ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 
Appeals of --
DODS, Inc. 
Under Contract No. W31P4Q-l l-C-0133 
APPEARANCE FOR THE APPELLANT: 
APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ASBCA Nos. 57746, 58252 
1"1r. David Storey 
President 
Raymond M. Saunders, Esq. 
Army Chief Trial Attorney 
LTC Mark A. Ries, JA 
Erica S. Beardsley, Esq. 
Trial Attorneys 
OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE PEACOCK 
These disputes under the captioned contract, for the supply of the center wing 
sections for the government's "workhorse" aerial target system, 
involve an appeal from a 
termination for default for failure to make progress (ASBCA No. 57746) and related 
affirmative contractor claims for alleged delay (ASBCA No. 58252). We deny both 
appeals. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Solicitation and Pre-Contract Communications 
1. The U.S. Army Contracting Command, Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM) 
Contracting Center (the "government") issued Solicitation No. W31P4Q-l O-T-0079 (the 
"solicitation") to procure one first article and eight production units of the center wing section 
for the MQM-107 aerial target system (ATS) on behalf of the Targets Management Office 
(TMO) (R4, tab 2). The ATS is the government's workhorse and most versatile aerial target, 
used for testing and evaluating weapons systems and training military personnel. It is about 
18 feet long with a 10-foot wingspan, is self-propelled by a turbo jet engine, is capable of 
aerodynamic maneuvers sufficient to engage in air-to-air combat training with manned fighter 
jets, and is recoverable for reuse. (R4, tabs 69, 85, 86; tr. 2/192-94) The center wing section 
consists of a panel that is about 5 feet by 3 .5 feet in size and is about 2 inches thick, along with 
the leading edges, which form the curved, aerodynamic shape of the wing front (tr. 2/195-96, 
3/120). 
2. The government distributed the solicitation and its accompanying technical 
data package (TDP) directly to potential contractors on 21 July 2010. The TDP was 

provided only on a compact disc (CD) (hereinafter the "TDP CD"), and contained all 
technical data required to build the center wing section. (Tr. 1/29-30) The paper version 
was not provided to DODS or any other potential contractor (tr. 1133).1 The TDP CD 
contained files in pdf or C4 format (hereinafter "pdf ') consisting of dozens of 
government part number drawings and also contained a "readme" file with instructions 
for accessing the information on the TDP CD and a helpdesk telephone number for 
troubleshooting assistance (tr. 3/199-200). Some of the drawings provided on the TDP 
CD are called digital data drawings, which provided instructions on how to use the 
three-dimensional computer aided design (CAD) models depicting the outer 
surface and 
shape of the center wing section (tr. 2/194, 202, 3/196, 199). 
3. The CAD 
models provided on the TDP CD were developed from, and replaced, 
the original master lines, commonly referred to as Mylars. The IMO stopped using 
Mylars and began including CAD models in the TDP provided to prospective contractors 
in the 1990s because CAD models provide greater accuracy. (Tr. 21198-99, 202) The 
CAD models were meant to be imported into computer numeric control (CNC) milling 
machines, and the CNC milling machines in turn would make molds, otherwise known as 
"tooling" or "special tooling" to make the physical parts for the end item (tr. 2/196, 
199-200). The center wing section could not have been produced without using the CAD 
files provided by the government on the TDP CD (tr. 3/198-99). The CAD files were 
provided in at least six different 
specific CAD programs as well as other neutral, or 
generic, file formats. The neutral formats allowed for the CAD models to be used by 
many CAD programs other than the specific program versions provided on the TDP CD. 
The digital data drawings on the TDP CD provided instructions for using the CAD files. 
(Tr. 2/205-10) 
4. Among the potential contractors sent the solicitation and TDP was a company 
called TTF, LLC (TTF) (tr. 1/31). Although the government sent the solicitation and 
accompanying TDP to TTF, Mr. David Storey acknowledged receipt of the solicitation 
and 
TDP on behalf ofDODS on 27 August 2010 (R4, tab 4 at 28; tr. 1/30-31). 
Mr. Storey is the president or manager of TTF (R4, tabs 78, 80; app. supp. R4, tabs 40, 
41; exs. G-2 at 1, G-5 at 1, G-12 at 1). Mr. Storey is the sole owner of both DODS and 
TTF (R4, tabs 78, 80; exs. G-2 at 1, G-5 at I, G-6 at 3). TTF is located at 1400 Mills 
Highway, Breaux Bridge, Louisiana. DODS consists of a "lean-to" against the side of 
the TTF building with an address of 1402 Mills Highway, Breaux Bridge, Louisiana. 
DODS and TTF operate out of shared office space. (R4, tabs 78, 80) 
5. DODS submitted its unqualified quote in response to the solicitation on 
29 August 
2010 (R4, tabs 4, 78, 80). The government received a total of three quotes in 
response to the solicitation, and awarded a contract to the bidder with the lowest priced 
quote. Within one week of award, the awardee notified the government that it could not 
1 Tab 3 in the Rule 4 file is a physical representation of the data contained on the 
TDPCD. 

produce the center wing section and requested that its contract be cancelled. (R4, tab 5; 
tr. 1132) 
6. On 19 October 2010, while the cancellation of the initial award was processing, 
the contract specialist contacted the next lowest quote, DODS, by email to determine 
whether its quoted price was still valid and to seek assurance that DODS could produce the 
center wing section. The contract specialist informed DODS that the initial awardee was 
unable to perform the contract because it was incapable of producing the required wing 
section, and requested that DODS confirm its ability to produce or access the 
proper 
tooling to make "the main channels (i.e., -15, 
-16, etc.) or the leading edges (i.e., -3, -2, 
etc.) or the bonding for the main body." (R4, tab 5) The contract specialist questioned 
these specific capabilities 
because they directly related to the inability of the initial 
awardee (R4, tab 5; tr. 1/33-35). The channels are extruded parts on the right-hand and 
left-hand sides of the center wing section for interface with the outboard wing assemblies 
(R4, tab 3 at 104; tr. 2/212-13). Extruded parts, generally, are "long narrow item[s] of 
continuous cross-section ... made by forcing a material through a die, such that the material 
takes on the shape of that die" (tr. 2/213). An everyday example of an extruded part is a 
train rail (id.). The channels for the center wing section have a specific cross-section, and 
are therefore not "off-the-shelf' items (tr. 3/208-09). 
7. On 20 October 2010, DODS responded to the contract specialist's 19 October 
2010 email stating that it was "pleased to accept [her] offer" and asking several questions 
regarding the requirement: 
In an effort to expedite the First Article delivery would you 
please request clarity 
for the following questions: 
1. BR-127 is our preferred Adhesive Primer. Is there any 
objections [sic] as MIS-26333K does not identify a primer 
other than 
one compatible to the adhesive system. 
2. Hysol's 9628, FM-132-2, or AF-126-2 for the film 
adhesive or equivalents. 
3. ISO 9001-2000 until November then ISO 9001-2008 for 
our Quality System. 
4. DOD's [sic] Autoclave is rated at 50 PSI.and 350 F. 
MIS-26333K on page 3, Section 3.1.1 requires an 
Autoclave [sic] capable of pressures 10 to 100 PSI at 350 F. 
3 

(R4, tab 6) 
However, the Center Wing Structure Cure Cycle is 
at 260-280 F, 9 F max heat up rate per minute, 10 to 80 PSI, 
for 55-140 minutes. 
Well within our capabilities. Is this acceptable? 
5. A sample part. Can be from a crashed unserviceable unit 
for clarity to engineering drawings. 
8. Also on 20 October 2010, DODS responded to the contract specialist's email 
and affirmed its capability to produce the part (R4, tabs 7, 78, 80). DODS specifically 
assured the contract specialist that, "[ w ]e have the capability or access to or can acquire 
through a vendor the proper tooling to make all the main channels (i.e., -15, -16, etc.) or 
the leading edges (i.e., -3, 
-2, etc.) or the bonding for the main body." DODS also states 
that, "in addition DODS, Inc has a HAAS VF 9 with a bed 36 by 96 inches, [t]hree 
Hydraulic Presses with the largest bed 120 by 36 inches rated at 800 tons, one heat treat 
oven, and two Autoclaves." (R4, tab 7) However, 
although not yet known by the 
contracting officer (CO) TTF, not DODS, owned the hydraulic presses, heat treat oven, 
and autoclaves (R4, tab 54 at 22-25; tr. 1/96, 5/71-78). 
9. On 3 November 2010, the contract specialist provided DODS with responses to 
its questions from 20 October 2010. Of particular relevance to these appeals, DODS was 
informed on 3 November 2010 that the government agreed to DODS' use of the BR-127 
adhesive primer and that the Hysol 9628, FM-132-2, and AF-126-2 film adhesives were 
all suggested by the specification and DODS could choose one to use. (R4, tab 3 at 171, 
tabs 8, 78, 80; tr. 4/11-15) DODS did not seek any additional clarification regarding any 
of the issues raised in its 20 October 2010 email prior to contract award (tr. 1137). 
10. On 3 November 2010, DODS thanked the contract specialist for the 
information and informed her that DODS was ready to proceed with the contract (R4, 
tabs 10, 78, 80). On 29 November 2010, DODS sent an email to the contract specialist 
stating, "[ c ]an you please provide status as I have a few people already working on this 
(at my own risk)" (R4, tab 13). DODS requested updates on the status of the contract 
award several more times between 29 November 2010 and 3 January 2011 (R4, tabs 15, 
17,19,21). 
11. On 4 January 2011, the contract specialist requested that DODS inform the 
government of the date by which DODS would deliver the inspected first article so that 
the contract would reflect accurate dates (R4, tab 22). DODS responded the same day 
that the first article would be complete, including the first article inspection, within 
206 "DARO," or days after receipt of order (R4, tab 23; tr. 1/39). From 4 January 2011, 
206 days would have been 29 July 2011, but 
DODS' email indicated the date of 2 August 
4 

