DENIED: April 2, 2012 
CBCA 2091 
THE CARRINGTON GROUP, INC., 
Appellant, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 
Respondent. 
Thomas W. Vassar of Jung & Vassar, P.C., Gaithersburg, MD, counsel for Appellant. 
William R. Korth, Office of the General Counsel, Department of Veterans Affairs, 
Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent. 
Before Board Judges SOMERS , GOODMAN , and SHERIDAN . 
SHERIDAN , Board Judge. 
The Carrington Group appealed the final decision of a Department of Veterans Affairs 
(VA) contracting officer denying its claim of $261,936.10 for unpaid services allegedly 
provided under VA contract V101(93)P-2093. The VA asserts that appellant is not entitled 
to the claimed costs because it has fully paid for all the services appellant provided. 

 
             
            
              
               
            
           
             
                 
      
         
            
              
        
            
          
            
               
           
             
           
            
        
         
            
               
       
         
            
            
               
             
              
   
2 CBCA 2091 
Factual Background 
Doyle Carrington worked for thirty-two years as an engineer and architect for the VA’s 
Office of Facility Management (OFM), the office that supports the VA’s major construction 
and real property programs. He left the VA OFM and formed The Carrington Group 
(Carrington), where he was the sole owner, president, and chief executive officer. In the years 
preceding and following the dispute at issue, Carrington was awarded several contracts to 
provide information technology (IT) support and maintenance services for the VA OFM’s 
resident engineer management system (REMS) and worked both as a sub and prime contractor 
on the system. 
1 The instrument that serves as the basis of the appeal before us involves what 
has been referred to as contract V101(93)P-2093. 2 
Carrington was awarded commercial item contract V101(93)P-2093 on October 1, 
2002, to provide “user systems support and maintenance services” (IT support) for REMS 
from October 1, 2002 through September 30, 2003. 
3 REMS was the computer system that 
was used by approximately eighty-six VA resident engineers (REs) and fifty support staff at 
the VA OFM’s headquarters in Washington, D.C., and approximately thirty-four field sites. 
REMS supported a project management database, office applications, electronic mail, and 
progress payments, and provided multi-user and multi-function work stations. The first page 
of the contract listed five types of services that Carrington was to provide by contract line 
items (CLINs), showing the type of service (e.g., network system administrator, network 
support technician, subject matter expert, etc.), number of hours, hourly rate, and total amount 
to be paid for the services the VA anticipated ordering. 
1 Carrington was awarded at least four contracts to provide IT services in support 
of REMS, V101(93)P-1802, V101(93)P-2021, V101(93)P-2093, and task order 101-E57037 
under General Services Administration (GSA) schedule contract GS-35F-0561N. Pursuant 
to those contracts, Carrington continuously serviced the VA REMS IT system from October 
1, 2001 through September 30, 2006, when the VA informed it that they would not be 
exercising option year two of task order 101-E57037. 
2 While we ultimately conclude that contract V101(93)P-2093 is void, for 
purposes of this decision we frequently refer to this instrument as a contract. 
3 Carrington filed several appeals relating to the services it provided for the VA 
REMS. Appeal files were submitted in both CBCA 2091 and CBCA 1646, an appeal which 
has been dismissed. The appeals were consolidated for processing. The Board has 
considered documents in both appeal files, as well as testimony adduced at hearing, to reach 
its decision. 

             
                 
              
                  
         
               
               
               
                
                    
               
     
               
               
                
            
                
                
            
  
              
      
             
               
 
            
            
                
  
           
         
        
