MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED:  April 9, 2026
CBCA 7891-R
KING & GEORGE, LLC,
Appellant,
v.
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
Respondent.
Edward T. DeLisle and Andrés M. Vera of Thompson Hine LLP, Washington, DC,
and Jamar T. King of Thompson Hine LLP, Miamisburg, OH, counsel for Appellant.
Alexander C. Vincent, Office of General Counsel, General Services Administration,
Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent.
Before Board Judges BEARDSLEY (Chair), O’ROURKE, and KANG.
O’ROURKE, Board Judge.
Respondent seeks reconsideration of our decision in King & George, LLC v. General
Services Administration, CBCA 7891, 25-1 BCA ¶ 38,833, asserting that the Board’s failure
to address two of respondent’s arguments constitutes clear error and was unjust.  Because
respondent has not stated grounds for reconsideration, we deny the motion.
Background
On June 5, 2025, the Board issued a decision denying the agency’s motion for
summary judgment, granting appellant’s motion for partial summary judgment, and granting


CBCA 7891-R 2
the appeal.  We presume familiarity with the facts of that decision but summarize them here
as background for deciding the instant motion.
The underlying appeal involved a facilities maintenance contract which required
appellant to provide janitorial services and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC)
maintenance for nine federal buildings in Florida.  The contract contained three provisions
relevant to the dispute:  a deductions clause, a minimum staffing requirement, and a
commercial items clause, Contract Terms and Conditions – Commercial Items (OCT 2018),
48 CFR 52.212-4 (2020) (Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.212-4).  The parties filed
cross motions for summary judgment asking the Board to interpret whether the deductions
clause permitted the agency to reduce monthly payments based solely on staffing vacancies,
regardless of the performance-based, firm-fixed-price structure of the contract and
appellant’s satisfactory performance record.
In our decision, the Board found that the deductions clause pertained to deficient and
omitted tasks but not to vacant positions.  We further noted that substandard work resulting
from those vacancies could have warranted deductions being taken, but the agency did not
link the vacancies to poor performance.  Instead, the agency erroneously determined that
staffing was the type of performance requirement for which deductions could be taken—a
construction that belied the plain language of the contract’s terms.  The Board further found
that the termination for cause provision of the commercial items clause provides the proper
remedy when a contractor fails to meet minimum staffing requirements.  See FAR
52.212-4(l).
Shortly after the Board issued its decision, respondent moved for reconsideration of
the decision under Board Rule 26 (48 CFR 6101.26 (2024)).  In its motion, respondent
contends that the Board, in its decision, “did not take into account GSA’s argument that
subsections (a), (g)(1), and (i) of [the commercial items clause] fully support GSA’s decision
not to pay K&G for those minimum staff positions that were required to be, but were not,
filled.”  Motion for Reconsideration at 2.  Respondent also argues that the decision failed to
address respondent’s theory that “under the common law of contracts, there is no duty to pay
for any part of a bargained-for performance that was not rendered.”  Id.  Appellant urges the
Board to deny respondent’s motion since it “merely restates arguments previously considered
and rejected by the Board,” which is not a proper basis for granting reconsideration. 
Appellant’s Response to Motion for Reconsideration at 1.  For the reasons that follow, we
deny the motion.

CBCA 7891-R 3
Discussion
I. Standard of Review
“[T]here are three primary grounds that justify reconsideration:  (1) an intervening
change in the law; (2) the availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error
or prevent injustice.”  BES Design/Build, LLC v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
CBCA 6453-R, et al., 24-1 BCA ¶ 38,471, at 186,998 (2023) (citing Delaware Valley Floral
Group, Inc. v. Shaw Rose Nets, LLC, 597 F.3d 1374, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).  It is well
established that “[a] motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity for a litigant to reargue
its case.”  Y2Fox, Inc. v. Department of State, CBCA 7805-R, 24-1 BCA ¶ 38,647,
at 187,873.  Reconsideration is warranted only in extraordinary circumstances.  Caldwell v.
United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
 
