MOTION TO ENFORCE ORDER DISMISSED: January 30, 2007 
CBCA 389, 589, 590 
AMEC CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT, INC., 
Appellant, 
v. 
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, 
Respondent. 
James  D. Wareham, Kirb y D.  Behre, James E. Anklam, and Danielle W. Pierce of 
Paul,  Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP , Washington, DC; and Barbara G. Werther and 
Ronan  J. McH ugh of Thelen, Reid, Brown, Raysman & Steiner LLP, Washington, DC, 
counsel for Appellant. 
Dalton  Phillips and Cat her ine Crow, Office of General Counsel, General Services 
Administration, Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent. 
Before Board Judges DANIELS  (Chairman), BORWICK , and PARKER . 
DANIELS , Board Judge. 
On December 26, 2006, AMEC Construction Management, Inc. (AMEC ) filed a 
Motion  to Enforce Order.  The “Order” to which the  motion is directed is a  decision issued 
by the General Services Board of C ontract  Appeals (GSBCA) in three cases before that 
board,  GSBCA 16163,  16183, and 16388.  On January 6, 2007, pursuant to section 847 of 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, the 
GSBCA  was terminated  and its cases, personnel, and other resources were transferred to  a 
newly-established  Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (CBCA).  The CBCA  redocketed the 

 
   
2 CBCA 389, 589, 590 
cases  as CBCA 389, 589, and 590, and is considering the motion under tho se d ocket 
numbers. 
The GSBCA’s decision, AMEC Construction Management, Inc.  v. General Services 
Administration , GSBCA  16163, et al. (June 16, 2006), incorporated the terms of a stipulated 
judgment.   It directed the respondent, the General Services  Administration (GSA), to pay  to 
AMEC  the sum of $6,700,000, together  with interest if appropriate.  The decision specified 
that “[p]ayment shall be made from the permane nt indefini te judgment fund.  31 U.S.C. 
§ 1304.” The decision also recited  stipulations of  the parties, including one “[t]hat neither 
party  will seek reconsideration or relief f rom fin al judgment or otherwise appeal the final 
judgment.” 
The permanent indefinite judgment fund is administered by the De partme nt of the 
Treasury.   On September 18,  2006, the manager of the Judgment Fund Branch of Treasury’s 
Financial Management Service wrote to AMEC: 
On August 25, 2006, the  General Services Administration (GSA)  submitted a 
request  to the Judgment Fund Branch, Financial Management Service (FMS), 
Department  of the Treasury, to certify a payment in the amount of 
$6,700,000.00,  pl us interest, awarded in the matter of AMEC Construction 
Management  Inc. v. General Services Adminis trati on, GSBCA Nos. 16163, 
16183,  16388.  GSA also provided notic e that t he entire payment amount 
should  be withheld and set off against  a debt owed by AMEC Construction 
Management Inc. (AMEC) to the United States. 
Pursu ant to 31 U.S.C. § 3728, the Department of the Treasury is required to 
collect a debt owed to the United States by taking a  setoff  against judgments 
awarde d in actions against the United States.  Accordingly, FMS is 
withholding the entire p ayment amount in the above-referenced matter in order 
to set off this payment against a debt owed by AMEC to the United States. 
The Board’s decision which is the subject of AMEC’s motion involved a contract 
between  AMEC and GSA for the renovation of the Interstate Commerce Commission, United 
States  Customs Service, and Connecting Wing Buildings in Washington, D.C.    The debt to 
which  the Treasury letter refers involves a Government claim which was m ade under  a 
contract  between the same parties for the core and shell construction of the  Thomas F . 
Eagleton  Courthouse in St.  Louis, Missouri.  With respect to the latter contract, on March  21, 
2006,  a GSA contracting officer issued a final decision which  states, “GSA has determined 
that [AMEC] is responsib le under the . . . contract for the excess reprocurement costs, the 
costs  to repair defective work installed by [AMEC] prior to the termination [for default], and 

