MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED: 
July 9, 2018
CBCA 5506, 5715, 5849
JBG/FEDERAL CENTER, L.L.C.,
Appellant,
v.
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
Respondent in CBCA 5506, 5849,
and
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent in CBCA 5715.
Vincent Mark J. Policy and William C. Casano of Greenstein DeLorme & Luchs,
P.C., Washington, DC, counsel for Appellant.
Lesley Busch Uhr and Bradley Boettcher, Office of General Counsel, General
Services Administration, Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent in CBCA 5506, 5849.
Lynn M. Deavers and Michael A. Smith, Office of the General Counsel, Department
of Transportation, Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent in CBCA 5715. 
Before Board Judges DRUMMOND, SULLIVAN, and CHADWICK.


CBCA 5506, 5715, 5849 2
SULLIVAN, Board Judge. 
JBG/Federal Center, L.L.C. (JBG), seeks partial reconsideration of the Board’s prior
decision on its motion for summary relief, JBG/Federal Center, L.L.C. v. General Services
Administration, CBCA 5506, et al., 18-1 BCA ¶ 37,019, asserting that the Board erred in its
application of the continuing claims doctrine to the General Services Administration (GSA)
demand for repayment of property taxes paid for the parking spaces not included in the lease
between GSA and JBG.  We deny the motion. 
Background
We presume familiarity with the Board’s previous decision.  We restate the contract
provisions and undisputed facts that underlie our analysis regarding whether GSA’s claim
survives the statute of limitations pursuant to the continuing claims doctrine.  
Lease section 2.6.1, as amended by supplemental lease agreement (SLA) no. 5,
provided that, “[f]rom the Lease Commencement Date, throughout the Lease Term, the
Government will reimburse Lessor as additional Rent 100% of the real estate taxes
(excluding any notary fees, penalties, or interest on a late payment by the Lessor) applicable
to the Leased Premises.”  Exhibit 5 at 4.1  Under this provision, JBG was permitted to claim
reimbursement of payments it made in lieu of taxes that were assessed by the District of
Columbia to fund neighborhood improvements.  Id.  Section 2.6.1 further provided that the
Government would reimburse JBG for real estate taxes on no more than 145 leased spaces
in the parking garage:
No portion of the Government’s tax payments shall reflect tax assessments
attributable (i) to any Site Improvements not directly benefitting the
Government, or (ii) to parking areas or structures, except for the 145 parking
spaces directly leased by the Government.
Exhibit 2 at 67. 
When seeking reimbursement, JBG was to submit “a proper invoice, . . .  a calculation
demonstrating Lessor’s entitlement to the amount claimed, and evidence of payment by
Lessor of real estate taxes related to the Facility and/or Site within which the Leased
Premises is located.”  Exhibit 2 at 67.   JBG also was required to provide to the contracting
1 All exhibits are found in the CBCA 5506 appeal file.

