tuscaloosa.7
Respondent explains that the language of Clause C.2 in the 2015 contracts is very
similar to and is intended to be interpreted in the same manner as Clause B.3.1 in the 2014
contracts.  Respondent provided the following explanations with regard to this clause.
Clause C.2 defines a specific geographic area within which “[t]he contractor shall
furnish all labor, transportation, materials, tools, equipment and supervision required to
provide Home Medical Equipment services to beneficiaries of the VA medical center located
6 HME is a subset of DME.
7 For the entries designated by (sic), it is assumed that these are scrivener’s
errors as explained by respondent for a similar error in a 2014 contract. 

CBCA 6814 7
in [designated], VAMC,” i.e., the VAMC’s catchment area specified in each contract.  In the
first sentence, the phrase “located in [designated] VAMC” is a reference to the catchment
area associated with the designated VA medical center.  The VA determines that each
beneficiary of a VA medical center is located in the designated VAMC by the following
method:
Certain counties in the geographic vicinity of a Medical Center are designated
as being within that Medical Center’s catchment area.  As such, veterans who
reside in those counties would be assigned to the Medical Center which
corresponds to those counties and those veterans would be considered
beneficiaries of that designated VA Medical Center.  There are some caveats,
however, in that if certain care (e.g., specialty care) is not available from a VA
facility in a particular catchment area, the veteran would be referred for that
care to a facility which could provide it, even if that facility is in a different
catchment area.
In response to a Board inquiry whether different principles are applied to determine
“beneficiaries of VA medical centers located in the [designated] catchment areas” as stated
in the 2014 contracts and “beneficiaries of the VA medical center located in [designated],
VAMC” as stated in the 2015 contracts, respondent offered the following:
No, the language is saying the same thing using similar but not identical
phraseology.  The language in the 2014 contracts was more precise in that it
alluded to the fact that beneficiaries of certain VA Medical Centers would be
within that Medical Center’s catchment area.  The language in the 2015
contracts was briefer, but it too was meant to signify that beneficiaries of
certain VA Medical Centers would be within that Medical Center’s catchment
area.  In terms of how it is determined which counties fall within a certain
Medical Center’s catchment area, [the method is the same as that described
previously].8
8 Respondent states that, as in the 2014 contracts, primary service area is
synonymous with catchment area.  Also with regard to combination zones, the definition is
the same as for the 2014 contracts, as it is an area which falls outside of a particular medical
center’s catchment area/PSA, and respondent repeats the example of a patient traveling
outside the patient’s designated catchment area.

CBCA 6814 8
Contract Performance
Respondent ordered HME from entities other than appellant during the period of
performance of the contracts at issue.  When appellant found that others were receiving
orders that it alleges should have been placed under its contracts, appellant complained to
respondent, as appellant alleges that the parties understood that the 2014 and 2015 contracts
were requirements contracts.  To support this allegation, appellant states that “[t]he VA
contracting officer notified all personnel in 2015, that they must order HME only from
Caring Hands and not place orders with other companies for these products.”  Appellant cites
the following email from the contracting officer in support of this allegation, while
respondent disputes that this email references any exclusive contractual right of appellant to
fulfill all VA orders for HME.
From: Buggs, Ki G.
Sent: Tuesday, September 01, 2015 10:30 AM
To: Jones, Isaac W. III
Cc: Hughes, Charles E.; Floyd-Ross, Bonita
Subject: DME Contract- Columbia / Charleston
Importance: High
. . . .
Please ensure that the facility orders from the contract if a contract is in place
and the contract covers the services the facility is needed [sic].  We have had
complaints recently about both Charleston and Columbia VA issuing orders
to contractors that are covered under the current DME ordering vehicle. 
Please reach out to your PA(s) at these locations.
If total transparency is required, I will personally provide oversight and
training to your PA(s)[.]  Our Director of Contracting has already addressed
issues with the facility Directors when it comes to this in the past.
If you have any questions please feel free to email me.
FYI
Please as a courtesy reach out to the contractor weekly to receive updates on
contractor performance or issues related and forward these issues to me
weekly.  This will help limit confusion. Thanks[.] 
Appellant’s Claim
On January 7, 2020, appellant submitted a certified claim, pursuant to the Contract
Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7109 (2018), to the contracting officer, which it amended
on February 4, 2020, alleging that appellant was the sole contracting party from which VA
could order HME during the periods of the 2014 and 2015 contracts for the geographic areas

