ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 
 
OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE MCLISH  
ON GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 
 
 Respondent, the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA or government), moves to 
dismiss this appeal on the ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction because appellant’s 
claim to the contracting officer did not demand a “sum certain,” as required for monetary 
claims under the Contract Disputes Act and its implementing regulations.  Appellant, J&J 
Maintenance, Inc., d/b/a J&J Worldwide Services (J&J), contends that no sum certain 
was required because its claim is a nonmonetary one.  The government argues that the 
purported nonmonetary claim is in truth a monetary claim for which a sum certain was 
required.  We grant the motion in part and deny it in part. 
  
STATEMENT OF FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF THE MOTION 
 
1. DeCA awarded J&J three task orders on the above-captioned contract to 
perform preventative maintenance and repair services for commissary facilities, 
HDEC03-20-F-0046 (Maintenance Group 2); HDEC03-20-F-0048 (Maintenance Group 
Appeal of - )  
 )  
J&J Maintenance, Inc., d/b/a J&J    
  Worldwide Services 
) 
) 
ASBCA No. 63013 
 )  
Under Contract No. 47QSHA-19-D-003F  
  Task Order Nos. HDEC03-20-F-0046  
                              HDEC03-20-F-0048 
                              HDEC03-20-F-0049  
) 
) 
) 
)  
 
APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT: Stephanie Magnell, Esq. 
Adam Lasky, Esq. 
Anthony J. LaPlaca, Esq. 
    Seyfarth Shaw LLP 
    Washington, DC 
 
APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: Betsy E. Dulin, Esq. 
   Principal Deputy General Counsel 
    Defense Commissary Agency 
  Fort Lee, VA 

2 
 
6); and HDEC03-20-F-0049 (Maintenance Group 8).  The task orders1 were for one year, 
commencing on July 1, 2020, with four option years.  (R4, tabs 2-4, 46 at 5178-79) 
 
2. The task orders provide that J&J will perform preventative maintenance 
services and program management on a fixed-price basis, while repairs (unscheduled and 
emergency maintenance) will be compensated on a time and materials basis (R4, tab 5 
at 4904-05). 
 
3. J&J subcontracts many of the services it performs under the task orders 
(compl. ¶ 15). 
 
4. During performance of the task orders, a dispute arose between the parties 
regarding J&J’s invoicing for subcontracted work performed on a time and materials 
basis (R4, tab 30 at 5071). 
 
5. When time and materials pricing is used, the government reimburses the 
contractor for the actual cost of materials.  FAR 16.601(b).  The task orders at issue here 
required J&J, when invoicing for time and materials work, to provide evidence of the 
actual costs of the materials, in the form of “supply house” invoices (R4, tab 5 at 4906). 
 
6. Section 4 of the Request for Quotation (RFQ) Performance Work Statement 
(PWS) addresses “Compensation for Services,” and includes the following: 
 
4.4.  Repair CLINs will be compensated on a time and 
material basis, at the applicable rates set forth in the contract 
CLIN structure and associated contract attachments and with 
reimbursement for substantiated material costs, except that, at 
the discretion of the Contracting Officer, compensation for 
major repairs shall be made on a fixed price basis[.] Work 
performed by sub-contractors shall be compensated at the 
contractually established hourly rates. 
 
4.5.  For any materials or subcontracted work, the Contractor 
may be required to provide at least three quotes from other 
sources if the Approving Authority or Field Engineer 
determines that the cost estimate is not fair and reasonable. 
The Contractor shall not charge or be entitled to additional 
compensation for profit, percentages, fees, or hours in excess 
of those charged by its subcontractors. 
 
1 Appellant refers to the orders at issue as “task orders,” while the government contends 
they are “delivery orders.”  We see no present need to resolve this issue.  For 
convenience, we refer to them herein as task orders.  

3 
 
 
 . . . . 
 
4.9.  The Contractor will be reimbursed for the cost of 
materials and associated material handling costs in 
accordance with Paragraph 2.8., above, provided that the 
Contractor has made payments for materials in accordance 
with the terms and conditions of this contract.  The Contractor 
shall invoice material handling costs with material costs and 
shall collect material handling costs in a separate pool in its 
accounting system to avoid double billing and compensation. 
 
