ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 
 
OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE WOODROW 
 
 On April 12, 2024, appellant, Penna Group LLC, filed a motion for voluntary 
dismissal of its appeals.  Penna Group represented that the parties had entered into a 
settlement agreement, dated February 1, 2024, and that, on March 8, 2024, the 
government had made payment of the settlement amount to Penna’s attorney of record, 
Neel, Hooper & Banes, P.C.  Subsequently, on April 16, 2024, the Board dismissed 
these appeals with prejudice.  The full text of the Board’s order states:  “The dispute 
has been settled.  These appeals are dismissed with prejudice.” 
 
 On July 17, 2024, the Board received the Receiver’s Motion to Vacate 
Settlement and Reopen Appeal.  The motion was filed on behalf of Robert Berleth, the 
appointed Receiver in Cause No. 153-30479B-18, styled Alliance Legal Solutions, 
LLC v. Penna Group, LLC, et al., in the 153rd Judicial District Court in Tarrant 
County, Texas.  According to the motion, on January 24, 2023, the 153rd Judicial 
District Court appointed Mr. Berleth as Receiver over judgment debtors 
Michael Evangelista-Ysasaga, the Penna Group a/k/a Pana Group, and the 
Evangelista-Ysasaga Firm, LLP.  To underscore an important point, Mr. Berleth is not 
a federal bankruptcy receiver. 
 
Appeals of - )  
 )  
Penna Group, LLC ) ASBCA Nos. 61708-ADR, 61641-ADR 
 61642-ADR 
 )  
Under Contract No. W9126G-10-C-0075 )  
   
APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT: Bryant S. Banes, Esq. 
Sean D. Forbes, Esq. 
Robert A. Magnuson, Esq. 
    Neel, Hooper & Banes, P.C. 
    Houston, TX 
 
APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: Michael P. Goodman, Esq. 
    Engineer Chief Trial Attorney 
 Jennifer M. Dorsey, Esq. 
Blake M. Hedgecock, Esq. 
    Engineer Trial Attorneys 
    U.S. Army Engineer District, Fort Worth 

2 
 In the motion, Mr. Berleth contends that Michael Evangelista-Ysasaga, the 
owner and representative of appellant, Penna Group, LLC, did not possess the 
authority to negotiate or sign the settlement agreement on behalf of Penna Group.  
Mr. Berleth further contends that Mr. Evangelista-Ysasaga did so by concealing the 
receivership from the Board∗ and by failing to disclose the settlement negotiations 
to the receiver.  Finally, Mr. Berleth contends, based upon the Judicial District Court’s 
order and undisclosed case law from the Supreme Court of Texas, that the settlement 
agreement is void. 
 
DECISION 
 
 The Board does not possess jurisdiction to grant the relief requested by the 
receiver, Mr. Berleth.  This is because the withdrawal of an appeal, followed by a 
dismissal of the appeal, without more, results in the Board no longer having 
jurisdiction over the appeal.  Phoenix Petroleum Co., ASBCA No. 45414, 02-1 BCA 
¶ 31,835 at 157,285. 
 
Board Does Not Possess Jurisdiction Over the Settlement Agreement 
 
 The voluntary withdrawal of an appeal by the contractor deprives the Board of 
jurisdiction and leaves the contractor in the position of not having filed the appeal.  
Charles G. Williams Const., Inc., ASBCA Nos. 51329, 51637, 99-2 BCA ¶ 30,409 
at 150,338 (holding once appeal is dismissed with prejudice it as if the appeal was 
never brought).  The Board’s April 16, 2024 dismissal of ASBCA Nos. 61708, 61641, 
and 61642 dismissed the appeals with prejudice and did not retain jurisdiction 
to enforce the settlement agreement.  Consequently, the Board does not possess 
jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes concerning the contract at issue here – the private 
settlement agreement between Penna Group LLC and the United States Army Corps of 
Engineers.  Id. 
 
