GRANTED: August 13, 2010 
CBCA 1093 
DSS SERVICES, INC., 
Appellant, 
v. 
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, 
Respondent. 
Ronald J. Shaw of The Shaw Law Firm, P.C., San Antonio, TX, counsel for 
Appellant. 
Michael J. Noble, Office of General Counsel, General Services Administration, 
Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent. 
Before Board Judges SOMERS , POLLACK , and GOODMAN . 
SOMERS , Board Judge. 
This case involves a contract between DSS Services, Inc. (DSS) and the General 
Services Administration (GSA) for the provision of nonpersonal services support of various 
information technology (IT) systems for the United States Army Medical Information 
Technology Command (USAMITC). 
1 After considering the testimony presented at a hearing 
1 Previously in this appeal, DSS filed two separate motions for partial summary 
relief. In one motion, DSS sought payment for the services that had been invoiced under the 
contract but for which it had not been paid. We granted this motion, finding that if the 
Government had not used contract funds allocated to a labor contract line item to pay for 
equipment, the funding would have been sufficient to cover all of the invoices for services 

 
                 
            
                
            
            
      
             
                
             
         
              
         
             
              
            
             
           
               
            
               
            
              
 
            
               
         
         
            
             
         
    
2 CBCA 1093 
held on October 9, 2009, as well as the parties’ post-trial briefs, we find that DSS is entitled 
to the remaining amount sought in the appeal, specifically $134,028, plus interest pursuant 
to the Prompt Payment Act and the Contract Disputes Act. Accordingly, we grant the appeal. 
Background 
2On September 29, 2003, GSA awarded DSS, in coordination with the Small Business
Administration, a task order contract to provide worldwide support services for various video 
conference, telecommunication, infrastructure, and tri-service information technology 
systems for the USAMITC, which is headquartered in San Antonio, Texas. The contract 
called for DSS to acquire hardware and software in support of these services or at the request 
of the Government. GSA used Standard Form 1449, which incorporates by reference Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) clause 52.212-4, Contract Terms and Conditions ­
Commercial Items, for the contract document. The initial contract ran from October 1, 2003, 
to September 30, 2004, and included one option year. 
GSA modified the contract several times, first by adding a fourth contract line item 
(CLIN) to cover travel and training. The second modification revised the statement of work 
to require the contractor to provide equipment “listed on the IGCE [Independent Government 
3Cost Estimate ] or as requested by the Government in support of various IT projects 
worldwide.” The other contract modifications increased funding for the various CLINs, 
exercised the one-year option, and redefined some of the labor skill categories. None of the 
rendered under the contract. See DSS Services, Inc. v. General Services Administration , 
CBCA 1093, 09-1 BCA ¶ 34,119. We concluded that DSS should be paid the difference 
between the amount invoiced for services and the amount paid for services, specifically 
$691,048, plus interest pursuant to the Prompt Payment Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3902 (2006), and 
the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613, to be paid after trial.  DSS filed a second 
motion for summary relief for payment for one outstanding invoice for equipment ordered 
for which the Government has made a partial payment. We denied that motion, finding that 
disputed issues of material facts precluded summary relief. 
2 DSS Services is a woman-owned minority small business contractor which 
operates and employs people in a historically underutilized business zone (i.e., in a 
designated HUBZone). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 632(a), 632(j), 632(p), 657(a) (2006). 
3 The record does not contain the “Independent Government Cost Estimate” 
referenced in this clause. 

 
           
   
  
           
            
            
               
            
            
                 
            
              
             
         
 
             
             
              
             
 
               
             
             
              
              
              
             
           
             
            
               
         
          
