DENIED:  March 31, 2026
CBCA 8362
BRITTANI WATTIKER,
Appellant,
v.
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
Respondent.
Brittani Wattiker, pro se, Dallas, TX.
Anne C. McDermott, Office of General Counsel, General Services Administration,
Philadelphia, PA, counsel for Respondent.
Before Board Judges LESTER, KULLBERG, and O’ROURKE.
KULLBERG, Board Judge.
Appellant, Ms. Brittani Wattiker, claims damages related to the purchase of three
outboard boat motors at an online auction conducted by the General Services Administration
(GSA).  Appellant contends that the auction website described the outboard motors as
“factory rebuilt” but that , instead, they were “cores” that had not been restored and were
unusable.  Respondent, GSA, argues that appellant did not give notice of a misdescription
within fifteen days from the date of award or removal of the property, as required under the
terms and conditions of the auction, or inspect those outboard motors before purchasing
them.  Appellant and GSA have filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  For the reasons
stated below, the Board denies appellant’s motion, grants GSA’s motion, and denies the
appeal.


CBCA 8362 2
Background
GSA conducted an online auction in which appellant placed separate bids for each of
three outboard motors, which were in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security
at a facility in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.  Exhibit 2 at 2-4, 14-16, 26-28.1  For each
of the three outboard motors, the auction preview provided a description and photograph that
advised potential bidders that each outboard motor was “rebuilt by the manufacturer and is
in like new condition.”2  Id.  GSA’s online terms and conditions for the auction stated, in
pertinent part, the following:
Acknowledgment of Sales Terms and Conditions
To participate in the GSAAuctionsSM bid process, an individual must
acknowledge that they have read and accepted ALL terms and conditions
detailed on this website and indicate that they agree by marking the required
box during the registration process or when prompted to when a change to the
terms [has] been implemented.  Doing so confirms that a bidder agrees to
make a good faith offer.  If the offer is accepted by the Government[,] a
contract between the bidder and the Government is formed.  As per the
contract, the bidder agrees to pay for and remove the property by the dates and
times specified in the notice of award email.
Photographs
Photographs may not depict an exact representation of the bid item(s) and
should not be relied upon in place of written item descriptions or as a
substitute for physical inspection.  Please contact the custodian for inspection
dates and times.
. . . .
1 All exhibits cited are found in the respondent’s appeal file unless otherwise
noted.  Exhibits 1, 4, 5, and 7 had three or fewer unnumbered pages, and those pages were
manually numbered.
2 A total of eight outboard motors were purchased at that GSA online auction,
but this appeal involves a claim for only three of those outboard motors.  Exhibit 4 at 1.

CBCA 8362 3
Contract Disputes
Contracts resulting from the sale of any offer in the GSAAuctions.gov
. . . website are subject to the Contract Disputes Act [(CDA)] of 1978 (41
[U.S.C. §§ 7101-7109 (2018)]) . . . as amended.
Successful Bidders are reminded that an award constitutes a binding contract
with the United States Government.  The online Terms and Conditions[,] as
well as the 114C General Sales Terms and Conditions, . . . define the process
and conditions under which a bidder may make a claim or dispute a contract. 
To dispute a contract, bidders must contact the Sales Contracting Officer for
the sale.
Description Warranty & Refunds
The Government warrants to the original purchaser that the property
listed on GSAAuctions.gov . . . will conform to its written description. 
Features, characteristics, deficiencies, etc. not addressed in the description are
excluded from this warranty.  GSA further cautions bidders that GSA’s written
description represents GSA’s best effort to describe the item based on the
information provided to it by the owning agency.  Therefore, gross omissions
regarding the functionality of items, failures to cite major missing parts and/or
restrictions with regards to usage may occur.
The Government does not warrant the merchantability of the property or its
purpose.  The purchaser is not entitled to any payment for loss of profit or any
other money damages - special, direct, indirect, or consequential.
Refunds Claim Procedures
Please be advised that refunds are not a frequent practice of GSA AuctionsSM. 
A request for refund must be substantiated in writing to the Contracting
Officer for issues regarding mis-described property, missing property and
voluntary defaults within 15 calendar days from the date of award.
Refund Amount
The refund is limited to an amount not to exceed the purchase price of the mis-
described property.

