ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 
OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE MCILMAIL  
ON THE PARTIES’ CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 
 The government moves for summary judgment upon eight claims arising from a 
contract for the design and construction of a pre-engineered metal building warehouse 
at a security complex in Tennessee.  Appellant cross-moves for summary judgment upon 
two of those claims.   
 
STATEMENT OF FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF THE MOTION 
  
 The following background is not in dispute; other, claim-specific assertions will be 
addressed below. 
 
 On September 28, 2017, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps, USACE, or 
government) contracted for appellant, Pangea, Inc., to design and construct a pre-
engineered metal building warehouse at the Y-12 National Security Complex in 
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for $3,696,859 (gov’t mot. ¶¶ 1, 3; app. resp. at 1).  The 
scheduled period of performance was 365 calendar days after notice to proceed (gov’t 
mot. ¶ 3; app. resp. at 1).  Pangea acknowledged receipt of the notice to proceed on 
November 2, 2017; the contract completion date was October 24, 2018 (gov’t mot. ¶ 4; 
app. resp. at 1).  On October 17, 2019, Pangea submitted a Request for Contracting 
Officer’s Final Decision on a multi-issue, certified claim, wherein Pangea requested 
compensation in the amount of $983,067.73, and a time extension of 169 calendar days 
Appeals of - )  
 )  
Pangea, Inc. ) ASBCA Nos. 62561, 62640 
 )  
Under Contract No. W912WR-17-C-0039 )  
   
APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT: John C. Grellner, Esq.  
J. Randolph Parham, Esq. 
  Berger, Cohen & Brandt, L.C. 
  Clayton, MO 
 
APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: Michael P. Goodman, Esq. 
  Engineer Chief Trial Attorney 
 Bonnie B. Jagoditz, Esq. 
Johanna L. Anderson, Esq. 
    Engineer Trial Attorneys 
    U.S. Army Engineer District, Nashville 
     

2 
 
(gov’t mot. ¶ 5; app. resp. at 1).  The claim was, in effect, a request for reconsideration of 
the denial of Pangea’s six previously filed Requests for Equitable Adjustment (REA) and 
reconsideration of a previously issued Final Contractor Performance Assessment 
Reporting System (CPARS) Evaluation (gov’t mot. ¶ 5; app. resp. at 1).  In March and 
August 2020, the contracting officer issued final decisions addressing the issues 
previously raised in REAs 2, 4, 6, and the Final CPARS Evaluation (gov’t mot. ¶ 6; app. 
resp. at 1). 
    
DECISION 
 
 Summary judgment will be granted if a moving party has shown that there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  CDM 
Constructors, Inc., ASBCA No. 61074, 18-1 BCA ¶ 37,124 at 180,682.  A non-movant 
seeking to defeat summary judgment by suggesting conflicting facts must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.  Id.  The non-movant must 
show an evidentiary conflict on the record; mere denials or conclusory statements are not 
sufficient.  McDonnell Douglas Servs., Inc., ASBCA No. 45556, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,333 
at 136,229.  If the non-moving party has the burden of proof at trial for elements of its 
case and fails to provide such proof in response to a summary judgment motion, the 
moving party is entitled to summary judgment.  CDM Constructors, 18-1 BCA ¶ 37,124 
at 180,682.     
 
Claim 1:  Additional Aggregate Material 
 
The government seeks summary judgment upon Claim 1, in which Pangea 
challenges the government’s “request for a downward adjustment” from an agreement to 
pay Pangea $171,264 for 6,400 tons of graded crushed aggregate base (gov’t mot. at 22; 
amend. compl. ¶ 12; R4, tab 28 at 474).  Pangea seeks $113,998.11, having been paid 
(according to the government) some $51,324.72 (amend. compl. ¶ 6 (incorporating 
October 17, 2019 request for contracting officer’s decision); R4, tab 78 at 1370; gov’t 
mot. ¶¶ 27, 30).    
 
STATEMENT OF FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF THE MOTION 
 
  The following is not in genuine dispute.  On April 19, 2018, pursuant to bilateral 
Modification No. A00002, the government agreed to pay Pangea $171,264 for 6,400 tons 
of graded crushed aggregate base at $26.76 per ton to remediate unsuitable soils under a 
concrete slab (see gov’t mot. ¶¶ 7, 13-14; app. resp. at 2; R4, tab 28 at 472-74).  
Modification No. A00002 includes Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.211–18, 
Variation in Estimated Quantity (VEQ), which provides (emphasis added): 
 
If the quantity of a unit-priced item in this contract is an 
estimated quantity and the actual quantity of the unit-priced 

3 
 
item varies more than 15 percent above or below the 
estimated quantity, an equitable adjustment in the contract 
price shall be made upon demand of either party.  The 
equitable adjustment shall be based upon any increase or 
decrease in costs due solely to the variation above 
115 percent or below 85 percent of the estimated quantity. 
 
