GRANTED IN PART AS TO ENTITLEMENT:  May 8, 2026
CBCA 8472, 8473
PERTAINGBER LAWRANCE NOAUH,
Appellant,
v.
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
Respondent.
Pertaingber Lawrance Noauh, pro se, Monrovia, Liberia.
Robert J. Anderson and Aaron J. Pound, Office of General Counsel, General Services
Administration,1 Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent.
Before Board Judges RUSSELL, O’ROURKE, and NEWSOM.
O’ROURKE, Board Judge.
Appellant, Pertaingber Lawrance Noauh, submitted a claim to the contracting officer
seeking $40,753.95 in uncompensated meal breaks spanning two separate but consecutive
personal services contracts for acquisition support services at the United States Embassy in
Liberia.  Appellant’s work schedule under both contracts did not provide for paid meal
1 Due to an agency restructuring and reduction in force, counsel for the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID or agency) withdrew from the case,
effective March 6, 2026.  Attorneys from the General Services Administration filed notices
of appearance “on behalf of USAID” on March 16, 2026.

CBCA 8472, 8473 2
breaks.  When a change in Liberian labor laws required paid meal breaks for employees
working forty-hour weeks, the Embassy submitted, through official channels, a request to
modify the work schedule consistent with the new Liberian labor law.
Eight years passed before the change was implemented, effective November 1, 2024. 
From that point on, local employees working forty hours per week earned paid meal breaks. 
Compensation for past meal breaks was not addressed by this change, prompting appellant
to submit a claim to the contracting officer covering the period from March 18, 2018, to
October 31, 2024.  The contracting officer denied the claim on the basis that appellant’s
contract did not provide for paid meal breaks.  Appellant appealed to the Board, which
docketed the case as CBCA 8473.
Appellant submitted a second claim to the contracting officer seeking $73,714.52 in
unpaid overtime.2  The contract required that requests for overtime be made in advance, in
writing, approved by a supervisor, and authorized by the contracting officer.  Finding no
evidence of pre-approved overtime, the contracting officer denied the claim in its entirety. 
Appellant appealed the denial to the Board, which was docketed as CBCA 8472.  In his
appeal for overtime, appellant argued that the terms of both contracts institutionalized
overtime by mandating compliance with a forty-three-hour workweek, in violation of his
contracts and local labor laws.  
Because we find that, pursuant to United States law and the terms of appellant’s
service contracts, the agency was obligated to compensate appellant consistent with local
labor laws, we grant in part the appeals.
Findings of Fact
I. Overview
Appellant, a resident of Liberia, was awarded a personal services contract in 2018 by
USAID (contract number 669-S-00-18-00006) and was assigned to the USAID Regional
2 Appellant submitted a third claim to the contracting officer seeking
compensation for the unexpired portion of his contract following the termination.  That
decision was also denied by the contracting officer and appealed to the Board.  That appeal
was docketed as CBCA 8471 but is not consolidated with this appeal.  As such, this  decision
does not address that matter.

CBCA 8472, 8473 3
Office of Acquisition and Assistance in Monrovia, Liberia.3  The initial period of
performance ran for about one year, and two contract modifications extended appellant’s
service through September 2022, at which time USAID awarded him a follow-on contract
(contract number 72066923S10004) with a period of performance continuing through
September 30, 2024, with three one-year options.  Appeal File, Respondent’s Exhibits
1-4, 6.4  In July 2024, USAID deleted the options and extended the period of performance
to September 30, 2027.  Respondent’s Exhibit 7 at 2.
Both contracts called for appellant to provide a wide variety of acquisition services,
from acquisition planning and policy advice, to reviewing project budgets, conducting
complex cost analyses, approving solicitations, evaluating offers, and performing post-award
contract administration.  Respondent’s Exhibits 1 at 2-5, 6 at 5-8. Appellant worked under
the general guidance of the contracting officer and served as a mentor to trainees.5  Id.
As detailed below, the original work schedule, which was imposed by the agency,
required appellant to work Monday through Thursday from 8:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., with a
forty-five-minute unpaid meal break each day.  On Friday, he worked from 8:00 a.m. to
1:00 p.m. with no meal break.  Respondent’s Exhibit 31 at 12.  Altogether, appellant spent
nine-and-one-half hours at work each day Monday through Thursday, plus five hours at work
on Friday, for a weekly total of forty-three hours spent at work, which included three hours
of unpaid meal breaks.  The parties dispute how much, if any, of these hours are overtime
and whether appellant was entitled to paid lunch breaks.
3 Section 636(a)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C.
§ 2396(a)(3) (2024), authorizes United States agencies to enter into personal services
contracts with individuals abroad but clarifies that personal services contractors “shall not
be regarded as employees of the U.S. Government for the purpose of any law administered
by the Civil Service commission.”  48 CFR 7, Appendix J at 2(b) (2024).
4 All exhibits are found in the appeal file, unless otherwise noted.
5 The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines a personal services contract
as “a contract that, by its express terms or as administered, make the contractor personnel
appear, in effect, [as] Government employees.”  48 CFR 7, Appendix J at 1(b)(1); 48 CFR
37.104 (FAR 37.104).

CBCA 8472, 8473 4
II. Relevant Statutes
A. The Contract Disputes Act
Disputes arising under federal contracts are resolved under the Contract Disputes Act
(CDA), 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7109.  The CDA grants a limited waiver of sovereign immunity
by allowing the federal government to be sued in its capacity as a contracting party.  Winter
v. FloorPro, Inc., 570 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2009); RDG Breton, LLC v. General
Services Administration, CBCA 6961, 22-1 BCA ¶ 38,020, at 184,637.
The disputes in these consolidated appeals involve federal personal services contracts
performed in Liberia by a Liberian citizen (referred to under the contract as a cooperating
country national or CCN).  As the contracts at issue, however, were performed outside of the
United States, two other statutes provide critical context to understanding the contracts’ terms
and resolving these appeals:  the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (FSA), 22 U.S.C. §§ 3901–
4226, and the Decent Work Act of 2015 (Liberia) (DWA) (Appellant’s Exhibit 19).  Below
are brief summaries of their relevant provisions.
B. The FSA
Enacted in 1980, the FSA established “a career foreign service . . . to assist the
President and the Secretary of State in conducting the foreign affairs of the United States.” 
22 U.S.C. § 3901(a)(1) (1980).  While most of the FSA’s provisions address employment
matters relating to Foreign Service personnel, section 3968 of the FSA applies to foreign
national employees and CCNs who work for the United States overseas, such as at an
embassy.  Section 3968, which is titled “Local compensation plans,” provides in relevant
part:
The Secretary shall establish compensation . . . plans for foreign national
employees of the Service and United States citizens employed under section
3951(c)(1) of this title.  To the extent consistent with the public interest, each
compensation plan shall be based upon prevailing wage rates and
compensation practices . . . for corresponding types of positions in the locality
of employment.
22 U.S.C. § 3968(a)(1) (emphasis added).