4.10.  Material costs include expenses incurred for direct 
materials, equipment, and subcontracts for supplies incidental 
to the Work performed by the prime or subcontractor, and 
substantiated by supply house invoices. 
 
(R4, tab 5 at 4904-06) (Emphasis added) 
 
7. J&J contends that, where materials are provided by a subcontractor, J&J’s 
“actual cost of materials” are the costs it pays its subcontractors for them, including any 
markup included by the subcontractor.  J&J further contends that the invoices it receives 
from its subcontractors satisfy the requirement for “supply house invoices.”  (R4, tab 30 
at 5072) 
 
8. J&J relies, in part, on DeCA’s responses to offerors’ written questions 
submitted prior to the deadline for submitting quotation for the task orders at issue (R4, 
tab 30 at 5071).  The Government’s responses to questions Nos. 47 and 48 were as 
follows: 
 
QUESTION 47: PWS 3.3-supply house invoices. Is this 
meant to be for any materials that the prime contractor 
supplies?  
GOVERNMENT ANSWER: Contractors and/or 
Subcontractors shall provide supporting documents to justify 
price. 
QUESTION 48: PWS 3.3-will a subcontractor quote for 
materials suffice for the above?  
GOVERNMENT ANSWER: Yes[.] 
 
(R4, tab 6 at 4944) 
 

4 
 
9. DeCA disagrees with J&J’s interpretation of the task orders.  DeCA requires 
J&J to submit evidence of the actual cost of the materials to the subcontractor and 
maintains that DeCA is not required to pay any subcontractor markup on the materials.  
DeCA further contends that the subcontractor invoices are not the functional equivalent 
of “supply house invoices” and that J&J must submit evidence of the amount the 
subcontractor paid for the materials.  DeCA informed J&J that it does not intend to pay 
for materials purchased in connection with the task orders unless J&J’s submissions meet 
the government’s requirements.  (R4, tab 46 at 5179-85) 
 
10.  According to J&J, DeCA has, on at least some occasions, approved payment 
for materials based on subcontractor quotations if J&J submitted independent evidence 
that the prices the subcontractor charged J&J for materials were competitive (app. br. 
at 2-3).  J&J calls this a “workaround” (id.).  The government disagrees with that 
characterization (gov’t reply br. at 6). 
 
11.  In a letter to the contracting officer, J&J requested a final decision confirming 
that (a) J&J’s subcontractors were permitted to charge markups on materials; and (b) J&J 
was not required to submit supply house invoices for materials (R4, tab 30 at 5067).  The 
letter stated “[t]his Claim does not include any request for monetary compensation at this 
time, however . . . J&J reserves the right to submit a subsequent claim for an equitable 
adjustment stemming from the Government’s insistence on providing supply house 
invoices . . . ” (id. at 5073). 
 
12.  The contracting officer issued a final decision.  The decision first found that 
J&J had not submitted a proper claim, asserting that “[i]f a significant result of purported 
claim is payment of additional compensation to the Contractor, then the Contractor must 
state a ‘sum certain’ in connection with the claim” (R4, tab 46 at 5182) (citing 
Securiforce Int’l Am., LLC v. United States, 879 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018); MAC 
Elec., Inc., ASBCA No. 62503, 21-1 BCA ¶ 37,768).  Because J&J could have submitted 
a monetary claim in a sum certain but did not do so, the contracting officer concluded 
that J&J’s submission was not a valid claim (R4, tab 46 at 5182). 
 
13.  The final decision went on to address the merits of J&J’s claim, stating that (a) 
“[s]ubcontractor markup for profit is not an allowable expense under the contract, where 
subcontractor is providing services and is not a merchant or supplier of relevant 
materials;” and (b) when invoicing for its material costs, J&J “must submit supply house 
invoices or other appropriate documentation as approved by the contracting officer” (R4, 
tab 46 at 5185).  The final decision concluded with information about J&J’s rights to 
appeal the decision (id.). 
 
14.  On August 24, 2021, J&J filed an appeal with the Board and subsequently 
filed a complaint.  The complaint’s prayer for relief requested that the Board (a) award 
J&J monetary damages of $5,861.40; (b) declare that a subcontractor’s reasonable 

5 
 
markup is allowable under the task orders; and (c) declare that J&J is not required to 
submit supply house invoices for materials used by its subcontractors (compl. at 12). 
 
