GRANTED IN PART:  February 19, 2008 
CBCA 105 
HEDLUND CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Appellant, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, 
Respondent. 
Jon E. Cushman and Nate J. Cushman of Cushman Law Offices, P.S., Olympia, WA, 
counsel for Appellant. 
Mary E. Sajna, Office of the General Counsel, Department of Agriculture, Portland, 
OR, counsel for Respondent. 
Before Board Judges GOODMAN , McCANN, and DRUMMOND. 
McCANN, Board Judge. 
Appellant, Hedlund Construction, Inc. (Hedlund), seeks  an equitable adjustment to 
the contract price for increased costs of performance caused by changes to the contract made 
by the United States Forest Service.  We grant the appeal in part.  

 
  
 
  
    
 
 
 
 
 
  
     
        
 
 
 
 
2 CBCA 105 
Background 
On October 29, 2002, Hedlund was awarded the Helitower Thin Timber Sale, 
contract number 000225.  In this contract the Forest Service agreed to sell timber located in 
the Gifford Pinchot National Forest to Hedlund, and Hedlund agreed to purchase, cut, and 
remove the timber.  Hedlund performed the contract satisfactorily.  Nevertheless, on May 13, 
2005, Hedlund submitted a claim to the contracting officer for increased costs of 
performance in the amount of $466,825.58.  The contracting officer denied this claim in  its 
entirety, and Hedlund appealed to the Department of Agriculture Board of Contract Appeals. 
That board has been incorporated into the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals and the case 
has been transferred to us, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 847, 119 Stat. 3136, 3391.95 (2006). 
Hedlund’s claim was broken down in the following manner: 
1. Increase in Performance Bond $765.60 
2. Changes in Scaling Requirements $86,010.20 
3. Felling of Hazard Trees  $16,599.00 
4. Inability to Remove Felled Operation Trees  $94,455.00 
5. Delay of Operations 
6. Additional Logging Costs 
Total 
Interest @ 8% 
Total Claim 
$214,189.57 
 $20,226.54 
 $432,245.91 
 $34,579.67 
$466,825.58 
Appeal File, Exhibit IV at 11. 
The following provisions of the timber sale prospectus and contract are relevant to 
these claims: 
Prospectus 
7.  Performance Bond.  A performance bond is required.  The penal sum of 
the bond will be 10 percent of the total bid value of the sale, rounded up to the 
nearest $100 when the total bid value is $10,000 or less; and rounded up to the 
nearest $1,000 when the total bid value exceeds $10,000 or $31,000.00 
whichever is greater. If an irrevocable letter of credit is used to secure the 
performance bond, the termination of the letter of credit must be at least 
6 months past the contract termination date.  

    
 
  
  
 
3 CBCA 105 
Appeal File, Exhibit VI  at 291. 
Contract 
A4 - Dead Trees Required to be Felled, Applicable to B2.12, B2.3 and 
B6.4 
Size Requirements:  Not Applicable  feet high and Not Applicable  inches 
d.b.h. 
Number Limitations Applicable only if Sale Area map indicates there are 
subdivisions where timber is to be designated after date of sale advertisement. 
In addition to dead trees felled within Clearcutting Units, construction 
clearings, and other authorized development clearings, no more than Not 
Applicable dead trees must be felled within subdivisions, or those portions 
thereof, where timber is designated after date of sale advertisement.  Number 
limitation does not apply to subdivisions, or portions thereof, designated at 
time of sale advertisement. 
Appeal File, Exhibit VI. 
A14 - Scaling Instructions and Specifications , applicable to B6.8 
Name and Date of Governing Instructions:  FSH-2409.11a. National Forest 
Cubic Log Scaling Handbook, as amended and supplemented.  Purchaser 
agrees to provide conditions suitable for remote check scaling by the Forest 
Service.  Check scaling will be performed at individual scaling locations. 
Scaling Specifications 
Species Product 
Maximum 
Scaling 
Length 
(feet) 
Trim Allowances 
Diameter 
Range 
(inches 
Length 
Range 
(feet) 
Trim 
Allowances 
(inches) 
All Sawtimber 40 5-99 8-20 12 
Id. at 354. 