2011 (R4, tab 23). The contract as eventually awarded actually provided DODS more 
time than it requested by setting the first article delivery date as 31 August 2011, or 
217 days after contract award (R 4, tab 1 at 3). 
12. On 21 January 2011, the contract specialist requested that DODS "please 
review the attached contract for errors or changes needed on your end" (R4, tab 26). The 
"attached contract" referred to by the contract specialist and provided to DODS prior to 
contract award was identical to the document contained in the Rule 4 file at tab 1, with 
the exception of signatures and one error noted by DODS and corrected prior to award 
(tr. 1/42-43). On 24 January 2011, DODS responded indicating that DODS had reviewed 
the contract and that the "Contract looks good. I only found one correction and that 
would be the production delivery date of December 31, 2011 (CLIN OOOlAB). That is 
the date the First Article review would be due. The Production is to follow at 113 days or 
April 25, 2012." (R4, tabs 27, 78, 80; tr. 1/40-43) The production delivery date was 
adjusted to 30 April 2012 
before the contract was signed, again providing DODS more 
time that it requested (R4, tab 1 at 4; tr. 1/42-44). 
13. On 26 January 2011, the government awarded Contract No. W31P4Q-11-C-0133 
(the "contract") to DODS (R4, tabs 1, 78, 80). The final signed copy was provided to 
DODS on 27 January 2011 (R4, tab 28). The contract was awarded as a firm fixed-price 
contract with one contract 
line item number (CLIN) 0001, for Part Number 13458239, 
NSN 1560-01-386-8205, the center wing section of an ATS. The CLIN was subdivided into 
two subCLINs OOOlAA and OOOlAB. SubCLIN OOOlAA was for the first article production 
and delivery by 31August2011 at a price of $84,900. SubCLIN OOOlAB was for the 
remaining eight production units at a unit price of $51,900 each, for a total amount for 
subCLIN OOOlAB of $415,200. The total contract price for the first article and the 
production units was $500,100. (R4, tab 1 at 1, 3-4) The contract incorporated by reference 
FAR 52.249-8, DEFAULT (FIXED-PRICE SUPPLY AND SERVICE) (APR 1984) clause. The 
contract also included FAR 52.209-4, FIRST ARTICLE APPROVAL - GOVERNMENT TESTING 
(SEP 1989), ALTERNATE I (JAN 1997) clause. (R4, tab 1 at 17) 
14. The contract provided for government inspection at origin and acceptance at 
destination for both subCLINs. The destination for the first article was designated as 
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, and the destination for the production quantity was 
designated as Fort Bliss, Texas. (R4, tab 1 at 3-4; tr. 1144) Contract administration was 
delegated to the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Dallas (R4, tab 1 at 1; 
tr. 2/8, 4/44). 
15. The contract incorporated by reference FAR 52.246-2, INSPECTION OF 
SUPPLIES-FIXED-PRICE (AUG 1996) clause. This clause stated, in relevant part: 
(b) The Contractor shall provide and maintain an 
inspection system acceptable to the Government.... As part 
of the system, the Contractor shall prepare records evidencing 
5 

all inspections made under the system and the outcome. 
These records shall be kept complete and made available to 
the Government during contract performance and for as long 
afterwards as the contract requires. The Government may 
perform reviews and evaluations as reasonably necessary to 
ascertain compliance with this paragraph. These reviews and 
evaluations shall be conducted in a manner that will not 
unduly delay the contract work. The right of review, whether 
exercised or not, does not relieve the contractor of the 
obligations under the contract. [Emphasis added] 
( c) The Government has the right to inspect and test 
all supplies called for by the contract, to the extent 
practicable, at all places and times, including the period of 
manufacture, and in any event before acceptance. The 
Government shall perform inspections and tests in a manner 
that will not unduly delay the work. The Government 
assumes no contractual obligation to perform any inspection 
and test for the benefit of the Contractor unless specifically 
set forth elsewhere in this contract. 
( d) If the Government performs inspection or test on 
the premises of the Contractor or a subcontractor, the 
Contractor shall furnish, and shall require subcontractors to 
furnish, at no increase in contract price, all reasonable 
facilities and assistance for the safe and convenient 
performance of these duties .... 
(i)( 1) If this contract provides for the performance of 
Government quality assurance at source, and if requested by 
the Government, the Contractor shall furnish advance 
notification of the time (i) when Contractor inspection or tests 
will be performed in accordance with the terms and 
conditions of the contract and (ii) when the supplies will be 
ready for Government inspection. 
(2) The Government's request shall specify the period 
and method of the advance notification and the Government 
representative to whom it shall be furnished. Requests shall 
not require more than 2 workdays of advance notification if 
the Government representative is in residence in the 
6 

Contractor's plant, nor more than 7 workdays in other 
instances. 
(R4, tab 1 at 6) 
16. The contract incorporated by reference FAR 52.246-11, HIGHER-LEVEL 
CONTRACT QUALITY REQUIREMENT (GOVERNMENT SPECIFICATION) (FEB 1999) clause. 
The contract filled-in the clause by specifying that, "THE CONTRACTOR SHALL 
COMPLY WITH THE HIGHER LEVEL CONTRACT QUALITY REQUIREMENT 
ANSl/AQSC Q9002 OR EQUIVALENT." (R4, tab 1at6) The higher level quality 
clause was included because of the critical nature of aircraft parts. Compliance with the 
higher level quality clause required a more structured manufacturing environment. 
(Tr. 1/45, 4/49-50) The higher level quality system requires the contractor to have a 
quality manual and other implementing documents that comply with the quality 
requirement, and requires that the contractor comply with its quality documents 
(tr. 4/142-43). 
17. The contract incorporated by reference FAR 52.242-17, GOVERNMENT DELAY 
OF WORK (APR 1984) clause. This clause stated, in relevant part: 
(a) If the performance of all or any part of the work of 
this contract is delayed or interrupted .... (2) by a failure of 
the Contracting Officer to act within the time specified in this 
contract, or within a reasonable time if not specified, an 
adjustment (excluding profit) shall be made for any increase 
in the cost of performance of this contract caused by the delay 
or interruption and the contract shall be modified in writing 
accordingly. Adjustment shall also be made in the delivery or 
performance dates and any other contractual term or 
condition affected by the delay or interruption. However, no 
adjustment shall be made under this clause for any delay or 
interruption to the extent that performance would have been 
delayed or interrupted by any other cause, including the fault 
or negligence of the Contractor, or for which an adjustment is 
provided or excluded under any other term or condition of 
this contract. 
(b) A claim under this clause shall not be allowed 
( 1) for any costs incurred more than 20 days before the 
contractor shall have notified the Contracting Officer in 
writing of the act or failure to act involved; and (2) unless the 
claim, in an amount stated, is asserted in writing as soon as 
7 

practicable after the termination of the delay or interruption, 
but not later than the day of final payment under the contract. 
(R4, tab 1 at 7) 
18. The contract required that DODS comply with Aerospace Material 
Specification (AMS) 2770, a process specification for the heat treatment of wrought 
aluminum alloy parts (R4, tab 3 at 16-25, tab 70 at 1; tr. 5/32-34). Although some parts 
lists notes within the TDP contained references to the military heat treatment 
specification MIL-H-6088, the technical data parts list (TDPL), incorporated into the 
TDP, dictated which specifications actually applied to the contract (R4, tab 3 at 107; 
tr. 5/31 ). The TDPL lists the drawings and specifications included in the TDP (tr. 5/31 ). 
19. AMS 2770H, paragraph 3.1.2.1, "Heating Media," provided in pertinent part 
that, "[t]he products of combustion and other materials that could contaminate parts shall 
not come into contact with parts" (R4, tab 70 at 2). 
20. AMS 2770H, paragraph 4.1, "Responsibility for Inspection," provided that: 
[T]he processor shall be responsible for the performance of 
all tests and inspections specified herein. The procuring 
activity reserves the right to perform any surveillance or tests 
or inspections of parts, and to review heat treating records and 
results of processor's tests and inspections to verify that heat 
treating conformed to the specified requirements. 
(R4, tab 70 at 8) 
21. The contract directed compliance with 
MIS-26333, a military process 
specification for adhesive bonding requirements for the ATS (R4, tab 3 at 16; tr. 3/8, 
4/13). MIS-26333, paragraph 3.3.4.5, "Controlled area," 
referenced to by the parties as 
"clean room" required that "[t]he application on primer and adhesive films shall take 
place in a clean, protected, dust-free area. The temperature shall be 75 [degrees, plus or 
minus 10 degrees] and the relative humidity shall not exceed 80 percent." (R4, tab 3 
at 155) 
22. MIS-26333K, paragraph 6.2.2, "Approved sources," provided that "[o]nly the 
following listed products are approved for use on the MQM-107 target system." 
Paragraph 6.2.2.1, "Adhesive System A," provided in relevant part: American 
Cyanamid Co., Part Number "FM-123-2, or equal"; Hysol Division, The Dexter Corp., 
Part Number "EA9601, or equal[;] EA9602, or equal"; and Minnesota Mining & Mfg. 
Co., Part Number "AF-126-2, or equal." (R4, tab 3 at 171) The inclusion of "or equal" 
after listing the specific manufacturer and product allowed the contractor to use any of 
8 