         
3 CBCA 2091 
CLIN 001A was for the services of a network system administrator with the schedule 
showing 2080 hours of services at $46.67 per hour for a total of $97,073.60. CLIN 001B was 
for the services of a network support technician, with the schedule showing 2080 hours of 
services at $37.34 per hour, for a total of $77,667.20. CLIN 001C was for the services of a 
subject matter expert, with the schedule showing 520 hours of services at $101.13 per hour, 
for a total of $52,587.60. CLIN 001D was for the services of a project management 
administrator with the schedule showing 520 hours of services at $20.23 per hour, for a total 
of $10,519.60. CLIN 001E was for the services of a database specialist, with the schedule 
showing 1040 hours of services at $57.80 per hour, for a total of $59,883.20. 
4 CLIN 001F 
was for travel, with ten trips to be provided at $1200 per trip, for a total of $12,000. Line 26 
of the contract showed an award amount of $309,731.20. 
5 The contract provided for a base 
year and two option years. 
The bulk of the services were to be provided at the VA OFM’s headquarter with some 
travel to specific sites to resolve technical issues that could not be resolved remotely. The 
statement of work also set forth a variety of tasks and reporting requirements. Work was to 
commence “upon receipt of [a] signed purchase order.” 
6 The contracting officer’s technical 
representative was to “make specific tasks on a daily basis.” The contractor was to track and 
bill all services on an hourly basis, with each employee submitting a daily time sheet. Written 
time sheets were to be submitted for each employee every seven calendar days. 
The contract type was shown as “Fixed Price, Labor Hours.”  The contract contained 
the payment clause set forth at paragraph (i) of Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) at FAR 
52.212-4, CONTRACT TERMS AND CONDITIONS–COMMERCIAL ITEMS (MAR 
2001), which provides: “Payment shall be made for items accepted by the Government that 
have been delivered to the delivery destinations set forth in this contract.” 48 CFR 52.212-4 
(i) (2001). 
4 We note that 1040 hours at $57.80 per hour actually would cost $60,112. 
5 The contract continued with CLINs for option years one and two with small 
increases in hourly rates. The number of hours for each CLIN remained the same for each 
option year. 
6 Based on a review of the contract modifications, the VA referenced several 
“purchase orders” (POs) for payment purposes, including 101-C27114, 101-C37028, 101­
C37093, 101-C37113, 101-G47051, 101-G47258, 101-G47259, 101-V47038. However, in 
some places these numbers were referred to as “obligations.” 

          
     
            
        
            
    
             
            
           
            
            
       
 
                
            
          
     
              
              
           
             
              
                
              
                
             
             
         
          
   
             
         
               
4 CBCA 2091 
The contract also contained the clause found at FAR 52.216-22, INDEFINITE 
QUANTITY (OCT 1995), which provides: 
(a) This is an indefinite-quantity contract for the supplies or services specified, 
and effective for the period stated, in the Schedule. The quantities of supplies 
and services specified in the Schedule are estimates only and are not purchased 
by this contract. 
(b) Delivery or performance shall be made only as authorized by orders issued 
in accordance with the Ordering clause. The Contractor shall furnish to the 
Government, when and if ordered, the supplies or services specified in the 
Schedule up to and including the quantity designated in the Schedule as the 
“maximum.” The Government shall order at least the quantity of supplies or 
services designated in the Schedule as the “minimum.” 
(c)  Except for any limitations on quantities in the Order Limitations clause or 
in the Schedule, there is no limit on the number of orders that may be issued. 
48 CFR 52.216-22 (1995) (emphasis added). The clauses found at FAR 52.216-18, 
ORDERING (OCT 1995), and FAR 52.216-19, ORDER LIMITATIONS (OCT 1995), were 
also in the contract. 
The contract did not state the maximum or minimum quantities the VA agreed to order. 
The VA exercised the options to extend the contract for two option years and, under 
contract V101(93)P-2093, Carrington agreed to provide IT services from October 1, 2003 
through September 30, 2004 (option year one) and from October 1, 2004 through September 
30, 2005 (option year two). Nine bilateral modifications were issued throughout the base and 
option years of the contract, mostly to increase or decrease the quantity of hours of a particular 
CLIN service. On September 30, 2004, the parties executed contract modification 9, by which 
they agreed to execute option year two of the contract, but also agreed to reduce the period 
of performance from twelve to three months, from October 1, 2004 through December 31, 
2004. They also agreed to eliminate completely the requirement for CLIN 003D, project 
management administrator services, and establish new CLINs for systems programmer/analyst 
services (CLIN 003G) and LAN/WAN [local area network/wide area network] network 
engineer services (CLIN 003H). 
With contract V101(93)P-2093 set to expire on December 31, 2004, the VA issued task 
order 101-E57037 to Carrington under General Services Administration (GSA) schedule 
contract GS-35F-0561N on December 29, 2004. The task order covered the same types of IT 

               
             
               
   
            
            
          
               
                
             
               
           
            
             
     
              
                  
     
             
            
           
         
 
         
           
             
            
           
             
             
  
 
          
         