CBCA 8362 4
Claims of Mis-description
If items have been awarded but not paid for and the successful bidder feels that
the property is mis-described, he/she must follow these procedures:  A written
claim needs to be submitted to the Sales Contracting Officer within 15
calendar days from the date of award requesting release of contractual
obligation for reasons satisfying that of a mis-description.  No verbal contact
with the custodian or the Sales Contracting Officer or any other federal official
will constitute notice of mis-description.
When items are awarded and payment has been received, regardless of the
removal status (removal may or may not have occurred), the successful bidder
must submit a written notice to the Sales Contracting Officer with 15 calendar
days from the date of payment e-mail (the Purchaser’s Receipt).  If property
has been removed and the claim is accepted by the Sales Contracting Officer,
the purchaser must maintain the property in its purchased condition and return
it at their expense to the location designated by the Sales Contracting Officer
or their designated official.
Exhibit 5 at 1-3.
GSA’s Sale of Government Property General Sale Terms and Conditions, Standard
Form 114C (Form 114C), which was referenced in the disputes paragraph of the online terms
and conditions for the auction, stated, in pertinent part, the following:
1. INSPECTION.
The bidder is invited, urged, and cautioned to inspect the property prior to
submitting a bid.  Property will be available for inspection at the places and
times specified in the Invitation.
2. CONDITION AND LOCATION OF PROPERTY.
Unless otherwise provided in the Invitation, all property listed therein is
offered for sale “as is” and “where is.”  Unless otherwise provided in the
Invitation, the Government makes no warranty, express or implied, as to
quantity, kind, character, quality, weight, size, or description of any of the
property, or its fitness for any use or purpose.
. . . .

CBCA 8362 5
15. LIMITATION ON GOVERNMENT[’]S LIABILITY.
Except for reasonable packing, loading, and transportation costs (such packing,
loading, and transportation costs being recoverable only when a return of
property at Government cost is specifically authorized in writing by the
Contracting Officer), the measure of the Government’s liability, in any case
where liability of the Government to the Purchaser has been established, shall
not exceed refund of such portion of the purchase price as the Government
may have received.
Exhibit 6 at 1-2.
A computer screenshot for the individual bidder registration of Brittani Wattiker (user
name “BWATTIKER”), dated April 8, 2024, showed that user BWATTIKER “Accepted
[Terms & Conditions] during registration.”  Exhibit 7 at 1.  In three separate emails, which
were all dated April 15, 2024, GSA advised appellant that her bids for each of the three
outboard motors did not meet the reserve price, but GSA stated that it was willing to accept
her bids for sale and lot numbers 11QSCI24192/007 (bid $4516), 11QSCI24192/008 (bid
$4506), and 11QSCI24192/009 (bid $4006).  Exhibit 2 at 5, 17, 29.  The three emails, which
used the same wording except for the precise hour, minute, and second deadline, instructed
appellant as follows:
This offer expires on 04/16/2024 09:34:35 CDT.  Please respond back to
me by email (accepting or rejecting the offer must be in writing) with
either:
• Yes, I accept.
• No, I do not accept.
If you decide to accept this offer at your high bid, this will constitute a Legal,
Binding Contract.  You will be given 2 business days to pay and 10 business
days to remove in accordance with the Online Terms and Conditions.
Id.  On that same date, appellant responded to each of GSA’s three emails with “Yes, I
accept.”  Id. at 6, 18, 30.
On April 16, 2024, GSA awarded to appellant contracts GS01F24FBEA257,
GS01F24FBEA258, and GS01F24FBEA259, and she made online payments for each of the
contracts that same day.  Exhibit 2, at 7-12, 19-24, 31-36.  The sales receipt for each contract
stated that the customer agreed to pay, subject to the following:  “NO REFUNDS EXCEPT

