ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 
Appeal of--
URS Federal Services, Inc. 
Under Contract No. FA8108-09-D-0006 
APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT: 
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APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: 
ASBCA No. 61443 
Terry L. Elling, Esq. 
Amy L. Fuentes, Esq. 
Holland & Knight LLP 
Tysons, VA 
Jeffrey P. Hildebrant, Esq. 
Air Force Deputy Chief Trial Attorney 
Colby L. Sullins, Esq. 
Erika L. Whelan Retta, Esq. 
Trial Attorneys 
OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE PROUTY 
Before us is a straightforward question presented by the government's pending 
motion to dismiss: whether the signature of appellant's Vice President, affixed to a claim 
through the use of a digital signature computer application that requires the use of a 
unique password and user identification, complies with the claim certification requirement 
in 41 U.S.C. § 7103(b), the Contract Disputes Act (CDA). We hold that it does and that 
nothing in the CDA or any of our prior cases requires the exclusive use of an ink signature 
or imposes standards for digital signatures that are any more stringent than those that 
apply to such traditionally-accepted ink signatures. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The facts material to the government's motion are relatively few, straightforward, 
and undisputed. 
The above-captioned contract (the contract) was awarded to the predecessor of 
appellant, URS Federal Services, Inc. (URS) on October 3, 2008 (R4, tab 1 at 1, tab 2 
(agreement changing business name of contract awardee to URS Federal Support 
Services)). 1 The contract incorporates by reference the standard Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) Disputes clause, FAR 52.233-1, DISPUTES (JUL 2002) (R4, tab 1 at 74). 
1 At some point, not clear in the Rule 4 file and not necessary to be resolved for this 
motion, URS dropped "support" from its name. 
I 

The Disputes clause requires that any claim exceeding $100,000 be certified. 
FAR 52.233-1 ( d)(2)(i). 
On June 3 0, 2017, URS submitted a demand for payment, entitled, "Certified 
Claim," in the amount of $1,232,278.54, for additional costs that were purportedly the 
fault of the government (R4, tab 80 at 1-8). The last page of the narrative stated: 
Pursuant to the Disputes Clause of the Contract, FAR 
52.233-1, and the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, as amended 
and codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7109, I certify that the 
claim is made in good faith; that the supporting data are 
accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and 
belief; that the amount requested accurately reflects the 
contract adjustment for which URS believes the Government 
is liable; and that I am duly authorized to certify the claim on 
behalf of URS. 
(R4, tab 80 at 8) 
Immediately underneath this statement was the following graphic representation, 
which we will refer to as the "digital signature" throughout the rest of this opinion: 
Th 
~iplbJT!lanmS. 
omas ::.lllaMs.-..CII\I, 
~fldsll llnlll, ff, 
S Walter ... 1111 .......... 
By: , Dlll:2D17.LUJ1W7:tl4W 
Thoow S. Waker 
VP, Contracts 
URS ~I Servte5, loc. 
(Id.) 
Mr. Walter, whose name is reflected in the digital signature above, was the 
Vice President of Contracts for URS at the time the claim was submitted (see app. 
opp'n, Walter decl. ,i 3).2 As such, he had the authority to certify CDA claims on behalf 
of URS (id.). He used PDF-XChange PRO software, installed on his office computer, to 
create the digital signature, above, that he electronically affixed to the claim to execute 
the certification (id. at 2, ,i 5). Prior to submission of the October 201 7 claim, he had 
executed other contract documents for the government in the same manner, but in 
2 "Walter decl. ,i_" refers to a paragraph of Mr. Walter's declaration, which is attached 
to Appellant's Response to the Government's Motion to Dismiss. 
2 

