DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION: May 10, 2007 
CBCA 617 
ROBERT T. RAFFERTY, 
Appellant, 
v. 
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, 
Respondent. 
Robert T. Rafferty, pro se, Patchogue, NY. 
Judith A. Bonner, Office of Regional Counsel, General Services Administration, 
Philadelphia, PA, counsel for Respondent. 
Before Board Judges DANIELS  (Chairman), STERN , and DRUMMOND . 
DANIELS , Board Judge. 
By a contracting officer’s final decision dated September 27, 2006, the General 
Services Administration (GSA) asserted a claim in the amount of $855 against Robert T. 
Rafferty.  Mr. Rafferty had been the high bidder on a boat being sold by GSA at auction. 
According to the decision, the agency was entitled to liquidated damages in the claimed 
amount because Mr. Rafferty did not comply with the auction requirement that he remove 
the boat from government premises within a prescribed period of time. 
Mr. Rafferty filed a notice of appeal of the contracting officer’s decision on 
January 24, 2007. GSA filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and Mr. 
Rafferty responded to the motion.  We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal. 

 
 
             
  
 
 
      
 
 
     
 
         
    
 
    
2 CBCA 617 
Discussion 
The Contract Disputes Act of 1978, which governs the Board’s review of contracting 
officer decisions, requires that an appeal of such a decision be filed “[w]ithin ninety days 
from the date of receipt of [the] decision.”  41 U.S.C. § 606 (2000).  This deadline for filing 
has been strictly construed by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit because the 
authorization to make the filing is a waiver of sovereign immunity.  A late filing divests the 
Board of jurisdiction to consider the case on its merits.  D. L. Braughler Co. v. West , 127 
F.3d 1476, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Cosmic Construction Co. v. United States , 697 F.2d 1389, 
1390 (Fed. Cir. 1982); Tiger Natural Gas, Inc. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 
16039, 03-2 BCA ¶ 32,321, at 159,910-11. 
The ninetieth day before Mr. Rafferty filed this appeal was October 26, 2006.  Under 
the statute, as interpreted by the court, we may consider the case only if the appellant 
received the contracting officer’s decision on or after that date. 
“Receipt” of a contracting officer’s decision, as that term is used in the Contract 
Disputes Act, means actual physical receipt of the decision by the contractor or its 
representative.  Riley & Ephriam Construction Co. v. United States , 408 F.3d 1369, 1372 
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Borough of Alpine v. United States , 923 F.2d 170, 172-73 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
If the Government moves to dismiss a case for lack of jurisdiction, for the reason that the 
decision was received more than ninety days before the case was filed, the burden is on the 
Government to prove the early date of receipt.  Riley & Ephriam , 408 F.3d at 1372; Tyrone 
Shanks , ASBCA 54538, 05-2 BCA ¶ 33,069, at 163,892.  
GSA has provided a declaration in which the contracting officer states that she sent 
her decision to Mr. Rafferty by certified mail on or about September 28, 2006. The agency 
has also provided a copy of the return receipt for that letter, and the receipt shows a signature 
of Robert Rafferty and a date of delivery of October 3, 2006.  
Mr. Rafferty has also presented information relating to receipt of the contracting 
officer’s decision. He told us, “Please be advised that my work often necessitates travel.  As 
such, I did not personally receive the decision . . . until October 29, 2006.”  We asked him 
to provide any documentation he might have which supports this assertion.  He responded 
simply, “I cannot.” 
GSA has carried its burden of proving that the decision was received by Mr. Rafferty 
or his representative prior to October 26.  The return receipt shows that the letter was 
accepted on October 3 by someone who signed the appellant’s name on the receipt. 
Although Mr. Rafferty’s statement that he did not personally receive the decision until 

    
 
    
 
  
     
  
  
    
 
 
 
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3 CBCA 617 
October 29 would seem to imply that the individual who signed his name was someone other 
than himself, he has not alleged that this is so.  In addition, he has not provided evidence 
(such as receipts from places of lodging) which might indicate that he was away from home 
during the period in question. 
Mr. Rafferty has said that an order the Board sent to him by certified mail was 
accepted at his address by his son while he was away.  Even if the contracting officer’s 
decision had the same fate, where the appellant is an individual and  the envelope containing 
the decision is accepted by a close relative at the appellant’s address, unless the appellant can 
show that the individual who accepted the letter had no authority to do so, the decision is 
considered to have been received and the appeal time begins to run when the letter is 
accepted.  See Ramos v. United States, 683 F.2d 396 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (same rule regarding 
decision of Merit Systems Protection Board);  Pleasant Logging & Milling Co. , AGBCA 79­
172 CDA, 80-2 BCA ¶ 14,605; M. D. Willner , DOTCAB 73-9, 75-1 BCA ¶ 11,011 (1974); 
cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(A)(iii) (service may be made by leaving a paper at a person’s 
dwelling house with someone of suitable age and discretion residing there).  We find that 
receipt occurred on October 3 -- more than ninety days before this appeal was filed.  We 
therefore have no jurisdiction to hear the case. 
Decision 
The appeal is DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION . 
STEPHEN M. DANIELS 
Board Judge 
We concur: 
JAMES L. STERN JEROME M. DRUMMOND 
Board Judge Board Judge