ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 
 
Appeals of -- ) 
 ) 
Kamaludin Slyman CSC ) 
 ) 
   ) 
 
APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT: Bryant S. Banes, Esq. 
Sean D. Forbes, Esq. 
  Neel, Hooper & Banes, P.C. 
  Houston, TX 
  
APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: Jeffrey P. Hildebrant, Esq. 
  Air Force Deputy Chief Trial Attorney 
Christopher M. Judge, Esq. 
Kyle E. Gilbertson, Esq. 
  Trial Attorneys 
DECISION OF THE BOARD BY THE SENIOR DECIDING GROUP 
 
OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE PROUTY 
 
For more than a decade, this Board has held that a typed signature block does not 
meet the requirement for a signature necessary for claims certification pursuant to the 
Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7109, (CDA).  See, e.g., NileCo General 
Contracting LLC, ASBCA No. 60912, 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,862; ABS Development Corp., 
ASBCA No. 60022 et al., 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,564; Tokyo Company, ASBCA No. 59059, 
14-1 BCA ¶ 35,590; Teknocraft Inc., ASBCA No. 55438, 08-1 BCA ¶ 33,846.  We have, 
however, also held that a “digital signature,” created by software requiring the use of 
some sort of unique identification, could satisfy the CDA’s certification requirement.  
URS Federal Servs., Inc., ASBCA No. 61443, 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,448.  Although 
e-commerce has been with us for longer than the period of time encompassed by these 
decisions, the Board’s own movement to an e-filing system, the continued increase in the 
use of digital conventions for transacting business in greater society, and the implications 
of our reasoning in URS have given us reason to revisit the subject.1  The matter before 
us, in which we decide a government motion to dismiss appellant Kamaludin Slyman 
Construction and Supply Company’s (Kamaludin’s) appeals for failure to originate upon 
a claim certified with what the government considers to be a proper signature, presents us 
such an opportunity.  Today, we hold that, so long as a mark purporting to act as a 
                                              
1 Because we have precedent of our own directly on point, any change of this rule of law 
for the Board must be accomplished through the Senior Deciding Group, unless it 
is reversed by our reviewing court, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  
SWR, Inc., ASBCA No. 56708, 15-1 BCA ¶ 35,832 at 175,220. 
ASBCA Nos.    62006, 62007, 62008 
Under Contract No.  H92237-12-C-0089 

2 
signature may be traced back to the individual making it, it counts as a signature for 
purposes of the CDA, whether it be signed in ink, through a digital signature application, 
or be a typed name. 
 
STATEMENT OF FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF THE MOTION 
 
The Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan awarded the 
above-captioned contract (the contract) to Kamaludin for the lease of certain heavy equipment 
in Afghanistan on December 23, 2011.  The box identifying Kamaludin on the first page of 
the contract included the email address, K***.2  In addition to many other provisions, the 
contract incorporated by reference the standard Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
Disputes clause, FAR 52.233-1, DISPUTES.  (R4, tab 14 at 1, 4, 8)  The Disputes clause 
requires that any claim exceeding $100,000 be certified.  FAR 52.233-1(d)(2)(i). 
 
By letter dated March 16, 2013, Kamaludin submitted a demand for payment in 
the amount of $155,500.00.  Kamaludin’s letter alleged that the government breached the 
contract by moving the equipment from the agreed upon place of performance to two 
different locations and also kept the equipment for five months after the lease expired.  
The letter contained a subject line which stated, “Letter of Claim.”  It also contained a 
handwritten signature from Kamaludin’s president.  The letter did not contain any 
reference to the CDA’s claim certification language.  (R4, tab 19 at 4)   
 
An email to the Air Force dated March 11, 2019 from the K*** email address is 
below reproduced exactly as it appeared: 
 
 
 
(R4, tab 19 at 1; tab 20 at 13) 
                                              
2 Following our usual practice, we do not replicate the full email address in this published 
decision, but represent it as K*** throughout. 
3 The email received by the government, as reproduced in tab 19 of the Rule 4 file, 
automatically reduced the email address in the “From” header to “Kamaludin 
Slyman,” but, as reflected in tab 20 of the Rule 4 file, the same email was 
forwarded by Kamaludin’s counsel to the government and, in its forwarded state, 


