GRANTED IN PART:  March 24, 2025
CBCA 8268-C(7213, 7393)
ADAPT CONSULTING, LLC,
Applicant,
v.
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
Respondent.
Joseph A. Whitcomb of Whitcomb, Selinsky, P.C., Lakewood, CO, counsel for
Applicant.
Justin Hawkins and David C. Charin, Office of General Counsel, General Services
Administration, Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent.
Before Board Judges LESTER, ZISCHKAU, and SULLIVAN.
ZISCHKAU, Board Judge.
Applicant, Adapt Consulting, LLC, timely filed an application to recover attorney fees
and related expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2018),
after the Board granted its appeals in part.  Adapt Consulting, LLC v. General Services
Administration, CBCA 7213, et al., 24-1 BCA ¶ 38,625.  Respondent, the General Services
Administration (GSA or agency), opposes the application, arguing that its actions were
reasonable and substantially justified.  GSA additionally argues that the amount of fees Adapt
seeks to recover is unreasonable.  We grant Adapt’s application in part. 


CBCA 8268-C(7213, 7393) 2
Background
The Initial Appeal and the Board’s Decision
The Board presumes familiarity with the facts stated in our merits decision which we
briefly summarize here.  On September 14, 2021, Adapt appealed a partial termination for
default in a contract to update approximately 110 physical access control systems in a
building occupied by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  GSA issued a partial
termination for default due to thirteen doors repeatedly receiving “fault/fault clear” (F/FC)
messages in the enterprise security software maintained by EPA.  Once EPA informed Adapt
of the issue, Adapt made repeated efforts to investigate and remedy the situation.  After
almost seven months investigating and troubleshooting the issue, Adapt and its team
determined that the F/FC messages were the result of environmental conditions outside of
Adapt’s control and that operation of Adapt’s systems were functioning as designed.  GSA
was not satisfied with Adapt’s response and ultimately issued a partial termination for default
of Adapt’s contract due to the F/FC issue being unresolved in thirteen doors.  Adapt appealed
the termination, and the case was docketed as CBCA 7213.  On May 5, 2022, Adapt
additionally appealed GSA’s denial of several affirmative monetary claims stemming from
the same contract, docketed as CBCA 7393.  Both appeals were consolidated.
On July 22, 2024, we sustained Adapt’s challenge of the partial termination for
default, concluding that GSA had failed to show that the termination for default was justified. 
Of the $220,870.85 sought by Adapt in its affirmative monetary claims, we granted recovery
totaling $97,907.41 (claim A—$2,048.10, claim B—$17,460.31, claim C—$22,243.09 (in
addition to the $46,484 GSA had already paid under claim C), and claim I—$56,155.91). 
We denied recovery for claims D, F, G, and H, primarily because Adapt had failed to provide
sufficient records to support those claims.  Adapt sought reconsideration of our denial of
recovery for claim F, which we denied on August 23, 2024.  Adapt Consulting, LLC v.
General Services Administration, CBCA 7213-R, et al., 24-1 BCA ¶ 38,645, at 187,869.  The
decision became final on November 19, 2024.  41 U.S.C. § 7107 (2018).
Adapt’s EAJA Application and GSA’s Opposition
On November 25, 2024, Adapt submitted its petition under EAJA, seeking to recover
$135,291.23, consisting of $128,237.50 in attorney fees and $7,053.73 in expenses.  Adapt
calculated its attorney fees by multiplying its counsels’ total hours, 1025.9 hours, by the
EAJA statutory hourly rate limit of $125 per hour.  5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A).  The expenses
Adapt identified were incurred in the litigation of its appeals after the partial default
termination.  Adapt submitted three exhibits with its EAJA petition:  (1) an affidavit
confirming that the company employed less than 500 employees and its total assets were less

