DENIED: December 19, 2022
CBCA 7109
GERALD E. PAULUS, JR.,1
Appellant,
v.
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
Respondent.
Gerald E. Paulus, Jr., pro se, Mesa, AZ.
John B. Alumbaugh and Eugene J. Benick III, Office of the General Counsel, Agency
for International Development, Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent.
Before Board Judges BEARDSLEY (Chair), KULLBERG, and ZISCHKAU.
ZISCHKAU, Board Judge.
Appellant, Gerald E. Paulus, Jr., appeals a decision by the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) to terminate his personal services contract for cause
after a co-worker reported harassment by him. Mr. Paulus argues that his termination for
1 Because the personal services contract at issue here was between USAID and
Gerald Edward Paulus, Jr., and did not involve any other corporate entity, the caption has
been corrected to reflect this by changing appellant’s name, which the Board in its notice of
docketing recorded as “Gerald E. Paulus dba ET/ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES, LC,” to
“Gerald E. Paulus, Jr.”

CBCA 7109 2
cause should either be invalidated or be changed to a termination for convenience because
USAID’s grounds for the termination are not supported and he was not provided written
notice of the reasons for his termination. He also seeks compensation for the leave and other
benefits that he claims he accrued prior to the termination. We conclude that USAID has met
its burden for sustaining the termination for cause and further conclude that Mr. Paulus is not
entitled to other compensation. Accordingly, we deny the appeal.
Background
In 2020, USAID contracted with Mr. Paulus to serve as a project management
specialist in Afghanistan. As modified, the personal services contract called for a base
performance period from April 6, 2020, through January 30, 2022, with three option years.
Mr. Paulus and the co-worker who subsequently reported the harassment met in
February 2021 during the course of their duties. On March 4, 2021, after helping the co-
worker carry packages to the co-worker’s apartment, Mr. Paulus began messaging the co-
worker. The co-worker gave minimal replies and never provoked the messaging coming
from Mr. Paulus. Mr. Paulus continued to message the co-worker and made requests to
spend time with the co-worker, which the co-worker declined. After more texts seeking
personal information about the co-worker, the co-worker told Mr. Paulus that the co-worker
was increasingly uncomfortable with his texting. Mr. Paulus offered to stop texting, and the
co-worker replied yes to that offer. However, Mr. Paulus continued to message the co-
worker afterwards. On March 8, 2021, the co-worker reported Mr. Paulus’ behavior to a
supervisor. The Regional Security Office (RSO) Threat Intelligence and Investigations
branch was informed of the co-worker’s complaint and immediately began investigating the
complaint about Mr. Paulus. On March 8, RSO special agents met with the co-worker and
Mr. Paulus separately. The co-worker reported that Mr. Paulus had messaged the co-worker,
emailed and attempted a phone call to the co-worker, and viewed the co-worker’s LinkedIn
profile. The co-worker felt threatened by Mr. Paulus and said that his communications were
inappropriate. The agents then interviewed Mr. Paulus, informing him that he needed to
cease any contact with the co-worker and that failure to comply with this directive could
result in removal from the post and being sent back to the United States on the next flight.
Mr. Paulus agreed not to contact the co-worker.
However, the next day, March 9, 2021, while passing by the co-worker in the embassy
compound, Mr. Paulus approached and called out to the co-worker and said that he was sorry
and that the co-worker did not need to fear him. The co-worker reported this contact to the
RSO. Later that day, one of the RSO security agents spoke with Mr. Paulus and reminded
him that just the day before he was ordered to stay away from the co-worker and had agreed
to do so. Mr. Paulus replied that he meant no harm and that if he has to be sent home so be