3 
On March 14, 2019, Kamaludin filed a notice of appeal with the Board, which we 
docketed as ASBCA No. 62006.4  The notice of appeal stated that this was an appeal 
from the deemed denial of appellant’s March 16, 2013 claim.5 
 
DECISION 
 
I. A CDA Claim in an Amount Greater Than $100,000 Must be Certified, Which 
Requires a Signature. 
 
The CDA requires the certification of claims “of more than $100,000.”  41 U.S.C. 
§ 7103(b).  This certification is required to be “executed by an individual authorized to 
bind the contractor with respect to the claim” and must state that: 
 
(A) the claim is made in good faith;  
 
(B) the supporting data are accurate and complete to 
the best of the contractor’s knowledge and belief; 
 
(C) the amount requested accurately reflects the 
contract adjustment for which the contractor 
believes the Federal Government is liable; and 
 
  
                                              
the reproduction also includes the K*** email address in brackets next to the 
Kamaludin Slyman name in the “From” header. 
4 Appellant has two additional appeals (ASBCA Nos. 62007 and 62008), which are 
consolidated with this appeal.  The allegations in those appeals involve claims 
under $100,000.  As such, the adequacy of the claim certification has no bearing 
on our jurisdiction in those appeals.  We also note that the government’s motion 
sought dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in 
ASBCA No. 62007.  We will not address that portion of the government’s motion 
in this decision given that nothing in it requires consideration by the Senior 
Deciding Group. 
5 Nearly six years passed between appellant’s demand for payment and its notice of 
appeal.  However, only three days passed between appellant’s purported claim 
certification and its notice of appeal.  The government had the opportunity to 
argue that the appeal was premature when it filed its motion to dismiss on 
April 30, 2019.  Instead, perhaps understandably, the government chose to focus 
its motion on the adequacy of the claim certification.  At this point, far more than 
60 days have passed from the date of the claim certification and the contracting 
officer has not issued a final decision.  Under the circumstances, we see no useful 
purpose in dismissing the appeal as premature and requiring appellant to refile.  
See ABS Development Corp., ASBCA No. 61042 et al., 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,784. 

4 
(D) the certifier is authorized to certify the claim on 
behalf of the contractor.   
 
41 U.S.C. § 7103(b). 
 
“It is well settled that certification is a jurisdictional prerequisite for this Board for 
contractor claims over $100,000.”  Special Operative Grp., LLC, ASBCA No. 57678, 11-2 
BCA ¶ 34,860 at 171,480 (citation omitted).  Although a defective certification does not 
deprive the Board of jurisdiction, 41 U.S.C § 7103(b)(3), the failure to certify at all does 
deprive the Board of jurisdiction and mandates dismissal.  Special Operative Group, 11-2 
BCA ¶ 34,680 at 171,480; CCIE & Co., ASBCA Nos. 58355, 59008, 14-1BCA ¶ 35,700 
at 174,816; Baghdadi Swords Co., ASBCA No. 58539, 13 BCA ¶ 35,395 at 173,665. 
 
And, as far as the law is concerned, an unsigned certification is considered to be 
not merely defective, but no certification at all.  This is because the “execution” of a 
CDA certification requires a “certifier to sign the claim certification,” Teknocraft, 08-1 
BCA ¶ 33,846 at 167,504 (citing Hawaii CyberSpace, ASBCA No. 54065, 04-1 BCA 
¶ 32,455 at 160,535), thus making the failure to sign the certification language into the 
equivalent of “failure to certify,” which may not be remedied.  Hawaii CyberSpace, 04-1 
BCA ¶ 32,455 at 160,535; see also Tokyo Company, 14-1 BCA ¶ 35,590 at 174,392.6 
 
II. What Makes a Valid Signature? 
 
The CDA does not define signature, thus we turn to the FAR for its definition.7  
See, e.g., URS, 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,448 at 181,967.  There, it is defined as “the discrete, 
verifiable symbol of an individual which, when affixed to a writing with the knowledge 
and consent of the individual, indicates a present intention to authenticate the writing.  
This includes electronic symbols.”  FAR 2.101.  In the past, we have looked at this 
definition as having two components:  whether the symbol purporting to be the signature 
is “discrete” and whether it is “verifiable,” with “verifiable” being the more critical of the 
two terms.  E.g., URS, 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,448 at 181,967-68.  Here, we think it may also be 
helpful to consider a third element: whether the symbol indicates the present intention to 
authenticate the writing to which it is affixed. 
 
