DENIED: October 4, 2021
CBCA 6265, 6273, 6274, 6275, 6276, 6277, 6278,
6280, 6281, 6282, 6283, 6288, 6342, 6343, 6344
CARMAZZI GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Appellant,
v.
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Respondent.
Timothy J. Turner, Jonathan D. Perrone, Joseph Whitcomb, and David Tscheschke
of Whitcomb, Selinsky, P.C., Denver, CO, counsel for Appellant.
Dorothy M. Guy, Brandon Dell’Aglio, Tal Kedem, and Alice M. Somers, Office of
the General Counsel, Social Security Administration, Baltimore, MD, counsel for
Respondent.
Before Board Judges BEARDSLEY (Chair), LESTER, and VERGILIO.
VERGILIO, Board Judge.
These fifteen cases involve contracts and task orders between Carmazzi Global
Solutions, Inc. (contractor) and the respondent, the Social Security Administration (agency),
that the agency terminated for cause.  The contractor challenges the terminations.  In a
different set of three parallel, representative cases, the Board granted an agency motion for
summary judgment and denied those appeals, concluding that the record demonstrated that
the agency justified each termination for cause and the contractor failed to provide potential
facts to support its contention that its failures to perform were excused under the contracts. 
Carmazzi Global Solutions, Inc. v. Social Security Administration, CBCA 6264, et al., 20-1


CBCA 6265, 6273, 6274, 6275, 6276, 6277, 6278,
6280, 6281, 6282, 6283, 6288, 6342, 6343, 6344
2
BCA ¶ 37,670.  The agency moves for summary judgment in these cases.  In opposing the
motion, the contractor acknowledges that it failed to perform but maintains that summary
judgment is inappropriate.
The background enumerates material facts not in dispute, with the contractor
acknowledging its failures to perform.  The contractor has not presented credible support for
its assertion that its failures to perform were excusable under each contract.  Mere allegations
are insufficient.  Although the contractor misrepresents actions and occurrences during these
appeals at the Board, that constitutes but an aside to its failure to meet its burden of proof at
this stage.  Further discovery is not warranted for the contractor to identify information that
it must possess to support its basic theories of relief; the contractor has not marshaled the
facts and law to avoid summary judgment.  The Board grants the motion by the agency,
denies these appeals, and upholds the terminations for cause.
Background
The agency awarded multiple commercial item contracts and issued task orders
thereunder to the contractor to provide court reporters at disability appeal hearings before
administrative law judges.  At issue here are fifteen contracts and related task orders for
various cities or areas.  After a transition period under each contract, the contractor was
obligated to provide 100% coverage for hearings and provide assurances ahead of each
hearing that a reporter would be present.  The contractor failed to provide reporters under
each of the fifteen contracts, before, during, and after the agency had identified actual
deficiencies and issued notices to cure and to show cause.  The agency found the contractor
in default of each contract and task order.  The contractor does not dispute these basic facts. 
The contracts contained a Termination for Cause clause, 48 CFR 52.212-4(m) (2018),
that permitted the agency to terminate each contract or task order if the contractor was in
default:
(m) Termination for cause.  The Government may terminate this
contract, or any part hereof, for cause in the event of any default by the
Contractor, or if the Contractor fails to comply with any contract terms and
conditions, or fails to provide the Government, upon request, with adequate
assurances of future performance.  In the event of termination for cause, the
Government shall not be liable to the Contractor for any amount for supplies
or services not accepted, and the Contractor shall be liable to the Government
for any and all rights and remedies provided by law.  If it is determined that
the Government improperly terminated this contract for default, such
termination shall be deemed a termination for convenience.

CBCA 6265, 6273, 6274, 6275, 6276, 6277, 6278,
6280, 6281, 6282, 6283, 6288, 6342, 6343, 6344
3
The contracts’ definition of “excusable delays” provided an exception to such a termination: 
“The Contractor shall be liable for default unless nonperformance is caused by an occurrence
beyond the reasonable control of the Contractor and without its fault or negligence . . . .”  48
CFR 52.212-4(f).  The agency justified each termination for cause.  The contractor, however,
maintains that under each contract its failure to perform should be deemed excused.
After the transition period, the contractor did not affirm coverage or provide 100%
coverage under these contracts and task orders, before or after receiving notices of
deficiencies, cure notices, and notices to show cause.  In its responses to the cure notices, the
contractor proposed numerous actions, including holding a joint meeting between executives
of each contracting party to identify problems; identifying and agreeing upon which of the
various contracts would be subject to 100% compliance; holding a series of meetings and
conference calls to address progress, status, any new/old issues, and milestones; requiring
the agency to provide advance payment with negotiated repayment terms; allowing the
contractor six months to reach 100% compliance (with interim goals of 80% compliance in
four months and 90% compliance in five months); requiring the agency to pay invoices
within fifteen days of submission and establishing a formal invoice certification policy;
requiring the agency to provide security and suitability clearances within four weeks of
receipt of submissions; and committing to weekly status reporting and calls.  The contractor
did not identify excusable delays.  Instead, the contractor sought to place extra-contractual
demands upon the agency but did not commit to providing the coverage as required under
the contracts.  Asking for extra-contractual concessions by the agency was not in keeping
with the terms and conditions of the contracts.  The agency found performance unacceptable
and assurances inadequate; the agency terminated for cause each of these contracts because
of contractor default.  The undisputed facts in the record support the agency’s conclusions
and determinations.
The contractor has not identified facts to support its legal theory that its failure to
perform any or all of the contracts was excusable.  In the discussion, the opinion addresses
some of the excuses and contractor characterizations and often mischaracterizations of the
agency’s positions and the underlying facts.  Nothing raised by the contractor provides a
basis to find an excusable delay; that is, a probative basis to alter the terminations is lacking.
Discussion
The Board applies the standards for summary judgment, as are undisputed and spelled
out in Board Rule 8(f)  (48 CFR 6101.8(f) (2020)).  Meridian Global Consulting, LLC v.
Department of Homeland Security, CBCA 6906, 21-1 BCA ¶ 37,875 (a party opposing a
motion cannot avoid summary judgment by relying on mere allegations without evidence and
must set forth specific evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact);

