DENIED:  March 29, 2018
CBCA 5911 
J.R. MANNES GOVERNMENT SERVICES CORP.,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Respondent.
Jerry R. Mannes II, President of J.R. Mannes Government Services Corporation,
Holland, MI, appearing for Appellant.
Jack R. Cordes, Jr., Anna F. Kurtz and Brian F. Binney, Office of the General
Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, counsel
for Respondent.
SOMERS, Board Judge (Chair).
J.R. Mannes Government Services Corporation (J.R. Mannes) alleges that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) improperly terminated for convenience its task order because
the FBI wanted to “get itself a better deal by performing the work in-house” or to retaliate
against J.R. Mannes for a previous appeal.  The parties submitted the appeal on the record,
under Board Rule 19 (48 CFR 6101.19 (2017)), after appellant elected the small claims
procedure, Rule 52.  Therefore, this is a single-judge decision; it is final and conclusive and
may not be set aside except for reasons of fraud, and it has no value as precedent.  I deny the
appeal for lack of evidence.  


CBCA 5911 2
Findings of Fact
In February 2014, the FBI entered into a blanket purchase agreement (BPA) with J.R.
Mannes.  In August 2015, the FBI issued a solicitation for process analyst services to support
the Vulnerability and Compliance Support Unit’s Mainframe Team.  This team granted and
administered user access to applications hosted on the FBI’s mainframe computer.  J.R.
Mannes timely submitted a proposal, and the FBI awarded appellant the multi-year task
order.  An employee of J.R. Mannes began working under the task order on October 19,
2015.  
In late February or early March 2017, because the FBI planned to retire the mainframe
system, a unit chief identified contracts that would be unnecessary and should be terminated. 
 Because J.R. Mannes’ task order supported this system, the FBI decided to end the contract
after the first option year.  During a transition between two contracting officers, the FBI
exercised the second option year by mistake.  Realizing the error, the contracting officer
deobligated the funds for the second option year through a unilateral modification.  The
contracting officer sent the modification to J.R. Mannes on June 15, 2017, stating that the
FBI had “determined that Option Year 2 . . . will not be exercised because of funding
restraints.”  
J.R. Mannes responded on June 23, 2017, stating that the modification “constitute[d]
an improper termination for convenience” because a bad faith termination would entitle it
to its “anticipated profit.”  On July 21, 2017, J.R. Mannes filed “a formal claim [for $53,139
in] lost profits.”  
On September 5, 2017, a second contracting officer terminated the task order for
convenience.  On October 12, 2017, the contracting officer explained to J.R. Mannes that its
claim for lost profits had been submitted prematurely, before the contract had actually been
terminated.  He asked J.R. Mannes to either agree to a no-cost settlement or submit a
settlement proposal.  When J.R. Mannes failed to receive a contracting officer’s decision, it
appealed.  The Board docketed the notice of appeal and complaint on November 6, 2017. 
On December 7, 2017, appellant moved for expedited disposition of his case under Rule 52. 
Discussion
The Government can terminate a contract for convenience when it is in its best
interests.  See Securiforce International America, LLC v. United States, 879 F.3d 1354, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding it “entirely reasonable–and not an abuse of discretion–for the
government to decide that [terminating the contract rather than seeking a waiver under the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979] was in its best interests”).  

CBCA 5911 3
Appellant alleges that the Government acted in bad faith when it terminated the
contract for convenience.  In response, the FBI says that it terminated the contract because
it no longer needed a contractor to support a mainframe computer system that the FBI
planned to retire in 2018.  Also, the FBI chose to eliminate this contract, as well as others,
due to funding constraints.     
Appellant’s evidence does not rebut the FBI’s defense.  J.R. Mannes alleges that the
FBI acted in bad faith in response to a previous claim on another contract.  It cites an
unsworn letter of December 2017 of appellant’s former employee as evidence of bad faith:
Sometime during the latter half of February 2017, I was instructed by [the
contracting officer’s representative] to train [an FBI civilian employee] to
perform my duties.  I inquired if there was a problem, to which she replied,
“Did you know that your company is suing the FBI?”  I asked her if my
employment was in jeopardy.  She intimated that I may wish to seek-out
employment elsewhere.  My initial and enduring reaction to her question and
comment is that the contract which I was performing was being targeted for
termination because of legal actions J.R. Mannes initiated on an unrelated FBI
contract.
However, in order to establish bad faith, J.R. Mannes must provide evidence sufficient to
rebut the “long-recognized ‘presumption that government officials act in good faith.’” 
Freeman v. United States, 875 F.3d 623, 630-31 (citing Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc. v.
United States, 281 F.3d 1234, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  J.R. Mannes’ evidence is insufficient
to overcome that presented by the FBI.  The FBI’s sworn declarations from the contracting
officer’s representative and the unit chief explain that the declarants did not know about J.R.
Mannes’ other claims until J.R. Mannes filed its claim in July 2017, much later than alleged
in appellant’s unsworn statement.  The declarations provide details, making them more
persuasive and believable.  By contrast, J.R. Mannes’ evidence does not establish the bad
faith necessary to establish an improper termination for convenience.  
In addition to alleging bad faith, J.R. Mannes argues that it and its subcontractors have
been subjected to reprisals, including obstructing it from winning other task orders and from
adding other subcontractors.  Because these allegations are different from those presented
in its claim before the contracting officer, I do not possess jurisdiction to entertain them.  See
Lee’s Ford Dock, Inc. v. Secretary of the Army, 865 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“the
Board may not consider ‘new’ claims a contractor failed to present to the contracting
officer.”).  

CBCA 5911 4
Decision
The appeal is DENIED.  
    Jeri Kaylene Somers       
JERI KAYLENE SOMERS
Board Judge