            
3 CBCA 1093 
contract modifications identified a CLIN against which equipment could be charged under 
the contract. 
During the first year of the contract, GSA ordered services and equipment under the 
contract for the client agency, USAMITC, and funded the projects through contract 
modifications, ultimately resulting in nine additional contract modifications. To do this, the 
agency’s representative, Mary Gillenwater, would obtain a quote for materials and then send 
a request to GSA’s project manager, Jerry Johnson, for a modification to the contract to add 
the equipment requested by USAMITC. The records indicate that GSA charged these 
equipment orders against CLIN 0001, the category identified for labor, most likely because 
the contract did not have a separate CLIN for equipment. Toward the end of the first year, 
Ms. Gillenwater sent an e-mail message to Mr. Johnson asking questions about exercising 
the option year. Ms. Gillenwater told Mr. Johnson that USAMITC intended to add services 
and equipment orders under the task order for the United States Army Medical Research 
Institute of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD), located in Aberdeen Proving Ground, 
Maryland. 
With the first option year, GSA changed the procedure to be used when ordering 
goods and services. Rather than issuing separate contract modifications for each order, GSA 
decided to fully fund the contract for the year, according to the “Acquisition Plan” prepared 
by GSA’s project manager, Mr. Johnson. 
4 Thus, each time USAMITC needed services or 
equipment, Ms. Gillenwater, representing the agency, would discuss the projects with DSS 
and obtain a price quote from that company. She would then forward the quote to 
Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson would obtain approval from GSA’s contracting officer who was 
assigned responsibility for this task order and would instruct Ms. Gillenwater to proceed with 
the order. Ms. Gillenwater would then order the services and equipment, and DSS would 
perform the services and/or provide the equipment. DSS would submit the invoices to GSA, 
and GSA would review the invoices. Once the invoices had been reviewed, GSA would 
make payment to DSS, without the necessity of modifying the contract. The Government 
paid twelve invoices for equipment and/or materials using this process. 
This process had some serious flaws. As Mr. Johnson testified at trial, the 
Government appeared to have no mechanism in place to double-check which services or 
equipment had been charged against the contract. In the standard process, in order to receive 
4 The plan included a document entitled “Determinations and Findings Authority 
to Use Time-and-Materials Project 735227/03RT1081,” contained the typed name of Jerry 
Johnson included on the signature block, and was dated September 23, 2004. 

 
           
              
             
             
              
             
            
              
  
        
            
                
              
              
  
             
       
    
              
               
         
      
              
           
            
               
              
             
             
            
                
           
  
         
         
4 CBCA 1093 
payment for services or equipment, the contractor would submit invoices to GSA’s 
Fort Worth office, which would review the invoices for accuracy. Under that process, the 
personnel, however, could not confirm whether the invoices had correctly been linked to a 
CLIN because they did not have any information identifying the specific CLINs for the 
contract. GSA’s Fort Worth office would then forward the invoice to GSA’s finance office, 
located in Denver, Colorado, which would prepare a receiving report and would then forward 
the invoice to the client agency’s representative, Ms. Gillenwater. Ms. Gillenwater would 
ascertain whether the goods had been received and whether they had been accepted by the 
client agency.  Once the client agency confirmed receipt and acceptance, the agency would 
return the receiving report to the finance office, which, assuming that funds were available 
on the applicable contract, would authorize payment, again without regard to whether the 
equipment fell under any of the CLINs to a contract. Finally, Mr. Johnson stated that neither 
he nor the GSA contracting officer would see the actual invoice or documents attached, so 
they did not know what goods and/or services had been provided or charged against the 
contract. 
On October 1, 2004, DSS sent Ms. Gillenwater a pricing proposal/quote for what is 
identified as “Ft Detrick fiber,” with equipment costs totaling $267,338.78. On October 5, 
2004, Ms. Gillenwater forwarded DSS’s proposal to Mr. Johnson, including a line item for 
the equipment. In her e-mail message, Ms. Gillenwater stated, “I approve attached quote for 
inclusion in the contract.” The record does not indicate what actions Mr. Johnson took in 
response to this e-mail message. Nonetheless, USAMITC ordered the IT equipment under 
the contract in October 2004. 
In January 2005, after the IT equipment had been ordered but before it had been 
delivered, another client representative, Myrna Pina, Chief of the Logistics Division for 
USAMITC, contacted GSA’s Mr. Johnson by e-mail message, asking him why the contract 
had not yet been modified to add a CLIN for equipment. Whether Mr. Johnson responded 
to this inquiry is unclear. The record contains a series of internal correspondence in which 
several USAMITC employees reach the conclusion that DSS is on the GSA schedule for 
professional services only, and not on the GSA schedule for equipment purchases. The 
USAMITC employees struggle to determine which GSA office is responsible for the award 
of the task order to DSS, hoping to resolve the issue, because, as an e-mail message from 
Joyce Baker 
5 states, “USAMITC has bought many, many equipment items from DSS 
Services.” 
5 Ms. Baker identifies herself as the COR (contracting officer’s representative) 
for the “Infor Tech Spec, Proc Spt Br” of USAMITC. 

