DENIED: February 26, 2008 
CBCA 752 
JOSEPH M. HUTCHISON, 
Appellant, 
v. 
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, 
Respondent. 
Joseph M. Hutchison, pro se, Morgantown, WV. 
Judith A. Bo nner, O ffice of Regional Counsel, General Services Administration, 
Philadelphia, PA. 
Before Board Judges PARKER, HYATT, and POLLACK. 
POLLACK, Board Judge. 
Statement of Facts 
1. On September 12, 2006, Ge neral Services Administration (GSA) sale no. 
3BFBPC-06-524 was conducted at Bel Air Auto Auction in Bel Air, Maryland. Appeal File, 
Exhibit 1.  Prior to the sale, vehicles were available for inspection on September 11  and 
September 12.  Id. Mr. Joseph Hutchison (appell ant) registered as bidder number 240. 
Appeal File, Exhibit 4.  By signing the sales register, appellant acknowledged that the sale 
was subject to certain terms and conditions.  Appeal File, Exhibits 1, 3, 4.  As stated by Mr. 
Hutchison, although an inspection was permitte d, the permitted inspection was limited to 
inspecting the vehicle in place, or as he characterized it, a “do not drive, do not move” 

 
 
 
  
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inspection.  Accordingly, the vehi cle was  not available to be test driven.  Appeal File, 
Exhibit 9. 
2. In the presale announcement for the sale dated September 12, 2006, bidders 
were advised: 
Please keep in mind that the vehicles being offered here today is (sic) offered 
without guarantee as to the conditions of any item.  Vehicles are warranted as 
to description only.  Condition is not gua ranteed.  I repeat, vehicles are 
warranted as to descri ption only, condition is not guaranteed.  Mechanical 
deficiencies, when know n will  be announced.  However absence of 
announced deficiencies does not necessarily mean  there are none.  We 
strongly encourage you to inspect the vehicles before you bid.  Appeal File, 
Exhibit 5. 
3. The terms of the sale included the following provision: 
DESCRIPTION WARRANTY: (Condition No. 2 of SF114C 
is deleted  and  the following applies ). The Government 
warrants to the original purchaser that the property listed in the 
invitation for bids will conform to its description.  If a 
misdescription is determined before removal of the property, the 
Government will keep the property and refund any money paid. 
If a misdescription is determined after removal, the Government 
will refund any money paid if the purchaser takes the property 
at his or her expense to a location specified by the Contracting 
Officer. No refund will be made unless the purchaser submits 
a written notice to the Contracting Officer within 15 calendar 
days of the date of removal that the property  is m isdescribed 
and maintains the prop erty in the same condition as when 
removed. After property has  been removed, no refund will be 
made f or shortages of property sold by the “LOT.”  T his 
warranty is in place of all other guarantees and warranties, 
expressed or implied.  The Government does  not warrant the 
merchantability of t he prop erty or its fitness for any use or 
purpose.  The amount of recovery under this provision is limited 
to the purchase price of th e misdescribed property.  The 
purchaser is not entitled to any payment for loss of profit or any 
other money damages, special, direct, indirect, or consequential. 