CBCA 8362 6
AS PERMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STANDARD FORM 114C AND
THE GSA SALE TERMS AND CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO [EACH] SALE
NUMBER.”  Id. at 10, 22, 34.  The words “customer signature” appeared below those terms. 
Id.  On April 29, 2024, appellant’s representative removed the three outboard motors
purchased under contracts GS01F24FBEA257, GS01F24FBEA258, and GS01F24FBEA259. 
Id. at 12, 24, 36.
In an email dated May 15, 2024, Mr. Geoffrey Wattiker (Mr. Wattiker), appellant’s
husband, informed the sales contracting officer (SCO) at GSA that one of the outboard
motors received was not factory rebuilt but was, instead, “a core unit.”  Exhibit 3 at 3. 
Subsequently, Mr. Wattiker informed GSA in a May 25, 2024, email that three of the eight
outboard motors purchased by appellant were “core units.”  Id. at 12.  He also claimed that
“one actually still has barnacles attached to the unit.”  Id.
By letter dated December 11, 2024, appellant and Mr. Wattiker, who identified
themselves as “claimants,” submitted a claim in the amount of $72,700 “for the marine
engines that were not delivered as contracted for, arising out of our auction contract with the
federal government dated on or about April 16, 2024.”  Exhibit 4 at 1.  In the alternative, they
requested that “three new units matching the descriptions in the original contract, plus
damages for shipping and travel in the amount of $7400.”  Id. at 2.  Their letter alleged the
following:
[T]he claimants [c]oordinated pick up of the engines from . . . the
government’s property custodian . . . on or about April 29[, 2024].
At the time of pickup, all of the units were completely enclosed in factory
packaging indicating that they were factory remanufactured units, and [the
government’s property custodian] verified on site that all units were in fact,
factory rebuilds.
The units were then shipped from Puerto Rico to Dallas where the claimants
retrieved them.  However, upon opening the crates, three of the units were
found to be cores, and not rebuilt engines.  On May 15[, 2024,] claimants
notified government agents . . . that the three units were not as advertised, but
were cores, not rebuilt engines.
Id. at 1-2.

CBCA 8362 7
On March 6, 2025, the SCO’s final decision (COFD), which was addressed only to
appellant, denied appellant’s claim.  Exhibit 1 at 3.  The COFD stated, in pertinent part, the
following:
The GSA Auctions Terms & Conditions explicitly state that “bidders have the
opportunity to physically inspect the property prior to placing a bid and prior
to the auction’s closing date and time or thereby waive the opportunity to
conduct a physical inspection.  In waiving their inspection rights, bidders bear
the risk for any gross omissions regarding the functionality of items, failure to
cite major missing parts, and/or restrictions with regards to usage that would
have been revealed by physical inspection.”
Additionally, claims of mis-description must be submitted in writing to the
Sales Contracting Officer within 15 calendar days from the date of award if the
item has not been paid for, or within 15 calendar days from the date of
payment if the property has been paid for.  Your initial claim was submitted
29 days after payment, beyond the required 15-day window established in the
GSA Auctions Terms & Conditions.
Id. at 2.
Appellant and Mr. Wattiker subsequently appealed the COFD in which they identified
themselves as claimants in their notice of appeal to the Board.  This appeal was originally
docketed with both Ms. Brittani Wattiker and Mr. Geoffrey Wattiker as appellants, but a
subsequent order by the Board removed Mr. Wattiker as an appellant because he was not a
party to the contract at issue in this appeal, and, consequently, he lacked standing to be an
appellant.  See Geoffrey Wattiker and Brittani Wattiker v. General Services Administration,
CBCA 8362, 26-1 BCA ¶ 39,985, at 189,810, motion for reconsideration denied, slip op. at
4 (Mar. 19, 2026).3  Both parties have submitted motions for summary judgment and their
responses to the opposing party’s motion.  GSA contends that the terms and conditions of the
online auction preclude appellant’s recovery because appellant did not give timely notice of
a misdescription and failed to inspect the outboard motors before the auction.  Appellant’s
motion argues that there was no agreement to those terms and conditions, that any
requirement in the terms and conditions for giving notice of a misdescription conflicts with
3 Appellant’s motion for summary judgment and response to GSA’s opposition
were submitted jointly by both appellant and Mr. Geoffrey Wattiker.  For the purpose of
consistency with the Board’s order, the Board references those submissions as having been
submitted only by appellant.