           
5 CBCA 2091 
services Carrington had been providing for REMS under the prior contracts. The term of task 
order 101-E57037 ran from January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2005, and provided for 
four option years. The option for option year one was exercised via modification 3, effective 
on January 1, 2006. 
In January 2006, a closeout specialist from the VA’s Office of Acquisition Operations 
Service attempted to closeout some outstanding purchase orders that had been issued to 
Carrington, including “purchase order 101-G47259.” On February 1, 2006, Carrington 
represented in an e-mail message that with regard to 101-G47259: “The VA has paid all of 
the amounts due to our company, and our work (IT services) was performed in a high quality 
manner under contract no. V101(93)P-2093 [sic].” On November 29, 2006, the VA informed 
Carrington it would not be exercising its option for option year two of task order 101-E57037 
(issued under GSA contract GS-35F-0561N) and on December 31, 2006, the VA’s 
relationship with Carrington for REMS servicing ended. Around this time, Carrington wrote 
the VA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) and a Member of Congress complaining of 
contract irregularities associated with contract V101(93)P-2093 and task order 101-E57037 
(issued under GSA contract GS-35F-0561N) as well as the VA’s refusal to exercise its option 
for option year two of task order 101-E57037. In a report issued on February 4, 2008, the VA 
OIG found Carrington’s complaints unsubstantiated. 
On August 22, 2008, over four and a half years after contract V101(93)P-2093 had 
ended, Carrington submitted an invoice to the VA titled: “CG-8-CLOSEOUT.” By invoice 
CG-8-CLOSEOUT, Carrington sought an additional $179,136.13, an amount it says it was 
due for “closeout” of contract V101(93)P-2093, referencing services provided from 
September 27, 2002 through December 28, 2004.
7   According to Carrington, this was a new 
“adjusted” invoice for services provided under contract V101(93)P-2093 that Carrington 
claimed had not previously been invoiced. The CG-8-CLOSEOUT invoice was different 
from all previous invoices in that it did not contain information regarding the services 
provided, such as the date of service, description of service (e.g., network system 
administrator, network support technician, subject matter expert, etc.), name of the employee, 
number of hours provided, or hourly rate charged. Invoice CG-8-CLOSEOUT was a lump 
sum invoice with the amount derived by subtracting the total amount Carrington asserted it 
was paid under contract V101(93)P-2093 from what it asserts was the total contract amount 
due. 
7 On August 8, 2008, Carrington also submitted an “adjusted” invoice, CG-5­
CLOSEOUT, seeking an additional $24,823.99 for closeout of contract V101(93)P-1802, 
referencing services provided from September 28, 2001 through September 26, 2002. 

          
                
             
        
             
             
              
              
             
            
           
            
          
        
            
            
             
             
       
            
           
       
        
            
          
        
             
            
              
            
             
           
             
6 CBCA 2091 
While the CG-8-CLOSEOUT invoice did not request a contracting officer’s final 
decision, it was treated as a claim by the contracting officer, who issued a final decision on 
May 15, 2009. The final decision analyzed invoices and payments made under four 
Carrington contracts - V101(93)P-1802, V101(93)P-2021, V101(93)P-2093, and task order 
101-E57037 - which were in place from October 2001 through December 2004. 
8 The 
contracting officer concluded Carrington was due a payment of $45,630 on all four contracts. 
Carrington appealed the final decision to this Board on July 7, 2009, where the appeal 
was docketed as CBCA 1646. As CBCA 1646 involved multiple contracts and issues, it 
became clear that each contract needed to be dealt with separately. Subsequent discussions 
between the Board and counsel revealed that the disputes associated with contract V101(93)P­
2093 were for amounts over $100,000 but had never been certified. 
On January 8, 2010, Carrington submitted a certified claim to the contracting officer 
demanding payment of $261,936.10 under contract V101(93)P-2093. Carrington asserted that 
contract V101(93)P-2093 contained “contract provisions [that] incorporate five different 
contract types or categories, as well as certain unclear requirements, and conditions prohibited 
by law.” The contract provisions, Carrington posited, support its interpretation that contract 
V101(93)P-2093 was a firm-fixed price definite quantity contract and that it should be paid 
the $179,136.13 remaining on the contract. Carrington stated that as no minimum or 
maximum quantities were set forth in the schedule: 
To insure that adequate staffing and performance was provided to carry out the 
actual quantities shown in the contract the company staffing and other overhead 
expense-related arrangements were increased. [Carrington] accepted the 
quantities designated on the schedule as minimum [quantities].” 
Carrington also claimed it was entitled to an additional $128,429.97 for heretofore uninvoiced 
and “unpaid services,” including $101,782 for project manager services, $10,518.60 for 
project management administrator services, and $16,128.37 for connectivity assistant services. 
No compelling evidence was provided as to when these alleged services were provided. 
Carrington derived the claimed amounts using Bureau of Labor statistical rates and estimating 
the number of hours that had allegedly been allocated each week to contract V101(93)P-2093. 
The contracting officer issued another final decision on April 21, 2010, denying this 
claim in total. The contracting officer concluded that “there was never any agreement 
8 As the appeal before us involves only contract V101(93)P-2093, we have not 
described the disputes relating to the other contracts Carrington held with the VA. 

