DENIED: May 30, 2007 
CBCA 402 
MITCHELL ENTERPRISES, LTD., 
Appellant, 
v. 
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, 
Respondent. 
William P. Weir, Fort Worth, TX, counsel for Appellant. 
Catherine Crow and Dalton F. Phillips, Office of General Counsel, General Services 
Administration, Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent. 
Before Board Judges DANIELS  (Chairman), HYATT , and DeGRAFF . 
DANIELS , Board Judge. 
1From 2001 to 2004, Mitchell Enterprises (Mitchell) constructed a new United States
Courthouse in Laredo, Texas, under a contract with the General Services Administration 
(GSA). Mitchell subcontracted the mechanical and plumbing work to LDI Metalworks, Inc. 
1 The contract was awarded to Mitchell Enterprises, Inc. Joint Stipulation 1.  On 
or about December 31, 2002, Mitchell Enterprises, Inc. transferred all its assets, obligations, 
and liabilities to Mitchell Enterprises, Ltd.  Joint Stipulation 76.  The parties refer to the 
Mitchell entities interchangeably as “Mitchell,” and we do the same here. 

      
  
  
   
   
      
  
   
 
   
 
 
    
 
 
 
             
  
   
        
     
 
   
2 CBCA 402 
(LDI). In this decision, we consider and deny a claim by subcontractor LDI which has been 
brought in the name of prime contractor Mitchell. 
The claim has lived through many permutations.  It was originally in the amount of 
$1,615,791.37.   It was later revised to $1,787,347.56 and a time extension of 131 days.   The 
claim in that posture was denied by the contracting officer, and this appeal was taken from 
that denial.  As a part of the settlement of other appeals involving other claims by Mitchell 
on this project, $354,372.25 of the claim amount and the time extension of 131 days were 
removed from this case.  Joint Stipulations 91-97.  By the time of our hearing in the case, in 
November 2006, the amount of the claim had been reduced to $953,469. Transcript at 4-5. 
That is the amount the contractor currently seeks.  Appellant’s Posthearing Brief at 1. 
Mitchell divides the claim into three elements: $942,335 related to defective drawings, 
$8300 for making additional flashed duct penetrations, and $2834 for repairing a sump 
pump.  Appellant’s Posthearing Brief at 1, 28.  The bulk of the amount, obviously, relates to 
the costs resulting from defective drawings.  This figure is divided into four components: 
$549,748 for additional fittings (“offsets” or “elbows” necessary to maneuver ductwork and 
piping around obstacles), $86,909 for additional shop drawings, $58,400 for extended project 
overhead over eighty-two days of compensable delay, and $247,278 for loss of productivity. 
Id. at 8, 20-21. 
Because the element of the claim which is based on the allegation of defective 
drawings encompasses almost all of the money at issue, we focus on that element in our 
decision.  The contractor’s position on this element is marred by two misunderstandings by 
LDI, one as to the portion of the structure made available under the contract for installing 
building systems and the other as to the nature of the contract drawings.  LDI’s errors were 
compounded by Mitchell’s failure to implement the contract requirements for coordination 
of the work. 
The parties agree that the principal issue as to this element, and as to the case as a 
whole, is whether GSA’s design for the building provided sufficient interstitial space to 
accommodate all of the building systems. Appellant’s Posthearing Brief at 1; Respondent’s 
Posthearing Brief at 1. Interstitial space, generally, is the space between stories of a building. 
Systems include the building’s heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system; 
water, sewer, storm drain, and fire sprinkler piping; and electrical conduit and apparatus. 
The parties disagree about how much of the space between stories was the interstitial 
space which LDI might reasonably have expected to be available for placement of the 
mechanical (HVAC) and plumbing (piping) systems it had subcontracted to install.  In the 
Laredo courthouse, each floor was concrete, supported by metal beams.  The disagreement 

    
  
  
   
   
  
    
  
  
    
  
   
 
    
 
    
 
  
 
  
     
 