CBCA 8268-C(7213, 7393) 3
than $7,000,000; (2) attorney time billing records beginning on October 7, 2021, with brief
descriptions of the purpose for the charges and the billed amount; and (3) a list of expenses
related to the litigation.  Applicant’s Brief, Exhibits A-C.
GSA responded that Adapt should not recover because the contracting officer’s
decision to issue a partial termination for default of Adapt’s contract, the denial of the
monetary claims, and the legal positions the agency took before the Board were substantially
justified.  GSA also argued that the fees requested were unduly excessive because the amount
sought exceeds the amount Adapt recovered on its monetary claims.  GSA highlighted that
Adapt had eight attorneys working on its appeals at one time or another, which likely led to
overlap and redundancy in work.  GSA noted that, because the descriptions provided in
Adapt’s attorney time logs are not very descriptive, it is difficult to determine how much of
the fees were excessive.
In its reply, Adapt explained that different attorneys worked on different issues and
different parts of the litigation.  Adapt also argued that, unlike its monetary claims, its
success in overturning the default termination did not have a direct monetary value.
Discussion
For an EAJA applicant to be successful, the applicant must meet five requirements: 
(1) be a prevailing party in a United States proceeding; (2) if a corporation, it cannot have
more than $7,000,000 in net worth and 500 employees at the time the adversary adjudication
was initiated; (3) submit a timely application within thirty days of the final adjudication;
(4) include a list of attorney fees and related costs with the total amount sought; and
(5) allege that the position of the agency was not substantially justified.  Vet4U, LLC v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, CBCA 6612-C(5387), 20-1 BCA ¶ 37,504, at 182,187
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1), (2), (b)(1)(B); Paradise Pillow, Inc. v. General Services
Administration, CBCA 5237-C(3562), 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,628, at 178,366); see also Hughes
Group LLC v. Department of Veterans Affairs, CBCA 7857-C(5964), 24-1 BCA ¶ 38,552,
at 187,376.
We find that Adapt has met all five prima facie elements for an EAJA application. 
GSA only contests the fifth element, arguing that the agency’s actions, both in contract
administration and during litigation, were substantially justified.
Substantial Justification
“Once an applicant has fulfilled the statutory requirements under EAJA, the burden
shifts to the agency to show that its position was substantially ‘justified to a degree that could

CBCA 8268-C(7213, 7393) 4
satisfy a reasonable person.’” Hughes Group LLC, 24-1 BCA at 187,376 (quoting Pierce v.
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)).  We will find a position substantially justified “if it
had a reasonable basis in law and fact.”  Silver Enterprises v. Department of Transportation,
CBCA 63-C(DOT BCA 4459, et al.), 07-1 BCA ¶ 33,496, at 166,016 (citing Pierce, 487 U.S.
at 565).  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in In re Secretary of the Army, notes
that whether the position of the agency was substantially justified is to be determined based
on the tribunal’s consideration of the record as a whole, rather than on particular issues or
claims within the adjudication.  124 F.4th 922, 929-30 (Fed. Cir. 2024); see 5 U.S.C.
§ 504(a)(1).  We consider several factors in determining substantial justification, including
each party’s success in the litigation, the extent to which the agency forced the contractor into
litigation to obtain relief, and whether the agency’s conduct overall was justified in the
administration of the contract.  See Michael Johnson Logging v. Department of Agriculture,
CBCA 7187-C(5089, et al.), 23-1 BCA ¶ 38,460, at 186,938 (citing DRC Corp. v.
Department of Commerce, GSBCA 15172-C(14919-COM), 00-1 BCA ¶ 30,841, at
152,227-28; Dream Management, Inc. v. Department of Homeland Security, CBCA
5739-C(5517), 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,916, at 179,861; Vet4U, LLC, 20-1 BCA at 182,187-88); see
also Hughes Group LLC, 24-1 BCA at 187,376-77.
Similarly, in Chiu v. United States, the Federal Circuit instructed tribunals “to look
at the entirety of the government’s conduct and make a judgment call whether the
government’s overall position had a reasonable basis in both law and fact.”  948 F.2d 711,
714-15 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  Thus, we must review whether the agency’s actions, both for the
termination for default and in its denial of the claims, were substantially justified.
We conclude that the agency’s actions relating to the default termination and the
monetary claims, under the totality of the circumstances, were not substantially justified. 
GSA did not have a reasonable basis in fact or law for the termination decision, and, after its
own investigation and discovery in the litigation, GSA should not have forced Adapt to
litigate the termination through a merits hearing.  GSA was unable to point to any evidence
that the F/FC messages were caused by defective work by Adapt or its subcontractors.  We
further conclude that Adapt’s only option to receive relief from the partial termination was
to appeal the determination and litigate.  We have previously recognized that when a
contractor faces a termination for default, it faces “the severest of sanctions asserted against
it, . . . [and is] forced to appeal the termination to obtain [any] relief.”  Hughes Group LLC,
24-1 BCA at 187,377.
Similarly, we conclude that the agency’s decision to deny entitlement on virtually all
of the monetary claims was not justified.  The record before us shows that the contracting
officer advanced erroneous bases in the final decision for denying entitlement to Adapt’s
claims.  As noted in our merits decision, there was no justification for denying entitlement,