On October 16, 2018, pursuant to Modification No. A00002, the government paid 
Pangea $23,334.72 for the placement of 872 tons of aggregate backfill (gov’t mot. ¶ 27; 
app. br. at 2-4; R4, tab 50 at 1273).  On December 8, 2020, the government issued 
unilateral Modification No. P00005, which, in part, compensated Pangea $27,990 for 
another 1,046 tons of aggregate backfill (gov’t mot. at ¶ 30; app. br. at 2-4; R4, tab 102 
at 2648-49).  The total of those two payments is $51,324.72, for 1,918 tons of aggregate. 
 
The following, however, appears to be in genuine dispute.  The government points 
to what it says is an August 16, 2018 agreement between the parties “on the final 
quantities for work actually performed under Modification A00006” (gov’t mot. at 5-6 
¶ 24 (citing R4, tabs 43 and 53)).  However, the government admits that Modification 
No. A00006 “was not ultimately signed by Pangea” (id.), and Pangea responds with the 
affidavit of its president, Michael Zambrana, who denies any such agreement (app. resp. 
at ¶ 24; Zambrana aff. at 1).  The government also challenges the “weight tickets” that it 
says Pangea provided the government to substantiate the amount of aggregate used under 
the concrete slab: 
 
On 2 July 2019, Pangea provided the Corps with weight 
tickets dated between 27 June 2018 and 2 February 2019 to 
substantiate its request for additional compensation.  These 
weight tickets were not previously provided to the Corps at 
the time of delivery, as required by the Contract.  None of 
these weight tickets include the Contract number or project 
name, as required by the Contract.  Neither the weight tickets 
nor any other documentation indicated which deliveries of 
aggregate material were used in support of this part of the 
project.  Thus, the Corps could not use these weight tickets to 
determine the quantity of aggregate material delivered to the 
work site to backfill the concrete slab. 
 
(Gov’t mot. at ¶ 29)  However, the government also asserts that “[t]hese weight tickets 
demonstrate that at least 1,575.4 tons of aggregate material were delivered to the job site” 
(gov’t mot. at 9 ¶ 48 ).  Further muddying the picture, the government cites (gov’t mot. 
¶ 24) an August 23, 2018 memorandum in which a contracting officer’s representative 
states that “the final measured quantity [of aggregate backfill] was 872 tons versus the 
quantity of 6,400 tons in the original contract . . . [t]his resulted in a quantity underrun in 

4 
 
the amount of ($147,929.28)” (R4, tab 43 at 995).  The government also cites (gov’t mot. 
¶ 24, tab 44 (found at R4, pages 998-99)), which the government describes as a 
“Government VEQ Worksheet in Support of Modification A00006,” which worksheet in 
turn calculates “aggregate weight” at 854.17 tons. 
 
DECISION 
 
The government would have the burden at trial to prove that under FAR 52.211-
18, it is entitled to pay less than originally agreed.  See Clement-Mtarri Companies, 
ASBCA No. 38170, 92-3 BCA ¶ 25,192 at 125,537.  The contentions recited above 
indicate that the government has not satisfied that burden.  Specifically, the record 
requires further development regarding how many tons of aggregate Pangea used as 
backfill under the concrete slab.  Therefore, whether the government is entitled to an 
equitable adjustment in the $171,264 contract price for aggregate—and if so, to how 
much of an adjustment—is a matter for trial.  Accordingly, the government’s motion for 
summary judgment upon Claim 1 is denied.  See Watts Constructors, LLC, ASBCA 
Nos. 61518, 61961, 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,382 at 181,728; cf. GSC Constr., Inc., ASBCA 
No. 59402, 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,396 at 177,435 (identifying “at least one reason” to deny 
summary judgment). 
 