CBCA 6265, 6273, 6274, 6275, 6276, 6277, 6278,
6280, 6281, 6282, 6283, 6288, 6342, 6343, 6344
4
Microtechnologies LLC v. Department of Justice, CBCA 6772, 21-1 BCA ¶ 37,830
(“Appellant fails in its burden of proof, as it rests on allegations that do not offer specific
facts evidencing entitlement to recover the costs at issue or showing genuine issues of fact.”);
Carmazzi; see GAF Corp. v. United States, 932 F.2d 947, 949 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (a claimant
must “produce specific evidence” for the claim elements when opposing summary
judgment).
The contractor states in opposing the agency’s motion, while failing to acknowledge
that disputes involving three contracts have been resolved in favor of the agency and are not
here at issue,
It is undisputed that [the contractor] was not able to cover 100% of the hearing
dockets under the 18 contracts.  Rather the heart of this dispute is whether the
Agency, through a litany of failures stemming from miscommunications, lack
of communication, bureaucratic delay, and even outright hostility to [the
contractor], prevented [the contractor] from meeting its obligations under the
18 contracts.
Contractor’s Response at 2.
The contractor identifies and discusses what it deems to be eight genuine issues of
material fact that preclude the granting of the agency’s motion for summary judgment.  The
fault with this analysis by the contractor is that it fails to appreciate that, having
acknowledged that it failed to perform under these contracts and task orders, the burden
shifts to the contractor to demonstrate that its failure was excused under the contracts. 
Asheville Jet Charter & Management, Inc. v. Department of the Interior, CBCA 4079, 16-1
BCA ¶ 36,373 (“If the Government establishes a prima facie case that termination of the
contract was proper, it is then the burden of the contractor to establish that its failure to
perform is excused.” (citing MLJ Brookside, LLC v. General Services Administration, CBCA
3041, 15-1 BCA ¶ 35,935)).  As noted in the earlier Carmazzi opinion denying the claims
and upholding the terminations, “[T]he contractor has not identified any disputed fact, or
provided proposed facts and associated legal theories, with record support, that could excuse
its non-performances.  The record, viewed for purposes of resolving the motion for summary
judgment, establishes no excusable delay.”
The agency has met its burden of proof
The contractor’s failure to meet requirements under each contract and task order
justified the terminations for cause.  The burden shifts to the contractor to demonstrate that
excusable delays relieve it of liability under each contract.

CBCA 6265, 6273, 6274, 6275, 6276, 6277, 6278,
6280, 6281, 6282, 6283, 6288, 6342, 6343, 6344
5
The contractor has not met its burden to avoid summary judgment
In particular, in its motion, the agency focuses upon the shortfalls of the contractor in
these proceedings, which the contractor has not corrected.  “[W]hile [the contractor] has had
ample opportunity to argue that different questions of law or substantively different facts
apply in these appeals [compared to the already denied three appeals], at no time has it done
so and, in fact, its positions have taken the opposite stance.”  Agency’s Motion for Summary
Judgment at 8.  The contractor has not met its burden to come forward with a legal theory
and plausible evidence to excuse its performance under each contract.  While the contractor
contends that the agency made different demands of the contractor for the various contracts
and task orders, the contracts do not dictate that the agency act consistently with its
requirements for payment.  The contractor has failed to identify an agency action or inaction
that violates a term or condition of a contract or task order.  The contractor’s other bases for
defeating summary judgment are not material but are briefly discussed.
The contractor has not identified facts for each contract that would permit the Board
to conclude that its failure to perform was excused under each or any of the contracts.  The
contractor always was represented by counsel in these cases, and the three earlier-denied
appeals, specifically during depositions and other discovery.  The contractor had the
opportunity to pursue its broad theories factually and legally.  In response to the motion for
summary judgment, the contractor states, “Even the one-sided and underdeveloped record
presented to the Board in the [motion] reveals no fewer than eight substantial and triable
factual disputes which must be resolved.”  This opinion addresses each of these items.
First, the contractor asserts that agency personnel at the local hearing offices held the
contractor to different invoicing standards, thereby causing significant delays in payment
through no fault of the contractor.  Assuming the statement is true that personnel at different
offices had different invoicing standards, the argument fails because the contracts did not
require every office to employ the same standard.  The contractor has not suggested with
record support that any agency action was contrary to the terms and conditions of the
contract.
Second, the contractor maintains that current and former holders of blanket purchase
agreements (BPAs) to perform court reporting services for the agency exerted significant
market pressure on the contractor to demand compensation higher than the rates at which the
contractor was to be paid under these fifteen and the other three contracts.  Again, the
contractor chose its pricing and has not identified a basis to avoid the termination of each
contract.

