February 15, 2018
CBCA 5911 
J.R. MANNES GOVERNMENT SERVICES CORP.,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Respondent.
Jerry R. Mannes II of J.R. Mannes Government Services Corporation, Holland, MI,
appearing for Appellant.
Jack R. Cordes, Jr., Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice,
Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent.
SOMERS, Board Judge (Chair).
ORDER
J.R. Mannes Government Services Corporation moves to compel the deposition of
Paul Courtney, the Chief Contracting Officer of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Department of Justice (the FBI).  The FBI opposes the motion and has requested a protective
order.  Because appellant has not shown that it could not obtain the information sought by
less intrusive means, we deny the motion to compel and grant the request for a protective
order. 
Background
This case is proceeding on an expedited basis under Board Rule 52.  After an initial
status conference, the parties jointly proposed a schedule for future proceedings on January
29, 2018.  We adopted the proposed schedule that same day.  


CBCA 5911 2
On January 29, 2018, appellant notified the FBI of its intent to depose Mr. Courtney
on February 16, 2018.  On February 5, 2018, the FBI told appellant that  “absent a court order
to the contrary, we will not make Paul Courtney available to you for a deposition . . . . He is
the Chief Contracting Officer for the FBI and had no involvement in the decision to
terminate your contract . . . . ” 
On February 8, 2018, appellant asked the FBI to reconsider.  Appellant tried to
persuade the FBI of the importance of deposing Mr. Courtney, pointing to a letter signed by
Mr. Courtney that had been sent to the Office of the National Ombudsman, U.S. Small
Business Administration.  The letter responds to allegations made by Jerry R. Mannes II,
CEO, that the FBI had improperly terminated two of appellant’s task orders for convenience. 
The FBI told appellant that it would not make Mr. Courtney available for deposition
because Mr. Courtney had no personal knowledge of the underlying facts.  In response to
appellant’s motion to compel, the FBI explained that FBI counsel had drafted the letter and
that Mr. Courtney had signed it without personal knowledge of the underlying facts.  In our
teleconference discussing this motion, the FBI noted that the letter was signed one month
after the claim had been filed. 
In its motion to compel, appellant focuses on the last paragraph of the letter:  
In conclusion, the FBI acknowledges that it terminated the two task orders at
issue for the convenience of the Government.  However, the FBI believes that
it has been responsive to Mr. Mannes’ inquiries, and both claims are being
processed in accordance with applicable Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) procedures and Federal law.  I hope this letter is responsive to your
concerns and I welcome any additional questions you have in connection with
this matter.  
Appellant says that this paragraph proves that Mr. Courtney had knowledge of, and was in
a position to be aware of, the decision to terminate the contract.  When asked at the
teleconference why Mr. Courtney should be deposed, appellant’s representative stated that
it hoped to gain Mr. Courtney’s high-level focus (or a bird’s eye view) of the procurement. 
Beyond that, appellant could not explain precisely why it could not obtain discovery from
another source more closely tied to the contract. 
Noting that it had responded to twenty-one interrogatories, thirty requests for
admissions, and eight requests for the production of documents from appellant, the FBI
indicated that it had agreed to make four other FBI employees available for deposition,
including the contracting officer who signed the letter advising appellant that the FBI did not

CBCA 5911 3
intend to exercise the option on the task order.1  The FBI opposes appellant’s request to
depose Mr. Courtney because he played no role in the contract and has no personal
knowledge of the facts underlying the appeal.  The FBI seeks a protective order to eliminate
the need for Mr. Courtney to comply with the deposition notice.  
Discussion
We encourage liberal, voluntary discovery between the parties where it appears the
information sought is relevant to the matters in dispute or reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.  Kepa Services, Inc. v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
CBCA 2727, et al., 15-1 BCA ¶ 35,889; Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (permitting parties to seek
discovery that is “relevant . . . and proportional to the needs of the case”).  Board Rule 13(c)
allows us to limit discovery for good cause.   
The need to limit access to high-ranking government officials in the discovery process
is well established.  In United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941), the Supreme Court
indicated that the practice of calling high ranking government officials as witnesses should
be discouraged.  Other courts have concluded that top executive department officials should
not, absent extraordinary circumstances, be called to testify or deposed regarding their
reasons for taking official action.  Id. at 422; see Bogan v. City of Boston, 489 F.3d 417, 423
(1st Cir. 2007) (citing Simplex Time Recorder Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 766 F.2d 575, 586
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted)).  This is because “high-ranking officials have greater
duties and time constraints than other witnesses” and that, without appropriate limitations,
such officials will spend an inordinate amount of time tending to pending litigation.  Id.
(citing In re United States (Kessler), 985 F.2d 510, 512 (11th Cir. 1993); Kyle Engineering
Co. v. Kleppe, 600 F.2d 226, 231 (9th Cir. 1979)(trial court did not err in vacating deposition
notice for high ranking government contracts official). 
To determine if extraordinary circumstances exist, courts consider whether or not the
party seeking the deposition has shown that: (1) the official’s testimony is necessary to obtain
relevant information that is not available from another source; (2) the official has first-hand 
information that could not be reasonably obtained from another source; (3) the testimony is
essential to that party’s case; (4) the deposition would not significantly interfere with the
1 During the teleconference, FBI counsel raised security concerns arising from
appellant’s plan to take video depositions using a online streaming platform through the
FBI’s network.  Ultimately, when informed that appellant would have to make other
arrangements to take the proposed depositions, appellant “waived” these depositions, citing
cost concerns.  

CBCA 5911 4
ability of the official to perform his government duties; and (5) that the evidence sought is
not available through any alternative source or less burdensome means.  Bogan, 489 F.3d at
423 (citing In re United States (Holder), 197 F.3d 310, 314 (8th Cir. 1999)); Energy Capital
Corp. v. United States. 60 Fed. Cl. 315, 318 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (noting that both current and
former high-ranking government officials are subject to depositions if they have personal
knowledge of the facts at issue).   
Our rules and precedent require more than an assertion that Mr. Courtney could
provide a “higher-level perspective” on the case.  Appellant must show that Mr. Courtney
was involved in the contract at issue, had personal knowledge of the events that could not be
gleaned from others, or that appellant could not use a less disruptive means to obtain the
potentially relevant information.  Appellant has not done so here.2  
 Decision
Appellant’s motion to compel is DENIED.  Respondent’s motion for a protective
order is GRANTED.  
___________________________
JERI KAYLENE SOMERS
Board Judge
2 Notably, appellant has chosen to vary the processing of  its appeal by using the
small claims procedure in Rule 52.  This procedure permits the Board to establish a schedule
meant to encourage the timely, expedited resolution of the appeal.  With that in mind, we
issued an order that shortened deadlines for discovery and limited the number of depositions,
as requested by appellant.  Appellant has propounded extensive discovery and has received
the agency’s responses.  If appellant believed that Mr. Courtney had additional information
not provided in the agency’s responses, it should have identified the missing information
with more specificity.