MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY RELIEF GRANTED;
 
DENIED IN PART:  March 22, 2011
 
CBCA 1346
 
CINDY KARP,
 
Appellant, 
v. 
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, 
Respondent. 
John M. Comolli of McLanahan & Comolli, Athens, GA, counsel for Appellant. 
Lesley M. Busch, Office of General Counsel, General Services Administration, 
Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent. 
Before Board Judges HYATT, VERGILIO , and SHERIDAN. 
HYATT, Board Judge. 
This appeal presents claims arising under a lease for office, warehouse, and storage 
space in Athens, Georgia. Appellant, Cindy Karp, seeks four years of property tax increases, 
as well as expenses she incurred in repairing damages to the building following the tenant’s 
vacation of the premises. Respondent, the General Services Administration (GSA), has 
moved for partial summary relief with respect to appellant’s claim for reimbursement of 
property tax increases for the years 2000 through 2003. 
The Board grants the motion. Appellant has not established either that she complied 
with the requirement for timely notice of tax increases provided for in the Tax Adjustment 
clause of the lease or that the requirement was waived. The Board thus denies this element 
of appellant’s claim. 

     
     
        
      
      
     
   
    
      
        
       
      
       
       
   
    
       
    
        
     
   
      
     
     
2 CBCA 1346 
Findings of Uncontested Facts 
1. On June 29, 1999, GSA awarded lease GS-04B-39093 to appellant, Cindy 
Karp. The lease was for approximately 6400 square feet of office, warehouse, special, and 
storage space located in Athens, Georgia, to be occupied by the U. S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service. The lease commenced on July 1, 1999, for a ten-year term, with the proviso that 
the Government could terminate at any time on or after July 1, 2004, upon at least sixty 
days’ written notice to the lessor. Respondent’s Statement of Uncontested Facts (RSUF) ¶¶ 
1-2; Appellant’s Response to Respondent’s Statement of Uncontested Facts (ASUF) ¶¶ 1-2. 
2. GSA negotiated to lease these premises through its regional broker contractor, 
Amelang Management Corporation. An Amelang employee, Mary Nix, dealt directly with 
appellant. The lease was executed by Ms. Karp and a GSA contracting officer, Kenneth 
Day. RSUF ¶¶ 3-4; ASUF ¶¶ 3-4; Appeal File, Exhibit 1; Deposition of Mary Gore Nix 
(July 17, 2009) at 7, 51 (Nix Deposition). 
3. The lease provided for the determination of a base property tax. The tax base 
represented the amount from which all tax increases were to be calculated throughout the 
duration of the lease. RSUF ¶ 5. The parties disagree on the year that should serve as the 
1base year,  but for the purpose of resolving this motion, this dispute has no relevance.
4. The Tax Adjustment clause in the lease states in pertinent part: 
(b) Base year taxes as referred to in this clause are the real estate taxes for 
the first twelve (12) month period coincident with full assessment, or may be 
an amount negotiated by the parties that reflects an agreed upon base for a 
fully assessed  value of the property. 
. . . . 
(d) The Lessor shall furnish the Contracting Officer with copies of all 
notices which may affect the evaluation of said land and buildings for real 
estate taxes thereon, as well as all notices of a tax credit, all tax bills and all 
paid tax receipts, or where tax receipts are not given, other similar evidence 
1 GSA uses the amount of $3572.70, the taxes paid in 2000, as the tax base. 
RSUF ¶ 5. Appellant contends that the appropriate base property tax is the amount of 
$3072, paid in 1998, the latest year for which tax information was available at the time the 
lease was executed.  ASUF ¶ 5. 

   
   
    
   
      
  
    
  
     
     
   
    
 
      
  
    
     
   
      
     
        
  
      
      
     
  