3 CBCA 402 
concerns whether the space between the beams should have been considered part of the 
available space. Mitchell and LDI assert that it should not have been considered available, 
and GSA contends that it should have been.  The matter is critical to the claim, since with the 
exception of a few places where the design was modified (and where Mitchell and LDI were 
compensated for extra work if necessitated by the modifications), many of the items LDI 
installed fit within the interstitial space as designed only if the beam space is included within 
that area.  See Joint Stipulations 55, 63, 66, 69-71, 79-81; Transcript at 115-16, 143-44, 190, 
623-24, 679-80, 694-97, 969-70, 974-75; Appeal File, Exhibits 71, 92. 
Mitchell’s project manager and LDI’s president and project manager all believe that 
interstitial space is the space above a ceiling and below the beams which support the floor 
above it.  Transcript at 18, 145, 285. They insisted at hearing that the space between the 
beams should not have been considered available for placement of the systems because it did 
not provide “a clear avenue” for installation.  Id.  at 344-45.  GSA witnesses, on the other 
hand, testified that the interstitial space is all space between a ceiling and the floor above it -­
including the area between the beams that support the floor.  These witnesses were the 
project managers for the agency itself and the agency’s construction manager, 
3D/International (3D/I); an architect with HDR Architecture, Inc. (HDR), which designed 
the building; an HDR construction contract administrator; and the agency’s expert witness, 
Stephen Weathers, a professional engineer with twenty-one years of experience in various 
aspects of construction project management.  Id. at 544, 655, 717-18, 733, 881, 883, 939. 
We find that GSA’s witnesses, who had a much broader range of training and more 
experience with construction projects of this size and scope, were more credible than 
Mitchell’s on this point.  Thus we find that as a general proposition, the definition of 
interstitial space to which the GSA witnesses subscribed is more reasonable. 
GSA finds support for its position not only in the testimony of its witnesses, but also 
in a document prepared by the Department of Veterans Affairs.  The document defines 
interstitial space as “unfinished or non-habitable space utilized for building service . . . 
subsystems of sufficient size to accommodate workers and permit maintenance and alteration 
without disruption of activities in functional spaces. The term usually refers to the portion 
of the service zone between the finished ceiling and the floor above .”  Transcript at 419-20 
(emphasis added).  Mitchell looks instead to a decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs 
Board of Contract Appeals, which defines the term, as used in the contract at issue there, as 
the “space above each operational or occupied floor of the building.  The top of the 
interstitial space is the floor slab (or roof) above .  The bottom of the interstitial space is a 
corrugated metal deck with lightweight concrete poured on top.”  Clark Construction Group, 
Inc., VABCA 5674, 00-1 BCA ¶ 30,870, at 152,389 (emphasis added).  According to 
Mitchell, this definition excludes beam space because the contract in the Clark  case required 
the contractor to install below the beams the kinds of materials LDI installed in the Laredo 

 
 
   
  
    
 
   
  
 
       
 
      
 
  
  
     
   
   
  
   
