MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED: October 21, 2016 
CBCA 4012-R, 4013-R, 5083-R
UNIVERSAL HOME HEALTH AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES, INC.,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent.
Anthony R. Smith, President of Universal Home Health and Industrial Supplies, Inc.,
Tampa, FL, appearing for Appellant.
David G. Fagan, Office of Regional Counsel, Department of Veterans Affairs,
Portland, OR, counsel for Respondent.
Before Board Judges GOODMAN, WALTERS, and SULLIVAN.
SULLIVAN, Board Judge.
In Universal Home Health & Industrial Supplies, Inc. v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, CBCA 4012, et al., 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,370, we decided the appeals filed by
appellant, Universal Home Health and Industrial Supplies, Inc. (Universal), following the
termination for default and subsequent conversion to termination for convenience of two
task orders to provide cardiac monitoring services for the Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA).  We dismissed the appeals of the terminations for default (CBCA 4012 and 4013)
as moot.  Upon finding no evidence of bad faith or an abuse of discretion on the part of
agency officials in the decision to terminate the task orders for convenience, we denied
Universal’s appeal of the terminations for convenience (CBCA 5083).  Familiarity with
that decision is presumed.      


CBCA 4012-R, 4013-R, 5083-R 2
Universal seeks reconsideration of the Board’s decision, based upon twenty
alleged “mistakes in critical evidence,” evidence that Universal believes  the Board failed
to consider or consider fully in rendering its original decision.  Universal also describes
how these alleged mistakes affected the Board’s decision and, once corrected, how the
Board may “amend its decision and grant damages and any and all recoverable costs” to
Universal.  After careful review of the points raised by Universal in its motion, the Board
sees no new evidence and discerns no errors in its original opinion.  Universal’s request
for reconsideration is denied.  
Rules 26 and 27 of the Board’s rules set forth the standards by which a motion for
reconsideration will be evaluated:
[R]econsideration may be granted for any of the following reasons: newly
discovered evidence which could not have been earlier discovered, even
through due diligence; justifiable or excusable mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or neglect; fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party; the decision has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a
prior decision upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, and it is no longer equitable that the decision should have
prospective application; the decision is void, whether for lack of
jurisdiction or otherwise; or any other ground justifying reconsideration,
including a reason establish by the rules of common law or equity
applicable as between private parties in the courts of the United States.
Oregon Woods, Inc. v. Department of the Interior, CBCA 1072-R, 09-1 BCA ¶ 34,063,
at 168,431-32, aff’d sub nom. Oregon Woods, Inc. v. Salazar, 355 F. App’x 403 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).  Reconsideration is not a vehicle for retrying a case or introducing arguments
that could have been made previously.  See Ryll International, LLC v. Department of
Transportation, CBCA 1143-R, 12-1 BCA ¶ 35,029, at 172,144.  “Arguments already
made and reinterpretations of old evidence are not sufficient grounds for granting
reconsideration.”  Rule 26 (48 CFR 6101.26 (2015)).    
In its motion, Universal largely presents arguments already made or seeks
reinterpretation of the evidence already presented to the Board.  For example, Universal 
challenges the Board’s characterization of an internal email message sent by the
contracting specialist before he contacted Universal about the reports of potential service
interruptions.  Universal notes that the contracting specialist used the phrase “upon
termination,” and argues that this phrase is evidence that the agency had already decided
to terminate Universal and issue a contract to its subcontractor, MedNet.  As detailed in
the Board’s decision, the Board fully considered this email message as part of all the