CBCA 6265, 6273, 6274, 6275, 6276, 6277, 6278,
6280, 6281, 6282, 6283, 6288, 6342, 6343, 6344
6
Third, the contractor contends that the BPA holders held considerable bargaining
power over it, and the pressure they exerted on the contractor for higher pay and other
demands was largely fueled by the lengthy and bureaucratic suitability and security vetting
process that resulted in a bottleneck of hearing recorder recruits who were not allowed to
attend and record hearings.  Again, specifics of violations by the agency or unforeseeability
or lack of contractor culpability are missing from the broad assertions.
Fourth, the contractor asserts that the BPA holders exerted substantial market pressure
that adversely affected the contractor’s ability to perform and that the situation was further
exacerbated by the agency’s decisions to keep extending BPAs beyond the date(s) originally
agreed upon when the contractor entered into the eighteen contracts.  The current and former
BPA holders would simply “hold-out” for higher wages or work for the agency directly
under their old BPA agreements.  Again, in light of the contractor’s inability to guarantee
coverage for hearings, the assertions, which lack factual underpinnings and specifics, do not
serve to excuse the contractor’s lack of performance and lack of providing a remedy to the
situation to ensure that it would perform in the future.
Fifth, is the contractor’s pronouncement that many current and former BPA holders
worked in concert to dissuade new court reporter recruits from working for the contractor. 
Once again, the contractor’s decision to reduce pricing without an understanding of the
market does not create a basis of excusability to void the terminations.
Sixth, with broad contentions, lacking in specifics of contracts, timing, and
individuals, the suggestion that certain agency personnel, perhaps including local hearing
office directors and administrative law judges, did not welcome the new court reporting
recruits that the contractor managed to push through the lengthy suitability and security
process, is no more than hyperbole without a basis to avoid summary judgment.
Seventh, the contractor states that the agency was not transparent on what the current
court reporters were being paid under the BPAs at the time the contractor entered into the
eighteen (these fifteen and the three in the earlier appeals) contracts.  Again, this provides
no basis for excusable delays to void the terminations.  That the contractor knowingly priced
each contract without the information of then current rates does not assist the contractor in
its position in these appeals.
Eighth, the contractor brings to light that the agency often provided far fewer hearings
than it originally estimated in the contracts.  Whether true or not, the contractor was unable
to provide reporters for the hearings scheduled or assure performance in the future.  Fewer
hearings would make the contractor’s task easier, not more difficult.

CBCA 6265, 6273, 6274, 6275, 6276, 6277, 6278,
6280, 6281, 6282, 6283, 6288, 6342, 6343, 6344
7
Even though not material to these cases, the contractor bemoans its prior
representation, although it has not demonstrated any impropriety by earlier counsel.  The
facts do not support its assertions that while in bankruptcy, the contractor lacked legal
counsel in all of these cases; the contractor was represented by counsel, even if after the fact,
the contractor takes issue with actions and inactions of counsel.  Such can happen,
intentionally or not, while in bankruptcy.  What is determinative here to explain why the
contractor does not defeat the motion is simply put—the contractor still has not put forward
facts to support its theories of relief.  It misinterprets the contract and has not demonstrated
that discovery is necessary, given that underlying facts are within its control which it must
put forward at this stage.  The Board grants the motion of the agency and denies these
appeals.  The Board upholds the terminations for cause.
One last suggestion by the contractor is that the Board may defer its ruling on the
motion until the contractor has a full and fair opportunity to complete its written discovery
and take deposition testimony from agency personnel and its organizational representative. 
By failing to come forward with factual and legal bases to support its claims, when the basics
would be in the possession of the contractor, either outright or as a result of the other three
appeals, the contractor has shown no need for discovery or a delay in the resolution of the
motion.
Decision
The Board grants the agency’s motion for summary judgment and DENIES the
appeals.  The terminations for cause are valid.
     Joseph  A. Vergilio          
JOSEPH A. VERGILIO
Board Judge
We concur:
    Erica S. Beardsley              Harold D. Lester, Jr.      
ERICA S. BEARDSLEY HAROLD D. LESTER, JR.
Board Judge Board Judge