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ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 
 
Appeals of - )  
 )  
Sungjee Construction Co., Ltd. ) ASBCA Nos. 62002, 62170 
 )  
Under Contract No. W91QVN-14-D-0050 )  
   
APPEARANCE FOR THE APPELLANT: Yong Eui Song, Esq. 
    Central IP & Law 
    Seoul, Korea 
 
APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: Scott N. Flesch, Esq. 
  Army Chief Trial Attorney 
CPT Dmitrius Ramon McGruder, JA 
1LT Bryan R. Williamson, JA 
  
 
    Trial Attorneys 
 
OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE EYESTER  
PURSUANT TO BOARD RULE 11 
 
This appeal arises from a termination for default by the Department of the 
Army (Army or government), 411th Contracting Support Brigade (411 CSB), of a task 
order issued to Sungjee Construction Company, LTD (Sungjee or appellant) for the 
repair of an officer dormitory on Osan Air Base located in the Republic of Korea.  The 
Army terminated the task order for default due to appellant’s failure to complete the 
project by the contract completion date (CCD).  The Board has jurisdiction over the 
termination pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. § 7101.  The parties 
elected to submit the appeal on the record pursuant to Board Rule 11.  Because the 
government has established the validity of the default termination, and appellant has 
failed to demonstrate the default was excusable and entitlement to its claimed 
amounts, the appeals are denied. 
 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
 
1.  On August 14, 2014, the 411 CSB awarded Sungjee indefinite-delivery, 
indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) Contract No. W91QVN-14-D-0050 to upgrade facilities for 
the United States Forces Korea (USFK) (R4, tab 1 at 1-3, 11).  According to the 
contract, the contracting officer was “the only person authorized to modify the contract 
terms or take any action to enter into a change or contractual commitment on behalf of 
the Government” (id. at 12).  In addition, as relevant here, the contract incorporated by 
reference Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.249-10, DEFAULT (FIXED-PRICE 
CONSTRUCTION)(APR 1984), and FAR 52.242-14, SUSPENSION OF WORK 

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(APR 1984), and incorporated by full text Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS) 252.201-7000, CONTRACTING OFFICER’S 
REPRESENTATIVE (DEC 1991) (id. at 23, 43).  DFARS 252.201-7000, stated that the 
contracting officer’s representative (COR) was “not authorized” to make any 
commitments or changes affecting price, quality, quantity, delivery, or any other 
contract term or condition (id at 23).  All orders issued pursuant to this IDIQ contract 
were subject to its terms and conditions (id. at 44). 
 
2.  Because work was to be performed in Korea, the contract also included 
Navy Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement 5152.204-4018, 
IDENTIFICATION OF CONTRACTOR’S EMPLOYEES.  According to this clause, 
contractors requiring entry to a U.S. Government installation had to be processed 
through the contracting officer or representative and approved for entry pursuant to 
USFK Regulation 190-7, which outlines the process for issuance of passes for base 
access.  (R4, tab 1 at 32)  USFK Regulation 190-7 (dated Sept. 27, 2017) stated that 
the sponsoring organization representative, which here was from the requesting or 
using activity, signs the pass applications, while the COR coordinates pass requests 
and validates the status of the contract prior to the approving official’s consideration 
(R4, tab 36 at 24).  Passes were valid for a maximum of one year (id. at 59).  With 
respect to renewals of contractor passes, the requesting activity was to submit a 
memorandum for the renewal month with a list of names, the dates of the contract, and 
the contract with the extended contract period (id. at 31).  The approving authority 
reviews this information, including the COR’s memorandum, when making his/her 
decision.  Renewal requests were to be submitted at least 30 days prior to the current 
pass expiration date (id. at 31). 
 
3.  On June 30, 2016, the 411 CSB issued fixed-priced Task Order 
No. W91QVN-14-D-0050, call order No. 0026, to Sungjee in the amount of 
$3,860,659.26 U.S. dollars for the repair of Officer Dormitory B929 at Osan Air Base 
(R4, tab 2 at 1-2).  The task order, awarded against the above-referenced IDIQ 
contract, explained that Sungjee was to comply with all the terms and conditions of the 
contract unless stated otherwise (R4, tab 2 at 4).  In addition, the task order set forth 
the repair work requirements, which included architectural, civil, mechanical, and 
electrical work (id. at 4-9).  Sungjee was to prosecute diligently and complete the 
repair work on the dormitory no later than 450 calendar days after the government 
issued the notice to proceed (id. at 13).  The government issued the notice to proceed 
on July 20, 2016, but later executed Modification No. 01 to the order stating the CCD 
was October 31, 2017 (R4, tabs 3 and 5).
1 
 
 
1 While the final completion date--450 days from the notice to proceed--was mid 
October 2017 (see gov’t br. at 3), the modification stated the CCD was 
October 31, 2017. 

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4.  As relevant here, the task order included the following instructions regarding 
access to the base:   
 
2.  Access and general protection/security policy and 
procedures.  This standard language is for contractor 
employees with an area of performance within Army 
controlled installation, facility, or area. 
 
Contractor and all associated sub‐contractors[’] employees 
shall provide all information required for background 
checks to meet installation access requirements to be 
accomplished by installation Provost Marshal Office, 
Director of Emergency Services or Security Office. . . .  
 
(R4, tab 2 at 15) (emphasis added)  While pass requests needed to be reviewed and 
approved by government officials, we find the onus of providing employee 
information and starting the pass request process was on the contractor. 
 
5.  On August 12, 2016, Sungjee submitted its preliminary and initial project 
schedule (R4, tab 10).  The government-approved schedule showed phase 1 removal 
work would begin around September 4, 2016, and the final inspection would occur 
prior to the CCD on October 10, 2017 (id. at 1, 10, 24). 
 
6.  On August 29, 2016, Sungjee emailed the government with a status report, 
including the status of base access passes (R4, tab 13 at 1, 3).  According to the email, 
Sungjee submitted its first request for passes for the architectural team, and its requests 
for the civil, mechanical, and electrical teams were “[o]n processing” (id. at 3).  
Sungjee stated it would submit the rest of the pass requests by September 23, 2016 
(id.).  The record shows, therefore, that Sungjee was delinquent in requesting passes 
on time at the start of the project as work started in early September, and Sungjee did 
not request passes for most of its employees until late September. 
 
First Request for an Extension 
 
7.  Two months before the CCD, in a letter dated August 31, 2017, Sungjee’s 
contract manager requested a 90-day extension.  According to Sungjee, it experienced 
issues relating to the cold weather, and it performed additional work for the user’s 
convenience and potential problems in the future.  Sungjee specifically stated it 
requested no additional money, just the additional time.  (R4, tab 32 at 1-3)  The 
government project engineer believed there should only be a 70-day extension because 
two of the additional items performed were required by the drawings and therefore 
were to be repaired/replaced by Sungjee (R4, tab 33 at 4-5).  Further, the base housing 

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office expressed concerned that there was no warehouse to store the furniture and 
appliances being delivered to the buildings at the end of the original CCD (id. at 3). 
 
8.  On September 21, 2017, the government issued no-cost unilateral 
Modification No. 02 to the task order.  The modification extended the CCD to 
December 23, 2017, “due to several design changes for the user’s convenience and 
adverse weather conditions.”  The modification further stated:  “In return for the CCD 
extension, the contractor agrees to release the Government from any claims related to 
this time extension.  All other terms and conditions remain unchanged.”  (R4, tab 35 
at 1) 
 
Additional Requests for Extensions 
 
9.  On December 15, 2017, Sungjee requested a 39-day extension stating it 
experienced issues relating to the cold weather and it performed additional work for 
the user’s convenience and potential problems in the future (R4, tab 39 at 1-3).  Again, 
Sungjee requested no additional money, just the additional time (id. at 1). 
 
10.  The Chief of Project Management recommended the contracting officer 
issue a no-cost modification extending the CCD and also believed Sungjee should be 
held liable for the cost of providing quarters for up to 30 personnel who would need to 
be relocated due to the delay in the completion of the dormitory, as well as the cost of 
any damages to the appliances and furniture that would need to be stored and delivered 
at a later time.  (R4, tab 40 at 2)  At this point in mid-December 2017, a contractor 
progress schedule showed the final inspection for the building to be completed by 
February 9, 2018 (R4, tab 41 at 2).  The request for an extension was denied (R4, 
tab 54 at 1). 
 
11.  On December 28, 2017, the government issued a Contractor 
Performance Assessment Report (CPAR) for Sungjee on the task order (R4, 
tab 42).  According to the CPAR, Sungjee was behind schedule and failing to 
manage its manpower, and the government was processing a time extension with a 
CCD of January 31, 2018 (id. at 1-2).  Further, the CPAR showed an 
unsatisfactory rating for schedule and management and the government stated it 
would not recommend the contractor for a similar requirement in the future ; 
Sungjee concurred with the CPAR (id. at 2). 
 
12.  In an email dated December 21, 2017, the contract specialist informed 
Sungjee the government would provide an extension after receiving and approving 
a progress schedule (R4, tab 43 at 9-10).  The contract specialist further stated that 
Sungjee was liable for retrieval, delivery, and installation of furniture and 
appliances by January 5, 2018.  Sungjee would also be responsible for all expenses 
incurred for furniture and appliance storage and any damages if the building was 

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not ready at that time.  Further, the contract specialist stated that Sungjee would be 
responsible for the cost of providing quarters to accommodate 30 individuals for 
each day until construction completion.  Sungjee was to provide a signed 
document confirming this obligation.  (Id. at 9) 
 
13.  On December 28, 2017, after the amended CCD of December 23, 2017 
passed, Sungjee emailed the contract specialist and stated, in relevant part:    
 
[Sungjee] Site staff[] and head office staff[] are all 
admitting most of the cause on [the] delay[] for [the] CCD 
of T.O#0026 is contractor’s fault and The Government 
[has] been helping [the] contractor to complete project 
successfully. 
 
