MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION GRANTED:  June 29, 2007 
CBCA 50-R 
TIDEWATER CONTRACTORS, INC.,
                                                   Appellant, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
                                                        Respondent. 
Joseph A. Yazbeck, Jr., of Yazbeck, Cloran & Hanson, LLC, Portland, OR, counsel 
for Appellant.  
David Sett, Division Counsel, Federal Highway Administration, Lakewood, CO, 
counsel for Respondent. 
Before Board Judges STERN , FENNESSY , and SOMERS . 
SOMERS , Board Judge. 
Appellant, Tidewater Contractors, Inc., (Tidewater) has filed a motion seeking 
reconsideration of the Board’s decision in the underlying appeal, Tidewater Contractors, 
Inc. v. Department of Transportation, CBCA 50, 07-1 BCA ¶ 33,525.  For the reasons set 
forth below, we grant appellant’s motion and modify our earlier decision.  
The case involves a contract between the Department of Transportation, Federal 
Highway Administration (FHA), and Tidewater for road work.  The Government issued 
what it characterized as an “off-site” notice to proceed on January 5, 2004, which set the 
project completion date for August 10, 2005.  The Government held the preconstruction 
conference on February 5, 2004.  By final decision issued on August 12, 2005, the 

  
 
    
  
             
 
  
 
   
 
     
     
  
  
   
 
 
    
    
 
2 CBCA 50-R 
contracting officer rejected appellant’s claim that the January 5, 2004, notice to proceed did 
not meet contract requirements and that the project completion date should be modified.  
The Board rejected the Government’s argument that the contract permitted the 
Government to issue an “off-site” notice to proceed prior to the preconstruction conference. 
The Board held that the contract specifications called for the Government to give Tidewater 
the notice to proceed within a specified period of time, and that the Government had failed 
to comply with that provision. Based upon the fact that the contract put the burden of 
scheduling the preconstruction conference upon the contracting officer and that the 
contractor could not proceed to work on the contract until after the preconstruction 
conference, the Board found that the Government caused the delay from January 5 to 
February 5, 2004, a period of thirty days. However, the Board rejected Tidewater’s claim 
of entitlement to an additional time extension because Tidewater had failed to provide an 
adequate quality control plan.  The Government issued the notice to proceed on April 5, 
2004, after it accepted Tidewater’s revised quality control plan. 
In its motion for reconsideration, appellant contends that no work could proceed 
under the contract until a valid notice to proceed was issued, and that none was issued until 
April 5, 2004.  Based upon this analysis, appellant concludes that the Board made a mistake 
of law by concluding that the time for contract performance began to run after the 
preconstruction conference.  After reevaluating the record and arguments in this case, the 
Board concludes that the previous decision erred in granting only a portion of appellant’s 
claim.    
Discussion 
Appellant, in its motion for reconsideration, argues that the Board’s decision was 
incorrect as a matter of law. In this regard, the Board does not grant reconsideration on the 
basis of arguments already made and reinterpretations of old evidence.  Tom & Tony’s Auto 
Wrecker Service v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 15698-R, 03-1 BCA ¶ 32,217. 
To warrant reconsideration, the moving party must make a satisfactory showing that 
revisiting the matter is appropriate.  Zinger Construction Co. v. General Services 
Administration, GSBCA 11039-R, 92-3 BCA ¶ 25,039, at 124,814.  In evaluating a request 
for reconsideration, a tribunal must “strike a delicate balance between two countervailing 
impulses: the desire to preserve the finality of judgments and the incessant command of the 
[tribunal’s] conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts.”  Advanced Injection 
Molding, Inc. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 16504-R, 05-2 BCA ¶ 33,097, 
at 164,063 (citing Koll Construction Co. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 
12306-R, 94-2 BCA ¶ 26,599, at 132,344). “Reconsideration is always appropriate where 
the tribunal is convinced that correcting the original decision may be necessary to avoid a 

 
  
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
  
 
   
 
     
   
 