              
              
              
           
           
              
           
         
                
               
          
            
             
      
          
            
               
           
              
              
          
           
              
                
     
           
                 
            
           
              
        
7 CBCA 2091 
between the two parties that the government would pay billable hours for work performed by 
Carrington’s project manager,” and there is no CLIN in the schedule or orders placed for 
project manager services. The VA acknowledged that while the original intent of the contract 
was to have project management administrator services, that requirement changed and those 
services were entirely deleted via contract modification two, which was executed by 
Carrington on March 5, 2003. The contracting officer observed that while there was a 
description of connectivity assistant services in the statement of work, connectivity assistant 
services were not shown as being needed on the schedule and there was no CLIN, estimated 
quantity, or unit price for those services in the contract. The VA also noted that Carrington’s 
proposal did not include an hourly rate for connectivity assistant services. The VA asserts that 
it never ordered connectivity assistant services under contract V101(93)P-2093, and that 
Carrington did not have an option to provide connectivity assistant services under the 
contract.
9 
The April 21, 2010, final decision was appealed to the Board, assigned docket number 
CBCA 2091, and consolidated with CBCA 1646 for purposes of processing.  Attempting to 
resolve the overlap between the appeals and correct jurisdictional deficiencies, appellant 
requested that the portion of the dispute relating to contract V101(93)P-2093 be withdrawn 
from CBCA 1646. On June 22, 2010, the Board dismissed all claims associated with contract 
V101(93)P-2093 from CBCA 1646 for lack of jurisdiction. The remaining disputes 
associated with CBCA 1646 were resolved by the parties, and on November 10, 2010, CBCA 
1646 was dismissed with prejudice. Only CBCA 2091 and the $261,936.10 in dispute relating 
to contract V101(93)P-2093 remain before this Board for consideration and decision. 
Discussion 
The terms of this contract, Carrington’s performance and billing, and the VA’s 
administration and payments were presented to the Board in a jumble of facts with notable 
gaps that took significant time to unravel. The VA appears to have used numbers for funding 
mechanisms and obligations interchangeably with contract numbers, making the tracking of 
payments, contracts, and obligations very difficult to sort out.  Whatever system the VA had 
was understood, at best, only by the VA, or, possibly, not at all. The confusion caused by 
funding issues complicated what should have been a very simple procurement. 
9 The VA further posits that had such services actually been provided, they 
should have been provided at REMS sites as opposed to Carrington’s office, which is where 
appellant claims the services were provided. 

           
                
            
          
             
       
  
            
               
           
           
                  
              
               
               
              
       
     
            
                
             
               
                 
                
               
             
              
             
               
            
             
              
              
           