CBCA 6814 9
specified in the contracts.  The contracting officer did not issue a decision in response to the
claim and amended claim, and appellant filed an appeal of a deemed denial of its claim to
this Board on May 14, 2020.  The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in
September 2021, and briefing was complete after submission of respondent’s responses to
the Board’s inquiries in August 2022.
Discussion
Appellant’s motion for summary judgment seeks a ruling that, based upon the contract
provisions and the parties’ intent, all the contracts were requirements contracts that
respondent had breached by ordering HME from entities other than appellant.
Respondent’s cross-motion for summary judgment alleges that, based upon a plain
reading of the contracts, the 2014 contracts were indefinite delivery indefinite quantity
(IDIQ) contracts that specified guaranteed minimum quantities, that quantities exceeding the
guaranteed minimum were ordered and paid for, and that appellant was not entitled to any
recovery.  With regard to the 2015 contracts, respondent asserts that because they contained
neither the Indefinite Quantities clause nor the Requirements clause, they were IDIQ
contracts without a guaranteed minimum quantity, which resulted in the contracts being
illusory and unenforceable except for orders which were actually placed with appellant,
delivered, and paid for.
Pure contract interpretation is a question of law that may be resolved by summary
judgment.  P.J. Maffei Building Wrecking Corp. v. United States, 732 F.2d 913, 916 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).  However, the question of interpretation of language, the conduct, and the intent
of the parties, i.e., the question of what is the meaning that should be given by a court or
board to the words of a contract, may involve questions of material fact and not present a
pure question of law.  If there is a genuine dispute of material fact, summary judgment is
inappropriate.  Beta Systems, Inc. v. United States, 838 F.2d 1179, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see
also Butte Timberlands, LLC v. Department of Agriculture, CBCA 646, 08-1 BCA ¶ 33,730
(2007).
While both parties are of the opinion that this dispute is ultimately one of contract
interpretation, they not only have referred to the terms of the contract but have submitted
statements of undisputed facts and opposing statements identifying genuine issues of material
fact, which, while admitting issues of undisputed fact propounded by the opposing party,
dispute these facts by extended “clarifying statements.”  However, we resolve the motions
by interpreting the plain language of the contracts at issue.  “It has been long recognized that
where a contract provision is clear, ‘[t]he rules of contract construction should not be
permitted to create an ambiguity where none exists or change or twist the plain meaning of
a simple agreement.’”  Au’ Authum Ki, Inc. v. Department of Energy, CBCA 2505, 14-1