the listed products or the updated versions then available from the manufacturer (tr. 2114, 
162, 31105-06, 161, 4/14-15, 5/8-9, 23). 
23. Shortly after award of the contract, the contract specialist queried DODS 
regarding its capability to produce the 
center wing section (R4, tab 30; tr. 1/49). On 
8 February 2011, DODS sent an email to 
the contract specialist in response to questions 
about DODS' capability to perform the contract work and produce the center wing 
section as required by the contract. In the email, DODS affirmed that "DODS has the 
capability to manufacture this item in-house. DODS is in the process of quoting details 
and materials, designing the tooling .... Will probably outsource Skin Cleaning and 
Adhesive Primer application." (R4, tabs 30, 78, 80) 
24. Unknown at that time to the contract specialist or the CO, or anyone else at 
the buying command, DODS actually consisted only of a "lean-to" against the side of the 
building owned by TTF (R4, tabs 78, 80; tr. 1/96, 5/57-58). DODS had insufficient 
manufacturing space, facilities, or equipment of its own to manufacture the center wing 
section (R4, tab 54 at 22-25; tr. 5171-78). 
25. On 7 April 2011, a DCMA Quality Assurance Representative (QAR), held a 
"QA Only Post-Award Conference" with DODS (R4, tab 32; tr. 5/138). A QA only 
post-award conference is one of the DCMA's surveillance mechanisms to ensure the 
quality of a product, and is held only pursuant to and consistent with internal DCMA 
policy. 
26. Among the matters discussed at the post-award conference and recorded on 
the Post-Award Conference Record were the following: Mr. Storey stated that DODS 
was preparing requests for quotes (RFQs) and the QAR reminded DODS to provide 
copies of all released purchase orders (POs) to the QAR for review and delegation 
determination; Mr. Storey twice stated, without qualification, that DODS would meet the 
31 August 2011 First Article delivery date; the QAR noted that as of the date of the 
conference, there was no production and no production employees in DODS plant; 
Mr. Storey stated that no "special tooling" would be necessary to manufacture the subject 
item; the QAR reminded DODS that its heat treating process and equipment must be 
validated and certified before being placed in the production flow; the QAR discussed the 
contract's higher level quality requirement, and DODS stated it understood; DODS 
expressed the need for clarification concerning a drawing, and the QAR advised DODS 
to contact engineering support for the buying command for clarification (R4, tabs 32, 78, 
80; app. supp. R4, tab 7; tr. 51139-58). 
27. DODS was required to forward POs to the QAR so that the QAR could verify 
that the contract requirements were actually included in the PO and to determine whether 
the item or service that DODS was purchasing required a DCMA QAR to visit and 
inspect that vendor (R4, tab 1 at 6, tab 32 at 1; tr. 41103-06). The contract required 
9 

DODS to flow down the quality and inspection requirements to any vendor or 
subcontractor. 
28. At no time prior to 7 April 2011 did DODS inform the government or DCMA 
that DODS' work on the contract was delayed while waiting for the post-award 
conference (R4, tabs 78, 80; tr. 1/85-86, 2/138-40, 5/155-58). On 7 April 2011, during 
the post-award conference, DODS twice specifically stated, without qualification, that it 
would meet the first article delivery date of 31 August 2011 and made no reference 
regarding any alleged government delay (R4, tabs 32, 78, 80; app. supp. R4, tab 7; 
tr. 5/155-58). In fact, the first time that DODS raised the timing of the post-award 
conference as an alleged government delay was in a letter to the government on 6 July 
2011 (R4, tabs 42, 78, 80; tr. 1/85-86, 2/138-40, 51155-58). The timing of the post-award 
conference did not delay DODS performance (tr. 5/155-58). No contract clause or other 
direction from the CO required that a post-award conference be held. 
29. Following receipt of a contractor's production plan, the DCMA QAR 
establishes "GMIPs" or government mandatory inspection points, by noting those points 
or processes during production for which the QAR requires advance notice and the 
opportunity to witness. These GMIPs do not hold up production. The DCMA QAR 
cannot notify the contractor regarding those inspection points without knowing the 
contractor's production plan. Once the DCMA QAR receives the production plan, the 
DCMA QAR can notify the contractor of the inspection points, or GMIPs, and then the 
contractor must notify the DCMA QAR at least seven days in advance of performing one 
of the GMIP processes. The notification allows but does not require, the DCMA QAR to 
be present to witness the process, but does not hold up the contractor's production. There 
is no evidence that DODS provided DCMA with any production plan prior to its 20 July 
2011 response to the cure notice, as discussed below. (Tr. 4/94-97, 51108-09) 
DODS' Request for Assistance - Hidden Line 
30. On 16 May 2011, DODS emailed a letter to the former contract specialist and 
raised for the first time with the CO its request for assistance regarding the drawing that 
the QAR told DODS to take to the engineering support for the buying command for 
clarification at the post-award conference on 7 April 2011 (R4, tab 32 at 4, tab 37; 
tr. 5/152-53). The complete text of the question in the letter was: "Regarding Contract 
W31P4Q-11-C-0133, we at DODS request engineering assistance. On the left 
and right 
hand end of the attach bracket is a hidden line (long rectangle) that is unidentifiable. Is 
this part of the next higher assembly? Please advise." (R4, tab 37) There were no 
drawings, explanations or other attachments to the letter (id.; app. supp. R4, tab 1; 
tr. 4/15). The letter did not indicate that the request for assistance was urgent or delaying 
production (R4, tab 37; app. supp. R4, tab l; tr. 1186, 88-89). 
31. The TMO engineer responsible for responding to the CO regarding technical 
questions for the MQM-107 was away on temporary duty (TDY) until 23 May 2011. 
10 

Upon his return, he researched the question and developed a response. (Tr. 1/65-66) To 
determine the answer, the engineer went to the TDP and located the top part drawing, and 
worked his way through the drawings to deduce the basis ofDODS' question (R4, tab 3 
at 112; tr. 4/16). On the top part drawing, the engineer located several "hidden lines," 
which are depicted as dashed lines on drawings and represent something underneath the 
current drawing's perspective. The drawing contains directions to find another drawing 
from a 
different view point, a cut-away view, to determine what the hidden line 
represents (tr. 2/214-15, 4/16, 18). 
32. The TMO engineer then proceeded through several steps to read the drawings 
and determine that he thought the answer to 
DODS' question was that the hidden line 
represented 
a nut assembly, a part included in the parts list for the center wing section 
(tr. 4116-26). The process to determine this answer took the TMO engineer, who had 
worked at the TMO for less than a year and had never reviewed the MQM-107 drawings 
prior to determining the answer to DODS' hidden line question, about one hour 
(tr. 3/232, 4/32-33, 5/12-13). Although the specific hidden lines examined by the 
engineer could only have represented the nut assembly (tr. 3/135-37, 211, 4/25-32), as a 
result of the vagueness ofDODS' question, the engineer still was not certain that DODS' 
question pertained to these particular hidden lines until the hearing in these appeals 
(tr. 4/34). 
33. Once the engineer had determined his answer to DODS' hidden line question, 
the response had to be approved by a senior government TMO representative, but that 
person was on TDY until the following week (tr. 1/65-66). 
34. On 21 June 2011, DODS submitted a request for assistance, reiterating its 
"hidden line" query and asking seven additional questions. Although DODS' letter is 
dated 16 June 2011, DODS did not email the letter until 21June2011 (hereinafter, 
"DODS' 21June2011 letter"). (R4, tab 38; tr. 1175) The text ofDODS' request was as 
follows: 
This is a follow-up to our previous request for engineering 
assistance sent May 16, 2011. DODS requests engineering 
assistance for the following: 
1. On the left and right hand end of the attach bracket is a 
hidden line (long rectangle) that is unidentifiable. Is 
this part of the next higher assembly? Please advise. 
2. Request to use Hysol EA9628.06 ILO EA9601 or 
EA9602 as the equal alternative. 
3. Request to use BR-127 Adhesive Primer. 
11 

4. Request to use MA-562 BMS 5-90 Core Splice 
Foaming Adhesive ILO FM-37 as the equal 
alternative. 
5. Request to use EA960F ILO EA960 as the equal 
alternative. 
6. Request to use BAC 5555 Phosphoric Acid Anodize 
ILO ASTM-3933 as the equal alternative. 
7. Part Number PL13458219-4 is not listed in the Parts 
List but is shown on the corresponding drawing, Sheet 
4, D7. Please advise material and thickness. 
8. Request to use AMS 2770 ILO MIL-H-6088. 
Please advise. 
(R4, tab 38) DODS' 21June2011 letter included two attached pages with what appears 
to be copied drawings. The first document had handwriting circling portions of the 
drawing and referencing "Question #7." The second document matches the drawing 
description in DODS' 21June2011 letter request number 7. (R4, tab 3 at 105, tab 38) 
Nothing in DODS' 21 June 2011 letter informed the CO that DODS' issues were 
impacting production or indicated urgency in any way (R4, tab 38). 
35. The CO answered DODS' "hidden line" request in a letter dated and emailed 
22 June 2011, stating: 
We assume the long hidden line rectangle mentioned by the 
vendor is the one by the Find No. 1 callout in section D 1 of 
drawing 13458239. If you follow Find No. 1 to drawing 
13458219 sheet 3 Section N-N, you will see Find No. 37 (-19 
channel, 11557862) and Find No. 19 (-20 nut assembly, 
NAS689Pl6-8. The hidden lines indicate the nut assembly. 
(R4, tab 39) The "We assume" language was included because DODS failed to 
adequately explain or describe its question to ensure that the TMO engineers would 
review the specific uncertainty (R4, tab 39; tr. 1/66, 4/35). The CO's email with her 
22 June 2011 letter attached was incorrectly addressed, omitting the "c" in "com." The 
CO however, did not 
realize the error because she received an automated delivery 
confirmation notice. (R4, tabs 39, 40; tr. 1166-68, 73-74) 
12 

