ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 
Appeals of --
L-3 Communications Integrated 
Systems, L.P. 
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Under Contract No. F A8620-06-G-4002 et al. ) 
APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT: 
APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: 
ASBCA Nos. 60713, 60716 
Karen L. Manos, Esq. 
Erin N. Rankin, Esq. 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP 
Washington, DC 
E. Michael Chiaparas, Esq. 
DCMA Chief Trial Attorney 
Cara A. Wulf, Esq. 
Trial Attorney 
Defense Contract Management Agency 
Boston, MA 
OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE D'ALESSANDRIS ON APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant L-3 Communications Integrated Systems, L.P. (L-3) appeals from 
three contracting officers' final decisions 1 asserting government claims for recovery 
of purportedly unallowable airfare costs claimed by L-3 and paid by the government. 
During fiscal year 2009 (FY 09), L-3 incurred airfare expenses in performing 
flexibly-priced contracts 2 with the government. L-3 was reimbursed for its claimed 
costs. In April 2016, the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) issued an audit 
report concerning L-3 's unsettled 3 flexibly-priced contracts for FY 09, including L-3 's 
claimed airfares. In the audit report, DCAA applied a 79% "decrement factor" based 
upon prior 
audits of L-3' s incurred costs, to claimed international airfare costs over 
1 ASBCA No. 60714, also involving a government claim for recovery of premium 
airfare, is not subject to this motion. A fourth contracting officer's final 
decision, docketed as ASBCA No. 60715, was settled before L-3 filed its 
complaint. 
2 Flexibly-priced contracts include fixed-price contracts with price adjustments for 
actual costs of labor or materials, cost-reimbursement contracts, incentive 
contracts, orders under indefinite-delivery contracts where final payment is 
based on actual costs incurred, and the materials portion of time-and-materials 
contracts. See FAR 30.00 I. 
3 Here, the flexibly-priced contracts are unsettled because L-3 and the government 
have not agreed on final indirect cost rates. See generally FAR 42.7. 

$6,000. The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) contracting officers 
subsequently issued final decisions asserting government claims for the costs 
questioned in the DCAA audit report. 
Pending before the Board is L-3's motion to dismiss ASBCA Nos. 60713 and 
60716 for lack of jurisdiction 4 because the final decisions purportedly fail to provide 
adequate notice of the bases and amounts of the government's claims. The DCMA 
opposes the motion, asserting that the contracting officers' final decisions provide 
sufficient information to survive L-3's motion to dismiss. For the reasons set forth 
below, we deny L-3's motion to dismiss. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF THE MOTION 
L-3 is a wholly-owned subsidiary of L-3 Communications Corporation. L-3 is 
party to numerous contracts with the government, administered by DCMA, including 
Contract No. FA8620-06-G-4002. (Comp I. ,, 1, 4, answer,, 1, 4) The contracts at 
issue, included a cost-reimbursement line item for travel (compl., 13, answer, 13). 
Although the contracts and task orders differed somewhat in their specific terms, they 
all placed restrictions on reimbursement of first class and business class airfare (app. 
mot. at 5-8; R4, tabs 1-4 ). 
On 13 April 2016, DCAA issued Audit Report No. 9891-2009Gl0100002, 
Independent Audit Report on L-3 Communications Integrated Systems' Proposed 
Amounts on Unsettled Flexibly-Priced Contracts for Fiscal Year 2009 (R4, tab 5). 
The audit report applied a 79% decrement factor to L-3 's claimed international airfares 
over $6,000 (app. mot. at 2; R4, tab 5 at 24-25). The decrement factor was based on 
the questioned travel costs in DCAA's audits ofL-3's FYs 2007 and 2008 incurred 
costs (id.). 
