DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION:
June 24, 2022
CBCA 7419
RAJ K. PATEL,
Appellant,
v.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
Respondent.
Raj K. Patel, pro se, Indianapolis, IN.
Robert R. Kiepura, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, Department of
Justice, Washington, DC; and Marina M. Kozmycz, Office of the General Counsel, Office
of Administration, Executive Office of the President, Washington, DC, counsel for
Respondent.
Before Board Judges LESTER, DRUMMOND, and SHERIDAN.
LESTER, Board Judge.
Appellant, Raj K. Patel, filed a notice of appeal in which he alleges that he entered
into a contract (or a series of contracts) with the President of the United States and that, by
using “a psycho-bio-tech stress weapon” in a manner that violates his rights under the United
States Constitution, the Government has breached that contract.  Because contracts entered
into with the President, which would be administered by the Office of Administration within
the Executive Office of the President (EOP), are not subject to the Contract Disputes Act
(CDA), 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7109 (2018), we lack jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Patel’s contract


CBCA 7419 2
claims.  We also lack jurisdiction to entertain the various non-contractual tort and
constitutional claims that Mr. Patel raises.  Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.
Background
In a declaration accompanying his notice of appeal, Mr. Patel alleges that he had
agreed to “live under the use of the stress weapon” while allowing the United States to
observe him and that, in exchange, “the United States would make sure nothing irreversible
happens to [him] and that [he] would be monetarily paid, by the United States, of harm
caused by the terroristic stress weapon.”  That contract is alleged to have been created
through communications with President George W. Bush, acting in his official capacity, and
then reaffirmed by Presidents Barack Obama, Donald J. Trump, and Joseph R. Biden through
additional communications made through the website www.whitehouse.gov.  The breach is
alleged to have precluded Mr. Patel from reentering law school and to have caused other
harm.  Mr. Patel asserts that President Biden is the current contracting officer for the contract
and that the “United States, Sovereign, . . . is the Defendant” in this action, although the
notice of appeal, while mentioning the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department
of Justice, appears to focus on either the President or the White House as the contracting
party.  Mr. Patel also seeks damages for a taking of his intellectual property, trespass,
violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, and other constitutional
violations.
Discussion
The Proper Respondent
Under the Board’s rules, the proper respondent in an appeal is “the government
agency whose decision, action, or inaction is the subject of an appeal, petition, or
application,” 48 CFR 6101.1(b) (2020), rather than the United States as a whole.  Here, the
contract, as alleged, was created by the President, acting in his official capacity.  The Office
of Administration within the EOP would administer any such contract.  42 Fed. Reg. 62,895
(Dec. 12, 1977).  Accordingly, we designate the EOP as the respondent in this appeal,
although the jurisdictional analysis herein applies equally to claims involving contracts with
the President or the Office of the White House.1
1 We decline Mr. Patel’s request that we caption this appeal with “The
Presidency,” which is not a government agency, as the respondent.

CBCA 7419 3
Jurisdiction To Entertain Appellant’s Contract Claims
The Board’s jurisdiction to entertain contract claims is based upon, and is defined by,
the CDA.2  The CDA “applies to any express or implied contract (including those of the
nonappropriated fund activities described in sections 1346 and 1491 of title 28) made by an
executive agency.”  41 U.S.C. § 7102(a).  The term “executive agency,” as applied to the
CDA, refers to the following entities:
(A) an executive department as defined in section 101 of title 5;
(B) a military department as defined in section 102 of title 5;
(C) an independent establishment as defined in section 104 of title 5, except
that the term does not include the Government Accountability Office;
and
(D) a wholly owned Government corporation as defined in section 9101(3)
of title 31.
Id. § 7101(8).
The EOP and its Office of Administration clearly do not fall within subsections (A),
(B), or (D) of the CDA’s definition of an “executive agency.”  Section 101 of title 5 of the
United States Code lists fifteen agencies within the Executive Branch that constitute
“executive departments,” none of which is the EOP or its Office of Administration.  The list
of military departments in 5 U.S.C. § 102 does not include the EOP or its Office of
Administration, and they are not included in the list of wholly-owned Government
corporations in 31 U.S.C. § 9101(3).
2 Appellant suggests that the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, allows the Board to
consider contract claims outside and beyond the context of the CDA, but the Tucker Act,
which addresses the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims, does not apply to the boards
of contract appeals.  See United Technologies Corp., Pratt & Whitney Group, Government
Engines & Space Propulsion, ASBCA 46880, et al., 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,456, at 136,766
(“Boards of contract appeals have no Tucker Act jurisdiction.”).  Mr. Patel’s further assertion
that the Court of Federal Claims and the Board are both “Article I courts with concurrent
jurisdiction to hear contract claims against the United States,” Appellant’s Response to Board
Order (June 8, 2022) at 10, is also incorrect.  The Board is not a court, see 41 U.S.C.
§ 7105(b), and, unlike the Court of Federal Claims, the Board’s contract jurisdiction is
limited to disputes arising under contracts subject to the CDA.  Id. § 7105(e); see Horse
Capture Consultants, Inc., IBCA 4393-2002, 02-2 BCA ¶ 32,047, at 158,371.