36. On 6 July 2011, DODS sent an email to the government and requested a 
120-day extension citing materials unavailability, government delay in responding to 
requests to use alternate products, and the time between contract award and the 
post-award conference with DCMA (R4, tab 42). DODS' 6 July 2011 letter was the first 
instance in which DODS informed the government of any alleged government delay for 
any cause, including the hidden line issue (R4, tabs 42, 78, 80; tr. 1185-86, 2/138-40, 
5/155-58). 
37. On 8 July 2011, the CO notified DODS in a letter attached to an email that the 
CO had answered DODS' hidden line question in her 22 June 2011 letter (R4, tab 44; 
tr. 1/69-70). This email message was missing the "c" in "com" for Ms. Beniest's 
(Mr. Storey's personal assistant) email address, but it was correctly addressed to 
Mr. Storey's email address. 
38. On 11 July 2011, DODS sent an email acknowledging receipt of the CO's 
8 July 2011 letter, and requested that the CO send DODS a copy of the letter dated 
22 June 2011 (R4, tab 46; tr. 1/93). On the same day, 11 July 2011, the CO emailed to 
DODS another copy of her 22 June 2011 response to DODS regarding its "hidden line" 
request (R4, tab 47; tr. 1/73-74). Appellant presented no evidence detailing to 
what 
extent, if any, the timing of the government's response to its question impacted DODS' 
performance under the contract. 
39. Resolution of DODS' "hidden line" request was not required to proceed with 
assembly. DODS should have been able 
to determine what the hidden line represented 
on its own (tr. 4/12-13). The answer 
was readily apparent from reading the drawings 
(tr. 3/223, 4/32-33). DODS could also have easily worked backwards from the 
parts list 
to cross-check what the hidden line represented (tr. 4/29). DODS could also have 
ordered the parts required for assembly and determined through assembly that the only 
possibility was that the hidden line represented the nut assembly (tr. 5/12-15). There is 
no evidence establishing how the hidden line request prevented DODS from ordering the 
parts and beginning assembly. DODS could 
have assembled the center wing section 
without knowing what the hidden line represented and still have been able to add the nut 
assembly because it sits in a channel easily accessible after assembly. (Tr. 5/15) 
40. Requests 2 and 3 in DODS' 21 June 2011 letter repeated questions that DODS 
posed in its email of 20 October 2010 and that the government answered on 3 November 
2010 (R4, tabs, 6, 8, 38). Both DODS' requests were unnecessary (tr. 5/8-9). With respect 
to request 2, the TDP in MIS-26333K listed several alternative products and provided the 
contractor with the authority to use an "equal" (R4, tab 3 at 171; tr. 2114, 162, 3/105-06, 
161, 4/14-15, 5/8-9, 23). DODS could have chosen one of the other products listed in 
MIS-26333K or it could have simply used the Hysol EA9628.06 as an equal alternative to 
the Hysol EA9601or9602 (tr. 2/14, 162, 3/105-06, 161, 4/14-15, 5/8-9, 23). Even if 
DODS wanted government approval, it did not need to hold up its production while 
13 

waiting for the response to either request 2 or 3. DODS could have ordered materials, cut 
materials, developed the tooling needed to create the leading edges, among other 
production steps, while it waited for the government approval. (Tr. 5/12, 17-18, 34-35) 
41. Requests 4 and 5 in DODS' 21 June 2011 letter presented a new request 
regarding use of specific adhesives but again lacked any explanation or indication of 
production impact or urgency. With respect to request 4, the TDP did not require the use 
of one specific adhesive; rather, the contractor was provided with suggested sources of 
supply, including three vendors and five different adhesives. DODS could have used any 
of those listed, or could have used other adhesives because the ones listed in this instance 
were merely suggested. (R4, tab 3 at 73; tr. 5/20-22, 34-35) With respect to request 5, 
the TDP in MIS-26333K listed a product and provided the contractor the authority to use 
an "equal" (R4, tab 3 at 172; tr. 2/14, 162, 31105-06, 161, 4/14-15, 5/8-9, 23). According 
to the TMO engineer, the adhesive DODS requested to use was very clearly the same 
adhesive as the listed product except that the manufacturer had denoted F to indicate that 
it was a faster curing adhesive (tr. 5/23). Even ifDODS wanted government approval, it 
did not need to hold up its process waiting for the government's response to either 
request 4 or 5. DODS could have ordered materials, cut materials, developed the tooling 
needed to create the leading edges, among other production steps, while waiting for the 
government's response. (R4, tab 3 at 73; tr. 5/20-24, 34-35) 
42. Request number 6 in DODS' 21June2011 letter presented a new request but 
again lacked any explanation or indication of production impact or urgency (R4, tab 38; 
tr. 2/162-63, 3/164, 5/14, 39). This request dealt with phosphoric acid anodizing 
specifications, and DODS requested to use the Boeing specification BAC-5555 instead of 
the industry standard specification included in the TDP, ASTM-3933. In this instance, 
the TDP did not provide the contractor with the choice of an "or equal" replacement. The 
government denied DODS' request unless DODS provided a detailed explanation as to 
why the Boeing specification was equal or better than the TDP specification because the 
government did not have access to the Boeing specification. Even if DODS had some 
legitimate reason for desiring to adhere to the BAC-5555 specification rather than the 
ASTM-3933 specification, it did not need to hold up its process waiting for the 
government's response. DODS could have ordered materials, cut materials, developed 
the tooling needed to create the leading edges, among other production steps, while 
waiting 
for the government's response. (R4, tab 3 at 148, tab 50; tr. 1/90, 5/24-27, 34-35) 
43. Request 7 in DODS' 21 June 2011 letter requested clarification of a drawing, 
and provided some explanation and two attached drawing sheets (R4, tab 38). DODS 
stated that: "Part Number PL 1345 8219-4 is not listed in the Parts List but is shown on 
the corresponding drawing, Sheet 4, D7. Please advise material and thickness." (R4, 
tab 38; tr. 5/27) The answer to Request 7 was readily determinable from the drawings 
(tr. 5/27-30). Part numbers are called "dash" numbers and are contained 
in the parts list 
portion of the drawings (tr. 5/27, 30). The Sheet 4, D7, however, does not indicate a part 
or a "dash 4" but points the reader to a Find Number 4, indicated on the drawing as 
14 

"(FN 4)" (R4, tab 3 at 105; tr. 5/27-30). Following the Find Number 4 to the parts list 
leads to the Dash Number 
7 part, a doubler, and the parts list provides the material and 
thickness (R4, tab 3 at 109; tr. 5/30-31 ). DODS did not need to hold up its process 
waiting for the government's response. DODS could have ordered materials, cut 
materials, developed the tooling needed to create the leading edges, among other 
production steps, while waiting for assistance in reading the drawings. (Tr. 5/31, 34-35) 
44. Request 8 in DODS' 21 June 2011 letter presented a new request but again 
lacked any explanation or indication of production impact or urgency (R4, tab 38). 
This request dealt with the heat treating specification, and DODS' request to use the 
AMS 2770 instead of the Military Specification H-6088 (MIL-H-6088) (R4, tab 38; 
tr. 5/31-32). This request was unnecessary because the TDP already required the use of 
the AMS 2770 specification (tr. 5/32). The TDPL includes a list of every drawing and 
specification included in the TDP (tr. 5/31). Several drawing notes in the TDP reference 
the MIL-H-6088 specification. The TDPL shows that MIL-H-6088 was replaced by 
AMS-H-6088, and shows that AMS-H-6088 was replaced by AMS 2770, 2771, and 
2772. (R4, tab 3 at 22, 25, 27; tr. 5/31-33) In other words, the TDP already indicated 
that DODS should use AMS 2770 instead of MIL-H-6088. Even if DODS wanted 
government verification, it did not need to hold up its process waiting for the 
government's response. DODS could have ordered materials, cut materials, developed 
the tooling needed to create the leading edges, among other production steps, while 
waiting for the government's verification (tr. 5/34-35). 
45. In its 6 July 2011 letter, DODS' first mention of an alleged government delay, 
DODS stated 
that the extension request was "due to unavailability of materials as stated 
in letters dated May 16, 2011 and June 20, 2011 [sic] requests for alternate products have 
gone unanswered for 2 months, causing a delay" (R4, tab 42). However, neither DODS' 
16 May 2011 letter, nor its 21 June 2011 letter, indicated that its requests were based on 
unavailability of materials (R4, tabs 37, 38; tr. 1/85-86, 88-89). In fact, DODS' 16 May 
2011 letter included only DODS' "hidden line" issue (R4, tab 37; tr. 1188-89). Apart 
from not having raised the material availability issue until its 6 July 2011 letter, DODS 
provided no support for its assertion that materials were unavailable. The materials and 
specifications questioned in DODS' 21 June 2011 letter were actually still available. 
(R4, tabs 81-84; tr. 3/99-102) 
46. On 8 July 2011, the CO denied DODS' 6 July 2011 request for an extension 
in the contract delivery date. In her letter, 
the CO informed DODS that she did not 
understand DODS' reference to DCMA delay. She also corrected DODS' assertions in 
its 6 July 2011 letter in which DODS stated that it had raised material unavailability in its 
16 May 2011 letter. The CO informed DODS that she had answered its first question 
("hidden line") in a letter dated 22 June 2011, its second and third questions in an email 
dated 3 November 2010, and that the answers to DODS' questions 4-8 (received on 
21 June 2011) were awaiting engineering responses. The CO also requested that DODS 
provide 
the reasons and justifications for each of its questions or requests. (R4, tab 44; 
15 