However, we are afraid that we have to ask The 
Government a few more days of t ime extension without 
any consideration since currently, our company (Sungjee 
Const.) is having serious financial problem[s]. 
 
Sungjee [has] ordered and paid all of off-shore materials 
for this contract and paid more money to sub-contractor 
compare[d] to what they have [] complete[d] in their 
activities. 
 
And, [s]ince we have gotten the E-mail from the 
Government regarding consideration, we promised sub-
contractor [] more money if they could complete their 
activities before 17th of Jan.2018. 
 
Considering we could complete all of our activities on 
[the] 19th, the  consideration would be almost $70,000 
what we could not afford in our current financial status. 
* * * * *  
 
Despite [] contractor’s faults, [w]e are asking you to give us 
more days time extension without consideration based on 
[the] attached schedule. 
 
(R4, tab 43 at 6-8).  In response, the government asked Sungjee for a plan of action 
for the furniture and appliances if the building was not ready by January 5 (id. at 5-6).  
Sungjee stated it could not install the appliances on January 5 and would therefore 
find storage (id. at 4-5).  Sungjee further stated:  “Sorry for the [] trouble caused by 
our fault.  If possible we could take all of the consideration we mentioned and we 

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really want for that” (id. at 5).  We find that Sungjee agreed to store and install the 
furniture and appliances as consideration for an extension of time.  We also find that 
starting December 2017, Sungjee admitted it was having financial problems and these 
problems impacted the project. 
 
14.  Sungjee continued performing.  According to COR daily inspection 
records in early January 2018, Sungjee’s workforce consisted of several workers 
who were performing tasks such as installing gypsum board, painting walls , and 
installing light fixtures (R4, tabs 45-47, 49).  For example, the COR’s daily report 
for January 10, 2018, stated that 22 employees were on the site (R4, tab 46 at 1).  
At that time, Sungjee’s revised progress schedule showed a CCD of February 14, 
2018 (R4, tab 48 at 1). 
 
15.  In an internal government email, the noncommissioned officer in 
charge (NCOIC) of base construction provided a summary of performance to the 
contracting officer.  The NCOIC explained that only eight days before the 
December CCD, at the NCOIC’s request, Sungjee submitted another request for an 
extension, and it was unclear why they failed to submit a request earlier.  This request 
was rejected because the alleged extra work performed was already part of the prior 
justification, and any alleged delay caused by cold weather was due to a lack of 
planning.  Regardless, the Civil Engineer Squadron (CES) requested a 39-day time 
extension and CCD of January 31.  At that point, however, the request by the CES had 
not been resolved.  
(R4, tab 50 at 2-4) 
 
16.  On January 29, 2018, Sungjee’s contract manager informed the COR 
that it would deliver and install the appliances on February 5, 2018.  Sungjee also 
stated it “would be responsible for [the] storing fee” if the delivery and installation 
were impossible and Sungjee’s fault.  Sungjee also requested review and 
cooperation with its extension request.  (R4, tab 51)  We find that Sungjee failed 
to meet the CCD, as extended, and therefore the appliances  could not be installed. 
 
The First Show Cause Notice 
 
17.  On February 1, 2018, the government issued Sungjee a show cause 
notice stating it may terminate the order for default because the government had 
provided an extension, and on January 11, 2018, Sungjee requested another 
extension until February 14, 2018, which was denied because the COR believed 
the project would not be completed until the middle of  March (R4, tab 54 at 1-2).  
Sungjee acknowledged the show cause letter the next day ( id. at 2). 
 
18.  Sungjee continued to perform work.  On February 6, 2018, the COR 
issued a report stating the contractor had 15 employees on the contract , which was 
not enough manpower (R4, tab 52 at 1-2).  According to the report, the COR 

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requested more manpower from Sungjee and believed Sungjee was behind 
schedule by about three months (id. at 1). 
 
19.  On February 12, 2018, Sungjee’s contract manager responded to the 
government’s show cause letter and stated that it was sorry it did not meet the 
CCD and that it did “not have any excuses on this” and that it “fully understand[s] 
The Government’s side and admit[s] that the delay for the construction is all of 
[the] contractor’s fault” and that the contractor was confused about the Army’s 
“management system” (R4, tab 55 at 1).  Sungjee asked to complete the project  
and included a revised schedule showing a completion date of April 9, 2018 (id. 
at 1, tab 65 at 3).  In addition, Sungjee stated it would “happily perform” 
additional activities as “the penalty of delay,” which included instal ling new 
doorknobs, replacing gypsum wall board, and “[s]toring and install[ing] furniture 
and appliances” (R4, tab 55 at 1-2).  Here, we find credible Sungjee’s admission 
by its contract manager that it caused the delay through this period, that it had no 
excuses, and that in return for an extension of time , it would perform additional 
work, including storing and installing furniture and appliances.  And Sungjee told 
the government it could complete the project in less than two months  (see R4, 
tab 65 at 3). 
 
20.  On February 19, 2018, the contract specialist requested Sungjee 
perform additional consideration work such as bike rack cleaning and repairs, 
installation of a new trash shelter, epoxy coating in outside stairwells, sidewalk 
repairs, and construction repairs (app. supp. R4, tab 19 at 1).  Sungjee mostly 
agreed to this work, with some caveats (app. supp. R4, tab 20 at 1). 
 
21.  Work continued in late February.  According to Sungjee’s contractor 
reports, its manpower included the project manager, quality control manager, 
safety engineer, electricians, carpenters, painters, duct workers, tile workers, and 
laborers (R4, tabs 56, 58-59, 61-62).  On February 20, 2018, the contractor’s 
report stated that 22 workers were on site that day, although, on February 25, a 
contractor report stated that no construction activities were performed  (R4, tabs 56 
at 2, 60 at 1).  In comparison, the COR’s report for February 2018, stated that 
Sungjee would not finish per the extension request, and the workers were smoking in 
the dormitory, leaving the dormitory unsecured, and leaving lights on and windows 
open after work hours (R4, tab 63 at 1-2).  The COR did not believe there was 
sufficient manpower to complete the project (id. at 2).
 
 
22.  Work on the project dwindled in early March.  On March 8, 2018, 
Sungjee submitted an application for base access, with escort privileges, for the 
quality control manager (app. supp. R4, tab 21).  The next week, on March 13, 2018, 
the Chief of Project Management emailed the contracting officer  and stated that 
Sungjee failed to adhere to the critical path after the show cause/cure notice was 

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issued in February and that only four workers were on site for a project that need ed 
12-15 to be completed by April 9, 2018.  Further, there was concern that the quality 
control manager and project manager were rarely on-site.  (R4, tab 64 at 1) 
 
The First Suspension of Work Order 
 
23.  On March 14, 2018, the contracting officer issued a suspension of work 
order explaining that Sungjee “shall cease all services and the ordering of supplies 
in support” of the task order (R4, tab 65 at 3-4).  According to the order, Sungjee 
provided no excuse for the delay in response to the show cause letter, and 
“continue[d] to exhibit the same lack of overall manpower and absenteeism related to 
the Project Foreman and Quality Assurance Manager as noted in the show cause 
notice,” and was at least one week behind its proposed, revised schedule (R4, tab 66 
at 1).  In a response the same day, Sungjee stated it disagreed with the suspension 
order; could finish the work by March 30, 2018; that the only work left was 
installation of wood trim, toilets, first-floor carpet, and vinyl composite tile (VCT), 
and rubber tiles; and that Sungjee had requested a time extension in exchange for 
performance of additional work, but the government never  responded.  At this time, 
Sungjee claimed it could complete the project in less than three weeks.   (R4, tab 65 
at 3)  And again, Sungjee agreed to perform additional work for a time extension 
and wanted a response from the government on its offer (id.). 
 
The Suspension of Work Order Was Lifted Two Days Later 
 
24.  On March 16, 2018, the contracting officer lifted the order and stated 
that, as agreed, the project must be completed by April 9, 2018, and that Sungjee 
must perform $100,000 of additional work as consideration (not inclusive of work 
already agreed upon).  The contracting officer also stated that it needed the cell 
phone numbers of the project manager and quality assurance individual, there 
would be no smoking in the buildings, lights would be turned off at the end of the 
day, and Sungjee was to provide daily reports to the COR.  (R4, tab 65 at 2) 
 
25.  In an email dated March 18, 2018, Sungjee agreed to all the contracting 
officer’s conditions (R4, tab 68 at 4-5).  Sungjee also stated it understood the 
government would issue a modification for a new CCD and lift the suspension of 
work order once the government and Sungjee agreed to the additional 
consideration work (id. at 5).  Sungjee further stated that it “[u]nderstood and 
agreed completely” with the consideration of $100,000 additional work (id.; app. 
supp. R4, tab 28 at 1-2). 
 
