DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION:  November 3, 2025
CBCA 8363
WILLIAMS BUILDING COMPANY, INC.,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent.
Douglas L. Patin and Erik M. Coon of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP,
Washington, DC, counsel for Appellant.
Neil S. Deol, Office of General Counsel, Department of Veterans Affairs, Decatur,
GA, counsel for Respondent.
Before Board Judges LESTER, GOODMAN, and SHERIDAN.
LESTER, Board Judge.
Appellant, Williams Building Company (WBC), has requested that the Board allow
it to withdraw this appeal but without prejudice to its ability to raise the challenges that it has
identified in the claim underlying this appeal in another case that is currently pending before
the Board.  WBC seeks specific declaratory relief in this appeal that subsequent
circumstances have rendered moot, but it is seeking monetary compensation in the related
appeal for the alleged agency breaches of contract upon which this appeal is based.  Because
it is clear that the Board lacks jurisdiction to entertain this appeal, we dismiss it for lack of
jurisdiction, which effectively acts as a dismissal without prejudice.


CBCA 8363 2
Background
On December 9, 2020, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) awarded a contract
to WBC for a construction project at the Togus VA Medical Center in Augusta, Maine. 
WBC alleges that, soon thereafter, it identified numerous latent defects in the plans for the
project for which it sought answers through the submission of requests for information
(RFIs).  It asserts that the VA refused to cooperate with WBC in resolving those design
defects and that, on November 3, 2021, it asked the VA to terminate the contract for
convenience.  It further alleges that, on January 4, 2022, the VA suspended work on the
project; that the VA later insisted that WBC submit replacement drawings for the entirety of
the project, which it did under protest; and that, on August 22, 2022, the VA refused to
terminate the contract for convenience.  Asserting that the price of the project would increase
dramatically using the new drawings, WBC in March 2023 requested a substantial increase
in the contract price, a request to which WBC says the VA contracting officer never
responded.  The parties continued to interact and exchange blame for the next several months
about problems on the project.
In July 2024, WBC submitted a request for an equitable adjustment (REA) seeking
payment of more than $7.7 million for what it called the VA’s breach of the contract.  On
September 26, 2024, it converted that REA into a certified claim in accordance with
section 7103 of the Contract Disputes Act (CDA), 41 U.S.C. § 7103 (2018).
In October 2024, at the contracting officer’s direction, WBC remobilized on site. 
WBC alleges that it was later told to perform work in accordance with the original design and
not in accord with proposed change orders, which WBC asserted could not be done.  The
parties continued to conflict about the work to be performed.
Then, on November 26, 2024, WBC submitted to the VA contracting officer what it
called a “Claim for Declaratory Relief” under the CDA in which it “request[ed] a final
decision/contract interpretation by . . . the Contracting Officer, that the VA has materially
breached the contract, and that [WBC] has the right to stop work.”
On February 26, 2025, WBC filed this appeal, which the Clerk of the Board docketed
as CBCA 8363, from the “deemed denial” of its November 26 declaratory relief claim.
Soon thereafter, on March 20, 2025, WBC filed with the Board a notice of appeal
from the contracting officer’s “deemed denial” of its September 26, 2024, monetary claim,
which the Clerk of the Board docketed as CBCA 8390.

CBCA 8363 3
On July 24, 2025, the VA contracting officer terminated the contract for default. 
WBC appealed the termination decision to the Board that same day, which the Clerk of the
Board docketed as CBCA 8519.
By order dated August 25, 2025, the Board requested that WBC show cause as to
whether, in light of the default termination, there was any remaining live dispute in
CBCA 8363, given that the request in that appeal was for permission to allow WBC to stop
work on the contract.  WBC responded on October 15, 2025, indicating its belief “that this
declaratory relief appeal [CBCA 8363] has been rendered moot by Respondent’s termination
for default” and requested that the Board allow it to withdraw its declaratory relief appeal
without prejudice and “without . . . waiving its rights to raise all issues discussed in
CBCA 8363 in defense of the termination for default appeal, CBCA 8519.”  Appellant’s
Motion to Withdraw Appeal Without Prejudice (Oct. 15, 2025) at 1.
Discussion
We lack jurisdiction over the appeal in CBCA 8363.  WBC is not seeking monetary
relief in CBCA 8363.  Although repeatedly mentioning entitlement to monetary relief in its
CBCA 8363 submissions, WBC ultimately seeks only declaratory relief in CBCA 8363 that
would allow WBC to stop work on the contract at issue without the work stoppage being
considered a contract breach.  Approximately five months after WBC filed its appeal in
CBCA 8363, the VA contracting officer terminated WBC’s contract for default, an action
that is currently on appeal in CBCA 8519.  Because the contract termination precludes WBC
from continuing to work the project at issue, the termination notice provided the relief that
WBC is seeking in CBCA 8363 (that is, the ability to stop work on the project), albeit not in
the form that WBC may have wanted.
“If a case does not ‘present a “case or controversy” due to developments during
litigation, those claims become moot.’”  Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., 915 F.3d 764, 770 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance
v. United States, 517 F.3d 1319, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).  “A case is moot where it can be said
with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur and
interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the alleged violation.” 
Avue Technologies Corp. v. Agency for Global Media, CBCA 6752, et al., 20-1 BCA
¶ 37,639, at 182,754 (quoting RMTC Systems, GSBCA 8732-P, 87-1 BCA ¶ 19,557, at
98,851 (1986)).
In Article III courts, “[t]he mootness doctrine implicates subject matter jurisdiction,
which requires the existence of an active case or controversy ‘at the outset and at all later
stages’ of a case.”  Id. (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 688 F.3d 1319, 1324 (Fed.

