GRANTED IN PART:  February 18, 2015 
CBCA 3815-C(1512), 3816-C(1537)
SYSTEMS INTEGRATION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., 
Applicant,
v.
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
Respondent.
Robert C. MacKichan, Jr. and Marques O. Peterson of Vedder Price P.C.,
Washington, DC, counsel for Applicant.
Nathan C. Guerrero, Office of General Counsel, General Services Administration,
Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent.
Before Board Judges SOMERS, STERN, and GOODMAN.  
SOMERS, Board Judge.
The General Services Administration (GSA or respondent) and Systems Integration
and Management, Inc. (SIM or applicant) entered into a basic ordering agreement.  Under
this agreement, GSA issued task orders to SIM, and SIM provided specified services.  SIM
submitted invoices to GSA in order to receive payment for services rendered.  GSA initially
paid all invoices submitted.  At some point, however, GSA failed to pay several of SIM’s
invoices.  SIM submitted a certified claim for payment of the amounts owed.  On
December 18, 2008, GSA’s contracting officer issued a decision denying SIM’s claim.  The
contracting officer determined that SIM did not submit invoices on a timely basis or had
failed to submit adequate supporting data with the invoices.  


CBCA 3815-C(1512), 3816-C(1537) 2
On February 10, 2009, SIM appealed this decision to the Board; the appeal was
docketed as CBCA 1512.  Later, SIM submitted a separate claim to a different GSA
contracting officer for payment of some of the invoices.  When the second contracting officer
failed to act, SIM appealed.  The Board consolidated the second appeal (CBCA 1537) with
the original appeal.  
Starting in May 2009, the parties engaged in settlement discussions.1  The Board
conducted a mediation session over several days in July 2009.  Although the Board-assisted
mediation did not immediately lead to settlement, by March 2010, the parties agreed that they
could resolve the case.  The settlement terms specified that GSA would pay SIM $960,000,
inclusive of all interest and fees.  Of that amount, a provision in the settlement agreement
would reflect an offset in the settlement amount of $525,000 to satisfy the judgment against
SIM that had been obtained by the United States in a civil false claims action in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  The parties agreed to
the entrance of a stipulation of settlement by the Board, enabling payment to be made from
the permanent indefinite judgment fund, 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012).  
GSA memorialized the settlement terms in a letter to SIM dated March 23, 2010.  The
parties submitted a joint notice of settlement to the Board and requested that proceedings be
suspended.  GSA provided a draft settlement agreement to SIM’s attorney, Mr. P.H. 
Harrington.  On April 9, 2010, Mr. Harrington sent GSA’s attorney a revised settlement
agreement, stating on the transmittal sheet: “revised settlement agreement.  As you can see,
I really tried not to make too many changes and left your language in.”  The revised
settlement agreement stated, in pertinent part: 
Whereas, on March 22, 2010, the parties agreed to settle on mutually
satisfactory terms all matters relating to the invoice claims under the BOA
[basic ordering agreement] and appeals number 1512 and 1537 before the
CBCA for the sum of $960,000, which sum includes costs, interest and
attorney’s fees.  At this time, SIM also agreed to an offset of $525,000 as the
total sum payable to GSA in full and final settlement of GSA’s allegations
under Civil Action No. 06-4930. 
The agreement specified that: “[t]he date of this Agreement shall be March 22, 2010, but this
Agreement shall become effective as of the latest date of execution by any signatory hereof.” 
1 The parties provided extensive records detailing the substance of their
settlement discussions to support their positions in the Equal Access to Justice Act litigation. 
The detailed facts related to the settlement discussions come from these records.    

CBCA 3815-C(1512), 3816-C(1537) 3
After the parties reached this agreement, SIM attempted to change various terms. 
First, SIM asserted that the parties need not enter into a settlement agreement.  Rather, SIM
suggested that the parties could accomplish the settlement through the submission of a
certificate of finality to the Board.  GSA’s attorney responded that any settlement between
the parties must be memorialized by a written and executed settlement agreement.  