CBCA 8472, 8473 5
C. The DWA
The Legislature of the Republic of Liberia enacted the DWA to provide a legal
framework for addressing various labor and employment matters.  DWA § 1.2.  The Act
“applies to all work performed within the jurisdiction of the Republic [of Liberia].”  Id. § 1.5
(emphasis added).  The DWA exempts certain categories of personnel, but contractors of the
United States are not listed among those exemptions.  Id. § 1.5(c).  Relevant to the instant
disputes are the provisions of the DWA contained in chapter 17, titled “Working Hours and
Breaks.”  These provisions address ordinary hours of work, overtime work, and meal breaks. 
Id. §§ 17.1, 17.5, 17.7.  We examine those provisions in more detail in the discussion section
of this decision.
III. Appellant’s Personal Services Contracts
A. Appellant’s 2018 Contract
Contract terms relevant to appellant’s claims for meal breaks and overtime during his
first contract included:  the period of performance, the work schedule, and overtime
compensation, which we elaborate on below.  Respondent’s Exhibit 1 at 5-7.  The contract
also included general provision contract clauses and Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
clauses.  The second general provision clause, “Compliance with Laws and Regulations
Applicable Abroad,” required appellant, and his dependents, to comply with “all applicable
laws and regulations of the cooperating country.”  Id. at 10.  The Limitation of Funds clause
at FAR 52.232-22 was incorporated by reference into appellant’s contract.  Id. at 23.
(1) Period of Performance.  Appellant’s first contract began on March 19, 2018. 
The period of performance consisted of a base year and multiple option years.  All option
years were exercised, and contract performance concluded on September 30, 2022. 
Respondent’s Exhibits 1-3.
(2) The Work Schedule.  The contract contained a general provisions (GP) section
applicable to personal services contracts with a “cooperating country national” (a Liberian
Citizen).  GP.4, titled “Workweek,” stated, “The contractor’s workweek shall not be less than
40 hours, unless otherwise provided in the Schedule, and shall coincide with the workweek
for those employees of the Mission.”6  Respondent’s Exhibit 1 at 10 (emphasis added).
6 The words “Mission” and “Embassy” are used interchangeably.

CBCA 8472, 8473 6
The contract referred to a “schedule” but did not actually contain one.  Rather, the
schedule was published in the 2013 “Locally Employed (LE) Staff Human Resources
Handbook” (Handbook) for the Monrovia, Liberia Mission.  Respondent’s Exhibit 31.  The
Handbook in effect at the time stated that the Mission’s official working hours were: 
Mondays through Thursdays, 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. and 12:45 p.m. to 5:30 p.m., and
Fridays from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.  Id. at 12.7  Thus, appellant’s work schedule, established
by the agency, required a total of forty hours of work time (eight-and-three-quarters hours
per day for four days and five hours for one day), plus three hours of unpaid meal breaks.
(3) Overtime Compensation.  The overtime provision in the first contract stated,
“Unless specifically authorized in the Schedule of this contract, no overtime hours shall be
allowed hereunder.”  Respondent’s Exhibit 1 at 6 (emphasis added).  The contract’s general
provisions further clarified that overtime pay was authorized “if approved in advance in
writing.”  Id.  The contract did not specify an hourly overtime rate nor did it provide a
method to calculate one.  The only guidance the contract provided regarding overtime rates
was that any overtime worked by the contractor “shall be paid in accordance with the
procedures governing premium compensation applicable to direct-hire foreign service
national employees.”  Id. at 10.  The contract did not elaborate on where such procedures
could be found.
The section of the contract pertaining to “Other Direct Costs” provided a summary
and breakdown of appellant’s compensation types and corresponding amounts.  The line item
for overtime listed five percent of appellant’s salary, or $1727.90, without further
explanation.  Respondent’s Exhibit 1 at 6.  The contract established an annual ceiling or
maximum dollar obligation of $48,196.08, which consisted of all pay and the maximum
possible benefits.  Id. at 7.  The contract noted that “[i]f, during the effective period of the
contract, the [Mission’s] Local Compensation Plan is revised, the contractor’s compensations
will be revised accordingly.”  Id. at 6.
7 The parties included two handbooks in the record.  The first one is dated
October 16, 2013, and the second one is dated May 17, 2022.  The 2022 Handbook has a
slightly different title, “Locally Employed Staff Handbook.”  Respondent’s Exhibit 5. 
Neither party contends that other published versions (if any) were materially different than
those in the record with respect to the parts of the handbooks that are relevant to these
appeals.

CBCA 8472, 8473 7
B. Appellant’s 2022 Contract
Contract terms relevant to appellant’s claims for meal breaks and overtime under his
second contract include terms for period of performance, work schedule, and overtime
compensation.  Respondent’s Exhibit 6 at 8-10.  Appellant’s second contract also included
general provision contract clauses and specified FAR clauses.  The general provision clause,
titled “Compliance with Laws and Regulations Applicable Abroad,” mandated appellant’s
compliance with “all applicable laws and regulations of the cooperating country.”  Id. at 14. 
The Limitation of Funds clause, FAR 52.232-22, was incorporated by reference into the
contract.  Id. at 26.
(1) Period of Performance.  The second contract established a period of
performance consisting of a two-year base period (October 1, 2022, to September 30, 2024),
followed by three, one-year option periods.  Respondent’s Exhibit 6 at 8-9.  On July 3, 2024,
the parties executed a bilateral modification to the contract, which established a single
five-year period of performance.  This was accomplished by revising the contract’s end date
to September 30, 2027, and deleting all references to option years.  Respondent’s Exhibit 7
at 1.  Accompanying the modification was a memorandum from the contracting officer,
explaining that the purpose of the modification was three-fold:  (1) to align the awarded
contracts with the terms of the solicitation; (2) to correct the misapplication of fiscal years
to contract budgets by switching to contract years, and (3) to restore consistency to the
Mission’s practice regarding personal services contracts.  Respondent’s Exhibit 7 at 2.
(2) The Work Schedule.  The workweek clause of the second contract was
identical to the workweek clause of the first contract.  “The contractor’s workweek shall not
be less than 40 hours, unless otherwise provided in the Schedule, and shall coincide with the
workweek for those employees of the Mission.”  Respondent’s Exhibit 6 at 16. 
Supplementing the workweek clause was a provision under the section of the contract
concerning compensation and reimbursement titled “Workweek and Premium
Compensation.”  This provision permitted appellant “to work more than 40 hours per week
where such a work schedule is standard practice at an overseas Mission, or where such a
schedule is specifically authorized.”  Id. at 10.
As with the first contract, the details of the Mission’s work schedule were not part of
the second contract.  Instead, the work schedule was published in the 2022 Handbook and
was essentially the same schedule that appellant worked under the first contract:  Mondays
through Thursdays, 8:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., with a forty-five-minute lunch break, and Fridays
from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. with no break.  Respondent’s Exhibit 5 at 10.

