DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION:  June 29, 2010 
CBCA 1895 
PEARSON E. DUBAR, 
Appellant, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, 
Respondent. 
Pearson E. Dubar, pro se, Overland Park, KS . 
Elin M. Dugan, Office of the General Counsel, Department of Agriculture, 
Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent. 
GOODMAN , Board Judge. 
Appellant, Pearson A. Dubar, an attorney, entered into a contract and a subsequent 
purchase order with respondent, the Department of Agriculture’s Natural Resource and 
Conservation Service, to represent respondent in Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) matters.  He appeals respondent’s contracting officer’s denial of his 
claim to this Board and has elected to proceed pursuant to Board Rule 52, Small Claims 
Procedure (48 CFR 6101.52 (2009)). 
1 This decision is rendered pursuant to that rule by the 
presiding judge in summary form, is final and conclusive, and has no value as precedent. 
1 The small claims procedure is a available in for claims of $150,000 or less if the 
appellant is a small business concern. The amount at issue in this case is $56,250.  Appellant 
alleges in his complaint that he is a small business concern.  Respondent does not challenge 
this statement.  For the purpose of this case, we assume the statement to be true. 

   
  
    
   
 
   
   
 
 
  
 
  
    
    
2 CBCA 1895 
Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  We grant 
respondent’s motion and dismiss the appeal. 
Findings of Fact 
On May 23, 2001, appellant was awarded Contract No. 53-3A75-1-047 (the contract) 
for EEO Representation Services through December 31, 2005. On January 27, 2006, 
appellant was awarded Purchase Order No. AG-3A75-P-06-0017 (the purchase order), which 
expired on September 30, 2006.  The purchase order was separate and distinct from the 
contract.  Under the purchase order, appellant represented respondent in the hearing of an 
EEOC case (the EEOC case) in July 2006.  Appellant was paid for his representation of 
respondent in the EEOC case when he submitted a final invoice.  Thereafter, respondent 
issued no other written contracts or purchase orders to appellant. 
Appellant alleges that, after he concluded his representation of respondent in the 
EEOC case, he entered into an oral agreement with an agency “contact person.”  There is no 
dispute that the contact person was not the contracting officer.  However, appellant believed 
the contact  person had actual authority to enter into a contract, because he asserts that the 
normal procedure under the purchase order was that he would communicate with the contact 
person, reach an oral agreement as to assignment of work, and then the contracting officer 
would “prepare the paperwork for the appellant to sign ratifying the oral agreement.” 
According to appellant, the oral agreement arose when the contact person told him to 
retain the files for the EEOC case so that he could prepare respondent’s response when the 
decision in the case was appealed.  Appellant concludes that it was “normal [that I] would 
expect to receive the paperwork for the oral agreement already reached with [the contact 
person] to prepare respondent’s response to the appeal.” 
Appellant further alleges that he was later told by the contact person that there were 
no funds to issue a purchase order for his representation during the appeal process and 
respondent would therefore assign the representation to an agency employee.  Thereafter, 
appellant discovered that the agency had contracted with another individual to represent 
respondent in the appeal of the EEOC case instead of assigning the work to an agency 
employee. 
On October 9, 2009, appellant submitted to the contracting officer a claim pursuant 
to the Contract Disputes Act (CDA), referencing both the contract and the purchase order. 
He claimed that, as a result of performing under the contract and the purchase order, he had 
entered into a subsequent oral agreement to represent respondent in the appeal of the EEOC 
case and that the oral agreement was “terminated” by respondent’s decision to have someone 

  
  
 
  
    
 
 
     
 
 
  
 
  
 
   
  