When SIM refused to finalize the settlement agreement, the parties returned to the
Board for assistance.  On March 9, 2011, after another mediation session with the Board, the
parties agreed that GSA would provide SIM with a new draft of the settlement agreement
containing language to which the parties had tentatively agreed.  GSA provided the draft
settlement agreement to SIM on March 11, 2011.  The March 2011 settlement agreement
parroted the March 2010 agreement.  After evaluating the agreement over the course of
several weeks, SIM proposed to amend the settlement agreement by adding a demand for
additional interest.  When GSA refused the amendment, SIM withdrew the proposed change. 
Finally, in August 2011, counsel for SIM indicated that he had presented the
settlement agreement (again with terms identical to the March 2010 agreement) to SIM’s
chief executive officer (CEO) for approval and signature.   The CEO refused to sign the
agreement.  In October 2011, SIM hired new counsel and rejected the settlement agreement. 
After trial and post-hearing briefing, the Board granted SIM’s appeals, finding GSA
owed SIM $1,058,722.23, plus interest.  See Systems Integration & Management, Inc. v.
General Services Administration, CBCA 1512, et al., 13 BCA ¶ 35,417, motion for
reconsideration denied, 14-1 BCA ¶ 35,543. 
After the Board denied GSA’s request for reconsideration, SIM submitted an
application for reimbursement of fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA or the Act), 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2012).  SIM sought $1,410,261.94 in attorney fees and
$43,313.23 in costs.    
GSA opposed the application, first noting that the request for fees included fees for
services arising from actions unrelated to the matter before the Board.  GSA examined the
fees claimed for each attorney identified in the application, while noting that only three of
the attorneys had entered a notice of appearance before the Board.  The majority of the
attorneys listed in the application represented SIM in various other civil and criminal actions
unrelated to the matter at hand.  In addition, GSA established that the application sought
over $600,000 in fees that occurred before December 18, 2008, the date of the contracting
officer’s final decision.  

CBCA 3815-C(1512), 3816-C(1537) 4
SIM, with the assistance of new counsel, replied with a significantly revised EAJA
application. The revised application seeks 331.4 hours for work performed by P.H.
Harrington (with fees totaling $57,666), 938 hours for work performed by various attorneys
with the law firm of Arnold & Porter (with fees totaling $172,769), and twenty-six hours for
work performed by attorneys from the law firm of Vedder Price (totaling $4966).  In total,
the application seeks $235,401 in attorney fees for 1295.4 hours. 
SIM calculates the hourly rate for these attorneys by presenting a cost of living
adjusted (COLA) formula to increase the standard EAJA statutory cap of $125 per hour. 
SIM explained:
SIM calculated its COLA request by comparing the March 1996 Consumer
Price Index for Urban Consumers (“CPI-U”) to the CPI-U for each month and
year an attorney billed time.  [citations omitted].  SIM then adjusted the $125
per hour EAJA statutory cap for each month by the percent differences
between the March 1996-CPI-U and the relevant month’s CPI-U and then
multiplied the hours by the number of hours billed.  The formula used to
obtain each monthly adjusted rate was: $125 x Month/Year CPI-U (March
1996 CPI-U) equals adjusted rate.  The adjusted rate was then multiplied by
the number of hours worked in the month.  SIM performed the calculation for
each month from February 2009 until September 2012, which covers the
representation by Mr. Harrington and the attorneys at Arnold & Porter, and for
October 2014 for the Vedder Price attorneys who assisted in this EAJA Reply. 
Applicant’s Reply to Respondent’s Opposition to Applicant’s Application for Costs and
Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act at 13.  
In addition to attorney fees, SIM seeks recovery for 24.75 hours for one legal case
specialist and seventy hours for two legal assistants.  Using the Laffey matrix2, SIM
calculates these fees at $16,107.50, using $170 per hour as the prevailing market rate for
paralegals in the District of Columbia.   
