DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION: September 24, 2010 
CBCA 1988 
GILJOY TECHNOLOGY, INC., 
Appellant, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, 
Respondent. 
Gilbert F. Cruz, President of Giljoy Technology, Inc., Houston, TX, appearing for 
Appellant. 
Blythe I. Rodgers, Office of General Counsel, Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent. 
Before Board Judges SOMERS , DRUMMOND , and KULLBERG. 
KULLBERG, Board Judge. 
Respondent, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), has moved 
for dismissal in this appeal.  Appellant, Giljoy Technology, Inc. (GTI), brought this appeal 
after the termination of two contracts with the City of Houston, Texas.  The Board finds that 
it has no jurisdiction in this appeal because no executive agency of the Government was a 
party to any contract with GTI that is at issue in this appeal.  Accordingly, we dismiss this 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

   
    
  
   
 
   
  
 
 
     
     
    
2 CBCA 1988 
Facts 
On October 2, 2009, and November 2, 2009, the City of Houston awarded to GTI a 
contract for the repair of a privately owned residence under the city’s single family home 
rehabilitation (SFHR) program. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, Exhibits 1, 2. 1   The 
dispute resolution section in both contracts provided for the appeal of disputes to the director 
of the city’s Housing and Community Development Department (HCDD).  Id. at 2, 12.  Such 
appeals were to be resolved with a binding decision by means of either mediation or 
arbitration.  Id .  The applicable law section in both contracts stated that the contracts were 
subject “to all laws of the United States of America, the State of Texas, charter and 
ordinances of the City of Houston and all rules and regulations of any regulatory body or 
office having jurisdiction and in particular, without limitation, the federal regulations 
codified at Title 24, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 570 or 24 CFR Part 92.” 
Id. at 15. 
On February 26, 2010, the City of Houston terminated both contracts for cause. 
Exhibit 3.  In a letter dated March 19, 2010, the city’s legal department responded to GTI’s 
March 9, 2010, complaint regarding the termination of the contracts, and GTI was advised 
that no payment for work would be made until after the costs of completing the contract had 
been paid.  Id .  Additionally, the legal department’s letter advised GTI of its right to appeal 
to the HCDD director.  Id. On August 9, 2010, GTI filed an appeal with this Board.   
Discussion 
Respondent contends that this Board lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal, and GTI 
argues that the City of Houston has consented to this Board’s jurisdiction.  This Board has 
recognized that an appellant “bear[s] the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction 
by a preponderance of the evidence.”  Opportunities for the Aging Housing Corp ., 
CBCA 1501, 10-1 BCA ¶ 34,311, at 169,488 (2009). Section 3(a) of the Contract Disputes 
Act of 1978 (CDA), 41 U.S.C. §§ 610-613 (2006), states the following: 
Unless otherwise specifically provided herein, this chapter 
applies to any express or implied contract . . . entered into by an 
executive agency for– 
1 Unless otherwise noted, all exhibits cited in this decision were attached to the 
Government’s motion.  

 
   
 
        
  
  
     
 
 
      
      
 
  
 
   
3 CBCA 1988 
(1) the procurement of property, other than real property in 
being; 
(2) the procurement of services; 
(3) the procurement of construction, alteration, repair or 
maintenance of real property; or, 
(4) the disposal of personal property. 
Id. § 602(a).  Under the CDA, an executive agency is “an executive department as defined 
in section 101 of title 5, an independent establishment as defined by section 104 of 
title 5 . . . , a military department . . . , [or] a wholly owned Government corporation.” 
Id. § 601(2). The City of Houston is not an executive agency of the Government.  Neither 
HUD nor any other executive agency of the Government is a party to GTI’s contracts.
2 
GTI’s appeal does not involve a contract with an executive agency of the Government, and 
this Board, consequently, lacks jurisdiction in this appeal. 
GTI argues that under the applicable law section of its contracts, the City of Houston 
consented to this Board’s jurisdiction to conduct either a mediation or arbitration.  The 
disputes section of GTI’s contracts with the City of Houston stated that appeals were to be 
submitted to the director of the HCDD, and appeals would be resolved by means of either an 
arbitration or mediation in which a binding decision would be issued.  GTI’s contracts 
contain no provision for dispute resolution that would involve this Board.  Nothing in the 
terms of GTI’s contracts or the rest of the record supports GTI’s assertion that the City of 
2 Section 12.02 of GTI’s contracts makes reference to parts 92 and 570 of title 
24 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Part 92 of title 24 relates to HUD’s home 
investment partnerships program, and part 570 concerns community development block 
grants.  24 CFR 92.1, 570.1 (2009).  Neither of those referenced parts in the CFR gives this 
Board jurisdiction over GTI’s contracts. HUD states in its motion that the City of Houston 
received a HUD grant to fund GTI’s contracts pursuant to parts 92 and 570 of title 24 of the 
CFR. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss at 7.  HUD, however, argues correctly that this Board 
does not have jurisdiction in this appeal under those circumstances.  It is well established 
“that the government’s involvement in the financing and supervision of a contract between 
a public agency and a private contractor does not create a contract between the government 
and the contractor, for the breach of which the contractor may sue the government.”  New 
Era Construction v. United States , 890 F.2d 1152, 1155 (Fed. Cir. 1989), aff’g New Era 
Construction, HUD BCA 88-3406-C6, 89-1 BCA ¶ 21,376 (1988). 

  
4 CBCA 1988 
Houston has ever consented to the jurisdiction of this Board, and even if GTI were correct 
in its assertion, we have no authority to hear this appeal under the CDA. 
Decision 
The appeal is DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION . 
______________________ 
H. CHUCK KULLBERG 
Board Judge 
We concur: 
_______________________ _______________________ 
JERI K. SOMERS JEROME M. DRUMMOND 
Board Judge Board Judge