 
4 CBCA 402 
courthouse.  Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1-2.  The distinction is not persuasive because the 
Clark  contract did not define the area between the beams as other than interstitial space; 
instead, it merely designated which systems would be installed there.  The definition used in 
the Clark  decision, like the definition in the Department of Veterans Affairs document, 
supports GSA’s position that the area between the beams is part of interstitial space. 
More important to the resolution of this case than any general definition, whether by 
testimony or documentation, however, is the words of the contract under which the Laredo 
courthouse was constructed.  The contract directed Mitchell (and through Mitchell, LDI) to 
“[k]eep pipes, ducts, conduit, and the like as close as possible to ceiling slab, walls, and 
columns to take up a minimum amount of space.”  Joint Stipulation 5 (emphasis added). 
Because the contract told the contractor to keep its materials close to the ceiling slab, the 
contract can only be read as telling the contractor that for this project, it should have realized 
that it might have to use the space between the beams -- which was under the ceiling slab -­
in making its installations. 
LDI’s other fundamental misunderstanding pertains to the relationship between the 
contract drawings and the installation of building systems. 
The contract warned that its drawings “are recognized as being diagrammatic in nature 
and not completely descriptive of requirements indicated thereon.”  Appeal File, Exhibit 
1001 at 55.  Within its mechanical division, the contract said that “[d]rawing plans, 
schematics and diagrams indicate general  location and arrangement of piping systems.” 
Joint Stipulation 6 (emphasis added). The contractor was required to prepare and submit 
shop drawings showing in detail where each trade would install its materials and coordination 
drawings showing how the work of those trades would fit together.  Shop drawings were 
required for both mechanical and electrical systems, and coordination drawings were required 
not only for each of those trades but also for project work as a whole.  Joint Stipulation 5. 
As explained by the HDR architect and construction contract administrator, a 
diagrammatic drawing shows only generally where systems need to be placed; it does not 
show all the twists and turns a contractor will need to make in installing components of those 
systems.  Transcript at 715-16, 746, 877-78. When drawings are diagrammatic, the 
responsibility for filling in the details is imposed on the contractor.  Id. at 755-56, 879. If an 
architect intends that systems be installed precisely as shown on contract drawings, the set 
of contract drawings would have to be considerably larger and more detailed, and there 
would be no need for shop drawings and coordination drawings.  Id.  at 879.  Consequently, 
these witnesses explained, a contractor should expect that in installing systems depicted in 
diagrammatic drawings, more turns (“offsets” or “fittings”) will be required than are shown 
and an allowance for them should be made in developing a bid.  Id.  at 754-55, 872, 880; see 

 
     
 
             
   
    
    
 
        
    
    
  
  
 
   
     
 
    
 
     
5 CBCA 402 
also Southern Comfort Builders, Inc. v. United States , 67 Fed. Cl. 124, 149 (2005).  As 
explained by the HDR engineer who reviewed mechanical division drawings for the project, 
“Most contractors that I’ve worked with make allowances for things like [needing more 
offsets than are shown on contract drawings]. . . .  [A]ny contractor that takes the drawings 
literally, knowing that they’re conceptual and diagrammatic in nature, is probably asking for 
trouble.”  Transcript at 832. 
LDI bid this job on the assumption that the project would be built just as it was 
depicted on the contract drawings, putting all of the mechanical and plumbing systems into 
open areas and requiring very few offsets.  Transcript at 117, 199-200, 203, 970.  This 
assumption was inconsistent with the way the contract was structured.  It ignored the 
statements that the contract drawings were diagrammatic and showed only the general 
locations of systems, as well as the requirements that the contractor provide shop drawings 
and coordination drawings which would show in detail how the contract drawings would be 
implemented. 
Mitchell compounded LDI’s errors by failing to implement the contract requirements 
for coordinating the work performed on the project so that the work would be performed in 
an efficient manner.  The overarching requirement was that Mitchell “[c]oordinate work of 
different trades so that interference between mechanical, electrical, and structural work, 
including existing services, will be avoided and within limits indicated the maximum 
practical space for operation, repair, removal, and testing of equipment is provided.”  Joint 
Stipulation 5 (ungrammatical sentence faithfully reproduced).  Mitchell also had to hold 
monthly general project coordination meetings at which “every entity currently involved in 
coordination or planning for work of the entire project” would be present and coordination 
problems would be resolved. In addition, pre-installation meetings and coordination 
meetings were required for each major element of the work.  Id.   Further, Mitchell had to 
employ a coordinator for the project as a whole and an MEP (mechanical, electrical, and 
plumbing) coordinator.  The former was to “act as the general coordinator of interfaces 
between units of work”; the latter was to “manage and coordinate MEP operations between 
all major subcontractors.”  Joint Stipulation 8.  The coordination drawings were of course to 
assist in coordination of the work as well.  See M. A. Mortenson Co. , ASBCA 53105, et al., 
04-2 BCA ¶ 32,713, at 161,847. 
While the project was under construction, GSA’s project manager expressed concern 
that coordination meetings were not being held as frequently as required and that some work 
was being performed in the absence of pre-installation conferences.  Joint Stipulation 13; see 
also  Joint Stipulation 49 (similar concern by 3D/I’s project manager).  He also objected to 
Mitchell’s proposal that instead of designating a single MEP coordinator, the contractor 
designate one coordinator for mechanical and plumbing work (LDI’s project manager) and 