2 The Laffey matrix initially arose from the determination of prevailing market
rates for paralegals in the District of Columbia as allowed by the United States District Court
in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  The Court of Federal Claims used
the Laffey matrix to determine the appropriate rates to be paid for paralegals in United 
Partition Systems, Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 42, 60 (2010).    

CBCA 3815-C(1512), 3816-C(1537) 5
Finally, SIM seeks costs for such expenses as air delivery service, color copies,
couriers, depositions and transcripts, duplicating, travel, lodging, and meals.  These costs
first appear in Arnold & Porter’s January 2012 invoice.  The total amount sought for
expenses is $26,830.68.  
With permission of the Board, GSA filed a sur-reply.  GSA argued that the Board
should consider the fact that SIM abandoned 80% of its original application when evaluating
the reasonableness of SIM’s conduct and its entitlement to fees.  GSA also asserted that SIM
inaccurately described the settlement negotiations, pointing to entries in Mr. Harrington’s
records that supported GSA’s version of the events.  Finally, GSA contends that SIM failed
to justify the billing rates and hours claimed for its attorneys.  
Discussion
EAJA departs from the general American rule requiring each party to a lawsuit to pay
its own legal fees.  Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 404 (2004) (citing Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)).  Under EAJA, “[a]n
agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall award, to a prevailing party other than
the United States, fees and other expenses incurred by that party in connection with that
proceeding, unless the adjudicative officer of the agency finds that the position of the agency
was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.”  5 U.S.C.
§ 504(a)(1); Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 574 (2008).  The
purpose of the law is “to eliminate barriers that prohibit small businesses and individuals
from securing vindication of their rights in civil actions and administrative proceedings
brought by or against the Federal Government.”  Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 406 (quoting
H.R. Rep. No. 96-1005, at 9 (1980)); see also A&B Limited Partnership v. General Services
Administration, GSBCA 16322-C(15208), 04-2 BCA ¶ 32,641, at 161,511.     
To be eligible under this Act for recovery of fees and other expenses incurred in
connection with a proceeding, an applicant must meet several requirements.  It must:  
(1) have been a prevailing party in a proceeding against the United States; 
(2) if a corporation, have not more than $7,000,000 in net worth and five
hundred employees at the time the adversary adjudication was initiated;
(3) submit its application within thirty days of a final disposition in the
adjudication; 
(4) in that application (a) show that it has met the requirements as to having
prevailed and size (numbers (1) and (2) above) and (b) state the amount
sought and include an itemized statement of costs and attorney fees; and 
(5) allege that the position of the agency was not substantially justified.  

CBCA 3815-C(1512), 3816-C(1537) 6
Russell Sand & Gravel Co. v. International Boundary and Water Commission,
CBCA 3781-C(2235), 14-1 BCA ¶ 35,615, at 174,443 (citing 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1), (2),
(b)(1)(B)) (additional citations omitted).  
GSA does not dispute that SIM timely filed its application, that SIM had not more
than $7,000,000 in net worth and had fewer than five hundred employees at the time it
initiated its appeal, or that SIM prevailed in the appeal.  GSA argues that its position was
substantially justified, and, therefore, SIM is not entitled to recover fees and expenses under
EAJA.  In addition, GSA opposes the application on the grounds that (1) SIM is not entitled
to a substantial portion of fees incurred after it rejected GSA’s settlement offer; (2) SIM
improperly requests fees for a number of attorneys who provided legal service to SIM for
matters other than the appeals before the Board; (3) SIM fails to explain, justify, or
document the time for attorneys and other staff for fees and expenses incurred prior to the
initiation of the appeals; and (4) SIM seeks to recover fees in excess of the statutory cap set
by EAJA. 