CBCA 8472, 8473 8
(3) Overtime Compensation.  The contract required that any overtime work had
to be approved in advance in writing.  Respondent’s Exhibit 6 at 16.  Overtime pay was
calculated at a rate of five percent of appellant’s annual salary ($2582.40), but the contract
did not specify an hourly overtime rate or a method to calculate an hourly rate.  Id. at 9. 
Rather, the contract advised that any overtime worked by the contractor was paid “in
accordance with the procedures governing premium compensation applicable to direct-hire
foreign service national employees.”  Id. at 16.  The contract did not state where those
procedures could be found.  Finally, the contract’s annual ceiling—which included all pay
and the maximum possible benefits for the first year of the second contract—was $65,906.44. 
Id. at 9.
III. The Mission’s Local Compensation Plan and Local Employee Staff Handbook
A. Local Compensation Plan for Monrovia, Liberia
The record contains four local compensation plans for the Monrovia, Liberia Mission
covering years 2019, 2021, 2022, and 2025.  Respondent’s Exhibits 33, 32, 34, 8.   Local
compensation plans form the legal basis for all compensation payments to foreign service
national employees.  See 3 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 7521.  These plans were required
to be developed in accordance with the prevailing wage rates and compensation practices in
Monrovia and applied to locally employed staff of the United States Government.  See
22 U.S.C. § 3968; Respondent’s Exhibits 33 at 2; 32 at 4; 34 at 4; 8 at 4.  The local
compensation plans in the record address a wide range of topics, including salary tables,
leave benefits, tax withholding, travel and temporary duty benefits, overtime rates, medical
coverage, and observed holidays.  Relevant here are provisions related to the basic workweek
and overtime rates.  “The basic full-time workweek schedule is 40 hours per week . . . some
employees are hired on 44 hours and 48 hours work weeks.”  Respondent’s Exhibit 8 at 4. 
“Overtime pay on a weekday is time and one-half per hour computed on basic pay.”  Id.
at 10.
The local compensation plans were expressly referenced in both contracts.  Under the
section addressing allowable costs, the first contract provided that appellant would earn
“[c]ompensation at the rate of US$34,558.00 per (year) equivalent to Grade FSN-9/13, in
accordance with the Mission’s Local Compensation Plan.”  Respondent’s Exhibit 1 at 6.  The
contract also explained that:
If during the effective period of this contract, the Local Compensation Plan is
revised, the contractor’s compensations will be revised accordingly, subject to
the availability of funds, and the contractor will be notified in writing by the
Contracting Officer.

CBCA 8472, 8473 9
Id.  Regarding pay increases, “[a]t the end of each year of satisfactory performance, the
contractor will be eligible to receive an increase equal to one annual step increase as shown
in the local compensation plan, pending availability of funds.”  Id.  “Meritorious step
increases may be granted to [CCNs] and TCNs paid under the local compensation plan
provided the granting of such increase is the general practice locally.”  Id. at 16.
Appellant’s second contract expressly incorporated the local compensation plan into
the contract.  Box nine, on page one of the contract, titled “Benefits Plan,” presented four
options:  “(1) CCN/TCN - Local Compensation Plan (LCP); (2) TCN - not subject to LCP;
(3) U.S. - Resident Hire; and (4) U.S. - Abroad/U.S.-based.”  Here, the first benefit plan was
checked:  CCN/TCN Local Compensation Plan (LCP).  Respondent’s Exhibit 6 at 1.
In addition, appellant’s second contract made multiple references to the local
compensation plan.  This contract stated, “Allowable costs, compensation, and all terms and
benefits under this contract will be in accordance with the Mission’s Local Compensation
Plan.”  Respondent’s Exhibit 6 at 9.  “The contractor’s compensation is calculated at the rate
of $USD 51,648.00 year/Hourly rate USD 24.83 corresponding to grade FSN 10/12 in
accordance with the Mission’s Local Compensation Plan.”  Id. at 10.  “Any adjustment or
increase in the local compensation plan will be allowed for the contractor subject to the
availability of funds.”  Id.  “Pay increases based on annual performance evaluations of
satisfactory or better may increase the rate of pay within the local compensation plan.”  Id. 
“Individuals at the highest rate of pay within the LCP-equivalent grade are ‘capped’ from
receiving any additional increases, but may be eligible for other merit based compensation
in accordance with the local compensation plan.”  Id.  “CCNs and TCN personal services
contractors paid under the local compensation plan are eligible to receive meritorious step
increases provided the granting of such increases is the general practice locally.”  Id. at 22.
In turn, the FSA mandates that, “[t]o the extent consistent with the public interest,
each [local] compensation plan shall be based upon prevailing wage rates and compensation
practices” in the locality of the employment.  22 U.S.C. § 3968(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
Consistent with that authority, various sections of the local compensation plans call attention
to this framework.  For example, in the 2025 LCP, the section dealing with leave policies
provides that Foreign Affairs agencies adopt locally prevailing leave benefits for locally
employed (LE) staff in lieu of those benefits modeled on the United States Annual and Sick
Leave Act of 1951 (Pub. L. No. 82-233, § 205, 65 Stat. 679, 681(1951)).  Respondent’s
Exhibit 8 at 14 (adopting Annual and Sick Leave Act of 1951 leave benefits).  Another
section of the 2025 LCP establishes a mandatory retirement age of sixty-five for LE staff,
including personal services contractors.  Id. at 41.  This provision states, “It is the policy of
the U.S. Government that employment conditions for LE Staff be consistent with local law