 
           
                 
            
              
             
           
     
              
              
               
             
              
     
 
             
     
      
  
           
       
        
         
            
       
         
      
       
    
          
        
  
              
               
             
5 CBCA 1093 
While the USAMITC representatives continued to investigate the issue, it appears that 
no one from GSA or the agency ever informed DSS that a problem could have arisen. Thus, 
pursuant to the October 2004 order, DSS purchased, delivered, and ultimately installed the 
equipment in April 2005. DSS submitted invoice no. 4088, dated April 11, 2005, seeking 
payment of $267,339. DSS submitted a DD Form 250, entitled “Material Inspection and 
Receiving Report,” with the invoice, providing verification that the Government had received 
and approved the equipment. 
On April 19, 2005, GSA rejected invoice no. 4088 because the amount of the invoice 
exceeded the contract funding remaining on the contract.  A note on the invoice referenced 
the need to sign an outstanding modification in order to provide additional funding to the 
contract. Effective on May 2, 2005, GSA and DSS agreed to a bilateral modification which 
increased the contract funding by $808,924.79. It increased CLIN 0001 by $800,000 and 
CLIN 0004 (Travel and Training) by $8924.79. None of the money had been allocated 
specifically to pay for equipment. 
On May 9, 2005, GSA contract specialist Aimee Ward wrote a memorandum to the 
contract file which stated: 
A twelfth modification was issued to contract 
GS08TO03BPC1081 (TO 45001294) on 5/2/05 in order to add 
funding to cover costs until the end of the POP [period of 
performance] (9/30/05). The modification resulted in an 
increased ceiling price from $2,154,208.22 to $2,963,133.01. 
Up until this point, the vendor had seven outstanding invoices, 
with three invoices more than 100 days old. As a result, the 
vendor had contacted Ben Gonzales [the GSA Assistant 
Regional Administrator], who then intervened in order to get the 
modification processed and pushed through to Pegasys [a GSA 
accounting software program] so that the outstanding invoices 
could be paid. 
As of 5/9/05, the bilateral modification had been signed by the 
vendor (DSS Services) and the CO [contracting officer] (Linda 
Reynolds). 
On May 13, 2005, when GSA again attempted to process invoice no. 4088, GSA had 
sufficient funds to pay only $133,310.70 of this invoice, leaving the balance unpaid. At that 
time, GSA informed DSS that the amounts sought for services and equipment exceeded the 

 
              
             
              
             
       
             
 
               
            
            
               
  
  
             
           
            
            
            
            
               
               
                
           
             
            
          
            
  
           
       
     
      
       
            
            
       
6 CBCA 1093 
funds obligated under the contract, even after the contract had been modified to add more 
funds. The GSA contracting officer would not or could not issue another contract 
modification to obligate additional funds to pay the remaining amount. On June 29, 2005, 
the contracting officer instructed DSS to provide written documentation in the form of a 
claim in order to receive additional funding. 
At the same time, once the Government realized that the funding obligated to the 
contract had been exhausted, but outstanding invoices remained, it began to investigate the 
reason for the shortfall. In a July 18, 2005, interagency e-mail message, Lori Rhodes, a 
branch chief with GSA Region 8 (the Rocky Mountain Region), notified the then-designated 
contracting officer, Gilbert Olivas, that according to GSA Finance, funding provided by the 
Army could not be used to pay the outstanding DSS invoices because the funding came from 
prior year funds. 
As part of his investigation into what happened on this contract, the GSA contracting 
officer, Mr. Olivas, questioned both government employees and the contractor about the 
services provided and the equipment purchased under the contract. When confronted with 
allegations that Mr. Johnson had acted outside his authority as a project manager, 
Mr. Johnson submitted a lengthy statement in response and obtained a statement from 
Wilton W. Webb, the prior GSA contracting officer with authority over the contract. 
Mr. Webb confirmed by e-mail message dated July 30, 2005, that he had authorized all of 
the actions taken by Mr. Johnson, that he considered Mr. Johnson’s actions to be proper, and 
that Mr. Johnson had consulted with him on all aspects of the contract order. 
After the investigation, Mr. Olivas concluded that the program manager did authorize 
the purchase of equipment and related labor, and that the contractor had provided equipment 
in performing the contract, but determined that the program manager had acted without 
proper authority, despite contracting officer Webb’s statement to the contrary. 
On August 12, 2005, Mr. Olivas terminated the contract, stating as follows, in 
pertinent part: 
The purpose of this letter is to inform DSS Services, Inc., that 
the Government hereby terminates the subject task order 
effective immediately pursuant to Contract Clause 52.212-04(1), 
Termination for the Government’s Convenience, and Paragraph 
c.7., Incremental funding/limitation of liability, of the statement 
of work. DSS Services, Inc., shall stop all work under the order 
at that this time (sic) and shall cause any and all of your 
suppliers and subcontractors to similarly cease work. 