   
3 CBCA 389, 589, 590 
the assessment of liquidated damages through the  date of substantial completion which  total 
$31,791,700.39.”   By letter of May 1, 2006, the contracting officer corrected this amount to 
$30,031,699.39,  of which GSA demanded payment of $28,496,723.05.  By letter  of October 
10, 2006, the contracting officer revised the amount of the paymen t d emand to 
$28,496,731.05.   On December 19, 2006, AMEC filed an  action in the United  States Court 
of Federal Claims appealing the contracting o fficer’ s March 21, 2006 decision and her 
revised final decisions dated May 1 and October 10, 2006. 
In its motion, AMEC asks t he Board to “d irect the GSA to honor the terms of the 
Order.”   Motion at 5.  AMEC says that GSA’ s condu ct in issuing the contracting officer’s 
decision in the St. Louis contract while negotiati ng a se ttlement of the cases involving the 
Washington  contract was “duplicitous” and “strongly suggests that the GSA was  not acting 
in good faith in this case.”  Id. at 5, 6. AMEC also finds GSA’s actions “particularly 
disturbing”  in that during 2005,  the agency had paid a settled amount in other cases  involving 
the Washington contract without asserting a right to  setoff.  Id. at 7.  AMEC further contends 
that “[t]he purported setoff directly harms subcontractors” of AMEC on the Washington 
project  in that “[a]n integral part of the [Board’s  decision] was the release of settlement funds 
so that AMEC  could make prompt payment to subcontractors.”  Id. at 3, 6.  “In sum,” says 
the contractor, “non-payment of the settlement  amount was bad faith by  the GSA.”  Id. at 7. 
AMEC  also makes two principal lega l argum ents.  First, it notes that boards of 
contract  appeals have said that  they have the authority to enforce settlement agreements.  See, 
e.g.,  East Coast Security Services, Inc. v. Department of Home land Secu rity, DOT CAB 
4469R,  et al., 06-1 BCA ¶ 33,290; Barnes, Inc. , AGBCA 97-111-1, et al., 97 -2 BC A 
¶ 29,237.  Therefore,  says AMEC, the Board has authority to grant its motion.  The 
contractor’s  second principal  legal argument is that “[b]ecause an appeal is already  pending 
regarding the termination of the [St. Louis] Courthouse Contract, neither the GSA nor the 
Depart ment  of Treasury has the right to setoff under 31 U.S.C. § 3728.”  Motion at 7.  On 
this point, AMEC cites 31 U.S.C. § 3711(g)(2)(A)(i) (2000), which st ates that paragraph 
(g)(1)’s  authorization to the Secretary of the Treasury  to take action to collect a debt “shall 
not apply to any debt or claim that is in litigation or foreclosure.” 
In response, GSA maintains that “[b]asically, AMEC is arguing tha t the Government’ s 
exercise  of its right  of offset was improper.”  Respondent’s Response  to Motion at 1.  The 
agency  notes that “[t]he Government’s administrative offset was not performed by the 
contracting  officer or a ny of the p ersonnel who administered the contract [for the 
Washington  project ]” and that “the captioned appeal[s] ha[ve] been settled, the record has 
been  closed and the Board has rendered its final order.”  Id. at 1, 2.  GSA cites several cases 
for the proposition that “[t]he Government’s common law right of setoff is  well established” 
and that “ [n]either the Contract Disputes Act (CDA) nor the [Debt Collection Act] limits 