26.  The next day, the contracting officer emailed Sungjee and clarified that 
a new schedule was required showing a completion date around April 9, 2018, and 
the additional work as consideration for the extension would be minor projects or 

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performed outside of the building so that the building could be occupied by the 
April date.  The contracting officer also stated that the additional work would be 
separately negotiated and that was why the government already lifted the 
suspension of work order.  (R4, tab 68 at 3-4)  Sungjee ultimately informed the 
contracting officer that while it thought it could finish by March 30, its 
subcontractor checked the schedule for realism and now the pre -final inspection 
would not occur until April 19, 2018; although the suspension of work lasted only 
two days, the subcontractor’s employees left for another job; and it “was all 
[Sungjee’s] fault since we did not check the last schedule properly” (id. at 1-2).  At 
this point, Sungjee needed another extension but was claiming the project could be 
completed in four weeks. 
 
Request for Base Passes 
 
27.  According to an email dated March 21, 2018, Sungjee informed the 
COR that its base passes had expired, and Sungjee hired a Korean national to 
escort individuals onto the base.  The COR requested a copy of Sungjee’s base 
passes and asked who was escorting the individuals and why Sungjee did not 
renew any base passes until now.  (App. supp. R4, tab 33 at 1)  In response, 
Sungjee stated:   
 
Currently there is no one who has base [p]ass since the 
original contract . . . expire[d] on Oct of last year. 
 
Our workers who had [] the pass from this contract ha[ve] 
turned in [their] pass to the pass department, I think. 
 
Since the delay on CCD is all our fault, we did not ask 
[for] the renew of [the] base pass. 
 
So, we hired [a Korean national] who has [an] escort pass . . . . 
 
We have not been saying or requesting anything for the 
renewal of pass[es] since the dealy [sic] on CCD is all our 
fault. 
 
We have been thinking we deserve for [] extra money for 
the escorting. 
 
Despite [] the fact, [currently], we have serious financial 
problem.  We [paid] to our subcontractor more money than 
[] received from the Government and paid off the Off-shore 
material, the personnel who ha[ve] been hired by us is so 

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busy these days that they could only show up around 
0800AM. 
 
At that time the Doduri gate is packed with construction 
people.  To get escort, we have to wait around one or two 
hours.
 
 
(App. supp. R4, tab 33 at 2)(emphasis added).  It appears Sungjee then submitted 
applications for passes for several individuals, including the project manager, in late 
March 2018 (id.; app. supp. R4, tabs 34, 42 at 8).  On April 5, 2018, the COR 
informed Sungjee the passes were rejected due to insufficient information, i.e., 
missing employment letters and two copies of identification cards for each individual 
(app. supp. R4, tab 35).  We find that Sungjee failed to request base passes for almost 
all of its employees from at least October 2017 through March 2018 because it 
believed the delay was its fault, and somehow that meant it could not request passes, 
and that Sungjee did not hold the government responsible for its failure to obtain base 
passes.  Further, while Sungjee submitted pass requests in late March 2018, the 
applications were defective, and any delay in obtaining passes was Sungjee’s fault. 
 
28.  A COR daily inspection report dated March 22, 2018, state d the 
contractor’s workforce consisted of eight individuals; however, three of those 
individuals were managers (R4, tab 69 at 1).  A contractor daily report for March 31, 
2018, stated that nine employees were present, and that 93.3 percent of the total job 
was complete; of the nine employees, two were managers and one was a safety 
engineer (R4, tab 71 at 1-2).  Meanwhile, a COR monthly report for March 2018 
stated that Sungjee’s work was unsatisfactory, the contractor was failing to 
maintain manpower, the project was behind, workers were smoking in the 
dormitory and leaving it unsecured after work hours as well as leaving lights on 
and windows open (R4, tab 70). 
 
And the Government Provides Another Extension 
 
29.  In the meantime, the government evaluated the additional work that 
Sungjee could perform as consideration for the extensions granted (R4, tab 72).  It 
is unclear why the government believed Sungjee could perform this additional 
work when Sungjee could not even complete the repair work required by the task 
order.  Nonetheless, on April 9, 2018, the Army requested Sungjee provide a 
timeline in which to complete the following additional work:  converting  two 
existing storage rooms to laundry rooms; removing the existing bicycle rack and 
installing a new one; removing the existing gazebo and installing a new one; 
replacing damaged steel plate covers; and working on a concrete sidewalk ( R4, 
tab 73 at 2-3).  On April 12, 2018, Sungjee agreed to complete the additional 
work, with a few caveats, as consideration for a revised CCD (id. at 2). 

11 
30.  Despite all the promises by Sungjee about the final completion of the 
project, a COR monthly report for the period ending April 2018 state d:  
“Manpower is still low despite base pass renewal.  Another extension for June 2018” 
(R4, tab 75 at 1). 
 
31.  Sungjee’s schedule supported the COR’s conclusions.  Sungjee’s 
schedule, dated April 24, 2018, showed a pre-final inspection date of May 28, 
2018, with the following work to be completed:  landscaping, asphalt, quarry tile 
at the stairs and washing rooms, installation of door  and toilet accessories, 
installation of wood trim, placing of VCT, painting, installation of plumbing and 
lighting fixtures, communication systems work, and fire alarm work including 
testing (app. supp. R4, tab 40 at 12).  Ironically, back on March 14, Sungjee told 
the government that the only work left was the installation of wood trim, toilets, 
first-floor carpet and VCT, and rubber tiles, and it could complete the project in 
less than three weeks.  Now, a month and a half later , Sungjee still needed to 
complete at least some of the same work but now needed another four weeks.  We 
find questionable Sungjee’s schedules as well as its contractor reports claiming the 
percentage of work completed.  Meanwhile, Sungjee’s schedule also showed 
June 26, 2018, as the completion date for the consideration work ( id. at 15). 
 
32.  On April 24, 2018, the contracting officer emailed the following to 
Sungjee:  “As discussed, I have approved an extension for handover for occupancy 
of the building NLT 15 June 2018 with completion of consideration work 31 July 
2018[.]”  The contracting officer also stated that consideration would be up to 
$150,000 in additional repair work at the government’s sole discretion, any “further 
delays will face additional consideration amounts or possible Termination for 
Default,” and Sungjee was to notify the office of any delay immediately.  (R4, tab 74 
at 1)  Although the contracting officer did not issue a formal modification to the 
contract, he informed Sungjee in writing that the CCD was extended (id.). 
 
33.  On May 2, 2018, Sungjee informed the COR that it had not yet 
received the passes for the workers and staff, and the pass department stated they 
would be ready by May 14.  Sungjee was worried that due to the lack of escort 
privileges, the manpower on the site was insufficient.  (App. supp. R4, tab 42 at 1)  
Only two days later, the COR informed Sungjee that six passes were ready for 
pick up (id. at 6).  At this time, the contracting officer had modified the  CCD 
through June/July 2018 via email, and passes were approved even though no other 
signed modification was issued on the order. 
 
34.  Meanwhile, according to Sungjee’s own Contractor’s Quality Control 
Report, dated May 19, 2018, it had completed 96.5 percent of the project (R4, 
tab 76 at 1).  This would mean it had to complete only 3.5 percent of the work by 
the occupancy CCD of June 15, 2018.  And yet, Sungjee failed to do so.  

12 
35.  On May 22, 2018, the COR emailed Sungjee and stated the project 
would not finish on time with only two workers a day and that the government  
“revalidated your base passes and other workers could be transferred from the 
PAX Terminal project during construction down time.  If manpower continues to 
be like this, I foresee another slip in the schedule.”  At this time, the CCD was still 
June 15, 2018.  (App. supp. R4, tab 45 at 1)  Despite receiving the requested base 
passes, Sungjee had only a few workers on the project.  
 
36.  On June 5, 2018, the government issued a contract deficiency report 
(CDR) to Sungjee stating, in part, that Sungjee installed doors that were not fire 
rated in accordance with the specifications.  There were also issues with the 
quality control manager.  (R4, tab 81 at 1) 
 
37.  Sungjee requested passes on June 8, 2018, for the project manager, 
quality control manager, structure foreman, and civil team foreman (R4, tab 85 
at 1).  Both the project manager and quality control manager sought escort 
privileges for three individuals each through September 30, 2018 (R4, tab 85 
at 2-3, 6-7).  The application noted that performance on the order ended June 30, 
2018 (id. at 4, 8, 12, 16).  The individuals had passes through June 30, 2018 (id. 
at 5, 9, 13, 17). 
 
38.  According to a COR report for June 2018, the government issued 
CDRs, there was “no manpower,” and another contract extension was needed (R4, 
tab 90).  On June 14, 2018, Sungjee submitted a corrective action plan in response 
to the government-issued CDRs (R4, tab 87).  Sungjee concurred with the CDRs, 
including that the doors were not fire-rated because it “failed to check the materials 
before installation,” however, Sungjee would contact the manufacturer to try and 
resolve the issue.  (Id. at 2-3). 
 