CBCA 7109 3
it. He asked the agent if he could write a statement, and the agent agreed to receive his
statement by email. On March 10, Mr. Paulus sent a lengthy, written statement by email to
the security agent explaining the situation from his point of view, stating that the RSO’s
instruction to avoid any contact with the co-worker was wrong and “counter to the basic rules
of humanity.” Mr. Paulus copied the co-worker on this email.
On March 10, 2021, the RSO determined that “it would be in the best interest of [the]
post” if Mr. Paulus was either asked to leave voluntarily or ordered to leave. On that same
day, the Embassy’s accountability and suitability board determined that it was no longer
suitable for Mr. Paulus to hold a position on the post. The RSO informed the contracting
officer responsible for human resources of the RSO and accountability board determinations
that Mr. Paulus could no longer stay at the post and would have to be sent back home
promptly.
The original contracting officer, the newly assigned contracting officer, the post’s
mission director, the deputy mission director, and the RSO discussed how to proceed, and
it was agreed that the mission director and deputy and a contracting officer would meet the
next morning with Mr. Paulus. By the time of the March 11 morning meeting, the new
contracting officer had concluded that, based on the accountability board’s determination that
Mr. Paulus was unfit to remain at the post for his misconduct and failure to follow the
directions of the RSO, there were sufficient grounds to terminate for cause Mr. Paulus’
contract. At the March 11 meeting, attended by the mission director, the deputy mission
director, the contracting officer, and Mr. Paulus, Mr. Paulus was informed that his contract
was being terminated for cause due to the decision of the accountability board and his failure
to abide by the directions of the RSO not to contact the co-worker. The meeting went on for
perhaps an hour or more, as Mr. Paulus complained that he had done nothing wrong meriting
termination. The mission director told Mr. Paulus that he could challenge the termination
decision if he wanted to do so but that he had to depart from the Embassy post on the next
available flight. Mr. Paulus asked, at the end of the meeting, if everyone in the meeting
could keep the basis of his termination confidential. Mr. Paulus was instructed to restrict to
his quarters and the cafeteria until his flight departure.
The contracting officer issued a termination letter to Mr. Paulus on March 13, 2021.
The letter states in relevant part: “As a result of the findings of the Embassy’s Accountability
& Suitability Board, the U.S. Personal Services Contract between you and
USAID/Afghanistan is terminated for cause effective March 16, 2021 pursuant to Section
C General Provisions 16A(1). . . . Please coordinate your checkout from post. . . . All
outstanding final payments associated with your service will be computed in accordance with
the pertinent provisions of the contract.” Mr. Paulus departed the post on March 15.

CBCA 7109 4
On April 22, 2021, Mr. Paulus appealed his termination. Mr. Paulus argues that his
actions did not merit a termination for cause, that USAID did not provide a written statement
of the reasons for the termination in the termination notice, and that USAID did not establish
beyond a reasonable doubt the facts warranting the termination. Mr. Paulus seeks
reinstatement, back pay, and compensation for accrued benefits.
The parties submitted this case pursuant to Board Rule 19, 48 CFR 6101.19 (2021),
on the written record and after closing briefs by the parties. Appellant filed a motion
requesting that the Board direct respondent to refrain from making certain statements about
appellant and enjoin respondent from issuing a debarment filing against appellant pending
the Board’s decision on this case.
Discussion
Mr. Paulus mainly argues that the termination for cause should either be invalidated
or be changed to a termination for convenience because he was not provided written notice
of the reasons for his termination and the facts do not support the termination for cause. The
termination provision in the contract provides in relevant part:
16. TERMINATION (NOV 1989)
(This is an approved deviation to be used in place of the clause specified in
FAR 52.249-12.)
(a) The Government may terminate performance of work under this contract
in whole or, from time to time, in part:
(1) For cause, which may be effected immediately after establishing
the facts warranting the termination, by giving written notice and a
statement of reasons to the contractor in the event (i) the Contractor
commits a breach or violation of any obligations herein contained, (ii) a
fraud was committed in obtaining this contract, or (iii) the contractor is
guilty (as determined by USAID) of misconduct in the Cooperating
Country. Upon such a termination, the contractor’s right to
compensation shall cease when the period specified in such notice
expires or the last day on which the contractor performs services
hereunder, whichever is earlier. No costs of any kind incurred by the
contractor after the date such notice is delivered shall be reimbursed
hereunder except the cost of return transportation (not including travel
allowances), if approved by the Contracting Officer. If any costs