     
 
 
      
 
4 CBCA 105 
A22 - Performance Bond Amount , Applicable to B9.1 
$37,000 
Id. at 355. 
C-315 - SALE OPERATIONS SCHEDULE (06/1994) 
SCHEDULE PURSUANT TO C6.315# - SALE OPERATION SCHEDULE (06/1994) 
Subdivisions Operating Conditions Purpose 
20 Felling and yarding must 
occur between August 1 
and March 31 
Protect retention/residual 
trees from damage during 
high sap flow. 
21, 31, 32, 33 Felling and yarding must 
occur between July 1 and 
February 28 
Protect retention/residual 
trees from damage during 
high sap flow. 
20, 21, 31, 32, 
33 & road reconstruction 
All operations must occur 
between July 1 and 
March 31 
To prevent disturbance to 
nesting spotted owls and 
direct impact to dispersing 
juveniles due to noise 
Id. at 419. 
On January 31, 2003, the Forest Service changed the operating conditions in the 
schedule for sections 20, 21, 31, 32, and 33 from “All operations must occur between July 1 
and March 31” to “All operations must occur between July 1 and February 28 & 29.”  The 
reason for this change was to prevent disturbance to the nesting spotted owl.  Joint 
Stipulations of Fact 10, 17.  
By amendment 2 to the contract, the contracting officer changed the log scaling 
requirements in clause A14 - Scaling Instructions and Specifications from 40 feet to 20 feet 
and the trim allowance from 12 inches to 6 inches. Appeal File, Exhibits VI at 354, XIV at 
1150. 

   
 
  
  
 
   
   
 
  
  
     
    
  
  
5 CBCA 105 
Discussion 
Performance Bond Interest (Claim 2006-108-1) 
This claim is for the increase in interest that Hedlund had to pay because the 
performance bond amount required by the contract ($37,000) exceeded the amount ($31,000) 
set forth in the timber sale prospectus. 
Hedlund has alleged that it properly based its bid on the timber sale prospectus, which 
indicated that the performance bond would be $31,000. When it came time to execute the 
contract, Hedlund was required to place a performance bond in the amount of $37,000. 
Hedlund claims that it is entitled to interest on the additional $6000 that it was required to 
post.  Hedlund  claims interest at 5.25 % during the twenty-nine months of performance for 
a total of $765.60.  
The Forest Service denied Hedlund’s claim in the final decision, but admitted at the 
very conclusion of the hearing that Hedlund was entitled to recover interest on the $6000 
increase in the bond amount. Transcript at 528.  In its post-hearing brief the Forest Service 
1affirms its admission to entitlement, but alleges that Hedlund has not proven any damages, 
and offers no calculation of how much interest it feels that Hedlund is entitled to receive. 
The only issue to be decided is the extent of Hedlund’s recovery of interest.  Hedlund 
has claimed a total of $765.60 on this claim based upon 5.25% interest on the additional 
$6000 for twenty-nine months.  Without any alternative calculation offered by the Forest 
Service, the Board finds that Hedlund’s claimed amount of $765.60 is reasonable and that 
Hedlund is so entitled.
2 
1 According to the Forest Service, “At the hearing the Government conceded 
that some interest might be due as a reliance damage because the contract bond amount did 
in fact differ from that required by the handbook.” Appellant’s Post-Hearing Brief at 7.  At 
the hearing the contracting officer, Mr. Fred Dorn, stated, “We do feel that he is entitled to 
that interest.”  Transcript at 528. 
2 Even though the Forest Service has admitted that Hedlund is entitled on this 
claim, it makes additional arguments inconsistent with this admission.  In its brief the Forest 
Service contends that Hedlund agreed to the $37,000 performance bond prior to entering 
into the contract.  Thus, the Forest Service seems to be arguing that Hedlund is not entitled 

    
              
      
       
 
 
 
  
  
     
 
 
    
 
 
    
  
6 CBCA 105 
Scaling (Claim 2006-109-1) 
In this claim, Hedlund asserts that it was charged by the Forest Service for more log 
volume than it removed from the site.  Hedlund claims that the Forest Service’s change from 
forty feet to twenty feet scaling caused this increase in log volume charged to Hedlund. 
There is no dispute between the parties that a change from forty feet to twenty feet would 
increase the amount of log volume charged to Hedlund.  The Forest Service contends, 
however, that the forty-foot specification was an obvious error and that Hedlund should have 
known that the specification really meant for the scaling to be accomplished with twenty-foot 
scaling, not with forty-foot scaling.  
Hedlund claims that the change from forty feet to twenty feet scaling caused it to be 
billed an estimated twenty percent more in total volume, and that it is entitled to be 
reimbursed $86,010.20 for this overcharge.   The Forest Service has submitted no calculation 
regarding the extent of Hedlund’s entitlement under this claim, should entitlement be found 
for Hedlund. 
Contract clause A14 - Scaling Instructions and Specifications clearly called for the 
maximum scaling length to be forty feet and the trim allowance to be twelve inches. 
Amendment 2 to the contract changed this requirement  to a maximum scaling length of 
twenty feet and a trim allowance of six inches.  The Forest Service argues that Hedlund 
should have known that the specification, as issued, was erroneous. 
There is nothing unclear about contract clause A14.  By agreeing to this clause, the 
Forest Service agreed to scale logs using a maximum length of forty feet and a trim 
allowance of twelve inches.  If the Forest Service did not so intend, then, obviously, the 
Forest Service should not have put these requirements in the contract specification. 
Contractors are not contractually obligated to peruse the entirety of specifications written and 
promulgated by the Forest Service and then question the Forest Service regarding whether 
to recovery because of Hedlund’s alleged agreement to the $37,000 performance bond.  This 
argument lacks merit as Hedlund never agreed to drop its claim for interest. Further, the 
Forest Service argues that appellant had a duty to discover that the $31,000 performance 
bond amount found in the prospectus was incorrect, and had a duty to make inquiry to the 
Forest Service about it prior to contract signing.  The Forest Service fails to establish any 
basis for this proposition. 