CBCA 6814 10
BCA ¶ 35,727, at 174,890-91 (quoting National Housing Group, Inc. v. Department of
Housing & Urban Development, CBCA 340, et al., 09-1 BCA ¶ 34,043, at 168,377). 
With regard to cases in which a party asserts a requirements contract exists, we stated
in Integhearty Wheelchair Van Services, LLC v. Department of Veterans Affairs, CBCA 7318
(July 8, 2022):
To determine the extent to which the VA was obligated to order services from
[a contractor], we first look to the language of the parties’ contract.  “[A]
requirements contract necessarily obligates the Government to purchase
exclusively from a single source” during the life of the contract.  Coyle’s Pest
Control, Inc. v. Cuomo, 154 F.3d 1302, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see Modern
Systems Technology Corp. v. United States, 979 F.2d 200, 205 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(“[A]n essential element of a requirements contract is the promise by the buyer
to purchase the subject matter of the contract exclusively from the seller.”);
FAR 16.503(a) (discussing requirements contracts). . . .
. . . We have previously interpreted Coyle’s Pest to mean that, where “the
contract does not contain the FAR Requirements clause, to qualify as a
requirements contract it must contain ‘words of exclusivity’ that not merely
suggest, but require that all of the work be assigned to the contractor.” 
Environmental Quality Management, Inc. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, CBCA 3072, 13 BCA ¶ 35,300, at 171,283.
Slip op at 6-7.
We find that the 2014 contracts are IDIQ contracts, as they contain the elements of
an IDIQ contract, i.e., the Indefinite Quantity clause and Orders Limitation clause which
included a guaranteed minimum quantity.  These contracts do not contain the FAR 52.216-21
Requirements clause or any other provision or language containing “words of exclusivity”
that require all work to be assigned to the contractor, including clause B.3.1, which only
requires the contractor to fulfill requirements ordered.  The contract cannot be a requirements
contract, because while appellant had the legal obligation to provide the services ordered, it
did not have the exclusive right to satisfy all of the VA’s requirements.  Valor Healthcare,
Inc. v. Department of Veterans Affairs, CBCA 6824, 22-1 BCA ¶ 38,039, at 184,733 (2021). 
As respondent ordered and paid for quantities exceeding the guaranteed minimum under
these IDIQ contracts, appellant is not entitled to additional recovery. 
We find that the 2015 contracts are illusory.  These contracts are neither IDIQ nor
requirements contracts, as they provide no award amounts or quantities and do not contain
the Indefinite Quantity clause, the Orders Limitation clause, the Requirements clause, or any

CBCA 6814 11
other provision or language containing “words of exclusivity” that require all work to be
assigned to the contractor.  While clause C.2 of the SOW states that “[t]he contract shall be
for the actual requirements of the VA as ordered by the VA during the life of the contract,”
this must be read together with clause C.1, which states, “The volumes or amounts shown
in the Contract Line Item Numbers (CLINS) are estimates only and impose no obligation on
the VA.”  There is no requirement for the VA to order any specific quantity pursuant to these
contracts, which renders the obligation under these contracts illusory, and therefore
unenforceable.  As such, the VA is only obligated to pay for quantities actually ordered.  See
MLB Transportation, Inc. v. Department of Veterans Affairs, CBCA 7019, 21-1 BCA
¶ 37,919, at 184,159. 
There are no issues of material fact in dispute.  Based upon the plain meaning of the
relevant contract language, the contracts are not requirements contracts as alleged by
appellant.9  With regard to the contracting officer’s email message cited by appellant, we do
not look to individuals’ purported interpretations to interpret contract provisions that are clear
on their face.  A verbal interpretation of an agency official, even a contracting officer, does
not change the express terms of a contract.  Future Forest, LLC v. Department of
Agriculture, CBCA 5764, 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,238, at 181,269 (2018).
 Decision
With regard to all contracts at issue, respondent’s motion for summary judgment is
granted, and appellant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.  The appeal is DENIED.
    Allan H. Goodman        
ALLAN H. GOODMAN
Board Judge
9 Appellant’s interpretation that the contracts obligate respondent to order all of
its requirements from appellant is based upon allegations of patent ambiguities which would
have obliged the contractor to seek clarification before award.  Appellant did not clarify the
alleged ambiguities and cannot prevail “regardless of the reasonableness of [its]
interpretation.”  Fortec Constructors v. United States, 760 F.2d 1288, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
F.A. Wilhelm Construction Co. v. Department of Veterans Affairs, CBCA 719, 09-2 BCA
¶ 34,228.

CBCA 6814 12
We concur:
   Beverly M. Russell               Kyle Chadwick               
BEVERLY M. RUSSELL KYLE CHADWICK
Board Judge Board Judge