tr. 1187-90) DODS never provided the requested reasons and justifications (tr. 1190). 
The CO's 8 July 2011 letter was received by DODS on 8 July 2011 (R4, tabs 44-46; 
tr. 1192). 
47. On 13 July 2011, the CO sent an email to DODS with her letter responding to 
the remaining five requests for assistance from DODS' 21June2011 letter. The CO's 
letter reminded DODS that questions 1 through 3 had been previously answered via email 
on 3 November 2010 and 
by letter dated 22 June 2011; approved DODS' request 
numbers 4, 5, and 8; denied DODS' request number 6 unless DODS provided a detailed 
explanation as to why its request was equal or better; and provided an explanation for 
DODS' request number 7. (R4, tab 50) 
The Cure Notice and Response 
48. The government received other information regarding DODS and the potential 
for performance problems beginning in late April 2011 (R4, tabs 33-36, 43, 58, 73, 74; 
tr. 1152, 2/45-46). At that time, the CO received two Delay Notice - Review documents (the 
"Delay Notices") regarding the contract, dated 13 and 20 April 2011 respectively, and 
issued by the DCMA Industrial Specialist (IS). The IS is responsible for monitoring 
contractor performance and evaluating whether the contractor will meet the delivery date 
required under the contract. If the IS considers that the contractor may miss the delivery 
date, DCMA policy directs the IS to input a Delay Notice that alerts the buying command to 
the potential delivery delay. Delay Notices do not impact the contractor's production; do 
not cause production delays; do not stop production; and do not require any action on the 
part of the buying command. Rather, Delay Notices provide information from the IS, who 
is located in the general vicinity of the contractor, to the buying command, which is 
generally located a significant distance away. (R4, tabs 33, 34; tr. 2/43-50, 166-67, 4/72-75, 
5/208, 211-12, 215-16) Prior to issuing the first Delay Notice on 13 April the IS contacted 
DODS, and DODS stated that it would meet the August 2011 first article delivery date 
(R4, 
tab 33; tr. 5/215). The Delay Notices did not directly lead to any overt action by the CO 
(tr. 2/49-50, 166-67). There is no evidence in the record that DODS was aware of the Delay 
Notices prior to receipt of the Rule 4 file in these appeals. 
49. On 8 June 2011, in response to her request, the CO received additional documents 
and information from DCMA regarding DODS and TTF (R4, tab 58 at 3; tr. 11195-96). 
Among the information that the CO received were 18 additional Delay Notices on other 
DODS' contracts 
(R4, tab 73), a report showing nine unacceptable pre-award surveys covering 
both DODS and TTF (R4, tab 74), and a level III Corrective Action Request response rejection 
letter indicating that TTF had serious quality problems and that its system was unacceptable to 
the government (R4, tab 31). Like the Delay Notices above, the CO was cognizant of the 
information received, considered the information as a "heads up" that DODS may have delay 
issues, and that she needed to look more closely at the situation (tr. 1/94-105). As of early 
June 2011, however, the CO had not yet been informed that DODS intended to subcontract 
work to TTF; and therefore, she did not give any weight to the TTF information (tr. 1196-97). 
16 

50. On 27 June 2011, the CO met with the TMO engineers to discuss the contract, as 
well as other TMO managed items. The TMO engineers explained to the CO the 
importance of the center wing section and the critical processes that were required for its 
manufacture. The TMO engineers explained that the center wing section manufacturing 
required about 12 weeks to complete after receipt of materials. (R4, tabs 41, 58; tr. 1/80-85) 
51. On 8 July 2011, the CO received an email from the DCMA IS regarding his 
visit to DODS on 7 July 2011. The email informed the CO that DODS had received 
some quotes for materials from vendors but had not yet ordered any material for the 
contract, and that DODS represented that it would take three weeks to produce the first 
article once all materials were received. The email also informed the CO that, relevant to 
another contract, Mr. Storey failed to properly conduct a heat treating test, introduced 
materials 
that could contaminate parts in the heat treating process, and the clean room 
was not ready for production. (R4, tabs 43, 58 at 4) 
52. On 13 July 2011, the CO issued a Cure Notice to DODS. The cure notice 
explained that the government considered DODS had failed to make satisfactory progress 
endangering contract performance and that appellant's failure to cure its deficiencies 
within 10 days of receipt of the notice would provide the government the right to 
terminate the contract for default. The cure notice requested that DODS provide adequate 
assurances to the government that DODS could deliver the first article and other contract 
requirements on time. The CO outlined seven specific failures, including: ( 1) failure to 
meet performance standards in the contract and reiterated the 7 April 2011 post-award 
conference; (2) failure to provide a Clean Room; (3) failure to acknowledge the tooling 
requirement; (4) failure to obtain materials, parts, and supplies; (5) failure to put in place 
procedures, mechanisms, and requirements to implement the required ANSI/AQSC Q9002 
quality assurance standards; ( 6) failure to validate and certify the heat treating process and 
artificial aging process; and (7) failure to obtain necessary materials. The CO also 
provided a general description of required actions by DODS to assure the government that 
DODS would meet the contract requirements, and she listed five specific documents to be 
provided: ( 1) certification of a fully implemented Quality Control Plan compliant with the 
higher quality level required by the contract; (2) a detailed Manufacturing Plan; (3) a 
comprehensive Production Plan listing all tooling and equipment; ( 4) documentation to 
support receipt of materials; and ( 5) a specific timeline to meet the 31 August 2011 
delivery of the First Article. (R4, tab 52; tr. 1/106-08) 
17 

53. On 20 July 2011, DODS responded to the cure notice, substantially as 
follows: 
1. DODS, INC's Quality System is acceptable to the 
Government. DODS, INC will be outsourcing portions of 
production to TTF, LLC with flow down requirements. 
Please see DODS's QCP attached (Exhibit A). 
2. Attached please find the Manufacturing Plan (Exhibit B). 
3. Attached please find the Production Plan, with equipment 
list (Exhibit C). 
4. Requests for quotes have been 
sent out, and purchase 
orders were prepared pending confirmation for the use of 
alternate products. On July 13, 2011, a letter was received 
answering questions DODS, INC had on alternate material 
use and engineering clarity. Waiting 
for a response has 
delayed the purchasing of materials. Purchase Orders 
were faxed to vendors on July 15, 2011 (Exhibit D). 
As mentioned in a letter dated, July 06, 2011, DODS 
requested an extension 
for an additional two months as 
requests for engineering assistant [sic] were being researched. 
Now that responses have been received, DODS has been able 
to release the purchase orders. Some products purchase [sic] 
have a lead time of 10 weeks. This would not have created a 
problem if the requests were answered timely. [I]n addition, 
the Post Award was held April 06, 2011, 2 months after being 
awarded this contract, and as this has a First Article, DCMA 
has advised that participation is 100%, that all work 
performed without affording him the opportunity to plan and 
insert GMIP's during Post Awards would be rejected and a 
Corrective Action Report issued (Exhibit E). Waiting on 
DCMA is [sic] perform the Post Award and advise of GMIPs 
has delayed production by 2 months. 
DODS's objective is to deliver this product per the 
Production Plan, and we believes [sic] we are in good shape 
to successfully complete and deliver the First Article with a 
shipment date of October 24, 2011. 
DODS requests a modification extending the First 
Article delivery date to October 24, 2011, allowing 120 days 
18 