October 2017, after submission of the claim, the government requested that he cease 
doing so, which he did3 (id. at 2, , 7). 
According to the declaration of Charles T. Rice, the Director of Information 
Management (IT) for URS, the digital signature that Mr. Walter utilized from the 
PDF-XChange PRO software can only have been created on URS computers through 
Mr. Walter's use of a unique password and user identification (app. opp'n, Rice decl. 
,i 8).4 Mr. Rice also explained that, notwithstanding these protections, an individual 
using a computer external to the company's network would not normally be able to 
access the "certificate" attesting to the validity of the digital signature, because making 
such a certificate publicly available would be contrary to information security protocols 
and allow for the disclosure of sensitive, nonpublic information (id. at 2, ,i 7 .c. ). 
The government denied URS's claim on September 14, 2017, making no reference 
to any alleged infirmity to Mr. Walter's signature (R4, tab 82). 
As part of its reply in support of this motion, government counsel apparently sent 
an email to a support staff member of the software company that publishes the 
PDF-XChange PRO software inquiring if he could "trust the signature" (gov't reply, 
ex. F). The support person apparently responded by email that "you cannot trust the 
[digital] certificate to prove the identity of the person who applied it" (gov't reply, ex. G). 
This is because, without more, no outside authority has been provided a "suitable ID 
proving who you are" (id.). This email does not purport to be under oath or fit within any 
known hearsay exceptions 5 although, as will be seen, we may accept it as accurate and 
give it consideration without changing the result of our decision in favor of URS. 
DECISION 
The government here argues that Mr. Walter's digital signature is insufficient to 
comply with the CDA's claim certification requirements, largely because the government 
is dissatisfied that the signature can be proven to be genuine on its face (see gov't. mot. 
at 7-10). Although we have decided multiple appeals relating to "electronic signatures," 
in which a claimant simply typed its name, with perhaps (or perhaps not) a "/s" to 
distinguish it from an unsigned signature block, see, e.g., Hawaii Cyberspace, ASBCA 
3 October 2017 is several months after Mr. Walter submitted the claim and was, in fact, 
after the claim was denied. The contracting officer, himself, used a similar digital 
signature on contract documents prior to October 2017. Walter decl. , 6. 
4 "Rice decl. ,_,, refers to a paragraph of Mr. Rice's declaration, which is attached to 
Appellant's Response to the Government's Motion to Dismiss. 
5 The government's propounding an unauthenticated unsworn document is somewhat at 
odds with its otherwise exacting position on authentication of signatures in this 
motion. 
3 

No. 54065, 04-1 BCA132,455; Tokyo Co., ASBCA No. 59059, 14-1BCA135,590; 
NileCo General Contracting LLC, ASBCA No. 60912, 17-1BCA136,862, we have not 
yet been presented with a digital signature of the type we see in this appeal. As discussed 
below, we hold that the digital signature used here meets the CDA's certification 
requirements and thus deny the government's motion to dismiss. 
I. Standard Of Review 
A challenge to the adequacy of the certification of a claim over $100,000 is a 
challenge to our jurisdiction to consider the appeal. "It is well settled that certification is 
a jurisdictional prerequisite for this Board for contractor claims over $100,000." Special 
Operative Group, LLC, ASBCA No. 57678, 11-2 BCA 134,860 at 171,480 (citations 
omitted). Although a defective certification does not deprive the Board of jurisdiction, 
41 U.S.C § 7103(b)(3), the failure to certify at all does, mandating dismissal. Special 
Operative Group, 11-2 BCA 134,680 at 171,480; CCIE & Co., ASBCA Nos. 58355, 
59008, 14-1BCA135,700 at 174,816; Baghdadi Swords Co., ASBCA No. 58539, 
13 BCA 135,395 at 173,665. 
And, as far as the law is concerned, an unsigned certification is considered to be 
not certified. This is because the "execution" of a CDA certification requires a "certifier 
to sign the claim certification," Teknocraft Inc., ASBCA No. 55438, 08-1 BCA 133,846 
at 167,504 (citing Hawaii CyberSpace, 04-1BCA132,455 at 160,535), thus making the 
failure to sign the certification language into the equivalent of "failure to certify," which 
may not be remedied. Hawaii CyberSpace, 04-1 BCA 132,455 at 160,535; see also 
Tokyo Co., 14-1BCA135,590 at 174,392. 
As the government correctly notes, the burden is on appellant to prove, by a 
preponderance of evidence, that we possess jurisdiction to consider this appeal. See 
Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exchange Service, 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir.1988); 
Suzan Co., ASBCA No. 59817, 16-1BCA136,474 at 177,728; Al Rafideen Co., ASBCA 
No. 59156, 15-1 BCA '135,983 at 175,808 (burden of proof in certification case). We 
add that we may consider evidence outside of the pleadings to decide a jurisdictional 
motion, like the one here. Suzan Co., 16-1BCA136,474 at 177,728 (citingLandv. 
Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 n.4 (1947)). 
II. What Is A Signature Under The CDA? 
The CDA does not define "signature," 6 but that term is defined in the FAR as "the 
discrete, verifiable symbol of an individual that, when affixed to a writing with the 
knowledge and consent of the individual, indicates a present intention to authenticate the 
6 Recall that "execution" of the certification requires a signature. Teknocraft Inc., 08-1 
BCA 133,846 at 167,504. 
4 