CBCA 8268-C(7213, 7393) 5
and some of the monetary claims were tied to the unsupported default termination.  The
agency’s overall conduct cannot be justified.  Adapt was forced to appeal the contracting
officer’s denials and litigate the monetary claims before us.
EAJA Fee Calculations
The United States Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have held that tribunals have
the “discretion to adjust the amount of fees for various portions of the litigation, guided by
reason and the statutory criteria.”  Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Jean, 496 U.S.
154, 165-66 (1990).
GSA argues that even if we find for Adapt, we should conclude that the attorney fees
sought are unreasonable.  GSA does not identify specific billings that are unreasonable and
seems to leave it to this Board to go line-by-line to assess the billings.  We see no reason to
reduce an award when “we find a reasonable division of the work and no overlapping fees
or costs.”  Hughes Group LLC, 24-1 BCA at 187,379.  Even if multiple attorneys worked on
a single matter, such as discovery, we see no reason to reduce the award on this basis alone, 
since the case had some level of complexity and there were instances of GSA’s lack of
cooperation, which required more work on the part of Adapt’s counsel.
“[T]he amount of fees and expenses awarded must be commensurate with the degree
of success obtained.”  Michael Johnson Logging, 23-1 BCA at 186,938 (citing Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1983)).  No single formula exists to determine an EAJA
award where fees for some claims are recoverable and others are not.  In this case, it is
difficult to ascertain the scope of legal work by claim based on the brief descriptions for each
line item in the attorney time logs.  In instances like this, we may assign a percentage
reduction based on the overall work put in for each issue through estimation.  See, e.g.,
Golden West Environmental Services v. Department of Homeland Security, DOT
BCA 2895A, 05-1 BCA ¶ 32,869, at 162,897-98 (reducing fees by 30% based on
approximately 30% of the applicant’s briefs being dedicated to losing claims); Baldi Brothers
Constructors v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 78, 83 (2002) (“Because plaintiff’s records do not
permit the court to determine with a reasonable degree of confidence how much time was
spent on these issues, the court finds that a pro rata reduction in plaintiff’s total recovery of
33.3% is warranted.”); WECC, Inc., ASBCA 60949, 22 1 BCA ¶ 38,115, at 185,141-42
(assigning a 20% reduction based on work put in on losing claims).
Adapt was largely successful in its appeals.  Invalidation of the termination for default
was the most important relief that it sought and obtained.  Adapt also successfully established
entitlement to nearly all of its monetary claims and recovered slightly less than half of the
quantum sought.  Adapt was not successful in proving quantum on some of the claims where

CBCA 8268-C(7213, 7393) 6
entitlement was established, primarily because it failed to provide adequate documentation
of its costs.  Based on our review of the billing records for the attorneys, paralegals, and law
clerk, we have found no time entries that strike us as unreasonable, considered individually
and as a whole.  We find that a value of 75% of Adapt’s total billings is reasonable in light
of Adapt’s degree of success and that a 25% reduction is appropriate for its lack of success
in establishing quantum on several of the claims.  We further find that Adapt is entitled to
recover its related expenses totaling $7,053.73.  These expenses are adequately supported in
the record.
Consistent with the above determinations, we make the following calculations to
award Adapt appropriate fees.  Adapt claims 1025.9 hours, incurred among eight attorneys,
several paralegals, and a law clerk.  Paralegals and law clerks are recoverable at the market
rate for which they were billed, subject to the $125 statutory cap that the EAJA applies to
attorney fees.  See Michael Johnson Logging, 23-1 BCA at 186,940 (permitting EAJA
recover for paralegal fees subject to the statutory cap); see also Asia Commerce Network,
ASBCA 58623, 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,352, at 181,625 (permitting recovery of paralegal and law
clerk fees at market rate because they were below the statutory cap threshold).  Since all fees
sought by Adapt exceed the statutory cap, we multiply recoverable hours by $125.  The
recoverable fees at the statutory cap are $128,237.50.  Applying the 25% reduction, Adapt
is entitled to $96,178.12.  We add related expenses of $7053 for a total EAJA award of
$103,231.12.
Decision
We GRANT IN PART Adapt’s EAJA application in the amount of $103,231.12.
  Jonathan D. Zischkau    
JONATHAN D. ZISCHKAU
Board Judge

CBCA 8268-C(7213, 7393) 7
We concur:
   Harold D. Lester, Jr.        Marian E. Sullivan      
HAROLD D. LESTER, JR. MARIAN E. SULLIVAN
Board Judge Board Judge