39.  On June 25, 2018, ten days after the occupancy CCD expired and five 
days before some of the base passes were to expire, Sungjee emailed the COR  a 
new schedule and stated it needed the passes for its workers since it could not 
afford to pay additional money to just come into the camp anymore (app. supp. 
R4, tab 49 at 1).  The revised schedule showed a completion date of September 15, 
2018 (id., app. supp. R4, tab 48 at 2).  In response, the COR stated that the 
submitted passes “were invalid due to contract completion dates and numbers.  We 
need new base forms submitted with the new projected contract completion date” 
as well as official letters for each employee stating Sungjee hired them for the 
project (app. supp. R4, tab 49 at 1).  And the next day, the government emailed 
Sungjee an attachment and stated that all new base pass applications need ed to be 
submitted on the correct form (id., tab 50 at 1).  Further, the COR expressed 
concern with missing items on the schedule.  The COR wanted a detailed schedule 

13 
so the government could get “an honest timeline of when the project will finish.”  
(Id., app. supp. R4, tab 49 at 2) 
 
40.  A revised contractor schedule dated June 29, 2018, showed a start date 
of July 1, a new CCD of September 29, 2019, for the project, and completion of 
the consideration work in mid-September (app. supp. R4, tab 56 at 2, 6).  In other 
words, Sungjee claimed it would take three months to complete the work.  This 
schedule included the following work elements:  landscaping; quarry tile at the 
stairs and washing rooms; installation of toilet and door accessories; removal work 
of installed tile and reinstallation in the kitchen; removal and fill work on a 
window frame; installation of wood trim; removal of wet carpet and VCT; 
replacement of mirror glass; placing VCT and baseboard; removal work of applied 
paint on the handrail and fixing steps; installation of rubber tiles on the stairs; tile 
work in the bathroom; painting; installation of plumbing and lighting fixtures; 
communication system work; removal work on installed switches for fan system; 
installation of conduit pipes; wiring work; installation of receptacle cover; fire 
alarm work and testing (id. at 2-3). 
 
41.  On July 3, 2018, the COR requested a new progress schedule and again 
stated that it still needed base pass renewal applications on the newest form sent 
(app. supp. R4, tab 57 at 1).  On that same day, Sungjee submitted a sample pass 
to the COR for review, stating that “
[i]f the file is OK, we would submit by next 
[T]uesday.”  In response, on July 11, 2018, the COR informed Sun gjee that it 
needed to change the date to “Oct 2018.”  (App. supp. R4, tab 50 at 3)  Again, no 
formal modification was required for base passes to be issued.  Further, the 
government had to remind Sungjee to submit the applications on the new form 
rather than Sungjee immediately doing so. 
 
42.  On July 16, 2018, the COR told Sungjee to submit a time extension 
request letter and stated he was “still waiting on base passe s and a new project 
schedule.”  On that same day, Sungjee responded that it did not have enough 
money to complete the project and would submit a request for an extension of time 
soon.  Sungjee also stated that it was “sorry for the delay due to our financi al 
problem” and that its quality control manager would pick up the submitted passes 
that day.  Sungjee also stated that it would re-submit pass applications by July 23, 
2018, because it was obtaining more workers to complete the project, which meant 
they would need more passes.  (App. supp. R4, tab 58 at 1)  We find the issuance 
of base passes was not the cause of the delay here as Sungjee has admitted that 
through July 2018, it caused the delay, and the cause was mainly due to 
insufficient finances and staff to complete the project. 
 
43.  On July 19, 2018, the COR informed Sungjee it would terminate the 
order for default for Sungjee’s failure to complete the project .  Sungjee responded 

14 
that it was willing to complete the project and had the financial capability.  (App. 
supp. R4, tab 61 at 1)  We find Sungjee’s claim it now ha d the financial means to 
complete the project inconsistent, at best, with its prior statements (made only 
three days earlier) that it did not have sufficient funds. 
 
44.  On July 25, 2018, Sungjee’s contract manager requested  the 
“opportunity to complete [the] project” despite the fact it had missed the CCD 
several times.  Sungjee explained it was experiencing “serious financial 
problem[s]” and its financial capital was frozen for six months, and that it “ feel[s] 
very sorry not to keep [the] CCD on this project for our financial problem[s].”  (R4, 
tab 92 at 1)  The letter concludes with the following:   
 
We admit all of the happening[s] for B.929 project is our 
fault.  And, for [] our reputation, pride and promise with 
U.S government, if we would get another chance, we are 
trying to do our best to complete B.929 project. 
 
(Id. at 2).  For at least the third time, Sungjee admitted fault for failure to meet the 
project completion date, and it was generally because Sungjee was experiencing 
serious financial problems. 
 
45.  According to an internal government email, there was a meeting with 
Sungjee on July 26, 2018.  Sungjee’s project manager and quality control manager 
were present and admitted to having financial issues since January 2017.  Sungjee 
further stated they believed they were 80 percent complete (or 70 percent complete 
if they needed to replace the doors/frames), and the COR agreed.  Sungjee 
presented a schedule to complete the remaining contract work by October 20 with 
a start date of August 1 and stated that $60,000 was needed to complete the work .  
The internal email also stated that the contractor had “not processed any base 
passes since the beginning of Jun[e]” and the timeline for new base passes was 
about 1 to 1.5 months.  (R4, tab 93 at 1)
 
 
46.  Further, according to the email, the government informed Sungjee that it 
needed to provide the following:  letters from the door and frame manufacturer stating 
the materials were fire-rated or replacements; a new and realistic schedule that included 
all the rework; a cost estimate for the remaining work; the manpower needed; a clearly 
defined critical path; a plan for the mold remediation; and base pass applications for all 
required workers.  Once that information was submitted by July 31, 2018, the 
contracting officer would decide the path forward and either terminate Sungjee for 
default or establish a new period of performance.  The email also explained a new 
contracting officer was on board, and the government was concerned with the four 
extensions already provided (including the most recent one to June 15), that Sungjee had 

15 
not worked in the building since June 6, and Sungjee’s work resulted in flooding and 
inoperable air conditioning which resulted in mold.  (R4, tab 93 at 2) 
 
47.  We find the meeting minutes set forth in this email consistent generally 
with the record and occurrences during this project. 
 
48.  On July 31, 2018, Sungjee provided letters from the door frame 
manufacturer concerning the fire rating (R4, tab 98 at 3).  Sungjee also submitted a 
project schedule estimating 1290 manpower hours to complete the work by 
November 25 (with the work beginning August 1), or almost four months.  The project 
schedule showed the following work elements:  landscaping; mold control; removal 
work on wet carpet and VCT; removal work and fill for window frames; installation of 
quarry tile at the stairs and washing rooms; removal of deficient tile; ordering and 
fabrication of tile; gypsum wallboard work and installation of tile; installation of toilet 
and door accessories and wood trim; replacement of mirror glass; placement of VCT 
and baseboard; removal of paint on handrail and steps; placement of rubber tiles on the 
stairs; other painting; installation of plumbing and lighting fixtures; communication 
systems work; installation of receptacle cover; fire alarm work and testing.  (App. 
supp. R4, tab 64 at 14) 
 
And Another Extension to the Schedule 
 
49.  The government issued bilateral Modification No. 003, effective July 27, 
2018, to extend the CCD to August 31, 2018, “resulting from the meeting with the 
[contractor] on 26 Jul 2018.”  The modification states:  “In return for the CCD 
extension, the contractor agrees to release the Government from any claims related to 
this extension.  All other terms and conditions remain unchanged.”  (R4, tab 95 at 1)  
Based upon the July 26, 2018 meeting minutes, we find one purpose of the extension 
was to acquire further information from Sungjee, such as a realistic schedule and 
sufficient base pass applications, to assess a path forward and decide Sungjee’s ability 
to complete the project. 
 
50.  At this point, Sungjee admitted several times that the failure to meet the 
CCD was all its fault, mainly due to the company’s financial issues.  Sungjee 
constantly asked to finish the project despite missing several deadlines and agreed to 
perform additional work as consideration for the extensions.  And as noted, Sungjee 
signed the bilateral modification.  We find nothing in the record shows that Sungjee 
was forced to sign the modification because of a coercive and pressured atmosphere. 
 
  

16 
The Contract Specialist Tells Sungjee Not to Do Anything Further at the Site 
 
51.  On August 2, 2018, the contract specialist informed Sungjee, via email, not 
to “do anything at [the] site until you are told to do so by the 411th CSB” and to submit 
a progress schedule using a critical path model that day (R4, tab 97 at 2).  The next 
day, the COR emailed the Chief of Contracting and stated that Sungjee provided the 
required information regarding the door and door frames and fire rating but should be 
terminated for failing repeatedly to finish the project, and there was concern over 
Sungjee’s financial situation (R4, tab 98 at 1).  At this point, Sungjee “provided 
verification from the manufacturers that the doors and frames were compliant” (R4, 
tabs 88, 91).  Therefore, Sungjee verified that the doors and frames met the task 
order’s specifications. 
 
52.  On August 8, 2018, the contract specialist requested Sungjee submit an 
updated progress schedule using a start date of October 1, 2018.  The contract 
specialist also requested financial statements to verify Sungjee’s willingness and intent 
to complete the project.  In addition, Sungjee was to submit base pass documentation 
no later than August 31, 2018.  (R4, tab 143 at 1; app. supp. R4, tab 68 at 1)  We find 
that regardless of the contract specialist’s email to not do anything on site, Sungjee 
was told to provide base pass applications and a schedule.  Further, we find that 
Sungjee failed to submit valid base applications before August 31 despite being 
reminded and asked to do so.  And finally, even if the contract specialist had not told 
Sungjee to cease work, Sungjee would not have completed the project by August 31 as 
its 
July 31, 2018 project schedule showed a completion date of November 25. 
 