CBCA 8362 8
statute, and that the photos and description of the three outboard motors constituted a
criminal violation.
Discussion
At issue is whether either party in its motion has established the existence of
undisputed material facts that support granting summary judgment.  The Board has
recognized the following:
Summary judgment is only appropriate where there is no genuine issue of
material fact.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”  Id.  It
is not the judge’s function “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of
the matter.”  Id. at 249.  All justifiable inferences and presumptions are to be
resolved in favor of the nonmoving party.  Id. at 255.
The moving party has the initial responsibility of stating the basis for its
motion and “identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,’
which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  “[A]llegations without
support are not evidence.”  McAllen Hospitals LP v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, CBCA 2774, et al., 14-1 BCA ¶ 35,758, at 174,970 (quoting Max
Castle, AGBCA 97-128-1, 97-1 BCA ¶ 28,833, at 143,845).  Where both
parties move for summary relief, each party’s motion must be reviewed on its
own merits, and all reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the
non-moving party.  First Commerce Corp. v. United States, 335 F.3d 1373,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003); DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Inc., 239 F.3d 1314,
1322 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  The fact that cross-motions have been filed does not
require the granting of one of the motions.  California v. United States, 271
F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Optimum Services, Inc. v. Department of the Interior, CBCA 4968, 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,383, at
181,734, aff’d, 829 F. App’x 527 (Fed. Cir. 2020).  “A fact is material if it will affect our
decision, and an issue is genuine if enough evidence exists such that the fact could
reasonably be decided in favor of the non-movant at a hearing.”  Danny R. Mitchell v.
General Services Administration, GSBCA 16209, 04-1 BCA ¶ 32,551, at 160,995 (citing
John Al Glasure v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 16046, 03-2 BCA ¶ 32,284,
at 159,746).

CBCA 8362 9
GSA contends that the Board should grant summary judgment because “1)
[a]ppellant[] failed to submit [her] claim of misdescription within 15 calendar days from the
date of Purchaser’s Receipt, as required by the contracts’ terms and conditions, and 2)
Appellant[] failed to physically inspect the property prior to purchase, thereby forfeiting [her]
misdescription claim.”  Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Respondent’s Motion)
at 1.  The Board has recognized that either a failure to inspect before the auction or to give
notice of a misdescription within fifteen days from the date of contract award will preclude
any recovery allowed under the terms and conditions of the auction.  See e.g., Badland Truck
Sales, Inc. v. General Services Administration, CBCA 7281, 22-1 BCA ¶ 38,143, at
185,264-65; Yasmin Saighi v. General Services Administration, CBCA 3963, 15-1 BCA
¶ 35,920, at 175,586-87, aff’d, 645 F. App’x 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2016).  Appellant neither
inspected the outboard motors before the auction nor gave any notice of a misdescription. 
Accordingly, GSA has established that there is no material issue of fact as to preclude the
Board from denying this appeal.
Although Mr. Wattiker sent emails dated May 16 and 25, 2024, to the SCO
concerning the three outboard motors, those emails were sent more than fifteen days after the
date of award and receipt of payment, which was April 29, 2024.  Mr. Wattiker, however,
was not the bidder in the auction, and nothing in the terms and conditions of the auction
allow a person who was not the bidder to assume the rights of the contractor to give notice
of a misdescription.  Even assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Wattiker had the authority to act on
behalf of appellant in giving notice of a misdescription, his notice was too late to allow for
a refund under the online terms and conditions of the auction.
Additionally, appellant never inspected the outboard motors before the auction, and
that failure to do so precludes a claim for a misdescription.  “It is also well established that
‘to the extent deficiencies could reasonably have been discerned during an in-person
inspection, the purchaser cannot establish a misdescription.’”  Randy Preston v. General
Services Administration, CBCA 1465, 10-1 BCA ¶ 34,317, at 169,510 (2009) (quoting Fred
M. Lyda v. General Services Administration, CBCA 493, 07-2 BCA ¶ 33,631, at 166,572)
(At a GSA auction, appellant purchased three paddle boats with damaged propellers, which
were not shown in photographs or mentioned in the description, but appellant failed to
inspect them before the auction which precludes any relief.).  Appellant asserts in her claim
that the outboard motors were in crates and that it was only upon the opening of the crates
that their actual condition was known.  The online terms and conditions of the auction and
Form 114C cautioned potential bidders not to rely on written descriptions and encouraged
them to inspect items to be sold in the auction before bidding.  Appellant has shown no
reason why an inspection of the outboard motors could not have been conducted before the
auction.  Such a failure to conduct an inspection precludes recovery.