                                              
6 Judge Hartman’s concurrence in result contends that the Federal Circuit’s recent 
decision in Dai Global, LLC v. Adm’r of the U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 945 F.3d 
1196 (Fed. Cir. 2019), has effectively overruled these cases.  Without deciding the 
matter, we are not so certain that Dai Global goes that far.  In any event, because 
we find herein that the certification was signed, we do not reach the issue of 
whether lack of signature is a curable defect. 
7 The FAR has been used elsewhere to flesh out the meaning of terms in the CDA, 
notably, for the pivotal word, “claim.”  E.g., H.L. Smith, Inc. v. Dalton, 49 F.3d 
1563, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 

5 
A. The Meaning of a “Discrete” Symbol 
 
In URS we selected a typical dictionary definition of “discrete,” which was that it 
was “separate and distinct.”  URS, 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,448 at 181,968.  This remains a 
satisfactory definition. 
 
B. “Verifiable” Means That a Mark Can Be Tied to an Individual 
 
URS turned on the meaning of “verifiable.”  In it, we held that, “if one can later 
establish that a mark is tied to an individual, it is verifiable.”  URS, 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,448 
at 181,968.  We continue to find this to be an appropriate definition.  As discussed in 
URS, our practice (and the practice of other bodies) in accepting “ink” signatures, when 
neither the government recipient of the certification nor the reviewing court might have 
any basis to recognize, on its face, that the handwritten mark comes from a particular 
individual, argues for an expansive reading of “verifiable.”  Moreover, we see no policy 
grounds for an overly-narrow reading of this phrase. 
 
We and our reviewing court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, have long held that the purpose of the CDA’s certification requirement is to 
encourage accurate claims and to discourage (through the potential of civil and criminal 
penalties) the submission of unfounded claims to the contracting officer.  As we said in 
Hawaii CyberSpace: 
 
“The purposes of the certification requirement are to 
discourage the submission of unwarranted contractor claims 
and to encourage settlements,” Paul E. Lehman, Inc. v. 
United States, 673 F.2d 352, 354, 230 Ct. Cl. 11, 14 (1982); 
“to push contractors into being careful and reasonably precise 
in the submission of claims to the contracting officer,” 
Tecom, Inc. v. United States, 732 F.2d 935, 937 (Fed. Cir. 
1984); and to enable the government “to hold a contractor 
personally liable for fraudulent claims,” Transamerica 
Insurance Corp. v. United States, 973 F.2d 1572, 1580 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992). 
 
04-1 BCA ¶ 32,455 at 160,533; see also Teknocraft, 08-1 BCA ¶ 33,846 at 167,505 
(signing claim is necessary for holding the signer responsible for falsities contained 
within it). 
 
The policy goal of requiring signatures to deter fraud, though, is bottomed upon 
the notion of its use to identify the person making the false claim so that the claimant can 
be held accountable for it.  Hence, we rejected typed “//signed//” (above a typed name as 
a signature) in Teknocraft, and a typed name in ABS.  In Teknocraft, we stated that 
“[w]ithout a signature, the purported author of the certification could just as easily 
disavow the certification because “//signed//” cannot be authenticated.”  08-1 BCA 

6 
¶ 33,846 at 167,505.  In ABS (relying on Teknocraft), we used similar language, stating 
that “a typewritten name, even one typewritten in Lucida Handwriting font, cannot be 
authenticated . . . .  [A]nyone can type a person’s name; there is no way to tell who did so 
from the typewriting itself.”  16-1 BCA ¶ 36,564 at 178,099.  NileCo, too, followed the 
Teknocraft line of cases without particular elaboration.  See 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,862 
at 179,606. 
 
