DENIED: January 29, 2007 
CBCA 391 
P&C PLACEMENT SERVICES, INC., 
Appellant, 
v. 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 
Respondent. 
Thomas  D. Ro senwein o f Gordon, Glickman, Flesch & Rosenwein, Chicago, IL, 
counsel for Appellant. 
Cla ry Hanmer, Office of the General Counsel, Social Security Administr ation , 
Baltimore, MD, counsel for Respondent. 
Before Board Judges DANIELS  (Chairman), PARKER , and HYATT . 
DANIELS , Board Judge. 
P&C  Placement Services, Inc. (P&C) claims that  the Social Security Administration 
(SSA) owes it $223,504.07 under a contract for the provision of nursing services at the 
Harold  Washington Social Security Center (HWSSC) in Chicago, Illinois.  Th e clai m is 
divided  into seven elements.  The case comes before us on P&C’s appeal  from a contracting 
officer’s decision which denied the claim. 
Earlier,  we granted in part a motion for summary relief which  had been filed  by SSA. 
In so doing, we denied the first and third elements of  the claim.  P&C Placement Services, 
Inc. v. Social Security Administration , GSBCA 16363-SSA, 06-2 BCA ¶ 33,300. 

  
2 CBCA 391 
After  that decision was issued, we scheduled a hearing on the remaining element s. 
The hearing was postponed after P&C’s counsel represented that  for health-related reasons, 
the company’s president --  who was expec ted to be a key witness -- was unable to attend. 
SSA  then filed two motions -- one for summary relief  on the remaining elements of the claim 
and the other to dismiss the case with prejudice for failure to prosecute. 
We grant the motion for summary relief, thereby denying the appeal.  We 
consequently dismiss as moot the motion to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. 
The reader will note that this  case  has been docketed as CBCA 391, whereas our 
earlier  decision was issued in  GSBCA 16363-SSA.  On January 6,  2007, pursuant to section 
847 of the  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, 
the General Services Board of Contract App eals (GSB CA) was terminated and its cases, 
personnel,  and other resou rces were transferred to a newly-established Civilian Board of 
Contract  Appeals  (CBCA).  The case remains as it was;  the docket number has been changed 
to reflect the transfer to the new Board. 
Undisputed Facts 
The following facts were set out as undisputed in our decision which is reported at 
06-2 BCA ¶ 33,300.  Neither party has taken issue with  our characterization of the facts as 
undisputed.  We restate the  facts here,  eliminating the references to the record (which may 
be found in the earlier decision). 
On May 30, 2001, SSA awarded to  P&C contract number 0600-01-55002, for nursing 
service s at the Harold Washington Social Security Center (HWSSC) in Chicago, Illinois. 
The contract was for the period from June 1, 2001, through  May 31, 2002, and contained  four 
one-year  option periods.   SSA exercised the  options for the first option period (June 1, 2002, 
through  May 31, 2003) and the  second option period (June 1, 2003, through May 31,  2004). 
The contract required  P&C to provide both general and occupational health nursing 
services  and emergency occupational health nursing services.  Included among the  fir st 
category  was ass istance  in the performance of clinical activities such as “administer 
immunizations,  inoculations, allergy treatments  and medications in the Health Unit; perform 
first  aid for minor burns, cuts, bruises and sprains; and obtain patient histories.”  Also among 
the first category’s tasks were “ensur[ing] that medications,  selective supplies (syringes, etc.), 
medical  records and files are ma intained in secure, locked storage” and “[p]rovid[ing] 
informal  training classes or  sessions to Government employees at  the HWSSC or at any other 
location  within the Chicago metropolitan area, as directed by the Government Project 
Officer.” 

 
   