CBCA 8363 4
Cir. 2012)); see Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997) (“[A]n
actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint
is filed.” (citations omitted)).  “[M]ootness is an exception to ‘the long-standing rule in the
Federal courts that jurisdiction is determined at the time the suit is filed and, after vesting,
cannot be ousted by subsequent events, including action by the parties.’”  CBY Design
Builders v. United States, 105 Fed. C1. 303, 329 (2012) (quoting F. Alderete General
Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d 1476, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
The extent to which the boards of contract appeals have treated the absence of a “case
or controversy” as a jurisdictional issue in appeals before them has been somewhat
inconsistent.  The “case or controversy” requirement is set forth in Article III of the United
States Constitution.  The Board, however, is an Article I, not an Article III, tribunal.  The
boards have sometimes adopted the need for a “case or controversy” as a jurisdictional
requirement in CDA appeals while, at other times, have found that it is not a jurisdictional
necessity.  Compare Avue Technologies, 20-1 BCA at 182,755-56 (dismissing for lack of
jurisdiction appeals that became moot) and SWR, Inc., ASBCA 56708, 12-1 BCA ¶ 34,988,
at 171,945 (“[L]ike the United States Court of Federal Claims, a non-Article III tribunal that
applies case or controversy justiciability standards, we also recognize such conditions,
including that standing is an element of our jurisdiction that must be proven by appellant.”
(citation omitted)) and Computer Data Systems, Inc., GSBCA 12824-P-R, 94-3 BCA
¶ 27,153, at 135,322-23 (“Because [the party] seeks an advisory opinion, the Board
summarily dismisses this portion of the motion for lack of jurisdiction” because of the
absence of “an actual case or controversy.”) with Air, Inc., GSBCA 7687, et al., 1985 WL
17107 (Nov. 5, 1985) (“Traditionally the boards of contract appeals, when dismissing cases
for mootness, have not linked such dismissals to a lack of jurisdiction.”) and Custodial
Guidance Systems, Inc., GSBCA 6531, 83-1 BCA ¶ 16,278, at 80,886 (opining that the
boards are not limited in CDA cases by the case-or-controversy requirement like Article III
courts but ultimately concluding that the issue “is a matter we think can await future
developments”) and Henry Products Co., ASBCA 19154, 74-2 BCA ¶ 10,918, at 51,947
(dismissing moot case “with prejudice”).
Other Article I tribunals, including the Court of Federal Claims and the United States
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, have consistently applied the “case or controversy”
requirement in cases before them and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction cases that do not
satisfy that requirement, including cases that became moot while pending.  See, e.g.,
Anderson v. United States, 344 F.3d 1343, 1350 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The Court of Federal
Claims, though an Article I court . . . applies the same standing requirements enforced by
other federal courts created under Article III.”); Zevalkink v. Brown, 102 F.3d 1236, 1243
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (“As a court established under Article I of the U.S. Constitution, the Court
of Veterans Appeals [now the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims] is not bound to the

CBCA 8363 5
‘case or controversy’ requirement of Article III,” but “it has decided [to adopt it as a
jurisdictional requirement] based on the same prudential considerations behind the “case or
controversy” requirement, i.e., courts should only decide real and substantial controversies,
not hypothetical claims.”); Industries for the Blind, Inc. v. United States, 120 Fed. Cl. 132,
135 (2015) (“Although the jurisdiction of this Court, as an Article I court, is not limited by
the ‘case or controversy’ requirement of Article III, this Court and other Article I courts have
adopted many justiciability precepts—including the doctrine of mootness—based upon
prudential grounds.”); Schooling v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 204, 208 n.7 & 209 (2004)
(dismissing case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because claims asserted in the
complaint were moot).
One of the reasons that at least the Court of Federal Claims has cited for treating
Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement as a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit in that
court is that the Article I court’s “decisions are appealable to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which is an Article III court.”  CW Government Travel, Inc.
v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 554, 558 (2000) (citation omitted).  A prior Supreme Court
decision directly supports and, in fact, appears to mandate that understanding.  In Muskrat
v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911), the Supreme Court considered the need for a “case or
controversy” to support jurisdiction before the then-Court of Claims, which was at that time
an Article I court.  By statute, the Court of Claims was granted jurisdiction to entertain
certain types of claims, including monetary claims involving challenges to the constitutional
validity of acts of Congress, “with the right of appeal, by either party, to the Supreme Court
of the United States.”  Id. at 350 (statutory citation omitted).  There was no doubt that the
Supreme Court’s authority to decide a case was “limited to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies’” under
Article III.  Id. at 356; see id. at 362.  Nevertheless, jurisdiction to resolve monetary disputes
arising from constitutional violations started in the Article I court, with such cases going
“first to the court of claims, and then upon appeal to” the Supreme Court.  Id. at 360.  The
Supreme Court determined that “there is neither more nor less in this procedure than an
attempt to provide for a judicial determination, final in this court, of the constitutional
validity of an act of Congress.”  Id. at 361 (emphasis added).  It recognized that it could not
segregate or bifurcate the Court of Claims’ authority to decide monetary relief suits through
decisions that, if not timely appealed, were supposed to be considered “final” from the
constitutional requirements applicable to the appellate court such that the Article I court’s
consideration of the case was subject to the same constitutional requirements as the Article
III court to which the Article I court’s decision would be appealed:
For the reasons we have stated, we are constrained to hold that these actions
present no justiciable controversy within the authority of the court, acting
within the limitations of the Constitution under which it was created.  As
Congress, in passing this act, as a part of the plan involved, evidently intended