Thus, our conclusions in the prior cases requiring signatures to deter fraud were 
about identification and were not premised on the notion that the legal jeopardy attaching 
to an individual submitting a false claim is any different if the signature is in notarized 
ink than if it is a typed “X” purporting to stand for the individual.  Nor could they be.  
The CDA’s fraud provision, 41 U.S.C. § 7103(c)(2), requires only a misrepresentation of 
fact or fraud in the claim, and, in fact, makes no distinction between claims of a monetary 
value that must be certified and those which need not be.  Thus, signature is immaterial to 
the applicability of this anti-fraud provision.  The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, 
prohibits and punishes presentment of false claims or false records or materials to the 
government, but does not hinge upon there being accompanying signatures of any form.  
Likewise, the general federal false official statement criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, 
makes no reference to signatures, whether they be ink, typewritten, or non-existent.  For 
the perpetrator to be liable under the law, it is enough that the perpetrator use a materially 
false statement, representation, writing, or document.  18 U.S.C. § 1001(a). 
 
As Judge Posner noted almost 20 years ago in a Uniform Commercial Code case 
involving an exchange of emails, although a written signature may perhaps be better 
evidence of identity than a typed one8, “the sender’s name on an e-mail satisfies the 
signature requirement of the statute of frauds.”  Cloud Corp. v. Hasbro, Inc., 314 F.3d 
289, 296 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 
Thus, we conclude that a signature which is verifiable in the sense that it permits a 
determination of which individual is responsible for the claim, satisfies the anti-fraud 
policy objectives which are the reason for the CDA’s certification requirement.  And this 
is so whatever form the “signature” takes.  Teknocraft and those cases following it did not 
allow for this possibility, and are expressly overruled to the extent that they, per se, 
preclude the use of a typed name, in conjunction with other evidence of the author’s 
identity, from constituting a signature for purposes of CDA certification. 
 
C. The Present Intention To Authenticate 
 
The final component of the definition of signature in the FAR is that it 
demonstrate a present intention to authenticate the writing.  That is generally read as a 
party’s affixing its name at the end of a document.  In Hamdi Halal Market LLC v. 
United States, 947 F.Supp.2d 159 (D. Mass. 2013), the district court applied the 
                                              
8 As discussed below, an email may, in fact, provide better proof of identity than an ink 
signature. 

7 
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7006 
(the ESIGN Act) and recognized that even a typed name at the end of a document could 
convey the intent to authenticate.  See 947 F.Supp.2d at 164-65; cf. Cloud Corp., 314 
F.3d at 296 (same result, but not considering ESIGN Act).  Whether the ESIGN Act 
strictly applies to CDA certifications is beside the point in our deciding this matter.9  For 
purposes of answering the question of what intent is demonstrated by a typed name at the 
end of a document, the world in which the ESIGN Act applies to most commercial 
transactions is a world in which the use of a name at the end of an email conveys the 
intent to authenticate the writing therein.  
 
III. The Typed Name at the End of the Email Here Counts as a Signature For 
Purposes of Claim Certification 
 
Because the typed name at the end of the end of the March 11, 2019 email is a 
discrete verifiable mark made with intent to authenticate, it constitutes a signature 
sufficient for the CDA’s certification purposes. 
 
To be sure, a typed name, without more, does nothing to verify the identity of the 
person submitting it (the point we made in ABS being well-taken), but we have more 
here.  Crucially, the name came from an email correspondence which demonstrates that 
the document came from the sender’s email address.  If we can satisfy ourselves that the 
email address is linked to the certifier (and there are numerous ways we may do that, 
including the practice of the government in communicating with Kamaludin during 
contract performance through that very same email address), then the signature is 
verifiable.  Though the government argues that a typewritten name on an email is an 
unreliable marker of identity (thus implying that email, itself, is such an unreliable 
identifier) (see gov’t reply at 8-11), we find this concern to be exaggerated and not any 
different than the risks of forged signatures in ink.  In a thoughtful opinion permitting 
email documents to be authenticated by virtue of the email addresses, the district court in 
United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D. D.C. 2006), rejected the notion that 
email was particularly subject to alteration compared to, say, paper records: 
 
While the defendant is correct that earlier e-mails that are 
included in a chain – either as ones that have been forwarded 
or to which another has replied – may be altered, this trait is 
not specific to e-mail evidence.  It can be true of any piece of 
documentary evidence, such as a letter, a contract or an 
invoice.  Indeed, fraud trials frequently center on altered 
paper documentation, which, through the use of techniques 
such as photocopies, white-out, or wholesale forgery, easily 
                                              
9 Kamaludin argues that it does (app. resp. at 2 n.1); the government argues that it does 
not (gov’t reply at 2-5).  But the FAR’s definition of signature expressly permits 
the use of electronic symbols, which is the whole point Kamaludin is attempting to 
make through its reference to the ESIGN Act (app. resp. at 2 n.1). 

