MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED: March 13, 2014 
CBCA 1512-R, 1537-R
SYSTEMS INTEGRATION & MANAGEMENT, INC., 
Appellant,
v.
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
Respondent.
Stuart W. Turner and Emma V. Broomfield of Arnold & Porter, LLP, Washington,
DC, counsel for Appellant.
Nathan C. Guerrero, Office of General Counsel, General Services Administration,
Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent.
Before Board Judges SOMERS and GOODMAN1.
SOMERS, Board Judge.
In Systems Integration & Management, Inc. v. General Services Administration,
CBCA 1512, et al., 13 BCA ¶ 35,417, we granted the appeals of Systems Integration &
Management, Inc. (SIM).  As we noted in our decision, after reviewing all of the evidence
presented, including extensive appeal files, transcripts from six days of testimony, and
1 Judge Anthony S. Borwick, a member of the panel which decided this case,
retired from the Board in December 2013.  Because this decision involves reconsideration
of the original opinion, no new judge has been added to the panel.  See Universal
Restoration, Inc. v. United States, 798 F.2d 1400, 1406 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  

CBCA 1512-R, 1537-R 2
voluminous pre-trial submissions and post-trial briefs, we concluded that the preponderance
of the evidence supported SIM’s claims for payments of unpaid invoices.
Respondent seeks reconsideration of the Board’s decision.  The Board finds that the
numerous allegations in respondent’s motion are either incorrect or immaterial to the
decision.  We deny respondent’s request for reconsideration because the grounds submitted
by respondent do not warrant reconsideration under the Board’s Rules.
Review of a motion to reconsider is governed by the standards set out in Board
Rule 26 (48 CFR 6101.26 (2013)).  As the Board has stated, 
The Board’s Rule 26 explains that reconsideration may be granted for any of
the following reasons set out in Rule 27(a): newly discovered evidence which
could not have been earlier discovered, even through due diligence; justifiable
or excusable mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect; fraud,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; the decision has
been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior decision upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, and it is no longer equitable that
the decision should have prospective application; the decision is void, whether
for lack of jurisdiction or otherwise; or any other ground justifying
reconsideration, including a reason established by the rules of common law or
equity applicable as between private parties in the courts of the United States.
Ryll International, LLC v. Department of Transportation, CBCA 1143-R, 12-1 BCA
¶ 35,029 (citing Oregon Woods, Inc. v. Department of the Interior, CBCA 1072-R, 09-1
BCA ¶ 34,063, at 168, 431-32, aff’d sub nom. Oregon Woods, Inc. v. Salazar, 355 F. App’x
403 (Fed. Cir. 2009); W.G. Yates & Sons Construction Co. v. General Services
Administration, CBCA 1495-R, 12-1 BCA ¶ 35,038 (2011); Springcar Co. v. General
Services Administration, CBCA 1310-R, et al., 10-2 BCA ¶ 34,534, at 170,332).
  
Reconsideration is not a vehicle for retrying a case or introducing arguments that have
been made previously.  Ryll International, 12-1 BCA at 172, 144 (citing Confederated Tribes
of Coos, Lower Umpqua & Siuslaw Indians v. Department of Health and Human Services,
CBCA 237-ISDA-R, 10-2 BCA ¶ 34,476, at 170,043).  Significantly, Rule 26(a) also
cautions that “[a]rguments already made and reinterpretations of old evidence are not
sufficient grounds for granting reconsideration, for altering or amending a decision, or for
granting a new hearing.”  Id. (citing Beyley Construction Group Corp. v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, CBCA 5-R, et al., 08-1 BCA ¶ 33,784, at 167,203).  