CBCA 4012-R, 4013-R, 5083-R 3
evidence of the conduct and communications between the parties and found no evidence
that the agency’s termination of Universal was undertaken in bad faith.  In its review of
Universal’s motion, the Board finds that points numbered 1, 3-7, and 9 all seek
reinterpretation of evidence the Board has already considered.  Arguments about
evidence the Board has already considered do not present a basis for reconsideration. 
Systems Integration & Management, Inc. v. General Services Administration, CBCA
1512-R, et al., 14-1 BCA ¶ 35,543, at 174,171.      
Universal also seeks to dispute the conclusions that the Board drew from the
evidence it considered.  For example, Universal takes issue with the Board’s
determination that the agency provided “Universal opportunities to resolve the situation
and provide assurance of future performance” prior to terminating Universal’s contract. 
With points numbered 13-17, Universal seeks to challenge the Board’s conclusions, but
disagreement with the Board’s conclusions based upon evidence that has already been
considered does not provide a basis for reconsideration.        
Universal points to perceived errors in the manner in which it was contacted
initially about the potential service disruption (point 2).  Specifically, Universal asserts
that the contracting officer’s representative (COR), the program person monitoring
Universal’s performance, was required to contact Universal, rather than the contracting
specialist who actually did.  As support, Universal cites to a draft quality assurance plan
attached to the solicitation.  The statement of work that was incorporated into the contract
does not contain this requirement, but, even if it did, the fact that the contracting
specialist rather than the COR contacted Universal is not material to the Board’s analysis
of the actions taken by the agency and does not provide a basis for reconsideration.  See
Ryll International LLC, 12-1 BCA at 172,145.  Universal also believes that the Board
made an error in not finding that agency contracting officials waited two days before
contacting Universal about the potential service interruptions.  Universal is incorrect–the
contracting specialist sent Universal an e-mail message the day after the COR received
notice of potential service interruptions and asked that Universal’s president call him.  
 
Universal also raises several points concerning the follow-on bridge contract that
the agency issued to fill the requirement after Universal’s task orders were terminated
(points numbered 8, 10 and 18).  Universal questions the Board’s conclusions as to who
the follow-on contractor was and what the relationship was between that contractor and
Universal’s supplier.  Universal also states repeatedly that the contracting officer signed
the sole source justification for the bridge contract prior to terminating Universal’s task
orders.  However, the Board made this finding in its original decision.  Universal states
that the Board has not identified any evidence to prove that the bridge contract was “not
fraudulent.”  The Board reviewed all of the evidence presented by Universal and made

CBCA 4012-R, 4013-R, 5083-R 4
findings based upon those documents.  Regardless of the points raised by Universal, there
is nothing in the evidence or the record to indicate that the issuance of the follow-on
contract was fraudulent.  
The Board also found that Universal had not provided any evidence to support its
claim that the VA paid significantly more for the services under the bridge contract than
it did under Universal’s contract.  In response to this finding, Universal highlights
evidence in the record and additional evidence attached to its motion that shows the price
of the services to be provided by another firm, Cardio Labs, on a contract that was
awarded in April 2015.  This contract is not the follow-on sole source contract that was
awarded to CardioNet following the termination of Universal’s contract.  The Board fails
to see the relevance of this 2015 contract to an inquiry into whether the conduct of
contracting officials evidences a “specific intent to injure” Universal.  V.I.C. Enterprises,
Inc. v. Department of Veterans Affairs, CBCA 1598, 09-2 BCA ¶ 34,284, at 169,363-64
(quoting Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1234, 1240 (Fed. Cir.
2002)).    
Universal also notes that the Board did not address two motions that it made in its
final briefing: (1) to overturn the contracting officer’s decision on its claim arising from
the conversion to a termination for convenience and (2) to strike the brief submitted by
respondent in response to the Board’s order (points 11, 12).  Universal is correct that the
Board did not specifically note these motions in its decision, but it was not necessary to
do so.  With its appeal of the contracting officer’s decision (CBCA 5083), Universal
sought to overturn the contracting officer’s decision.  The Board, in denying the appeal,
denied Universal’s motion.  As noted, the Board ordered supplemental briefing after the
appeal was filed and counsel for respondent filed a supplemental brief.  Universal’s
objection to arguments that respondent made in that brief does not provide a basis for
striking the brief or granting reconsideration.  
Finally, Universal takes issue with the Board’s restatement of its argument that the
contracting officer should have reinstated the task orders instead of converting the
terminations for cause to terminations for convenience (point 19).  The Board’s
restatement of Universal’s argument did not change the Board’s analysis of Universal’s
contention.  Universal also asserts that the Board identified no factual or legal basis for
the Board’s determination that the contracting officer could not reinstate Universal’s task
orders (point 20).  The Board did state a basis for that determination–the underlying
schedule contract had expired and with it the contracting officer’s authority to issue task
orders from it.  

CBCA 4012-R, 4013-R, 5083-R 5
Decision
The motion for reconsideration is DENIED.  
___________________________
MARIAN E. SULLIVAN
Board Judge
We concur:
______________________________ _____________________________
ALLAN H. GOODMAN RICHARD C. WALTERS
Board Judge Board Judge