ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 
Appeal of --
Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. 
Under Contract No. DAAA09~02-D-0007 
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ASBCA No. 56358 
APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT:. Jason N. Workmaster, Esq. 
Raymond B. Biagini, Esq. 
Alejandro L. Sarria, Esq. 
McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP 
Washington, DC 
APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: Raymond M. Saunders, Esq. 
Army Chief Trial Attorney 
MAJ John C. Dohn, JA 
Robert T. WU,Esq. 
Trial Attorneys 
OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE FREEMAN ON THE 
GOYERNlVlENT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
The government moves for reconsideration of our 2 Apri12012 decision denying 
both parties' motions for summary judgment. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc., 
ASBCA No. 56358,12-1 BCA ~ 35,001. The government argues that we erred in 
holding that the captioned contract did not categorically prohibit use of private armed 
security companies to supplement force protection where necessary to accomplish the 
logistical support mission of the contract. The specific errors alleged are that (i) our 
conclusion "is not supported by any meaningful analysis of the contract language" and 
(ii) we ignored the government's extrinsic evidence purportedly showing that during 
performance of the contract KBRS agreed with the government's interpretation of the 
contract as categorically prohibiting use of private armed security companies without the 
express permission of the government. (Gov't mot. at 2, 4-5) 
Our analysis of the contract text in Special Provisions H-13, H-16 and H-21 is set 
forth in the third through sixth paragraphs of our decision and we see no need to repeat 
that analysis here. 12-1 BCA ~ 35,001 at 172,015. That analysis led us to conclude that 
the clear and unambiguous terms of the contract relied upon by the goven1111ent contained 
no categorical prohibition against the use of private armed security companies for force 
- protection where necessary to accomplish the logistical support mission of the contract. 
Having so concluded, any extrinsic evidence of post-award interpretations to the contrary 
could not be considered to vary the objectively manifested intent of the parties in the 

clear and unambiguous written terms of the contract at award. l Coast Federal Bank, FSB 
v. United States, 323 F.3d 1035, 1038, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
On reconsideration, we affirm our decision of 2 April 2012. 
Dated: 22 June 2012 
h~C~~~ 
MONROE E. FREEMAN, JR. 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
I concur I concur 
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"MARK N. S1EMPL~ EUNICE W. THOMAS 
Administrative Judge Administrative Judge 
Acting Chairman Vice Chairman 
Armed Services Board Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals of Contract Appeals 
1 As an example of its extrinsic evidence of the parties' alleged intent to bar the use of 
private armed security companies without the government's permission, the 
government cites a post-award request by a KBRS contract manager to the 
government that "until appropriate security support is provided ... you provide 
authorization for KBR to Issue or procure weapons and ammunition for our 
Security force" (gov't mot. at 4-5). This request was expressly made under the 
terms of Special Provision H-21 and the "Security force" to be armed consisted of 
"employees'"who "would be screen[ed]" by KBRS (R4, tab 14 at 2). This was a 
request for permission to arm KBRS employees and not a request for permission 
to retain a professional private armed security compa~y having its own employees, 
arms and ammunition. 
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I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the 
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA No~ 56358, Appeal of Kellogg 
Brow11 & Root Services, Inc., rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. 
Dated: 
CATHERINE A. STANTON 
Recorder, Armed Services 
Board ofContract Appeals 
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