Claim 2:  Design-Related Delay Claim 
 
 In Claim 2, Pangea seeks a compensable time extension arising from design delays 
allegedly attributable to the government (see amend. compl. ¶ 13; R4, tab 78 at 1366).  
The government moves for summary judgment, saying that Pangea ignores that Pangea’s 
fire suppression system design calculations were untimely, deficient, and not on the 
project’s critical path (gov’t mot. at 24).  In such cases, delay must be to work on the 
critical path, because only work on the critical path affects when the project is completed.  
Creative Times Dayschool, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 59507, 59779, 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,535 
at 177,984.  Apparently agreeing that the issue here is the government’s review of the fire 
suppression system design, Pangea says that:  (1) “it was [the government’s] failure to 
perform a proper review of the earlier versions of [the fire suppression] system that 
resulted in [the] late and unnecessary delay in issuing the for[-]construction design”; 
(2) “the ‘fact’ that the [government’s] review [of the fire suppression system] did not 
affect the critical path of performance is without any factual support”; and (3) “proper 
review would have avoided the delay since all of the late comments by [the government] 
should have been covered [earlier]” (app. resp. at 6). 
 
The government asserts that the actual critical path activity—allegedly foundation 
demolition—was not completed until July 19, 2018; after the government had completed 
reviewing the fire suppression system design (gov’t mot. ¶¶ 24-26, 32-42).  In support of 
this assertion, the government states “[a]s reported on Pangea’s July Schedule Update 
(data date 24 July 2018), Activity S-004 (Demo Foundation) was not completed until 

5 
 
19 July 2018” (gov’t mot. ¶ 41).  However, (1) a party asserting that a fact cannot be 
genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing the record (Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c)(1)(A)); (2) the government does not identify where in the record the July Schedule 
Update appears; and (3) we will not scour the record for a party’s evidence.  Creative 
Times Dayschool, 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,535 at 177,983.  For its part, Pangea is silent on 
whether foundation demolition was completed on July 19, 2018 (app. resp. at 5), but what 
matters more here is that, in the first instance, a party, here the government, seeking 
summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing [a] court of the 
basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file[],’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of 
a genuine issue of material fact.”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) 
(emphasis added).  Because, in the first instance, the government fails adequately to 
support its motion for summary judgment upon Claim 2, that motion is denied.   
 
Claim 3:  Differing Site Condition 
 
 In Claim 3, Pangea seeks additional compensation for allegedly unsuitable backfill 
it encountered while excavating for a sewer system (amend. compl. ¶ 14).  The 
government seeks summary judgment, saying that Pangea cannot prove a Type I differing 
site condition (gov’t mot. at 27).  Without citing any evidence, Pangea responds that: 
 
The first four paragraphs of [the government’s] argument 
concern a Type 1 DSC and will not be addressed since 
Pangea has not asserted a Type 1 DSC.  Testimony will 
demonstrate that the conditions encountered by Pangea in the 
area, which is the subject of this claim, were materially 
different than reasonably anticipated by Pangea at the time of 
bidding on this Contract meeting the standards of a Type 2 
DSC. 
 
(App. resp. at 7 (emphasis added)) 
 
 Regardless of what type of differing site condition Pangea alleges it encountered, 
the government having challenged Pangea’s unsuitable backfill claim on summary 
judgment, it is up to Pangea to demonstrate that there is an evidentiary conflict; that is, 
Pangea needs to point to an evidentiary conflict on the record, and mere denials or 
conclusory statements are not sufficient.  McDonnell Douglas, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,333 
at 136,229.  Pangea says its differing site condition claim is of the Type II, in which a 
claimant must establish that the conditions encountered were unexpectedly and materially 
peculiar in nature from the conditions anticipated and perceived as intrinsic in common 
contract interpretation.  Totem Const. Co., ASBCA No. 35985, 91-1 BCA ¶ 23,585 
at 118,260.  Pangea’s mere allegations, unsupported by any evidence, are not sufficient to 
survive summary judgment upon such a differing site condition claim, upon which it 

6 
 
would have the burden at trial.  See CDM Constructors, 18-1 BCA ¶ 37,124 at 180,682; 
McDonnell Douglas, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,333 at 136,229.  Consequently, the government is 
entitled to summary judgment upon Claim 3, and its motion for summary judgment upon 
that claim is granted. 
 