  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
    
  
  
     
     
  
6 CBCA 402 
another for electrical work (the electrical subcontractor’s project manager).  GSA’s project 
manager maintained that having two MEP coordinators would not promote coordination of 
the various trades, but he ultimately allowed Mitchell to proceed in the way it wanted.  Joint 
Stipulations 10, 12; Transcript at 536.  Even given this dispensation, however, Mitchell’s 
project manager was not sure how coordination between the two coordinators was to be 
accomplished.  Transcript at 165-67.  LDI’s project manager testified that “[e]verybody 
assumed I was the [MEP] coordinator,” but she told Mitchell “[p]robably on a daily basis” 
that she did not hold such a position.  Joint Stipulation 14; Transcript at 119. 
Mitchell’s project manager understood that coordination drawings are “a tool to be 
used to identify problems” and were for Mitchell’s benefit on this project.  Joint Stipulation 
62; Transcript at 170.  Despite this understanding and frequently repeated cautions from 
GSA’s and 3D/I’s project managers that coordination drawings were needed, Mitchell never 
provided a complete set of composite coordination drawings.  Joint Stipulations 17-21, 25­
26, 29-31, 35-36, 38-39, 62; Transcript at 542-45, 653-54, 663.  Nor did the contractor even 
accept responsibility for these drawings.  Mitchell’s project manager testified that 
subcontractors were responsible for all coordination drawings and that Mitchell was simply 
an agent responsible for transmitting those drawings to GSA.  Transcript at 164-65. 
As a result of Mitchell’s failure to coordinate the project sufficiently, the record 
contains many complaints about coordination problems.  The drywall and masonry 
subcontractors built structures which interfered with planned installations of piping and 
ductwork.  Joint Stipulations 58, 60, 64, 65; Transcript at 116-17.  The fire protection 
subcontractor hung sprinkler pipe where ductwork was supposed to be placed.  Joint 
Stipulation 74; Transcript at 116-17.  LDI’s project manager at one point expressed with 
some exasperation, “These [mechanical coordination] drawings and all of the coordination 
is useless if all the trades do not install their work as discussed and agreed upon.  We do not 
have the power to force any of the trades to adhere to the agreed location.”  Joint Stipulation 
56.  
The difficulties described above were major contributing factors to our determination 
not to award Mitchell any money for any of the four components of the principal element of 
its claim.  We also note the following problems which contribute to this determination. 
With regard to the largest component, the costs of providing additional fittings, the 
number of “additional” fittings is the difference between LDI’s “original bid units” and its 
“as-built units.”  Appeal File, Exhibit 505, Tabs 14, 15; see also Transcript at 84, 91, 94, 295. 
As we have explained, the baseline for this calculation does not have any validity because 
LDI bid the job on the assumption that it could follow the contract drawings precisely and 
that assumption was not reasonable.  The record contains no information as to how many 

  
  
    
 
      
     
    
    
  
 
     
   
 
     
    
 
   
 
  
  
     
    