       
3 CBCA 1346 
of payment acceptable to the Contracting Officer (hereinafter, evidence of 
payment), and a proper invoice (as described in the Prompt Payment clause of 
this lease, GSAR 552.232-71) of the tax adjustment including the calculation 
thereof, for each year that real estate taxes are incurred during the lease term 
or any extension thereof. All such documents are due within ten (10) calendar 
days of receipt except that the proper invoice and evidence of payment shall 
be submitted within sixty (60) calendar days after the date the tax payment is 
due from the Lessor to the taxing authority.  Failure to submit the proper 
invoice and evidence of payment within such a time frame shall be a 
waiver of the right to receive payment resulting from an increased tax 
adjustment under this clause. 
(e) The Government shall make a single annual lump sum payment to the 
Lessor for its share of any increase in real estate taxes during the lease over 
the amount established as the base year taxes, or receive a rental credit or 
lump sum payment for its share of any decreases in real estate taxes during the 
lease term below the amount established in the base year taxes. 
. . . . 
(g) The Government may direct the Lessor upon reasonable notice to 
initiate a tax appeal or the Government may decide to contest the tax 
assessment on behalf of the Government and the Lessor or for the 
Government alone. The Lessor shall furnish to the Government information 
necessary to appeal of the tax assessment in accordance with the filing 
requirements of the taxing authority. If the Government decides to contest the 
tax assessment on its own on behalf of the Government and the Lessor, the 
Lessor shall cooperate and use all reasonable efforts including but not limited 
to affirming the accuracy of the documents, including documents required for 
any legal proceeding and taking such other actions as may be required. 
RSUF ¶ 6; ASUF ¶ 6; Appeal File, Exhibits 1, 2 (emphasis in original). 
5. GSA’s notice of intent to vacate the property in sixty days was transmitted to 
the lessor on July 30, 2004. The lease was terminated effective September 30, 2004. RSUF 
¶ 7; ASUF ¶ 7; Appeal File, Exhibit 8. 
6. Sometime after the lease was terminated, the lessor sent tax adjustment 
documentation for the years 2000 through 2004 to GSA, asking for payment of the increased 
amounts.  RSUF ¶ 8.  Appellant does not contest this statement, but adds that: 

        
         
     
    
   
      
          
    
  
    
       
     
    
  
       
       
     
     
     
      
        
       
       
        
  
     
4 CBCA 1346 
Ms. Karp testified [at her deposition] she also sent copies of the paid ad 
valorem tax bills to Mary Nix the first two years into the Lease. During the 
course of the Lease she sent copies of the tax bills to Mary Nix, Vince Aliffi, 
Mary Curr[i]n, and Elaine Peters, among others. It is believed Elaine Peters 
became the contracting officer for the Lease shortly after it was signed by 
2Kenneth Day.[ ] Also, Ms. Nix indicated that had she received the tax bills,
she would have forwarded them to GSA. 
3 Because of the high turnover of 
personnel and the method for routing faxes involving tax matters at GSA, it 
is possible the faxes were misdirected or misplaced by GSA. 
ASUF ¶ 8. 
7. In October 2005, approximately one year after the lease was terminated, Ms. 
Peters, the contracting officer assigned to this lease at that time, compensated the Lessor for 
the tax increase incurred for the year 2004, even though timely notice had not been received. 
RSUF ¶ 9; ASUF ¶ 9. 
8. By letter dated April 17, 2008, addressed to Mr. Day, appellant filed a formal 
claim with respect to the subject lease.  As to the issue presented in this motion, the claim 
stated the following: 
2 Respondent proffered the affidavit of Elaine D. Peters, a contracting officer 
employed by GSA in Atlanta, Georgia. In her affidavit, Ms. Peters attested that she has been 
a contracting officer with GSA for a total of six years. She stated that she was not the 
contracting officer for the lease prior to its termination in September 2004, although she was 
responsible for drafting the contracting officer’s final decision dated June 23, 2008. She 
further averred that as contracting officer she had limited communications with Ms. Karp, 
and did not advise Ms. Karp that payments for tax adjustments would be resolved at the end 
of the lease term. She stated that she did advise Ms. Karp that the GSA tax division would 
review the tax information she submitted after the lease was terminated. Affidavit of Elaine 
D. Peters (Oct. 4, 2010) ¶¶ 2, 4-7. 
3 Ms. Nix testified in her deposition that she did not recall receiving tax notices 
from Ms. Karp or having any discussions with her concerning taxes, but stated that any 
notices or information directed to her would have been forwarded to the GSA contracting 
officer she worked with on the lease, Mr. Day.  Nix Deposition at 13-15, 35-36. She also 
stated that she explained to Ms. Karp that she was a subcontractor, not a GSA employee, and 
that the contracting officer for the lease was Mr. Day.  Id. at 7, 51. 

