MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DENIED: September 26, 2019
CBCA 6264, 6265, 6273, 6274, 6275, 6276,
6277, 6278, 6279, 6280, 6281, 6282, 6283, 6284, 6288, 6342, 6343, 6344
CARMAZZI GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Appellant,
v.
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Respondent.
Richard F. Busch II of Busch Law Firm, L.L.C., Littleton, CO; and Katherine B.
Burrows of Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, LLP, Baltimore, MD, counsel for
Appellant.
Dorothy M. Guy, Tal Kedem, Alice M. Somers, and Brandon Dell’Aglio, Office of
the General Counsel, Social Security Administration, Baltimore, MD, counsel for
Respondent.
Before Board Judges SOMERS (Chair), VERGILIO, and BEARDSLEY.
VERGILIO, Board Judge.
The contractor, Carmazzi Global Solutions, Inc., has submitted a motion for summary
judgment in eighteen appeals.  Proceedings in fifteen of the cases (CBCA 6265, 6273, 6274,
6275, 6276, 6277, 6278, 6280, 6281, 6282, 6283, 6288, 6342, 6343, 6344) are suspended,
pending the resolution of the remaining three.  The contractor has not asked to lift the
suspension in those cases.  The Board denies the motion for summary judgment in the
suspended cases as inappropriately filed.

CBCA 6264, 6265, 6273, 6274, 6275, 6276, 6277, 6278, 6279,
            6280, 6281, 6282, 6283, 6284, 6288, 6342, 6343, 6344
2
In the three active cases, CBCA 6264, 6279, 6284, a response to the motion by the
agency, the Social Security Administration, is unnecessary.  In these cases, the contractor
challenges the termination for default of each of the substantively similar contracts.  The
contractor posits in its motion that, because the agency first terminated for convenience
another of its substantively identical contracts, under the doctrine of finality the contractor
must prevail in having these later terminations converted to ones for convenience.  The
conclusion reached by the contractor is not supported legally; the termination for
convenience of one contract does not compel the agency to so terminate other contracts with
the same contractor or preclude the agency from justifying a termination for default.
Discussion
The standards for resolving a motion for summary judgment are well established. 
When there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, the movant must demonstrate that it
is entitled to prevail as a matter law.  Walker Development & Trading Group Inc. v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, CBCA 5907, 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,376, at 181,709.
The contractor has failed to demonstrate legal entitlement to relief, because the
termination for convenience it relies upon creates no finality for the matters at issue.  The
contractor maintains that the agency terminated for convenience one of its contracts, and
subsequently terminated for default the contracts at issue in these three appeals.  The finality
of the termination for convenience of a contract not here at issue is not challenged or in
dispute.  However, the contractor provides no substantive basis that would make that
determination final in any of these cases, under which the Board reviews de novo the
challenged decisions of the contracting officer. “If made [by the contracting officer], specific
findings of fact are not binding in any subsequent proceeding” and “[t]he contracting
officer’s decision on a claim is final and conclusive and is not subject to review by any
forum, tribunal, or Federal Government agency, unless an appeal or action is timely
commenced as authorized by this chapter.”  41 U.S.C. § 7103(e), (g) (2018).
The contractor is misguided in its notion that a determination to terminate for
convenience one contract precludes a contracting officer (the same or a different one) from
acting differently under a separate, but substantively identical, contract.  The decisions to
terminate or not, and if to terminate, for convenience or default, are discretionary.  If a
contractor fails to satisfy terms and conditions of a contract, a contracting officer is not
compelled to issue a termination for convenience or for default; either termination may be
an available option.  A contracting officer must exercise discretion for each contract.  The
Board reviews that determination, if appealed, on a de novo basis.  It is anticipated that the
decisions in each of the representative appeals will be instructive to the resolution of the

CBCA 6264, 6265, 6273, 6274, 6275, 6276, 6277, 6278, 6279,
            6280, 6281, 6282, 6283, 6284, 6288, 6342, 6343, 6344
3
other appeals; however, the contractor incorrectly posits that the resolution of these three
appeals automatically dictates the results in the remaining cases.  Whether or not substantive
factual distinctions exist has not been determined.
The contractor has failed to support the basic premise of its motion, which is that
finality of a contracting officer’s decision in one contract equates to finality in another
contract.  The cases it references, e.g., URS Consultants, Inc., IBCA 42285-2000, 02-1 BCA
¶ 31,812, and the cited material in a treatise, do not purport to extend finality beyond a given
contract.
It is not material that the contracts and circumstances are essentially the same, as
posited in the contractor’s motion, which also recognizes that a contracting officer is to
exercise discretion in a fair and reasonable manner when terminating a contract for default. 
That contracts may be the same, and circumstances the same or similar, does not preclude
a contracting officer from reasonably reaching different results.  For example, a decision to
terminate for default one of these contracts does not mean that all of the contracts must be
terminated for default.
Decision
The Board DENIES the contractor’s motion for summary judgment.
     Joseph A. Vergilio          
JOSEPH A. VERGILIO
Board Judge
We concur:
    Jeri Kaylene Somers           Erica S. Beardsley          
JERI KAYLENE SOMERS ERICA S. BEARDSLEY
Board Judge Board Judge