In a final decision dated 29 June 2016, administrative contracting officer (ACO) 
Gladys Broyles asserted a government claim in the amount of $755,091 for repayment 
of purportedly unallowable premium airfare and travel on non-U.S. flag carriers that 
the government had paid to L-3 (R4, tab 6 at 1 ). The final decision referenced the 
DCAA audit report and based the government claim upon the ACO's finding that L-3 
had not complied with Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 31.205-46(b) along with 
ten additional FAR provisions in FAR parts 31.201, 31.205, 47.4, 47.403, 47.405, and 
52.24 7 (id. at 2). The final decision asserts a government claim in an amount equal to 
the costs questioned in the DCAA audit report. 
4 As will be explained below, although the appeal challenges DCMA's decisions, 
here, where the decisions challenged are government claims, success in the 
motion to dismiss will set DCMA's final decisions aside. 
2 

The ACO found that the delivery orders associated with the contract required 
that first and business class airfares be documented and justified and that "all such 
costs shall be reimbursable hereunder at an amount approved by the ACO" (R4, tab 6 
at 3). The final decision found that L-3 did not submit any requests for approval under 
the delivery orders and that the ACO did not approve any requests for the use of 
premium airfare, and she thus denied $381,430 as a violation of the terms of the 
contract (id.). In addition, the ACO asserted that she was "unable to determine from 
the lack of documentation how much of the questioned costs are a result of Contractor 
failing to use U.S.-flag air carriers and complying with FAR 47.2 and ifthe contractor 
acted reasonably" (id. at 5). 
In a final decision dated 1 July 2016, ACO Cheryl Clark asserted a second 
government claim in the amount of $16,3 54 for repayment of purportedly unallowable 
premium airfare that the government had paid to L-3 on delivery orders other than 
those at issue in ACO Broyles' final decision (R4, tab 8 
at 1). ACO Clark's final 
decision also referenced the 13 April 2016 DCAA audit report. She based the 
government claim on her finding that L-3 had not complied with FAR 3 
l .205-46(b) 
and FAR 31.205-46(a)(7), and also cited FAR 31.201-2(d) for L-3's purported failure 
to maintain adequate records, and FAR 31.201-3 price reasonableness (id. at 2). The 
ACO found that "L-3 has not provided documentation to justify the need for premium 
airfare which calls into question the denied amount" (id.). 
L-3 timely appealed to the Board from the two final decisions. 
DECISION 
I. L-3's Motion To Dismiss for the ACO's Alleged Failure to Adequately Explain 
the Government's Claim is a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction 
The parties disagree as to the proper standard of review for L-3' s motion. L-3 
asserts in its opening brief that this is a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and 
therefore the Board "may consider matters outside the pleadings and decide disputed 
issues of fact" ( app. mot. at 1 ). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FED. R. CIV. P.) 
distinguish between motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (Rule l 2(b )( 1)) and 
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Rule 12(b)(6)); however, Board Rule 7 
does not make this distinction. Where the Board's rules are silent, we look to the 
FED. R. CIV. P. for guidance. See, e.g., Dennis Anderson Constr. Corp., ASBCA 
Nos. 48780, 49261, 96-1BCAi!28,076 at 140,188. In supplemental briefing, L-3 
confirmed its position that its motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
should be reviewed consistent with FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(l) (app. supp. br. at 1). In 
opposition, the government confirmed its position that the motion should be reviewed 
3 

as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 
pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (gov't supp. br. at 4). 
The distinction between a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and a 
dismissal for failure to prove the necessary elements of a claim for which relief could· 
be granted is a long-standing source of confusion because the term "jurisdiction" has 
more than one meaning. See Spruill v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 978 F.2d 679, 
686 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ('"Jurisdiction' is a term that is one of the most slippery in the 
legal lexicon. It takes on different connotations depending upon the context."). As the 
Supreme Court recognized in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006), 
judicial opinions "often obscure the issue by stating that the court is dismissing 'for 
lack of jurisdiction' when some threshold fact has not been established, without 
explicitly considering whether the dismissal should be for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim." Id. (quoting Da Silva v. Kinsho 
International Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 361 (2nd Cir. 2000)). 