CBCA 8472, 8473 10
and prevailing practices to the extent feasible and in support of efficient operations of the
Mission.”  Id.
B. Local Employee Staff Handbook, Monrovia, Liberia
“Each post must develop and maintain an LE Staff Handbook that documents the
Mission’s LE Staff employment policies and procedures, as well as LE staff responsibilities
and expected conduct.”  3 FAM 7155(a).  The record in this case includes LE Staff
Handbook versions from 2013 and 2022.  Respondent’s Exhibits 5, 31.  The handbooks were
neither attached to, nor referenced in, appellant’s contracts.8  Nonetheless, they contained
information material to appellant’s contract performance.  In particular, the handbooks
published the Mission’s work schedule—a term alluded to, but not detailed in, appellant’s
contracts.  The handbooks also contained information relevant to overtime work, such as the
requirement to obtain approval in advance, to keep overtime to a minimum, and to ensure
that any overtime worked is deemed mission-essential.  Respondent’s Exhibits 5 at 20,
31 at 25.  Overtime pay rates were also included in the 2022 Handbook and were
cross-referenced to and consistent with the rates published in the local compensation plan. 
Respondent’s Exhibit 5 at 20-21.  The 2013 Handbook states that “overtime pay on a week
day is time and one-half per hour computed on basic pay.”  Respondent’s Exhibit 31 at 26.
The 2013 Handbook outlines policies, procedures, benefits, and working conditions
applicable to LE staff and serves as a guide to employee rights and obligations.  It also states
that “Embassy personnel programs conform as closely as possible to the labor laws of the
Republic of Liberia.”  Respondent’s Exhibit 31 at 7.  The 2022 Handbook similarly states
that its purpose is to familiarize LE staff with employment conditions, policies, and
expectations.  Respondent’s Exhibit 5 at 3.  The 2022 Handbook provides a more nuanced
explanation of the relationship between United States and local law.  For example, one
section of the Handbook states that “[w]hile U.S. Mission LE Staff programs respect the laws
and regulations of Liberia, they are based on, and administered in accordance with U.S. laws
and regulations (3 FAM 7224.2-1).”9  Id.  In another section, the 2022 Handbook clarified
that “[i]t is the policy of the [United States Government (USG)] to establish local
employment programs and policies that respect local laws, regulations, customs, and
practices, as long as they do not violate U.S. laws and regulations.”  Id. at 8.
8 The Mission’s human resources office provided handbooks to new employees. 
9 The referenced provision of the FAM is titled “Government Laws and
Regulations of the Receiving State.”

CBCA 8472, 8473 11
The 2022 Handbook also notes that the Department of State works directly with
personnel and management teams at each mission to review LE staff benefits, such as
“severance pay, health insurance, etc., to ensure compliance with local labor law and/or
prevailing practice.”  Respondent’s Exhibit 5 at 19 (emphasis added).  “Benefits not included
in the definition of total compensation are reviewed as needed, such as when a change in
local labor law prompts a review, when a contract expires, or if the mission becomes aware
of a change in local practices.”  Id.
IV. Agency’s 2017 Request to Update Local Compensation Plan and LE Staff Handbook
In October 2016, the Department of State’s Office of Inspector General (OIG)
inspected the United States Embassy in Monrovia.  The OIG’s May 2017 inspection report
included a recommendation that the Embassy, in coordination with the Bureau of Human
Resources for Overseas Employment (HR/OE), update its handbook and local compensation
plan to reflect the Government of Liberia’s labor law.  In the report, the OIG stated that LE
staff members informed OIG that the 2013 Handbook and local compensation plan did not
comply with Liberian labor law.  Appellant’s Exhibit 24 at 18.  The report further explained:
In June 2015, the Government of Liberia issued the “Decent Work Act 2015,”
which required employer compliance as of March 1, 2016.  Guidance in
3 FAM 7224.2-1(a), requires Foreign Service national personnel programs to
conform as closely as feasible to local law and customs but be based on, and
administered in accordance with, U.S. laws and regulations.  Management
stated that the handbook needed to be updated but other priorities during the
Ebola crisis contributed to the delay in reviewing and implementing the
changes.  Without accurate policies and procedures, LE staff may not receive
the benefits to which they are entitled.
Id.
Embassy Monrovia acknowledged the recommendation and responded as follows: 
“Embassy Monrovia accepts the recommendation and submitted a request to amend the LCP
to HR/OE on March 13, 2017.  The request included documentation outlining changes in the
Local Labor Law and the Embassy’s proposal to comply.  The request was vetted through
all agencies prior to submission to HR/OE.”  Appellant’s Exhibit 24 at 38.  The Embassy’s
proposal was not included in the record.  No other updates regarding the processing of this
request were included in the record.

CBCA 8472, 8473 12
V. Local Employees’ Request for a DWA-Compliant Work Schedule and Back Pay
On August 14, 2023, six years after the Embassy submitted the above-mentioned
request to HR/OE, local staff members and Embassy management held the regular monthly
meeting during which local staff members raised concerns about an inconsistency between
their work schedule and the DWA.  Staff representatives, which included appellant, noted
that, under the DWA, employees working forty hours per week were entitled to paid meal
breaks.  Furthermore, the meal breaks were to be included in the forty-hour workweek.10 
Neither of those things was happening at that time, despite the March 2017 request.  “While
LE Staff work[ed] 40 hours per week, these hours [we]re not inclusive of the additional three
hours used per week for lunch.”  Appellant’s Exhibit 22 at 3.  “In line with the DWA, this
means that staff are working 43 hours per week (an excess of 3 hours).”  Id. at 1.
To remedy the inconsistency, local staff members proposed two options: 
(1) compensate local staff for the extra three hours; or (2) modify the work schedule to bring
it in line with the DWA.  Appellant’s Exhibit 22 at 3.  The Embassy pursued the second
option.  It introduced a new work schedule that reduced the daily work schedule by thirty
minutes each day, Mondays through Thursdays, and by one hour on Fridays.  Under the new
schedule, which took effect on November 1, 2024, appellant was at work from 8:00 a.m. to
5:00 p.m. Mondays through Thursdays and from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on Fridays. 
Appellant’s Exhibit 21.  Although the memorandum introducing the new schedule to Mission
employees made no mention of paid meal breaks, the contracting officer’s final decision
acknowledged that “prior to November 1, 2024 the LCP and Locally Employed Staff
Handbook at the Embassy did not provide for a paid lunch hour.”  Respondent’s Exhibit 16
at 2 (emphasis added).
According to the agency, the new schedule ensured compliance with the DWA going
forward, but it did not address back pay.  In a memorandum to the Mission Director, dated
February 3, 2025, local staff sought retroactive compensation for meal breaks and overtime
work:
Prior to the adjustment by Embassy Monrovia on November 1, 2024, LE staff
employed to work 40 hours were working 43 hours per week (Monday to
Thursday from 8 am to 5:30 pm and Friday, from 8:00 am to 1:00 pm).  By
implication, staff of this category were working three hours per week in
10 At that time, in August 2023, the Monrovia Mission’s work schedule still
provided for an unpaid meal break.  No action had been taken on the request to update the
local compensation plan to bring it into compliance with the DWA.