 
    
     
    
       
     
    
 
 
 
 
    
    
 
  
    
  
 
7 CBCA 105 
or not the agency really meant to say what it said in the specification. The Forest Service’s 
arguments to the contrary lack merit. 
It is plain that Hedlund paid for more timber than it removed from the site.  Hedlund 
sold the timber it purchased from the Forest Service to lumber mills.  Hedlund contends that 
it was paid by the mills for a quantity of timber that was less than the quantity for which 
Hedlund was billed by the Forest Service.  The mills paid Hedlund for 4807.63 MBF
3 of 
timber.  Appeal File, Exhibit XVII at 1272.  The Forest Service, however, billed Hedlund for 
the quantity 10,917.47 CCF.  Id ., Exhibit VI at 812.  The Forest Service introduced no 
evidence regarding the method or accuracy of its CCF (one thousand board feet) calculation. 
The contract provides conversion factors for converting CCF to MBF.  Appeal File, 
Exhibit VI at 294.  To convert Douglas fir from CCF to MBF the conversion factor is .5471. 
To convert hemlock from CCF to MBF the conversion factor is .5297. The Forest Service 
charged Hedlund for removing 9635 CCF of Douglas fir and 1282 CCF of hemlock and other 
wood.
4   Appeal File, Exhibit VI at 812.  The calculation to convert the timber charged to 
Hedlund from CCF to MBF is as follows: 
9635 CCF  x .5471 = 5271 MBF 
1282 CCF  x .5297 = 679 MBF 
5950 MBF - Total 
Accordingly, if the Forest Service’s calculation of CCF was correct Hedlund should 
have received payment for 5950 MBF from the mills. However, Hedlund received payment 
for only 4808 MBF.  Appeal File, Exhibit XVII at 1272.  The difference (5950 - 4808) is 
1142 MBF.  This equates to an overcharge of 19.19% (1142 / 5950 = 19.19%) to Hedlund. 
The total cost of the sale was $430,051.36.   A 19.19% overcharge equates to $82,526.85. 
3 CCF (one hundred cubic feet) and MBF (one thousand board feet) are two 
different log scaling methods used to determine the log volume.  The Forest Service uses the 
CCF method.  Lumber mills use MBF. The Forest Service has not disputed that Hedlund 
was paid by the mills for 4807.63 MBF of timber.  
Other wood has been included with hemlock. The amount of other wood is 
considered to be de minimis. 
4 

     
 
 
 
   
   
   
 
    
     
 
  
  
8 CBCA 105 
The Forest Service has offered little, if anything, as a defense to Hedlund’s 
overpayment claim.  It stated in its brief: 
Because the Appellant fails to prove entitlement, the 
Government does not address Appellant’s damage calculation, 
other than to point out that Appellant has not proven its 
damages.  More importantly, the Government expert explained 
that there is no mathematical “constant” for conversion from 
CCF to MBF or MBF to CCF the way there is, for example, 
between meters and yards. 
Respondent’s Brief at 13. 
Apparently, it is the Forest Service’s position that CCF cannot be converted to MBF 
and vice versa.  However, the contract contains conversion factors to convert from CCF to 
MBF.  Appeal File, Exhibit VI at 294.  We find no merit to the Forest Service’s position 
here.  
The Forest Service has offered no evidence that its calculation of the volume of wood 
charged to Hedlund was correct, and it offers no explanation for why the mills paid  Hedlund 
for such a small volume of wood.  Accordingly, we find that Hedlund is entitled to payment 
in the amount of $82,526.85 on this claim. 
Felling of Hazard Trees (Claim 2006-111-1) 
Hedlund claims that it is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost ($16,599) of cutting 
5533 dead trees in the timber sale area. Hedlund points to contract clause A4 - Dead Trees 
Required to be Felled as support for its position. 
Hedlund claims that this clause indicates that there are no dead trees to be felled in the 
timber sale area.  Accordingly, it claims since there were dead trees that needed to be cut, this 
clause puts the responsibility for the cost of that cutting on the Forest Service.  The Forest 
Service disagrees. 
Neither party has explained to the Board’s satisfaction the meaning and purpose of this 
clause. Be that as it may, the Board is unable to find in this clause any statement or 
representation by the Forest Service that there are no dead trees to be cut in the sale area. 
Appellant’s claim for $16,599 is denied.  