8 
can be altered.  The possibility of alteration does not and 
cannot be the basis for excluding e-mails as unidentified or 
unauthenticated as a matter of course, any more than it can be 
the rationale for excluding paper documents (and copies of 
those documents).  We live in an age of technology and 
computer use where e-mail communication now is a normal 
and frequent fact for the majority of this nation's population, 
and is of particular importance in the professional world. 
 
435 F. Supp. 2d at 41. 
 
Indeed, other courts have routinely found an email address, combined with other 
indicia within the email, to be sufficient to authenticate the email for admission as 
evidence.  In United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2000), the court of 
appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to admit emails written by the criminal defendant 
in a fraud case, and considered the email address and the content of the emails to be 
sufficient circumstantial evidence that they originated from the defendant.  235 F.3d 
at 1322-23.  In Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007), the 
district court recognized Siddiqui and other cases that supported a finding that email 
addresses provide circumstantial proof of authorship, see 241 F.R.D. at 546, 554, and 
even suggested that there might be room for a business email to be self-authenticating.  
Id. at 554.  Numerous other courts have followed suit.  See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Musicians 
of United States & Canada v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 903 F.3d 968, 976 (9th Cir. 
2018); United States v. Fluker, 698 F.3d 988, 999-1000 (7th Cir. 2012) (circumstantial 
evidence of authorship of email); Copeland Corp. v. Choice Fabricators Inc., 345 F. 
App’x 74, 77 (6th Cir. 2009) (email from known email address with typed name at end is 
considered “signed”); cf. Cloud Corp. 314 F.3d at 296. 
 
At this stage of the proceedings, we are satisfied that the typed name at the end of 
the email from the same email address with which the government corresponded with 
Kamaludin is a discrete and verifiable mark made with the intent to authenticate the 
certification and we have no basis to suppose that any other individual would have reason 
to falsify the signature.  Thus, we treat it as we would a handwritten mark purporting to 
be a signature or a digital signature – no better, no worse:  absent the later production of 
evidence proving otherwise, we find that the claim that is the basis of ASBCA No. 62006 
is certified. 
  

9 
CONCLUSION 
 
Because the typed name of Mr. Slyman following the certification language in his 
March 11, 2019 email satisfied the signature requirement for Kamaludin’s claim, the 
government’s motion to dismiss is denied.  Because of this result, we need not reach 
Kamaludin’s additional arguments regarding the absence of a signature being a curable 
defect (app. resp. at 4-5) or the government’s supposed waiver of the signature requirement 
(id. at 5-6) – both of which appear to be contrary to our precedent in any event. 
 
Dated:  September 25, 2020 
 
 
 
 
J. REID PROUTY 
Administrative Judge 
Vice Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 
 
I concur 
 
 
 
 I concur 
 
 
 
JOHN J. THRASHER 
Administrative Judge 
Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 RICHARD SHACKLEFORD 
Administrative Judge 
Vice Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 
 
  
I concur 
 
 
 
 I concur 
 
 
 
OWEN C. WILSON 
Administrative Judge 
Vice Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 MICHAEL T. PAUL 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 
(Signatures continued) 
  


10 
I concur 
 
 
 
 I concur 
 
 
 
REBA PAGE 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 CHERYL L. SCOTT 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 
 
  
I concur in result (see separate opinion) 
 
 
 
 I concur in result (see separate opinion) 
 
 
 
CRAIG S. CLARKE 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 TERRENCE S. HARTMAN 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
   
 
I concur in result (see separate opinion) 
 
 
 
 I concur in result (see separate opinion) 
 
 
 
 
MARK A. MELNICK 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 TIMOTHY P. MCILMAIL 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 
 
  


11 
SEPARATE OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE CLARKE 
 
I concur in the result and the reasoning of the majority which finds the typed 
signature block to be a signature in these circumstances, although I believe that 
Teknocraft and the cases that followed it may be distinguished on the facts and need not 
be overruled to obtain this result. 
 