53.  Sungjee submitted a revised schedule on August 21, 2018, showing a start 
date of October 1 and a new completion date of January 25, 2019.  This means 
Sungjee anticipated it would take four months to complete the following work:  
restoration/landscaping; quarry tile at the stairs and washing rooms; installation of 
door accessories/toilet accessories; removal of installed tile; installation of gypsum 
wallboard and tile in kitchen; installation of wood trim; placement of VCT including 
baseboard; other painting; installation of plumbing and lighting fixtures; 
communication systems work; installation of receptacle cover; and fire alarm work 
and testing.  (App. supp. R4, tab 70 at 1-2)  Upon review, the contract specialist 
believed the schedule did not show the critical path for network analysis as required by 
the specifications (app. supp. R4, tab 71 at 2).  Upon our review, we find that this 
schedule contained most of the same work as the one provided on June 29, where 
Sungjee stated it would take only three months to complete the work.  Again, 
Sungjee’s schedules were unreliable, and we do not believe Sungjee knew when it 
could complete the work.  At this time, the contracting officer requested a meeting 
with Sungjee because work was at a standstill, no progress had been made, and the 
contractor failed to meet the CCD (id. at 1). 
 

17 
54.  On August 22, 2018, the COR requested the location of the stored furniture 
and a checklist or inventory of the items (app. supp. R4, tab 69 at 1).  The COR asked 
for this information again on September 5, 2018 (id. at 2).  On September 12, 2018, 
Sungjee provided a list of 11 furniture items being stored and stated it could not 
contact the owner of the storage facility to obtain an address (id. at 3). 
 
55.  On August 28, 2018, a government construction inspector notified several 
individuals that he had reviewed Sungjee’s quality control plan and found that “two of 
their employees had submitted fraudulent Engineer Architecture Certifications” 
because they were not certified through the Engineer Architecture program of Korea.  
One of the individuals verbally admitted he submitted fraudulent credentials to the 
government and then sent a text apologizing for the fraudulent paperwork.  (R4, 
tab 145)  On that same day, Sungjee informed the government that it “falsfied (sic) QC 
plan.  In the QC plan, we falsfied [sic] certifications.  It is all contractor’s fault.  And, 
we are willing take all responsibilities” (R4, tab 146). 
 
The Second Show Cause Notice 
 
56.  On August 31, 2018, the contracting officer issued another show cause 
notice stating that since Sungjee failed to perform within the required time set forth in 
the order, or “cure the conditions endangering performance,” the government may 
terminate the order for default (app. supp. R4, tab 72 at 3).  On September 4, 2018, 
Sungjee responded to the show cause letter and stated the following as the cause of the 
delay:   
 
1. From 2018[/]01 to 2018[/]04 :  Sungjee’s sub-
contractor has dropped out of the project for the financial 
problem even though Sungjee paid more money to them 
compare[d] to working progress. 
 
Sungjee tried to find another sub-contractor.  Yet, it was 
very hard to find another sub- contractor. 
 
2. From 2018[/]05 to 2018[/]07 :  Sungjee had been 
trying to clear the CDR from QA.  Sungjee’s main concern 
on the CDR was door problem.  So, Sungjee had sent one 
of employee to the United States to check regarding the 
door and submitted official letter from manufacturer to the 
Government. 
 
3. From 2018[/]08 to present:  Sungjee has gotten E-mail 
from the Government not to proceed any construction 
activities before the Government’s direction. 

18 
 
(app. supp. R4, tab 73 at 3).  Sungjee never claims it failed to meet the CCD because 
the government did not issue timely base passes. 
 
57.  In an internal email dated September 6, 2018, the government 
memorialized a meeting held that day with Sungjee.  According to the email, several 
ongoing issues were discussed, including:   
 
- Lack of Manpower - Only 2-3 personnel on site 
- Lack of Work - Workers on site engaged in various non-
work tasks (sleeping, using phones, [etc.]) 
- No Effort to Ensure Base Access - No new passes have 
been submitted since May 
- No Qualified QC Manager - QCM is not appropriately 
licensed 
- Payment - 411th has received complaints that 
subcontractors for Sungjee have not been paid 
- Mold Issue - Mold is still growing in the building and no 
attempt has been made to mitigate it 
- Status of Consideration Work - Contractor has made no 
attempt to complete the 6 projects that they agreed to 
complete for consideration work 
 
(R4, tab 102 at 2-3).  According to the government, Sungjee agreed to submit a critical 
path model, all required base access pass applications, a listing of all stored 
government furnishings and location, and the name of a new quality control manager 
by September 8 or 12, 2018.  In addition, Sungjee’s senior director agreed to request 
base access to make periodic visits, guaranteed the project would be completed, and 
stated that at least $300,000 would be required to complete the work, and the company 
had financial security.  The government informed Sungjee that if these “stipulations” 
were not met, it would terminate the task order for default.  (Id. at 3)  We have no 
basis to question the veracity of this memorandum. 
 
58.  Sungjee submitted a timeline chart schedule showing the critical path.  The 
schedule was sparse.  For example, for construction work it showed only restoration, 
installation of door/toilet accessories, removal work on installed tile, putty work, 
painting work and site cleaning.  The schedule stated that Sungjee needed 167 days, or 
approximately 5.5 months, to complete the work.  (App. supp. R4, tab 77 at 2) 
 
59.  On September 10, 2018, Sungjee informed the contracting officer that it 
would submit at least eight pass applications in the next two days after notification of a 
new completion date.  In this regard, Sungjee stated that it believed the completion 
date for the passes was October 2018, but Sungjee’s new schedule showed that it 

19 
would need more time to complete the work and asked which date it should use (R4, 
tab 103 at 1-2).  Via separate email, Sungjee also proposed replacements for its project 
manager and quality control manager (R4, tab 101 at 1).  In response, the contracting 
officer informed Sungjee and others that it needed to verify the licenses for the two 
new individuals, review the new schedule and determine the end date of any extension.  
Only after those items were accomplished would the government “look at passes.”  
(R4, tab 103 at 1) 
 
60.  On September 12, 2018, the COR concluded that Sungjee’s schedule was 
vague and lacking in many line items (R4, tab 104 at 1).  The COR also concluded that 
the request for only eight base passes represented an insufficient workforce to 
complete the project because at least 15-20 individuals were needed to finish the job in 
50 days.  Further, the Army needed hard copies of the base pass applications, and 
therefore Sungjee’s email submission was insufficient, and “this busts our request date 
[of September 8] of base passes.”  (Id. at 2) 
 
61.  The next day, the contract specialist, a licensed construction engineer, 
reviewed the schedule and concluded that the overall duration was 167 days and tasks 
were missing.  For example, the stairs in the building were still bare concrete and 
needed a final finish with rubber tiles, and the entrance floor needed quarry tiles, but 
these tasks were not on the progress schedule.  (R4, tab 107 at 1) 
 
62.  On September 19, 2018, the contracting officer notified Sungjee that it 
failed to meet the requirements for an extension as discussed during the September 6, 
2018 meeting.  Specifically, Sungjee failed to:  provide a critical path method (CPM) 
showing the consideration work, rework, and manpower; submit all required base pass 
applications by the due date; inform the government of its subcontractors; provide the 
location of the furniture storage; and propose a qualified quality control manager (R4, 
tab 109 at 1).  The contracting officer stated it had previously advised Sungjee that if 
these stipulations were not met, he would terminate the contract for default (id. at 2).  
In response, Sungjee stated it would appoint a project manager and quality control 
manager, has hired some subcontractors with passes, requested a CCD for pass 
applications and was awaiting a response, and misunderstood the requirement for the 
CPM to include consideration work.  Sungjee believed it could submit manpower after 
the CPM was reviewed.  Sungjee further stated that it was willing and had the financial 
capacity to complete the project.  (R4, tab 163)  Sungjee’s response confirms that it 
submitted an inadequate CPM.  For example, even if Sungjee believed consideration 
work was not to be included, Sungjee does not explain sufficiently why the rework or 
manpower was excluded.  In addition, Sungjee may have hired subcontractors but 
failed to identify them to the government.  And Sungjee never provided a response on 
the location of the stored government furnishings. 
 
  

20 
The Final Suspension of Work Order is Issued 
 
63.  On September 20, 2018, the contracting officer issued a suspension of work 
order (R4, tab 110 at 2-3).  The order instructed Sungjee to “[i]mmediately stop all 
work, and place no further orders.  Provide by electronic means similar instructions to 
all subcontractors and suppliers” (id. at 3). 
 
64.  On November 22, 2018, Sungjee emailed the contracting specialist and 
stated that they have been on the site almost every day since the September 6, 2018, 
meeting, even though they do not have passes, and they have been working on the 
mold problem, which was almost fixed.  Sungjee also stated it performed water 
pressure testing on the newly installed sprinkler line.  (App. supp. R4, tab 84 at 1)  
According to Sungjee’s quality control manager, by May 19, 2018, it had completed 
96.5 percent of the project (R4, tab 76).  Yet, six months later, despite Sungjee saying 
it kept working after a stop work order had been issued and with no base passes, it had 
still not completed the project. 
 
The Termination for Default 
 
65.  On December 20, 2018, a newly assigned contracting officer issued a 
memorandum for the record stating that the task order would be terminated for default 
for the following reasons:  (1) as of December 15, 2018, Sungjee had completed only 
72.7 percent of the project work and offered multiple excuses, none of which were 
outside the company’s control; (2) uncompleted work included the installation of 
underground rain pipes and surface inlets, removal and reinstallation of concrete 
sidewalk and curbs, installation of hardware for all interior and exterior doors, 
testing/adjusting/balancing on HVAC and plumbing systems, pipe cleaning for all 
HVAC systems, and pipe cleaning for all potable water pipework; (3) the building was 
designated as housing for military officers and at the time of termination, there was no 
reasonable estimated time for the project completion; and (4) Sungjee had been paid 
70 percent of the value of the contract work (R4, tab 112).  That same day, the 
government issued Modification No. 04, terminating the task order for default 
pursuant to FAR 52.249-10, DEFAULT (FIXED PRICE CONSTRUCTION) (R4, 
tab 113).  According to the termination notice to Sungjee, the government terminated 
the task order for the following reason:   
 
Failing to complete all work within the Statement of Work 
and Drawings in accordance with terms and conditions of 
the contract order by the Contract Completion Date and 
numerous extensions. 
 