7 CBCA 402 
fittings a contractor could reasonably have projected, making a prudent allowance after 
reviewing the diagrammatic contract drawings carefully.  See P. J. Dick Contracting, Inc. , 
VABCA 3177, et al., 92-2 BCA ¶ 24,827, at 123,859.  Thus, we have no idea whether the 
number of fittings LDI needed was really additional to a rationally-based figure.  We also 
note that a prospective supplier to LDI would have fabricated duct fittings (or “offsets”) at 
no additional cost if those bends had been identified before fabrication.  Appeal File, Exhibit 
38; Transcript at 252.  This statement indicates that advance planning, through coordination 
and shop drawings, could have reduced the costs of whatever fittings were necessary on the 
project. 
GSA expert witness Stephen Weathers credibly testified as to more problems with the 
additional fittings component of the claim. Mr. Weathers stated that from the drawings the 
contractor presented as exhibits, he was unable to make an accurate count of the offsets 
alleged by LDI; he estimated that LDI’s counts of as-built offsets are about twice as high as 
the counts he could make from the drawings. Transcript at 917-19.  In addition, some of the 
markups (for engineering and drafting) duplicate separately identified costs; other costs (such 
as ladders and “job expense”) appear to be excessive; and different parts of the component 
use different hourly rates for supervision (between $27 and $55) and different markups on 
labor costs (twenty-eight to thirty-eight percent).  Id.  at 902-06. 
With regard to the costs of making shop drawings, LDI was required to make two 
major revisions of the drawings, and it believes that GSA should reimburse it for those 
revisions. Transcript at 400-01; see also id. at 102. A major contributing factor to the need 
for the revisions, however, was LDI’s failure to understand that it would have to use space 
between beams to install much of its ductwork and piping.  LDI believed that huge portions 
of the contract drawings were defective and needed to be redrawn, not understanding this 
fundamental aspect of the project, but it could not identify specific problems.  Transcript at 
774-81.  In making its first set of shop drawings, LDI unilaterally decided to make changes 
to the basic design of the ductwork in order to eliminate conflicts it perceived in HDR’s 
design.  After being informed that this was not permissible and that the shop drawings were 
incomplete, LDI had to make further changes to comply with HDR’s design as well as to 
make the shop drawings complete.  Joint Stipulation 47; Transcript at 29, 663-67; Appeal 
File, Exhibits 54, 75.  After Mitchell had completed its work, GSA convened a team of 
professionals from both inside and outside the agency to consider design deficiency issues 
on the project.  Transcript at 523-24. The team found forty-five “design issues”  and 
determined that they resulted in $144,000 of additional project cost -- less than one-half of 
one percent of total project cost.  The team concluded, “It is our opinion then that the items 
associated with these change order design issues do not constitute consideration as ‘Design 
Deficiencies.’”  Appeal File, Exhibit 1165.  We do not see any reason to question this 
conclusion. 

    
 
     
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
   
  
            
      
  
 
8 CBCA 402 
With regard to overhead costs over eighty-two days of delay, we know that LDI was 
on the job far longer than it expected to be, Transcript at 315, but cannot find that GSA was 
solely responsible for this subcontractor being there for eighty-two or any other number of 
extra days.  To establish entitlement to an extension based on excusable delay, a contractor 
must show that the delay resulted from unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without 
the fault or negligence of the contractor.  In addition, the contractor must show that the 
unforeseeable cause affected the critical path of performance so as to delay the overall 
completion of the contract.  Sauer Inc. v. Danzig , 224 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
Mitchell has not done this here.  Its expert witness, Robert McCullough, did not perform a 
schedule analysis on which a delay claim could best be based, and he knows that no such 
analysis has been made.  Transcript at 446-47.  The record does contain evidence that 
according to Mitchell, various of its subcontractors delayed completion of the project.  E.g. , 
Appeal File, Exhibits 1117 (roofer), 1118 (LDI), 1141 (millworker), 1144 (electrician).  GSA 
expert witness Weathers, after careful analysis, concluded, “There’s no entitlement to 
compensable delay of 82 days.”  Transcript at 900. He did find twenty days of delay 
attributable to the Government, but concluded that those days were concurrent with days of 
delay attributable to Mitchell and its subcontractors (predominantly the millwork 
subcontractor) and therefore were not compensable.  Id.  at 889-93, 924. 
With regard to loss of productivity, LDI’s president testified that most of his firm’s 
work was performed under very difficult conditions and some was performed out of 
sequence.  Transcript at 346, 348-49, 353.  The contractor has not persuaded us that 
Mitchell’s expert witness is correct, however, in attributing the entire loss of productivity to 
GSA.  See id. at 989.  We have already noted the inefficiencies that derived from Mitchell’s 
failure to coordinate project work successfully.  We note also that Mr. Weathers conducted 
a measured mile analysis, as a result of which he concluded that LDI’s labor productivity was 
“relatively on target” through the end of 2002 and fell off significantly after that date.  He 
attributed the loss of productivity largely to actions of various subcontractors (including 
LDI’s own actions).  Id. at 909-11.  He found no cause-and-effect relationship between 
GSA’s actions and LDI’s loss of productivity.  Id. at 916-17.  Indeed, statements by Mitchell 
in this case demonstrate the contractor’s recognition that at least some of the inefficiency was 
its own fault. Mr. McCullough testified, “The impacted work then was installed out of 
sequence because in order to keep the project moving Mitchell  allowed the drywall contractor 
to go ahead and install and other contractors to go ahead of the duct work installation and 
piping installation.”  Id. at 402 (emphasis added). The contractor’s posthearing brief, at 20­
21, asserts that the loss of productivity resulted in part from “[t]he fire sprinkler 
[sub]contractor [having been] allowed to install ahead of the ductwork and piping.”  Whether 
to allow the fire sprinkler subcontractor to install ahead of LDI was a call the prime 
contractor, not the Government, would have made.  Even if we were able to quantify LDI’s 