CBCA 8472, 8473 13
overtime.  In addition, Embassy Monrovia did not pay LE staff members for
meal breaks, which, per the law’s requirement, is one hour a day – amounting
to four hours per week.  As a result, staff members were not paid for the
following:  1) four hours per week in meal break[s] from Monday to Thursday,
and 2) three hours per week in overtime.
Appellant’s Exhibit 26 at 1.
VI. Appellant’s Claims for Meal Breaks and Overtime
On June 9, 2025, appellant submitted a claim to the contracting officer seeking
payment for 1652 hours of unpaid meal breaks in the amount of $40,753.95.  The claim
spanned both of appellant’s contracts.  In his claim, appellant stated:  “Between 2018 and
October 2024, I was never compensated for . . . meal break[s], resulting in 1,652 unpaid
hours, valued at $40,753.95.”  Notice of Appeal (CBCA 8743) at 4.
In addition to the claim for unpaid meal breaks, appellant submitted a separate claim
to the contracting officer for 1985 hours of unpaid overtime in the amount of $73,714.52. 
The overtime claim covered the same period of time as the meal break claim, March 19,
2018, through October 31, 2024:
From the beginning of my employment, my scheduled work hours were 8:00
a.m. to 5:30 p.m., Monday through Thursday, with a 1-hour unpaid lunch
break.  This resulted in 9.5 total hours at work per day, but only 8.5 hours
counted as paid work.  Under Section 17.5(a)(ii) of the Decent Work Act of
2015, all work performed in excess of the ordinary 8-hour workday is
considered overtime and must be compensated at a rate not less than 50%
above the normal rate, unless a written agreement for compensatory time
exists.  I was not offered, nor did I sign any such compensatory agreement
during my time of service.
Respondent’s Exhibit 12 at 1-2.
VII. The Contracting Officer’s Final Decision and Appellant’s Appeals to the Board
On June 16, 2025, the contracting officer issued a single final decision (COFD)
denying appellant’s claims.  In the decision, the contracting officer determined that there was
no provision in the contracts that granted appellant a paid lunch hour “and prior to
November 1, 2024 the LCP and [LE] Staff Handbook at the Embassy did not provide for a

CBCA 8472, 8473 14
paid lunch hour.”  Respondent’s Exhibit 16 at 2.  Accordingly, the contracting officer denied
appellant’s claim for past meal breaks.  Id.
The contracting officer also denied appellant’s claim for overtime.  “As calculated in
accordance with the existing LCP and [LE] Staff Handbook, your regular work hours
amounted to 40 hours each week.”  Respondent’s Exhibit 16 at 2 (emphasis added).  The
contracting officer further stated that clause five of the contract provided for overtime only
“if approved in advance in writing,” but noted that no evidence of pre-approval was included
with appellant’s claim.  Id.
Ten days after the contracting officer denied the claims, appellant filed separate
appeals at the Board.  Initially, appellant elected to proceed with the appeals under Board
Rule 52 (48 CFR 6101.52 (2025)), the Board’s small claims procedure.  Because the
overtime appeal partly depended on the outcome of the meal break claim and exceeded the
monetary threshold for small claims, the parties agreed to consolidate the appeals and
continue processing them on the Board’s regular track.
Discussion
This matter is before the Board on the written record pursuant to Board Rule 19 (the
rule governing appeal submissions on the record without a hearing).  The parties filed initial
briefs and reply briefs, urging the Board to grant relief in their favor.  In its brief, the agency
challenges the Board’s jurisdiction to decide these appeals, describing them as “extra-
contractual claims arising solely from foreign labor laws.”  Respondent’s Brief at 2.  The
agency also disputes appellant’s entitlement to paid meal breaks under the terms of the
contracts and cites a lack of evidence demonstrating that appellant sought and received
approval to work overtime.
Appellant, on the other hand, maintains that he is legally entitled to back pay for meal
breaks due to changes in local labor laws with which the Embassy was required to comply. 
Appellant also contends that the agency institutionalized overtime by mandating a forty-
three-hour workweek.  Appellant explained, “These excess hours were neither voluntary nor
incidental, but management directed.”  Appellant’s Brief at 1.  Before considering the merits
of the appeals, we briefly address the agency’s jurisdictional concerns.
I. The Board Possesses Jurisdiction to Resolve Appellant’s Claims
The agency characterizes appellant’s claims as “extra-contractual” and “arising solely
from foreign labor laws.”  The phrase “extra-contractual” refers to obligations, conduct, or
claims that arise outside the formal terms of a written contract.  See Williamson Farm v.

CBCA 8472, 8473 15
Diversified Crop Insurance Services, 917 F.3d 247, 253 (4th Cir. 2019) (Damages are outside
the contract when they “fail[] to draw [their] essence from the contract.” (quoting Patten v.
Signator Insurance Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir. 2006))).  But whether a claim
is “at its essence” contractual depends on both the source of the rights asserted and the relief
sought.  See Widakuswara v. Lake, 779 F. Supp. 3d 10, 29 (D.D.C. 2025) (quoting Crowley
Government Services, Inc. v. General Services Administration, 38 F.4th 1099, 1106
(D.C. Cir. 2022)).  Courts likewise distinguish between claims founded on contract and those
arising solely from statute or the Constitution.  Id. at 30 n.19; see Transohio Savings Bank
v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Here, appellant’s claims for unpaid meal breaks and overtime work arise under his
contracts with the agency.  Those contracts incorporate local compensation plans designed
to ensure that locally employed staff are compensated in accordance with local labor laws
and practices.  The agency does not dispute the validity of appellant’s contracts, and nothing
in the record suggests that the services procured thereunder were exempt from applicable
labor laws.  Moreover, governing United States authorities, including the FSA and FAM,
require compliance with local labor laws when compensating locally employed staff such as
appellant.  See Miller v. Clinton, 687 F.3d 1332, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the authority, purpose, and function of local compensation plans and
the mandate to comply with local labor law in matters involving foreign national employees).
The Board derives its jurisdiction to decide contract disputes from the CDA.  Optum
Public Sector Solutions, Inc., CBCA 7920, 23-1 BCA ¶ 38,464, at 186,950.  Appellant
submitted his claims pursuant to the Disputes clause of the contracts, which states, in relevant
part, that “[t]his contract is subject to [the CDA]” and that “all disputes arising under or
relating to this contract shall be resolved under this clause.”  FAR 52.233-1(a), (b).  Just like
courts have decided that mere reference to a contract does not render a claim contractually
based, see Spectrum Leasing Corp. v. United States, 764 F.2d 891, 893 (D.C. Cir.1985), the
fact that foreign labor laws play a role in resolving these disputes does not classify them as
extra-contractual or defeat the Board’s CDA jurisdiction.
Accordingly, we deny respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
II. Merits of the Claims
A. Agency Compliance with the DWA
A central issue in these appeals is whether the United States is bound by host-country
labor laws when it employs local foreign nationals under personal services contracts.  In
Liberia, the employer-employee relationship is governed by the DWA.  This Act “applies to

