DISMISSED IN PART FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION: January 24, 2012 
CBCA 2549 
DR. LEWIS J. GOLDFINE, 
Appellant, 
v. 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 
Respondent. 
Dr. Lewis J. Goldfine, pro se, Baltimore, MD. 
Uri R. Ko and Ryan M. Warrenfeltz, Sr., Office of the General Counsel, Social 
Security Administration, Baltimore, MD, counsel for Respondent. 
Before Board Judges DANIELS (Chairman), STEEL , and McCANN . 
DANIELS , Board Judge. 
The Social Security Administration (SSA), respondent, moves the Board to dismiss 
in part, for lack of jurisdiction, an appeal filed by Dr. Lewis J. Goldfine. According to SSA, 
the Board lacks jurisdiction of two portions of the case. First, the agency maintains, we may 
not consider Dr. Goldfine’s demand for money damages because he has never submitted a 
claim to the contracting officer or certified such a claim. Second, SSA says, we may not 
consider the doctor’s demand for reinstatement of the blanket purchase agreement (BPA) at 
issue because a BPA is not a contract and the demand therefore does not engender a 
contractual dispute. 

 
              
               
             
               
             
             
             
   
                
    
                  
             
              
     
                
                
    
               
           
        
                 
           
             
          
           
            
     
          
          
           
2 CBCA 2549 
We grant the motion, dismissing the two aspects of the case addressed by the motion 
but preserving for our consideration the aspect of the case not so addressed – Dr. Goldfine’s 
challenge to the termination of the “call order” which SSA issued under the BPA. 
Background 
On April 28, 2011, SSA awarded a BPA to Dr. Lewis J. Goldfine to “assess and 
document impairment severity in SSA disability claims.” The duration of the BPA was 
lengthy. It was stated inconsistently as “from date of award through 12/31/2015”; “60 
months from the award unless otherwise terminated or extended”; and June 1, 2011, through 
May 31, 2016. 
The BPA lists two tasks and contains prices for the performance of each of them. For 
each independent case review Dr. Goldfine performed, he was to be paid $82, and for each 
hour he devoted to non-case services ordered by the agency, he was to be paid $123. As with 
BPAs generally, however, this BPA did not obligate any funds. It explained, “The 
Government is obligated only to the extent of authorized call orders (also referred to as 
‘calls’) placed under this agreement.” 
On May 18, 2011, SSA issued call order number 1 to Dr. Goldfine, for services to be 
performed between June 1, 2011, and February 29, 2012. The total amount of the award was 
$49,200. 
On the afternoon of June 10, 2011, Dr. Goldfine and some SSA employees engaged 
in a discussion about a case he was reviewing. According to the SSA employees, the 
discussion became heated; Dr. Goldfine was aggressive, intimidating them and making them 
feel uncomfortable. According to Dr. Goldfine, the discussion was reasonable, though one 
of the SSA employees became angry and slammed a manual on her desk. Later in the day, 
Dr. Goldfine and the supervisor of the employees conversed about the discussion. 
Six days later, on June 16, a SSA contracting officer wrote to Dr. Goldfine: 
You are hereby notified that, effective immediately, the referenced BPA is 
cancelled and the referenced BPA Call Order is terminated for the convenience 
of the Government. Both contract actions are taken as a result of an incident 
that occurred on June 10, 2011. 
In accordance with the BPA terms and conditions at Clause C-3.16(n)(iv), 
Removal from Duty, the Government may remove a contractor from working 
under the contract based on conduct that occurs after a favorable suitability 

 
         
         
             
        
       
   
            
              
           
            
 
   
    
              
            
          
         
   
         
         
         
    
              
              
                 
               
               
3 CBCA 2549 
determination. The Government has determined that your disorderly conduct, 
loud, disruptive demeanor, quarreling, and intimidation of others warrants your 
removal. 
The BPA does not contain a clause bearing the number noted by the contracting 
officer. It does, however, contain the following clause: 
C-3.20 0401 – SECURITY AND SUITABILITY REQUIREMENTS (NOV 
2010) 
m. Government Control 
The Government has full control over and may grant, deny, or withhold access 
to a facility, site, system, or information and may remove contractors . . . from 
performing under the contract for reasons related to conduct even after the 
individual has been found suitable to work on the contract (see paragraph o., 
below). 
. . . . 
o. Removal From Duty 
SSA may remove a contractor . . . from working under the contract based on 
conduct that occurs after a favorable suitability determination. . . . The 
Government’s determination may be made based on, but not limited to, 
incidents involving the misconduct or delinquency as set forth below: 
. . . . 
iv. Disorderly conduct, use of abusive or offensive language, 
quarreling, intimidation by words or actions, or fighting. Also, 
participating in disruptive activities that interfere with the normal and 
efficient operations of the Government. 
Dr. Goldfine sent the contracting officer on June 23 what he described as a “final 
invoice” for work he performed under the BPA and Call Order – twenty-six case reviews. 
At $82 per case review, the total amount of the invoice was $2132. SSA paid this amount. 
The doctor objected to the way in which the agency was treating him, however. On 
July 6, he told the contracting officer, “I feel my BPA was withdrawn without good cause, 