This distinction between establishing jurisdiction and establishing the facts 
necessary to recover on a claim is also relevant to determining the evidence that the 
Board may consider in deciding the motion. When a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(l) denies or controverts allegations of jurisdiction, only 
uncontroverted factual allegations are accepted as true for purposes of the motion, 
and other facts underlying the jurisdictional allegations are subject to fact-finding. 
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Watkins, 11F.3d1573, 1583-84 (Fed. Cir. 1993); 
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514. The facts supportingjurisdiction are subject to fact-finding 
by the Board based on our review of the record. CCIE & Co., ASBCA Nos. 58355, 
59008, 14-1BCAii35,700 at 174,816; Raytheon Missile Sys., ASBCA 58011, 13 
BCA ii 35,241 at 173,016. However, when the factual dispute involves the allegation 
of a fact that is not jurisdictional, but an essential element of a claim for relief, this is a 
matter that goes to the merits, and is not determined by the Board at the preliminary 
stage. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514. Moreover, when the jurisdictional facts are 
intertwined with the merits of the appeal, the Board should leave the jurisdictional 
determination until the hearing. See 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 3D § 12.30[3]. 
Pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act (CDA) 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7109, a 
contractor may, "within 90 days from the date of receipt of a contracting officer's 
decision" under 41 U.S.C. § 7103 "appeal the decision to an agency board as provided 
in" section 7105. 41 U.S.C. § 7104(a). Our reviewing court, the Federal Circuit, has 
held that CDAjurisdiction requires both a valid claim and a contracting officer's final 
decision on that claim. M Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1323, 
1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing James M Ellett Constr. Co. v. United States, 93 F.3d 
1537, 1541-42 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Additionally, the Federal Circuit has held that an 
additional jurisdictional requirement is that a claim be submitted in writing and contain 
a "clear and unequivocal statement that gives ... adequate 
notice of the basis and amount 
of the claim." Contract Cleaning Maintenance, Inc. v. United States 811 F.2d 586, 
4 

592 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Maropakis, 609 F.3d at 1327.5 The Board treats a determination 
regarding the adequacy of a claim to be jurisdictional. See, e.g., CCIE & Co., 14-1 
BCA, 35,700 at 174,816. "The statement of claim must provide a basis for 
meaningful dialogue between the parties aimed toward settlement or negotiated 
resolution of the claim if possible, or for adequate identification of the issues to 
facilitate litigation should that be necessary." Blake Constr., Co., ASBCA No. 34480 
et al., 88-2 BCA, 20,552 at 103,890; see also Holk Development, Inc., ASBCA 
Nos. 40579, 40609, 90-3 BCA, 23,086 at 115,939. 
Where, as here, the CDA claim is a government claim, the contracting officer's 
final decision is considered to be the claim. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp., ASBCA 
No. 57525, 12-1 BCA,35,017. Thegovernmentbearstheburdenofestablishing 
jurisdiction for a government claim. See, e.g., Cedars-Sinai, 11 F.3d at 1584. Pursuant 
to the CDA, for a government claim, this Board's jurisdiction is dependent on a 
contracting officer asserting a claim in the form of a contracting officer's final decision 
issued to the contractor. Raytheon Company, ASBCA No. 57576 et al., 15-1 BCA 
, 36,043 at 176,049. 
II. The Final Decisions at Issue State CDA Claims 
The parties do not dispute that the DCMA issued written contracting officers' 
final decisions demanding sums certain that were timely appealed to the Board. In 
addition, we find that both final decisions provide adequate notice of the basis and 
amount of the claims. The final decision by ACO Broyles at issue in ASBCA 
No. 60713 asserts a sum certain of$755,091 and provides an adequate notice of the 
basis for the claim by stating that it is for recoupment of premium airfare and travel on 
non-U.S. flag air carriers (R4, tab 6 at 1). Similarly, the final decision by ACO Clark 
in ASBCA No. 60716 asserts a sum certain of$16,354 for recoupment of premium 
airfare (R4, tab 8 at 1). Additionally, both final decisions reference the DCAA audit 
report. These final decisions provide an adequate notice to L-3 of the basis for each 
government claim and state claims upon which relief may be granted. 