The contracting officer concluded the failure to perform was not excusable.  (App. 
supp. R4, tab 86 at 4) 

21 
 
66.  On December 21, 2018, the government project engineer provided a 
“rough” estimate of the total amount of work completed for each section of the 
statement of work (R4, tab 114).  According to the estimate, the following amount of 
work had been completed:  architectural work (75 percent), civil work (40 percent), 
mechanical work (90 percent), and electrical work (90 percent) (R4, tab 115). 
 
67.  At the time of termination, Sungjee had submitted seven requests for 
payment, setting forth the total work it believed it had completed on the project and the 
period of performance for that work (R4, tabs 19, 23-25, 27, 31, 37).  By November 15, 
2017, Sungjee stated it had performed 72.7 percent of the work (R4, tab 37).  Sungjee 
relies on its own contractor daily reports, which are inconsistent with the government’s 
reports and facts set forth above and we therefore find unreliable, to claim that by 
May 19, 2018, it had completed 96.5 percent of the work, despite allegations that not 
having base passes prevented them from working (R4, tabs 56, 58-62, 71, 76). 
 
68.  A review of the photographic evidence in the record shows some completed 
work.  However, the photos also show an uninhabitable building--lighting fixtures 
dangling from the ceiling, unpainted/unfinished walls, incomplete floors, incomplete 
tile work, etc. (see e.g., app. supp. R4, tab 91).  In addition, these pictures do not 
provide evidence that the mold issue was remediated or that the electrical, mechanical, 
or alarm systems were functioning.  Further, Sungjee’s assertion that it had completed 
96.5 percent of the work is inconsistent with Sungjee’s own August 2018 schedule 
showing it needed 167 days to complete the project.  Therefore, we find Sungjee has 
failed to show that it completed 96.5 percent of the work. 
 
69.  At the time of termination, the government had assigned at least three 
CORs, one contract specialist, and four contracting officers to the task order (see R4, 
tabs 5, 65, 93, 112, 125, 164).  While the management of the project was less than 
perfect, we nonetheless find no evidence in the record that the changes in government 
personnel managing the task order impacted the progress of or schedule for the project. 
 
70.  In January 2019, Sungjee submitted a proposal to the government seeking 
$1,126,581,736 Korean won from the government (app. supp. R4, tab 88 at 5). 
 
Claims and Appeals 
 
71.  On March 18, 2019, Sungjee filed a notice of appeal regarding the 
termination with the Board, which was docketed as ASBCA No. 62002.  On April 30, 
2019, Sungjee filed its complaint, arguing that the termination was improper because 
the government:  (1) failed to turn over the site on time which contributed to the delay; 
(2) failed to monitor and supervise timely issuance of passes and automobile decals for 
base access; (3) gave oral extensions of time rather than written modifications; (4) 

22 
inefficiently managed the government furnished government installed (GFGI) items; 
(5) pressured Sungjee to provide free work in exchange for extensions of time; (6) 
gave Sungjee a stop work order on August 2, 2018, which was not lifted until the date 
of termination; (7) issued a show cause notice on August 31, 2018, and Sungjee 
responded but never received a decision from the government on the response; (8) 
inefficiently managed the contract due to frequent changes of management personnel; 
and (9) arbitrarily rejected 80 door frames (compl. at 4-5).  The complaint requested a 
monetary sum, despite recognizing the Board lacked jurisdiction over the claim for 
money as it was never submitted to the contracting officer for a decision (compl. at 2, 
12-13). 
 
72.  On July 12, 2019, Sungjee submitted a claim to the contracting officer 
stating that the termination for default should be converted to a termination for 
convenience for the same reasons as set forth in its complaint with the Board (R4, 
tab 166 at 1).  In addition, the claim stated that Sungjee was seeking a sum certain for 
work performed on the contract (₩1,130,241,196 won), transportation and storage fees 
of appliances, which were GFGI (₩12,376,000 won), storage fees of furniture which 
were also GFGI (₩101,750,000 won), and additional work provided free of charge 
(installation of electrical conduit and outlets, waterproofing of bathrooms) which should 
have been taken care of as change orders (₩79,922,660 won) (id. at 1-2). 
 
73.  Sungjee claims that it incurred storage fees for the furniture from March 1, 
2018, through June 30, 2019 (app. br. at 24).  However, on May 17, 2019, a furniture 
company emailed the government and stated it would keep the stored furniture at no 
cost to the government until a delivery date could be established.  The company also 
stated that Sungjee only paid three months of storage fees.  (R4, tab 116 at 1) 
 
74.  On July 30, 2019, the Board dismissed, in part, Sungjee’s appeal.  
Specifically, the Board dismissed the portion of ASBCA No. 62002 relating to the 
appellant’s monetary claim, leaving only the propriety of the default termination 
before the Board.  Sungjee Constr., Ltd., ASBCA Nos. 62002, 62078, 2019 
WL 3842481 (July 30, 2019). 
 
75.  The government issued a contracting officer’s final decision (COFD) on 
August 20, 2019, denying the monetary claim in part.  According to the COFD, 
Sungjee sought $1,138,670.80.  (R4, tab 167 at 1)  The government already paid 
Sungjee $2,724,205.64 of the total fixed-priced award amount of $3,776,769.67.  The 
government paid this amount based on progress payment requests submitted by the 
company and approved by the Government for the completion of 72.1 percent of the 
work.  The government stated it would pay $83,152.56 because during a meeting, the 
government and Sungjee both agreed that Sungjee had completed 80 percent of the 
task order work and the amount due was the delta between what was paid already and 
the agreed upon completed work at termination.  The government stated it would not 

23 
pay for storing furniture and appliances because Sungjee never informed the 
government of this in its response to the show cause notice or request for equitable 
adjustment.  (Id. at 2)  Finally, the government denied the request for money for the 
installation of electrical conduit and outlets due to a supplemental agreement 
(Modification No. 03) where the government stated Sungjee released it from any 
claims relating to the extension (id. at 2-3). 
 
76.  On September 9, 2019, Sungjee filed its notice of appeal/complaint on this 
COFD, which the Board docketed as ASBCA No. 62170.  The Board later 
consolidated the appeals and issued an order stating that the Rule 11 briefs would 
address entitlement only. 
 
DECISION 
 
As noted, the parties requested a decision pursuant to Board Rule 11(a), which 
permits parties “to waive a hearing and to submit [their] case upon the record.”  Board 
Rule 11(d) explains that “[t]he weight to be given to any evidence will rest within the 
discretion of the Board” and therefore allows the Board to “make findings of fact on 
disputed facts.”  U.S. Coatings Specialties & Supplies, LLC, ASBCA No. 58245, 20-1 
BCA ¶ 37,702 at 183,031 (citation omitted).  In addition, Board Rule 11 specifically 
states:  “Submission of a case without hearing does not relieve the parties from the 
necessity of proving the facts supporting their allegations or defenses.” 
 
In its brief, Sungjee asserts only two issues on the appeal:  (1) whether the 
default termination was arbitrary, capricious, and issued in bad faith; and (2) whether 
the government should be held liable for the monetary loss and damages Sungjee 
incurred as a result of the improper termination (app. br. at 2).  The government asserts 
the default termination was reasonable and supported by the record, and Sungjee failed 
to establish the reasonableness of its entitlement to money (gov’t reply at 1). 
 
The Government’s Default Termination was Justified 
 
A termination for default is a government claim.  Securiforce Int’l Am., LLC v. 
United States, 879 F.3d 1354, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018).  Therefore, the government bears 
the burden to prove that its termination was justified.  Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v. 
United States, 828 F.2d 759, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Cascade Designs, Inc., ASBCA 
No. 62378, 22-1 BCA ¶ 38,068 at 184,843.  In addition, we note at the outset that a 
termination for default is “a drastic sanction,” and it “should be imposed (or sustained) 
only for good grounds and on solid evidence.”  Lisbon Contractors, 828 F.2d at 761. 
 
The legal standards for a default termination are well established.  Pursuant to 
the relevant default clause, in this appeal FAR 52.249-10, DEFAULT (FIXED-PRICE 
CONSTRUCTION) (APR 1984), the government may terminate a contract for default 

24 
when:  (1) “the Contractor refuses or fails to prosecute the work or any separable part, 
with the diligence that will insure its completion within the time specified in this 
contract including any extension,” or (2) “fails to complete the work within this time.”  
FAR 52.249-10(a).  A termination for failure to make progress generally occurs prior 
to a contractual deadline, and a termination for failure to meet the contractual deadline 
occurs after the deadline.  Abcon Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 625, 631 
(1999) (citations omitted). 
 
In this appeal, there were several extensions and the last CCD, set by a bilateral 
modification, was August 31, 2018.  In this regard, we have explained that:   
 
It is well established that the “action of the parties in 
agreeing upon a new delivery schedule eliminates from 
consideration the causes of delay occurring prior to such 
agreement.”  E.g., RFI Shield-Rooms, ASBCA No. 17374, 
77-2 BCA ¶ 12,714 at 61,731.  “In establishing a new 
delivery date, the parties agree to ‘let bygones be bygones’ 
and ‘[a]ny delinquencies on the part of either the contractor 
or the Government [a]re ‘washed out’ . . . .”  Environmental 
Devices, Inc., ASBCA No. 37430 et al., 93-3 BCA ¶ 26,138 
at 129,934, quoting Winder Aircraft Corp., ASBCA 
Nos. 4364 and 4733, 58-2 BCA ¶ 2,044 at 8567. 
 