Claim 4:  Delay Related to Enforcement of Safety Regulations 
 
 In Claim 4, Pangea seeks additional compensation pursuant to FAR 52.242-14, 
Suspension of Work, for an alleged delay caused by government enforcement of safety 
regulations (amend. compl. ¶ 15).  The government seeks summary judgment, saying that 
“Pangea cannot demonstrate the Government’s actions to protect those present at the 
worksite, including the employees of Pangaea and its subcontractor, were unreasonable 
or beyond the Contracting Officer’s authority under the Contract, including the Accident 
Prevention Clause” (gov’t mot. at 33).  In response, Pangea references emails and other 
documents without identifying where, if at all, those documents can be found in the 
record, and says that “[a] determination of the merits of this claim and the reasonableness 
of the [government’s] actions cannot be determined in a summary action based on the 
opinion of [the government]” (app. resp. at 9).  Because Pangea fails to show an 
evidentiary conflict on the record, summary judgment is granted to the government upon 
Claim 4.  See McDonnell Douglas, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,333 at 136,229. 
  
Claim 5:  Steel 
 
 The parties cross-move for summary judgment upon whether Pangea is entitled to 
$33,844 for an alleged increase in the price of domestic steel (gov’t mot. at 34; app. resp. 
at 10).  Pangea says that the price increase was the result of tariffs that the United States 
imposed upon foreign steel (id.).   
 
STATEMENT OF FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF THE MOTION 
 
 The following is not in dispute.  Pangea seeks compensation for the increase in the 
price of domestic steel following the enactment of an ad valorem tariff on steel imports.  
The President of the United States issued a series of proclamations that changed the ad 
valorem tariffs on aluminum and steel imports to 10% and 25%, respectively.  These 
proclamations were signed on March 8, 2018, and effective March 23, 2018.  In its 
certified claim, Pangea stated that the steel, quoted in both the original purchase order 
and the revised purchase order, was domestic steel, and that “the original Purchase Order 
from Star followed FAR Clause 52.225-9, Buy American Act-Construction Materials 
correctly.”  Pangea submitted a purchase order, dated January 19, 2018, which showed a 
quoted price of $287,136.12 for a variety of steel products.   Pangea submitted a change 
order request, dated April 30, 2018, showing an updated price of $317,559.28 for the 
same steel products.  The change order request does not reference a “tariff,” “duty,” or 
“excise tax.” (See gov’t mot. ¶¶ 72-77; see app. resp. at 9) 

7 
 
DECISION 
 
 FAR 52.229-3(c) provides: 
 
The contract price shall be increased by the amount of any 
after-imposed Federal tax, provided the Contractor warrants 
in writing that no amount for such newly imposed Federal 
excise tax or duty or rate increase was included in the contract 
price, as a contingency reserve or otherwise. 
 
And FAR 52.229-3(a) provides: 
 
After-imposed Federal tax means any new or increased 
Federal excise tax or duty, or tax that was exempted or 
excluded on the contract date but whose exemption was later 
revoked or reduced during the contract period, on the 
transactions or property covered by this contract that the 
Contractor is required to pay or bear as the result of 
legislative, judicial, or administrative action taking effect 
after the contract date.  It does not include social security tax 
or other employment taxes. 
 
 Pangea does not persuade us that an increase in the price of domestic steel 
resulting from a tariff on foreign steel is a “Federal tax” within the meaning of 
FAR 52.229-3.  Consequently, the government is entitled to summary judgment upon 
Claim 5.  The government’s motion for summary judgment upon Claim 5 is granted, and 
Pangea’s cross-motion for summary judgment upon Claim 5 is denied. 
 
Claim 6:  Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
 
 In Claim 6, Pangea seeks a time extension, alleging that the government breached 
its implied duty not to hinder Pangea’s performance (amend. compl. at 3 ¶ 17).  The 
government moves for summary judgment (gov’t mot. at 35-38). 
 
STATEMENT OF FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF THE MOTION 
  
 The following, taken from the government’s recitation (gov’t mot. ¶¶ 78-90), is 
not in genuine dispute.  There is no genuine dispute because Pangea says only this in 
response to the government’s recitation:  
 
These paragraphs [gov’t mot. at 14-16 ¶¶ 78-90] do not 
contain statements of fact, but contain simply a recitation of 
the contentions made by Pangea respecting this claim and the 

8 
 
opinions of Respondent in response to this claim.  Pangea 
understands that it must meet its burden of establishing that 
the actions and inactions of Respondent alleged in this claim 
constituted unreasonable interference on the part of 
Respondent.  Pangea intends to do that in the hearings on this 
Claim.   
 
(App. resp. at 11)  If a party fails to properly address another party’s 
assertion of fact, the court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of 
the motion.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). 
 