3CBCA 50-R 
manifest injustice.”  Twigg Corp. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 14639-R, 
99-1 BCA ¶ 30,310, at 149,877.  The tribunal would be so convinced where the movant 
“point[s] to controlling decisions or data that the [tribunal] overlooked – matters, in other 
words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusions reach[ed] by the 
[tribunal].”  Rowe, Inc. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 15217-R, 03-1 BCA 
¶ 32,215, at 159,328-29 (citing Shrader v. CSX Transportation, Inc. , 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d 
Cir. 1995)). 
We grant Tidewater’s motion because it has convinced us that we misunderstood the 
contractor’s claim for relief.  In its motion for reconsideration, Tidewater points to the 
1contract, which includes an amended  version of Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.211-10:
52.211-10 Commencement, Prosecution, and Completion of 
Work  (Apr 1984) - Alternate I (Apr 1984) 
The Contractor shall be required to (a) commence work under 
this contract within 10 calendar days after the date the 
Contractor receives the notice to proceed, (b) prosecute the 
work diligently, and (c) complete the entire work ready for use 
no later than (See Standard Form 1442).  The time stated for 
completion shall include final cleanup of the premises.  
The completion date is based on the assumption that the 
successful offeror will receive the notice to proceed by the 70
th 
day following the bid opening.  The completion date will be 
extended by the number of calendar days after the above date 
that the Contractor receives the notice to proceed, except to the 
extent that the delay in the issuance of the notice to proceed 
results from the failure of the Contractor to execute the contract 
and give the required performance and payment bonds within 
the time specified in the offer. 
Appeal File, Exhibit 1 at F-6. Tidewater contends that it is entitled to an extension if the 
Government delayed issuance of the notice to proceed,  unless Tidewater failed to execute 
the contract or to give the required performance and payment bonds within the time 
specified.  Because there is no dispute that the contractor accomplished those tasks, 
1  FAR  52.211-10 contains blanks.  These blanks have been filled in by the 
Government in the text included in the contract. 

 
 
 
     
   
  
     
   
 
   
 
 
  
       
 
4 CBCA 50-R 
appellant claims that as a matter of law under the contract, it is entitled to a day-for-day 
extension of the eighty-nine days between the seventieth day following bid opening 
(January 8, 2004) and April 5, 2004, the date the Government issued the notice to proceed. 
Appellant takes issue with that portion of the Board’s holding that the contract time 
began to run after the preconstruction conference.  In its motion for reconsideration, 
appellant clarifies its argument, focusing on the fact that the contract requires the 
Government to issue a notice to proceed by the seventieth day following bid opening once 
Tidewater had executed the contract and provided the performance and payment bonds. 
Appellant points out that the Board’s finding that Tidewater was contractually obligated to 
prepare a quality control plan did not create a basis for the Government to delay the issuance 
of the notice to proceed until April 5, 2004.  
Appellant is correct in its statement that the contract does not expressly require the 
contractor to perform any other tasks other than to execute the contract and give the required 
performance and payment bonds prior to the issuance of the notice to proceed.  The contract 
required that the Government hold a preconstruction conference before it could issue the 
notice to proceed. By failing to schedule the preconstruction conference and issue the notice 
to proceed by the seventieth day following bid opening, the Government became obligated 
to grant an extension of the completion date for each day after the seventieth day following 
bid opening. 
In its opposition to appellant’s motion for reconsideration, the Government states 
that “the Commencement, Prosecution and Completion of Work clause is supplemented and 
limited by FP-96,  Standard Specifications for Construction of Roads and Bridges on 
Federal Highway Projects , 1996, § 108.03.”  Government’s Motion in Opposition to 
Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration at 2. Section 108.03 provides that “only delays or 
modifications that affect critical activities or cause noncritical activities to become critical 
will be considered for time extension.”
2   The Government posits that the delay in the 
2 The entire text of FP-96, § 108.03, provides as follows:      
Only delays or modifications that affect critical activities or 
cause noncritical activities to become critical will be considered 
for time extension.  
When Critical Path Method schedules are used, no time 
extension will be made for delays or modifications that use 
available float time as shown in the current construction 

 
 
 
  
    
  
        
 
 
5 CBCA 50-R 
issuance of the notice to proceed did not affect the critical construction activities because 
Tidewater never had any intention on starting the job earlier than it did. As evidence, the 
Government asserts that Tidewater admitted that it had failed to submit a schedule or 
schedule narrative to the Government at the preconstruction conference, and, instead, 
submitted it on February 27, 2004.  The Government claims that Tidewater did not submit 
a schedule in compliance with the contract until April 7, 2004, when Tidewater provided 
its final revised version. Because Tidewater has not shown that any critical activities had 
been delayed prior to April 5, 2004, the Government contends that Tidewater cannot rely 
upon the Commencement, Prosecution, and Completion of Work clause as a basis for an 
extension of time for contract performance. 
This issue presents a question of contract interpretation.  It is well established that 
“the language of a contract must be given that meaning that would be derived from the 
schedule required by Section 155. 
Time will not be extended for a claim that states insufficient 
time was provided in the contract.  
When requesting a time extension, follow the requested contract 
time adjustment including the following: 
(a)  Contract clause(s) under which the request is being made. 
(b) Detailed narrative description of the reasons for the 
requested contract time adjustment including the following: 
(1) Cause of the impact affecting time 
(2) Start date of the impact 
(3) Duration of the impact 
(4) Activities affected 
(5) Methods to be employed to mitigate the 
impact 
(c) Suggested new completion date or number of days supported 
by current and revised construction schedules according to 
Section 155. 