15.  At the time J&J filed its appeal with the Board, performance of the task orders 
was ongoing (R4, tabs 39-41) (exercising first option year for all three task orders and 
extending contract period of performance to June 30, 2022).  The complaint states that 
“J&J has delayed submission of invoices in the amount of $89,449.01, with the 
understanding that [the] contracting officer would deny $5,861.40 of those invoices under 
the agency’s interpretation of the contract terms as stated in the [contracting officer’s 
final decision]” (compl. ¶ 7). 
 
DECISION 
 
 J&J, as the proponent of the Board’s jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing 
jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.  Najmaa Alshimal, ASBCA No. 62701, 
21-1 BCA ¶ 37,872 at 183,899; see also K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 778 F.3d 
1000, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  “The facts supporting jurisdiction are subject to our fact-
finding upon a review of the record.”  CCIE & Co., ASBCA Nos. 58355, 59008, 14-1 
BCA ¶ 35,700 at 174,816.  We determine our jurisdiction based on the facts at the time 
the appeal was filed with the Board.  Greenland Contractors I/S, ASBCA No. 61113, 
19-1 BCA ¶ 37,259 at 181,332 (citing Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 
(1993)). 
 
 The Board's jurisdiction is governed by the Contract Disputes Act (CDA), 
41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-09.  Pursuant to the CDA, a valid claim and a contracting officer’s 
decision are prerequisites to our jurisdiction.  41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(1); Securiforce, 879 
F.3d at 1359; M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010).  “[W]here there is no claim, there can be no effective decision from which to 
appeal.”  Sweet Star Logistic Serv., ASBCA No. 62082, 20-1 BCA ¶ 37,704 at 183,045 
(quoting Mawaraa AlBihar Co., ASBCA No. 58585, 13 BCA ¶ 35,426 at 173,783). 
 
 The CDA does not define the term “claim.”  Rather, we look to the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which defines a claim as “a written demand or written 
assertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of 
money in a sum certain, the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief 
arising under or relating to the contract.”  FAR 2.101; Sweet Star Logistic Serv., 20-1 
BCA ¶ 37,704 at 183,045.  Under this definition, a “sum certain” is required for claims 
that seek the payment of money, but is not required for nonmonetary claims, such as 
those seeking “the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms” or other contractual 
relief. 
 

6 
 
A. We Lack Jurisdiction Over the Request for Monetary Relief Asserted for   
the First Time in J&J’s Complaint to the Board 
 
 J&J’s complaint seeks both monetary and nonmonetary relief.  Its claim to the 
contracting officer, however, did not seek any monetary relief.  Indeed, J&J expressly 
stated in the claim that it was not requesting money and was reserving its right to submit 
a later claim for an equitable adjustment to the contract (R4, tab 30 at 5073).  Because the 
monetary claim asserted in the complaint seeks different relief than the claim submitted 
to the contracting officer, it is a separate claim that cannot be raised for the first time at 
the Board.  K-Con Bldg. Sys., 778 F.3d at 1005 (requests are “separate claims if they 
either request different remedies (whether monetary or non-monetary) or assert grounds 
that are materially different from each other factually or legally”) (emphasis in original); 
ECC Int'l Constructors, LLC, ASBCA No. 59586, 21-1 BCA ¶ 37,862 at 183,855 
(“Claims seeking different types of remedy, such as expectation damages versus 
consequential damages, are different claims.”).  Even if the claim submitted to the 
contracting officer could be read as seeking a monetary remedy, it failed to demand a 
sum certain.  For monetary claims, the absence of a sum certain is “fatal to jurisdiction 
under the CDA.”  Securiforce, 879 F.3d at 1359-60 (quoting Northrop Grumman 
Computing Sys., Inc. v. United States, 709 F.3d 1107, 1112 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).  
Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over J&J’s claim for $5,861.40 or any other monetary 
relief. 
 
B.  We Have Jurisdiction Over J&J’s Claims for Nonmonetary Relief 
 
 Whether we have jurisdiction over J&J’s claims seeking declaratory rulings 
interpreting the disputed contract provisions depends on whether these claims are 
monetary claims masquerading as nonmonetary claims.  If the “only significant 
consequence” of J&J prevailing on these claims is that J&J would be entitled to recover 
money from the government, then they are effectively monetary claims.  Securiforce, 879 
F.3d at 1360. 
 