       
    
      
       
  
  
  
    
       
   
     
     
 
          
  
    
9 CBCA 105 
Preventing Removal Of Old Growth Hazard Trees (Claim 2006-112-1) 
Hedlund claims that it was prevented from removing and selling nine old growth 
hazard trees that would have sold for $94,455.10.   Hedlund claims that the Forest Service 
designated these trees for removal and sale, but then, after Hedlund had directionally felled 
the trees to facilitate removal, prevented Hedlund from removing them. The Forest Service 
alleges that these trees were never designated for removal and that therefore Hedlund is not 
entitled to recovery. 
The nine trees in issue were old growth trees that were 80 to 100 feet above the canopy. 
These trees were a hazard to helicopter logging and had to be cut.  The Forest Service’s sale 
administrator, Mr. George Shaefer, admitted in testimony that he had the authority to 
designate the trees for cutting and removal and for designating them as “included timber” 
under the contract.  Transcript at 442.  Mr. Shaefer marked the trees with blue paint.  Appeal 
File, Exhibit VI at 800. This was the same color scheme that was used for designating other 
trees as included timber.  Transcript at 428, 436.  Trees to be cut and left on the ground were 
designated with orange paint.  Id. at 437.  When Mr. Shaefer marked the trees, it was his 
intent that the trees be cut and removed.  Id . at 439.  Mr. Shaefer then issued a written report, 
which was signed by Mr. Hedlund, President of Hedlund Construction, Inc., and Mr. Shaefer, 
authorizing the removal of the trees.  Appeal File, Exhibit VI at 800.  Mr. Hedlund notified 
Mr. Shaefer that he intended to remove the trees and took the time and effort to directionally 
fell the trees to facilitate removal.  Transcript at 424, 448-49. 
The Forest Service alleges that Hedlund was never given permission to cut and remove 
the nine old growth trees. It takes the position that Mr. Shaefer did not have the authority to 
grant such permission even though he testified that he had such authority and the Forest 
Service has introduced no evidence to the contrary.  The Forest Service then states that even 
if Mr. Shaefer had such authority, he did not grant such permission.  The Forest Service 
makes this statement notwithstanding the fact that the record clearly shows by written 
documentation that such permission was given. Timber Sale Inspection Report dated 
December 23, 2002, states as follows: 
B2.39  Marked 9 trees with blue paint batch J021.  Tree removal 
is necessary to clear flight path into landing. All trees are 80-100 
feet above ordinary canopy. 

  
 
   
  
       
  
     
 
 
   
 
    
 
  
 
 
10 CBCA 105 
Appeal File, Exhibit VI at 800.  This document was signed by Mr. Shaefer and Mr. Hedlund. 
Nevertheless, the Forest Service inexplicably alleges that at no time did Hedlund have the 
right to remove the trees. 
The Forest Service’s position here lacks merit and is not supported by any evidence in 
the record. It is beyond dispute that the Forest Service agreed to allow Hedlund to remove 
the trees, and that Hedlund also agreed to remove the trees and took action in accordance 
therewith by directionally felling the trees to facilitate removal.  This agreement was part of 
the contract.  Accordingly, when the Forest Service subsequently refused to allow Hedlund 
to remove the trees it breached the contract. Therefore, Hedlund is entitled to damages.  The 
damages that Hedlund is entitled to are the price that it would have received for the trees less 
its costs.  
Pacific Western Timbers did an estimate of the timber in the nine old growth trees and 
calculated that they contained a net of 62,970 (board feet (62.97 MBF).  Supplement to the 
Appeal File at 1571-74.  It also estimated that it would pay $1500 per MBF.  Accordingly, 
Pacific Western Timbers estimated that it would pay Hedlund $94,455 for the nine old growth 
trees (62.97 MBF x $1500 = $94,455). Id.  Hedlund estimated that it would have paid the 
Forest Service about $5500 for these logs. Thus, Hedlund is entitled to recovery of $88,955 
($94,455 - $5500 = $88,955).
5 
Delay Claim (Claim 2006-113-1) 
Hedlund’s claim here ($201,290.83) is for damages caused by the Forest Service’s 
alleged reduction in the operating schedule for all operations from March 31, 2003, to the end 
of February 2003.  The Forest Service alleges that there was no reduction in the operating 
schedule.  
 Clause C6.315 - Sale Operation Schedule provides that timber removal shall be 
accomplished within defined time periods.  As can be seen from a perusal of this clause, the 
5It seems likely that Hedlund would have incurred costs for felling, removing, and 
transporting trees, in addition to the $5500 it would have paid to the Forest Service.  The 
Board does not know the extent of these costs and the Forest Service made no effort to 
ascertain them through cross-examination or otherwise.  The Board is loath to speculate as 
to the existence or extent of these costs, and, since the Forest Service made no attempt to 
ascertain or quantify them, concludes that they are not significant. 

