ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 
Appeal of --
Chugach Federal Solutions, Inc. 
Under Contract No. N44255-14-D-9000 
APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT: 
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APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: 
ASBCA No. 61320 
Richard B. O'Keeffe, Jr., Esq. 
Gary S. Ward, Esq. 
Cara L. Lasley, Esq. 
Lindy C. Bathurst, Esq. 
William A. Roberts III, Esq. 
Wiley Rein LLP 
Washington, DC 
Craig D. Jensen, Esq. 
Navy Chief Trial Attorney 
David M. Marquez, Esq. 
Anthony Hicks, Esq. 
Trial Attorneys 
OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE D' ALESSANDRIS 
ON THE GOVERNMENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS I, III, IV, V &VI 
OF THE COMPLAINT 
Respondent, the Department of the Navy (government or Navy) moves to 
dismiss counts I (negligent negotiations), III (mutual mistake), and IV ( constructive 
change), as well as portions of counts V (good faith and fair dealing) and VI (improper 
withholding of payment), of the complaint filed by appellant, Chugach Federal 
Solutions, Inc. (Chugach or CFSI). Specifically, the Navy asserts that the Board is 
without jurisdiction to entertain count I (negligent negotiations) and that Chugach fails 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted in count III (mutual mistake). The 
Navy asserts that the Board lacks jurisdiction to entertain count IV ( constructive change) 
because Chugach did not present the claim to the contracting officer. With regard to 
counts V (good faith and fair dealing) and VI (improper withholding of payment), the 
Navy asserts that they should be dismissed to the extent they rely upon counts I, III, and 
IV. For the reasons stated below, we deny the Navy's motion. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF THE MOTION 1 
On November 21, 2011, the Navy Facilities Engineering Command, Northwest 
Contracting Office (NA VF AC) released Solicitation No. N44255-l O-R-5016, a Request 
for Proposals (RFP) seeking facility support services (comp!., 10). The RFP 
contemplated a five-year contract covering a broad range of base operations services 
detailed in a Performance Work Statement (PWS) (comp!., 11). The Navy developed 
an Independent Government Estimate (IGE) of the cost and staffing levels necessary to 
perform the requirements of the RFP ( comp I. , 7). 
The RFP required that offerors "clearly demonstrate ... understanding of current 
industry standards, policies, procedures, and processes utilized in accomplishing the 
complexity and magnitude of the RFP requirements." The specific "Basis of 
Evaluation" for this factor included the adequacy of offerors' proposed staffing levels. 
(Comp!., 19) In addition, offerors were required to propose specific "Direct Labor 
Hours" and "Direct [full time equivalent] FTEs" for each contract line item number 
(CLIN) and subCLIN of each separate annex, set forth in Attachment J.M-5 (comp!. 
i120). In its initial proposal, Chugach proposed a total of 604,063 hours, which it 
translated to 322.85 FTEs (comp!. i137). On August 7, 2012, Chugach submitted an 
updated proposal that included 619,820 hours, which it translated to 329.04 FTEs 
( comp I. i1 40). 
Pursuant to Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 15.306(d), "Exchanges with 
offerors after establishment of the competitive range:" 
Negotiations are exchanges, in either a competitive or sole 
source environment, between the Government and offerors, 
that are undertaken with the intent of allowing the offeror to 
revise its proposal.... When negotiations are conducted in a 
competitive acquisition, they take place after establishment 
of the competitive range and are called discussions. 
(3) At a minimum, the contracting officer must, subject 
to paragraphs (d)(S) and (e) of this section and 15.307(a), 
indicate to, or discuss with, each offeror still being considered 
for award, deficiencies, significant weaknesses, and adverse 
1 For purposes of resolving this motion to dismiss only, we treat properly-pied facts as 
true. We also note facts alleged and theories advanced by appellant's claim 
herein because they aid in our understanding the contents of the complaint. 
2 

past performance information to which the offeror has not yet 
had an opportunity to respond. 
FAR 15.306(d). 
