RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY RELIEF GRANTED IN PART;
APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY RELIEF DENIED: August 13, 2014
CBCA 2294
AMERICOM GOVERNMENT SERVICES, INC.,
Appellant,
v.
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
Respondent.
Thomas L. McGovern, III and Brendan M. Lill of Hogan Lovells US LLP,
Washington, DC, counsel for Appellant.
Jennifer L. Howard, Office of General Counsel, General Services Administration,
Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent.
Before Board Judges POLLACK, GOODMAN, and SHERIDAN.
POLLACK, Board Judge.
This matter arises under indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract
number GS-35F-0301N (the contract) and task order number 9T3APN018, between GSA
and Americom Government Services, Inc. (AGS).  AGS provided host nation authorizations
(HNAs) through GSA for use with satellite terminals owned by United States Forces Korea
(USFK).  GSA was the sole and exclusive purchasing agent for HNAs for USFK at the time. 


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GSA alleges that AGS performed additional, unauthorized work for which GSA
improperly paid it.  Once GSA realized what it has characterized as a mistake, GSA
proceeded to recoup the funds from other GSA/AGS contract work.  That recoupment is the
subject of the appeal.  Among issues we must resolve are whether the work for which AGS
was paid was authorized and ordered under an express or implied contract, and whether the
purchase was institutionally ratified.  Absent a contract or ratification, appellant cannot
prevail in its challenge to the GSA recoupment action.  The parties have filed cross-motions
for summary relief.  We find in favor of GSA in part and deny appellant’s motion for
summary relief in its entirety.  The matter of institutional ratification remains to be resolved.
Facts
In August 2003, GSA issued a request for quotations (RFQ) for commercial satellite
services in support of USFK.  The purpose of the RFQ was to solicit quotations on the basis
of which a task order could be awarded under the GSA Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) to
a vendor who would meet the requirements identified in the statement of work (SOW)
attached to the RFQ.  Specific work activities were to be ordered through a task order.  The
RFQ provided that GSA would award the task order on the basis of best value.  The SOW
contained the following language:
International Commercial Satellite Services: Provide Host Nation
Authorizations (HNA) in Korea; Negotiate and provide HNA, Transponder
tax, and local frequency licensing IAW [in accordance with] Korean Military
Information and Communications (MIC) for each terminal and within each
province region; Provide ROK [Republic of Korea] installation service at each
site; Training and Translations with Korea host nation, Negotiate and provide
Korean training instructors, translation of technical manuals, and technical
translator services for meetings between ROK and American technicians and
managers.
HNAs are essentially licenses to operate satellite terminals in foreign countries.  Without the
HNAs, terminals cannot be operated as intended.
AGS sent a proposal in response to the RFQ, pricing HNAs for thirteen terminals. 
AGS placed an asterisk by its price quote and there noted, “Additional Terminals can be
added at a cost of $5,000 per terminal.”  AGS states that at the time of the task order, there
was an expectation on the part of both AGS and GSA for additional HNAs.  In response to
AGS’s proposal, GSA awarded Task Order 9T3APN018 to AGS on August 28, 2003, for
thirteen HNAs.  The record identifies David Williams as GSA’s contracting officer (CO) on
the task order.  In addition to calling for AGS to provide thirteen HNAs, the task order set