CBCA 1512-R, 1537-R 3
In its motion for reconsideration, GSA asserts (1) that the Board failed to consider
its arguments in CBCA 1537, (2) that the Board did not properly apply the burden of proof
in both CBCA 1512 and CBCA 1537; and (3) the Board’s decision as a whole is simply
inadequate because it “makes factual pronoucements with no citation to record evidence or
even an explanation of the premise of the factual determination.”  GSA concludes its
introductory paragraph by asserting that “the purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to
correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence,” citing
Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3rd Cir. 1985).2  To establish each of these
points, GSA simply reargues the same issues and arguments it presented before the decision
was issued.  
In support of its first ground for reconsideration, GSA asserts that the Board failed
to consider the testimony of the contracting officer for the Region 1 task order (CBCA
1537), and that the Board ignored evidence presented by GSA concerning the task order. 
To the contrary, the Board expressly cited to the contracting officer’s testimony in the
decision, Systems Integration & Management, 13 BCA at 173,759-60, and addressed the
task order in its discussion, id. at 173,761.  Rather than ignoring GSA’s evidence on this
point, the Board clearly considered, and rejected, GSA’s argument that SIM did not timely
submit invoices for the Region 1 task order.3  
As its second ground for reconsideration, GSA asserts that the Board failed to
properly apply the burden of proof.  In support of this assertion, GSA again cites to the same
arguments and evidence that the Board expressly considered, and ultimately rejected. 
Nothing supports GSA’s contention that the Board failed to apply the proper burden of
proof.  Rather, as noted in our decision, the contractor had the burden to prove “that it
2 In Harsco, the plaintiff sought declaratory judgment that it owned an invention
developed while by the defendant while he was employed by the plaintiff.  After the court
granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the court subsequently denied.  Citing Harsco, GSA recites a
different standard from the one contained in Board Rule 26.  Under our Rules and case law,
GSA fails to provide adequate grounds to support its motion for reconsideration.  
3 GSA cites to footnote 4 of the Board’s decision to support its contention that
the Board ignored its arguments related to the task order.  As appellant correctly concluded
in its opposition to respondent’s motion for reconsideration, this footnote contained a
typographical error.  The Board intended to say that “GSA did not address this task order
in its post-hearing reply brief.”  The statement in that footnote is immaterial to our decision,
so correcting the statement does not merit reconsideration.  Cf. Oregon Woods, 09-1 BCA
at 168,432 n.2.   

CBCA 1512-R, 1537-R 4
delivered the [services] in accordance with the contract requirements, that it properly and
timely submitted invoices for those services, and that such services remained unpaid by the
Government.”  Systems Integration & Management, 13 BCA at 173,761 (citing Ahmed S.
Zhickrulla, ASBCA 52137, 03-2 BCA ¶ 32,409, at 160,420).  After examining all of the
evidence before us, we determined that appellant had met its burden of proving its prima
facie case through documents and testimony.  We next turned to the evidence presented by
GSA, and found it insufficient to rebut appellant’s prima facie case, relying, in significant
part, on the testimony of government witnesses, whose testimony supported appellant’s
contention that the services had been provided and that invoices had not been paid.  GSA
has not explained how the standards set forth in Rule 26 require the Board to reconsider this
analysis.  
Finally, GSA claims that the Board’s decision “contains manifestly inadequate factual
determinations and citations to the record to allow the parties, or anyone reading the decision
for that matter, to make a determination regarding the Board’s factual conclusions and
decision on entitlement.”  In particular, GSA asserts that the decision does not provide it
with enough information to allow it to calculate interest due on the unpaid invoices under
the Prompt Payment Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3903 (2006), because the decision does not list for
each individual invoice the agency’s receipt.  However, GSA already possesses the
information necessary to calculate the interest due.  Indeed, the contracting officer’s final
decision, dated December 18, 2008, identifies each of the forty-five invoices sought in
CBCA 1517 by invoice number, period of performance, and date of submission.  GSA’s
contention that the decision will lead to “needless confusion and perhaps further litigation”
ignores the factual information in the record to support the calculation of interest.
Decision
For the reasons set forth above, respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the
Board’s decision is DENIED.
__________________________
JERI KAYLENE SOMERS
Board Judge
I concur:
__________________________
ALLAN H. GOODMAN
Board Judge

CBCA 1512-R, 1537-R 5