 
               
              
               
                 
            
              
              
             
            
              
             
            
                
            
   
        
                
            
               
             
               
           
     
             
                 
             
           
            
            
          
4 CBCA 2549 
and in part, to satisfy a policy of OMVE [Office of Medical and Vocational Expertise] staff 
reduction.” On July 19, he requested reconsideration of the June 16 decision, saying, “[M]y 
actual work has been deemed very satisfactory by both the former and current chiefs at SSA. 
In 20 years I have never been disciplined, and I presume my age is not a hidden factor.” 
On September 1, 2011, the contracting officer issued a unilateral modification to the 
call order. The modification stated that its purpose was “to terminate the order for the 
Convenience of the Government and to de-obligate the remaining funds. As a result, the 
total obligated amount of the order is hereby decreased from $49,200.00 by $47,068.00 to 
$2,132.00 .” 
On September 9, Dr. Goldfine appealed what he called the “wrongful termination” of 
the BPA and the call order. In the notice of appeal, Dr. Goldfine stated: 
Among other things, my due process rights have been violated. There was no 
notice of appeal in the termination letter, there was no opportunity for a 
hearing, and I was told that I did not have the right to an appeal by [the 
contracting officer]. I am 76-years-old. My termination also was unlawful as 
it constitutes age discrimination. 
The amount in controversy is in excess of $800,000. 
In the course of the appeal, Dr. Goldfine filed a complaint. In the complaint, he 
“seeks reversal of the contract termination” and “seeks monetary damages, including pay for 
lost work and compensation for violating his due process rights in the amount of at least 
$60,000.” Later, Dr. Goldfine filed an amended complaint in which he additionally states 
that he is Jewish and alleges that his “contract was terminated by SSA because of his 
religious affiliation.” According to the amended complaint, Dr. Goldfine “seeks monetary 
damages in the amount of $150,000.” 
Discussion 
SSA correctly understands that the Board has jurisdiction over this appeal to the extent 
that it challenges the termination of the call order. We note, in this regard, that – 
A court or board of contract appeals may find that a termination for the 
convenience of the Government constituted a breach of contract only if the 
tribunal finds that the termination was motivated by bad faith or constituted an 
abuse of discretion, or that the Government entered into the contract with no 
intention of fulfilling its promises. Greenlee Construction, Inc. v. General 

 
           
             
           
           
    
              
            
                   
                
   
                 
          
            
              
     
 
             
               
               
               
               
           
    
               
               
           
                 
                 
               
               
         
5 CBCA 2549 
Services Administration , CBCA 415, et al., 07-2 BCA ¶ 33,619, at 166,510 
(citing T & M Distributors, Inc. v. United States , 185 F.3d 1279, 1283 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999); Krygoski Construction Co. v. United States , 94 F.3d 1537, 1541, 
1543-44 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc. v. Glickman , 55 F.3d 
1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
Oregon Woods, Inc. v. Department of the Interior , CBCA 1072, 09-1 BCA ¶ 34,014, at 
168,202 (2008), reconsideration denied , 09-1 BCA ¶ 34,063, aff’d sub nom. Oregon Woods, 
Inc. v. Salazar , 355 F. App’x 403 (Fed. Cir. 2009). If Dr. Goldfine is able to prove what he 
alleges – that SSA’s termination of the call order was an abuse of discretion (in that it 
ignored a record of twenty years of very satisfactory service) or was motivated by bad faith 
(in that it was caused by discrimination on the basis of age and religious affiliation) – he will 
prevail on this portion of the matters addressed in the appeal. 
SSA maintains, however, that we may not consider either the doctor’s requests for 
monetary damages or his contention that the cancellation of the BPA was impermissible. In 
this opinion, we consider these points. 
Money damages 
Under the Contract Disputes Act, a claim relating to a government contract may be 
made by a contractor by submitting a demand to the contracting officer. 41 U.S.C.A. § 
7103(a)(1) (West Supp. 2011). The contracting officer is to issue a decision in writing on 
a claim. Id. § 7103(a)(3), (d). The contractor may appeal any contracting officer decision 
to the appropriate agency board of contract appeals. Id. § 7104(a). This Board has 
jurisdiction to decide appeals from decisions of contracting officers of most executive 
agencies. Id. § 7105(e)(1)(B). 
The contracting officer’s decision which Dr. Goldfine has appealed states that it did 
two things – it canceled the BPA and terminated for the convenience of the Government the 
call order which was issued under the BPA. The decision did not mention money damages, 
and there is no evidence that Dr. Goldfine ever submitted to the contracting officer a claim 
for money. While he did submit an invoice under the call order, that invoice was paid and 
is not in dispute. The amounts of money he now seeks – variously, “in excess of $800,000” 
(in the notice of appeal), “at least $60,000” (in the complaint), and $150,000 (in the amended 
complaint) – were never the subject of a claim submitted to the contracting officer. 
1 The 
1 Dr. Goldfine maintains in his opposition to the motion that: 