 
          
    
      
    
     
    
      
      
       
     
       
     
      
  
      
       
           
   
     
       
5 CBCA 1346 
Under the terms of the Lease, the following ad valorem taxes are due 
and owing for the property for the following years: 
2000: $3,572.70 
2001: $3,572.70 
2002: $4,438.91 
2003: $4,506.77 
Each was paid by the Lessor in October of the Tax Year. GSA paid the ad 
valorem taxes on the property for the year 2004, the pro-rated sum of 
$3,374.99, in November of 2005. The amount paid for 2004 included the 
adjusted increase of the taxes for that year. The Lessor gave timely notice also 
of the adjusted increases for the years 2002 and 2003, per the tax adjustment 
provisions of the Lease. The total demanded for taxes owed is $16,091.08, 
plus interest thereon from the date of payment. Attached to this letter are 
copies of the applicable tax bills in documentation of the applicable tax bills 
paid by the Lessor. 
Appeal File, Exhibit 10. In her opposition to the motion for summary relief, appellant 
concedes that the base year taxes were amortized throughout the lease term and that her 
claim must be limited to the amount of tax increases over and above the base year tax 
amount.  ASUF ¶ 12.
4 
9. On June 23, 2008, Ms. Peters denied the lessor’s claim for tax increases for 
the years 2000 through 2003, stating that the requests for payment had not been timely made 
under the terms of the lease.  Appeal File, Exhibit 11. 
10. In an affidavit submitted with the appellant’s supplemental appeal file, Rule 
4(b), the lessor, Cindy Karp, provided the following statement: 
2. In connection with the denial of compensation for unpaid taxes under 
the terms of the Lease, the Letter Opinion is factually incorrect. I, in fact, 
gave timely notice to GSA for the tax years 2000 and 2001. A copy of my fax 
4 In its brief, respondent notes that the lessor was inadvertently overpaid for the 
full amount of taxes in 2004 and suggests that appellant actually owes the Government 
money as a result. The contracting officer has not written a decision making such a claim, 
however, so this issue is not before us and we do not address it. 

     
           
       
        
         
    
       
    
     
     
     
      
        
    
       
        
        
        
      
           
       
        
         
   
    
     
     
 
6 CBCA 1346 
to Mary G. Nix, GSA Contract[ing] officer, of October 26, 2001, is attached 
5hereto.[ ] I have been unable to locate my fax of the tax bill for 2000 but it
was timely sent to Mary G. Nix. Neither of these bills was paid by GSA. 
When I continued to call and request payment, I was told by Ms. Nix that 
GSA would pay the tax bills at the end of the term of the lease when an 
accounting would be had at that time. Please note that I later sent Elaine 
Peters a fax, attached, in which I confirmed what Nix had advised me. 
3. In reliance on the direction of Ms. Nix, I did not thereafter send the 
yearly tax bills to GSA believing the notice provision had been waived. 
4. Please note as well that the GSA paid the pro-rata share of the tax bill 
for 2004, the last year of the Lease, in November of 2005, over a year after 
termination of the Lease, thereby confirming no notice was required for that 
year or any other year. I in fact re-sent all five years several times to several 
employees of GSA as they seemed to have “misplaced” or “misdirected” 
directed them to the wrong people. In this regard, I contacted and spoke with 
[Ms. Nix and twelve named] individuals at GSA. 
Supplemental Appeal File, Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Cindy Karp (Nov. 20, 2008) ¶¶ 1-4 (Karp 
Affidavit). 
11. In her deposition, Ms. Karp attested that she was new to leasing with the 
Government and that she dealt mostly with Ms. Nix and relied on her advice. Deposition 
of Cindy Karp (July 17, 2009) at 20-21. She stated that she sent copies of the tax bills and 
invoices to Ms. Nix for the first two years of the lease and that Ms. Nix told her the tax 
payments would be resolved at the end of the lease. Id. at 33-34. At some point, Ms. Karp 
also started to send tax documentation to Vince Aliffi at GSA because she had been told that 
he was in charge of the tax issue. Ms. Karp said she never developed “a clear understanding 
of all of the different people involved and what their role was,” but she also talked with 
5 As noted in finding 2, Ms. Nix was employed by Amelang Management 
Corporation, not by GSA. The attachments to the affidavit include a fax cover sheet from 
Ms. Nix to Ms. Karp, dated May 14, 1999, prior to the execution of the lease.  There is an 
undated fax cover sheet addressed to Mary Nix, with the notation “tax bill enclosed,” and 
there is a tax cover sheet dated October 26, 2001, addressed to Brenda Driskell, with no 
subject matter noted.  An undated fax cover sheet from Ms. Karp to Ms. Peters stated that 
Ms. Karp had been “waiting as told for the end of the lease to be compensated.”   