3 CBCA 752 
Appeal File, Exhibit 1. 
4. Among the vehicles for sale was a 2002 Dodge GR Caravan SP, tag number 
G61-14193, listed on run number 93 with a mileage of 70,633 miles.  Appeal File, Exhibit 
1.  According to the contracting officer (CO), the vehicle had been previously assigned for 
use to the Secret Service and referred for sale to GSA.   Declaration of Amy Anthony (Dec. 
11, 2007), Exhibit A.  T here is no evidence that information as to the prior user of the 
vehicle had been provided to either Mr. Hutchison or any other potential bidder. 
5. At the auction, appellant submitted the high bid for the above vehicle.  The 
vehicle was awarded to him on September 12, 2006.  Appeal File, Exhibit 6. 
6. The vehicle at issue was among the last few vehicles to be offered.     By the 
time Mr. Hutchison and GSA completed the necessary paperwork and he made payment and 
was instructed with respect to departing the auction site,  the sale had ended.  As described 
by Mr. Hutchison, at that point all that he had ahead was a long rid e back to h is home in 
Morgantown, West Virginia, the ride being in two vehicles (the one that took Mr. Hutchison 
and his wife to the auction and the vehicle being pu rchased at auction).  Mr. Hutchison 
stated in his letter to GSA dated February 27, 2007, that upon leaving  the auction site, “it 
was quickly evident that the brake rotors were badly warped  and one or more of the brake 
pads were apparently worn to the point of metal to metal contact.”  On what continued to be 
a tedious and difficult ride home, Mr. Hutchison identified other problems, stated that the 
rear brake light turn signals did not work, the vehicle appeared to be seriously out  of 
alignment (with a significant pull to the left), there were constant vibrations, and the engine 
was weak on power.  Mr. Hutchison described himself as both disappointed and angry at the 
experience, “considering that it was utterly impossible to have detected these flaws  under 
the restrictive inspections in advance of purch ase that were permitted by GSA.” 
Nevertheless, he thought he could correct the problems by means of a brake job, a go od 
four-wheel alignment, and an engine tune up.  He stated that he was determined to postpone 
transferring the vehicle  until such time as the vehicle was made road worthy and could pass 
a West Virginia inspection.  Appeal File, Exhibit 9. 
7. Mr. Hutchison proceeded to have the vehicle repaired.  Full repairs, however, 
were delayed, and as described by Mr. Hutc hison, his pursuing the repair process had 
proceeded over time because of previously scheduled travel  and other out of state travel for 
himself and his wife.  As of the date of his letter of February 27, 2007, he stated that 
approximately $1650 had been expended on various  repairs and additionally, he had been 
advised as to other repair issues, the most significant being a b roken drive shaft and the 
possibility that the frame was bent from a crash.  The letter of February  27, 2007, was the 
first notification to GSA of the problems.  Appeal File, Exhibit 9. 

  
4 CBCA 752 
8. There is no dispute that there were numerous repair issues with the vehicle. 
Appellant in his letter of February 27 suggested the following remedies:  return of the 
vehicle plus reimbursement of repair costs; exchange for a like vehicle; additional repairs 
to be  arranged by appellant and paid for by respondent; or additional repairs to be 
undertaken and paid for by GSA, to appellant’s satisfaction, and  reimbursement to appellant 
for repair costs to date. Appeal File, Exhibit 9.  
9. In further stating his position, Mr. Hutchison made the following point.  He 
asserted “what is patently wrong under the “do not drive, do not move” inspection policy is 
a failure to disclose fully any and all substantial flaws that are not readily detectable under 
the allowable inspection system and should be readily detectable in the course of good, 
vehicle maintenance program.  GSA could not have  failed t o be aware of these flaws in 
servicing the vehicle and certainly in getting it to the auction site.”  Appeal File, Exhibit 9. 
10.   The contracting officer replied to Mr. Hutchison’s letter by final decision 
dated March 12, 2007, and denied appellant’s claim.  The basis of th e denial was that the 
claim was untimely under the Description Warranty clause.  More specifically, the CO stated 
that per the GSA Sale Terms and Conditions, as set out in the Description Warranty clause, 
Appeal File, Exhibit 12, condition of the property  is not gua ranteed and any claim for 
misdescription must be submitted to the CO within fifteen calendar days following removal 
of the property.  Finally, although not set out in the final decision, the CO, after receiving 
Mr. Hutchison’s letter of February 27, did inquire as to the repair and maintenance history 
of the vehicle.  Documents as to that history were submitted by the CO as part of the Appeal 
File.  One of the documents does show that the vehicle was in an accident, but does not fully 
describe the scope of the damage.  Appeal File, Exhibits 10, 11, 15.  Additionally, the CO 
provided a declaration with the Government’s brief.  In that declaration, the CO states that 
to the best of her  knowledge, the referring agency (Secret Service) had not reported any 
mechanical or other deficiencies in the vehicle and she had no knowledge at the time of sale 
concerning any mechanical or other deficiencies regarding the vehicle.  Anthony 
Declaration. 
Discussion 
The Description Warranty clause in the contract allows a purchaser to recover his 
money where the vehicle has been misdescribed and where the purchaser ha s submitte d 
written notice of an actionable misdescription of  the vehicle within fifteen days from the 
date the vehicle was removed from the auction site. In this instance, appellant removed the 
vehicle on September 12, 2006.  Appellant did not provide any notice to th e Governme nt 
of claimed  deficienc ies until February 27, 2007, five months later.  The Description 
Warranty clause  addresses condition of the vehicles for auction and expressly excludes any 