According to L-3, the government was required to "identify the specific items 
costs that the Government actually determined to be unallowable" and "state the basis 
for the unallowability of specific costs" (app. mot. at 12). L-3 does not provide a 
5 But see, e.g., Relfectone Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 
bane); Ellett Constr., 93 F .3d at 1542; England v. The Swanson Group, Inc., 
353 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2004) for cases that do not include the 
requirement for a clear statement of the claim as a jurisdictional requirement. 
As explained below, we find that the government has provided a clear statement 
of the claim, so L-3 's motion must be denied whether it is evaluated pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(l) or 12(b)(6). 
5 

citation to authority requiring this level of specificity to establish a valid CDA claim.6 
At best, L-3 cites to the decision of the Court of Federal Claims in Volmar 
Construction, Inc. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 746 (1995), for the proposition that the 
government must set forth in any claim "the specific basis of liability and the amount 
corresponding to each basis." Id. at 752. However, to the extent L-3 relies on Volmar 
for its motion, such reliance would be entirely misplaced. In Volmar (an opinion that 
is not binding upon us) the government withheld a portion of the contract balance 
pursuant to five different setoffs. Although Volmar is not entirely clear regarding 
procedural posture, after Volmar filed suit before the court, the government asserted 
the setoffs as "claims" in opposing Volmar's motion for summary judgment. Volmar 
argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the government's setoffs because 
they had not been the subject of contracting officer final decisions before the case was 
filed. Id. at 749-51. The court held that the government asserted valid claims to the 
extent that each unique setoff included the amount of liability corresponding to that 
particular setoff. Id. at 752. 
The Board has dismissed appeals for failure to provide adequate notice of the 
basis for a claim, but in these instances, the claim provided almost no information. For 
example, in IE.A. Company, ASBCA No. 37182, 89-1BCAii21,576, the Board 
dismissed an appeal where the contractor asserted a claim of "$25,000 per contract" 
for 187 contracts for "excess costs." The Board granted the government's motion to 
dismiss holding that "without an itemization of the damage claims and some minimal 
explanation of the alleged cause and effect of the damages, the claim bordered on the 
'frivolous.'" Id. at 108,656 (citing Reese Industries, ASBCA No. 29594-91, 84-3 
BCA ii 1 7 ,628). The minimal amount of information sufficient to provide adequate 
notice is quite low. In Marshall Construction, Ltd., ASBCA Nos. 37014, 39361, 90-1 
BCA ii 22,597, the Board found a valid claim for overrun costs based upon a "bare 
bones" letter to the contracting officer basically requesting a contracting officer's final 
decision and stating a sum certain. Although the letter itself did not provide sufficient 
supporting data, the Board found that the supporting 
information was available to the 
government in a prior letter and the complaint in the Board appeal. Id. at 113,390. 
In this appeal, each final decision sets forth a sum certain, and a basis for the 
claim. In ASBCA No. 60713 the final decision actually sets forth two bases for the 
claim: improper use of premium airfare; and improper use of foreign flag carriers (R4, 
tab 6 at 1). We do not read Volmar as requiring the government to state a value for 
each basis within a final decision. However, even to the extent Volmar could be read 
to impose such a requirement, we note that the contracting officer found that she was 
"unable to determine from the lack of documentation how much of the questioned 
costs are a result of Contractor failing to use U.S.-flag air carriers and complying with 
6 We note that a rule, such as that proposed by L-3, requiring that claims specify the 
amount claimed for each cost element would result in the dismissal of many 
meritorious contractor claims. 
6 

FAR 47.2 and ifthe contractor acted reasonably" (R4, tab 6 at 5). Thus, to the extent 
Volmar is relevant, we find that the final decision in ASBCA No. 60713 alleges 
jurisdictional facts sufficient to satisfy the requirement of stating a value for each basis 
within the final decision. 