3 CBCA 391 
The contract required P&C to “furnish qualified nurses as required to in sur e full 
coverage  at the Health Unit from 6:00 AM to 6:00 PM  daily, Monday through Friday, 
excluding Federal holidays.”  P&C  had to provide one  registered nurse (RN) on a full-time 
basis  (eight hours per day).  “Additionally,  the contractor [had to]  provide any other nurse(s) 
necessary  to provide full coverage during scheduled break and lunch periods  and during the 
full-time  RN[’]s off work  hours.  The additional nurse(s) may be either full-time or part-time 
RNs or Licensed Practical Nurses (LPNs), at the contractor’s discretion.” 
The  c ontract included, for each contract year, one hourly price for provid ing R N 
services  and another for providing LPN  services.  The price for RN services  was higher than 
the price for LPN services in each contract year.  For  the initial contract period, the  hourly 
prices were $34.63  for RN services and $29.58 for LPN services.   For the first option year, 
the hourly prices were $38.09  for RN services and $32.54 for  LPN services.  For the second 
option year, the hourly prices were $41.09 for RN services and $35.79 for LPN services. 
The contract stated that the Department  of Labor had issued  a wage determination to 
cover  the wages  and health and welfare benefits to be paid  to RNs and LPNs who performed 
services  under the contract.  The wage determination applicable at the beginning of the 
contract  required that each “Registered Nurse I” be paid at least $16.26 per hour and that 
each  “Licensed Practical  Nurse I” be paid at  least $12.14 per hour.  The wage determination 
also  requir ed that $1.92 be paid per hour for health and welfare benefits for each of  th e 
nurses. 
P&C’s  president, Patricia A. Maddox, understood when P&C offered to perform the 
contract  that the contract required the provi sion of “[b]asic registered nurse one” services. 
The contract required P&C to identify key personnel, and the contracto r named Joann e 
Colclasure,  RN, and  Margaret Gilbertsen, RN, as its key personnel.  Beginning in June 2001, 
P&C  provided these individuals  to perform  work under the contract.  The contract permitted 
the provision of substitutes for the key  personnel when the individuals  named “are unable or 
unavailable to perform the required work on any given day.” 
The contract did not provide for a physician to direct the  nurses or  to work with the 
nurses.  Indeed, it made no mention of a physician’s presence in the Health Unit. 
The contract stated that performance  of P&C’s work “shall be subject to the technical 
direction  of the Project  Officer.”  The  contract identified the project officer as Sonya Peques. 
(Her  last name is spelled “Pegues,” however,  throughout the  parties’ filings and in most of 
the appeal file documents.)   “Technical direction must be within the  general scope of work 
stated  in the contract.”  If the contractor believed that any instruction or  direction  issued by 

 
4 CBCA 391 
the project officer was not authorized, it could ask the contracting offic er “to modify the 
contract  accordingly.”  If the contracting officer took action and the contractor disagreed with 
that action, the contractor could initiate a dispute. 
On November 10,  2003, P&C submitted a “cost impact statement” to  the contracting 
officer.   In the cost impact statement, P&C sought adjustm ents t o the contract amount on 
seven  separate bases, which we call elements of  the claim and  which are set out in numbered 
paragraphs below. 
(1) In the cost impact statement,  P&C alleged that in  July 2001, the SSA project 
officer  had directed the contractor to cease providing LPN services after  August 2001.  P&C 
stated: 
As part of its bid pr ocess on contract Number 0600-01-55002, P&C used 
LPNs  to the maximum amount allowable under the law.  When P&C was 
informed  by Ms. Pegues, the Government Technical Director, that P&C could 
no longer provide LPNs,  the Government’s actions severely impacted  P&C’s 
bottom line.  LPNs were more plentiful  and cheaper to hire.  The inability to 
provide  these personnel hurt P&C, as did the fact that the escalating  costs in 
a market where the demand for RNs was at an all time high.  S SA never 
compensated P&C for the increased costs incurred due to this change. 
P&C  claimed that the impact of the  project officer’s directive was  as follows:  For the initial 
contract  year (beginning on June  1, 2001, and ending on May 31, 2002), 1385.75 hours were 
worked  by RNs which cou ld have been worked by LPNs, and multiplying this number of 
hours  by the difference in  hourly rat es between RNs and LPNs, and adding markups for 
general  and administrative expenses, an adjustment of  $14,151.28 was due.  Similarly, the 
figures  for the first option period were  1616 hours and an adjustment of  $14,802.29, and the 
figures  for the second option period through October 31, 2003, were 753.75 hours and an 
adjustment of $8321.40. 
(2) In the cost  impact statement, P&C alleged  that because of the project officer’s 
directive,  the contractor had to fire Ms. Er’na Davis,  an LPN,  and that as a consequence of 
the ensuing unemployment hearing involving Ms. Davis, the ra te charged P&C for 
unemployment  insurance premiums sextupled.  For the period from January 1, 2002 , to 
“present,” P&C sought an adjustment in the contract amount of $22,941.57. 
In its complaint, however,  P&C a lleged that in following the project officer’s 
directive,  it “told the LPN(s) that it had on staff that  . . . they  would no longer be allowed to 
work  at the HWSSC.”  (Emphasis added.)  P&C also alleged in it s complaint  that “[n]ot 