In its initial evaluation, the Navy's Technical Team determined that Chugach' s staffing 
levels were "significantly low" for "Annexes 02000, 1500000, 160000, and 180000"2 and 
that this was a "significant weakness'' (Comp I. ,.;, 41, 102). Around this same time, the 
Navy's Source Selection Advisory Council (SSAC) documented certain aspects of the 
proposal evaluation prior to the initiation of discussions under FAR 15 .306( d). The SSAC 
noted a variance between offerors' staffing levels (represented by FTE headcounts) and the 
IGE. (Compl. ,I 42) The SSAC concluded that because this effort is "traditionally labor 
intensive," the wide variation in proposed staffing levels is an "indicator" that the offerors 
may not have fully understood the level of effort required ( comp I. ,I 43 ). 
Around this time, the Navy amended the PWS, "clariflying] trouble call 
quantities are unlimited" and updating the Integrated Maintenance Plan "performance 
standard" ( comp I. ,I 109). During discussions, the Navy issued an evaluation 
notification to Chugach stating: 
After reviewing the Performance Work Statement for 
Annexes 020000, 150000, and 180000, please ensure your 
work hour estimates and FTE staffing for these annexes 
[have] adequately addressed no limitation to trouble call 
quantities, the increased requirements of the RFP ( over 
historical) maintenance program IMP, and environmental 
services, specifically hazardous waste management. 
(Comp I. ,I 105 9 ( citing R4, tab 140 at 6)) When CFSI did not substantially revise its 
proposal, NA VFAC concluded that "CFSI's response [to this statement] did not 
adequately address the government's concern and the significant weakness remained'' 
( comp I. ,I 111 ). 
On November 19, 2012, Chugach submitted a proposal revision that reduced its 
overall staffing levels to 597,516 hours, which it translated to 317 .87 FTEs ( comp I. 
,I 55). In another proposal revision submitted on February 1, 2013, Chugach decreased 
its overall staffing level to 314.71 FTEs (compl. ,I 73). Another prospective bidder 
challenged its exclusion from the competitive range before the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO). The GAO sustained the protest holding that the Navy 
2 There are discrepancies in the Annex Numbers throughout the record (missing or 
additional zeros). As the exact numbering is immaterial to this decision, the 
Annex Numbers in quotations may differ. 
3 

failed to conduct "meaningful discussions. (Compl. ,i,i 65-67) After reopening 
discussions, the Navy again failed to identify any "significant concerns" to Chugach 
( comp 1. ,i 114 ). Instead, NA VF AC informed CFSI that its "overall recurring work FTEs 
are within an acceptable range" ( com pl. ,i 115). 
By letter dated November 15, 2013, the Navy announced that it had "concluded 
discussions for the subject solicitation." The Navy further stated that Chugach "may 
now submit written final revisions to either your non-price related factors or price 
proposal, or both" on November 26, 2013. (Compl. ,i 74) The Navy's letter did not 
identify any specific concerns with CFSI's proposal, and the Navy never informed 
Chugach that it considered its staffing levels for the annexes to be significantly low or a 
significant weakness ( com pl. ,i,i 75, 104 ). In its November 26, 2013 proposal revision, 
Chugach reduced its staffing levels to 311.18 FTEs (compl. ,i 76). On March 21, 2014, 
the Navy awarded the contract, sometimes referred to as the West Sound Base Operating 
Services Contract (WSBOSC) to Chugach (compl. ,i 80). 
Since the early days of performance, Chugach has struggled to satisfy the Navy's 
demands under the contract (compl. ,i 83). Chugach took significant steps to address the 
manning shortfall, hiring additional staff and working significant overtime hours at substantial 
costs to maintain adequate quality and stay close to schedule ( comp 1. ,i,i 90, 96). 
Chugach alleges that the Navy's actions caused it to negotiate staffing levels (and, as a 
direct result, firm- fixed pricing) for this contract that were materially inadequate and that 
caused significant losses under the contract ( comp 1. ,i 119). Chugach asserts that it relied on 
the Navy's negotiation statements and would have made substantial changes in staffing­
significantly increasing its staffing levels-had NA VF AC communicated its concerns ( comp 1. 