 
 
5 CBCA 752 
warranty of merchantability or fitness for any use or purpose with regard to condition.  The 
announcement of sale provided a similar warning.  The exclusion of the warranties should 
be a red flag, that appell ant is  not to look to the Government to guarantee the quality, 
usability, or fitness of the vehicle and that the vehicle is being purchased at the buyer’s risk. 
One of our predecessor boards, the General Services Board of Con tract Appeals, 
clearly set out the law surrounding the above clause in Michael Griffin v. General Services 
Administration, GSBCA 16729, 06-1 BCA ¶ 33,274, a case where the purchaser made many 
of the same arguments put forth in this appeal.  In Griffin, the board stated: 
Although GSA warrants that the items purchased in their auctions are the 
items they are stated to be, it expressly disavows any warranty of condition. 
At best purchasers are told of any known deficiencies.  Chris Ward v. General 
Services Administration, GSBCA 16473, 05-1 BCA ¶ 32,881; Coleridge D. 
Henri v. General Services Admin istration, GSBCA 13991, 97-2 BCA 
¶ 29,187, at 145,161; accord Rene Hernan dez v. General Services 
Administration, GSBCA 15448, 01-2 BCA ¶ 31,463; William B. Wobig v. 
General Services Administration, GSBCA 14424, 98-1 BCA ¶ 29,650.  
Id. at 164,927.  The decision continues: 
In essence, the vehicle Mr. Griffin purchased required fa r more extensive 
repairs than he had planned for based on the description provided on line. As 
we noted above, in these sales, the buyer assumes the risks and uncertainties 
inherent in  purchasing a used vehicle through the auction process.  It is 
expected that the buyer will account for these risks and unc ertainties, 
including the possible need for extensive repairs, in formulating the price that 
is bid for the proper ty.  If it is impracticable to inspect the property prior to 
submitting a bid , as Mr. Griffin says was the case here, the buyer should 
consider the possibility that, in the absence of a warranty as to condition, the 
article purchased may require substantial repairs.  The terms and conditions 
of these auction sales do not provide a remedy for the optimistic bidder who 
is disheartened to learn, upon making arrangements to accept delivery of the 
property, that the repairs required are more extensive than he or sh e ha d 
anticipated.  At that point the bidder has two choices - to breach the contract, 
decline to purchase the property, and pay the resulting liquidated damages, or 
to honor the contract, purchase the property, and remove it from the 
Government’s premises.  Once the property has been removed, the buyer has 
no alternative but to keep it, unless he or she can demonstrate a misdescription 
that would justify a full refund under the Description War ranty clause.  The 

 
 