CBCA 7419 4
Mr. Patel asserts that the White House falls within subsection (C) of the “executive
agency” definition because it is an “independent establishment” under 5 U.S.C. § 104. 
Although the CDA does not define what the term “independent establishment” means, that
term is defined in 5 U.S.C. § 104 as “(1) an establishment in the executive branch (other than
the United States Postal Service or the Postal Regulatory Commission) which is not an
Executive department, military department, Government corporation, or part thereof, or part
of an independent establishment; and (2) the Government Accountability Office.”  Applying
that definition, the EOP argues that “the label ‘independent establishment’ suggests that
Congress believed such an entity to be separate from and outside the direct control of the
President.”  Respondent’s Response to Board Order (June 17, 2022) at 6.
Whatever Congress meant to include in the definition of the term “independent
establishment,” the term’s use in other statutes indicates that the term excludes the President,
the White House, and the EOP’s Office of Administration.  In at least one statute (3 U.S.C.
§ 112), the terms “White House Office,” the “Office of Administration” within the EOP, and
“independent establishment of the executive branch” are listed separately, suggesting,
consistent with the rationale of a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, that Congress views the White House Office and the EOP’s
Office of Administration as something distinct from an “independent establishment.”  See
Haddon v. Walters, 43 F.3d 1488, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Because “Congress distinguished
the Executive Residence from the independent establishments, whatever they may be,
suggests that Congress does not regard the Executive Residence to be an independent
establishment, as it uses that term.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 13212(b)(3) (differentiating
between an “independent establishment” and the EOP).  Recently, the Comptroller General
held in Argus Secure Technology, LLC, B-419422, et al., 2021 CPD ¶ 84 (Feb. 22, 2021),
that the Office of Administration is not an independent establishment or an Executive agency
for purposes of the bid protest provisions of the Competition in Contracting Act, 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3551–3557.  The rationale underlying the analyses by the Comptroller General and the
District of Columbia Circuit, which we find persuasive, applies equally to the definition of
an “independent establishment” under the CDA.  See also Downey v. White House, No.
DC-1221-17-0707-W-1, 2019 WL 4252291 (M.S.P.B. Sept. 6, 2019) (non-precedential)
(holding that the EOP’s Office of Administration is not an “independent establishment”). 
Because the EOP’s Office of Administration is not an “independent establishment” to which
the CDA applies, we do not possess jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Patel’s contract claim
against it or the President.
Even if the contract, as alleged, involved an executive agency to which the CDA
applied, the contract that appellant describes would still not be one that the CDA
encompasses.  The CDA applies to contracts for “(1) the procurement of property, other than
real property in being; (2) the procurement of services; (3) the procurement of construction,
alteration, repair, or maintenance of real property; or (4) the disposal of personal property.” 