writing. This includes electronic symbols." FAR 2.101. Applying this definition, we 
have previously held that a typed but unsigned name is not sufficiently discrete or 
verifiable to satisfy the CDA requirement that the certification be signed. Tokyo Co., 
14-1 BCA ,i 35,590 at 174,392; RECO Rishad Engineering Construction ORG, ASBCA 
No. 60444, 16-1BCA136,558 at 178,051-52; ABS Development Corp., ASBCA 
No. 60022 et al., 16-1 BCA 136,564. Thus, the legal battle over whether a symbol counts 
as a signature often turns ( as it does here) on whether it is "discrete" and "verifiable." 
These terms are not separately defined by the FAR or our case law. 
"Discrete,'· though paired with "verifiable," turns out to be a relatively unimportant 
term in the definition. We read it to mean separate and distinct, see, e.g., Webster's Ninth 
New Collegiate Dictionary (1986)7, which is easily met by the digital signature we see 
here. 
For "verifiable," we, again, turn to the dictionary, which yields a definition of 
"capable of being verified," with "verify" meaning "establish the truth, accuracy, or 
reality of." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary. 
Consistent with its view that the authorship of an electronic signature must be 
immediately demonstrated on its face, the government argues that, to be verifiable, an 
electronic signature must be capable of being authenticated with a "validated, trustworthy 
certificate underlying the digital signature" (gov't mot. at 10). We reject this definition 
out of hand because it is not supported by the text of the FAR or CDA.8 Moreover, any 
common sense examination of what we accept in an ink signature informs a less onerous 
interpretation of "verifiable" than the government demands. No ink signature, on its 
face, includes any way for the reader to know who executed it unless that reader already 
possesses an intimate familiarity with the certifier's handwriting-and even that 
knowledge can be overcome by the simple expedients of tracing or photo-shopping such 
a mark. In our experience, we have NEVER seen an appeal where the government 
successfully argued that the ink signature certifying a claim was inadequate or facially 
belonged to somebody else. 
We have no intention of revisiting the practice by which we generally allow ink 
signatures to satisfy certification requirements, but we are certainly not going to impose 
draconian demands on digital signatures, not required to be met for their ink counterparts. 
In particular, if there is no way to require an ink signature to be certainly identifiable as 
7 Though we reference one particular dictionary, these definitions are relatively consistent 
across the board. 
8 The government relatedly argues that certain International Standards Organization 
(ISO) standards impose particular requirements upon digital signatures (see gov't 
mot. at 4-5, 8). Since these standards are neither part of the contract, nor the 
CDA, nor the FAR, they are simply immaterial. 
5 

originating from the purported signatory at a glance, we will not require a digital 
signature to be instantly linked to some immediate form of proof of its veracity. 
With the common practice involving ink signatures in mind and looking to the 
straightforward dictionary definition of verifiable, we conclude that, if one can later 
establish that a mark is tied to an individual, it is verifiable. This is also consistent with 
the more open policy towards allowing electronic signatures reflected in the Electronic 
Signature in Global and National Commerce Act ("ESIGN" Act), 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 7001-7006. 9 
III. The Digital Signature Here Meets The FAR' s Definition of Signature 
Although, as noted above, the government expresses dismay that it cannot 
immediately link the digital signature here to a digital certificate (gov't mot. at 10), that 
is not the test for whether a signature is considered valid for CDA certification purposes. 
The test is whether the mark acting as a signature can be ultimately tied to the signatory, 
and we find the digital signature here can. 
First, it is plain that the claim document, including the digital signature, originated 
from Mr. Walter's email account with appellant. This, to us, reflects evidence that he 
was the author and creator of the digital signature. Second, the evidence from Mr. Rice, 
URS's IT manager, also indicates that the digital signature originated with Mr. Walter 
since it required password and user identification unique to him. 
Against this evidence that supports a finding that Mr. Walter executed the digital 
signature (i.e., that it is verifiable), the government argues that even the software maker 
concedes that the certificate available does not prove that Mr. Walter executed it (gov't 
reply at 6-8). Even ifwe were to consider this "evidence" from the government, of 
which we are dubious because it is not authenticated in any way, it would not change our 
decision. The software company's purported response was completely consistent with 
the declarations from Mr. Walter and Mr. Rice, and thus consistent with our finding that 
the authorship of the signature could be verified-just not with the attached certificate. 10 
9 The parties have argued extensively over whether the ESIGN Act applies to the digital 
signature here (see app. resp. at 6-7, 21-23; gov't reply at 8-17. We need not 
decide the applicability of the ESIGN Act, finding, as we do, that the digital 
signature before us is compliant with the FAR and CDA on its own terms. 
10 Thus, the facts of this decision are distinguishable from such prior opinions as ABS, 
16-1 BCA ,-i 36,564, cited by the government, in which we rejected a typed name 
as a signature because "anyone can type a person's name." ABS, 16-1 BCA 
,-r 36,564, at 178,099 (quoted by gov't mot. at 10). Here, the evidence is that only 
Mr. Walter could have made the digital signature. 
6 

CONCLUSION 
There is sufficient evidence before us to determine that Mr. Walter's digital 
signature on the claim certification was, in fact, his and is verifiably so. The 
government's motion to dismiss is denied. 
Dated: October 3, 2019 
I concur 
RICHARD SHACKLEFORD 
Administrative Judge 
Acting Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
J. REID PROUTY 
Administrative Judge 
Vice Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
I concur 
LIS B. YOUNG 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the 
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA No. 61443, Appeals URS Federal 
Services, Inc., rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. 
Dated: 
7 
PAULLA K. GATES-LEWIS 
Recorder, Armed Services 
Board of Contract Appeals