(R4, tab 54) 
for FAA [first article approval], with a new delivery date of 
June 29, 2012 for the production articles. 
54. DODS' cure notice response letter alerted the CO, for the first time, that 
DODS would "out source portions [of production] to TTF, LLC with flow down 
requirements" (R4, tab 54 at 2; tr. 1/109). DODS' Manufacturing Plan, provided in 
response to the CO's direction in the cure notice and included in the cure notice response 
as exhibit B, stated that parts are "sent to TTF, LLC to be bonded. The skins are brought 
into the clean room ... where adhesive is applied ... and parts are placed together." (R4, 
tab 54 at 18) Coupled with DODS' cure notice response letter, it became clear to the CO 
that DODS planned to subcontract bonding to TTF (tr. 11109). The CO already knew that 
TTF had been found to have inadequate documentation of internal procedures for the 
bonding process because she received notice of such prior to issuing the cure notice (R4, 
tab 31; tr. 11109-11, 123). The CO also received notice from DCMA during its cure 
notice response review that TTF's bonding methods and facilities were incapable of 
complying with contract requirements (R4, tabs 57, 72 at 5; tr. 11141-43). 
55. In response to the CO's direction to provide "a comprehensive Production 
Plan listing all tooling and equipment," DODS provided exhibit C to its cure notice 
response (R4, tabs 52, 54 at 2, 21; tr. 1/123). The "Production Plan" provided by DODS 
was a one-page document dated 30 June 2011, began with a date of 4 July 2011 and 
showed a first article shipment date of 24 October 2011, two months after the contract 
delivery date of 31 August 2011. The Production Plan was unsigned, and lacked a 
detailed description of actual production dates and processes. (R4, tab 54 at 21; tr. 1/116, 
124, 3/108, 117, 4/120-38, 5/172) In fact, other than "Paint Part" listed as planned for the 
weeks of 5 and 12 September 2011, no other production processes appeared on DODS' 
production plan (R4, tab 54 at 21; tr. 4/132-33). No tooling or equipment were listed on 
the Production 
Plan (R4, tab 54 at 21 ), but DODS did include a separate generic 
equipment list in exhibit C (R4, tab 54 at 22-25). The equipment list identified three 
pieces of equipment owned by DODS and sixteen owned by TTF; all of the bonding and 
heat treating equipment belonged to TTF (R4, tab 54 at 22-25; tr. 11125-26, 571-75). 
56. In response to the CO's direction to provide "a detailed Manufacturing Plan," 
DODS provided exhibit B to its cure notice response (R4, tabs 52, 54 at 2, 16; 
tr. 11117-18). The first sentence of the Manufacturing Plan referenced using Mylars, a 
medium the TMO had not used in more than a decade, rather than the CAD data provided 
by the government on the TDP CD (R4, tab 54 at 16; tr. 1/119). It was impossible to 
build the center wing section without using the CAD data provided on the TDP CD (R4, 
tab 58 at 8; tr. 11119, 3/88, 198), DODS' cure notice response made no mention of using 
the CAD data provided by the government (R4, tab 54 at 16; tr. 1130-31, 3/195-96). 
19 

57. Regarding the RFQs, none were provided for the subcontracting work to TTF or 
Dynamic Paint Solutions as indicated in its cure notice response letter and Manufacturing 
Plan (R4, tab 54 at 2, 17-18, 27-43). On at least two RFQs, DODS sought quotes simply by 
referencing Army drawing numbers out of the TDP from which the vendors would have had 
no way of providing a quote. In each instance, the vendor responded by indicating that it 
could not provide a quote. (R4, tab 54 at 28, 31; tr. 3/96-97) Several necessary parts and 
bulk material were not reflected anywhere in the RFQs or the POs, including nut assemblies, 
primer, label stock, adhesive, trailing edge, other small hardware items, and, notably, the 
channels (R4, tab 54 at 27-43, tab 3 at 107-11; tr. 3/92-96, 208-09). The channels are the 
extruded parts, bonded into the center wing section assembly for interface with the 
outboard wing assemblies and the left and right leading edges (R4, tab 3 at 104; tr. 2/212-13, 
3/208-09). The channels are not off-the-shelf items readily available to DODS (tr. 3/208-09). 
DODS confirmed its ability to provide these channels prior to contract award, but did not 
explain how it would obtain the channels in its cure notice response (R4, tabs 7, 54 ). 
58. Although appellant submitted documents purporting to be POs with its cure 
notice response, uncontradicted testimony established that appellant did not issue several 
of the POs (tr. 4/115). The one PO that could be verified as having been placed, was the 
PO for honeycomb material with a ten-week lead time. The honeycomb material is the 
roughly two-inch thick core of the wing structure that will have aluminum skins bonded 
on its top and bottom to create the wing (tr. 3/86). Although nothing prevented DODS 
from ordering the honeycomb material earlier (tr. 5/35), DODS allegedly waited until 
13 July 2011 to place the PO with Plascore despite the fact that it had a ten-week lead 
time for delivery (R4, tab 54 at 3, 38-39). Compounding the issue, DODS did not 
actually place the Plascore PO for the honeycomb material on 13 July 2011 as the PO 
indicates; DODS placed that PO three weeks later, on or about 3 August 2011 (tr. 4/116). 
59. Bonding was a critical process requirement for production of the center wing 
section (R4, tab 41; tr. 1194, 3/112, 5/83). In August 2010, the DCMA QAR and a 
DCMA engineer had conducted an in-depth process review of the TTF bonding process, 
which resulted in a determination that TTF methods and facilities were incapable of 
complying with the imposed contract requirements at that time. Further, "[the] Clean 
Room and Autoclaves (which were 'not operational' at the time) must be repaired, 
returned to full functionality and certified before being placed back into production. 
Additionally, his bonding procedures must undergo process validation (his internal 
validation) before being used in production." (R4, tabs 31, 57, 72; tr. 11142, 51118-21) 
TTF remained incapable of performing bonding through the performance of the contract 
(tr. 51121, 181). 
60. The TMO engineers identified the clean room as critical to the manufacture of 
the center wing section in the 27 June 2011 meeting with the CO (R4, tab 41; tr. 1184, 
94). DODS' clean room was not ready for production (R4, tab 43; tr. 1194-95). 
Therefore, the CO identified DODS' failure to provide a clean room specifically in her 
cure notice (R4, tab 52). DODS did not address the clean room issue in its cure notice 
20 

response, but it did state its plan to outsource bonding to TTF and thus made relevant any 
issues involving TTF's clean room (R4, tab 54 at 2; tr. 11141). The clean room is used 
for adhesive application, and it is vitally important that no contaminants are present to 
compromise the adhesive seal (tr. 3/112-13, 5/120-21). The TTF "clean room" was not 
clean - it had a popcorn ceiling that generated thick dust, peeling paint and mildew on the 
walls, three doors that open directly into other areas including one directly into a sanding 
area. Neither DODS nor TTF had an acceptable clean room (tr. 5/181). 
61. TTF was likewise incapable of properly conducting the required heat treating 
process (R4, tabs 31-34, 43; tr. 1194-95, 5/197-98, 200-01, 203-06). On 7 July 2011, TTF 
failed to properly 
test its heat treatment process and conducted its heat treatment in 
violation of the AMS 2770 specification (R4, tabs 43, 70 at 2; tr. 5/197-206). Neither 
DODS nor TTF had a conforming heat treatment process (tr. 5/181). 
The Termination 
62. On 27 July 2011, the CO issued a final decision terminating the contract for 
default. After considering DODS' performance, DODS' cure notice response, input from 
government technical experts, and the factors in the FAR, the CO determined that DODS 
had "failed to make satisfactory progress and has failed to provide adequate assurance 
that DODS would be able to deliver the First Article item that would successfully pass 
performance testing by 31 August 2011, and that said failures did not arise out of causes 
beyond DODS' control." (R4, tab 58 at 9; tr. 11144-46) 
63. On 3 August 2011, the DCMA QAR handed Mr. Storey a copy of the 
modification terminating the contract (R4, tab 62). On 17 August 2011, DODS appealed 
the termination. 
64. On 14 July 2011, the government posted a synopsis on FedBizOps for a 
requirement for additional spare center wing structure assemblies. This synopsis was not 
a replacement procurement action for the items covered by appellant's contract, but was 
rather to fill a need for an additional quantity of the same items. After the termination of 
the instant contract, the CO added nine additional items when the solicitation was posted 
on 3 August 2011. The contract was competed on a full and open competition basis, and 
the solicitation did not close until September 2011. The resulting contract 
price was 
unknown to anyone prior to the termination of appellant's contract for default. 
(R4, tab 76; app. supp. R4, tab 68; tr. 2/140-45) 
65. By letter dated 9 April 2012, appellant submitted a certified "Delay Claim" in 
the amount of $2,057,477.40 to the CO. The CO denied the claim in its entirety in her 
final decision dated 13 June 2012. DODS' appeal of the final decision by letter of 
31August2012 was docketed as ASBCA No. 58252. DODS failed to briefthe issues 
associated with the affirmative claims except as they pertain to the excusability of the 
21 

default. No evidence was admitted at trial concerning the affirmative claims except as 
they concern appellant's defenses to that termination. 
DECISION 
These appeals involve the propriety of the government's termination of the 
contract for default (ASBCA No. 57746) and appellant's allegations 2 that it was 
excusably delayed in the performance of the contract as a defense regarding the 
termination as well as a separate affirmative claim for monetary compensation 
(ASBCA No. 58252). 
Termination for default is a "drastic sanction" that may be imposed only when 
there are "good grounds and on solid evidence." Matrix Research, Inc., ASBCA 
Nos. 56430, 56431, 11-2 BCA ~ 34,789 at 171,239 (citing ABS Baumaschinenvertrieb 
GmbH, ASBCA No. 48207, 00-2 BCA ~ 31,090). The government bears the initial 
burden of showing that the termination was reasonable and justified. Lisbon Contractors, 
Inc. v. United States, 828 F.2d 759, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1987). To support a termination for 
default for a contractor's failure to make progress so as to endanger performance of the 
contract, the CO must have a reasonable belief that there is no reasonable likelihood that 
the contractor can perform the entire contract effort within the time remaining for 
contract performance. Lisbon Contractors, 828 F.2d at 765. After the government 
makes that showing, the burden then shifts to the contractor to provide evidence of 
excuse for its default. DCX, Inc. v. Perry, 79 F.3d 132, 135 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Matrix 
Research, 11-2 BCA ~ 34,789 at 171,239 (citing Centurion Electronics Service, ASBCA 
No. 48750, 00-1BCA~30,642). 
We find that the contract was properly terminated for default, that appellant failed 
to provide adequate assurances that it could timely perform in its response to the cure 
notice of 12 July 2011 and that DODS was not excusably delayed in the performance of 
the contract. 
2 It must be emphasized at the outset that appellant's briefs are replete with allegations 
that are not supported by trial testimony and other evidence in the record. 
Appellant elected not to appear for the final two days of the five-day hearing and 
submitted its case for decision on the existing record, including the transcript of 
the initial three days of the hearing. Appellant expressly recognized and 
acknowledged that the remainder of the hearing would proceed in appellant's 
absence. Consequently, appellant did not present a case-in-chief. In particular, 
Mr. Storey, appellant's principal did not appear to offer testimony under oath and 
subject himself to cross-examination. The briefs in substantial part consist of 
Mr. Storey's unsworn views that the government had no opportunity to rebut at 
trial. To the limited extent that appellant does cite to the record, the citations are 
often inaccurate and/or do not persuasively corroborate the allegations made. 
22 