CBCA 8362 10
Appellant argues that the “Online Terms and Conditions . . . are unenforceable.” 
Appellant’s Brief in Opposition to Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment and in 
Support of Appellants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Appellant’s Motion) at 6. 
This Board has recognized that “[t]he requirements for a binding contract with the
Government, whether express or implied-in-fact, are ‘mutual intent to contract including an
offer, an acceptance, and consideration.’”  Navigant SatoTravel v. General Services
Administration, CBCA 449, 09-1 BCA ¶ 34,098, at 168,603 (quoting Trauma Service Group
v. United States, 104 F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).  The Board has further recognized
the following:
According to the objective theory of contract formation, what is essential is not
assent, but rather what the person to whom a manifestation is made is justified
as regarding as assent.  Thus, if an offeree, in ignorance of the terms of an
offer, so acts or expresses himself as to justify the offeror in inferring assent,
and this action or expression was of such a character that a reasonable person
in the position of the offeree should have know it was calculated to lead the
offeror to believe that his offer had been accepted, a contract will be formed
in spite of the offeree’s ignorance of the terms of the offer.
Id. at 168,603-04 (quoting 1 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 4:16 (4th ed. 1990). 
“[A]s the Supreme Court has said long ago, ‘[i]t will not do for a man to enter into a contract
and when called upon to respond to its obligations, to say that he did not read it when he
signed it, or did not know what it contained.’”  Id. (quoting Fiesta Leasing and Sales, Inc.,
ASBCA 29311, 86-3 BCA ¶ 19,045, at 96,188 (quoting Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50
(1875))).  “Any other rule would throw chaos into all contract arrangements because a party
could avoid responsibility thereunder at his convenience simply by saying that he had signed
the contract without reading it.”  Id. (quoting Schoeffel v. United States, 193 Ct. Cl. 923, 935
(1971)).
There is no issue of material fact that appellant entered into a contract as shown in the
facts cited above.  Appellant submitted bids for the three outboard motors at issue in this
appeal, and when asked to confirm her bid, she manifested her agreement to do so for all
three.  The record of the sale for each of the contracts shows appellant’s signature, and the
receipt for each sale references the online terms and conditions of the auction and Form
114C.  The online terms and conditions of the auction and Form 114C are part of the record,
and appellant has offered no grounds in fact or law to show that she was not subject to those
terms of the contract.  Appellant acknowledges that “[t]he Federal Standard Form 114C,
entitled ‘Sale of Government Property’ controls in general sales, including the case at bar.” 
Appellant’s Motion at 3.  As shown above, the online terms and conditions for the auction
referenced Form 114C, and appellant offers no explanation as to how it would be possible