 
           
                 
              
            
            
           
   
    
               
                
                
          
               
               
      
   
            
              
                
              
                
              
          
                 
                
            
             
              
          
                
                
                
          
              
6 CBCA 2549 
contracting officer, consequently, never decided whether Dr. Goldfine is entitled to any 
amount of money. We, as a result, have no jurisdiction over the doctor’s request for money. 
England v. Swanson Group, Inc. , 353 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2004); James M. Ellett 
Construction Co. v. United States , 93 F.3d 1537, 1541-42 (Fed. Cir. 1996); C-Shore 
International, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture , CBCA 1696, 10-1 BCA ¶ 34,379, at 
169,741; California Valley Miwok Tribe v. Department of the Interior , CBCA 817-ISDA, 
07-2 BCA ¶ 33,680. 
Cancellation of blanket purchase agreement 
The Contract Disputes Act “applies to any express or implied contract . . . made by 
an executive agency for” any of four matters, one of which is “the procurement of services.” 
41 U.S.C.A. §7102(a). SSA urges that a BPA is not a contract, so Contract Disputes Act 
procedures (such as an appeal of a contracting officer’s decision) do not apply to decisions 
involving such an instrument. Dr. Goldfine notes that the BPA relevant to this dispute is 
replete with references to itself as a contract, and he concludes that because the agency calls 
it a contract, it must be one. 
A BPA is “a simplified method of filling anticipated repetitive needs for supplies or 
services by establishing ‘charge accounts’ with qualified sources of supply.” 48 CFR 
13.303-1(a) (2010). It is, in essence, a framework for future contracts, which come into 
being when orders are placed and accepted under it. Because a BPA, such as the one 
involved in this case, lacks mutuality of consideration (or, said another way, does not create 
binding rights and obligations), it is not itself a contract. Zhengxing v. United States , 204 F. 
App’x 885 (Fed. Cir. 2006), aff’g 71 Fed. Cl. 732 (2006); Modern Systems Technology Corp. 
[t]here was one and only one dollar amount at issue in this dispute – $49,200 
– the fixed and set amount of the contract at issue here. . . . By repeatedly 
referencing the contract at issue in his emails to the contracting officer . . . , it 
is plain that Dr. Goldfine gave more than ample notice to the contracting 
officer of the amount of the claim. Simply put, by directing the contracting 
officer over and over again to the one and only one contract amount at issue 
– $49,000 – Dr. Goldfine easily satisfied the sum certain requirement. 
We have reviewed all of the e-mail messages in the record which were sent by Dr. Goldfine 
to the contracting officer and can find no mention of $49,000 or any other dollar figure (other 
than the figure in the final invoice). The only dollar figures mentioned by the doctor are 
contained in the notice of appeal, the complaint, and the amended complaint – all of which 
were filed with the Board and submitted to us, not the contracting officer, for decision. 

 
                 
             
               
               
    
        
             
              
             
  
 
 
    
  
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v. United States , 979 F.2d 200 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Thus, “there is no factual or legal predicate 
establishing jurisdiction under the [Contract Disputes Act].” Zhengxing , 71 Fed. Cl. at 738 
(citing Julian Freeman , ASBCA 46675, 94-3 BCA ¶ 27,280). The fact that the BPA which 
SSA issued to Dr. Goldfine calls itself a contract brings to mind a quotation attributed to 
President Lincoln: “If you call a tail a leg, how many legs does a dog have?  Four.  Calling 
a tail a leg doesn’t make it a leg.” 
Decision 
SSA’s motion is granted. The appeal is DISMISSED IN PART FOR LACK OF 
JURISDICTION . We will continue to consider the appeal to the extent that it challenges 
SSA’s termination for convenience of the call order the agency issued to Dr. Goldfine. 
_________________________ 
STEPHEN M. DANIELS 
Board Judge 
We concur: 
________________________ _________________________ 
CANDIDA S. STEEL R. ANTHONY McCANN 
Board Judge Board Judge