4 CBCA 389, 589, 590 
[that]  right.”  Id. at 3. GSA says that AMEC’s allegations of  inappropriate behavior and bad 
faith “are untrue and totally unfounded.”  Id. at 4.  The agency also observes that  AMEC’s 
own motion states that the contractor has already paid its subcontractors  their agreed-upon 
shares  of the amount provided in the Board’s decision, so any conc ern fo r how the setoff 
might  affect the  subcontractors is misplaced.  Id. at 6.  GSA also cites a practical reason for 
making  the setoff:  According to a stipulation  in a case  before the Court of Federal Claims, 
AME C is “win ding down its business” and its net assets had become negative by tens of 
millions  of dollars by July 2005.  If the agency prevails at the  court, the  agency says, “[t]his 
setoff  may be  GSA’s only  opportunity to seek redress from AMEC for the taxpayers.”  Id. 
at 7.  Finally, GSA urges that two 1973 decisions of the Court of Claims -- Dale  Ingram, Inc. 
v. United States , 475 F.2d 1177, 1188, and Project Map, Inc.  v. United States , 486 F.2d 1375 
-- support the  prop osition that the Government may set off moneys owed to a contractor 
against  the Government’s  contract claims, even if  those claims are being challenged before 
a board of contract appeals. 
We are puzzled by the motion because AMEC is not asking the Board to  do anything 
other  than what it did last June 16, as to the matters  addressed in our  decision of that date: 
order  the Government  to pay $6,700,000 to AMEC.  We took  this action in a decision from 
which  no motion for reconsideration or relief from decision, and no appeal, was possible. 
GSA  has acknowledged a debt to AMEC in this  amount.  If we were to reissue the decision, 
saying,  “This time we really mean it!” how would that affect  anything?  Because we  issued 
a decision, rather than an order dismissing the cases in question, the situation is different 
from  the ones in the  cited East Coast  and Barnes  cases:  we have already mandated the action 
that the contractor asks us to direct.  The holdings in  those  cases consequently do not apply 
here. 
AMEC  has used the words “bad faith” in its motion.  Could this be cause for 
reopening  the matters addressed in the decision,  notwithstanding  the limitations placed in the 
decision at  the parties’ request?  We need not answer this  question because even if we were 
to conclude in the affirmative, the assertions AMEC  makes do not, on their face, show bad 
faith.  Whatever actions GSA took in 2005 to pay the  contractor in settlement of claims  on 
the Washington project, when  matters were not yet resolved  on the St. Louis project, do not 
preclude  the agency from acting differently in 2006; and the 2006  settlemen t on the 
Washington  claims  does not prevent GSA from asserting a setoff based on St. Louis claims. 
The contracting officer  issued the decision asserting the St.  Louis claim on March 21, before 
the parties settled the  Washington claims on March 31 and well  before the parties moved for 
a st ipulated judgment on the appeals encompassing the Washington claims on June  14. 
AMEC  had ample  opportunity to propose rewriting the settlement  agreement to exclude the 
possibility  of the Government setting off one claim against the  other,  or to propose writing 
the motion for stipulated judgment t o exclude this possibility, but it did not avail itself of 

 
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5 CBCA 389, 589, 590 
either  opportunity.  AMEC’s subcontractors have by the  contractor’s admission been paid 
the amounts to which they were entitled pursuant to the settlement, so we cannot see how 
payment to them might be dependent on GSA’s transmission of funds to AMEC. 
As GSA points  out, AMEC is really objecting to the determination of the Department 
of the Treasury, acting at the request of GSA, to set off against a claimed d ebt t he amount 
of money t he Board awa rded in its decision.  The Board’s jurisdiction under the Contract 
Disputes  Act is limited to  hearing and deciding appeals  by contractors of decisions issued by 
contracting  officers on claims und er cont racts for the procurement of property (other than 
real property in being); services; construc tion , alteration, repair, or maintenance of real 
property;  or disposal  of personal property.  41 U.S.C.A. §§ 438(c)(1), 602, 605-607 (West 
2007).   We have no authority to decide,  in the absence of such an appeal,  whether GSA acted 
permissibly  in requesting, or  Treasury acted permissibly in determining,  whether the setoff 
at issue was permissible.  Whether AME C is correct in maintaining that statute precludes 
such  a setoff, and whether GSA is correct is maintaining that  case law  permits it, will have 
to be decided by a tribunal which has jurisdiction to consider these arguments. 
Decision 
AMEC’s Motion to Enforce Order is DISMISSED . 
STEPHEN M. DANIELS 
Board Judge 
We concur: 
ANTHONY S. BORWICK ROBERT W. PARKER 
Board Judge Board Judge