ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 
OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE STINSON ON  
THE GOVERNMENT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 
 Appellant GLJ, Inc. (GLJ), appealed  a contracting officer’s denial of its claim 
in the amount of $18,810, alleging damages to GLJ’s property arising out of a Land 
Lease with the government (R4, tabs 4-5).1  The United States Army Corps of 
Engineers (USACE or government), requests summary judgment based upon a 
settlement agreement entered between GLJ and the government after Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR) proceedings at the Board.  We previously denied GLJ’s 
motion for summary judgment by decision dated April 21, 2022, GLJ, Inc., ASBCA 
No. 62964, 22-1 BCA ¶ 38,121, knowledge of which is presumed.  For the reasons set 
forth below, we grant the government’s motion. 
 
STATEMENT OF FACTS (SOF) FOR PURPOSES OF THE MOTION 
 
Parties Enter Into Land Lease Agreement 
 
 1.  On September 20 , 2016, GLJ entered Land Lease No. DACA45-5-16-00059 
(the Land Lease) with the USACE Engineer District, Omaha (R4, tab 1 at 1).  Pursuant 
to that agreement, GLJ leased to the government land located in the Cottonwood Hills 
Addition to LaGrange Township, Missouri Valley, Harrison County, Iowa (id.).  The 
purpose of the Land Lease was to allow the government access to 16 environmental 
 
1 The government numbered the tabs in the Rule 4 file, as well as the individual page 
numbers, with leading zeros, e.g. “001,” and “00001.”  For simplicity, we have 
dropped the leading zeros. 
Appeal of - )  
 )  
GLJ, Inc. ) ASBCA No. 62964 
 )  
Under Lease No. DACA45-5-16-00059 )  
   
APPEARANCE FOR THE APPELLANT: Mr. Gary L. James 
    Secretary/Treasurer 
 
APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: Michael P. Goodman, Esq. 
    Engineer Chief Trial Attorney 
 Melissa M. Head, Esq. 
Thomas J. Tracy, Esq. 
    Engineer Trial Attorneys 
    U.S. Army Engineer District, Omaha  

2 
 
“Monitoring Wells” (R4, tab 1 at 1, tab 5 at 13).  The lease term commenced May 1, 
2016, and ran through April 30, 2017, but was to remain in force thereafter from year 
to year, until April 30, 2021 (R4, tab 1 at 1).  The government agreed to pay GLJ 
$3,120 per lease year (id.).  Paragraph 10 of the Land Lease, entitled “DISPUTES,” 
stated that “[t]his lease is subject to the Contracts Disputes Act of 1978 [CDA], as 
amended (41 U.S.C. § 7101 et. al.) and is governed according to federal law” (id. at 2). 
 
GLJ Claim Submission 
 
 2.  By letter dated March 18, 2021, addressed to Heidi Durako, Project 
Manager, Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha District, GLJ stated that “[a]ctions by the 
Government’s employees or agents in the exercise of the Right-of-Entry have resulted 
in damage to the real property,” and that “[t]he provisions of the contract dated 
April 6, 2017 allow the Owner to make a claim under applicable laws for any damages 
pursuant to Right-of-Entry” (R4, tab 2).  GLJ alleged a loss of $18,810, based upon a 
reduction in crop production for the years 2018-2020 (id.). 
 
Government Issues Final Decision 
 
 3.  By letter dated June 14, 2021, Amanda M. Simpson, Acting Chief, Real 
Estate Division, Real Estate Contracting Officer, issued a final decision denying GLJ’s 
claim (R4, tab 5).  Ms. Simpson stated, in part: 
 
We have reviewed your claim and find that the wells were 
installed in the locations shown on the exhibit attached to 
the lease and that the Government's operations and 
activities were consistent with the normal operations 
approved by the lease.  Condition 9 of the Army Lease sets 
forth the standard for establishing damages under the lease.  
That condition specifically states the ‘The Government 
shall be liable only for damage resulting from negligence 
or misconduct of Government personnel or its agents, 
contractors, or assigns.’  You have not alleged nor 
provided any evidence of Government negligence or 
misconduct so your claim is hereby denied. 
(Id.) 
 