CBCA 8363 6
to provide a review of the judgment of the court of claims in this court, as the
constitutionality of important legislation is concerned, we think the act cannot
be held to intend to confer jurisdiction on that court separately considered.
The judgments will be reversed and the cases remanded to the Court of
Claims, with directions to dismiss the petitions for want of jurisdiction.
Id. at 362-63 (emphasis added; citations omitted); see David Krinsky, How to Sue Without
Standing:  The Constitutionality of Citizen Suits in Non-Article III Tribunals, 57 Case W.
Rsrv. L. Rev. 301, 326 (2007) (“When hearing . . . cases [demanding monetary relief], the
[Article I Court of Federal Claims] adheres to Article III standing requirements [except in
congressional reference cases], apparently on the statutory interpretation ground that its
appeals are intended to go to the Article III Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which
is barred from ruling one way or another on a purely advisory lower-court judgment.”).
The boards of contract appeals’ jurisdiction to consider contract disputes “derives
from, and is limited to claims that arise under, the CDA.”  Rashid El Malik v. Department
of Veterans Affairs, CBCA 6600, 20-1 BCA ¶ 37,536, at 182,275; see 41 U.S.C. § 7105(e). 
The CDA provides that a contractor may appeal a contracting officer’s final decision to a
board and that, if a party is dissatisfied with a board decision, it may appeal the decision to
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, an Article III court, 41 U.S.C. § 7107(a)(1),
followed by a petition seeking review by the Supreme Court.  28 U.S.C. § 1254.  That
appellate process before the Article III courts may be pursued only if there is an active “case
or controversy,” see Arctic Corner, Inc. v. United States, 845 F.2d 999, 1000-01 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (dismissing appeal of a board of contract appeals’ decision that was issued without an
actual “case or controversy” and finding that the board’s decision, which could be considered
only advisory (even though labeled final), was effectively unenforceable), and a “case or
controversy” must exist and continue to exist during all stages of the disputes resolution
process.  See Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 362-63.  Unless our decisions are to be considered
anything other than advisory in nature, that includes the time that an appeal is pending before
the Board.1  See id. at 362 (“In a legal sense the judgment [of the Article I court, issued
without a case or controversy,] could not be executed, and amounts in fact to no more than
an expression of opinion upon the validity of the acts in question.”).  The CDA does not
1 To the extent that the Board in Sylvan B. Orr v. Department of Agriculture,
CBCA 5299, 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,522, dismissed a CDA appeal that had become moot for failure
to state a claim, rather than for lack of jurisdiction, we did not consider the Supreme Court’s
guidance in Muskrat in deciding that case.

CBCA 8363 7
contemplate that our decisions are only advisory.  See 41 U.S.C. § 7107(a)(1) (“[T]he
decision of an agency board is final” unless timely appealed.).
Because WBC’s request for a decision allowing it to stop work on the contract at issue
here was rendered moot by the agency’s termination of the contract for default, there is no
active case or controversy underlying this appeal, as required by Article III.  Accordingly,
we lack jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
To the extent that WBC arguably might have a separate outstanding request in
CBCA 8363 (beyond its request for a decision allowing it to stop work) that the Board
declare the agency in material breach of the contract, the Federal Circuit’s decision in
Securiforce International America, LLC v. United States, 879 F.3d 1354, 1360-62 (Fed. Cir.
2018), precludes us from exercising jurisdiction over a request for declaratory relief when
the ultimate purpose of the requested declaration would be to allow the appellant to recover
money.  WBC may pursue its monetary claim, based upon alleged breaches of contract that
it can prove, in CBCA 8390, which is still pending before the Board.
Decision
For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is DISMISSED FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION.
    Harold D. Lester, Jr.      
HAROLD D. LESTER, JR.
Board Judge
We concur:
    Allan H. Goodman            Patricia J. Sheridan      
ALLAN H. GOODMAN PATRICIA J. SHERIDAN
Board Judge Board Judge