,i 120). Chugach asserts that it is entitled to an adjustment in the contract price to compensate 
for the significant loss it allegedly has incurred because of the Navy's actions during contract 
formation ( comp 1. ,i 121 ). Chugach additionally asserts that the parties mistakenly believed 
that the scope of the requirement for the new WSBOSC, notwithstanding significant changes 
to the terms and conditions, was commensurate with the previous contract and could 
therefore, if the conditions did not change, be performed by a workforce of a similar size 
(compl. ,i 143). While the Navy had the information necessary to realize that the WSBOSC 
would require greater staffing than the previous base service contract, the evaluation process 
demonstrates that the Government shared the same mistaken belief about the scope of the 
requirement as Chugach (compl. ,i 144). The mutual mistake shared by the parties-namely 
that a work force of 311 could do the work of 421 as estimated by the Navy (adjusted for a 
blended rate of 1,882 productive hours per year)-led to the defective formation of a contract 
under which Chugach simply could not get the job done ( comp 1. ,i 152). As a result, in 
reliance on the Navy's resulting mistaken statements in negotiations, Chugach failed to 
appreciate that its staffing was at least a significant weakness and increased staffing 
accordingly ( comp 1. ,i 15 8). 
4 

Chugach' s claim asserts mutual mistake of factual issues such as a mistake that 
"the historical data provided in the Solicitation mapped to the current requirements" and 
the fact that the Navy changed the requirements from "service calls" to "trouble calls" 
and the parties' understanding of permissible cross-utilization and productive hours 
under the collective-bargaining agreement (R4, tab 238 at 29274-75, 29277-78). 
Chugach also asserts that, by requiring it to provide services requiring staffing 
levels over and above the staffing levels negotiated by the parties during contract 
formation, the Navy changed the contract (compl. ,-r 170). For example, even though the 
parties negotiated a contract under which Chugach would begin performing with a staff 
of 3 11 FTEs, by the end of the first year, the Navy had pushed it to expand its staff to 
458 personnel ( comp I. i1 171 ). Because of this change, Chugach asserts that it has 
incurred damages in the form of excess costs of performance ( comp I. i1 172). Chugach 
alleged in its claim that the Navy had "whether consciously or not, arbitrarily 
established enhanced performance requirements" (R4, tab 238 at 29235), and required 
Chugach to "perform trouble calls on certain pieces of equipment...within two days of 
receipt of the work order" which was not part of its proposal (id. at 29271). Moreover, 
Chugach's claim detailed discussions with the Navy regarding its performance 
problems, including an August 26, 2015 meeting where the contracting officer invited 
Chugach to "show that it was performing in accordance with its proposal and making a 
reasonable and efficient use of the resources and staffing proposed" and then would 
consider financing increased staffing levels (id. at 29261 ). Moreover, the claim 
discussed pressure from the Navy to increase its staffing, noting that Chugach's 
"customer service is great, but you don't have enough manpower" (id. at 29258), and 
further stating that "[t]he overall effort I feel was more than they were prepared for and 
staffing is on the increase as a result" (id. at 29260). 
Chugach also alleges that the Navy breached the implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing when it, among other things, misled Chugach during the negotiation process, 
withheld its superior knowledge, and required Chugach to perform additional work beyond 
what either of the parties intended to be covered by the contract (compl. ,1176). Finally, 
Chugach asserts that the Navy withheld amounts based on its conclusion that CFSI failed 
to perform according to the standards set forth in the contract ( comp I. ,1179). 
DECISION 
I. Standard of Review 
Chugach bears the burden of proving the Board's subject matter jurisdiction by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exchange Service, 
846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988); United Healthcare Partners, Inc., ASBCA 
No. 58123, 13 BCA ,-r 35,277 at 173,156. The Board possesses jurisdiction pursuant to 
the Contract Disputes Act (CDA) when a claim has "some relationship to the terms or 
5 

performance of a government contract." Todd Construction, L.P. v. United States, 656 
F .3d 1306, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ( quoting Applied Companies v. United States, 144 
F.3d 1470, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). In addition, the Board will grant a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim when the complaint fails to allege facts "·plausibly suggesting 
(not merely consistent with)' a showing of entitlement to relief." Cary v. United States, 
552 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 557 (2007)); American General Trading & Contracting, WLL, ASBCA No. 56758, 
12-1 BCA ,i 34,905 at 171,640. The allegation "must be enough to raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level." Cary, 552 F.3d at 1376. In addition, the "complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 570). 