CBCA 7419 5
41 U.S.C. § 7102(a).  “The scope of the Act thus is limited to express or implied contracts
for the procurement of services and property and for the disposal of personal property.  It
does not cover all government contracts.”  Coastal Corp. v. United States, 713 F.2d 728, 730
(Fed. Cir. 1983).  The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has indicated
that the type of “service” that Mr. Patel alleges he provided — allowing the Government to
use a stress weapon on him and to observe its effects — is not the type of “service” to which
the CDA applies, at least in part because it could not realistically be subject to an award
through competitive bidding.  Institut Pasteur v. United States, 814 F.2d 624, 626 (Fed. Cir.
1987); see Bailey v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 187, 210-12 (2000) (alleged contract to assist
the Government in repatriating foreign assets from the contractor’s own clients, which could
not be competitively bid, did not involve the type of “service” to which the CDA would
apply).  Accordingly, even if the EOP’s Office of Administration could be considered an
executive agency under the CDA, we would lack jurisdiction to entertain a claim under the
type of contract alleged.
The Government has informed us that Mr. Patel raised similar allegations to those
raised here in a lawsuit previously filed with the Court of Federal Claims.  That court
dismissed Mr. Patel’s lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction because the allegations were “clearly
baseless” and “frivolous,” and the Federal Circuit subsequently summarily affirmed that
dismissal decision.  Patel v. United States, No. 21-2004 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 5, 2021), aff’d, No.
2022-1131 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 11, 2022).3  Because we lack jurisdiction on the grounds described
above, we need not consider the extent to which the nature of Mr. Patel’s contract allegations
would preclude our jurisdiction over Mr. Patel’s appeal and, further, whether the absence of
3 In footnote 5 of its response to the Board’s order dated June 3, 2022, the EOP
argues that, because Mr. Patel originally elected to file his dispute with the Court of Federal
Claims, the “Election Doctrine” bars this appeal.  “Once a contractor makes a binding
election under the Election Doctrine to appeal the contracting officer’s adverse decision to
the appropriate board of contract appeals [or, instead, to the Court of Federal Claims], that
election must stand and the contractor can no longer pursue its claim in the alternate forum.” 
Salt River PMIA-Maricopa Indian Community v. Department of Energy, CBCA 1193, 09-2
BCA ¶ 34,246, at 169,246 (quoting National Neighbors, Inc. v. United States, 839 F.2d 1539,
1542 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).  Nevertheless, “only if the chosen forum has jurisdiction over the
proceeding can a contractor’s choice to pursue its claim in that forum be a binding election.” 
National Neighbors, 839 F.2d at 1543.  Because the Court of Federal Claims dismissed Mr.
Patel’s suit for lack of jurisdiction, the Election Doctrine does not bar this appeal.  For the
same reason, we reject the EOP’s argument that Mr. Patel’s claim is barred by res judicata. 
See Engage Learning, Inc. v. Salazar, 660 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[A] dismissal
on the merits usually carries res judicata effect whereas a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
typically does not.”).

CBCA 7419 6
a claim submitted in accordance with the requirements of the CDA would similarly bar
jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction To Entertain Appellant’s Non-Contractual Claims
In addition to allegations of breach of contract, Mr. Patel in his notice of appeal
alleges a taking of his intellectual property rights, trespass, violation of his First Amendment
right to free exercise of religion, and other constitutional violations.  The Board lacks
jurisdiction to entertain non-contractual tort and constitutional claims.  See Allred v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, CBCA 4952, 15-1 BCA ¶ 36,108, at 176,283 (no jurisdiction
to entertain pure tort claims); Data Enterprises of the Northwest v. General Services
Administration, GSBCA 15607, 04-1 BCA ¶ 32,539, at 160,928 (no jurisdiction over Fifth
Amendment takings claims); H.T. Engineers & Contractors, Inc., VABCA 2456, 86-3 BCA
¶ 19,321, at 97,718 (no jurisdiction over Fifth Amendment due process claims); M&M
Services, Inc., ASBCA 28712, 84-2 BCA ¶ 17,405, at 86,688 (“no jurisdiction to provide
relief based solely on alleged violations of the Constitution”).
Decision
Because appellant has not alleged any claims that fall within the Board’s jurisdiction,
the appeal is DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
    Harold D. Lester, Jr.      
HAROLD D. LESTER, JR.
Board Judge
We concur:
  Jerome M. Drummond         Patricia J. Sheridan     
JEROME M. DRUMMOND PATRICIA J. SHERIDAN
Board Judge Board Judge