  
  
 
 
  
     
 
   
 
      
   
    
     
 
 
  
 
   
   
          
 
 
11 CBCA 105 
time frames vary from August 1 to March 31, July 1 to February 28, and July 1 to March 31, 
depending on the subdivision.  
On January 31, 2003, the Forest Service reduced the operating schedule for sections 
20, 21, 31, 32, and 33, requiring operations to end by the end of February instead of the end 
of March.  It did this to prevent disturbance to the  nesting spotted owl. Hedlund contends that 
it relied on the March 31 end date in planning its operations.  It alleges that had it been able 
to work until March 31, 2003, it would have completed all operations by that date.  The Forest 
Service does not agree that Hedlund could have completed the work by the end of March.  In 
any event, it asserts that clause C6.315 prevents Hedlund from operating during the month of 
March due to sap flow restrictions.  Thus, it contends that the change regarding the spotted 
owl is irrelevant.  
The Forest Service’s argument here lacks merit because both Hedlund and the Forest 
Service knew that operating restrictions due to sap flow are routinely waived by the Forest 
Service. In fact, the contracting officer testified that had a request for a waiver of the sap flow 
operating restriction been submitted by Hedlund, it would have been granted.  Transcript at 
351.  Accordingly, it is clear that the sap flow restriction in this case is illusory. 
The Forest Service, nevertheless, argues that the contract required Hedlund to submit 
a written request for a waiver of the sap flow restriction and that Hedlund is being inconsistent 
in its argument because it did not submit such a written request.  Respondent’s Brief at 30-31. 
This argument by the Forest Service borders on disingenuity.  Obviously, since the Forest 
Service was preventing operations from proceeding after the month of February due to the 
spotted owl restriction, there was no purpose in Hedlund requesting a waiver of the sap flow 
restriction which also prevented it from operating after the month of February.  
The Forest Service also argues that the operation end date of March 31 was an obvious 
error for the simple reason that there was a conflict between the sap flow restriction date of 
February 28 and the spotted owl restriction date of March 31.  This argument is completely 
meritless.  As Mr. Hedlund testified, he was well aware that the sap flow restriction date was 
routinely waived by the Forest Service, and he had no reason to believe that it would not be 
waived in this instance. Transcript at 133-34. Under this correct interpretation no conflict 
exists with the end dates specified in the contract. 
In addition, if the owl restriction date was so obviously wrong, the question arises as 
to just why it took the Forest Service the better part of two months to correct the “obvious 
error.” The error was discovered in early December 2002.  Transcript at 256, 310.  The 

  
 
  
 
 
 
   
  
    
    
 
   
 
         
       
        
 
    
  
      