Dated:  September 25, 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CRAIG S. CLARKE 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 


12 
SEPARATE OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE HARTMAN 
 
I concur in the result because I agree with the concurring opinions of 
Judges McIlmail and Melnick that the email here is not a valid CDA claim certification.  
I note simply that the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Dai Global, LLC v. Adm’r of 
the U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 945 F.3d 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2019), effectively has overruled 
our prior line of precedent that unexecuted documents, such as the email here, do not 
constitute a “defective certification” that later can be corrected. 
 
Dated:  September 25, 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
TERRENCE S. HARTMAN 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 


13 
SEPARATE OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE MELNICK 
 
I concur in the result that the motion to dismiss should be denied.  Though the 
email is not a valid CDA certification, it is a defective certification that can be corrected. 
 
I. Email 
 
The CDA requires a contractor to certify that a claim exceeding $100,000 meets 
the statute’s well-known criteria.  41 U.S.C. § 7103(b).  In the nearly half century since 
the CDA was enacted, the Board has never found that a conventional email is a 
satisfactory certification.  In fact, it has held the opposite multiple times.  It was correct. 
 
Congress ascribed great importance to the certification requirement so as to 
discourage unwarranted claims.  Paul E. Lehman, Inc. v. United States, 673 F.2d 352, 
354 (Ct. Cl. 1982).  It is also well established that the CDA, along with its certification 
requirement, is a waiver of sovereign immunity.  Winter v. FloorPro, Inc., 570 F.3d 
1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  As such, its language must be strictly construed, or 
construed narrowly.  Id. at 1370, 1373.  Strictly applying the legal definition in use at the 
time of enactment, to certify means “to testify in writing.”  Certify, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (rev. 4th ed. 1968).  In turn, to “testify” is “to bear witness; to give evidence 
as a witness.”  Testify, Black’s Law Dictionary (rev. 4th ed. 1968). 
 
These definitions suggest that a certification evokes a degree of formality.  Merely 
firing off a run-of-the-mill email reciting the language in section 7103(b) does not rise to 
the level of formally giving testimony or evidence as a witness, just as I think an email 
fails to satisfy the requirements for making a declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 1746.  It is 
proper under these definitions to expect more.  Indeed, appellant has failed to cite, nor 
have I found, any precedent holding that a certification mandated by a federal statute can 
be made in an email.  Considering the significance of the CDA certification to Congress, 
I am confident that if squarely confronted with that question it would have expected 
something more solemn than an email. 
 
Up until now the Board’s holdings have comported with my conclusion, though it 
has analyzed the matter differently.  Rather than concentrate upon the meaning of the 
word “certify,” the Board has found that the generic definition of the word “signature” 
contained in FAR 2.101 controls whether an email is a certification.  That provision 
requires a symbol that is discrete and verifiable.  I would not have taken this approach 
because nothing in the FAR indicates that its definition of “signature” also defines the 
word “certify” in section 7103(b).  Regardless, the Board has found that emailed 
certification language accompanied only by a typed name is not sufficiently discrete and 
verifiable to support a certification.  Teknocraft Inc., ASBCA No. 55438, 08-1 BCA 
¶ 33,846; see also Nileco Gen. Contracting LLC, ASBCA No. 60912, 17-1 BCA 
¶ 36,862; ABS Dev. Corp., ASBCA No. 60022, 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,564; RECO Rishad Eng. 
Constr. ORG, ASBCA No. 60444, 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,558.  Viewed through the Board’s 
chosen lens, these conclusions make sense.  Email accounts are commonly used by more 

14 
than one individual.  That is not typically the case for either “wet” or digital signatures.  
Email accounts can be cancelled.  Email accounts can be hacked.  There is little basis to 
conclude an email is any more trustworthy than a typed name on company letterhead.  
That is not adequate. 
 