Substantial Justification
Because SIM is a prevailing party, it is entitled to a reasonable EAJA award unless
respondent can show that its position was substantially justified.  To establish that its
position was “substantially justified,” as a predecessor board, the General Services Board
of Contract Appeals, explained:  
The Supreme Court has held that the adjudicator should ask, when confronted
with this defense, whether the agency’s position was “‘justified in substance
or in the main’ – that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable
person.”  Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).  Under this
standard, the trier of the case must determine whether the Government’s
position had a reasonable basis in both law and fact.  Chiu v. United States,
948 F.2d 711, 715 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Ramcor Services Group [Inc. v.
United States], 185 F.3d [1286,] 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Ace Services, Inc. v.
General Services Administration, GSBCA 12067-C(11331), 93-2 BCA
¶ 25,727, at 128,012.  The burden is on the Government to show that its
position was substantially justified.  Doty v. United States, 71 F.3d 384, 385
(Fed. Cir. 1995); Community Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Garrett, 2 F.3d
1143, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Hospital Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Department
of the Treasury, GSBCA 14719-C (14442-TD), 99-1 BCA ¶ 30,282, at
149,785.

CBCA 3815-C(1512), 3816-C(1537) 7
Divecon Services, LP v. Department of Commerce, GSBCA 16468-C (15597-COM), et al.,
05-1 BCA ¶ 32,834, at 162,451 (2004) (quoting A&B Limited Partnership, 04-2 BCA at
161,511).    
a. Was GSA’s position substantially justified?
GSA argues that its position was substantially justified, as evidenced by the witness
testimony presented at the hearing and as argued in its post-hearing submissions.  GSA
suggests that due to the passage of time between when SIM performed the work covered by
the invoices at issue and when it submitted its claims, “principles of fiscal law” limited
GSA’s ability to simply pay SIM the amounts it sought.  In general, as to the merits of the
action, GSA argues that our rejection of its arguments at trial does not necessarily mean its
position was not substantially justified. 
We explained in our decision why we rejected GSA’s argument:  
GSA’s assertions that SIM failed to provide adequate supporting documents
for the invoices do not explain GSA’s inconsistent actions.  GSA never
explained why it paid some invoices and did not pay others, even though the
unpaid invoices had the same supporting documentation.  
Systems Integration & Management, 13 BCA at 173,766.  In sum, SIM established that it
had performed the work and presented invoices, and that GSA had failed to pay for the
work.  GSA’s inability to explain why it paid for some invoices, and not others, mandated
rejection of its defense.  We find that the failure of GSA to provide adequate evidence
explaining why GSA paid some invoices and not others requires a finding that the
Government’s position was not substantially justified.  
b.  Did GSA’s position become substantially justified when SIM rejected GSA’s
settlement offer?  
EAJA provides that the adjudicative officer “may reduce the amount to be awarded,
or deny an award, to the extent that the party during the course of the proceedings engaged
in conduct which unduly and unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the matter in
controversy.”  5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(3).  As explained by one of our predecessor boards:  
[I]f, after a certain point in time, the Government’s position on the issues
involved in a case becomes substantially justified, reimbursement of costs
incurred by the contractor in prosecuting the case further is not appropriate
under the  EAJA.  

CBCA 3815-C(1512), 3816-C(1537) 8
ROI Investments v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 15488-C(15037-C)-REIN,
01-1 BCA ¶ 31,352, at 154,828 (citing Universal Development Corp. v. General Services
Administration, GSBCA 12174-C(11251), 93-2 BCA ¶ 25,836).  In other words, costs
associated with actions unduly prolonging the litigation are not appropriate for award under
EAJA.  Michael C. Lam v. General Services Administration, CBCA 1472-C(1213),
09-2 BCA ¶ 34,227, at 169,117 (citing Universal). 
GSA argues that GSA’s position became substantially justified after SIM
unreasonably rejected GSA’s settlement offer of $960,000 (inclusive of all interest and fees). 
GSA notes that our decision resulted in an award of $1,058,722.23, plus interest.  GSA
asserts that the judgment amount is less than $100,000 more than the proposed settlement
amount.  GSA notes that SIM expended more than $500,000 in additional fees and costs
after finally rejecting the proposed settlement.  