CBCA 5506, 5715, 5849 3
officer copies of “all notices that may affect the valuation of the Facility and/or the Site upon
which the Facility is located, as well as all notices of tax credits (or refunds or abatements),
all tax bills, and all paid tax receipts.”  Id.  If JBG received any tax credits, refunds, or
abatements, the Government retained the right to receive “100% of the tax credit attributable
to the Government’s occupancy of the Leased Premises.”  Id. at 67-68.  
In April 2007, JBG submitted its first request to GSA for reimbursement of real estate
taxes for October 20, 2006, to March 31, 2007.  Exhibit 9 at 4.  JBG attached the property
tax bill issued by the District of Columbia for the lot that included the buildings and the
parking lot.  Id.  GSA paid the full amount JBG sought for October 20, 2006, through March
31, 2007.  Exhibit 9 at 1.  Biannually thereafter until June 2015, JBG sought and GSA paid
the full amount of the taxes levied by the District of Columbia on the lot that included both
the buildings and the parking lot.  Exhibits 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 21, 25, 26, 29, 31, 35, 38, 43,
50, 54; GSA’s Statement of Uncontested Facts ¶¶ 11, 12.    
Discussion
I. Standard of Review
To obtain reconsideration of the Board’s decision, JBG must identify newly acquired
evidence or an error of law.  Yates-Desbuild Joint Venture v. Department of State, CBCA
3350-R, et al., 18-1 BCA ¶ 36,959, at 180,083 (2017).  JBG asserts that the Board erred in
its application of the continuing claim doctrine and urges the Board to reconsider this
decision and find GSA’s claim for repayment to be barred in its entirety by application of the
six-year statute of limitations. 
II. JBG Has Not Identified A Basis for Reconsideration
Based upon the plain language of the tax provision, we found that GSA was not
obligated to pay the property tax for the parking spaces in excess of the 145 spaces required
by the lease.  JBG/Federal Center, 18-1 BCA at 180,275.  Because JBG attached the
property tax bill to each of its requests for reimbursement, as required by the lease, and the
amount of the bill matched the amount sought by JBG, we held that GSA knew or should
have known that JBG was seeking reimbursement of taxes in excess of those permitted by
the lease with the submission of the first property tax bill in 2007.  Id. at 180,277.  The
statute of limitations ran from that date.  However, because the terms of the lease required
JBG to submit reimbursement requests for the property taxes as those taxes were paid to the
District of Columbia, we further held that GSA’s claim was a continuing claim and not
barred in its entirety by the statute of limitations.  Id.  Instead, GSA could pursue its claim

CBCA 5506, 5715, 5849 4
for repayment of amounts paid in the six-year period preceding the contracting officer’s
decision in September 2016.  
JBG seeks reconsideration of this last portion of our decision.  According to JBG, we
erred in our analysis by not deciding that GSA’s claims arose only once, in 2007, when GSA
first reimbursed JBG the entire amount of property tax sought.  JBG describes this action as
a “decision” by GSA to ignore the language of the contract and pay the full amount.  Having
made this decision, JBG argues, GSA knew of its right to reimburse less than the full amount
of the bill in 2007 and its claims for overpayment are barred by the statute of limitations.
As we found in our decision, GSA knew or should have known in 2007, when JBG
submitted the first tax bill for reimbursement, that it did not owe JBG the full amount and the
payment of the full amount gave rise to its claim.  We did not find that GSA made a decision
to disregard the language of the contract and overpay this amount.  In fact, as we noted, the
reason why GSA reimbursed JBG the full amount remains something that we expect will be
explained at hearing.  Instead, GSA knew or should have known of its claim based upon the
language of the contract and the fact that JBG sought reimbursement of the entire property
tax bill, despite this language.  
A claim accrues on “the date when all events, that fix the alleged liability on either the
Government or the contractor and permit assertion of the claim, were known or should have
been known.”  48 CFR 33.201 (2017).  “[W]here a claim is based upon a contractual
obligation of the Government to pay money, the claim first accrues on the date when the
payment becomes due and is wrongfully withheld in breach of the contract.”  Oceanic
Steamship Co. v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl 217, 225 (1964).  “The prerequisite acts 
necessary for a claim to accrue, then, are entirely dependent upon the language of the
government contract at issue.”  Systems Management & Research Technologies Corp. v.
Department of Energy, CBCA 4068, 15-1 BCA ¶ 35,976, at 175,790.   
The language of the lease dictates that GSA is not obligated to pay real estate taxes
until JBG timely submits an invoice with evidence that it has paid the property taxes for
which reimbursement is sought.  GSA’s liability for property taxes and claim for
overpayment of these taxes does not arise until these events occur.  “[A] cause of action
accrues when all the events have occurred that fix the defendant’s alleged liability and entitle
the plaintiff to institute an action.”  Ariadne Financial Services Pty. Ltd. v. United States, 133
F.3d 874, 879 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Fallini v. United States, 56 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 1995)).  Contrary to JBG’s insistence, GSA’s claim for the repayment of property taxes
could not be fixed in 2007.  JBG had not incurred those real estate taxes (despite being sure
that they would be levied), had not presented the tax bills to GSA as required by the lease and