CBCA 8472, 8473 16
all work performed within the jurisdiction of the Republic [of Liberia].”  DWA § 1.5(a)
(emphasis added).  Although the statute contains certain exemptions, none apply to
employees like appellant—a Liberian citizen, employed by the United States Government
under a personal services contract.
United States compliance with the DWA does not mean that Liberian law directly
binds the United States.   Rather, United States compliance is self-imposed.  By incorporating
host-country labor practices into its own statutory and contractual frameworks, the United
States binds itself.  Under the FSA, the Secretary of State must establish compensation plans
for foreign national employees that are “based upon prevailing wage rates and compensation
practices . . . in the locality of employment.”  22 U.S.C. § 3968(a)(1).  The FAM, in turn,
provides that personal services contractors fall within the category of foreign national
employees compensated in accordance with local compensation plans.  3 FAM 7261.5(a). 
Under these circumstances, host-country labor laws do not act as external constraints on the
agency’s compensation obligations to its LE staff.  Instead, the agency relies on those laws
to define its own compensation obligations—even as they continue to evolve.
Appellant’s contracts reinforce this structure.  They expressly incorporate the
applicable local compensation plan and provide that changes to the plan during performance 
require corresponding adjustments to contract’s compensation and benefits.  The FAM
similarly establishes procedures for revising local compensation plans, including updates
prompted by host-country laws or decrees.  See 3 FAM 7523.  Together, the statute (FSA),
regulations, and the contracts’ terms create a dynamic system of compensation in which
employee entitlements track prevailing local practices.
Here, the agency failed timely to update the local compensation plan and Mission
schedule to reflect changes in Liberian law.  As a result, appellant was denied compensation
benefits mandated by the DWA—the very risk identified in the 2017 Inspector General’s
report.  The question, therefore, is whether the agency’s reliance on an outdated local
compensation plan can override a statutory mandate that had already taken effect.  We find
that it may not.
Courts have long recognized that, absent a clear statutory directive stating otherwise,
legislative mandates take effect according to their terms and are not contingent on agency
implementation.  See, e.g., Adkins v. Vilsack, 252 F. Supp. 3d 588, 600 (N.D. Tex. 2017),
aff’d, 899 F.3d 395 (5th Cir. 2018).  Allowing an agency to delay compliance until internal
policies are updated would permit indefinite postponement of statutory obligations and
undermine the supremacy of duly enacted law.  That principle applies with equal force here. 
Because the governing statutory and regulatory framework ties compensation to prevailing
local practice, changes in that practice give rise to corresponding compensation entitlements

CBCA 8472, 8473 17
when they take effect, not when administratively implemented.  This conclusion is reinforced
by decisions of the United States Government Accountability Office recognizing that, where
compensation is governed by an established plan or external standard, the Government’s
obligation attaches when the benefit is earned, not when it is administratively implemented.
See, e.g., State Department Severance Plan, B-199722 (Comp. Gen. Sept. 15, 1981).  Thus,
once local law required the compensation at issue, appellant’s entitlement accrued as the
work was performed, and the agency’s delay in updating the local compensation plan could
not extinguish or defer that obligation.
This conclusion is also consistent with decisions of boards of contract appeals
recognizing that external legal changes may affect contractual obligations during
performance.  See, e.g., Constructora St. Malo, S.A., ENG BCA PCC-35, 82-2 BCA
¶ 15,868, at 78,715 (in the absence of a contract clause shifting the risk of unexpected costs
to the Government, the fixed-price contractor was liable to cover the wage increases
mandated by changes in Panamanian labor laws during performance); Sahasin Enterprise,
ASBCA 20672, 76-2 BCA ¶ 11,940, at 57,237 (same with regard to fixed-price contract
affected by changes to Thai labor laws); see also ITT Arctic Services, Inc. v. United States,
524 F.2d 680, 693 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (A wage escalation clause designed to shift liability for
increased wages from the contractor to the agency cannot be expanded to insulate the
contractor from cost increases resulting from Canadian currency fluctuations.).  While these
cases allocate risk in different contexts, they reflect the broader principle that changes in
governing law during performance can affect a party’s contractual obligations.
Liberia enacted the DWA on June 26, 2015, and established March 1, 2016, as the
mandatory compliance date.  Nothing in the statute conditions its effectiveness on further
regulatory action, and no exemption applies in these circumstances.  United States law
permits deviations from local compensation practices only where compliance is infeasible
or not in the public interest.  See 22 U.S.C. § 3968; 3 FAM 7224.2-1(a).  The agency has
made no such showing.  To the contrary, its subsequent efforts to revise the local
compensation plan and the LE staff handbook confirm both the feasibility of compliance and
its alignment with the public interest.
In these circumstances, the agency’s reliance on an outdated compensation plan
cannot defeat appellant’s entitlement to compensation, consistent with prevailing local
practice.  In light of the clear language of the FSA, the implementing regulations, and the
contracts’ terms, we conclude that the agency was required to compensate appellant in
accordance with the DWA in March 2018, when appellant began performing under his first
contract.  In failing to do so, we find that the agency erroneously withheld compensation that
had already accrued.