CBCA 7109 5
relating to the period subsequent to such date have been paid by
USAID, the contractor shall promptly refund to USAID any such
prepayment as directed by the Contracting Officer.
Appeal File, Exhibit 1 at 32-33.
The provision of the Contract Disputes Act dealing with the contents of a contracting
officer’s decision, 41 U.S.C. § 7103(e) (2018), states that “the contracting officer’s decision
shall state the reasons for the decision reached and shall inform the contractor of the
contractor’s rights as provided in this chapter. Specific findings of fact are not required. If
made, specific findings of fact are not binding in any subsequent proceeding.” As quoted
above, Mr. Paulus’ contract with USAID provides that a termination for cause “may be
effected immediately after establishing the facts warranting termination, by giving written
notice and a statement of reasons to the contractor.”
Here, Mr. Paulus was given the reasons for his termination at the meeting of
March 11, 2021, with the mission director, deputy mission director, and contracting officer.
As spelled out during the meeting, and supported by the exhibits in the record, Mr. Paulus
repeatedly sent messages to the co-worker, and when the co-worker told Mr. Paulus to stop
communicating, he failed to do so. After the co-worker complained about the inappropriate
messaging, the post’s RSO directed Mr. Paulus to cease all contact with the co-worker and
informed him that he could be removed from the post and sent home if he failed to do so.
Mr. Paulus agreed, but, the next day, Mr. Paulus called out to the co-worker on a street
within the post, telling the co-worker that he was sorry and that the co-worker did not need
to fear him. Then, after being confronted with this violation of the RSO’s previous day’s
order, Mr. Paulus asked the RSO if he could make a written statement. When he submitted
his statement by email to the RSO, Mr. Paulus copied the co-worker on the email. The RSO
determined the same day that Mr. Paulus was not fit to remain on the post. The
accountability board similarly concluded that Mr. Paulus had to be removed from the post.
In summary, these are the facts and the reasons that were presented to Mr. Paulus during the
meeting to explain why his contract was being terminated for cause. Although not all of
these facts were spelled out in the written notice of termination dated March 13, 2021, the
termination notice states that the termination was based on the findings of the accountability
board. There can be no reasonable argument that Mr. Paulus was unaware of the basis of
USAID’s termination for cause based on the March 11 meeting and the written termination
notice. All of the facts summarized above are supported by the record. In our view, these
facts justify the termination for cause. See Cooper/Ports America, LLC v. Secretary of
Defense, 959 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (sufficiency generally considered in the
context of the communication between the parties) (citing Empire Energy Management
Systems, Inc. v. Roche, 362 F.3d 1343, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); Cherokee General Corp. v.

CBCA 7109 6
United States, 150 Fed. Cl. 270, 280 (2020); Emiabata v. United States, 139 Fed. Cl. 418,
422 (2018), aff’d, 792 F. App’x 931 (Fed. Cir. 2019);5860 Chicago Ridge, LLC v. United
States, 104 Fed. Cl. 740, 756 (2012).
Mr. Paulus has raised other arguments throughout these proceedings, such as whether
the contracting officer had authority to issue the termination notice, whether the contracting
officer knew the facts regarding the matter and personally made the decision, and whether
the contracting officer considered the alternatives to and consequences of a for-cause
termination. None of these arguments changes our conclusion that the termination was
justified.
Other Claims
Mr. Paulus requests that the Board direct respondent to refrain from making certain
statements about appellant and enjoin the agency from issuing a debarment filing against him
pending the Board’s decision in this case. Regarding the request for injunctive relief, we
have no authority to grant such relief. See YRT Enterprises LLC v. Department of Justice,
CBCA 1501, 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,809, at 179,407-08.
Additionally, appellant makes a claim in his notice of appeal for unpaid accrued sick
and vacation leave. Appellant first raised this claim to the contracting officer in an email
dated April 14, 2021, stating, “One final question, who is the person that I may contact to be
reimbursed for my leave and/or any other benefits accrued as this has not been settled to
date.” The contracting officer responded, stating, “So, if you should choose to submit a
voucher for such costs, the costs would not be reimbursed.”While Mr. Paulus has not
asserted a sum certain with regard to his accrued leave, the agency had a basis to calculate
the amount (his accrued leave times his rate of pay), and therefore we find that he has
asserted a claim for his accrued leave and received a decision from the contracting officer
rejecting his claim.
We conclude that Mr. Paulus is not entitled to his accrued leave. Under the contract,
a termination for cause effectively terminates his right to compensation by the agency as of
the date of termination. The Termination clause provides, at paragraph (a)(1), for
termination for cause and states: “Upon such a termination, the contractor’s right to
compensation shall cease when the period specified in such notice expires or the last day on
which the contractor performs services hereunder, whichever is earlier.” In contrast, the
clause, at paragraph (a)(2), includes a termination for convenience provision by which the
“contractor’s right to compensation shall cease when the period specified in such notice
expires except that the contractor shall be entitled to any unused vacation leave.”
Additionally, the clause provides, at paragraph (a)(3), for a termination for convenience due

CBCA 7109 7
to the contractor’s illness. Under that provision, upon termination, “the contractor shall not
be entitled to compensation except to the extent of any unused vacation or sick leave.” As
the Termination clause did not carve out any exceptions for unused sick or vacation leave for
a termination for cause, any right that Mr. Paulus had to compensation for his accrued leave
ceased the moment his termination for cause became effective.
Decision
The appeal is DENIED.
Jonathan D. Zischkau
JONATHAN D. ZISCHKAU
Board Judge
We concur:
Erica S. Beardsley H. Chuck Kullberg
ERICA S. BEARDSLEY H. CHUCK KULLBERG
Board Judge Board Judge