       
       
          
    
      
         
       
       
   
         
    
      
       
      
         
 
     
    
   
   
       
      
     
         
        
      
 
    
      
        
7 CBCA 1346 
other employees of GSA, including Ms. Peters, in an effort to resolve this issue. Id. at 35-36. 
Discovery has been completed with respect to the issue raised in this motion. 
Discussion 
Summary relief is properly granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); 
US Ecology, Inc. v. United States, 245 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Olympus Corp. v. 
United States, 98 F.3d 1314, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In resolving summary relief motions, 
a fact is considered to be material if it will affect our decision and an issue is genuine if 
enough evidence exists such that the fact could reasonably be decided in favor of the 
non-movant at a hearing. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp ., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). In considering summary relief, the 
tribunal will not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. Anderson, 
477 U.S. at 249; accord JAVIS Automation & Engineering, Inc. v. Department of the 
Interior, CBCA 938, 09-2 BCA ¶ 34,309 at 169,478. 
The moving party bears the burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issue 
of material fact. Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 
1987). The nonmoving party is then required to “go beyond the pleadings and . . . designate 
‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 
324 (quoting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)); Silver Springs Citrus, Inc. v. 
Department of Agriculture, CBCA 1659, 10-2 BCA ¶ 34,537, at 170,338. The existence of 
only a scintilla of evidence or mere denials, conclusory statements, or evidence that is merely 
colorable and not significantly probative, will not suffice to defeat the motion. Anderson, 
477 U.S. at 249-52; ERBE Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady Technology LLC , 629 F.3d 
1278, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational 
trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.”’ 
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (1986). When appropriate, summary relief may serve as a 
salutary measure designed to achieve the just and speedy resolution of disputes. Sweats 
Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1987); CACI, Inc.­
Federal v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 15588, 03-1 BCA ¶ 32,106, at 158,755 
(2002); Adelaide Blomfield Management Co. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 
12851, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,514 at 137,114. 
Appellant seeks to recover property tax increases for the leased premises for the years 
2000 through 2003. Respondent relies on the express language of the tax adjustment clause 
in the lease to support its motion for summary relief. Finding 4. This clause, which 

     
       
   
     
     
  
    
    
        
      
      
   
    
      
       
     
       
       
    
      
    
      
   
       
       
           
     
    
      
     
      
   
          
8 CBCA 1346 
expressly warns that the contractor will lose rights if a submission is not made in the 
prescribed period of time, has been construed to contain a binding notice requirement that 
is strictly enforced. Roger Parris dba Manchester Realty v. General Services 
Administration, GSBCA 15512, 01-2 BCA ¶ 31,629 at 156,259-60; Riggs National Bank 
of Washington, D.C. v. General Services Administration , GSBCA 14061, 97-1 BCA 
¶ 28,920, at 144,179; Universal Development Corporation v. General Services 
Administration, GSBCA 12138 (11520)-REIN, et al., 93-3 BCA ¶ 26,100, at 129,739-40. 
This contrasts with the general rule, first enunciated by the United States Court of Claims 
in Hoel-Steffen Construction Co. v. United States, 456 F.2d 760, 768 (Ct. Cl. 1972), that 
notice provisions should not be “applied too technically and illiberally” when the 
Government has full notice of the operative facts. In both Riggs and Universal 
Development, the board, after considering the rationale of Hoel-Steffen, together with the 
equally venerable principle that agreed-upon contract terms should be given effect, see, e.g., 
Madigan v. Hobin Lumber Co., 986 F.2d 1401, 1403-04 (Fed. Cir. 1993), concluded that 
this notice provision should be enforced. Riggs, 97-1 BCA at 144,179; Universal 
Development, 93-3 BCA at 129,739. 
In response to GSA’s motion, appellant asserts that she undertook to serve the 
requisite notice for the first two years (2000 and 2001) and that, in any event, she was 
assured that she could wait until the end of the lease to pursue collection of the tax 
adjustments that had paid. Further, appellant contends that the payment of the 2004 tax 
increase, for which there was also no timely notice, constituted a waiver of the notice 
requirement. 
We first address appellant’s evidence that she furnished GSA with timely notice of 
tax increases for the first two years of the lease. Appellant relies primarily on Ms. Karp’s 
statements in her affidavit and deposition, to the effect that she faxed the information to Ms. 
Nix in the belief that Ms. Nix was the contact point for GSA.  Findings 9-10. 
As respondent points out, however, the adequacy of this evidence falls far short of 
what is needed to defeat the motion. Appellant has alleged that for tax years 2000 and 2001 
the notice was faxed to Ms. Nix. Ms. Nix, however, had no authority under the lease to act 
on behalf of the Government and had no recollection of receiving such notices, although she 
stated that had she received notices she would have forwarded them to Mr. Day. Finding 
6. The fax cover sheets that purport to support appellant’s contentions do not include the 
underlying documentation and do not clearly state what the subject matter is or when the 
faxes were sent. Appellant has adduced no evidence showing that the faxes were actually 
transmitted to the contracting officer within the requisite time frame. After drawing every 
inference in favor of appellant, the evidence proffered does not create a genuine issue for 
trial. Even assuming Ms. Karp sent the tax notices to Ms. Nix, there is no basis for 