With Land Lease Agreement About to Expire, Parties Enter Into New Right of 
Entry Agreement 
 
 4.  On March 23, 2021, GLJ and the USACE entered into a new agreement, 
No. DACA45-9-21-00014, entitled “Department of the Army Right-Of-Entry for 
Environmental Assessment and Response” (the “Right of Entry Agreement”) (R4, 

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tab 72 at 1-2).  Pursuant to the Right of Entry Agreement, GLJ granted the government 
“an irrevocable and assignable right to enter in, over and across the land described 
below, for a period not to exceed 60 months, beginning with the date of the signing of 
this instrument” (R4, tab 7 at 1). 
 
Parties Agree to ADR 
 
 5.  In June 2022, the parties requested mediation of their dispute under the Land 
Lease pursuant to the Board’s ADR procedures (Agreement to Utilize the Mediation 
Procedure Under Addendum II of the ASBCA dtd. Jun. 28, 2022).  On August 3, 
2022, the parties participated in an ADR mediation before an ASBCA administrative 
judge (R4, tab 8 at 2).  
 
Parties Agree to Settle Land Lease Claim and Enter into Settlement Agreement 
 
6.  Subsequent to ADR mediation, the parties entered into a written settlement 
agreement “[f]or the purpose of disposing of the Parties’ appeals [sic], without any 
further proceedings and without there being any further adjudication of any issue of 
law or fact, and without constituting any admission of liability on the part of any 
party” (R4, tab 8 at 1).  The settlement agreement was signed by appellant on 
August 24, 2022, and by the government on August 25, 2022 (R4, tab 8 at 7). 
 
7.  Regarding payment, the settlement agreement provided: 
 
In full and complete satisfaction of the above-described 
Appeals [sic], the Government agrees to pay in the amount 
of Ten Thousand Dollars and 0/100 Cents ($10,000.00), 
which includes all liquidated damages (the "Settlement 
Amount"), which shall be paid no later than Forty-five (45) 
days from the Effective Date of this Agreement. 
 
(R4, tab 8 at 2) 
 
 
2 On February 14, 2022, the government submitted a Rule 4 supplement containing 
one additional document – tab 7, titled “Photos of claimed damages dated 
May 10, 2021.”  On June 28, 2022, the government submitted a second Rule 4 
supplement containing tabs 7-9, with a different document – the Right of Entry 
Agreement – reproduced in tab 7.  Our citations to tab 7 in this decision refer to 
the Right of Entry Agreement.  

4 
 
 8.  Regarding dismissal of this appeal, the settlement agreement provided:  
 
GLJ consents to dismiss with prejudice ASBCA 
No. 62964, and shall within Ten (10) days after payment in 
full of the Settlement Amount file with the ASBCA a 
motion for dismissal of the Appeal with prejudice.  If such 
request is not filed by GLJ within Ten (10) days of receipt 
of payment in full of the Settlement Amount, the 
Government may move to dismiss the appeals with 
prejudice, and GLJ will not oppose such motion. 
 
(R4, tab 8 at 2-3) 
 
 9.  Regarding release of claims, the settlement agreement provided: 
 
Upon execution of the Settlement, GLJ hereby releases, 
irrevocably waives, and abandons all claims against the 
United States, its political subdivisions, its officers, agents, 
and employees, arising out of or related to the Lease, 
whether known or unknown, regardless of whether they 
were included in the claim or complaint, including but not 
limited to any claims for costs, interest, expenses, attorney 
fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) and 
damages of any sort. 
 
(R4, tab 8 at 3) 
 
 10.  By letter dated September 28, 2022, entitled “RELEASE FORM,” the 
government provided appellant a United States Treasurer’s Check dated September 20, 
2022, “in the amount of $10,000.00, for your claim filed in March 2021,” noting that 
“[t]he amount represents payment negotiated for settlement at the ADR on August 3, 
2022” (R4, tab 9 at 1). 
 