 It is well-established that the Board has jurisdiction to decide nonmonetary claims 
and issue declaratory relief interpreting disputed contract provisions.  Garrett v. Gen. 
Elec. Co., 987 F.2d 747, 749 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Our reviewing court has established that 
“nonmonetary claims are not outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims 
simply because the contractor could convert the claims to monetary claims by doing the 
requested work and seeking compensation afterwards.”  Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. 
United States, 178 F.3d 1260, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1999), reh'g denied, 186 F.3d 1379 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999).
2  The court rejected the government’s argument that “nonmonetary disputes” 
 
2 In General Electric, the Federal Circuit recognized Congress’ intent that there be 
jurisdictional parity between the boards and the Court of Federal Claims.  Id. 
at 750.  The Alliant decision is therefore instructive as to our jurisdiction even 

7 
 
should be read narrowly to exclude “disputes arising prior to the completion of work on a 
contract” and “disputes that have not [yet] ripened into a monetary dispute, but ... could” 
if the contractor “could convert the claim into one for monetary relief” by its own actions.  
Alliant, 178 F.3d at 1268 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 Alliant also addressed the contention that jurisdiction over nonmonetary disputes 
can be denied based on “prudential” reasons.  Id. at 1270-72.  It explained that “Congress 
has granted relatively free access to the boards of contract appeals and the Court of 
Federal Claims . . . .”  Id. at 1270.  With respect to the boards, it noted that the CDA 
authorizes review of “any appeal [from a contracting officer's decision on a claim] 
relative to a contract made by [an] agency.”  Id. at 1270-71 (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 607(d)).  
The court of appeals went on to say that “[t]he FAR has likewise ensured that review of 
contract claims will be relatively easy to obtain, by defining the term ‘claim’ broadly, to 
include a demand or assertion seeking, as a matter of right, inter alia, ‘the adjustment or 
interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating to the contract.’”  
Id. at 1271 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 33.201).  It thus rejected the notion that “all but a narrow 
class of actions on nonmonetary claims” should be dismissed.  Id. 
 
 Against this backdrop, the Federal Circuit held that a contractor cannot evade the 
sum certain requirement by casting a monetary claim as a nonmonetary one.  Securiforce, 
879 F.3d at 1360.  The court did not disturb the holdings in General Electric and Alliant, 
but rather cited both of them approvingly.  Id. at 1361-62.  Securiforce held that, if the 
“only significant consequence” of a purported nonmonetary claim is that the contractor 
would obtain money damages from the government, the claim is a monetary one.  Id. 
at 1360.  To be a legitimate nonmonetary claim, the requested relief must have a 
significant consequence other than the recovery of money.  Id.  “While contractors may 
in some circumstances properly seek only declaratory relief [for a nonmonetary claim] 
without stating a sum certain, they may not circumvent the general rule requiring a sum 
certain by reframing monetary claims as nonmonetary.”  Id. 
 
 Securiforce involved a contract that had been terminated, in part for default and in 
part for convenience.  Id. at 1358.  The contractor contested both termination decisions in 
the Court of Federal Claims.  Id. at 1358-59.  The government contended that the court 
lacked jurisdiction over the termination for convenience claim because the claim to the 
contracting officer did not request monetary relief in a sum certain.  Id. at 1360.  The 
 
though it addressed an appeal from the Court of Federal Claims.  See, e.g., Kaman 
Precision Products, 10-2 BCA ¶ 34,529 at 170,287 (citing Alliant in holding that 
“[t]he fact that a decision on [a claim for contract interpretation] may later result in 
a monetary claim does not affect our jurisdiction to hear the appeal before us nor 
does it lead us to conclude that it would be premature to decide [the claim for 
contract interpretation] at this time.”). 
 

8 
 
contractor contended that its claim was a nonmonetary one seeking only a ruling that the 
termination for convenience was improper.  Id.  The court of appeals disagreed, holding 
that the claim was in essence a monetary one because “the only significant consequence” 
of finding the termination for convenience to be improper was that the contractor would 
be entitled to money damages.  Id. at 1360-61.  The contract having been terminated, 
there could be no other significant consequence of overturning the termination for 
convenience.  Therefore, the failure to include a sum certain in the claim to the 
contracting officer rendered the claim invalid.  Id. 
 