       
      
    
     
    
      
        
      
   
    
       
            
       
       
    
        
      
     
       
     
    
       
     
      
        
    
    
    
        
      
9 CBCA 1346 
concluding that the notices for 2000 and 2001 were timely received by the contracting 
officer. Ms. Nix was very vague, not recalling that she received the notices but stating that 
if she had she would have passed them on to GSA. Even after accepting these statements 
as true and granting every inference in appellant’s favor, this evidence is insufficient to 
entitle Ms. Karp to a hearing on the question of whether actual notice was timely effected 
for the first two tax years. Under the plain language of the lease, appellant is required to 
establish that notice was timely provided to the contracting officer. GSA has no record of 
receiving the notices prior to the termination of the lease. Appellant has not produced any 
evidence or alleged probative facts to support an inference that the responsible contracting 
officer received the notices in the requisite time frame. Cf. Sygnetics, Inc., ASBCA 56806, 
10-2 BCA ¶ 34,576, at 170,464 (contractor had the burden to prove the contracting officer 
received a copy of its certified claim where the agency had no signed copy of the 
certification, even though the contracting officer averred she would not have issued a 
decision on the claim without a signed certification). The evidence relied upon by appellant 
is simply too speculative to meet her burden to raise a genuine dispute for trial. 
Based upon the undisputed facts, the Board concludes that neither a contracting 
officer nor an authorized representative received a timely request for a tax adjustment for 
any of the four years at issue. Purported submissions to a regional broker do not constitute 
the necessary timely submissions for 2000 and 2001. Appellant concedes that the required 
notices were not provided to the contracting officer for 2002 and 2003. By 2004, 
submissions to the contracting officer for all four years were untimely. 
Appellant also contends that the notice requirement was waived by GSA. First, 
according to appellant, the “frequent assurances” of GSA’s agents and employees (Ms. Nix 
and Ms. Peters, among others) that tax issues would be resolved at the end of the lease led 
Ms. Karp to believe that the notice requirement of the lease would not be strictly enforced. 
Second, appellant points to the fact that GSA paid the tax adjustment for the final year of 
the lease without invoking the requirement for timely notice. 
As the Court of Claims noted in Gresham & Co. v. United States, 470 F.2d 542, 555 
(Ct. Cl. 1972): 
The waiver of a contract provision requires a decision by a responsible officer 
assigned the function of overseeing the essentials of contract performance, not 
just any Federal employee or officer whose work happens to be connected 
with the contract. 
It is, thus, not enough to say that Ms. Karp sent information to and received assurances from 
an employee of a GSA contractor or even from various individuals at GSA. It was her 

       
     
     
      
    
    
        
      
  
       
    
      
      
     
    
     
   
   
       
     
      
        
     
  
      
    
       
     
    
 
      
     