 
          
        
           
          
         
             
            
           
            
            
           
              
              
         
               
             
            
         
            
            
               
              
               
           
            
              
       
                
         
               
           
            
            
     
7 CBCA 1093 
As provided by Paragraph c.7(e) of the statement of work, funds 
allocated under the subject contract have been depleted and 
additional funds are not available at the present time. As you 
know, this is a result of the Government having paid your 
company for equipment not provided for in the contract. 
After issuing the termination notice, Mr. Olivas sent DSS a series of letters seeking 
information from DSS related to contract transactions. In those letters, the contracting 
officer indicated that he intended to determine whether an unauthorized commitment had 
been made. The contracting officer did not specifically question whether the equipment 
ultimately invoiced under invoice no. 4088 fell under the category of IT equipment. 
Subsequently, after evaluating the information provided by DSS, Mr. Olivas wrote a 
letter to DSS on March 23, 2006. In the letter, Mr. Olivas summarized the information that 
he had received during his investigation. He concluded that the task order contract was 
improperly awarded and contained many flaws, including “preclusion of competition, 
unpriced items and an unclear statement of work.” Mr. Olivas advised DSS that he had 
concluded that an unauthorized commitment had occurred and that he would not ratify the 
unauthorized commitment. At the end of the letter, Mr. Olivas incorrectly directed DSS to 
submit a claim to the Government Accountability Office. 
On January 31, 2007, DSS submitted a certified claim to Mr. Olivas, seeking 
$824,846.07 plus Prompt Payment Act interest. The amount sought included the unpaid 
costs for both services and equipment. When the contracting officer failed to issue a final 
decision or inform DSS when he would issue such a decision within sixty days, DSS 
appealed to this Board. The Board docketed the appeal on February 28, 2008. 
Appellant submitted two motions for partial summary relief. By decision dated 
April 16, 2009, the Board granted one of appellant’s motions and awarded appellant 
$691,048, as well as interest pursuant to the Prompt Payment Act and the Contract Disputes 
Act.  The Board denied appellant’s second motion for partial summary relief on the ground 
that a disputed issue of material fact, i.e, whether Mr. Johnson had the authority to order the 
equipment, precluded summary relief. 
At a hearing held on October 27, 2009, Mr. Johnson denied that he had made any 
unauthorized commitments on the contract. He testified that GSA’s contracting officer, 
Mr. Webb, had reviewed and approved all of his actions. During cross-examination, 
Mr. Johnson specifically confirmed that the contracting officer approved the purchase of the 
equipment on invoice no. 4088. 

 
            
                
                
           
             
              
               
              
               
            
              
     
                 
             
             
            
            
            
               
               
             
          
           
            
              
              
     
             
                