SIM disagrees, arguing that GSA never presented a reasonable settlement offer.  SIM
says that although GSA agreed to pay SIM a portion of the amount owed for the unpaid
invoices ($960,000 all inclusive), SIM would only receive the amount remaining after
offsetting $525,000 due as the result of a judgment against SIM arising from a False Claims
Act case brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
In addition, SIM contends that GSA refused to provide a date for payment.  SIM maintains
that the fact that the final award required GSA to pay interest resulted in a much better
recovery for SIM, asserting that “SIM achieved a net gain of over $500,000, even
recognizing that SIM will have to satisfy the judgment for the unrelated matter.”  
In Universal, GSA’s position became substantially justified when the agency made
a settlement offer which was in an amount no less than the Board awarded after the case was
fully litigated.  The Board consequently denied recovery of all costs incurred by the
contractor after the offer was made and rejected.  We find that here, although the amount
awarded by the Board was a bit more than the amount offered in settlement, the same
consequence should follow.  
Specifically, in this appeal, the parties reached a settlement in principle, and so
informed the Board by filing a notice of settlement on March 23, 2010.  GSA outlined the
terms of the settlement in a letter to counsel for SIM on that same date.  At that time, the
parties agreed to a settlement amount of $960,000 in favor of SIM, to include all interest and
fees, a provision in the settlement agreement that would reflect an offset in the settlement
amount of $525,000 to satisfy the judgment against SIM that was obtained by the
United States in the civil False Claims Act action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
and the entrance of a stipulation of settlement by the Board so that the remaining payment
to SIM could be paid by the Judgment Fund.

CBCA 3815-C(1512), 3816-C(1537) 9
Based upon a review of the correspondence exchanged by the parties, the billing
records of Mr. Harrington, and the papers filed with the Board, we find that the key terms
of the settlement did not vary from terms contained in the settlement agreement presented
to SIM’s counsel on April 9, 2010.  We conclude that GSA’s position became substantially
justified on that date.  
On April 9, 2010, SIM had the chance to resolve the dispute by signing the settlement
agreement.  Instead, SIM insisted on prolonging settlement negotiations by making
unreasonable demands (i.e., suggesting that the parties could finalize settlement without a
written settlement agreement), proposing changes to the terms of the settlement after the
parties had informed the Board of the settlement, and withdrawing from the settlement
completely in October 2010.  SIM then insisted on a hearing and a decision, and achieved
no better result than what respondent had offered after deducting litigation costs incurred
after the offer.  We find that SIM’s actions after April 9, 2010, “unduly and unreasonably
protracted the final resolution of the matter in controversy.”  Consequently, applicant is
entitled to only those litigation expenses incurred from December 18, 2008, until April 9,
2010, the date GSA presented the draft written settlement agreement to SIM, reflecting the
agreement reached by the parties on March 23, 2010.   
c.  EAJA Award
For the period between the date of the contracting officer’s initial final decision
(December 18, 2008) and the date the settlement agreement was presented to SIM’s counsel
(April 9, 2010), SIM presents billing records reflecting a total of 261.9 hours.  Upon
examination, we note that these billing records include 4.7 hours for time spent on matters
unrelated to the appeals before the Board.  SIM is not entitled to be reimbursed for fees
incurred for outside matters.  See, e.g., Divecon Services, 05-1 BCA at 162,452.  Therefore,
we find that SIM should be reimbursed for attorney fees reflecting 257.2 hours, the hours
remaining after deducting 4.7 hours for unrelated work.  
As noted previously, SIM asserts an upward adjustment to the statutory hourly rate
cap established in EAJA.  CBCA Rule 30(c)(7) (48 CFR 6101.30(c)(7) (2014)) states: 
If the application requests reimbursement of attorney fees that exceed the
statutory rate, explain why an increase in the cost of living or a special factor,
such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings
involved, justifies such fees.