      
10 CBCA 1346 
responsibility to determine whether the individuals she dealt with had authority to bind the 
Government. Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947) 
(“Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone entering into an 
arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he 
who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority.”); accord 
Trauma Service Group v. United States , 104 F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1997); City of El 
Centro v. United States, 922 F.2d 816, 820 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See also Potter v. United 
States, 167 Ct. Cl. 28, 36 (1964) (“[N]o unauthorized officer of the Government can waive 
the terms of the contract.”); Walter C. Reedeger, Inc. v. United States, 94 Ct. Cl. 120, 125 
(1941); Baucom Janitorial Service, Inc. , GSBCA 5188, 80-2 BCA ¶ 14,514 at 71,536.
6 
Likewise, oral assurances by unauthorized representatives of the contracting officer cannot 
confer rights on a contractor. Baucom, 80-2 BCA at 71,536 (citing Industrial Engineering 
Co. v. United States, 60 Ct. Cl. 766 (1925), aff'd, 273 U.S. 659 (1927)). Finally, where an 
implied waiver is not based upon consideration, it must be demonstrated by clear, decisive, 
and unequivocal conduct or statements of government officials authorized to waive a term 
of the contract.  Adelaide Blomfield, 95-1 BCA at 137,115. 
Viewing the evidence presented “‘through the prism of the substantive evidentiary 
burden’ that would inhere at trial,” Johns Hopkins University v. CellPro, Inc. , 152 F.3d 
1342, 1359 (Fed. Cir.1998) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254)), we conclude that nothing 
proffered by appellant, if proven, would establish a waiver of the notice requirement. There 
is no documentation attributable to GSA indicating that the requirement was waived. 
Appellant has not identified specific discussions she held with any individual who had 
authority to modify the terms of the lease. Although she stated in her affidavit that she 
discussed the tax issues with Ms. Peters, she did not directly aver that Ms. Peters promised 
to waive the notice requirement. Appellant’s imprecise assertions that she had conversations 
about the tax payments with Ms. Nix and various GSA employees at unspecified times, 
without more, is not sufficiently probative to raise a genuine issue for trial.  
Although there is no non-waiver clause in appellant’s lease, appellant’s argument 
that GSA’s action in paying the tax adjustment for 2004 established a waiver as to all the tax 
increases for prior years cannot withstand scrutiny. A waiver is the “intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 
6 Only contracting officers are authorized to enter into or modify contracts on 
behalf of the federal government. Winter v. Cath-dr/Balti Joint Venture, 497 F.3d 1339, 
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Although contracting officers may, in some circumstances, delegate 
contracting authority to certain designated representatives, id., the record does not reflect 
that any such limited delegation occurred with respect to this lease. 

      
  
      
     
   
      
       
  
      
          
   
    
     
       
      
      
      
     
   
      
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11 CBCA 1346 
(1938); Cherokee Nation v. United States, 355 F.2d 945, 950 (Ct. Cl. 1966). The contractor 
must show that it acted in reliance on the Government’s relaxation of a requirement.  See, 
e.g., Gresham, 470 F.2d at 554-55; Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. United States, 91 
Fed. Cl. 363, 367 (2010); 4J2R1C Limited Partnership v. General Services Administration, 
GSBCA 15584, 02-1 BCA ¶ 31,742, at 156,820; General Security Services Corp. v. General 
Services Administration, GSBCA 11381, 92-2 BCA ¶ 24,897, at 124,172.  
The burden of proving a contract provision was waived by the Government is 
allocated to the contractor. See Westfed Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 407 F.3d 1352, 
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Public Service Co., 91 Fed. Cl. at 367. Here, appellant has shown 
only that GSA paid the 2004 tax increase, despite the lack of timely notice, after the lease 
had been terminated. In general, when a clause requires separate notice of each claim, 
failure to enforce the notice requirement with respect to a single claim does not waive the 
Government’s right to enforce the requirement as to other claims. See Rubi’s Metals, Inc., 
ASBCA 52059, et al., 01-1 BCA ¶ 31,266, at 154,450. Further, appellant could not have 
relied upon this waiver to justify its failure to comply with the notice requirements for prior 
tax years. As a matter of law, GSA’s payment of the tax adjustment for 2004 cannot serve 
to establish a waiver of the notice requirement for tax years 2000 through 2003.  
To avoid summary disposition of its claim, appellant must have advanced probative 
evidence to persuade a reasonable trier of fact that there is some possibility that she might 
prevail at a hearing. The vagueness of the assertions attested to by appellant, when weighed 
against the applicable legal requirements, falls short of that mark. Even accepting all of 
appellant’s assertions as true, and drawing all favorable inferences from that evidence, 
appellant has not overcome respondent’s motion.  
Decision 
GSA’s motion for partial summary relief is GRANTED. CBCA 1346 is DENIED 
IN PART. 
CATHERINE B. HYATT 
Board Judge 
We concur: 

__________________________________ ________________________________ 
 
12 CBCA 1346 
JOSEPH A. VERGILIO PATRICIA J. SHERIDAN 
Board Judge Board Judge