 
6 CBCA 752 
contracting officer has no authority to provide any other relief and neither 
does the Board.  Chris Ward, 05-1 BCA at 162,922. 
Id. 
Applying the above to the case before us, appellant has no remed y here based on a 
warranty as to condition. The contract was clear in warning appellant of the risks of 
purchase. 
We now turn to the remedy in the clause dealing with misdescription. The fact that 
the condition of the vehicle in this case was not what appellant expected or des ired is not 
synonymous with a misdescription.  Misdescription requires the Government to have made 
an error in describing what has been offered for sale.  Under the facts of this case, GSA did 
not misdescribe the vehicle.  
The auction identified the vehicle as a 2002 Dodge GR Caravan SP, tag number G61­
14193, listed on run number 93 with a mileage of 70,633 miles.  The vehicle was not 
described as being in any particular condition.  The sale terms th at described the vehicle, 
while limited, were accurate.  
This is not a case where GSA specifically described the vehicle one way and in fact 
the vehicle was different.  Here, Mr. Hutchison surmised or inferred that the vehicle would 
be in better mechanical condition then it was, relying on an expectation as to maintenance 
and on outward appearance.   However, nothing in the description conveyed specifically that 
the vehicle was in go od mechanical shape and would not require serious repair.  It is also 
true that nothing said it was mechanically unsound, but the Government had no obligation 
to make such a representation, particularly when it disclaimed any warranty.  Accordingly, 
appellant does not qualify for recovery under the misdescription  portion of the clause.  
Moreover, even were we to find a misdescri ption, which we do not, the failure to 
submit a claim within the requisite time-frame of fifteen days defeats any claim a purchaser 
might otherwise have under the Description Warranty clause.  Danny R. Mitchell v. General 
Services Administration, GSBCA 16122, 04-1 BCA ¶ 32,511.   The need to meet the fifteen-
day limitation is well set out in McNutt Used Cars v. General Services Administration , 
GSBCA 16398, 04-2 BCA ¶ 32,668.  There, based on undisputed facts, the mobile home 
in issue was misdescribed in that it was sold a s a 2004 mobile home when it in fact was a 
2002 model.  However, McNutt failed to notify the CO of the misdescription within fifteen 
days of removing the mobile home from Government possession.  Instead he notified the CO 
within thirty-five days.  The Board ruled that the fifteen-day limit stated in the contract for 
return was controlling and the mobile home could not be returned.  

 
  
  
7 CBCA 752 
As noted above, the contract specifically addresses th e issues o f condition of the 
vehicle and misdescription.  There is, however, as addressed in Danny R. Mitchell, GSBCA 
16209, 04-1 BCA ¶ 32,551, one other potential area of relief, albeit limited to very specific 
situations.  In Mitchell, the board noted that in very limited instances, the disclaimer as to 
condition can be overcome, where the purchaser can establish that the Government made a 
misrepresentation of either a fraudulent or material nature and that the misrepresentation 
induced the purchaser t o enter i nto the contract.  Id. at 160,995 (citing  Morris v. United 
States, 33 Fed. Cl. 733, 745 (1995)); accord Roberto Gomez v. General Services 
Administration, GSBCA 16700, 05-2 BCA ¶ 33,095. The evidence in this case does not 
support a finding of misrepresentation.   To co nstitute misrepresentation the Government 
had to represent as true certain elements which it knew were false.  That did not happen in 
this case.  GSA described the model and the mileage and further told appellant  and others 
that the Government was not warranting the merchantability of the property or its fitness for 
any use or purpose.  The c ombination of the lack of specificity as to components and the 
disclaimer language clearly defeat any claim based on misrepresentation.  It is unfortunate 
that Mr. Hutchison did not get a vehicle in the condition he expected.  But the Government 
did not mislead him.  Appellant did not realize his expectations, or he miscalculated the risk. 
Appellant has also contended that GSA had to know of the vehicle’s poor condition, 
since the vehicle was likely driven to the site of the auction, and as such GSA should have 
revealed that informati on to  appellant.  Appellant, however, has not shown that the 
contracting officials had such knowledge, cannot demo nstrate through evidence how the 
vehicle behaved in transit, and finally cannot overcome the fact that the Government, while 
not providing specifics, gave ample warning to purchasers that what they were buying was 
not guaranteed as to mechanical soundness.  In fact, in the declaration of the CO, she stated 
that she had no knowledge of the vehicle’s condition or of any mechanical deficiencies 
having been reported by the referring agency.  GSA was selling a used vehicle.  It did not 
promise to appellant or any other bidder that the vehicle would  be without flaws.  Here, it 
was appellant who had expectations as to condition.  GSA in the auct ion and in its sale 
documents recognized a nd identified the potential risks.  In a similar vein, appellant has 
argued that we did not have an opportunity to fully inspect the vehicle and for that reason 
the Government should bear responsibility in this matter.  Appellant was aware w hen he 
provided his price of the fact that he could not and did not test drive the vehicle.  He had the 
choice to simply not bid. 

__________________________ 
8 CBCA 752 
Decision 
Based upon the foregoing, this appeal is DENIED. 
HOWARD A. POLLACK 
Board Judge 
We concur: 
_______________________________ _____________________________ 
ROBERT W. PARKER CATHERINE B. HYATT 
Board Judge Board Judge