Appellant now asks the Board to change its mind and repudiate its well established 
precedent rejecting emailed certifications.  I agree with Judge McIlmail that the doctrine 
of stare decisis requires adherence to the Board’s past holdings.  Stare decisis enhances 
predictability and efficiency by establishing settled expectations through prior rulings.  
Decker Corp. v. United States, 752 F.3d 949, 956 (Fed. Cir, 2014).  Explaining why 
reexamination of well-settled precedent can be harmful, the Supreme Court has said: 
 
Justice Brandeis once observed that “in most matters it is 
more important that the applicable rule of law be settled 
than that it be settled right.”  To overturn a decision 
settling one such matter simply because we might believe 
that decision is no longer “right” would inevitably reflect 
a willingness to reconsider others.  And that willingness 
could itself threaten to substitute disruption, confusion 
and uncertainty for necessary legal stability. 
 
John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008) (quoting Burnet 
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (dissenting opinion)).  Stare decisis 
directs us to disfavor revisiting a debate simply because reasonable arguments continue to 
exist on both sides.  Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 
F.3d 1272, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc), vacated sub nom. Lighting Ballast Control 
LLC v. Universal Lighting Techs., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015) (quoting Morrow v. 
Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 181 (3rd Cir. 2013) (Smith, J. concurring)). 
 
Of course, the Board recognizes stare decisis.  See Boeing Co., ASBCA 
No. 30404, 86-3 BCA ¶ 19,314.  Furthermore, stare decisis applies to the Senior 
Deciding Group’s reconsideration of issues previously decided (here multiple times) by 
our panels.  This is because the panel decisions reflect Board precedent entitled to due 
regard for its value to the law’s stability, requiring good and sufficient reasons to reject it 
at a later date.  See Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013) (en banc) (explaining that stare decisis concerns apply to court of appeals 
panel opinions when the issues decided are reconsidered by the en banc court).  Finally, 
stare decisis has special force upon a prior interpretation of a jurisdictional statute.  The 
reason is that the statute can always be changed.  John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United 
States, 552 U.S. at 139; but cf. Procopio v. Wilkie, 913 F.3d 1371, 1380 n.7 (Fed, Cir. 
2019) (en banc) (observing that it is not the case that a statute’s interpretation can never 
be overruled). 
 
I am unaware of anything happening in the three years since the Board most 
recently rejected emailed certifications in Nileco that overcomes the special stare decisis 

15 
force upon our settled law.  The appellant has not identified any intervening development 
showing the national body of law applicable to statutorily mandated certifications is 
moving counter to us.  There is also no other basis for making such a radical change.  The 
Board has recently recognized certifications executed with digital signatures that use 
unique software generated identifiers.  URS Fed. Servs., Inc., ASBCA No. 61443, 19-1 
BCA ¶ 37,448.  These distinct devices are regularly used in formal transactions.  And a 
claimant may always send its certification with a traditional wet signature.  This requires 
little more than an envelope and postage.  See Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United 
States, 764 F.3d 51, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2014), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 750 (2016).  Neither option 
presents an unusual burden.  Moreover, if traditional wet signatures (which have 
customarily been accepted for generations) pose the potential for falsification, we should 
not compound that risk by now accepting emails with all of their own verification 
problems.  The Board’s current law is thoroughly reasonable and consistent with the 
formality associated with a certification.  For these reasons, I would reject common 
emails that purport to certify claims under section 7103(b). 
 
II. Correction of a Defective Certification 
 
Where I do part ways with the Board’s prior law is with its refusal to recognize 
that an email is a sufficient attempt at a certification to be correctible.  As it is also well 
known, a defective certification does not deprive the Board of jurisdiction.  It can be 
corrected.  41 U.S.C. § 7103(b)(3).  As far as I can tell, the Board first held in Hawaii 
Cyberspace, ASBCA No. 54065, 04-1 BCA ¶ 32,455, that a purported certification 
containing a typed signature is not subject to correction.  The Board stated in a somewhat 
conclusory fashion that the legislative purposes for certification dictate that “the failure to 
sign is more akin to a ‘failure to certify’” and is therefore not curable.  Id. at 160,535.  
However, since then the right to correct defective certifications has been readily applied 
at the appellate level.  Nontechnical defects are correctible.  Even a defect arising from an 
intentional, reckless, or negligent disregard for the applicable certification requirements is 
correctible.  Dai Global, LLC v. Adm’r of the United States Agency for Int’l Dev., 945 
F.3d 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2019).  The legislative purposes for permitting correction dictate 
allowing it here.  Accordingly, though I would reject appellant’s request that we deem its 
emailed certification valid, I concur in the result that the government’s motion to dismiss 
should be denied. 
 