 In Claim 6 of its complaint, Pangea seeks a compensable extension of 
143 calendar days under the Suspension Clause, for delays caused when the government 
allegedly breached its duty to cooperate and not to hinder performance and breached its 
duty of good faith and fair dealing when administering the contract.  Although not 
specified in Claim 6 of the complaint, in its certified claim, Pangea cited a collection of 
19 allegations of constructive suspensions, weather delays, and contract changes as 
evidence of the Corps’ contractual duties. 
 
 As to the constructive suspension and changes elements of the claim, Pangea 
contends that the Corps’ efforts to require compliance with the contract’s specifications 
and requirements constituted a breach of the government’s duty of good faith and fair 
dealing, thus resulting in approximately 58 calendar days of delays due to compensable 
constructive suspensions and changes.  While Pangea does not dispute the actual contract 
requirements, Pangea argues that it was unreasonable for the Corps to require compliance 
with the terms and conditions of the contract because: 
 
This Contract contains over 1300 pages and references over 
150 FARs.  It is clear from the mountain of documents 
incorporated into this Contract, that no bidder could possibly 
predict or given consideration of the applicable by a 
government agent to the performance requirements of the 
contractor and must rely on the typical course of dealing and 
trade practices . . .  [w]ithin those 1300 pages and 150 FARs 
are further references most of which have nothing to do with 
the construction of this basic building . . . .  It is unreasonable 
for the government to assume that a contractor bidding or 
performing on this Contract would be able to sort through this 
morass of documents to determine what the government 
wanted. 
 
(R4, tab 78 at 1369) 

9 
 
 Pangea seeks an extension of three non-compensable calendar days for unusually 
adverse weather for the period of August 1, 2018 through September 30, 2018.  Pangea 
also seeks an extension of 56 compensable calendar days for unusually adverse weather 
for the period of November 1, 2018 through March 31, 2019.  In support of its claim, 
Pangea alleges that constructive suspensions pushed weather-dependent activities beyond 
their planned completion of October 2018, converting otherwise non-compensable delays 
into compensable delays. 
 
 By letter, dated September 4, 2018, the Corps documented its analysis of actual 
adverse weather delays for the period of June 1, 2018 through August 31, 2018, wherein 
the Corps determined two days of adverse weather for June, five days of adverse weather 
for July, and three days of adverse weather for August.  However, per Contract 
Specification No. 00 80 00.00 06 (Special Provisions) ¶1.27, Time Extensions for 
Unusually Severe Weather, three days of adverse weather were anticipated for June 2018, 
three days of adverse weather were anticipated for July, and three days of adverse 
weather were anticipated for August 2018.  Accordingly, the Corps determined that 
Pangea was entitled to a time extension of four calendar days to the contract for this time 
period.  (R4, tab 47)  
 
 By letter, dated December 21, 2018, the Corps documented its analysis of actual 
adverse weather delays for the period of November 1, 2018 through November 30, 2018, 
wherein the Corps determined five days of adverse weather for November 2018.  
However, per Contract Specification No. 00 80 00.00 06 (Special Provisions) ¶1.27, 
Time Extensions for Unusually Severe Weather, four days of adverse weather were 
anticipated for November.  Nine additional days claimed by Pangea were denied.  
Accordingly, the Corps determined Pangea was entitled to a two-day time extension to 
the contract for this time period, extending the contract period of performance 
December 2, 2018 to December 4, 2018.  By letter, dated January 15, 2019, the Corps 
documented its analysis of actual adverse weather delays for the period of December 1, 
2018 through December 31, 2018, wherein the Corps determined four days of adverse 
weather for December 2018. 
 
 However, per Contract Specification No. 00 80 00.00 06 (Special Provisions) 
¶ 1.27, Time Extensions for Unusually Severe Weather, six days of adverse weather were 
anticipated for December 2018.  Two additional days claimed by Pangea were denied.  
Accordingly, the Corps determined Pangea was not entitled to an extension for weather 
days in December.  By letter, dated February 22, 2019, the Corps documented its analysis 
of actual adverse weather delays for the period of January 1, 2019 through January 31, 
2019, wherein the Corps determined five days of adverse weather for January 2019.  
However, per Contract Specification No. 00 80 00.00 06 (Special Provisions) ¶ 1.27, 
Time Extensions for Unusually Severe Weather, seven days of adverse weather were 
anticipated for January 2019.  Two additional days claimed by Pangea were denied.  