 
 
5 CBCA 391 
allowing  LPNs, triggered unemployment hearings,” with the last word being plural. 
Additionally,  P&C President Maddox has acknowledged that during the period when t he 
cont rac t with SSA was in effect, she fired other employees – key personnel Joanne 
Colclasure  and Margaret Gilbertsen for not following protocol or f or fai lure to make her 
aware  of issues, Dawn Monk for issues  involving her arrival for scheduled shifts,  and Marge 
Bunnell because she had a conflict with an SSA employee named Jackie. 
(3) In the cost  impact statement, P&C alleged  that the work performed by nurses 
under  the contract should have been classified as Registered  Nurs e II (occupation code 
12312),  rather than Registered Nurse I (occupation code 12311).  P&C said that it was 
concerned  that if the Department of Labor were to determine that  the nurses were performing 
Registered  Nurse II duties, but were being paid at Registered Nurse  I rates,  “the contractor 
places  itself in harm[’]s way and faces possible penalties and fines.”  As  a result , the 
contractor  said, it had to pay n urs es at a higher rate than anticipated.  For the period from 
June  1, 2003, thro ugh October 31, 2003, multiplying the number of hours worked by RNs 
by the difference in hourly rate  between $60 and the contract  rate of $41.09, P&C sought an 
adjustment in the contract amount of $36,463.40. 
P&C  paid its RNs between $22.50 per hour  and $24.50 per  hour in 2003.  The range 
was $22 to $25 per hour  during the period from contract inception to the date on which the 
cost impact statement was submitted to the contracting officer. 
(4) The contract  required that “[a]ll technical directions shall be issued  in writing 
by the Project Officer or shall be confirmed by him/her in  writing within 5 working days  after 
issuance.”   In the cost im pact statement, P&C alleged that a major issue during contract 
performance  w as the  project officer’s refusal to put directions in writing.  The project 
officer’s  failure to put directions in writing was a particular problem, according to the 
contractor,  because nurses are accustomed to operating under writt en orders.  “The 
Government’s  inability to follow procedur es as out lined in its own contract increased the 
cont ractor’s  administrative costs as the contractor was forced to accept the incre ase d 
administrative  responsibilities in order to retain personnel  and comply with other rules and 
regulations.”   Allegedly, the project officer’s actions caused one RN to  resign, which  in turn 
caused P&C “to lose revenue and increased administrative costs.”  P&C  maintained that  it 
lost 193 billable hours “due to loss of RN  caused by  Govt interference,” with a resulting cost 
impact of $9910.91. 
(5) In the cost impact statement, P&C sought  an adjustment of $68,073.60 to the 
contract amount for 1021 hours of “additional administrative costs.”  Specifically, P&C 
alleged  that it spent 300 additional hours during the  initial contract  period, at a rate of $52 

 
6 CBCA 391 
per hour; 345 additional hours during the first option year, at a rate of $56  per hour; and 376 
hours during the second option year to “present,” at a rate of $58 per hour. 
(6) In September 2003, an SSA employee who was a collea gue of the project 
officer  told P&C t o acce pt delivery of flu vaccine.  P&C’s president and the contracting 
officer  then engaged in a discussion about whether P&C’s nurses could admin ister the 
vaccine  in the absence of a licensed physician.  P&C m aintains that its president incurred 
costs  in researching whether the presence of a physician  was necessary for the administration 
of the vaccine. 
In the cos t impact statement, P&C alleged that it had “increased legal a nd 
administrative  costs due to the inability to rely upon the Governme nt.”  The contractor 
appears  to allege that these costs were related to the dispute about the necessity of the 
presence  of a physic ian.  P&C sought $46,020.82 for “unpaid directives.”  The invoices 
involved  in this matter were  dated June 4,  2003 ($1413.27); June 4, 2003 ($1854.62); June 
30, 2003 ($12,797.31); July 8, 2003 ($1007.86); August 7, 2003 ($3328.16); August 14, 2003 
($4265.77);  September 26, 2003 ($4265.77); September 28, 2003  ($7567.92);  and October 
30, 2003 ( $1850.00).  The remainder of the total consists of markups for general and 
administrative expenses and profit. 
(7) P&C  also sought $2818.80 for preparation of the cost impact  statement itself. 
The total amount sought was $223,504.07. 
On January 30,  2004, P&C submitted to the contracting officer a certification  of its 
November  1 6, 20 03, cost impact statement, designated the statement as a claim, and 
requested a decision on it. 
On February 10, 2004, the contracting  officer denied the claim.  The contracting 
officer  reasoned as described below, with numbered paragraphs corresponding to the 
elements  of the claim.  P&C does not accept the reasoning, but we set it out in the intere st 
of making clear the stated justification for the denial. 
(1) As to the directive to preclude use o f LPNs, whether such a directive 
was ever issued  has not  been shown, but if it was, it had no cost impact because P&C 
properly  billed for RN services  at the contract rate  for those services and was properly 
reimbursed at that rate. 
(2) As to the  increased unemployment  insurance premiums, all personnel 
costs,  including unemployment insurance prem iums , are the contractor’s 
responsibility. 