Dated:  September 25, 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
MARK A. MELNICK 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 


16 
SEPARATE OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE MCILMAIL 
 
I concur in the result.  I agree with Judges Melnick and Hartman that, following 
Dai Global v. Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, 
945 F.3d 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2019), the certification is defective, but curable.  I do not agree 
that the certification here was signed.  The legal doctrine of stare decisis requires us, 
absent special circumstances, to treat like cases alike.  June Med. Servs. L. L. C. v. Russo, 
No. 18-1323, 2020 WL 3492640, at *22 (U.S. June 29, 2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).  
The question whether the certification is signed is controlled by our decisions of only a 
few years ago; no special circumstance justifies a different conclusion.  See id. at *29. 
 
Additionally, from Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 137, 
144 (1983) (emphasis added), comes the following legislative history: 
 
Admiral Rickover was the prime mover of the certification 
provisions before the Congress. At hearings on the CDA on 
June 14, 1978, he advised that the new law should: 
 
“[r]equire as a matter of law that prior to evaluation of any 
claim, the contractor must submit to the Government a 
certificate signed by a senior responsible contractor official, 
which states that the claim and its supporting data are current, 
complete and accurate. In other words, you put the contractor 
in the same position as our working man, the income tax 
payer who must certify his tax return....” 
 
Contract Disputes Act of 1978: Joint Hearings on S.2292, 
S.2787 & S.3178 Before the Subcomm. on Federal Spending 
Practices and Open Government of the Senate Comm. on 
Governmental Affairs and the Subcomm. on Citizens and 
Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1978). 
 
The Court of Claims cited this testimony in Paul E. Lehman, 
Inc. and commented notably on the legislative history of the 
CDA: 
 
“Admiral Rickover wanted to deter contractors from filing 
inflated claims which cost the Government substantial 
amounts to defeat. He sought to do so by subjecting 
contractors to financial risk if their claims were 
unreasonable.... [He] viewed the certification requirement as a 
necessary prerequisite to the consideration of any claim. The 
provisions Congress adopted to include the certification 
requirement were based upon Admiral Rickover's written 

17 
suggestions and fairly must be deemed to have incorporated 
his view concerning the effect of the certification 
requirement. [citing United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 
U.S. 16, 31–32, 102 S. Ct. 821, 830–31, 70 L. Ed. 2d 792 
(1982)] ....  “The import of the language of the Act and its 
legislative history is that unless a claim has been properly 
certified, it cannot be considered under the statute..... Unless 
that requirement is met, there is simply no claim that this 
court may review under the Act.”  Id. at –––, 673 F.2d at 355. 
 
In view of that history, our precedent reflects a perfectly reasonable position, 
particularly given the importance of the certification requirement.  It is not too much to 
ask that a contractor affix a hand-written signature or what we all understand to be a 
“digital” signature to express ceremoniously his solemn vow (much like witnesses raise 
right hands to give their oaths to provide truthful testimony) that: 
 
[t]he claim is made in good faith, the supporting data are 
accurate and complete to the best of the contractor’s 
knowledge and belief, the amount requested accurately 
reflects the contract adjustment for which the contractor 
believes the Federal Government is liable, and the certifier is 
authorized to certify the claim on behalf of the contractor. 
 
Indeed, not only have we followed our precedent several times in recent years, the 
Government Accountability Office expressly followed our lead only two years ago in 
Distributed Solutions, Inc., B-416394 (Aug. 13, 2018).  In this sense, our change in 
direction is a solution in search of a problem.  What box this watering-down will open, 
and what slippery slope this unwarranted and unnecessary relaxation establishes 
(presumably requiring litigation to sort out, including, perhaps, in the United States Court 
of Federal Claims and federal district courts handling fraud and false claims cases), we 
can only guess. 
 
Dated:  September 25, 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
TIMOTHY P. MCILMAIL 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 


18 
I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the 
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA Nos. 62006, 62007, 62008, 
Appeals of Kamaludin Slyman CSC, rendered in conformance with the Board’s Charter. 
 
Dated:  September 29, 2020 
 
 
 
PAULLA K. GATES-LEWIS 
Recorder, Armed Services 
Board of Contract Appeals