CBCA 2294 3
the period of performance as October 1, 2003, through September 30, 2004.  The award
document said services were to be provided in accordance with the contract, the SOW, and
AGS’s proposal.  Thereafter, the original performance period for the task order was
extended by GSA to May 31, 2005.  The extension was done through four written
modifications.
Services had to be provided under the auspices of a local Korean company, and AGS
provided the thirteen HNAs under the task order through ISS, which was a local license
holder.  As will be noted later, ISS was also the company involved in providing the
additional (fifty) HNAs in dispute.
The initial value of the task order was set at $2,914,339.  GSA states that it advised
AGS that the task order would be incrementally funded via modification to the full ceiling
price of $5,115,611, based on availability of funds.  The task order provided that the contract
was not to exceed the total task dollar value ceiling.  GSA advised AGS that subsequent
increments of funding would be obligated via the “in theatre maintenance/contract”
(ITM/CO).  The award provided that any work done or expenditures made, beyond the
increments of the funding obligated to the contractor, would be at the contractor’s risk.
USFK provided funding to GSA to pay for services under the task order by issuing
three military interdepartmental purchase requests (MIPRs) - MIPR3HOAF00354,
MIPR4BOAF00096, and MIPR5DOAF00305.  GSA thereafter issued four modifications
to the task order, which took the total task order ceiling value to $5,115,611.  The totals
under each MIPR were as follows: MIPR3HOAF00354, $1,990,431.80;
MIPR4BOAF00096, $3,249,479; and MIPR5DOAF00305, $1,329,120.  Ultimately, the
total amount USFK provided to GSA under the three MIPRs was $6,569,030.80.
The parties appear to agree that the MIPRs were not contracting documents and none
of them obligated money to a particular task order.  However, task order 9T3APN018
appears to be the only task order in place between GSA and AGS at the time of the
referenced MIPRs, and the only task order in place for purchase of HNAs serving USFK. 
According to GSA, the relevant document to determine what services were contracted for
by GSA is the task order and not USFK’s funding MIPRs.
For purposes of this ruling, the parties have agreed that AGS provided USFK with
the fifty additional HNAs in issue.  They were provided at some time in 2004 to meet a need
created by a purchase for USFK of fifty additional terminals.  Those fifty terminals had been
purchased for USFK through a Department of the Interior (DOI) task order (BCHF040378). 
GSA was not a party to the purchase of the fifty terminals.  The terminals were secured for
USFK through the efforts of Mr. Mitchell Stevens, a Northrop Grumann employee, who

CBCA 2294 4
worked as technical manager and engineer to support the USFK/Defense Intelligence
Agency combined intelligence network.
As noted above, in order to operate, terminals must have HNAs.  The only
government contract for USFK to secure HNAs was purchase through GSA.  The record
shows that Mr. Stevens was tasked with securing the needed HNAs.  According to AGS,
Mr. Stevens secured the HNAs from ISS, told ISS to invoice AGS for the work, and advised
AGS that USFK had provided GSA the funds to pay for the additional HNAs.  Mr. Stevens
then told AGS to bill GSA for the HNAs under task order 9T3APN018.
It appears that USFK did in fact provide funds to GSA and intended those funds to
be used for payment for the fifty HNAs in issue.  There is no evidence that GSA was
informed at the time of either the purchase of the terminals (through DOI) or Mr. Stevens’
dealings with ISS and AGS as to the HNAs.  AGS paid ISS for the fifty HNAs and then
submitted invoice 90037154 to GSA, on June 22, 2005, for payment in the amount of
$579,793.52 for the fifty HNAs.  It appears AGS’s invoice contained no information
referencing task order 9T3APN018.  However, based on evidence provided, 9T3APN018
was the only task order (involving HNAs for USFK) in existence between AGS and GSA
at the time.
On September 15, 2005, GSA paid AGS’s invoice in full ($579,793.52).  According
to AGS, at that point, GSA still had $1,105,464.72 in available funds out of the $5,115,611
total funding level.  Prior to paying AGS for the invoice, GSA conducted some type of
review.  The parties stipulated to the following concerning the approval form that was
signed and paid by GSA:
GSA transaction records note the following for AGC Invoice 90037154:
“Client Date Reviewed: 8/14/2005”, “Client Authorization, Accepted”
Accepted by Elizabeth Bigger at 8/23/2005 11:43:44 PM.  See IT-Solutions
Shop Acceptance Information Invoice 90037154, attached as Attachment 1. 
In August 2005 Elizabeth Bigger was a Technology Project Adviser working
for GSA Federal Technology Service, Asia Business Team.
GSA acknowledged that it used money from one of the MIPRs to pay AGS for
invoice 90037154.  GSA, however, later recouped that sum through short payment on other
obligations owed to AGS.  That recoupment is at issue in this proceeding.  GSA states that
while the MIPR was used for Task Order 9T3APN018, the funding from the MIPRs could
have been used for other task orders.