10 
 
Accordingly, the Corps determined that Pangea was not entitled to an extension for 
weather days in January 2019. 
 
 By letter, dated March 22, 2019, the Corps documented its analysis of actual 
adverse weather delays for the period of February 1, 2019 through February 28, 2019, 
wherein the Corps determined zero days of adverse weather for February 2019.  Nine 
days claimed by Pangea were denied.  Accordingly, the Corps determined Pangea was 
not entitled to an extension for weather days in February 2019.  On April 5, 2019, the 
Corps executed Modification No. A0007, a unilateral modification of the contract, 
extending the contract period of performance by two calendar days from December 2, 
2018 to December 4, 2018, for “delays caused by adverse weather in excess of 
anticipated during the period November 1, 2018 through November 30, 2018” (R4, 
tab 67). 
 
 Pangea raised this issue in Request for Equitable Adjustment 6 on May 8, 2019, 
which the government denied on August 2, 2019.  Pangea included this issue as Issue 6 in 
its certified claim on October 17, 2019, which the contracting officer denied on August 3, 
2020 (R4, tab 82 at 1405, 1413-22).  On September 30, 2020, the Corps executed 
Modification No. P00004, a unilateral modification of the contract, extending the contract 
period of performance by two calendar days from December 4, 2018 to December 6, 
2018 (R4, tab 100 at 2638, 2640).  
 
DECISION 
 
 Pangea claims that it is entitled to a time extension because, it says, the 
government “breached its implied duty not to hinder [Pangea’s] performance and failed 
to act in good faith and fair dealing [] in administering the Contract constructively and in 
effectively suspending [] work on the critical path” (amend. comp. ¶ 17).  The 
government moves for summary judgment on this claim because, it says “[t]here is no 
evidence to suggest the Corps administered the Contract unreasonably with respect to 
requiring strict compliance with contract specifications or the calculation of weather 
delays,” and that “Pangea has offered no evidence that the Corps breached its duty of 
good faith and fair dealing” (gov’t mot. at 38).   
 
Pangea, as the proponent of the claim, has the burden of proof.  Every contract 
imposes upon each party a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and 
enforcement.  The duty of good faith and fair dealing imposes obligations on both 
contracting parties, including the duty not to interfere with the other party’s performance 
and not to act so as to destroy the reasonable expectations of the other party.  However, 
this implicit duty cannot expand a party’s contractual duties beyond those in the express 
contract or create duties inconsistent with the contract’s provisions.  A breach of the duty 
of good faith and fair dealing may be shown by proving, inter alia, a lack of diligence, 
willful or negligent interference, or a failure to cooperate.  The proper inquiry regarding 

11 
 
the duty often boils down to questions of reasonableness of the government’s actions.  
John Shaw LLC d/b/a Shaw Bldg. Maint., ASBCA No. 61379, 21-1 BCA ¶ 37,844 
at 183,748.   
 
 Pangea’s entire response to the government’s position consists of the following: 
 
Without testimony detailing the facts and circumstances of 
each of the Respondent’s actions, a determination of the 
merits of this claim and the reasonableness of the 
Respondent’s actions cannot be determined.  These issues are 
heavily fact dependent and require an evidentiary hearing. 
  
(App. resp. at 11)  Such mere denials and conclusory statements are not sufficient.  See 
McDonnell Douglas, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,333 at 136,229.  Pangea has failed to make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of distinct acts that the government as an 
organization, or any individual representative thereof, has engaged in which would 
indicate a breach of this duty or would be considered unreasonable, an element essential 
to Pangea’s case, and on which Pangea would bear the burden of proof at trial.  See 
Watts, 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,382 at 181,728.  The government is entitled to summary judgment 
upon Claim 6, and its motion for summary judgment upon that claim is granted. 
 
Claim 7:  CPARS 
 
 Pangea claims that it did not receive a fair and accurate CPARS evaluation, and 
that the CPARS evaluation was issued in retaliation for claims that Pangea presented to 
the contracting officer (see amend. comp. ¶ 18).  The government moves for summary 
judgment because, it says, “there is no evidence to suggest that the Corps Assessing 
Official acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner or abused their discretion” (gov’t mot. 
at 38-39).   
 