12 CBCA 105 
contract was not amended, however, until January 31, 2003.  Joint Stipulation of Fact 17. 
Apparently then, this discrepancy was not so obvious.  Furthermore, it was important that this 
change be made quickly, as a quick change may have mitigated the damages suffered by 
Hedlund. 
In its argument the Forest Service completely contradicts itself.  It argues that Hedlund 
was informed in December that the owl stop work date was February 28 or 29, but then it 
argues that it was attempting to find a way to stay with the March 31 date.  The Forest Service 
cannot have it both ways.  Obviously, it did not inform Hedlund in December that the cut-off 
date was February 28 or 29 because in December and January it was still trying to get 
clearance to stay with the March 31 date. In addition, since the Forest Service spent a 
considerable amount of time trying to stay with the March 31 date, this date could not have 
been “obviously” wrong. 
The change in the spotted owl restriction depriving Hedlund of its ability to complete 
the removal of timber from the site during the month of March was a change to the contract 
entitling Hedlund to an adjustment in the contract price. 
Delay Damages 
The first issue that must be resolved pertains to whether Hedlund would have 
completed the work by the end of March 2003. The Forest Service makes a number of 
arguments that relate to the operating plan submitted by Hedlund indicating that Hedlund was 
not intending to complete the work by the end of March 2003.  Actually, appellant’s operating 
plan showed that it would be working far longer than that. The problem with the Forest 
Service argument here is that Hedlund was in no way bound to its plan.  It could change the 
plan at any time by simply submitting another one.  
There is no dispute that Hedlund had entered into a contract with the Columbia 
Helicopter company in December 2002 to remove timber from the site.  Appeal File, 
Exhibit VIII at 932-37. Furthermore, there is no dispute that Hedlund was going to attempt 
to finish removing the timber by the end of March.  There is ample evidence supporting 
Hedlund’s position that it could have completed the work by the end of March 2003.  It 
completed 29% of the removal working for just nineteen days at the beginning of the year. 
Transcript at 142. Had Hedlund been able to work through the end of March it would have 
had forty-two more days to operate.  Id. The weather during March was exceptional.  Id. at 
143.   Furthermore, there is no reason to think that Hedlund could not have hired more men 
or employed more and bigger helicopters and done whatever was necessary to complete the 

  
 
   
      
     
 
   
 
 
  
  
 
 
     
  
 
  
 
    
13 CBCA 105 
work by the end of March. It clearly had the flexibility to do what was required.  On the other 
hand, the Forest Service has not shown that it would have been impossible for Hedlund to 
complete the work. 
6 The contract did not mandate that the contractor could not deviate from 
the operating plan.  Accordingly, we find that Hedlund could have completed the timber 
removal had it been able to work during the month of March. 
The Forest Service has argued that Hedlund was not injured by being prevented from 
performing in March 2003 because Hedlund was paid more by the mills after the first quarter. 
The Forest Service argues that this increase more than offset the increase in price for timber 
that Hedlund was required to pay to the Forest Service after the first quarter.  The Forest 
Service has introduced no calculations to support this proposition.  Hedlund, on the other 
hand, has introduced evidence and calculations indicating that the price it was paid by the 
mills after the first quarter did not make up for the increased rates charged by the Forest 
Service.  The Board rejects the Forest Service’s argument and proceeds to calculate the 
damages due Hedlund. 
In order to calculate damages we must compare the amount of money that Hedlund 
paid the Forest Service for the timber that it removed from the site over the course of the 
contract with the amount that it would have received had it been allowed to remove all the 
timber by the end of March 2003.  We must also consider the price and amount paid to 
Hedlund for timber by the mills during these differing time periods. 
Following this blueprint we proceed to the calculation of damages. Over the life of the 
contract Hedlund paid the Forest Service $430,051.36 for the wood that it removed from the 
site.  Appeal File, Exhibit VI at 811.  However, if Hedlund had been able to remove all of the 
wood from the site in the first quarter of 2003, it would have paid only $278,815.52.
7 The 
6 The Forest Service admits that it was possible that Hedlund could have 
completed the logging on lot 33 in March.  Transcript at 346.  This lot was 34% of the total 
sales volume.  Appeal File, Exhibit VI at 161.  Appellant did not inquire and the Forest 
Service offered no opinion about its view of the possibility of Hedlund completing the 
removal of logs on other lots in March. 
Total Douglas fir shipped was 9634.63 MBF (Appeal File, Exhibit VI at 812) 
x $28.14 (first quarter rate) (Id. at 814) = $271,118.48. Total hemlock shipped was 1282.84 
MBF (Id. at 812) x $6 (first quarter rate) (Id. at 903) = $7697.04.  $271,118.48 + 7697.04 
= $278,815.52. The total hemlock shipped (1282.84 MBF) includes de minimis amounts 
7 

     
   
    
     
       
 
 
 
  
    
 
 
    
  
 
  