     
8 CBCA 1093 
Discussion 
DSS submitted invoice no. 4088 for equipment purchased under the contract. The 
Government has paid a portion of the amount invoiced. The issue is whether DSS is entitled 
to be paid for the rest of the amount due under the invoice, i.e., $134,028.08, plus interest, 
even though no additional funds have been allocated to cover the remaining amount owed. 
DSS does not challenge the right of the contracting officer to terminate the contract 
for convenience or the grounds relied upon by the contracting officer – it simply contends 
that it should be paid for the equipment ordered and installed by DSS at the Government’s 
request. DSS asserts that the contracting officer approved the purchase of the equipment, and 
that the only reason that the Government failed to pay the remaining portion of the invoice 
was due to an internal funding dispute between GSA and USAMITC. Alternatively, 
assuming for the sake of argument that the contracting officer did not expressly authorize the 
purchase, DSS argues that the evidence supports the conclusion that the contracting officer 
ratified the contract. Finally, DSS claims that it is entitled to recover on the basis of quantum 
valebant : the Government ordered the equipment, DSS obtained it for the Government, and 
the Government accepted the equipment, meeting all of the elements for an award. 
GSA disagrees, arguing that the contract did not contemplate the ordering of the 
equipment identified on the invoice, that no implied-in-fact contract existed, and that DSS 
cannot prevail under an implied ratification theory or under the doctrine of quantum 
valebant . GSA further maintains that DSS is not entitled to any interest under the Prompt 
Payment Act because, in the absence of a written contract, no payment due date exists. 
To the extent necessary to resolve this appeal, we address the arguments in turn.
6 
a. Did the contract contemplate ordering the equipment identified on the invoice ? 
Although GSA has conceded that the contract authorized the ordering of equipment, 
GSA contends that the contract did not specifically authorize DSS to supply equipment 
destined for Fort Detrick. GSA states that only GSA’s contracting officer could modify the 
contract to add Fort Detrick equipment to the list of deliverables, and that the contracting 
officer did not do so. 
6 The fact that we do not address each and every argument presented by either 
party in this opinion should not be taken as any indication that we did not consider these 
arguments fully and completely. 

 
             
            
              
             
    
                
                 
             
               
                
                
               
       
           
           
             
             
              
            
           
               
              
             
                
              
            
 
            
               
           
                 
               
          
9 CBCA 1093 
GSA misses the point. The contract’s statement of work contained within the second 
modification expressly required the contractor to provide equipment “listed on the IGCE or 
as requested by the Government in support of various IT projects worldwide.” As noted 
previously, the record does not include the IGCE, leaving us without any method to 
determine whether the equipment for Fort Detrick is listed on that document or not.  In any 
event, even if the equipment did not appear on that list, the clause does not limit the 
equipment that can be ordered under this contract to that listed on the IGCE. In addition, the 
clause required DSS to provide equipment “as requested by the Government in support of 
various IT projects worldwide.” A plain meaning of the contract clause does not require the 
exact destination of the equipment ordered to be specified in order for it to be included within 
the scope of the clause. The Government fails to explain why the equipment ordered for an 
IT project at Fort Detrick should not be included within the scope of a clause which 
contemplated support for IT projects “worldwide.” 
b.	 Did the contracting officer authorize the equipment to be ordered ? 
GSA contends that neither Mr. Johnson, GSA’s project manager, nor Ms. Gillenwater, 
USAMITC’s representative, had the authority to make changes or to add requirements to the 
contract. GSA argues that because GSA’s contracting officer did not formally amend the 
contract to expressly add the Fort Detrick fiber to the list of deliverables, the contracting 
officer never intended that equipment should be ordered for Fort Detrick. 
As discussed above, the contract permitted the Government to order equipment for 
various IT projects worldwide, not limited to those included on the list of deliverables. The 
evidence indicates that the equipment identified on invoice no. 4088 was ordered for use for 
an IT project at Fort Detrick. 
7 Therefore, the contracting officer did not need to modify the 
contract to add the equipment to the contract. The ordering of the equipment at issue was 
within the scope of the contract and was not a change or an extra requirement. 
c.	 Is the theory of an implied-in-fact contract necessary to justify the ordering of 
the equipment ? 
Although appellant does not rely upon a theory of implied-in-fact contract in support 
of its claim here, GSA presents an argument addressing that theory. First, GSA identifies the 
7 The Government has not raised the issue or submitted any evidence suggesting 
that the equipment had not been ordered for an IT project which was located at Fort Detrick. 
The only issue raised is whether equipment for Fort Detrick had been listed on the IGCE, 
which the Government refers to as the list of deliverables. 

 
           
             
           
              
             
             
           
               
             
            
              
              
              
                
            
                
           
   
 
            
              
   
             
       
              
              
          
               
           
               
             
              
              
             
     