Moreover, L-3' s complaint and motion both demonstrate that it is aware that the 
dollar amount of the claim was arrived at by multiplying the decrement factor (computed in 
L-3's 2007 and 2008 incurred cost audits) by the claimed international airfares of$6,000 or 
more. Thus, we find that L-3 has sufficient information to "provide a basis for meaningful 
dialogue between the parties aimed toward settlement or negotiated resolution of the claim 
if possible, or for adequate identification of the issues to facilitate litigation should that be 
necessary." Blake Constr., 88-2 BCA ,-r 20,552 at 103,890. Obviously, L-3 and the 
government disagree on the merits of the claim, but the parties clearly understand how the 
government calculated the amounts of its claims. These facts are sufficient to 
establish jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. A motion to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV. 
P. l 2(b )( 1) must be denied. 
Based on the analysis above, we do not address the government's argument 
regarding notice pleading. Further, we agree with L-3 that the sufficiency of a 
contractor claim is determined by the adequacy or sufficiency of the information 
submitted to the contracting officer. (App. reply br. at 7) (citing Montage, Inc., 
ASBCA No. 56796, 09-2 BCA ,-i 34,293). For a government claim, L-3 asserts, 
without citation to authority, that the adequacy or sufficiency of the claim should be 
determined solely by the contracting officer's final decision asserting the claim (app. 
reply br. at 7). As we find that the final decisions themselves provide sufficient 
information to assert a government claim, we do not reach this issue. 
L-3 cites to non-record documents that it contends demonstrate that the final 
decisions do not provide sufficient notice and provide a basis for the Board to dismiss 
for lack of jurisdiction. We disagree. While the Board properly may consider 
evidence beyond the face of the pleadings to make factual findings regarding 
jurisdiction, as noted above, such findings are limited to facts necessary to resolve a 
jurisdictional question, and the Board should leave facts that are intertwined with the 
merits of the appeal for resolution at a hearing. See, e.g., Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514; 
2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 3D § 12.30[3]. Here we find that L-3 's collateral 
attack on final decisions through reference to purported errors in the 2007 and 2008 
DCAA audit reports as well as the 2009 audit report of the incurred costs at issue in 
these appeals raise issues that go to the merits and are not appropriate for consideration 
on a motion to dismiss (app. mot. at 2-9, exs. 1, 2). To the extent L-3's argument can 
be read as contesting a jurisdictional fact, the jurisdictional fact is intertwined with the 
determination of the merits and is not subject to resolution in a motion to dismiss. 
Similarly, L-3 's argument attempting to discredit ACO Broyles' statement in her final 
decision that she reviewed the underlying transactions (app. reply br. at 8-12) goes to 
the merits of the appeal. As ACO Broyles' statement is not a jurisdictional fact, we 
7 

assume it to be true for the purpose of this motion to dismiss. Moreover, L-3's citation 
to a Department of Defense Inspector General report critical ofDCAA's use of a 
decrement factor and DCAA's purported failure to comply with Generally Accepted 
Government Auditing Standards (app. reply br. at 13) again does not relate to 
jurisdictional facts and we do not consider this argument in deciding a motion to 
dismiss. Following development of the record, the Board may ultimately review these 
issues on the merits, but it would not be proper for the Board to consider such 
arguments in reviewing a motion to dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, L-3's motion to dismiss is denied. 
Dated: 27 September 2017 
I~ 
RICHARD SHACKLEFORD 
Administrative Judge 
Acting Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
DA YID D' ALESSANDRIS 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
I concur 
J. REID PROUTY 
Administrative Judge 
Vice Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the 
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA Nos. 60713, 60716, Appeals of 
L-3 Communications Integrated Systems, L. P., rendered in conformance with the 
Board's Charter. 
Dated: 
8 
JEFFREY D. GARDIN 
Recorder, Armed Services 
Board of Contract Appeals