14 CBCA 105 
difference is $151,235.84. ( $430,051.36 - $278,815.52 = $151,235.84)  In addition, Hedlund 
paid a 5% timber tax on this additional $151,235.84 which equals $7,561.79.   Thus, the total 
overpayment equals $158,797.63 ($151,235.84 + $7561.79 = $158,797.63).  
After the first quarter of 2003 Hedlund received a higher price from the mills of $9.90 
per MBF than it did in February of 2003. 8 However, had Hedlund been allowed to sell in 
March of 2003 it would have received $15 per MBF more than it did in February 2003. 
Appeal File, Exhibit XVI at 1234-35; Transcript at 161-66.  Thus, Hedlund actually received 
$5.10 per MBF less after the first quarter than it would have received had it been allowed to 
sell to the mills in March 2003.  Multiplying 3410.85 (the number of MBF delivered to the 
mills after the first quarter)
9  by $5.10 =  $17.395.33.   The loss to Hedlund is therefore 
$158,797.63 + $17,395.33 = $176,192.96.  The Board finds that Hedlund is entitled to this 
amount as damages. 10 
of other kinds of lumber, which are included in the hemlock calculation for sake of 
simplicity. 
8 In its brief appellant explains how it derived the average increase in price for 
wood paid by the mills after the first quarter of 2003.  The Board accepts this derivation as 
being reasonably accurate and reliable. 
9 The 3410.85 MBF number is arrived at by subtracting the number of MBF 
delivered to the mills in the first quarter (1396.78) from the total MBF (4807.63) delivered. 
(4807.63 - 1396.78 = 3410.85.)  Appeal File, Exhibit XVII at 1272. 
10 In Hedlund’s loss of premium claim Hedlund claims an additional $45,960.90 
because it could have received a bonus of $15 per MBF if it had been able to sell logs to the 
mills in March 2003 instead of February 2003.  The price in March 2003 was $15 more per 
MBF than it was in February.  This claim by Hedlund lacks merit because the proper time 
period in which to compare the March price is the actual selling time after the first quarter, 
not the February price.  The actual selling price after the first quarter was $5.10/MBF less 
than the March 2003 selling price.  This $5.10/MBF loss has been accounted for in the 
previous calculation. 

  
 
  
 
    
 
  
    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
   
    
   
        
15 CBCA 105 
Extra Road Maintenance (Claim 2006-114-1) 
Hedlund claims that it is entitled to $12,898.74 in additional road maintenance. 11  Its 
itemization of this amount is contained in the Appeal File, Exhibit XXI at 1474.  This road 
maintenance was caused by Hedlund being prevented from completing the work during the 
first quarter of 2003.  Additional road maintenance was required due to the passage of time 
and erosion of the roads due to weather. The Forest Service disputes this cost and offers no 
calculation of its own.  The Board finds that Hedlund’s method of calculating its extra cost 
was reasonable.  However, there are some errors in the calculation.  Appellant erroneously 
included $1605.83 for water diverters that had to be installed after March 2003 as required 
by the contract.  Also a road expense of $2026.64 incurred in March 2003 was erroneously 
added to Hedlund’s figure. The correct measure of damages then is $9266.27 ($12,898.74 ­
2026.64 - 1605.83 = $9266.27).  We find that Hedlund is entitled to recover $9266.27 on this 
claim.  
Additional  Logging Costs (Claim 2006-110-1) 
A portion of the work under the prime contract between Hedlund and the Forest 
Service required the use of helicopters to transport cut logs. Hedlund owned no helicopters 
and had no alternative but to subcontract this portion of the work.  On December 16, 2002, 
Hedlund entered into a subcontract with Columbia Helicopter for this purpose.  Appeal File, 
Exhibit VI at 932-37.  The subcontract required Columbia Helicopter to perform its work 
during the performance period of the prime contract, when Hedlund was required to perform 
its work.  Id. 
The Forest Service prevented Hedlund from performing the contract work during 
March 2003 as allowed by the prime contract.  As the result of this government-caused delay, 
Hedlund and Columbia were forced to perform in a later time frame than originally 
anticipated.  During this later time period, Columbia’s fuel price increased, causing its cost 
to perform the subcontract work to increase. Columbia would not have incurred this cost but 
for the government-caused delay.  Columbia requested, and Hedlund agreed to, a contract 
modification increasing the logging price by $3 per ton for work performed in the later 
performance period, reflecting the increased price of fuel to perform this work.  Hedlund paid 
11 This claim is part of Hedlund’s overall delay claim of $214,189.57.  Delay 
claim  2006-113-1 is for $201,290.83 and extra road maintenance claim   2006-14-1 is for 
$12,898.74. ($ 201,290.83 + $12,898.74 = $214,189.57.)
 

     
   
  
      
 
   
   
      
  
      
      
   
 
 