II. Count I, Negligent Negotiations 
In count I, Chugach asserts that it was harmed by the Navy's negligent 
negotiations, specifically, the Navy's purported violation of FAR 15.306(d). According 
to Chugach, the Navy's source selection panel determined that Chugach's proposal had 
"significantly low" staffing in four annexes of the bid, but informed Chugach that its 
overall staffing was "within an acceptable range" which Chugach contends was a 
violation of the requirement in FAR 15.306(d) that the Navy indicate or discuss with 
each offeror "deficiencies" and "significant weaknesses." (Campi. ,i,i 97-121) 
According to the Navy, the Board lacks jurisdiction to entertain count I because it is in 
reality a pre-award bid protest (gov'tmot. at 17-21). The Navy characterizes Chugach's 
claim as a challenge to the Navy's evaluation of Chugach's bid during the procurement 
process, rather than a claim related to Chugach's performance of the contact (id.). It is 
beyond dispute that bid protest challenges by disappointed bidders, do not state claims 
within the CDA. See, e.g., Coastal Corp. v. United States, 713 F.2d 728, 730 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (holding that the implied contract to treat bids honestly and fairly is not a contract 
covered by the CDA). Thus, the Board would lack jurisdiction to entertain such a claim. 
See, e.g., Amaratek, ASBCA No. 60503, 16-1 BCA ,i 36,491 at 177,831-32. However, 
here, Chugach is not a disappointed bidder, but instead was awarded the contract. 
Chugach alleges that its claim "relates" to the contract, and thus, is a CDA claim 
within the jurisdiction of the Board (app. opp'n at 3-6). Chugach relies on the Federal 
Circuit's holding in LaBarge Products, Inc. v. West, 46 F.3d 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995). LaBarge 
concerned an Army procurement for aluminum pipe sections and couplings that involved 
bidding irregularities, including the Army's disclosure of information about LaBarge's initial 
bid and the Army's procurement discussions with LaBarge to another bidder prior to the 
submission of best and final offers. Id. at 1548-50. After performing the contract, LaBarge 
filed a claim seeking reformation of the contract by repricing the contract using its initial bid 
price. LaBarge asserted that reformation was necessary to compensate it for the Army's 
improper actions. LaBarge asserted a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and 
6 

violations during the bidding process of FAR 15 .610( d), prohibiting the use of auction 
techniques. Id. at 1550-52. 
The Federal Circuit held that LaBarge had stated a valid CDA claim "related" to 
the contract because it was a government contractor, rather than a disappointed bidder, 
and because it alleged a violation of FAR 15.610(d) during formation of the contract. 46 
F.3d at 1552. The court held that FAR 15.610(d) was "plainly for the benefit of the 
contractor" and that the violation of the FAR provision provided an independent basis 
for its reformation claim such that it was not solely asserting jurisdiction on an implied 
contract to treat bids honestly and fairly. Id. In its reply brief the Navy argues that 
LaBarge is limited to claims pertaining to contract reformation, and, thus, cannot 
support Chugach's claim for an adjustment in contract price (gov't reply at 1-4). 