STATEMENT OF FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF THE MOTION 
 
 The following, taken from the government’s recitation (gov’t mot. at ¶¶ 91-101), 
is not in genuine dispute.  There is no genuine dispute because Pangea says only this in 
response to the government’s recitation: 
 
These paragraphs [gov’t mot. ¶¶ 91-101] do not contain 
statements of undisputed material facts on the allegations 
made by Pangea, but simply a recitation of the contentions 
made by Pangea and the opinions of Respondent in response 
to this claim. 
 
(App. resp. at 11) Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).   

12 
 
 FAR 42.1503 includes Table 42-1—Evaluation Ratings Definitions, which defines 
the different ratings that can be entered for performance evaluations including but not 
limited to the following: 
 
(e) Unsatisfactory: Performance does not meet most 
contractual requirements and recovery is not likely in a timely 
manner.  The contractual performance of an element or sub-
element contains a serious problem(s) for which the 
contractor’s corrective actions appear or were ineffective. 
 
On April 24, 2019, the Corps sent its Final Contractor Performance 
Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) Evaluation to Pangea.  The Corps 
provided the following ratings to Pangea: 
 
Quality: Unsatisfactory 
Schedule: Unsatisfactory 
Cost Control: N/A 
Management: Unsatisfactory 
Small Business Contracting: N/A 
Regulatory Compliance: Satisfactory 
 
Under Quality, the Assessing Official included comments regarding serious issues 
with several aspects of Pangea’s quality control process, preparatory meetings, 
submission of daily reports, submittal approvals, key safety personnel, and attendance at 
other required meetings.  For example, at project completion, Pangea had failed to submit 
more than 160 required submittals and the Final Evaluation references 13 separate 
Specifications sections Pangea failed to comply with during contract performance.  Under 
Schedule, the Assessing Official included comments regarding concerns with Pangea’s 
failure to get input from subcontractors and suppliers in development of its original 
schedule, failure to review bar charts produced at weekly progress meetings, and delays 
in providing all required submittals, all of which contributed to Pangea’s significant delay 
in contract completion.  Under Management, the Assessing Official included comments 
regarding concerns with the high level of active engagement from Corps personnel, 
including senior leadership and Pangea’s corporate office, which was required to ensure 
Pangea was able to complete the project, albeit over 100 days behind schedule.  
 
Pangea first viewed the Final Evaluation on May 1, 2019.  Between May 2, 2019 
and June 17, 2019, twelve emails were sent by CPARS to mzambrana@pangea-
group.com.
  No action was taken by Pangea during this period. 
 
Pangea did not enter a non-concurrence or comments in response to the Final 
Evaluation, and on June 23, 2019, the 60-day window for doing so expired.  On June 25, 
2019, the Corps’ Assessing Official acknowledged his review and approval of the 

13 
 
comments and the Final Evaluation was closed.  On August 26, 2019, Pangea appealed 
its Final Evaluation to the District’s Senior Reviewing Official, wherein Pangea 
requested that its rating be revised to reflect circumstances identified by Pangea.  In its 
October 17, 2019 Request for a Contracting Officer’s Final Decision, Pangea again 
requested reconsideration of its Final Evaluation, incorporating by reference the same 
appeal considered by the Senior Reviewing Official (R4, tab 78 1369).  On February 24, 
2020, the Senior Reviewing Official responded to Pangea’s initial request for 
reconsideration of its appeal, upholding the Unsatisfactory ratings assigned to Pangea for 
the “Quality,” “Schedule,” and “Management” evaluation factors. 
 
DECISION 
  
 Government officials are presumed to have acted in good faith; to prove bad faith 
(here, retaliation; see Genome-Commc’ns, ASBCA Nos. 57267, 57285, 11-1 BCA 
¶ 34,699 at 170,889 (allegedly bad faith, retaliatory contract termination); Defense 
Systems Co., ASBCA No. 50918, 00-2 BCA ¶ 30,991 at 153,005 (allegedly bad faith, 
retaliatory cure notice)) Pangea would have to show with convincing clarity a high 
probability that the government officials responsible for the CPARS acted from personal 
animus with specific intent to injure it.  See Watts, 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,382 at 181,728.  
Pangea’s entire response to the government’s argument consists of the following: 
 
Pangea understands that it must meet its burden of 
establishing that the evaluation of Respondent is unjustified 
as alleged in this claim and intends to do that in the hearings 
on this Claim as well as Claims 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 which will 
establish a pattern of conduct by Respondent that renders this 
evaluation unjustified.  These issues are heavily fact 
dependent, and until there is a full hearing on all of these 
claims, such a determination cannot be rendered. 
 