 
7 CBCA 391 
(3) As to the alleged misclassificatio n of nurse s, the scope of work was 
included in the original solicitation and contract and should have been addressed prior 
to award of the contract.  Further, the rate of $60 per hour proposed for Re gistered 
Nurse IIs is unsupported. 
(4) As to costs allegedly incurred because of the project officer’s 
interference, the project officer has presented a different version of the occurrences 
and the allegations have not been substantiated. 
(5, 6) As to alleged additional administrative costs, “[t]he amount s claimed 
. . . are not supported by  any documentation other than your narrative.  The hours and 
rates  id entifi ed appear to be arbitrary figures that do not relate to any supportable 
evidence.”   Further, as to any time  P&C devoted to researching whether a  physician 
had to be present for nurses  to administer flu  vaccine, the contractor assumed this task 
voluntarily and was not directed to assume it by any SSA employee. 
(7) The cost impact statement  “is for  the most part totally unsupported by 
the documentation provided.” 
With  regard to the remaining elements of the claim, SSA, in its currently- pendin g 
motion  for summary relief, maintains that P&C “h as co nsistently demonstrated a lack of 
evidence  to support its claims.”  Respondent’s  Second Motion for Summary Relief (Second 
Motion)  at 4.  With regard to this assertion, SSA urges that certain facts are  uncontested and 
P&C  disagrees.  In the discussion portion of this  decision, we evaluate  the parties’ positions 
on these matters. 
Discussion 
As we explained in our decision on SSA’s first motion for summary relief: 
Resolving  a dispute on a motion for summar y relief i s appropriate when the 
moving  party  is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, based on undisputed 
material  facts.  The moving party  bea rs the burden of demonstrating the 
absence  of genuine issues of material fact.   All justifiable inferences must be 
drawn  in favor of the nonmovant.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 47 7 U.S. 31 7 
(1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242 (1986).  The purpose of 
summary  relief  is not to deprive a litigant of a hearing, but to avoid an 
unnecessary  hearing when only one outcome can  ensue.  Vivid  Technologies, 
Inc. v. American Science & Enginee ring, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 806 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). 

 
 
8 CBCA 391 
06-2 BCA at 165,135. 
As to elem ent  2, the contention that P&C’s unemployment insurance premiums 
sextupled  because the project officer’s directive that  P&C cease providing LPNs caused the 
contractor  to fire Ms. Er’na Davis, SSA says that P&C has not at any time “suppl[ied] 
documentation to show how its rate ros e from .6%  to 3.6% or provide[d] evidence to 
demonstrate that it was related, in any way, to the nurse’s firing.”  Second Motion at 9.  In 
response,  P&C shows tha t its rat e rose from 0.6% to 3.6% during the first quarter of 2003 
and then fell back to 2.4% during the third and fourth quarters of that year.  Additionally, 
P&C  notes that in its earlier decision, the Board wrote that on this ele ment, “ P&C will 
ultimately  have large burdens to meet.   It will have to prove that the directive  was issued; that 
as a consequence of the directive, it could not place Ms.  Davis in another position; and  that 
its unemployment insurance premi ums sextupled solely because of the hearing on her 
application  for unemployment benefits.”  06-2 BCA at 165,136.  P&C says that it “is 
prepared  to meet that  burden, and should not be deprived of  its right to trial simply because 
such  burde n is heav y.”  Appellant’s Opposition to Respondent’s Second Motion for 
Summary Relief (Appellant’s Opposition) at 7. 
The rise and fall of P&C’s unemployment in surance pr emium rate, standing alone, 
does  not prove the three matters which, as we  explained, it is P&C’s burden to establish.  The 
contractor’s  statement that it is prepared  to meet th e burden does not suffice to defeat the 
motion,  either.  As the Supreme  Court  has explained, summary judgment must be entered, 
“after adequate time for discovery and upon motion” -- both of which are present here -­
against  a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establi sh the 
existence  of an element essential to that party’s case, and on  which that  party 
will bear the bu rden of proof at trial.  In such a situation, there can be “no 
genuine  issue as to any materi al fact,” since a complete failure of proof 
concerning a n essen tial element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily 
renders all other facts immaterial. 
Celotex  Corp., 477 U.S. 317, 322.  See  also Ferring B.V.  v. Barr Laboratories, Inc. , 437 F.3d 
1181,  1193 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Conclusory allegations and attorney arguments are insufficient 
to overcome a motion for summary judgment.”)  Because P&C has failed to ma ke th e 
requisite showing that  it can establish any of the three matters we identified as  essential to 
proving  this element of the claim, we grant SSA’s motion for  summary relief on this element. 
As to element 4, the contention that the project officer’s action caused one RN to 
resign,  which in turn caused P&C to lose 193 billable  hours  with a resulting cost impact of 
$9910.91,  SSA says that the claim is calculated illogically.  The contract required P&C to 