 A dismissal order must incorporate the terms of a settlement agreement in order 
for it to be enforceable in the same action.  Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
511 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1994).  This is equally true with respect to dismissals of Board 
appeals.  Erlich Contracting, Inc., ASBCA 50867, 02-2 BCA ¶ 31,950 at 157,843-44 
(distinguishing a dismissal with prejudice from an enforceable judgment on the merits, 
such as a decision in the nature of a consent judgment).  In this appeal, we dismissed 
the appeals with prejudice with an order stating “[t]he dispute has been settled.  These 
appeals are dismissed with prejudice.”  (Bd. Order dtd. April 16, 2024).  According 
to the dismissal order, the Board did not expressly or impliedly retain jurisdiction over 
the matter or over the terms of the settlement agreement.  Accord Poly Design, Inc., 
 
∗ Indeed, the present motion is the first the Board has heard anything about a possible 
receivership in this matter. 

3 
ASBCA No. 48591 et al., 01-2 BCA ¶ 31,644 at 156,303 (holding that appellant was 
not a prevailing party pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, because “[t]he 
Board did not approve or assume oversight of the settlement or incorporate the terms 
of the settlement agreement in the order of dismissal”).  Therefore, we do not possess 
jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to the settlement agreement. 
 
No Third Party Practice Before the Board 
 
 Even if the terms of the Board’s dismissal order incorporated the terms of the 
settlement agreement, the Board does not possess the authority to entertain a  
third-party challenge to the terms of the settlement agreement.  Simply put, the 
Contract Disputes Act (CDA) does not grant the Board authority to engage in  
third-party practice.  41 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq.; Gulf Apparel Corp., ASBCA 
No. 27784, 83-2 BCA ¶ 16,823 at 83,691.  As we held in Bravo Manufacturing, Inc.: 
 
It is settled that this Board does not engage in third-party 
practice and that our rules do not provide for impleading, 
permissively joining or interpleading third parties as under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 14, 20 and 22. 
 
ASBCA No. 45293, 94-3 BCA ¶ 27,236 at 135,718; see also Thorington Electric, 
ASBCA No. 56895, 10-2 BCA ¶ 34,511 at 170,177 (party before the Board other than 
the government must be a contractor); Sentry Ins., ASBCA No. 21918, 77-2 BCA 
¶ 12,721 at 61834 (surety has no standing); Safeway Moving & Storage Corp., 
ASBCA Nos. 12167, 12401, 68-1 BCA ¶ 6852 at 31,687 (no interpleader at Board). 
 
 In American Export Group International Services, Inc./Zublin Delaware, Inc., 
JV, a subcontractor moved to intervene in an appeal as a creditor of the appellant.  We 
denied the motion, holding that the CDA does not authorize third-party intervention 
before the Board.  ASBCA No. 42616, 95-2 BCA ¶ 27,615 at 137,633.  In Leland 
Stanford Junior University, ASBCA No. 46971, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,335 at 136,232, 
a plaintiff in a qui tam suit in Federal District Court against the appellant moved 
to vacate a settlement agreement between the appellant and the Navy.  We held that 
the CDA does not provide for third-party practice before the Board and the Board 
lacked jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to the scope or terms of the settlement 
agreement between the parties.  As the Board explained: 
 
Whether the settlement agreement which led the parties to 
seek dismissal of the appeals before us also resolved other 
disputes between the parties or was improper with respect 
to issues not before us, is not a matter for our 
consideration.  When and if the settlement agreement is 
held forth in another action as a bar or defense, the forum 

4 
in which such assertion is made must determine the effect 
of the settlement agreement upon the issues before it. 
 
95-1 BCA ¶ 27,335 at 136,233. 
 