8 CBCA 2091 
When Carrington’s relationship with the VA on REMS ended, Carrington believed it 
was entitled to additional payments for the work it had performed over the years. After the 
payments on various contracts were sorted through, most were resolved, with only the 
$261,936.10 claim associated with contract V101(93)P-2093 remaining in dispute. Through 
this claim Carrington seeks the alleged balance on V101(93)P-2093 as well as payment for 
additional services it claims it provided. 
Unpaid contract balance 
Carrington posits that the contract in issue was a firm-fixed price definite quantity 
contract and as such, it is entitled to be paid the $179,136.13 remaining on the contract. 
Appellant states that even though the contract contained indefinite quantity clauses, no 
minimum or maximum quantities were provided and, as a result, it considered the quantities 
in the schedule as the minimum quantities to be provided. It asserts it should be paid for those 
minimum quantities whether or not they were provided. Carrington does not aver that it 
provided the $179,136.13 worth of services that it now seeks; it claims that amount solely on 
its purported entitlement to what it asserts remains in the contract. We note that until 
Carrington invoiced for the balance of the contract amount in August 2008, there is no 
indication in the record that it construed the contract to provide for payment of services that 
had not actually been provided. 
The VA responds that the contract in issue is an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity 
(ID/IQ) contract for the services described in the schedule and that it has fully paid for the 
services it ordered and Carrington provided. In the alternative, respondent argues that the 
contract is void for lack of consideration because no minimum quantities were set forth in the 
contract, and as such, Carrington is only entitled to be paid for the services it provided. Either 
way, the VA asserts it has fully paid Carrington for all the work it performed. 
Whether a contract is of one variety or the other is determined by an objective reading 
of the language of the contract, not by one party’s characterization of the instrument. 
Varilease Technology Group, Inc. v. United States , 289 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Travel 
Centre v. Barram , 236 F.3d 1316, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Maintenance Engineers v. United 
States , 749 F.2d 724, 726 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Marut Testing & Inspection Services, Inc. v. 
General Services Administration , GSBCA 15412, 02-2 BCA ¶ 31,945, at 157,820. 
To determine whether, as the appellant alleges, the contract at issue is a firm-fixed 
price definite quantity contract, or, as respondent asserts, an ID/IQ contract, we turn to the 
language of the contract. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, our appellate 
authority, has provided well-established guidance on the rules of interpretation for contracts: 

              
          
            
             
              
               
             
             
     
            
            
            
            
    
              
              
               
              
              
        
  
             
             
               
             
           
    
               
             
             
        
9 CBCA 2091 
In interpreting a contract, we begin with the plain language. We give the words 
of the agreement their ordinary meaning unless the parties mutually intended 
and agreed to an alternative meaning. In addition, we must interpret the 
contract in a manner that gives meaning to all of its provisions and makes 
sense. 
Jowett, Inc. v. United States , 234 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see 
also Coast Federal Bank, FSB v. United States , 323 F.3d 1035, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en 
banc) ; Hunt Construction Group, Inc. v. United States , 281 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002); 
Hol-Gar Manufacturing Corp. v. United States , 351 F.2d 972 (Ct. Cl. 1965). 
The Federal Circuit has explained additionally: 
If the provisions of the solicitation are clear and unambiguous, they must be 
given their plain and ordinary meaning; we may not resort to extrinsic evidence 
to interpret them. Finally, we must consider the solicitation as a whole, 
interpreting it in a manner that harmonizes and gives reasonable meaning to all 
of its provisions. 
Banknote Corporation of America, Inc. v. United States , 365 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(citations omitted). Further, outside evidence may not be brought in to create an ambiguity 
where the language is clear. McAbee Construction, Inc. v. United States , 97 F.3d 1431, 1435 
(Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Tacoma Department of Public Utilities v. United States , 31 F.3d 
1130, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Interwest Construction v. Brown , 29 F.3d 611, 615 (Fed. Cir. 
1994). 
Based on Federal Circuit precedent we see no reason to look beyond the terms of the 
contract before us to determine the type of contract.  We do not give credence to appellant’s 
assertions we should consider the other types of contracts the parties previously entered into, 
or those contracts’ terms, conditions, and practices, in considering how the contract before us 
should be interpreted. Read in a manner that gives harmony and reasonable meaning to all 
of its provisions, this instrument contained the clauses appropriate for an indefinite quantity 
contract, FAR clauses 52.215-18, -19, and -22. The clause found at FAR 52.216-22, 
INDEFINITE QUANTITY (OCT 1995) was in the instrument and unequivocally stated: “This 
is an indefinite-quantity contract for the supplies and/or services specified, and effective for 
the period stated, in the schedule. The quantities of supplies and services specified in the 
schedule are estimates only and are not purchased by this contract.” However, the 
instrument was invalid as an indefinite quantity contract because it lacked the stated minimum 
and maximum quantities that the VA promised to order. 