Sach Sinha and Assocs., Inc., ASBCA No. 46916, 96-2 BCA ¶ 28,346 at 141,562-63; 
see also Zimcon Pros., ASBCA Nos. 49346, 51123, 00-1 BCA ¶ 30,839 at 152,212 
(applying this standard to termination for default of contract for replacement of hangar 
roof); Precision Dynamics, Inc., ASBCA No. 42955, 97-1 BCA ¶ 28,846 at 143,892. 
 
The government terminated the task order because Sungjee failed to complete 
all the work by the original CCD and numerous extensions.  The memorandum 
supporting the termination noted that Sungjee had only performed 72.7 percent of the 
project work and offered multiple excuses, there were several items of uncompleted 
work, and there was no estimated time for project completion, which was problematic 
because it was needed to house military personnel. 
 
The record shows the appellant failed to meet the initial CCD or any extensions, 
including the final CCD of August 31.  Failure to complete work by the task order 
deadlines is a well-settled ground for default termination.  See Consolidated Indus., 
Inc. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  We conclude the 
government has met its burden here that default was warranted for failure to meet the 
project deadlines. 
 
  

25 
No Excusable Delay 
 
Where the government satisfies its burden of establishing the validity of the 
default termination, the contractor has the burden of establishing that the default was 
excusable.  Highland Al Hujaz Co., LTD., ASBCA No. 58243, 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,336 
at 177,164, aff'd, 696 F. App’x. 509 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam).  The relevant FAR 
default clause explains that a contractor is not to be terminated for default (or charged 
with damages when terminated) if “[t]he delay in completing the work arises from 
unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the 
Contractor.”  FAR 52.249-10(b)(1), DEFAULT (FIXED-PRICE CONSTRUCTION) 
(APR 1984).  Such unforeseeable causes can include government acts, such as whether 
“the government materially breached the contract[,] thereby discharging appellant’s 
duty to perform.”  Highland Al Hujaz Co., LTD., 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,336 at 177,164 
(citations omitted).  Appellant sets forth three main arguments that the government, 
and not Sungjee, caused the delay here. 
 
Issuance of Base Passes 
 
First, appellant argues that the government caused the delay because it failed to 
issue the base passes in a timely manner (app. br. at 5).  Sungjee states that “[e]ven if 
[it] had timely submitted requests for passes after each expiration,” the government 
would not have issued the passes because there was no valid modification stating a 
fixed CCD (id. at 6).  According to Sungjee, when the government failed several times 
to extend the CCD via written modification, the already-issued passes expired, and the 
issuance of new passes was not even possible (id. at 5).  And, finally, according to 
Sungjee, any passes that the government issued without a formal modification were 
false, improper, and illegal and should not have been issued (app. br. at 9; app reply 
at 9). 
 
As set forth above, where the parties agree upon a new delivery schedule, the 
causes of any delay occurring prior to the agreement are eliminated from 
consideration.  See Sach Sinha and Associates, Inc., supra.  Regardless, 
we note that 
the task order specifically required Sungjee provide all information required for 
background checks to meet installation access requirements.  Therefore, Sungjee was 
responsible for initiating base pass requests (finding 4).  Sungjee was delinquent in 
requesting passes at the start of the project (finding 6), and it continued from there.  In 
this regard, 
Sungjee failed to request base passes from October 2017 through March 
2018 because it believed the delay was its fault (finding 27).  And although Sungjee 
argues the government failed to renew passes and decals after June 30, 2018,  we 
found that Sungjee failed to submit valid base applications before August 31 despite 
being told to do so (finding 52). 
 

26 
In addition, when Sungjee did provide the government pass applications, they 
were deficient (e.g., missing information such as completion dates or letters of 
employment) (finding 27).  Further, during performance of the task order, Sungjee did 
not hold the government responsible for Sungjee’s failure to obtain base passes 
(findings 27, 56).2  In fact, Sungjee itself admitted that through July 2018, it caused the 
delay, and the cause was due to insufficient finances and staff to complete the project 
(findings 42, 44).  In addition, even when base passes were issued in May 2018, 
Sungjee had few workers on the project (finding 35).  Based upon these findings, we 
conclude the government did not fail to issue passes in a timely manner and regardless, 
Sungjee admitted several times it caused any delay. 
 
We also found that the government issued passes without a formal modification 
(findings 33, 41).  For example, on April 24, 2018, the contracting officer informed 
Sungjee in writing that the CCD was extended through June 15, 2018, for occupancy 
and July 31, 2018, for the total project.  Pass applications were approved in May 2018 
(finding 33).  Therefore, we conclude that contrary to Sungjee’s assertions, a formal 
modification to the task order was not required for the issuance of passes. 
 
And while Sungjee argues that issuing passes without a formal modification is 
improper and illegal (app. br. at 9; app reply at 9), it is unclear how issuing the very 
passes Sungjee says it requested and required caused it delay.  Further, USFK 
Regulation 190-7 requires the submission of information, such as a memorandum and 
the contract, and an extension for the approval authority to consider when making a 
final decision; in other words, the discretion appears to be left to the approving 
authority. 
 
Stop Work Orders 
 
Second, Sungjee argues that it could not perform after the contract specialist’s 
August 2, 2018, email requesting a progress schedule and ordering appellant not to 
work at the site until told to do so (app. br. at 11).  Sungjee contends it stopped work 
because it tried to cooperate with all government personnel to ensure a good 
relationship (id.).  Further, Sungjee states it could not perform any work after the 
government issued the September 20, 2018 stop work order, which was in effect until 
December 20, 2018 (id.).  According to Sungjee, by June 15, 2018, it had completed 
96.8 percent of the work (id. at 12). 
 
2 Sungjee argues that the government failed to produce documents related to pass 
applications that Sungjee submitted because such documents were destroyed 
after one year (per government protocol) (app. br. at 8).  This issue was 
addressed previously in Sungjee Constr. Co., LTD., ASBCA No. 62002, 21-1 
BCA ¶ 37,825 at 183,701-702, where we denied Sungjee’s motion for sanctions 
against the government for failure to produce the pass application documents. 

27 
The contracting officer, not the contract specialist, issued the first suspension of 
work order in March 2018 and its rescission two days later.  Just a few days prior to 
the contract specialist’s instruction to stop work on the project site in early August, the 
contracting officer issued a bilateral modification extending the CCD to the end of 
August.  The project’s history shows the contracting officer issued stop work orders 
and modifications, not the contract specialist.  And, in fact, the contract (and therefore 
the task order) included the suspension of work clause (finding 1).  This clause 
provides that only the “Contracting Officer may order the Contractor, in writing, to 
suspend, delay, or interrupt all or any part of the work.”  FAR 52.242-14(a). 
 
In addition, a contract administrator or specialist usually lacks authority to order 
a contractor to suspend work.  Precision Dynamics, Inc., ASBCA No. 50519, 05-2 
BCA ¶ 33,071 at 163,920 (citation omitted).  In fact, the contract (and therefore the 
task order) also included DFARS 252.201-7000, CONTRACTING OFFICER’S 
REPRESENTATIVE (DEC 1991) which explains the COR is not authorized to make 
any commitments or changes affecting delivery or any other term or condition of the 
order (finding 1).  Consequently, nothing in the record here indicates the contract 
specialist possessed the authority by himself to order Sungjee to stop work.  
Accordingly, as a matter of law, we cannot conclude that the email regarding the 
stoppage of work at the project site was, in and of itself, an effective suspension of the 
work.  Precision Dynamics, Inc., 05-2 BCA ¶ 33,071 at 163,921; see also Lansdowne 
Steel & Iron Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 41110, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,506 at 137,082 (“Even if 
the contract specialist suggested such a cessation of performance, as appellant 
contends, appellant stopped performance at its own risk, in the absence of a stop work 
order or other directive to do so from the contracting officer.”). 
 
Further, regardless of the contract specialist’s instruction to Sungjee to suspend 
work, Sungjee was never going to complete the work by the modified CCD of 
August 31, 2018 (finding 52).  As the record demonstrates, Sungjee had unreliable 
schedules (findings 31, 53).  As an example, a
 revised contractor schedule dated 
June 29, 2018, showed a CCD of September 29, 2019, or three months to complete the 
work (finding 40); a July 31, 2018 project schedule showed a CCD of November 25, or 
four months to complete the work (finding 48); a revised August 2018 scheduled 
showed a CCD of January 2019 or four months to complete the work (finding 53); and 
a September 2018 timeline chart schedule showed Sungjee needed approximately 5.5 
months to complete the work (finding 58).  In addition, Sungjee lacked the financial 
means and personnel to complete the project (findings 13, 42, 44). 
 
Moreover, one purpose of the last CCD extension was to obtain a realistic 
schedule and sufficient base pass applications to assess a path forward and decide 
Sungjee’s ability to complete the project (finding 49).  And the contract specialist 
specifically requested the schedule and base pass applications.  Sungjee failed to 

28 
provide an adequate schedule showing all work and manpower (findings 60-62) and a 
sufficient number of base pass applications. 
 