      
16 CBCA 105 
Columbia an additional $20,226.54 pursuant to this modification and seeks to recover this 
amount from the Forest Service. We have found (claim 2006-113-1) that Hedlund is entitled 
to recover its increased costs from the Forest Service caused by this delay. 
The Forest Service does not contest that Columbia Helicopter incurred these additional 
costs due to the fact that it was forced to perform after the first quarter of 2003 instead of in 
March 2003. Further, it does not contest the accuracy of the amount, the existence of a 
contract modification, or that payment was made by Hedlund. Its sole argument is based upon 
the contention that Hedlund was not contractually obligated to make such a payment to 
Columbia Helicopter because the subcontract price for Columbia’s services did not change 
regardless of when Columbia performed.  Accordingly, it argues that Hedlund was not liable 
to Columbia and that the Forest Service is not liable to Hedlund. The Forest Service’s 
argument lacks merit for several reasons. 
Had Hedlund owned helicopters and been able to perform the work without 
subcontracting to Columbia, the Forest Service would clearly have been liable to Hedlund for 
the increased fuel costs as an element of an equitable adjustment under the prime contract, as 
the increased costs were the result of government-caused delay.  Yet, the Forest Service 
contends that it is shielded from liability for this government-caused delay because Hedlund 
subcontracted this portion of the work to a subcontractor, and pursuant to the subcontract 
Hedlund was not obligated to pay Columbia for the increased costs. 
The fact that Hedlund had subcontracted a portion of the work does not shield the 
Forest Service from liability for a subcontractor’s claim  for government-caused delay unless 
the prime contractor is not liable to the subcontractor.  While not citing Severin v. United 
States , 99 Ct. Cl. 435 (1943), the Forest Service appears to be relying upon the holding in this 
case, commonly referred to as the Severin doctrine. This doctrine relieves the Government 
from responsibility for a subcontractor’s claim unless the prime contractor is also responsible 
to pay the subcontractor. 
This Board, in Acquest Government Holdings, OPP, LLC v. General Services 
Administration, CBCA 413, 08-1 BCA ¶ 33,720  (2007), has noted that the Severin doctrine 
has been narrowly construed. 
In its present state, the doctrine applies only where there is an 
iron-clad release or contract provision immunizing the prime 
contractor completely from any liability to the subcontractor. 
J.L. Simmons Co. v. United States , 304 F.2d 886 (Ct. Cl. 1962); 

 
   
 
     
 
  
  
    
  
   
 
  
  
 
17 CBCA 105 
Cross Construction Co. v. United States , 225 Ct. Cl. 616 (1980); 
George Hyman Construction Co. v. United States , 30 Fed. Cl. 
170 (1993), aff’d , 39 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (table).  Also, 
the burden is on the Government to establish the existence of an 
iron-clad release sufficient to trigger application of the Severin 
doctrine.  Metric Constructors, Inc. v. United States , 314 F.3d 
578 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
Id. at 166,969. “If the contract is silent as to the prime’s ultimate liability to the sub, suit by 
the former will generally be permitted.”  Cross Construction Co. v. United States , 225 Ct. Cl. 
616, 618 (1980) (citing Blount Bros. Construction Co. v. United States , 346 F.2d 962, 964-65 
(Ct. Cl. 1965)). 
In the instant case, the Government has not met its burden of shielding itself from 
increased costs incurred by Hedlund’s subcontractor as the result of government-caused delay, 
as there is no language in the subcontract that exculpates Hedlund nor any post-contract 
release that absolves Hedlund of liability for government-caused delay.  In the prime contract 
Hedlund had the right to choose the time of performance that was most advantageous to it 
within set limits. Hedlund was deprived of that right and received damages from the Forest 
Service. Implied in the subcontract was an agreement that Hedlund would choose the most 
advantageous time for Hedlund and Columbia to perform.  Columbia had a right to rely on 
Hedlund’s right to choose the most advantageous time for performance.  That right was taken 
away from Hedlund by the Government and thus Hedlund took that same right away from 
Columbia.  Hedlund is liable to Columbia for the loss of that right. Accordingly, Hedlund 
may bring a suit against the Forest Service for Columbia’s increased costs due to the delay 
caused by the Forest Service.  We find the Forest Service liable to Hedlund for these costs in 
the amount of $20,226.54. 
In summary, we find that Hedlund is entitled to recover the following damages from 
the Forest Service: 
Performance Bond Interest (Claim 2006-108-1)      $765.60 
Scaling (Claim 2006-109-1) $82,526.85 
Additional  Logging Costs (Claim 2006-110-1) $20,226.54 

____________________________ 
_____________________________ _____________________________ 
 
CBCA 105 18 
Felling of Hazard Trees (Claim 2006-111-1) 0 
Preventing Removal of Old Growth Hazard Trees 
(Claim 2006-112-1) 
$88,955.00 
Delay Claim (Claim 2006-113-1) $176,192.96 
Extra Road Maintenance (Claim 2006-114-1) $9226.27 
Total $377,979.24 
DECISION 
Appellant’s claims are  GRANTED IN PART  as set forth above in the amount of 
$377,979.24 . 
R. ANTHONY McCANN 
Board Judge 
We concur: 
ALLAN H. GOODMAN JEROME M. DRUMMOND 
Board Judge Board Judge