CBCA 3815-C(1512), 3816-C(1537) 10
SIM states that “the market rates in Washington, D.C., for attorneys similar to those who
represented SIM are substantially higher than the $125 EAJA statutory cap.” 
Mr. Harrington apparently charged SIM $350 per hour for his services.  
In TST Tallahassee, LLC v. Department of Veterans Affairs, we rejected a request for
a fee exceeding the statutory cap of $125 per hour:  
While a judicial tribunal is free to make the determination that a fee in excess
of the statutory rate of $125 per hour is justified by an increase in the cost of
living or a special factor, an administrative tribunal, such as ours, cannot do
so in the absence of an agency regulation addressing that issue.  NVT
Technologies, Inc. v. General Services Administration,
GSBCA 16195-C(16047), 03-2 BCA ¶ 32,401.  TST [Tallahassee, LLC] has
referred us to no agency regulation, nor are we aware of any VA [Department
of Veterans Affairs] regulation, which determines that an increase in the cost
of living or some special factor justifies award of a fee based upon an hourly
rate greater than $125.  In the absence of such a regulation, we decline to
make an award at a rate greater than the statutory rate. 
CBCA 2472-C(1576), 12-1 BCA ¶ 35,037, at 172,152 (2011); see also Russell Sand &
Gravel; Tidewater Contractors, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, CBCA 982-C(50),
08-2 BCA ¶ 33,908; Data Enterprises of the Northwest v. General Services Administration,
GSBCA 16536-C(15607), 05-1 BCA ¶ 32,968.  Even where an agency has promulgated a
regulation, the Supreme Court has held that the phrase “limited availability of qualified
attorneys . . . for the proceedings involved” must be interpreted restrictively, referring to
attorneys with an identifiable practice specialty like patent law or knowledge of foreign law
or language.  Russell Sand & Gravel, 14-1 BCA at 174,444 (citing Pierce, 487 U.S.
at 571-72).  SIM has not referred us to any GSA regulation that “determines that an increase
in the cost of living or some special factor justifies award of a fee based upon an hourly rate
greater than $125.”  TST Tallahassee, LLC, 12-1 BCA at 172,152.  
Accordingly, we reduce the amount claimed for attorney fees to $125 per hour. 
Based upon a total of 257.2 hours, we award SIM a total of $32,150 in attorney fees for
Mr. Harrington’s time.  
The fees for other professionals and the costs claimed by SIM all occurred after SIM
failed to act on the settlement offer.  Therefore, we find that SIM is not entitled to any of
those fees or costs.  

CBCA 3815-C(1512), 3816-C(1537) 11
Finally, SIM seeks twenty-six hours for attorney fees from the law firm of Vedder
Price (totaling $4966) to prepare and file the reply submission.  CBCA Rule 30(c)(3)
requires that the application for fees and other expenses:
Be accompanied by an exhibit fully documenting any fees or expenses being
sought . . . . The date and a description of all services rendered or costs
incurred shall be submitted for each professional firm or individual whose
services are covered by the application, showing the hours spent in connection
with the proceeding by each individual, a description of the particular services
performed by specific date, the rate at which fee has been computed, any
expenses for which reimbursement is sought, and the total amount paid or
payable by the applicant.  
SIM did not provide any exhibit documenting the fees sought for the hours spent by Vedder
Price to prepare the reply submission.  There is nothing evidencing the date and description
of the services rendered, hours spent by each individual, or a description of the services
performed by specific date.  Therefore, we reject SIM’s application for twenty-six hours of 
attorney fees for preparation of its EAJA reply submission because no exhibits have been
provided to document the fees sought. 
Decision
We GRANT IN PART the application and award applicant $32,150 without interest
pursuant to the EAJA. 
___________________________
JERI KAYLENE SOMERS
Board Judge
We concur:
_____________________________ _______________________________
JAMES L. STERN ALLAN H. GOODMAN
Board Judge Board Judge