CBCA 8472, 8473 18
B. Applying the DWA to Appellant’s Claim for Unpaid Meal Breaks
Regarding meal breaks, the DWA provides that “[a]n employer shall give an employee
who works continuously for more than five hours a meal interval of at least one continuous
hour, for which time the employee shall be paid.”  DWA § 17.7(a).  This requirement is
straightforward, yet appellant’s contracts made no reference to meal breaks.  Instead, the
contracts stated only that the workweek “shall not be less than 40 hours, unless otherwise
provided in the Schedule” and “shall coincide with the workweek” of Mission employees.
The referenced schedule, published in the LE Staff Handbooks, provided for unpaid
meal breaks (at least until the schedule changed in November 2024), while the contract
simultaneously required forty-hour workweeks.  This  arrangement did not comply with the
DWA’s mandate that qualifying meal breaks be paid.
Beginning with his first contract in 2018, appellant worked schedules that met the
DWA’s threshold for paid meal breaks.  Despite this, appellant did not begin receiving the
required compensation until November 1, 2024.  In light of the DWA’s requirements,
appellant’s work schedule, and our prior determination that the agency’s delayed compliance
does not excuse liability, we conclude that appellant was entitled to paid meal breaks on all
qualifying workdays (Mondays through Thursdays).  Accordingly, the only remaining
limitation on recovery is the timing of appellant’s claim submission to the contracting officer. 
To determine the period for which costs are recoverable, we must first identify and apply the
relevant statute of limitations.
C. The Applicable Statute of Limitations, Claim Accrual, and Timeliness
Respondent urges the Board to apply the DWA’s three-year statute of limitations to
this matter rather than the CDA’s six-year statute of limitations period.  See DWA § 9.2(c);
41 U.S.C § 7103(a)(4)(A).  Respondent contends that, if the Board finds liability under the
DWA, the DWA’s statute of limitations should control.  We disagree.
Appellant submitted his claim under the Disputes clause of a personal services
contract governed by the CDA—the same statute that provides the Board’s jurisdiction to
resolve this case.  Although the FSA requires the agency to incorporate the payment
standards of the DWA, it does not require incorporation of the DWA’s statute of limitations,
which is a matter of federal procurement law.  See The Heirs of Bahawouddin, Son of Neyaz
Mohammad v. Department of State, CBCA 7135, 22-1 BCA ¶ 38,212, at 185,565 (citing Sam
Gray Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 596, 601 (1999), aff’d, 250 F.3d 755
(Fed. Cir. 2000) and Inversa, S.A. v. Department of State, CBCA 440, 08-2 BCA ¶ 33,924,

CBCA 8472, 8473 19
at 167,891 (discussing the “desirability of maintaining uniform rules of public contract
law”)). 
Under the CDA, a contractor must present a claim to the contracting officer within six
years of its accrual.  41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(A); see ThinkGlobal Inc. v. Department of
Commerce, CBCA 4410, 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,489, at 177,793, modified on other grounds,
17-1 BCA ¶ 36,642.  “Whether and when a claim has accrued is determined according to the
[FAR], the language of the contract, and the facts of the particular case.”  Electric Boat Corp.
v. Secretary of the Navy, 958 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2020).  The FAR defines accrual
as “the date when all events, that fix the alleged liability of either the Government or the
contractor and permit assertion of the claim, were known or should have been known.” 
FAR 33.201; see Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. Murphy, 823 F.3d 622, 626
(Fed. Cir. 2016).  Claim accrual is notice dependent:  “once a party is on notice that it has a
potential claim[,] the limitations period begins to run.”  United Liquid Gas Company DBA
United Pacific Energy, v. General Services Administration, CBCA 5846, 18-1 BCA
¶ 37,172, at 180,941 (quoting Cardinal Maintenance Service, Inc. ASBCA 56885, 11-1 BCA
¶ 36,616, at 170,610 (2010)).
Appellant argues that his claim began to accrue on November 1, 2024, when the
agency came into compliance with the DWA.  The record does not support that position. 
LE staff members informed the OIG in October 2016 that the Embassy’s local compensation
plan and handbook did not comply with local labor law.  Appellant began working at the
Mission in March 2018.  The available evidence indicates that appellant knew of his potential
claim no later than August 2023, when the local employee staff association—of which
appellant was a member—raised the issue with Embassy management.  Neither party has
presented evidence that appellant knew or should have known of his potential claim prior to
this date, and, accordingly, we conclude that his June 6, 2025, claim was timely.
We further determine that appellant’s claim is subject to the continuing claim doctrine,
which applies when a claim is “inherently susceptible to being broken down into a series of
independent or distinct events or wrongs, each having its own associated damages.” 
JBG/Federal Center, L.L.C v. General Services Administration, CBCA 5506, et al.,
18-1 BCA ¶ 37,019, at 180,277 (citing Brown Park Estates-Fairfield Development Co. v.
United States, 127 F.3d 1449, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).  Here, each unpaid meal break
constitutes a distinct, actionable wrong.  Thus, even if portions of the claim accrued earlier,
the continuing claim doctrine preserves recovery for violations falling within the applicable
limitations period.
The CDA’s six-year presentment requirement also defines the outer boundary of
recoverable damages.  Any damages falling outside that six-year window are time-barred. 

CBCA 8472, 8473 20
Brown Park Estates, 127 F.3d at 1458 (citing Mitchell v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 63,
modified on other grounds on reh’g, 10 Cl. Ct. 787 (1986)).  Because appellant submitted
his meal break claim on June 6, 2025, damages incurred prior to June 6, 2019, are not
recoverable.  Appellant argues that the limitations period was equitably tolled on the grounds
that, throughout performance, the agency represented to LE staff that the schedule was lawful
and contractually compliant.  Appellant contends that only later, when the agency issued a
DWA-compliant schedule, did he know he had a potential claim.  These grounds do not
support equitable tolling:
A litigant seeking equitable tolling must prove “‘(1) that he has been pursuing
his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his
way’ and prevented timely filing.”  Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649
(2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).
Extraordinary circumstances were further defined by the Court to mean beyond
a litigant’s control.  Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States,
[577 U.S. 250, 256] (2016); see also Marty Indian School Board, Inc. v.
Department of the Interior, CBCA 2446-ISDA, 11-2 BCA ¶ 34,834, at
171,377-78 (Extraordinary circumstances may include where litigant has been
victim of fraud or duress).
Pegasus Enterprises, LP v. General Services Administration, CBCA 5420, et al., 19-1 BCA
¶ 37,459, at 182,002.
The agency’s representation that the schedule was lawful and contractually compliant
was not an extraordinary circumstance.  Such representation did not prevent the LE staff
association from raising this issue with management in August 2023.  Therefore, appellant
has not established a basis to toll the statute of limitations during any earlier period. 
Accordingly, to calculate entitlement to compensation for past meal breaks, we conclude that
the eligible claim period runs from June 6, 2019, through October 31, 2024.
 