10 CBCA 1093 
requirements for an implied-in-fact contract. Citing to various cases, including Flexfab 
L.L.C. v. United States , 424 F.3d 1254, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2005), and Angel Menendez 
Environmental Services, Inc. v. Department of Veterans Affairs , CBCA 19, et al., 
08-1 BCA ¶ 33,731 (2007), GSA states that in order to establish an implied-in-fact contract, 
DSS must show: “(1) mutuality of intent to contract; (2) consideration; (3) an unambiguous 
offer and acceptance; and (4) actual authority on the part of the government’s representative 
to bind the government.”  GSA next explains that DSS cannot rely upon an implied-in-fact 
contract to support its claim that it should be paid for the equipment. Specifically, GSA 
asserts that DSS cannot rely upon the theory of implied-in-fact contract because DSS cannot 
establish that anyone with actual authority had authorized the purchase of the equipment. 
GSA urges that because neither Mr. Johnson nor Ms. Gillenwater had actual authority to bind 
the Government, an implied-in-fact contract could not arise from the facts of this case. 
Ultimately, GSA’s argument focuses upon a theory of the law that has not been argued 
by appellant and is unnecessary to resolve this appeal. As we have noted above, the contract 
specifically permitted the Government to order the equipment identified on invoice no. 4088. 
As the order of the equipment was within the scope of the contract, arguments as to an 
implied-in-fact contract are not relevant to the resolution of the appeal. 
d.	 The contracting officer reviewed and authorized all contract actions taken by 
Mr. Johnson . 
In our previous opinion, we denied appellant’s motion for partial summary relief for 
payment of the remaining amount due under invoice no. 4088, because a genuine issue of 
fact existed as to whether anyone with contractual authority had authorized the purchase of 
the equipment. Based upon the evidence presented, we now conclude that the contracting 
officer authorized the purchase of the equipment. 
The record shows that during the first option year of the contract, GSA decided to 
fully fund the contract for the year, so that each time USAMITC needed services or 
equipment, the agency’s representative, Ms. Gillenwater, would discuss the projects with 
DSS and obtain a price quote from DSS. She would forward the quote to GSA’s 
Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson would obtain approval from GSA’s contracting officer, 
Mr. Webb, and would instruct the agency to proceed with the order. USAMITC would then 
order the services and equipment, and DSS would perform the services or provide the 
equipment. DSS would then submit the invoices to GSA, and GSA would review the 
invoices. Once the invoices had been reviewed, GSA would make payment to DSS, without 
the necessity of modifying the contract. GSA paid twelve invoices for equipment and/or 
materials using this process. 

 
 
              
           
            
            
                
                
                
               
             
               
            
              
              
                 
                
             
             
            
              
              
         
       
           
           
             
         
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11 CBCA 1093 
The record includes the e-mail message from GSA’s contracting officer, Mr. Webb, 
revealing that he approved all of Mr. Johnson’s actions. Mr. Johnson’s testimony at trial 
confirmed the fact that, consistent with the standard procedure, the contracting officer 
approved the purchase of the equipment included on invoice no. 4088. 
GSA suggests that because the contracting officer did not sign a modification adding 
the equipment to the contract, he did not authorize the purchase of the equipment. As noted 
above, the equipment ordered fell within the scope of the contract and did not need to be 
added by modification. In addition, there was no need to modify the contract during the first 
option year. The procedure used by the parties permitted GSA to make payment to DSS 
without modifying the contract to add funding for each request. The Government had 
intended to fully fund the contract from the beginning of the first option year. 
Also, the record indicates that when, in October 2004, the agency ordered the 
equipment listed in invoice no. 4088, sufficient money had been allocated to the contract to 
pay for the entire amount on the invoice. Although the Government discovered that the 
contract had a cost overrun at least as early as February 2005, and even though it was aware 
that the equipment had been ordered, it took no action to prevent delivery of the equipment. 
Thus, DSS delivered the equipment to the Government in April 2005. The Government 
accepted the equipment and has presumably used the equipment for the purposes intended. 
In any event, the equipment has never been returned to DSS. 
In light of our finding that the equipment was properly ordered under the contract and 
with full authorization by the contracting officer, we conclude that DSS is entitled to the 
amount remaining due under the contract, $134,028, plus interest. 
Decision 
For the reasons stated above, appellant’s claim is GRANTED. DSS is entitled to 
payment of the total amount claimed, i.e., $ 824,846.07 , which includes the amount 
previously awarded in our decision granting appellant’s first motion for partial summary 
relief, $691,048, and the amount sought at trial, $134,028, plus interest pursuant to the 
Prompt Payment Act and the Contract Disputes Act. 
JERI KAYLENE SOMERS 
Board Judge 

 
___________________________ _____________________________ 
 
12 CBCA 1093 
We concur: 
HOWARD A. POLLACK ALLAN H. GOODMAN 
Board Judge Board Judge