 Here, unlike in Securiforce, performance of the task orders was ongoing when the 
claim was submitted and when J&J filed this appeal.  J&J asserts that the Board’s 
resolution of the contract interpretation disputes will affect how it performs the task 
orders going forward: 
 
[T]he parties are in the middle of the total contract period of 
performance. . . .  Resolution of the dispute about the 
allowability of subcontractor markup on materials will result 
in a change in contract performance.  If the Board decides 
that the markup is allowable, then both J&J and the 
Government will no longer engage in the “workaround” 
practice.  In contrast, if the Board decides that the 
subcontractor markup is not allowable, then J&J will likely 
seek to significantly reduce the amount of repair work 
performed by subcontractors, as J&J will only be assured of 
reimbursement for its own materials costs.  Or instead, J&J 
could consider attempting to source all of the materials used 
in the repairs itself and subcontracting only the repair 
services, which would result in an increase in overhead hours 
on the Task Orders. 
  
(App. br. at 9-10)  In short, J&J contends that the Board’s determination of the contract 
interpretation issues presented in this appeal could cause J&J to change its approach to 
using subcontractors to perform work, such as by self-performing more of the work or 
purchasing materials directly that it would otherwise obtain through its subcontractors.  
These changes in performance would appear to permit J&J to avoid costs (the 
subcontractor markups on materials) that would go unreimbursed under DeCA’s 
interpretation.  In addition, if J&J’s interpretation prevails, it will be able to avoid 
performing the task of obtaining and submitting supply house invoices, which the 
government is requiring over J&J’s objections. 
 
 The government does not dispute J&J’s description of the potential consequences 
of a ruling in its favor on the contract interpretation dispute, but nonetheless contends that 
we still lack jurisdiction under Securiforce.  The government begins by arguing that there 

9 
 
is no requirement that “the sole consequence or impact of a submission be monetary in 
order to trigger the jurisdictional requirement for a ‘sum certain.’”  (Gov’t reply br. at 4) 
(emphasis in original)  This cannot be squared with the clear language in Securiforce, 
which repeatedly states otherwise.  Securiforce, 879 F.3d at 1360 (standard is whether 
“the only significant consequence” would be recovery of money damages and noting that 
the claim at issue “would—if granted—yield only one significant consequence [i.e., 
money damages]”). 
 
 The government then argues that the changes in performance J&J says it may have 
to make depending on the outcome all have “significant – and arguably primary – 
monetary components” and that the “potential cost to Appellant . . . is the only significant 
factor in the purported claim and is easily ascertained or estimated” (gov’t reply br. 
at 5-6).  According to the government, J&J was therefore required to submit a monetary 
claim for a sum certain.  This sweeps far too broadly.  While it is undoubtedly true that 
resolution of the interpretation disputes would have financial consequences, the question 
Securiforce requires us to address is whether the only significant relief that J&J could 
obtain is money damages.  The mere fact that the outcome of the dispute will ultimately 
affect the contractor’s bottom line does not answer this question. 
 
 The government’s position is essentially as stated in the contracting officer’s final 
decision:  “[i]f a significant result of [a] purported claim is payment of additional 
compensation to the Contractor, then the Contractor must state a ‘sum certain’ in 
connection with the claim” (R4, tab 46 at 5182) (citing Securiforce, 879 F.3d at 1360 and 
MAC, 21-1 BCA ¶ 37,768).  That, however, misstates the law.  Securiforce did not hold 
that any claim that may lead to payment of additional compensation is monetary, and thus 
must state a sum certain.  To the contrary, it held that claims must be asserted as 
monetary claims when “the only significant consequence” of the claim would be money 
damages.  Securiforce, 879 F.3d at 1360.  The jurisdictional question, therefore, is not 
whether the claim may have a significant monetary impact, but whether it may have a 
significant nonmonetary impact. 
 