In this appeal, Chugach is an actual government contractor asserting a claim 
relating to its contract. As noted above, the Federal Circuit has held that FAR 15 .610( d) 
existed for the benefit of the contractor. Based upon the Federal Circuit's determination, 
the same should be true for FAR 15 .306( d), "Exchanges with offerors after establishment 
of the competitive range" requiring the contracting officer to discuss with each offeror 
"deficiencies, significant weaknesses, and adverse past performance information to which 
the offeror has not yet had an opportunity to respond." Moreover, we do not see a 
jurisdictional distinction between the request for contract reformation in LaBarge and 
Chugach's request for an adjustment to the contract price. In LaBarge the contractor was 
able to point to its initial bid as the "original intent" of the parties, while here Chugach 
merely alleges in its complaint that it would have increased its proposed staffing had it 
known of the Navy's concerns. However, the difference between LaBarge 's reformation 
claim and Chugach's claim for an adjustment to the contract amount goes to the proof of 
the "original intent" factual scenario and not jurisdiction. Additionally, we note that 
Chugach's claim, but not its complaint, seeks "an adjustment in the contract price or 
reformation of the contract" (R4, tab 238 at 29265) (emphasis added). Here, in deciding a 
motion to dismiss, Chugach' s jurisdictional allegations are sufficient to prevent the entry 
of summary judgement. Moreover, Chugach' s negligent negotiations claim is actually, for 
all intents and purposes, really just an element of its superior knowledge claims that is not 
subject to the Navy's motion to dismiss. 
The Navy additionally contends that a failure to dismiss count I of Chugach's 
complaint would be problematic because every future contractor losing money on the 
performance of a CDA contract will seek discovery of source selection documents in 
search of procedural violations that the contractor will allege to be the source of its 
losses (gov't reply at 3-4). That is not the case with this appeal. Moreover, we are 
applying nearly 25 year-old binding precedent to Chugach's appeal, and are not making 
new law. The flood of claims predicted by the Navy did not materialize after the 
LaBarge decision was issued, so we see no reason why it would follow our decision in 
this appeal. 
7 

III. Count III, Mutual Mistake 
In its complaint, Chugach states that it and the Navy were mutually mistaken that 
"the scope of the requirement for the new WSBOSC notwithstanding significant 
changes to the terms and conditions, was commensurate with the previous contract and 
could therefore, if the conditions did not change, be performed by a workforce of similar 
size" (compl. ,i 143). Based upon this sentence, the Navy asserts that Chugach is 
alleging mutual mistake regarding a prediction or judgment regarding future events, and 
thus, that Chugach cannot be asserting a claim for mutual mistake (gov't mot. at 21-25). 
In opposition, Chugach asserts that its mutual mistake claim does not depend on 
predictions of future events, but is based on facts and circumstances in existence at the 
time of contract formation (app. opp'n at 6-8). Chugach cites, not to its complaint, but 
to its claim for examples of mutual mistake of factual issues such as a mistake that "the 
historical data provided in the Solicitation mapped to the current requirements'' and the 
fact that the Navy changed the requirements from "service calls" to "trouble calls" and 
the parties' understanding of "permissible cross-utilization and productive hours under 
the collective-bargaining agreement" (id. at 7-8 ( citing R4, tab 238 at 29274-75, 29277-
78)). Chugach additionally asserts that the Navy's motion applies the wrong standard of 
review by citing to cases decided on the merits rather than appeals decided using the 
appropriate plausible claim for relief standard. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Under the 
appropriate standard of review, assuming all facts in favor of Chugach, we find that 
Chugach has properly asserted that there were mutual mistakes regarding an existing 
fact sufficient to support a claim upon which relief could be granted. 3 
IV. Count IV, Constructive Change 
The Navy asserts that the Board is without jurisdiction to entertain Chugach's 
claim for constructive change because this claim was not presented first to the 
contracting officer for a final decision (gov't mot. at 25-29). Chugach opposes the 
Navy's motion asserting that its constructive change count is a new legal theory based 
upon the same operative facts asserted in its claim, and thus it is the same claim for 
jurisdictional purposes (app. opp'n at 8-12). 
3 To the extent Chugach's complaint is ambiguous, any ambiguity in the words of the 
complaint can be resolved in favor of the interpretation that Chugach is alleging 
mistakes involving existing facts. Moreover, to the extent Chugach cites to its 
claim, the document that provides the Board with its jurisdiction, rather than its 
complaint, a dismissal here would serve no purpose as Chugach could simply 
move to amend its complaint, a request that would be readily granted under the 
Board's practice. 