A. Propriety of the Termination for Default for Failure to Make Progress 
1. No Reasonable Likelihood of Timely Performance 
The CO's assessment of appellant's poor progress was justified and supported the 
reasonableness of her conclusion that there was no reasonable possibility that appellant 
could have timely performed the contract. Appellant was awarded the contract on 
26 January 2011. The first article delivery date was 31 August 2011, 217 days after 
award. The contract included the First Article Approval-Government Testing clause, 
providing that contractor failure to deliver the first article on time would 
be treated as a 
failure to deliver under the Default clause. At the time of issuance of the cure notice, 
75% of the performance period had expired. As of the date of the termination, 182 (84%) 
of the 217 days allotted for delivery had elapsed. There was no reasonable likelihood that 
appellant could have timely performed. 
DODS implicitly conceded as much. Its "Production Plan," submitted to the CO 
in response to the cure notice, called for shipment of the first article on 24 October 2011. 
Cf Smart Power Systems, Inc., ASBCA No. 56743, 11-1BCA~34,615 (granting 
summary judgment in favor of government where appellant admitted that it needed an 
additional 12 weeks to complete the first article requirement). Not only did DODS admit 
that it could not deliver by the contract date, there is no persuasive evidence 
that it was 
capable of performing by the date proposed in its cure notice response regardless of the 
excusability of the alleged delays discussed below. Particularly problematic for appellant 
was the failure to timely purchase materials. Ordering of the critical "honeycomb" 
material was not impacted by any delay associated with appellant's requests for 
assistance and should have been procured promptly. In fact, the purchase order for the 
"honeycomb" material was issued at an indeterminate time on the same day as the CO 
issued her final decision terminating the contract for default. Appellant's unsupported 
assertions in its briefs notwithstanding, the only evidence in the record indicates that the 
material required a ten-week lead time for delivery to 
DODS. Consequently, appellant 
would not have received the material until 12 October 2011. Production time, assuming 
the honeycomb materials and all other all requisite materials were on hand, would have 
required approximately an additional three months. Thus, the dates in the production 
plan were obviously not feasible. Not only did the plan provide for delivery of the first 
article approximately nine weeks after the contractually-specified date of 31 August 
2011, delivery would not have occurred until about mid-January 2012. Even ifthe CO 
had extended the delivery date as requested by appellant, DODS could not have delivered 
by its proposed extended date. Cf ABC Knitwear Corp., ASBCA No. 22575, 81-1 BCA 
~ 14,826 at 73,169 (default termination proper prior to first article delivery date where 
contractor failed to order necessary yarn). 
23 

2. Lack of Purchasing Activity and Materials 
The 
record contains a few RFQs purportedly issued by appellant to gather quotes 
for certain materials. However, there is no evidence RFQs were prepared by DODS for 
other necessary parts and materials, including 
the channels which the evidence indicates 
likely would not be readily available to DODS. Although DODS confirmed its ability 
prior to award to provide the channels, there is no persuasive explanation of how it would 
obtain the channels in its cure notice response. With minor exceptions, the materials 
generally could have been ordered before responses to the technical clarifications were 
provided. At least two of the RFQs contained insufficient information for potential 
vendors to base a quote. 
No "Purchase Orders" were purported by DODS to have been placed prior to 
15 July 2011. With the exception of the "honeycomb" material discussed above, 
however, there is no proof that DODS actually placed these "Purchase Orders" even 
though they were supplied to the CO in response to the cure notice. In addition, contracts 
with subcontractors, most importantly TTF, were not provided. We conclude that the 
lack of necessary materials was a significant factor justifying the termination. Cf 
Universal Fiberglass Corp. v. United States, 537 F.2d 393, 398 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Smart 
Power Systems, 11-1BCAii34,615. 
3. Lack of Acceptable Facilities 
The termination is also supported by appellant's deficient manufacturing facility 
and that of its proposed subcontractor TTF, a firm also owned by Mr. Storey that was 
located at the same address and with whom DODS shared facilities. In particular, 
bonding and heat treatment were critical requirements for production of the center wing 
section. TTF, which was to fulfill bonding and heat treating requirements, was incapable 
of properly performing the requisite operations during the performance period of the 
contract. In addition, we have found that the proposed clean room was deficient and 
equipment required significant repairs and certification before being returned to full 
functionality and placed back in operation. DODS in its brief challenges these 
conclusions, minimizes their significance and attributes them to DCMA malice and 
maladministration. However, appellant fails to cite to record evidence 
that impugns the 
government's evidence and our findings based thereon. · 
B. Failure to Give Adequate Assurances in Response to Cure Notice 
In accordance with the contract's Default clause, DODS was required to 
give 
adequate assurances of timely performance in response to the CO's cure notice. E.g., 
Danzig v. AEC Corp., 224 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 995 
(2001); National Union Fire Insurance Co., ASBCA No. 34744, 90-1BCAii22,266 
at 111,855. Here, the termination was further justified by appellant's failure to give 
sufficient assurances of its capability of timely performing in a specification-compliant 
24 

manner. Its response in general was vague and largely unsubstantiated by persuasive 
evidence that it was taking adequate steps to perform. First, as detailed above, DODS 
had not yet ordered requisite materials even as late as the date of termination. 
Moreover, both appellant's production and quality assurance plans, submitted to 
the CO in response to the cure notice, were deficient. Cf L&M Thomas Concrete Co., 
ASBCA No. 49198, 03-1BCAi!32,194. The perfunctory, unsigned, one-page 
"Production Plan," dated approximately two weeks prior to issuance of the cure notice, 
was particularly flawed and unacceptable. Among other things, it began with a date of 
4 July 2011 (more than six months after award) and proposed a first article delivery date 
of 24 October 2011. The principal assumption underlying the plan was that appellant 
was entitled to time extensions of approximately two months. As explained herein, 
appellant was not entitled to any time extension. 
The production plan also failed to identify basic production milestones and 
inspection points for critical manufacturing assembly operations. In this regard, it lacked 
fundamental understanding of the interrelation of the production and government quality 
assurance process. A primary purpose of the plan was to approximate dates during 
performance, sometimes referred to as government mandatory inspection points 
(GMIPs), to permit DCMA to plan its involvement and 
any site visits to fulfill its quality 
assurance role. Without advance notice and scheduling of GMIPs, this primary purpose 
of the plan was defeated. 
We also consider that appellant's cure notice responses to the CO regarding its 
facilities, equipment and quality considerations generally did not meaningfully nor 
satisfactorily address known and documented deficiencies with its equipment and 
facilities discussed above. The equipment list generically identified three pieces of 
equipment owned by DODS and 16 pieces owned by TTF. All of the bonding and heat 
treating equipment was owned by TTF. Without subcontracting, DODS did not have the 
requisite equipment to complete the contract. To the extent that DODS intended to 
subcontract out the heat treating operations to a firm other than TTF as it alleges in its 
brief, it also failed to so inform the CO. 
C. Excusable Delay Allegations 
Appellant contends that it was excusably delayed and entitled to time extensions 
as a consequence of government-caused delays associated with the DCMA conduct of a 
post-award conference and late government responses to its technical inquiries. In 
addition, appellant generally cites government maladministration and actions tantamount 
to bad faith in support of its arguments that it was excusably delayed. These alleged 
delays attributable to the government also underlie appellant's claims for monetary 
adjustments comprising the subject matter of ASBCA No. 58252. 
25 