D. Appellant’s Claim for Overtime Compensation
Appellant’s claim for overtime relies on many of the same underlying facts as the
meal break claim, such that the terms of both contracts, the local compensation plans, the
DWA, the periods of performance, and the work schedules are all relevant here.  Consistent
with the Embassy’s published work schedules prior to November 2024, appellant was present
for work during the following hours under both contracts:  Mondays through Thursdays, from
8:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., and Fridays, from 8:00 a.m., to 1 p.m.  Pursuant to the DWA, this was
considered a variable schedule because it permitted a shortened Friday by imposing longer
days Mondays through Thursdays.  See DWA § 17.2.

CBCA 8472, 8473 21
The DWA provides that “all work in excess of ordinary hours . . . shall be paid at a
rate not less than fifty percent above the normal rate for that work.”  DWA § 17.5(a)(ii)
(emphasis added).  The DWA also defines “ordinary hours” as follows:  “Ordinary hours of
work shall be eight hours in any one day or forty-eight hours in any one week.” 
DWA § 17.1(a).  Respondent acknowledges that appellant’s work schedule exceeded eight
hours a day on Mondays through Thursdays but argues that “[s]ince Fridays served as ‘half
days,’ [the] DWA permits exceeding the 8 hour limit on other days of the week without
triggering overtime compensation.”  Respondent’s Additional Briefing on Timeliness and
Quantum Methodology at 3 n.2.
The agency’s interpretation is unreasonable.  The DWA states that “ordinary hours
of work” shall be “eight hours in any one day” or “forty-eight hours in any one week.” 
DWA §17.1(a).  That language imposes both daily and weekly thresholds for overtime pay. 
In other words, if an employee works in excess of eight hours in a day, that employee is
entitled to overtime pay for that day’s work that exceeds eight hours.  Alternatively, if an
employee’s ordinary hours of work total forty-eight in any one week, he is entitled to
overtime pay for the number of weekly hours in excess of forty-eight.  To interpret this
language as the agency suggests would fail to give meaning to, and ignore, the portion of the
statute defining ordinary hours of work to mean eight hours in any one day.
As to how to calculate overtime, the DWA states that “all work in excess of ordinary
hours . . . shall be paid at a rate not less than fifty percent above the normal rate for that
work.”  DWA § 17.5(a)(ii).  The DWA, however, distinguishes “work” from a “meal
interval.”  For example, it states that “[a]n employer shall give an employee who works
continuously for more than five hours a meal interval of at least one continuous hour, for
which time the employee shall be paid.”  DWA § 17.7(a) (emphasis added).  It follows that,
while a meal break “shall be paid,” a meal break is not “work” and, thus, need not be paid
at overtime rates.
Appellant’s schedule provided that, on Mondays through Thursdays, he was at work
from 8:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. and, during that time, he took a forty-five-minute meal break. 
Thus, for each of those nine-and-a-half-hour-long days, he worked a total of eight hours and
forty-five minutes, and he took forty-five-minute meal interval.  Under the DWA, he should
have been paid for eight hours of “ordinary” time, another forty-five minutes for a paid meal
break at straight time, and forty-five minutes of overtime.  Combining this with five hours
of ordinary time on Fridays, each week he should have been paid for forty hours of straight
time (eight- and-three-quarter hours for four days and five hours for one day) and three hours
of overtime.

CBCA 8472, 8473 22
The agency also argues that overtime compensation is barred because appellant failed
to comply with contractual procedures requiring prior written authorization from the
contracting officer to work overtime.  There is no evidence in the record that appellant sought
or received such authorization.  Furthermore, the contracts established limitations on the
payment of overtime, such as monetary caps based on annual compensation.  Appellant’s
claim appears to exceed these limitations.  The local compensation plans similarly
emphasized that overtime must be mission-essential and kept to a minimum.
The agency’s arguments, however, are without merit.  The agency established and
enforced the work schedule that, it now implicitly concedes, required him to work overtime. 
In effect, the agency is arguing that appellant should have requested authorization to work
the schedule that his employer directed him to work.  Courts have recognized that the
Government may be liable where supervisory personnel knowingly create conditions that
require overtime work.  Fox v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 593, 598-99 (E.D. Va. 1976);
Hannon v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 142, 149 (1993).  In such circumstances, authorization
need not necessarily be expressed, and courts may “treat as issued those orders that ought to
have been issued.”  Fox, 416 F. Supp. at 598.  We do so here.  See Doe v. United States, 372
F.3d 1347 (2004) (holding that even without formal written pre-approval, if management
induces employees to work overtime through workload expectations or scheduling practices,
the overtime may be compensable).
Here, the officially-approved work schedule effectively institutionalized overtime by
requiring more than eight hours of work per day.  Overtime was not incidental but a regular
foreseeable component of the schedule.  Under these circumstances, the absence of formal
pre-approval does not defeat appellant’s claim.  The FAM provides:  “If local law provides
for overtime pay after 40 hours per week, [the Mission] must not approve such [a] . . .
schedule to the extent it will incur overtime costs every pay period for regularly scheduled
work.”  3 FAM 7555.1(d).  But that is exactly what happened in this case.  When a
contracting officer knowingly requires services beyond the contract’s stated limits, fails to
adhere to the requirement that approval be obtained in writing for the additional work, and
then accepts the benefit of that performance, the agency is bound to compensate the
contractor for the additional work.  See Miller Elevator Co. v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 662,
688-89 (1994) (government conduct requiring additional performance constitutes an implied
modification of the contract’s terms).
For these reasons, we find that appellant is entitled to overtime compensation for work
performed in excess of forty hours per week, from June 6, 2019, through October 31, 2024. 

CBCA 8472, 8473 23
III. Appellant’s Damages
Appellant seeks $40,753.95 in uncompensated meal breaks and $73,714.52 in
overtime pay.  Since these amounts were based on an entitlement period distinct from the
Board’s findings here, the parties agreed to work together to calculate damages for any
period to which the Board found entitlement.  The parties further acknowledged the
challenge of precisely computing damages.  In addition to potential deductions for sick days,
annual leave, and twenty United States and local holidays, the unique working arrangements
during the COVID pandemic must be accounted for in calculating damages.
Although access to time and attendance records and pay records was affected by the
agency’s recent restructuring, the agency confirmed that those records remain available and
can be retrieved by the agency from the relevant pay center within the United States.
Decision
The appeals are GRANTED IN PART AS TO ENTITLEMENT.  By separate
order, the Board will schedule further proceedings to address quantum.
   Kathleen J. O’Rourke     
KATHLEEN J. O’ROURKE
Board Judge
We concur:
   Beverly M. Russell                Elizabeth W. Newsom     
BEVERLY M. RUSSELL ELIZABETH W. NEWSOM
Board Judge Board Judge