CBCA 2294 5
As appellant emphasizes, and taking all inferences in its favor, the payment and
approval document signed by Ms. Bigger indicates that GSA’s client, USFK, and GSA 
reviewed the invoice before GSA paid AGS, and that a GSA official with voucher
approving authority approved the voucher.  However, a number of material facts are not
evident: What did GSA and the client agency know?  What did GSA think it was paying
for?  What was the full role and status of Ms. Bigger, and to whom, if anyone, did she
report?
At some time in October 2005, GSA became aware that Task Order 9T3APN018 did
not cover the effort to secure the additional fifty HNAs for which AGS had billed and been
paid.  At some point thereafter (on a date that has not been established) GSA began its
recoupment action, by short paying invoices to AGS in connection with work that would
otherwise have been payable.  We lack information as to what triggered that GSA
knowledge of overpayment and what actions it then took.  The record is not clear as to how
and on what dates GSA made its recoupments, what if any contacts were made with AGS
or USFK as to the matter, and whether at the time of the initial recoupment GSA provided
AGS with an explanation linking the short payments to GSA’s earlier payment for the fifty
HNAs.
In either January or March 2006, GSA returned $597,566.08 to USFK as unobligated
funds.  That figure was the sum of funds that USFK had provided to GSA to pay the invoice
and which, according to the parties, was funded through MIPR4BOAF00096.  Again, details
surrounding that transaction are lacking.  Apparently, at a point prior to returning the funds,
GSA had from USFK the initial total of $5,971,464.72 plus an additional $597,566.08 in
funding.  As noted above, it is not clear why GSA returned the funding, who was involved,
and whether GSA notified AGS of the pending return.  AGS has argued that it should be
paid, because GSA mismanaged the funds.
The Claim
The record is not clear as to what occurred from the start of the short payments to the
submission of a claim by AGS.  We know that AGS submitted a claim dated March 18,
2008, for $597,456.80.  The claim asserted that AGS did not receive payment for the HNA
licensing and frequency taxes.  There were some communications between AGS and GSA
after submission of the claim, but we lack details about those communications.  Then, on
November 15, 2010, the contracting officer CO at that time, Mr. Stephen Durrett, issued his
final decision denying the claim.  In his decision, he stated that upon his assignment as CO
on June 21, 2010, he had requested that AGS provide (1) documentation to support the
government authorization/request for additional terminal services, (2) financial documents
to support payment of the ISS invoices, and (3) documentation to establish that the HNA

CBCA 2294 6
licensing and frequency taxes were actually paid to the Korean government.  He stated that
to that date, the requested supporting documentation had not been received.
Appellant filed a timely appeal.
Discussion
Positions of the Parties
The parties have filed cross-motions for summary relief.  Appellant contends that it
was authorized under the task order (express contract) with GSA through GSA’s CO,
Mr. Williams, to provide the fifty HNAs, and as such, should be paid.  Appellant further
contends that if that is not found to be the case, then the procurement of the fifty HNAs was
contractually ratified (implied contract) by GSA through the payment of the voucher. 
Alternatively, if the transaction was not ratified by an authorized contracting official,
appellant asserts the procurement was institutionally authorized.  Finally, appellant argues
it is entitled to relief on basis of quantum valebant.
GSA contends that the express contract did not cover the fifty HNAs, no GSA official
authorized or ratified their purchase, and there was no institutional ratification.  GSA asserts
that benefit to GSA, and not simply benefit to the Government (in this case USFK), is a
requirement for institutional ratification and that GSA secured no benefit from the
procurement.  GSA further argues that quantum valebant is not available, for in order to
recover under quantum valebant there must be either an express or implied contract, and
neither exists.  GSA also provides arguments that the payment was improper because of
language barring the contractor from exceeding the contract’s cost ceiling.
Express and Implied Contract
The parties agree that the language from the SOW, quoted above, was the only place
in the SOW where the HNA requirement was discussed.  In answer to GSA’s contention that
the fifty HNAs were unauthorized as they were never ordered by GSA, appellant asserts the
following:
The text of the SOW requirement for HNAs shows that [GSA] authorized
AGS to support the HNA requirements of the USFK’s satellite network.  See
JS [Joint Statement] at 2.  The requirement broadly authorized AGS to
“Provide Host Nation Authorizations (HNA) in Korea,” and “Negotiate and
provide HNA . . . for each terminal and within each province region,” without
restricting or limiting the number of HNAs to be provided.  Id.  Consistent