 The government’s approach would dramatically curtail, if not completely nullify, 
contractors’ ability to bring claims that seek only “the adjustment or interpretation of 
contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating to the contract.”  FAR 2.101.  
Almost every contract interpretation dispute ultimately has monetary consequences; 
parties rarely expend resources arguing about interpretation issues that have no financial 
impact.  The government’s interpretation of the law would restrict the Board’s 
jurisdiction to declare the rights of the parties under a contract to those infrequent 
occasions when the outcome is financially meaningless.  This would be contrary to the 
long-standing recognition that we have jurisdiction to hear contract dispute issues even in 
situations where the contractor could perform as the government directs and seek 
compensation afterwards.  Alliant, 178 F.3d at 1270.  It is also inconsistent with 
Congress’ intent to grant “relatively free access to the boards of contract appeals” and the 

10 
 
FAR's scheme that “review of contract claims will be relatively easy to obtain.”  Id. 
at 1270-71. 
 
 Finally, the decisions the government relies upon are distinguishable.  In each of 
the decisions it cites, there was no plausible assertion that the purported nonmonetary 
claim could result in changes to contract performance or the avoidance of costs, as 
opposed to purely monetary relief.  In MAC Electric, Inc., ASBCA No. 62503, 21-1 BCA 
¶ 37,768, the purported nonmonetary claim seeking a declaration of the date a contract 
was substantially complete was a monetary claim because the “only ‘significant 
consequence’ of [such a determination] would be to permit [the contractor] to use that 
determination in a delay claim seeking monetary damages.”  MAC, 21-1 BCA ¶ 37,768 
at 183,328.  In Duke University v. Department of Health and Human Services, CBCA 
No. 5992, 18-1 BCA ¶ 37,023, the Civilian Board found that it lacked CDA jurisdiction 
because a “ruling in Duke's favor would not result in Duke avoiding costs, but instead 
would be used only to entitle Duke to monetary relief in a separate proceeding.  In such 
circumstances, it is clear that Duke has an uncertified and unquantified monetary claim.”  
Duke, 18-1 BCA ¶ 37,023 at 180,291.  See also Parsons Gov’t Servs., Inc., ASBCA 
No. 62113, 20-1 BCA ¶ 37,586 at 182,511 (“Parsons will not be able to avoid 
performance of a contractual task by virtue of its claim for contractual interpretation.”); 
Greenland Contractors I/S, ASBCA Nos. 61113, 61248, 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,259 at 181,332 
(“[A] holding in Greenland's favor would not allow Greenland to avoid performing, but 
would only be used to entitle Greenland to monetary relief in a separate proceeding.”). 
 
 Here, J&J plausibly contends that a ruling on the contract interpretation issues 
raised in its claim may allow it to avoid costs going forward and relieve it from an 
obligation to perform a task the government is insisting upon over J&J’s objections.  We 
find that these are “significant consequences” other than the recovery of money and 
therefore suffice to demonstrate that the claims are not barred by the Securiforce rule. 
 
 Our ruling is limited to finding that we have jurisdiction to hear J&J’s claim for 
declaratory relief.  We do not address here whether there are other reasons we should not 
issue a ruling interpreting the contract at this time.  Even where we have jurisdiction, we 
are not “required to issue a declaration of rights whenever a contractor raises a question 
of contract interpretation during the course of contractor performance.”  Alliant, 178 F.3d 
at 1271.  We are “free to consider the appropriateness of declaratory relief, including 
whether the claim involves a live dispute between the parties, whether a declaration will 
resolve that dispute, and whether the legal remedies available to the parties would be 
adequate to protect the parties' interests.”  Id.  Those questions are not presently before us 
and we do not consider them here.  We also do not express any view of the merits of the 
claim. 
 
 
 

11 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is GRANTED as to 
the claim asserted in appellant’s complaint for monetary relief.  The government’s 
motion is otherwise denied. 
  
 Dated:  May 15, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THOMAS P. MCLISH 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
I concur 
 
 
 
RICHARD SHACKLEFORD 
Administrative Judge 
Acting Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 I concur 
 
 
 
 J. REID PROUTY 
Administrative Judge 
Vice Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 
 
 I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the 
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA No. 63013,
 Appeal of J&J 
Maintenance, Inc., d/b/a J&J Worldwide Services, rendered in conformance with the 
Board’s Charter. 
 
 Dated:  May 16, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PAULLA K. GATES-LEWIS 
Recorder, Armed Services 
Board of Contract Appeals