  
  
  
 
 
   
    
    
   
 
  
      
 
 
 
               
     
 
9 CBCA 402 
loss of productivity with a degree of confidence, Mitchell has provided us with no evidence 
on which we could allocate responsibility for that loss between Mitchell and GSA. 
The remaining two elements of the claim -- costs of making additional flashed duct 
penetrations and repairs to a sump pump -- are small and can be dealt with quickly. 
LDI maintains that Mitchell was ordered by 3D/I, and LDI was then ordered by 
Mitchell, to install flashing at 123 locations where ductwork penetrated drywall constructions 
“at all walls going to the deck.”  LDI says it included no such work in its bid.  Appeal File, 
Exhibit 505, Tab 2 at 2; Appellant’s Posthearing Brief at 23. According to Mr. McCullough, 
the contract “only called for sheet metal flashing around walls that had acoustic batt 
insulation,” and the claim is for flashing in other places.  Transcript at 393-94.  GSA 
responds, “LDI has not provided copies of the drawings it relies upon under its latest theory 
and has presented no testimony regarding its interpretation of the drawings. . . .  [LDI’s 
president] has not indicated the exact locations at issue or how [LDI] calculated its 
damages.”  Respondent’s Posthearing Brief at 29-30.  Mitchell’s reply brief, at 9, calls 
certain drawings to our attention, but provides no guide as to how to read them so as to 
identify the 123 locations. No such assistance was provided by any witness at our hearing 
or appears in the documentary record.  Nor do we have any evidence at all as to the cost of 
flashing ductwork penetrations of drywall. We deny this element of the claim as 
insufficiently proven. 
The parties agree that the contract called for Mitchell to provide a sump pump to 
remove water from the basement of the building while construction was taking place and that 
the contractor, by subcontract with LDI, complied with this requirement.  Appellant’s 
Posthearing Brief at 23; Respondent’s Posthearing Brief at 56. While the building was under 
construction, this sump pump broke and LDI repaired it. Transcript at 135.  According to 
Mitchell’s project manager, the pump probably ceased to operate “because of all the sand and 
grit that it sucked in out of the basement whenever we had to turn it on to get the water out 
of the building.”  Id. at 157.  LDI’s president believes that the pump was subjected to so 
much debris because paving the parking garage was delayed several times.  Id.  at 314.  This 
may have been true, but 3D/I’s project manager testified, without contradiction, that not 
paving the parking area in the upper part of the basement was “solely a decision made by 
Mitchell” to avoid having the surface damaged during construction.  Id.  at 670-72.  Because 
the repairs were effectively caused by Mitchell’s choice as to the sequence of construction, 
GSA is not obligated to pay for the repairs. 

10 CBCA 402 
Decision 
The appeal is DENIED . 
_________________________ 
STEPHEN M. DANIELS 
Board Judge 
We concur: 
_________________________ _________________________ 
CATHERINE B. HYATT MARTHA H. DeGRAFF 
Board Judge Board Judge