(App. resp. at 11)  Such mere denials and conclusory statements are not sufficient.  See 
McDonnell Douglas, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,333 at 136,229.  Pangea has failed to make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of a high probability that the government 
officials responsible for the CPARS acted from personal animus with specific intent to 
injure Pangea, an element essential to Pangea’s case, and on which Pangea would bear 
the burden of proof at trial.  See Watts, 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,382 at 181,728.  The government 
is entitled to summary judgment upon Claim 7, and its motion for summary judgment 
upon that claim is granted. 
 
  
 
 
Claim 8:  Payment Withholding 

14 
 
 
 On this claim both parties move for summary judgment in their favor (gov’t mot. 
at 39-41; app. resp. at 13-15).  Pangea alleges that the government has violated the 
Prompt Payment Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3905, because the government has not yet paid 
what Pangea says is “the undisputed balance due” under the contract” (amend. compl. 
¶ 19).  The government says that “Pangea has not paid at least some of its 
subcontractors,” and that the government is justified in refusing payment of Pangea’s 
final invoice (Invoice No. 18) “so long as Pangea continues to request payment of 
amounts it has retained from its subcontractors” (gov’t mot. at 41).  The government also 
cites a March 1, 2021 letter from an attorney ostensibly writing on behalf of Pangea’s 
surety, North American Specialty Insurance Company, notifying the contracting officer 
in writing that, with respect to the contract at issue: 
 
It has come to my attention that the United States Army 
Corps of Engineers (“USACE”) intends to issue payment of 
contract funds directly to Pangea, Inc., in connection with the 
above referenced Project.  It is also my understanding that 
there are outstanding amounts owed to subcontractors and 
suppliers on this Project, which North American Specialty 
Insurance Company (“NAS”) bonded pursuant to the Miller 
Act.  The Miller Act Bond number is 2258142.  Dave 
Mathews of NAS has spoken with Michael Zambrana of 
Pangea, Inc. about this matter, and it is my understanding that 
Mr. Zambrana has agreed the funds to be distributed by the 
USACE will either be issued jointly to Pangea, Inc. and the 
subcontractors and suppliers that are owed payment of these 
funds or directly to the Surety to cover its losses under this 
and the other payment and performance bonds that NAS 
issued for Pangea, Inc.  The Surety will be involved in how 
the funds are distributed, once the USACE is ready to make 
the distribution. 
 
Please accept this as written instructions to yourself as the 
Contracting Officer.  Please provide me with verification that 
you have received this correspondence and will proceed as 
instructed. 
 
(R4, tab 103 at 2652-53 (emphasis added))  And as the government also points out but 
Pangea ignores (gov’t mot. at 40; app. resp. at 13-14), FAR 28.106-7(b) provides: 
 
If, after completion of the contract work, the Government 
receives written notice from the surety regarding the 
contractor’s failure to meet its obligation to its subcontractors 

15 
 
or suppliers, the contracting officer shall withhold final 
payment . . . .  The contracting officer will authorize final 
payment upon agreement between the contractor and surety 
or upon a judicial determination of the rights of the parties. 
 
At this stage, the Board is not persuaded that either party has met its burden of 
proving that it is entitled to summary judgment on this issue, for at least one reason:  
whether, within the meaning of FAR 28.106-7(b), there is an “agreement between the 
contractor and surety” requiring the contracting officer to “authorize final payment” is a 
question that will require further development of the record, presumably during a hearing 
on the merits.  The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment upon Claim 8 are, 
therefore, denied.  
  
CONCLUSION 
 
 The government’s motion for summary judgment upon Claims 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 is 
granted.  The government’s motion for summary judgment upon Claims 1, 2, and 8 is 
denied.  Pangea’s motion for summary judgment upon Claims 5 and 8 is denied.   
 
 Dated:  January 4, 2022 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TIMOTHY P. MCILMAIL 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
I concur 
 
RICHARD SHACKLEFORD 
Administrative Judge 
Acting Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 I concur 
 
 
 
 OWEN C. WILSON 
Administrative Judge 
Vice Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 
  


16 
 
 I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the 
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA Nos. 62561, 62640, Appeals of 
Pangea, Inc., rendered in conformance with the Board’s Charter. 
 
 Dated:  January 5, 2022 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PAULLA K. GATES-LEWIS 
Recorder, Armed Services 
Board of Contract Appeals