  
      
9 CBCA 391 
have  a nurse on duty during contract hours, SSA maintains, and it was entitled to bill the 
agency  for hours  worked by its nurses, not -- as the contractor has done here -- to bill the 
agency  for hours which were not worked by a nurse.  In response, P&C  simply reiterates its 
argument  as to entitle ment; it does  not even address SSA’s assertion that the claim is 
calculated illogically.  
Even if P&C can  prove that the project officer’s action caused an RN  to resign, this 
response  is insufficient to  defeat the agency’s motion.  To receive an equitable adjustment 
from  t he Government, a contractor must show resultant injury as well as liability and 
causation. Servidone Construction Corp. v. United States , 931 F.2d 860, 861 (Fed. Cir. 
1991)  (citing Wun derlich Contracting Co. v. United States , 351 F.2d 956, 968 (Ct. Cl. 
1965)).   By failing to add ress SSA’s p oint that the claim is calculated illogically, and by 
failing  to offer justification for its calculation, P&C has not  met its burd en of showing a 
rational  way of determining the value of whatever  injury may have resulted from the project 
officer’s  action.  We therefore grant SSA’s motion for summary relief on this element.  06-2 
BCA  at 165,136 (granting summary relief as to elem ent 1 of claim because P&C’s way of 
calculating  damages “is not a rational measure of increased  costs”); see also Long Lane  L.P. 
v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 15334, 04-2 BC A ¶ 32,659, reconsideration 
denied , 04-2 BCA ¶ 32,751,  aff’d sub nom. Long Lane L. P. v. Bib b, 159 Fed. Appx. 189 
(Fed.  Cir. 2005) (granting renewed motion for summary relief where appellant, after being 
accorded  ample opportunity to present sufficient  evidence to avoid  denial of appeal on such 
a motion, failed to make such a presentation). 
As to element 5, the contention that P&C is  entitled to  an adjustment of $68,073.60 
to the contract amount for 1021 hours of “additional administra tive costs,” SSA says that 
“P&C  has not identified how SSA’s alleged wrongful actions caused it to incur  those  hours, 
nor provided proof that anyone worked them. . . .  Significantly, [P&C]  has not identified the 
individual  expenses that constitute this very large  claim.”  Second Motion at  6.  In response, 
P&C  asserts  that SSA has  failed to comply with 48 CFR 19.812(c) (2001), which provides: 
To the extent consistent with the contracting  activ ity’s capability and 
resources,  8(a) contractors [1] furnishing requirements shall be afforded 
produc tion and technical assistance, including, when appropria te, identification 
of causes of deficiencies in  their products and suggested corrective action  to 
make such products acceptable. 
1 An 8(a) contractor is a firm which was awarded  a contract under section 8(a) 
of the Small  Business Act (15 U.S.C. § 637(a)).  As to the contract in dispute, P&C was  such 
a contractor. 