CBCA 8362 11
for her to be aware of Form 114C and not the online terms and conditions that referenced
Form 114C.
Appellant contends that part of the GSA auction website is a “browsewrap” that
“includes the fifteen day limit on notifying the Contracting Officer of a claim, and the waiver
of misdescription and photograph clauses, none of which is ‘accepted’ during registration by
any user of the site.”  Appellant’s Motion at 9.  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
stated that “a browsewrap agreement does not require the user to manifest assent to the terms
and conditions expressly . . . [a] party instead gives assent simply by using the website.” 
Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hines v.
Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366-67 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)).  Appellant misapplies
the term browsewrap to the GSA auction website by suggesting that she never accepted those
terms that she disputes.  To the contrary, a bidder in a GSA auction had to acknowledge all
of the terms and conditions of the auction in order to submit a bid, and those terms and
conditions include those that she disputes.  The Board finds no material issue of fact as to the
terms and conditions of the GSA auction.  Appellant has only made allegations about the
GSA auction website, and, as discussed above, allegations without support are not evidence. 
Optimum Services, 19-1 BCA at 181,734.
Appellant contends that the CDA provides for a six-year period in which to file a
claim, and “since the GSA has asserted no basis for overriding the statutory six year
limitation period, the GSA’s argument that the Appellant[’s] claim to the contracting officer
was out of time should be denied.”  Appellant’s Motion at 17.  The CDA provides that
“[e]ach claim by a contractor against the Federal Government relating to a contract . . . shall
be submitted within 6 years after the accrual of the claim.  41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(A).  The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has recognized, however, that, despite the six-year
period identified in the CDA, the statute does not preclude a contractor from agreeing,
through contract language, to a shorter limitations or notification period, as discussed in a
prior Board decision:
[A]s the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recognized in Do-Well
Machine Shop, Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 637 (Fed. Cir. 1989), Congress,
in enacting the CDA, did not intend “to prevent parties from agreeing to terms
[in their contracts] that would further expedite the claim resolution process.” 
Id. at 641.  If a contract with the Government contains a term limiting a
contractor’s right to bring claims to a period less than the six-year period for
which the CDA provides, or (as in this case) to notify the Government of
anticipated claims, “[t]he United States can enforce the waiver of, or
agreement to, a given limitations period with the same force as a private
party.”  Id.  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit in Do-Well enforced a contract

CBCA 8362 12
provision that limited to one year after contract termination the time that a
contractor could submit a termination settlement proposal.  Id. at 640-41; see
Jonathan Noeldner v. Department of Agriculture, CBCA 5379, 16-1 BCA
¶ 36,499, at 177,844-45 (clause requiring contractor to submit all claims within
sixty days after timber sale is closed “is enforced because ‘[t]he consequences
of failing to comply with [the] time limitation provision[] are explicit in the
contract language.”’ (quoting Duffy, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, CBCA
1369, 09-2 BCA ¶ 34,250, at 169,253)).
[A provision in the contract at issue there] purports to create the same type of
limitation:  it requires the contractor to notify the [agency] of any claims that
it intends to pursue within ninety days after receipt of the [agency’s] draft final
voucher and draft release of claims.  Although the [agency] describes the
provision as creating a “deemed executed and delivered” release of claims,[]
the provision, in essence, acts as a waiver of the contractor’s ability to
maintain claims under the contract.  If the contractor does not submit a release
of claims (with a reservation of specific claims) to the Government within the
prescribed time, it waives all claims.  Such a waiver provision is not
unenforceable simply because the time limit imposed for reserving claims is
shorter than the statute of limitations identified in the CDA.
AHTNA Environmental, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, CBCA 5456, 17-1 BCA
¶ 36,600, at 178,304 (2016).  In the same manner, the fifteen-day time limit for notifying
GSA of misdescriptions is an enforceable provision within the standard GSA online terms
and conditions for auctions.
Additionally, appellant has alleged that “GSA’s acts in posting fraudulent photos and
false descriptions of the engines . . . constitute a criminal violation of 18 U.S. Code § 1341, 
entitled Frauds and Swindles.”  Appellant’s Motion at 18.  It is well established that “our
jurisdiction does not extend to torts and criminal matters and is limited to a review of the
contracting officer’s decision denying [appellant’s] claim.”  Danny R. Mitchell, 04-1 BCA
at 160,994 (Board’s jurisdiction did not extend to torts and criminal matters despite “dozens
of civil and criminal statutes, regulations, treatises, and cases from many jurisdictions [cited
by appellant] in support of his position.”).  As discussed above, the Board has addressed the
issues of this appeal within its jurisdiction.  The Board cannot expand its jurisdiction simply
because a party urges the Board to apply laws from other jurisdictions.

CBCA 8362 13
Decision
Appellant’s motion for summary judgment is denied, and respondent’s motion for
summary judgment is granted.  The appeal is DENIED.
    H. Chuck Kullberg         
H. CHUCK KULLBERG
Board Judge
We concur:
    Harold D. Lester, Jr.         Kathleen J. O’Rourke     
HAROLD D. LESTER, JR. KATHLEEN J. O’ROURKE
Board Judge Board Judge