CBCA 2294 7
with this broad authorization, AGS noted in the HNAs section of its pricing
proposal that “Additional Terminals can be added at a cost of $5,000 per
terminal.”  JS at 4.
From the above, AGS argues that the Board should find that the additional fifty
HNAs ordered through Mr. Stevens were not a change or extra requirement, but rather were
contemplated and covered by the contract.  As such, appellant argues GSA had no need to
separately order the HNAs in order for them to be authorized.  In reaching this conclusion,
AGS relies heavily on our decision in DSS Services, Inc. v. General Services Administration,
CBCA 1093, 10-2 BCA ¶ 34,532 (DSS II).  In addition, appellant argues that the language
of the SOW that addresses HNAs neither restricts nor limits the number of HNAs to be
provided under task order 9T3APN018.  AGS further states that there is no language in the
SOW which indicates that AGS would provide HNAs for a finite number or specific set of
satellite terminals; therefore, the number was open.  Appellant continues that because the
contract did not specifically say that no other HNAs could be ordered, and because GSA
accepted AGS’s proposal (which, by asterisk, offered additional HNAs at $5000 each), GSA
in fact authorized AGS to provide additional HNAs beyond the thirteen initially provided. 
There is no question that Mr. Williams, who was the CO at the time of award, had
contracting authority.
GSA reads the language differently.  GSA states that the contract and task order do
not authorize procurement of additional HNAs absent a specific order from the CO or other
authorized contracting official.  It does not interpret the asterisk and absence of limitations
to provide authority to add more HNAs.  Rather, GSA contends that to add more than the
thirteen HNAs initially specified, there had to be a specific contractual order.  GSA says the
asterisk language relied upon by AGS is in the nature of an option.  It is simply a mechanism
by which additional HNAs could be purchased, if wanted, by GSA.  We note that the parties
appear at times to use the concepts of “authorized” and “ordered” interchangeably.  For
purposes of the motions, we accept that GSA could have ordered additional HNAs under the
contract.  However, that does not establish either an express or implied contract.  In order
to show an express or implied contract, AGS must show that an authorized contracting
official, either expressly ordered, impliedly ordered, or ratified the purchase of the fifty
HNAs.  There is simply no evidence to support such a finding.
As to AGS’s reliance upon DSS II, we agree with GSA that the case does not help
appellant.  Critical to that conclusion is that in DSS II, the Board found that the contracting
officer was aware of and in fact authorized purchase of the contested equipment.  While the
Board rejected GSA’s argument that the ordering was not authorized by the contract, the
decision turned on the fact that the item was in fact properly ordered.  Here, there is no
evidence that Mr. Williams or any contracting official knew of or authorized the purchase

CBCA 2294 8
of the HNAs at the time AGS provided the items to USFK.  There is also no evidence that
Mr. Williams ratified their purchase.  What is clear is that the HNAs were purchased under
direction of Mr. Stevens, who was not a government employee.  Further, there is no
evidence of any interaction between Mr. Stevens and the CO, or AGS and the CO, at the
time of the purchase of the additional fifty HNAs.
Turning to the respective interpretations of the parties as to the meaning of the
language in the SOW and task order, we find nothing in the language that allows AGS to
provide HNAs without an order from GSA.  The task order was a procurement for a set
number (thirteen) of HNAs and was not an agreement to go beyond that by the CO.  At best
what appellant provided with the asterisk was an option, and for an option to proceed, the
option must be exercised by a contracting official.  That did not happen here.  While in
accepting appellant’s proposal GSA may well have had the right to order more HNAs at the
$5000 price offered by appellant, that still had to be done under specific government
direction and not unilaterally by appellant or through an unauthorized direction from a non-
governmental official.  Accordingly, we find that there was no express contract.
We also find there was no implied contract.  For there to be an implied contract,
appellant must show that an authorized contracting official accepted, through actions or
inactions, the work performed by appellant, even though there was no proper contractual
instrument.  An implied contract requires the involvement or knowledge (constructive or
actual) of the contracting official at the time the work was performed or ratified.  Engage
Learning, Inc. v. Department of Interior, CBCA 1165, 12-1 BCA ¶ 34,960.  Absent
contracting by an authorized contracting official, the Government is not bound on an express
or implied contract.  Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 322 U.S. 380, 384 (1947). 
We have no evidence that Mr. Williams, the only contracting official identified, had any
knowledge as to the actions surrounding the purchase of the fifty HNAs in issue, or any
evidence that he took any action after their purchase.  Accordingly, there was no implied
contract.  While Ms. Bigger, a GSA official, approved the voucher and money was in fact
paid to appellant for the work, the law is clear that the act of payment, without more, does
not constitute contractual acceptance or ratification.  United States v. Mead, 426 F.2d 118,
124 (9th Cir. 1970).
Quantum Valebant
Recovery under quantum valebant is appropriate, to avoid unjust enrichment by the
Government through taking and retaining benefit without paying.  As this Board stated in
our decision on motions in DSS Services, Inc. v. General Services Administration, CBCA
1093, 09-1 BCA ¶ 34,119 at 168,711 (DSS I), in order to recover under either the equitable
doctrine of quantum valebant or quantum meruit, the contractor must establish that an

