MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY RELIEF DENIED: April 7, 2014
CBCA 3354
BRASFIELD & GORRIE, LLC,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent.
Laurence Schor, Dennis C. Ehlers, and Robert D. Pratt of Asmar, Schor & McKenna,
PLLC, Washington, DC; and Axel Bolvig III of Bradley Arant Boult & Cummings, LLP,
Birmingham, AL, counsel for Appellant.
Stacey North-Willis, Beth Chesney, Ogochukwu Ekwuabu, Benjamin Diliberto, and
Charlma Quarles, Office of the General Counsel, Department of Veterans Affairs,
Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent.
Before Board Judges DANIELS (Chairman), HYATT, and VERGILIO.
DANIELS, Board Judge.
Many disputes have arisen during performance of the contract between the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Brasfield & Gorrie, LLC (B&G) for the build-out
of the hospital and clinic at the VA’s Medical Center in Lake Nona, Florida.  Among those
disputes is one involving B&G’s Claim 2, for damages the contractor and its subcontractors
allegedly incurred as a result of a suspension of work directed by the VA.  This claim is for
eighty-five days of compensable delay and associated costs in the amount of $5,046,738. 
The VA contracting officer granted the claim in part, concluding that “B&G and its


CBCA 3354 2
subcontractors are entitled to 56 calendar days of additional contract time and additional
compensation as identified in Change Order (CO) -16L and Settlement by Determination
(SD) 351.”  B&G appealed this decision, asserting that it is entitled to an additional twenty-
nine days of compensable delay and those costs which it earlier claimed but the contracting
officer did not agree to pay.
B&G has now submitted a motion for partial summary relief in the appeal.  The
contractor notes that through SD 351, the VA has paid it $1,687,100 for extended general
conditions costs it incurred.  The motion addresses $2,084,917 in costs allegedly incurred by
B&G’s subcontractors during the fifty-six days of delay allowed by the contracting officer,
plus $97,829 in B&G markups on those costs.  The contractor maintains:
B&G submitted, on behalf of its subcontractors, detailed cost requests . . . in
the 56 Day Cost Proposal expressly requested by the VA.  VA has had these
cost proposals for more than a year and has not audited the subcontractor cost
requests or expressed any disagreement with them.  B&G submits that this
constitutes an admission that B&G’s subcontractors are entitled to costs in the
amount submitted in the 56 Day Cost Proposal.
In response, the VA maintains that B&G has not shown “that claimed costs for the 56
days of compensable delay were actually incurred, that they were properly allocable to the
delay, and that they were otherwise reasonable.”  For each and every one of the
subcontractors whose costs are sought, the VA has made specific objections to the claimed
costs.  For example, for the first subcontractor, the VA says that B&G has not demonstrated
that the subcontractor acted prudently in keeping both a project manager and a superintendent
on the job during the period of delay, or in having manufactured items stored during the
period (rather than ordering those items only when ready for installation); that the claim
preparation costs sought were necessary; or that the cost of the time of the company’s
accountant was appropriately billed as a direct cost rather than assigned to overhead.
Resolving a dispute on a motion for summary relief is appropriate when the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, based on undisputed material facts.  The
moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of material
fact.  All justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmovant.  Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).   In our
view, the objections made by the VA show that genuine issues of material fact suffuse this
case.  B&G’s filing of the motion for summary relief has served to smoke out the VA’s
position on the various elements of the claim.  The motion cannot be granted, however.  At
the parties’ request, the Board has authorized discovery to continue in this case and
associated cases for nearly a year.  We expect that the parties will use this time to develop

CBCA 3354 3
and address the matters the VA has raised in opposing the motion.  See Burnside-Ott Aviation
Training Center, Inc. v. United States, 985 F.2d 1574, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1993); CB&I Federal
Services LLC v. Department of Homeland Security, CBCA 3112, et al. (Mar. 26, 2014).
Decision
B&G’s motion for partial summary relief is DENIED.
_________________________
STEPHEN M. DANIELS
Board Judge
We concur:
_________________________ _________________________
CATHERINE B. HYATT JOSEPH A. VERGILIO
Board Judge Board Judge