 
 
   
  
    
  
 
  
 
        
      
 
    
 
  
6 CBCA 50-R 
contract by a reasonably intelligent person acquainted with the contemporaneous 
circumstances.”  Hol-Gar Manufacturing Corp. v. United States , 351 F.2d 972, 975 (Ct. Cl. 
1965).  Contract interpretation ordinarily begins with “the plain meaning of the provision 
in question.”  S.W. Aircraft Inc. v. United States , 551 F.2d 1208, 1212 (Ct. Cl. 1977). 
Generally, the plain language of a contract controls, and only language which is reasonably 
susceptible to more than one meaning may be considered ambiguous.  John C. Grimberg 
Co. v. United States , 7 Cl. Ct. 452, 457, aff’d , 785 F.2d 325 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (table). 
In this case, the FAR provision in question, FAR 52.211-10,  expressly states that the 
completion date will be extended by the number of calendar days after the seventieth day 
following bid opening, the date by which the contractor should have received the notice to 
proceed.  The FAR clause uses the word “will” in a mandatory, not permissive, sense.  The 
only exception to the mandatory extension of the completion date is when the delay results 
from the contractor’s failure to execute the contract and give the required performance and 
payment bonds.  
The Government seeks to modify the FAR clause by arguing that FP-96, § 108.03, 
limits the extension of the completion date to those delays or modifications that affect 
critical activities.  FP-96 cannot modify FAR provisions unless a deviation is granted in 
accordance with FAR 1.402 to .404, which govern individual or class deviations to the FAR. 
There is no evidence that any deviation has been granted so as to change the scope of FAR 
52.211-10.  In addition, FP-95, § 108.03, does not “limit” the FAR clause; rather, as 
expressly stated, the subsection “supplement[s]” the clause. Supplement means “to fill up 
or supply with additions; add something to. . . .”  Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary, Unabridged (1986).  It does not mean to “limit.” 
In determining the order of precedence of the contract documents, FP-96, § 104.04, 
provides that the documents govern in the following order:  
(a) Federal Acquisition Regulations 
(b) Transportation Acquisition Regulations 
(c) Special contract requirements 
(d) Plans 
(e) Supplemental specifications 
(f) Standard specifications 
To adopt the Government’s argument requires one to ignore the plain meaning of the 
section, which is intended to supplement, not limit the FAR provision.  In addition, to the 
extent that the section, which, as part of FP-96, is a standard specification, could be 

           
 
     
     
     
  
   
 
 
 
  
  
   
 
 
 
           
  
 
________________________________ 
7 CBCA 50-R 
construed to be inconsistent with the mandatory requirement set forth in the FAR, the FAR 
clause governs. 
The Board finds that the Government’s argument that Tidewater must prove the delay 
in the issuance of the notice to proceed impacted critical activities of its schedule is not a 
reasonable interpretation of the contract. FAR 52.211-10 does not require Tidewater to 
prove the delay impacted its activities. The contractor need only execute the contract and 
provide the required performance and payment bonds – at that point, the Government “will” 
extend the completion date by the number of days after the seventieth day after bid opening 
that the issuance of notice to proceed is delayed. Whether Tidewater failed to submit a 
proper quality control plan, or, as the Government now argues, Tidewater failed to submit 
a proper construction schedule, the fact remains that the Government did not issue a notice 
to proceed until April 5, 2004. 
In sum, upon further review of the record, the Board concludes that appellant is 
correct.  The contract does not permit the contractor to begin work in the absence of a valid 
notice to proceed. In addition, the Board finds that there is no contract requirement to 
prepare a quality control plan or to submit an approved construction schedule prior to receipt 
of the notice to proceed. The record contains no evidence of any action, inaction, or failure 
to fulfill other contract requirements by appellant that hindered the issuance of the notice 
to proceed.  Therefore, the Board agrees, on reconsideration, that the time for contract 
performance could not run until the Government issued the notice to proceed.  The Board 
finds that appellant is entitled to an extension of the contract completion date of eighty-nine 
days.    
Decision 
Tidewater’s MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION  is GRANTED .  Our decision 
is modified on reconsideration to delete the finding that Tidewater did not meet its burden 
of proof to establish entitlement to the remaining extension of time sought in the appeal. 
The decision is amended to reflect that Tidewater has established entitlement to an eighty-
nine day extension of the contract completion date, and to indicate that the appeal is granted. 
JERI KAYLENE SOMERS 
Board Judge 

____________________________ ________________________________  
   
8 CBCA 50-R 
We concur: 
JAMES L. STERN EILEEN P. FENNESSY 
Board Judge Board Judge