CBCA 2294 9
implied-in-fact contract existed.  See International Data Products Corp. v. United States,
492 F.3d 1317, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2007); United Pacific Insurance Co. v. United States,
464 F.3d 1325, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 2006); United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387
(Fed. Cir. 1986). 
We have determined that there was no implied-in-fact contract.  Furthermore, the
Board in DSS I provided that a necessary factor for quantum valebant is that the government
representative, whose conduct was relied upon, had actual authority to bind the Government
in contract.  09-1 BCA at 168,711; see also Lewis v. United States, 70 F.3d 597, 600 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).  The evidence in this case does not support any such finding.
Institutional Ratification
Contractual ratification in government contracts may be accomplished by a
contracting official accepting government responsibility either directly or implicitly through
his or her actions, and sometimes inactions.  Ratification may also occur through
institutional ratification, which does not require the ratification to be made by an authorized
contracting official.  Janowsky v. United States, 133 F.3d 888, 891-92 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Silverman v. United States, 679 F.2d 865 (Ct. Cl. 1982).  We earlier concluded that the
additional HNAs were not procured through either the direct or implicit action of an official
with contracting authority and therefore not contractually ratified.  Accordingly, there can
be no basis for contractual ratification.
Institutional ratification, however, is a distinct alternative remedy and creates a
separate but limited avenue for recovery in the absence of contractual ratification.  In limited
and exceptional instances, courts and boards have found that the Government can be bound
to pay for otherwise unauthorized contract work, even though neither the initial commitment
nor ratification was carried out by an official empowered with contracting authority.  See
Janowsky; Silverman.
The parties have extensively briefed institutional ratification.  For purposes of
resolving these motions, we will not review the multiple cases cited to us.  Rather, we find
that Janowsky and Silverman, along with the City of El Centro v. United States, 922 F.2d
816, 820-21 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (El Centro), identify the elements of institutional ratification. 
These three cases provide us with the broad parameters which need to be established.  Each
can be factually distinguished from the matter before us, and there are factual differences
within the cases themselves.  The three cases illustrate that institutional ratification does not
have to fit a specific fact pattern.  Rather, while the cases do require that certain threshold
matters be met, once the parameters are met, we still must evaluate whether institutional
ratification is proper under the facts.