CBCA 5506, 5715, 5849 5
had not obtained reimbursement.  Instead, GSA had a new claim each time JBG presented
the bills for reimbursement and it mistakenly paid the full amount.  
JBG also argues that the obligation to pay the real estate taxes was fixed with the
execution of the lease and that its bi-annual reimbursement requests were just a formality. 
Again, JBG’s argument is contrary to the terms of the lease.  JBG did not have the right to
seek reimbursement of the real estate taxes until it paid the property taxes levied by the
District of Columbia.  It paid these taxes when they were levied bi-annually and sought
reimbursement pursuant to the terms of the lease.  If JBG receives no tax bill, albeit an
unlikely scenario, or fails to submit a claim for reimbursement, GSA has no obligation to
reimburse JBG for real estate taxes for that period.  Moreover, the amount of the tax
payments varies, which creates a distinct claim each time a request for reimbursement is
presented.  See Burich v. United States, 366 F.2d 984, 988 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (claim for variable
amounts of overtime pay deemed a continuing claim).
JBG relies upon Raytheon Co. v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 327 (2012), as support
for its assertion that GSA’s claim for repayment stems from a single agreement.  In that case,
the Court of Federal Claims found the continuing claim doctrine not to be applicable because
the contractor’s entitlement arose from a single agreement between the contractor and
government agency regarding the future allowability of costs to be submitted for payment. 
As noted, pursuant to the lease terms, JBG’s entitlement to recover its tax payments and
GSA’s claim for repayment arise with the periodic requests for reimbursement.  Those
requests must be made before GSA is obligated to reimburse JBG for the property taxes.   
  
JBG also relies upon a string of disability or retirement pay cases in which courts have
found the continuing claim doctrine not to apply.  In each of these cases, beginning with Hart
v. United States, 910 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1990), the Court has found that the obligation to pay
arose from a single event, determination, or legal obligation.  Bias v. United States, 722 Fed.
Appx. 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Davis v. United States, 550 Fed. Appx. 864 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
In  these cases, the determination of benefits was made once based upon statute or regulation. 
The periodic payments thereafter did not give rise to a new claim or right to challenge the
original determination.  Again, the lease dictates that JBG cannot seek reimbursement and
GSA cannot seek repayment until JBG is taxed on the property.  Moreover, the tax amounts
vary.  This situation is more akin to that outlined in Burich, which involved claims for
overtime pay.  Because the claims arose only when overtime was worked and the amounts
of overtime pay varied, the court found that the claimant could pursue claims for pay earned
in the six years prior to the suit.  366 F.2d at 988; see also Gray Personnel, Inc., ASBCA
54652, 06-2 BCA ¶ 33,378, at 165,477 (continuing claim doctrine applies with the issuance
of each delivery order under the contract).   

CBCA 5506, 5715, 5849 6
If the claims were reversed, the same reasoning would apply.  Assume that JBG,
pursuant to the lease terms, was entitled to  be reimbursed all of the property taxes for the
property but GSA, beginning in 2007, failed to reimburse JBG the full amount.  This failure
to reimburse the full amount continued with every property tax reimbursement request until
2016, when JBG made a claim for the amounts it was owed.  JBG would be permitted to seek
the amounts owed for six years preceding its claim.  The only decision that would be binding
upon JBG would be the decision to forego filing a claim until 2016, thereby relinquishing a
claim to monies owed for reimbursement requests submitted more than six years before the
date of its claim.   
Decision
JBG’s motion for partial reconsideration is DENIED.   
Marian E. Sullivan 
MARIAN E. SULLIVAN
Board Judge
We concur:
Jerome M. Drummond  Kyle Chadwick 
JEROME M. DRUMMOND KYLE CHADWICK
Board Judge Board Judge