 
10 CBCA 391 
P&C  does not address SSA’s  assertion that P&C has  not provided proof that anyone worked 
the hours allegedly incurre d as a result of the agency’s actions and has not identified the 
individual  expenses that c onst itute this element of the claim.  Consequently, we resolve 
SSA’s  motion fo r summary relief as to this element in the same way that we resolved the 
motion  as to element 4:  the motion is granted bec ause e ven if P&C is correct as to 
entitlement,  it cannot prevail since it has not met its burden of showing that there is a valid 
means of measuring the value of whatever injury resulted. 
As to element 6, the contention  that P&C incurred increased legal  and administrative 
costs  in the amount of $46,020.82 in responding to “unpaid directives,” apparently related 
to the dispute about whether flu  vaccine could be administered if a physician was not present, 
SSA  says that P&C’s contractual duties were not dependent on the presence  of a physician 
and that the agency did not require, acquiesce in, or accept  the benefit of additional work  in 
this regard.  In response, P&C maintains  that “[i]t is a  requirement of state law that nurses 
operate  under written orders and those orders must  be issued by a physician,” and in support 
of that position cites a provision  of the Illinois Nursing and Advanced Nursing Practice Act. 
Appellant’s Opposition at 5. The provision states: 
“Regi stered  professional nursing practice” includes all nursing specialiti es and 
means  the performance  of any nursing act based upon professional knowledge, 
judgment,  and skills acquired by me ans of co mpletion of an approved 
registered  professional nursing education program.  A registered professional 
nurse provides nursing care . . . that  includes but is not limited to: . . . (4) the 
administration of medications  and treatments as prescribed by a physician 
licensed  to practice medicine in  all of its branches [or by any of  a number of 
other licensed health professionals] . . . . 
225 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 65/5-10(l) (West 2007). 
Evidently , as to this element of the claim, there is a dispute as to a threshold i ssu e 
which  is essentially one of law and not fact.  This issue is appropri ate for disposition on a 
motion  for summar y relie f.  Anderson , 477 U.S. 242, 247-49.  While the provision of the 
Illinois  Nursing and Advanced Nursing Practice Act cited by P&C requires  that a registered 
nurse  administ er medi cations as prescribed by a licensed physician or other health 
professional,  it does  not, contrary to the  contractor’s interpretation, require that a physician 
be pre sent while the nurse is administering medications.  In this regard, it is instruct ive t o 
compare  the provision  with another provision in  the Illinois Nursing Act, 225 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
Ann.  65/15-25, pertaining to certified registered nurse anesthetists.  The lat ter provision 
permits such a nurse to provide anesthesia services  pursuant to the order of a licensed 
physician  or other health professional.  It additionally mandates that “[f]or anesthesia 

_________________________ 
11 CBCA 391 
services,  an anesthesiologi st, physician, dentist, or podiatrist . . . shall remain physically 
present  and be available on the premis es during the delivery of anesthesia services unless 
[certain  circumstances are present].”  Id. 65/15-25(a); see also  65/15-25(c) ; Polla chek v. 
Department  of Professional Regulation,  854 N.E.2d 721 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).   If in drafting 
the Nursing Act, the Illinois legislatur e had wa nted to require that a physician be present 
when  a registered nurse was administering medications, the legislature  surely knew  how to 
do so.  And it did not write the law in that way. 
Because  element  6 of P&C’s claim is  premised on the theory that the contractor was 
forced  to perform additional work as a result of  SSA’s demand  that P&C’s nurses administer 
flu vaccines when a physician was not present, and the  agency’s  demand was consistent with 
the law P&C says was applicable to the situation, this element, too, fails as a  matter of  law. 
We grant SSA’s motion for summary relief as to this element. 
In our decision  on the agency’s first motion  for summary relief, we reserved judgment 
on element 7 of the claim, the contention that P&C  is entitled to  the costs of creating its cost 
impact  statement, until after the parties had addressed the element.   As to e lement 7, SSA 
says that because the  other elements of the claim have no merit, there can be no ground for 
the contractor’s recovering the costs of preparing  th e statement.  P&C responds that the 
statement contains information  that the contracting officer told  the contractor to present to 
have  its claim considered.  The claim has now been conside red and found wanting.  We 
therefore  agree with SSA that ev en if the cos ts of preparing a valid claim are recoverable, 
there can be no recovery of those costs here. 
Decision 
SSA’s  motion for summary relief is  granted.  As a result,  all of the elements of P&C’s 
claim are denied and the appeal is DENIED . 
Because  the case has now  been resolved, we do  not need to consider SSA’s motion 
to dismiss for failure to prosecute.  That motion is dismissed as moot. 
STEPHEN M. DANIELS 
Board Judge 

_________________________ _________________________ 
12 CBCA 391 
We concur: 
ROBERT W. PARKER CATHERINE B. HYATT 
Board Judge Board Judge