CBCA 2294 10
The following thresholds must be met in order to prove institutional ratification: (1)
the Government received and retained benefits from the unauthorized contract; (2) the
ratification was not done by mistake but with knowledge of the work being paid for; and (3)
the ratifying official must be one who either because of position or status, makes ratification
reasonable.  Janowsky; Silverman; El Centro.
In Silverman, the Court found institutional ratification of the purchase of transcripts
through the actions of an official of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), who had
authority to approve vouchers for payment, but who did not possess contracting authority. 
The Court stated that the Government ratified “by accepting the benefits flowing from the
senior FTC official’s promise of payment.”  679 F.2d at 705, 709.  In El Centro, 922 F.2d
at 821, the Court rejected institutional ratification, focusing on two elements that had been
established in Silverman, but were not established in El Centro.  The Court found that the
border patrol agent, who was identified as the ordering party, did not have sufficient status
to bind the Government and also found that there was no consideration or benefit flowing
to the Government from the procurement.  As to the latter, the Court found that the
hospital’s treatment of the illegal aliens did not qualify as a government benefit.  In deciding
El Centro, the court did not overrule Silverman or negate the theory of institutional
ratification as an alternative remedy.  Rather, the Court concluded that the necessary
elements were not established.
Janowsky, a more recent case, was an appeal from a ruling by the Court of Federal
Claims granting summary relief on behalf of the Government.  The case arose out of a
Federal Bureau of Investigation sting operation.  In vacating the decision of the lower court,
the Federal Circuit stated that the lower court had erred when it dismissed Janowsky’s claim
without considering whether the agency ratified the proposed contract by allowing the sting
operation to continue and by receiving the benefits from it.  133 F.3d at 892.
It is clear that one does not have to have specific contracting authority in order for
institutional ratification to occur.  In fact, institutional ratification is only raised in instances
where a party cannot link a contracting official to the governmental action.  Therefore, to
the extent GSA has argued that contracting authority is a needed element for institutional
ratification, that position is in error.
For purposes of deciding motions for summary relief, we must take all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party.  Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States,
812 F.2d 1387, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1987).  We find summary relief in favor of the moving party
“[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving party.”  Matshushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986).

CBCA 2294 11
In this case, appellant has identified enough facts that the Board could conclude,
particularly in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that Ms. Bigger qualified as to status
and that she was aware of what was being paid for.  As to benefit, we discuss that below. 
We also note that GSA in opposing appellant’s motion has provided sufficient evidence to
justify denying appellant summary relief.  Taking evidence in GSA’s favor, we could find
that Ms. Bigger did not have adequate status and may have paid by mistake.  As we stated
earlier in this ruling, we find on the record before us that many significant facts relating to
institutional ratification remain unclear and unexplained.  Among them are matters regarding
the operation and use of the MIPRs, information as to interaction between GSA and USFK
both during the AGS performance and in returning the money, and details as to the actions
and status of Ms. Bigger and what she knew when she approved the vouchers.  In addition,
the record is not clear as to facts surrounding the recoupment actions.  For those reasons,
summary relief for either party is unwarranted and inappropriate.
Accordingly, we deny both parties’ motions for summary relief as to institutional
ratification.
Other issues
We briefly comment on two other issues raised in the briefing by the parties.  In
arguing against institutional ratification, GSA asserted that institutional ratification requires
that the benefit to the Government be to the agency (here, GSA) which is the party in
litigation.  According to GSA, USFK may have received a benefit, but that is not
transferable or applicable to GSA.  We note that case law does not define whether the
benefit must be to a specific agency or to the Government in general, and GSA has provided
no authority or case law for its contention.  While GSA has argued that the benefit must be
directly to GSA, we look at the matter more broadly.  GSA in this case was operating as an
agent of USFK in securing HNAs and paid the money in issue to AGS in that capacity. 
GSA recouped the money in dispute from otherwise valid obligations.  While agencies are
in fact independent, we will not parse out the Government into pieces for purposes of
defining benefit in a case where the agency recouping funds is recouping them based on a
transaction involving benefits to another agency, in this case USFK.  Further, there are
additional questions raised by appellant as to whether GSA received a commission or fee.
GSA also argues that the claim cannot be paid because the task order contained a
ceiling price which AGS was not to exceed and that payment of the sum sought would
violate that ceiling price.  Both parties have made numerous assertions relating to the
operation of payment instruments, and on the record before us we can draw no conclusions
without further detail and amplification.  This matter is not ripe for summary relief
consideration on the basis of the claimed violation of the ceiling price.  Moreover, while we

CBCA 2294 12
do not here decide issues relating to the ceiling price, we do point out that we have
reservations as to whether the ceiling issue is at all relevant in connection with our analysis
as to institutional ratification.  The ceiling issue may well have been important if there was
an express or implied contract, but we find that neither such contract came into being.
Decision
Accordingly, we GRANT the GSA motion as to there not being an express or
implied contract.  We DENY the GSA motion as to institutional ratification.  We DENY
appellant’s motion in full.  The case shall proceed on the matter of institutional ratification. 
________________________________
HOWARD A. POLLACK
Board Judge
We concur:
ALLAN H. GOODMAN
Board Judge
PATRICIA J. SHERIDAN
Board Judge