II. The Agency’s Grounds for Reconsideration
Respondent contends that reconsideration is justified in this case to correct a clear
error and prevent manifest injustice.  According to respondent, the error is the Board’s failure
to consider two arguments raised in its motion for summary judgment:  (1) that certain
sections of the commercial items clause permitted the agency to refuse payment for staffing
vacancies; and (2) that the agency did not have a duty to pay for performance that was not
provided.  Respondent further asserts that these arguments are fully dispositive of the dispute
and independently justify the agency’s actions without regard to the interpretation of the
deductions clause.  Below, we examine each of these arguments.
A. The Commercial Items Clause Argument
In our decision, we addressed only those arguments advanced by respondent that were
based in fact and legally viable.  The argument relating to the commercial items clause was
hypothetical and bore no relation to the agency’s documented justification for reducing
payments.  The record established that the agency reduced contractor payments pursuant to
the deductions clause of the contract, not under the commercial items clause.  In responding
to a similar allegation in a motion for reconsideration, one of our predecessor boards
concluded that there is no requirement to respond to each and every argument a party raises,
particularly when that argument lacks any factual basis.  See Jay P. Altmayer v. General
Services Administration, GSBCA 12639-REM-R, 96-2 BCA ¶ 28,453, at 142,120 (choosing
not to address an argument that it found “so lacking in support as not to be worth
discussing”).

CBCA 7891-R 4
In addition, respondent does not define “clear error,” nor cite to any legal authority
supporting the premise that a decision lacking a response to each argument constitutes clear
error.  At most, respondent appears to suggest that a tribunal’s silence with respect to a
particular argument automatically amounts to clear error warranting reconsideration.  We
disagree.  In resolving contract disputes, our role is not to chase every argument raised by a
party but to address those that are relevant, factually supported, and material to the issues
presented.  Our decision demonstrates exactly that approach.  We identified all of the
arguments presented by respondent and discussed only those that satisfied the criteria set
forth above.  Indeed, the absence of analysis addressing a particular argument is not error but
reflects a deliberate determination that the argument, although considered, did not warrant
discussion.
Finally, the argument at issue pertained to the invoicing and payment provisions of
the commercial items clause and was based on the agency’s insistence that the “services”
rendered by appellant included staffing.  Under that interpretation, the agency justified
reducing the contractor’s payments (for vacant positions) under the deductions clause. 
However, our decision expressly rejected the proposition that the deductions clause could be
applied to staffing shortfalls in the same way that it could be applied for failing to conduct
water testing or to service an air handler.  “Reconsideration is not granted when a party
reargues facts and theories upon which the Board has previously ruled.”  John Douglas Burke
v. Department of Health and Human Services, CBCA 7492-R, 23-1 BCA ¶ 38,360, at
186,276 (quoting Power Wire Constructors v. Department of Energy, CBCA 2057-R, 12-2
BCA ¶ 35,165, at 172,559).  For these reasons, we find that respondent has not articulated
a proper ground for reconsideration.
B. The Common Law Argument
Respondent’s second argument is that, under the common law of contracts, the agency
did not have a duty to pay for performance that was not provided.  Respondent contends that
the Board’s failure to address this argument in its decision warrants reconsideration to correct
clear error and prevent manifest injustice.  This argument merely rehashes previous
arguments made by respondent and rejected by the Board.  “Arguments and evidence
previously presented are not grounds for reconsideration.”  Rule 26.
A careful reading of our decision demonstrates that, in denying the agency’s summary
judgment motion, we determined, under the plain language of the contract’s terms, that
staffing shortfalls were not performance failures in the same way as failed or omitted tasks
and, as such, were not eligible for deductions.  We also found that the agency was obligated
to pay for the operations and maintenance services it received and, further, that the remedy
for breaching the minimum staffing requirement of the contract was the termination for cause

CBCA 7891-R 5
provision.  In making those determinations, the Board considered respondent’s common law
argument and rejected it.  Respondent cannot raise it again here.  “A motion to reconsider is
not a second chance at trying the case.”  Walker Development & Trading Group Inc v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, CBCA 5907-R, 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,465, at 182,010.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the Board’s decision considered all arguments
advanced by appellant in its summary judgment motion.  Accordingly, we find no reason to
reconsider our decision.
Decision
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
   Kathleen J. O’Rourke    
KATHLEEN J. O’ROURKE
Board Judge
We concur:
    Erica S. Beardsley              Jonathan L. Kang        
ERICA S. BEARDSLEY JONATHAN L. KANG
Board Judge Board Judge