8 

Pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act, a contractor may, "within 90 days from 
the date of receipt of a contracting officer's decision" under 41 U.S.C. § 7103 "appeal 
the decision to an agency board as provided in" section 7105. 41 U.S.C. § 7104(a). Our 
reviewing court, the Federal Circuit, has held that CDA jurisdiction requires both a valid 
claim and a contracting officer's final decision on that claim. M Maropakis Carpentry, 
Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing James M Ellett 
Constr. Co. v. United States, 93 F.3d 1537, 1541-42 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The CDA does 
not define the term "claim" so we look to the FAR to implement the CDA. See 
Maropakis, 609 F.3d at 1327 (citing Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 1575 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) ( en bane)). Pursuant to the FAR, a claim must be "(I) a written demand or 
assertion, (2) seeking as a matter of right, (3) the payment of money in a sum certain." 
Ellett Cons tr., 93 F .3d at 1542 ( citing 48 C.F .R. § 33.201 (1995); and Reflectone, 60 
F .3d at 1576). 
The Board has recognized that "[t]he test for what constitutes a 'new' claim is 
whether 'claims are based on a common or related set of operative facts." 4 
Unconventional Concepts, Inc., ASBCA No. 56065 et al., 10-1 BCA, 34,340 at 
169,591 (quoting Placeway Construction Corp. v. United States, 920 F.2d 903, 907 
(Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
Here, Chugach alleged in its claim that the Navy had "whether consciously or 
not, arbitrarily established enhanced performance requirements" (R4, tab 238 at 29235), 
and required Chugach to "perform trouble calls on certain pieces of equipment...within 
two days of receipt of the work order" which was not part of its proposal" (id. at 29271). 
Moreover, Chugach's claim detailed discussions with the Navy regarding its 
performance problems, including an August 25, 2015 meeting where the contracting 
officer invited Chugach to "show that it was performing in accordance with its proposal 
and making a reasonable and efficient use of the resources and staffing proposed" and 
then would consider financing increased staffing levels (id. at 29261 ). Chugach' s claim 
also discussed pressure from the Navy to increase its staffing, noting that Chugach' s 
"customer service is great, but you don't have enough manpower" (id. at 29258), and 
further stating that "[t]he overall effort I feel was more than they were prepared for and 
staffing is on the increase as a result" (id. at 29260). These allegations are sufficient to 
support the Board's jurisdiction regarding Chugach's constructive change claim. To the 
extent the Navy argues that these facts were not "operative facts" in the context of the 
claim (gov't reply at 7), we find that the facts were relevant to Chugach's mutual 
mistake claim where Chugach alleges that the Navy intentionally or unintentionally 
created enhanced performance requirements (R4, tab 238 at 29235). A constructive 
change occurs when "a contractor performs work beyond the contract requirements 
without a formal order, either by an informal order or due to the fault of the 
4 Another requirement not material here, is that the claim seeks "essentially the same 
relief." Scott Timber Co. v. United States, 333 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
9 
I 

Government." Agility Public Warehousing Co. KSCP v. Mattis, 852 F.3d 1370, 1385 
(Fed. Cir.2017) (quoting Int 'l Data Prods. Corp. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1317, 1325 
(Fed. Cir. 2007)). Under the motion to dismiss standard of review, we find that 
Chugach has alleged that the government, either intentionally or unintentionally, 
required Chugach to comply with enhanced performance requirements that constitute a 
constructive change. 
V. Counts V (Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) and VI 
(Improper Withholding of Payment) 
The Navy seeks dismissal of counts V (breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing) 
and VI (improper withholding of payment) to the extent these counts are premised upon 
counts I (negligent negotiations), III (mutual mistake), or IV (constructive change) (gov't 
mot. at 30). As we have denied the Navy's motion to dismiss with regard to counts I, III, 
and IV, we find no basis for dismissing counts V and VI. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, we deny the government's motion to dismiss. 
Dated: May 16, 2019 
I concur 
Administrative Judge 
Acting Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
10 
DA YID D' ALESSANDRIS 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
I concur 
J. REID PROUTY 
Administrative Judge 
Vice Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 

I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the 
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA No. 61320, Appeal of Chugach 
Fe4eral Solutions, Inc., rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. 
Dated: 
11 
PAULLA K. GATES-LEWIS 
Recorder, Armed Services 
Board of Contract Appeals