 Here, it is undisputed that the receiver, Mr. Berleth, is not a contractor and not a 
party in the appeals.  Although Mr. Berleth contends that he stands in the shoes of 
appellant as appellant’s receiver in bankruptcy, it is undisputed that Mr. Berleth was 
not appointed until after appellant filed its claims with the contracting officer and after 
appellant filed its appeals with the Board.  Mr. Berleth was appointed as receiver on 
January 24, 2024.  Appellant filed its initial claim with the contracting officer on 
June 18, 2015, and filed subsequent claims on June 29, 2015 and April 3, 2018.  Penna 
Group, LLC, ASBCA No. 61640 et al., 21-1 BCA ¶ 37,917 at 184,146-47.  Appellant 
filed its appeals of those claims on June 8, 2018.  Id. at 184,149.  Therefore, even if a 
court were to conclude that Mr. Berleth had the authority to act on behalf of appellant 
during the settlement negotiations, he was not a party to the appeals. 
 
Texas District Court Retains Exclusive Jurisdiction 
 
 Finally, the terms of the receivership order itself foreclose this Board from 
exercising jurisdiction over this matter.  Paragraph G of the receivership order, 
(entitled Fraudulent Transfer, states that the 153rd Judicial District Court: 
 
shall maintain exclusive jurisdiction over any fraudulent 
transfer litigations brought by the Receiver or Plaintiff.  
The Court shall further maintain exclusive jurisdiction over 
any litigation pertaining to the ownership interests disputed 
during the Receiver’s actions against a relevant third party. 
 
(Order at 8 (emphasis added)). 
 
Mr. Berleth’s motion seeks to vacate the settlement between the government 
and Penna Group LLC on the grounds that Mr. Evangelista-Ysasaga deliberately 
concealed the fact that Penna Group was in receivership and that he had no authority 
to act on behalf of Penna Group LLC (mot. at 3-4).  According to the Court’s order, 
the Texas District Court retains exclusive jurisdiction to entertain such litigation. 
 
Whether the Receiver Has Assumed Appellant’s Claims 
 
 In certain circumstances, the Board’s precedent permits the assignment of an 
appellant’s contract claims to a bankruptcy receiver.  For example, in Certified 
Abatement Techs., Inc., ASBCA No. 39852, 99-1 BCA ¶ 30,389, we explained that the 

5 
Contract Disputes Act permits the transfer of claims relating to Government contracts 
incident to bankruptcy proceedings.  We stated: 
 
For decades this Board has held, on the authority of 
United States Supreme Court and other federal court 
precedents, that transfers of claims under Government 
contracts made incident to bankruptcy - both from the 
debtor to the estate and from the estate to third parties – 
are transfers by operation of law and therefore outside the 
prohibitions of the Assignment of Claims Act, which bars 
only voluntary assignments.  
 
Id. at 150,201 (citations omitted). 
 
 The situation here is different, because this is not a federal bankruptcy case, but 
a state debt collection matter.  Moreover, the Texas court did not appoint Mr. Berleth 
as receiver until after appellant filed its appeals.  Additionally, Mr. Berleth did not 
seek to intervene until after the parties had negotiated their settlement and the Board 
had dismissed the appeals with prejudice.  Finally, neither the Board nor the 
government had notice of appellant’s receivership until Mr. Berleth filed his motion on 
July 17, 2024. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 For these reasons, we deny the Receiver’s Motion to Vacate Settlement and 
Reopen Appeal. 
 
 Dated:  February 20, 2026 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Signatures continued) 
 
 
 
KENNETH D. WOODROW 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 

6 
I concur 
 
 
 
OWEN WILSON 
Administrative Judge 
Acting Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 I concur 
 
 
 
 J. REID PROUTY 
Administrative Judge 
Vice Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 
 
 I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the 
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA Nos. 61708-ADR,  
61641-ADR, 61642-ADR,
 Appeals of Penna Group, LLC, rendered in conformance 
with the Board’s Charter. 
 
 Dated:  February 20, 2026 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PAULLA K. GATES-LEWIS 
Recorder, Armed Services 
Board of Contract Appeals