1. Post-Award Conference 
The timing of the post-award conference with DCMA also did not delay appellant. 
In short, the record in this case does not justify appellant's allegations that DCMA 
prevented appellant from proceeding prior to the conduct of the conference. 
First, the conference is for DCMA's benefit not the contractors. Although the 
conference is called for in DCMA internal regulations, it is not a contract requirement 
and there are no specific timing requirements for its conduct. As discussed below, 
appellant's cursory written production plan is dated well after the conference. Since an 
obvious purpose of the conference is to facilitate coordination with DCMA, productive 
discussion and scheduling of DCMA involvement could not occur without appellant 
approximating critical production/inspection milestones in its manufacturing/assembly 
operations. A plan, establishing critical manufacturing points to facilitate coordination 
with DCMA inspection needs, was one of the primary requisites for a meaningful 
meeting. Appellant has not established that it was ready for a productive meeting. In any 
event, conducting the conference was not a prerequisite to performance. As a minimum, 
the contractor could proceed with the ordering of materials and accomplish other 
preliminary tasks prior to the start of actual assembly/manufacturing. There is no 
evidence here that appellant placed any purchase orders until the approximate time of 
termination, if at all. 
In addition, the post-award conference was rescheduled to accommodate 
appellant's schedule. Even the actual meeting date in early April was not unreasonably 
late. This is particularly true here given appellant's state of preparedness and since 
DODS expressly stated at the conference it would timely complete the first article with 
no mention of delay. Appellant first notified the government that it had been delayed 
three months after the conference. 
2. Responses to Technical Inquiries 
DODS alleges that the information contained in the TPD was "defective, outdated, 
obsolete and incorrect." Consequently, appellant alleges that it was necessary to ask 
three series of technical questions to clarify and resolve perceived deficiencies. The 
initial questions were posed to the government in October 2010 after receipt of the RFQ 
and prior to submission of its quotation. Approximately 3 Y2 to five months following 
award, appellant sent further inquiries on 16 May and 21 June 2011. The first article was 
due on 31 August 2011. Appellant claims it was excusably delayed the entire period 
from the dates of its 16 May and 21 June 2011 inquiries until it was furnished with 
government responses. 
We need not dwell at length on the various subjective factors to be considered in 
assessing the reasonableness of the time taken by the government to reply to the inquiries 
and/or dissect precisely when appellant and/or Mr. Storey were furnished the government 
26 

responses. To establish excusable delay, DODS not only must prove that the 
government's response time was unreasonable, but must also establish that it was actually 
delayed for a specific period while awaiting the government's response. 3 See, e.g., 
Rivera Construction Co., ASBCA Nos. 29391, 30207, 88-2 BCA ~ 20,750; Elter S.A., 
ASBCA No. 52832 et al., 02-1BCA~31,672; Sonora Manufacturing, Inc., ASBCA 
No. 31587 et al., 91-1 BCA ~ 23,444. Here, regardless of whether the government's 
response time was reasonable, the evidence wholly fails to establish that appellant was 
actually delayed pending receipt of the government's responses. 
First, neither appellant's 16 May nor 21June2011 letters advised that its 
production could not proceed without the answers. Contemporaneously, no urgency was 
expressed by appellant. It was not until 6 July 2011, that appellant provided notice that 
the government's delay in responding to the "hidden line" question was 
allegedly 
impacting production. After learning that its 22 June response to that question had been 
emailed to the incorrect address, the government provided the response to appellant, 
Mr. Storey, on 11 July 2011. 
In addition, the record affirmatively demonstrates that production was not 
impacted. There was no need to await a response before basic ordering of essential 
materials and extensive manufacturing and assembly commenced. The testimony of 
government technical personnel is the only detailed evidence in the record regarding the 
impact of the questions/replies, or lack thereof, on appellant's ability to make progress. 
Not only is that testimony unrefuted, we have no reason to doubt its credibility. In short, 
the government persuasively demonstrated that extensive ordering, manufacturing and 
assembly operations could have been accomplished pending receipt of the answers and 
that they were unaffected by those answers. Unaffected critical activities in significant 
part did not occur. Unsupported and conclusory assertions in appellant's briefs are 
insufficient to overcome this record evidence. 
Appellant's inquiries primarily involved requests to use alternate, "equal" 
binders/adhesives and products that allegedly were new 
and/or improved versions of 
superseded versions of older adhesives. The TDP listing of these products generally also 
provided listings of multiple alternatives that appellant also could have used without 
inquiry. There is no suggestion that the alternatives already listed were also obsolete. 
The government emphasizes that appellant provided no manufacturer literature or 
technical descriptive data establishing their equivalence which affected the time that the 
government required to research and approve use of the substitutes. Again, we need not 
dig deep into the details to conclude that appellant was not excusably delayed by lack of a 
government answer. The overarching problem for appellant was that it has not 
demonstrated that it was ever approaching a stage in the production process where it 
would actually use the products in question. Regardless of whether the government's 
3 We need not address the government's contentions regarding whether appellant gave 
sufficient notice of the alleged delaying events. 
27 

response time was unreasonable, any delay had no impact on performance. Most 
obviously, even ifthe government had responded to the appellant's belated 21 June 2011 
inquiries on the same date, the "honeycomb" material could not have been ordered and 
delivered to appellant until the end of August 2011, a few days before the first article was 
due. With all necessary materials on hand, actual production required approximately an 
additional 11 weeks assuming performance proceeded without further delays. 
3. Government Maladministration and Allegations Tantamount to Bad Faith 
Generally 
Persuasive proof is most lacking in appellant's allegations of government 
"confusion" and maladministration generally of the contract. The record fails to support 
allegations of lack of good faith by the government. Perhaps most significantly, even if 
vague allegations bore some seeds of truth, there is simply no convincing evidence that 
government actions actually delayed appellant's performance. Moreover on this record, 
ifthere was any "confusion," it was not attributable to the government but to appellant's 
lack of understanding of its own obligations under the contract. 
The "confusion" and maladministration arguments are largely based on appellant's 
misinterpretation and misanalysis of our decision in another appeal, DODS, Inc., ASBCA 
No. 57667, 12-2 BCA ii 35,078, recon. denied, 13 BCA ii 35,203 (hereinafter ASBCA 
No. 57667). Our decision in ASBCA No. 57667 is inapposite. That case involved a 
different 
government party and a different, unrelated contract and end item. The primary 
issue in ASBCA No. 57667 involved 
a fact-specific waiver of the termination date, not a 
failure to make progress as in the present case. No trial was conducted in ASBCA 
No. 57667 and the case was submitted by the parties for decision on the record pursuant 
to Board Rule 11. That record, the factual circumstances and bases for the decision are 
not in evidence in this appeal. The Army has rebutted in particular appellant's 
allegations ofDCMA misconduct and maladministration. The primary DCMA 
individuals in question and involved in administering the contract testified under oath, 
explained the communications at issue and were subject to cross-examination in the 
instant appeal, unlike Mr. Storey. We also note that the alleged problems with DCMA 
surfaced in the spring of 2010, long before DODS submitted its quote and was awarded 
the contract in late January 2011. Consequently, the schedule proposed by appellant in 
mid-January 2011 and adopted by the government presumably took into consideration 
perceived difficulties and instructions allegedly issued by DCMA. 
Appellant's emphasis on the perceived accuracy of routinely-prepared and 
required "Delay Notices" also diverts the focus from the primary issue in this appeal, 
i.e., whether there was any reasonable possibility that appellant could have produced the 
instant contract's end items on time. The notices involve unique facts and 
assessments 
regarding performance under other contracts and other end items. To examine their 
accuracy and how assessments and conclusions were reached in the context of litigating 
performance problems under the present contract, is a highly questionable excursion into 
28 

the outer fringes of relevance. In short, the CO was fully justified in reaching her 
termination decision without the reports based on the totality of the information available 
to her.4 There is no evidence that the notices had a disproportionate or unreasonable 
influence on the termination decision. Other more significant factors concerning the 
details of the performance of this specific contract made that decision reasonable. We 
also do not consider that appellant has proved that these reports were prepared 
maliciously or in bad faith. 
Appellant alleges that subsequent procurement of the end items also calls into 
question the propriety of the termination suggesting that the CO "had already made up 
her mind." Apparently appellant is referencing the 14 July 2011 posting of a synopsis on 
the FedBizOps website and subsequent 3 August 2011 solicitation for the items. The 
later procurement had no proven bearing on the CO's decision. There is no evidence 
tending to indicate that the synopsis was anything more that a routine notice to potential 
offerors of the government's recurring future needs. Only after appellant's default were 
an additional nine end items added to the solicitation. The CO could not have known at 
the time of her decision that the items would be procured post-termination in September 
2011 at a substantially reduced cost, a cost savings which effectively benefitted appellant 
inasmuch as no excess cost assessment was made by the government as a consequence of 
the reprocurement. 
D. ASBCA No. 58252 
Appellant's briefs do not address its claims comprising the subject matter of 
ASBCA No. 58252 for compensable delay. We need not decide whether the claims were 
effectively abandoned as argued by the government. The claims lack merit and are 
unproven in any event. As we have detailed above, appellant has not shown that it was 
excusably delayed as a defense to the termination for default. For the same reasons, 
appellant has failed 
to establish that it is entitled to a monetary adjustment for the alleged 
causes of delay in dispute. Appellant has not proved that it is entitled to a time extension 
for any government-caused delay. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to discuss additional 
issues relating to whether DODS concurrently caused such delays or its failure to detail 
its methodology in computing the delay period and the amount claimed. 
4 It warrants emphasis that appellant inexplicably argues that the CO was negligent in not 
promptly taking termination action sooner given the purported seriousness of the 
delay information contained in the notices. Apparently DODS considers that her 
alleged failure to take prompt action constituted a waiver of the government's 
right to terminate. The "waiver" doctrine of course, inter alia, requires the actual 
passage of the delivery date which had not occurred here. 
29 

The appeals are denied. 
Dated: 22 July 2014 
I concur 
~~(fA= 
Administrative Judge 
Acting Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
I concur 
PETER D. TING 
Administrative Judge 
Acting Vice Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
• ,, 
I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the Armed 
Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA Nos. 57746, 58252, Appeals ofDODS, Inc., 
rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. 
Dated: 
30 
JEFFREY D. GARDIN 
Recorder, Armed Services 
Board of Contract Appeals