    
3 CBCA 1895 
else perform the work.  Appellant sought $56,250, the amount which he alleges he would 
have received had he represented respondent in the appeal of the EEOC case at the hourly 
rate he negotiated with the contact person. 
The contracting officer issued a final decision dated November 30, 2009, denying the 
claim on the basis that appellant had been paid for all work performed under the contract and 
the purchase order and that there was no contract between appellant and respondent with 
regard to appellant representing respondent in the appeal of the EEOC case.  Appellant 
appealed the contracting officer’s denial of his claim to the Board on February 26, 2010, and 
designated his Notice of Appeal and attached documents as his complaint.
2 
Discussion 
Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the alternative 
grounds that 1) appellant’s claim is a bid protest; 2) there was no contract between the parties 
from which a dispute could arise; or 3) at most there was an agreement to enter into a 
contract in the future.  Under any of these grounds, respondent asserts, the Board lacks 
jurisdiction. 
Respondent’s second ground is dispositive.  The existence of a contract to which the 
Government and the contractor are parties is an essential prerequisite to this Board’s 
jurisdiction under the CDA.  Presidio County, Texas v. General Services Administration, 
CBCA 1209, 08-2 BCA ¶ 33,976. The facts as stated by appellant do not support appellant’s 
allegation that his claim arises from a contract between him and respondent.  Appellant’s 
contract with respondent expired in 2005, before he represented respondent in the EEOC 
case.  The subsequent purchase order pursuant to which he represented respondent in the case 
expired in September 2006, and he was paid for all services rendered under that purchase 
order.  Appellant bases his claim on representations by a person who was not a contracting 
officer that he would in the future be assigned representation of respondent when an appeal 
was filed in the case. 
Corners and Edges, Inc. v. Department of Health and Human Services , CBCA 648, 
07-2 BCA ¶ 33,706,  recon . denied , 08-1 BCA ¶ 33,741 (2007), contains circumstances 
similar to the instant appeal.  In that case, appellant asserted that a government project 
manager who was not the contracting officer verbally agreed to an extension of a purchase 
2 Appellant alleged in his designation of complaint that the agency’s actions were 
malicious and motivated by bad faith and racial animus.  As the Board finds that it lacks 
jurisdiction in this appeal, these allegations are not addressed in this decision. 

 
  
     
 
    
           
  
 
   
 
  
 
 
   
 
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4 CBCA 1895 
order and that the Government thereafter breached the verbal agreement when no additional 
orders were placed during the period of the alleged extension.  The Board held that no 
extension of the purchase order had been created, as the project manager had no authority to 
enter into a contract or a contract modification. 
In so holding, this Board cited the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) which 
provides that “[c]ontracts may be entered into and signed on behalf of the Government only 
by contracting officers.”  48 CFR 1.601(a).  Furthermore, the FAR provides that “only 
contracting officers acting within the scope of their authority are empowered to execute 
contract modifications on behalf of the Government.”  48 CFR 43.102(a).  The Board noted 
that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has emphasized that, in light of these 
regulations,  “[w]here a party contracts with the government, apparent authority of the 
government’s agent to modify the contract is not sufficient; an agent must have actual 
authority to bind the government.”  Winter v. Cath-dr/Balti Joint Venture , 497 F.3d 1339, 
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  Thus, the Court concluded that actions of a project manager, in the 
absence of ratification by the contracting officer, could not bind the Government to contract 
modifications. 
Similarly, in the instant appeal, appellant alleges that a person who was not a 
contracting officer, without actual authority to bind the Government, made representations 
that future work would be assigned.  Despite appellant’s expectations that the contracting 
officer would “issue paperwork” ratifying these representations, there is no evidence, nor 
does appellant allege, that the contracting officer took any further action. The actions of a 
government employee without actual authority cannot bind the Government.  California 
Business Telephones v. Department of Agriculture , CBCA 135, 07-1 BCA ¶ 33,553. 
Accordingly, as there is no contract between appellant and respondent for appellant’s 
representation of respondent in the appeal of the EEOC case, this Board lacks jurisdiction. 
Presidio County, Texas. 
Decision 
Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.   This appeal is DISMISSED FOR 
LACK OF JURISDICTION. 
ALLAN H. GOODMAN 
Board Judge