Finally, the stop work order issued by the contracting officer on September 20, 
2018, was a precursor to the default termination.  At that point, Sungjee was so far 
behind in its schedule due to its fault (as it admitted) (findings 19, 26, 27, 42-44) not 
even Sungjee had a reliable estimated time for completing the project (finding 53). 
 
Changes in Government Personnel 
 
And finally, Sungjee argues that the constant change in government personnel 
administering the task order caused poor and inefficient management, which resulted 
in many delays (app. br. at 13).  Specifically, appellant argues that the government’s 
inefficient management caused the issues relating to GFGI (id. at 13-14).  We found 
no evidence in the record that the changes in government personnel managing the task 
order impacted the progress or schedule for the project (finding 69).  While it is not 
clear why the government continued to provide Sungjee extensions, they nonetheless 
did upon the requests and promises made by Sungjee.  At the end of the day, Sungjee 
failed to meet every contract extension requested and granted.  Further, with respect to 
the GFGI, because Sungjee failed to meet the CCD, issues arose regarding the storage 
and installation of the furniture and appliances.  We conclude that Sungjee presented 
no evidence that the government’s conduct interfered with its ability to perform. 
 
For all these reasons, we conclude that Sungjee has not shown the delay in 
completing the work arose from unforeseeable causes beyond its control and without 
its fault or negligence or any material breach by the government.
3  As a result, we also 
conclude Sungjee has failed to show the government acted in bad faith when 
terminating the order for default. 
 
The Government Admits it is Liable for Certain Costs Incurred Before the Termination 
 
Sungjee also appeals from the contracting officer’s final decision denying its 
claim for additional payments.  Specifically, Sungjee seeks money for completion of 
 
3 Sungjee argued in its complaint that the government arbitrarily rejected 80 door 
frames but only addressed the allegation in a few sentences in its Rule 11 reply 
brief (app. reply br. at 8).  Accordingly, we deem this aspect of its claim to have 
been abandoned.  See Science and Mgmt. Res., Inc., ASBCA No. 60412, 19-1 
BCA ¶ 37,236 at 181,243 (failure to address contention in hearing or post-
hearing brief equated to abandonment of the issue).  In addition, we note that 
we have carefully considered all the arguments made by the parties.  To the 
extent they are not mentioned, they were irrelevant to our disposition of the 
appeals or were not persuasive. 

29 
96.8 percent of the work, transportation and storage fees of appliances, storage fees for 
furniture, additional work provided, and salaries of employees on standby from August 
to December 2018 (app. br. at 14; app. reply at 2, ).  The government argues appellant 
failed to meet its burden to show the monetary claim is reasonable or the amount 
already paid by the government is inadequate compensation for the work performed 
(gov’t reply at 31). 
 
In general, a construction contractor who has been terminated for default is 
entitled to payment for work that was properly performed in accordance with the 
contract prior to the default termination.  J.G. Enters., Inc., ASBCA No. 27150, 83-2 
BCA ¶ 16,808 at 83,543.  Sungjee bears the burden to prove that it performed work for 
which it was entitled to be paid.  Truckla Servs., Inc., ASBCA No. 57564, 17-1 BCA 
¶ 36,638 at 178,447-48.  We hold that Sungjee has not met its burden. 
 
Percentage of Work Completed 
 
Sungjee relies on its contractor’s daily reports to support its assertion it 
completed most of the project by May 2019.  However, we found these reports 
unreliable and self-serving (findings 31, 67).  Sungjee also relies on photos of the 
building but upon review, we found the photos show uninhabitable buildings with 
dangling lighting fixtures, unpainted/unfinished walls, incomplete floors and tile work; 
the pictures also fail to demonstrate whether it resolved the mold issue or completed 
the electrical, mechanical, or alarm systems (finding 68). 
 
In addition, as discussed, the record is replete with Sungjee’s admissions that 
beginning in December 2017, its performance was affected by financial issues.  
Further, in August 2019, Sungjee submitted a schedule stating it would take four 
months to complete a litany of projects, including restoration/landscaping, 
quarry tile 
at the stairs and washing rooms, installation of door accessories/toilet accessories, 
removal work on installed tile, installation of gypsum wallboard and tile in kitchen, 
installation of wood trim, placing VCT including baseboard, painting, installation of 
plumbing fixtures, installation of lighting fixtures, communication systems work, 
installation of receptacle cover, and fire alarm work and testing 
(finding 53).  Later in 
August, Sungjee submitted another schedule showing it needed 167 days, or 
approximately 5.5 months, to complete the same work.  We found Sungjee’s assertion 
that it had completed 96.5 percent of the work is inconsistent with this August 2018 
schedule showing that Sungjee needed 167 days (or five months) to complete the 
project (finding 68).  Accordingly, we conclude Sungjee has not met its burden here. 
 
Transportation and Storage Fees of Appliances/Storage Fees for Furniture 
 
Sungjee also seeks transportation and storage fees for appliances, storage fees 
for furniture, and additional work provided.  The government argues that pursuant to 

30 
Modification 03, Sungjee released and waived any claims arising from its request to 
extend the CCD (gov’t br. at 37). 
 
“A release is a contract whereby a party abandons a claim or relinquishes a 
right that could be asserted against another.”  Holland v. United States, 621 F.3d 1366, 
1377 (quoting Koules v. Euro-Am. Arbitrage, Inc., 689 N.E.2d 411, 414 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1998)).  As a release is contractual in nature, it must be interpreted in the same manner 
as any other contract term or provision.  Korte-Fusco Joint Venture, ASBCA 
No. 59767, 15-1 BCA ¶ 36,158 at 176,455 (citation omitted).  “[T]he inquiry regarding 
releases should focus on the intent of the parties at the time the release is executed[,] 
and this intent should be sought from the whole and every part of the instrument.”  
Futuronics Corp., ASBCA No. 29324, 85-2 BCA ¶ 18,137 at 91,045.  Therefore, we 
first examine the plain language of the release and give the provisions their plain and 
ordinary meaning.  JAAAT Tech. Servs., LLC, ASBCA No. 61792 et al., 21-1 BCA 
¶ 37,878 at 183,970. 
 
With bilateral Modification 03, Sungjee agreed to release the government from 
any claims related to the extension in return for a new CCD.  Sungjee did not agree to 
release the government from any and all claims, just those related to the August 2019 
extension.  At that point, the storage of appliances and furniture had been negotiated 
several months prior and did not relate to this modification. 
 
However, we found Sungjee agreed to store and install the furniture and 
appliances as consideration for a previous extension (findings 13, 19, 23).  In fact, 
Sungjee argues only that
 it did not agree to be held responsible for the delivery and 
installation if the delay was not its fault (app. br. at 25).  We found that Sungjee failed 
to meet the CCD, as extended, and therefore the government had nowhere to put the 
appliances.  As the delay was Sungjee’s fault, we conclude Sungjee was responsible 
for these costs. 
 
Extra Work 
 
With respect to the alleged extra work completed (installation of electrical 
conduit and outlets and waterproofing of bathrooms), Sungjee fails to provide anything 
to support the supposition that it was extra work.  Further, Sungjee states the 
government told it to install electrical outlets and water proofing work in return for the 
first extension of the CCD to December 23, 2017, but it never agreed to provide this 
work for no money (app. br. at 27-8).  As the record shows, Sungjee repeatedly offered 
to provide extra work as consideration for extensions to the task order because Sungjee 
was responsible for the delay (see findings 13, 19, 23).  In fact, Sungjee stated in its 
August 31, 2017, request for an extension that it performed additional work “for the 
user’s convenience,” and it requested no additional money, just the additional time 
(finding 7).  The government’s modification extending the CCD until December 23, 

31 
2017, quoted Sungjee (finding 8).  We have no reason to doubt the contemporaneous 
statements made by Sungjee around the time the first modification extending the CCD 
was issued. 
 
Standby Costs 
 
Finally, Sungjee seeks standby costs.  Sungjee states that the “actual claimed 
amount of ₩55,248,040 [won] represents the salaries of Sungjee’s person[s] occurred 
from August to December 2018” (app. br. at 25 citing app. supp. R4, tab 97).  This is 
the only argument Sungjee makes on this matter.  See also app. br. at 14-15 (stating 
only that it is seeking salaries of individuals on standby from August through 
December 2018).  Even though the parties did not argue this point, the claim was not 
presented to the contracting officer (see findings 72-73, 75; R4, tabs 166 (claim), 167 
(COFD)).  Therefore, the Board lacks jurisdiction over this issue.  41 U.S.C. 
§ 7103(a)(1)(contractor claims shall be presented to a contracting officer for a 
decision). 
 
Further, even if the Board had jurisdiction over this issue, we are justified in 
denying it because Sungjee’s brief on this matter is devoid of citations to legal 
authority and contains undeveloped, unsupported and conclusory arguments.  See BES 
Const., LLC, ASBCA No. 60608, 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,455 at 181,990. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, the appeals are denied. 
 
Dated:  July 11, 2023 
 
 
 
LAURA EYESTER 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 
 
 
 
(Signatures continued) 

32 
I concur 
 
 
 
 I concur 
 
 
 
RICHARD SHACKLEFORD 
Administrative Judge 
Acting Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 OWEN C. WILSON 
Administrative Judge 
Vice Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 
 
I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the 
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA Nos. 62002, 62170, Appeals of 
Sungjee Construction Co., Ltd., rendered in conformance with the Board’s Charter. 
 
Dated:  July 11, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PAULLA K. GATES-LEWIS 
Recorder, Armed Services 
Board of Contract Appeals