          
           
          
             
             
             
 
     
              
            
     
    
             
               
               
     
               
             
        
            
             
                
             
         
            
             
               
              
                 
          
10 CBCA 2091 
FAR 16.504(a) defines an indefinite quantity contract as a contract which: 
Provides for an indefinite quantity, within stated limits, of supplies or services 
during a fixed period. The Government places orders for individual 
requirements. Quantity limits may be stated as number of units or as dollar 
values. 
(1) The contract must require the Government to order and the contractor to 
furnish at least a stated minimum quantity of supplies or services. In addition, 
if ordered, the contractor must furnish any additional quantities, not to exceed 
the stated maximum. . . . 
(2) To ensure that the contract is binding, the minimum quantity must be more 
than a nominal quantity, but it should not exceed the amount that the 
Government is fairly certain to order. 
48 CFR 16.504(a) (2001). 
A contract lacking a minimum quantity term cannot be construed as a valid indefinite 
quantity contract and is binding only to the extent it was performed. Willard, Sutherland & 
Co. v. United States , 262 U.S. 489 (1923); Coyle’s Pest Control, Inc. v. Cuomo , 154 F.3d 
1302, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
In light of the clear terms of the contract stating that it was an indefinite quantity 
contract and that the “quantities of supplies and services specified in the schedule are 
estimates only and are not purchased by this contract,” we cannot find appellant’s proffered 
construction reasonable. Appellant’s construction, that the figures in the schedule should be 
used as the minimum quantities, puts unwarranted emphasis on only one portion of the 
contract, the schedule, and ignores the language in other clauses. Read in a manner that gives 
harmony and reasonable meaning to all of the instrument’s provisions this was a defective 
indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (ID/IQ) contract that lacked stated minimum quantities. 
Lacking minimum quantities, Carrington is entitled only to the compensation agreed upon in 
the contract attributable to the work performed, with the reasonable value of the work 
measured by the contract prices. Coyle’s Pest Control, 154 F.3d at 1306; Urban Data Systems 
v. United States , 699 F.2d 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Ralph Construction, Inc. v. United States , 
4 Cl. Ct. 727, 733 (1984). Carrington has already been fully paid for the work performed and 
is not entitled to be compensated for services it never provided. 

            
    
             
             
         
             
          
               
   
               
            
                  
               
       
              
              
              
           
              
             
              
             
               
              
           
               
   
   
________________________ 
   
 
11 CBCA 2091 
Unpaid services in the amount of $128,429.97 for a project manager, project management 
administrator, and connectivity assistant. 
Appellant asserts it is entitled to be paid an additional $128,429.97 for unpaid services 
that it provided at its own office: $101,782 for project manager services, $10,518.60 for 
project management administrator services, and $16,128.37 for connectivity assistant services. 
The evidence reveals that during the pendency of the contract the parties followed certain 
practices to order, provide, bill, and pay for contract services.  The practice was that the VA 
ordered the specific service(s), Carrington provided the service(s), and Carrington then 
invoiced the VA for the service(s) it provided. The invoices, which set forth the service(s) 
provided, included the date of service, description of service, name of employee, number of 
hours provided, and hourly rate charged. Those invoices were then reviewed by the VA and 
paid. These practices seemed perfectly acceptable to both parties until Carrington’s services 
were no longer required by the VA. It was not until several years after the contract had ended 
and the last invoice was paid that Carrington began to allege that it had provided additional 
services for which it had not been compensated. 
The contract does not list the claimed services in the schedule, and there is no 
indication in the contract that any services were to be provided at Carrington’s own office. 
There is no documentation or other compelling evidence that the VA ordered any of the 
alleged services, or that Carrington submitted contemporaneous time sheets or invoices for 
the services. Carrington did not follow its typical invoicing procedure for the alleged unpaid 
services by submitting an invoice showing the services provided, including the date of service, 
description of service, name of employee, number of hours provided, and hourly rate charged. 
The allegation of unpaid services was not raised until Carrington’s January 8, 2010 certified 
claim. Had such services been ordered, they would have been a change to the contract 
necessitating a modification. There is no such modification. To the extent testimony was 
offered alleging that these services were actually provided, that testimony was neither credible 
nor compelling. We are convinced that Carrington was fully paid for all the services it 
provided under the contract. 
Decision 
The appeal is DENIED . 
PATRICIA J. SHERIDAN 
Board Judge 

12 CBCA 2091
 

 
    
  
13 CBCA 2091 
We concur: 
____________________________ _________________________ 
JERI KAYLENE SOMERS ALLAN H. GOODMAN 
Board Judge Board Judge