 11.  The September 28, 2022, letter, also included a provision entitled 
“ACCEPTANCE BY CLAIMAINT,” which stated: 
 
I hereby accept the within stated award, compromise, or 
settlement as final and conclusive and agree that 
acceptance constitutes a complete release by me of the 
claim filed on March 18, 2021, against the United States 
and against any employee of the Government whose act or 
omission gave rise to the claim, by reason of the same 
subject matter. 

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(Id.)  Mr. Gary James signed the ACCEPTANCE BY CLAIMANT provision on 
September 29, 2022 (id.). 
 
 12.  On January 24, 2024, the Board held a telephone conference with the 
parties to discuss the status of the appeal.  The government subsequently filed its 
motion for summary judgment on February 21, 2024 (gov’t mot.).  Appellant filed its 
response in opposition to the government’s motion on March 1, 2024 (app. opp’n), and 
the government filed its reply brief on April 22, 2024 (gov’t reply). 
 
DECISION 
 I.  Standard of Review 
 
 “Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  First 
Commerce Corp. v. United States, 335 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003); F
ED. R. CIV. 
P. 56(a).  “The moving party bears the burden of establishing the absence of any 
genuine issue of material fact . . .”  Bubble Room, Inc. v. United States, 159 F.3d 553, 
561 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  A party challenging a motion for summary judgment “must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”  Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (quoting First Nat'l Bank or Ariz. v. Cities Serv. 
Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288 (1968)).  “[A]ll significant doubt over factual issues must be 
resolved in the opposing party’s favor.”  Bubble Room, 159 F.3d at 561.  
 
 II.  Contentions of the Parties 
 
 The government seeks summary judgment based upon the terms of its 
settlement agreement with GLJ, as well as GLJ’s acceptance of a check in the amount 
of $10,000 in settlement of its claims, and GLJ’s signed release of claims (gov’t mot. 
at 4-5).  Appellant does not challenge the government’s assertions regarding the 
parties’ settlement agreement or appellant’s acceptance of a check in release of its 
claims brought pursuant to the Land Lease (app. opp’n at 1).  Instead, appellant asserts 
that during the August 3, 2022, ADR, the parties also discussed “settlement regarding 
hay production on land covered by ROE DACA45-9-21-0-00-114” – the Right of 
Entry Agreement (app. opp’n at 1) (emphasis supplied by appellant).  Appellant states 
that “[t]he terms of this second agreement included a guaranteed payment of 4 large 
bales per acre, with adjustments based upon actual production and USDA hay value,” 
and that “[b]oth parties verbally agreed to this solution during the ADR meeting but 
were [sic] never formalized into a written contract despite Mr. [Phillip] Jackman’s 
commitment” (id.).3  The government responds “[t]o the extent that GLJ, Inc., may 
 
3 Phillip Jackman is a manager within the Army’s Formerly Used Defense Sites 
Program (app. opp’n at 1-2). 

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have alleged claims for crop losses or damages experienced under a later Right of 
Entry, those claims cannot be pursued under the Contract Disputes Act, and the Board 
does not have jurisdiction to consider them” (gov’t mot. at 4-5). 
 
 III.  The Parties have Settled, and GLJ has Released , All Claims GLJ Asserted 
Under the Land Lease 
 
 It is well established that “[a] settlement agreement is a contract, which we 
interpret as a matter of law.”  Supreme Foodservice GMBH, ASBCA No. 57884, et al., 
16-1 BCA ¶ 36,387 at 177,394 (citing Slattery v. Dep’t of Just., 590 F.3d 1345, 1347 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (additional citations omitted)).  Here, the settlement agreement 
included a release, which “is interpreted in the same manner as any other contract term 
or provision.”  Bell BCI Co. v. United States, 570 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
Where “a release’s terms are clear and unambiguous, we are to give them their plain 
and ordinary meaning, without resort to extrinsic evidence.”  Supreme Foodservice 
GMBH, 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,387 at 177,394 (citations omitted). 
 
 The settlement agreement is unambiguous in its terms, releasing all appellant’s 
claims arising under the Land Lease (SOF ¶ 9).  The same is true regarding the 
Release Form signed by Mr. Gary on September 29, 2022 (SOF ¶¶ 10-11).  Appellant 
does not contest the fact that it entered into a settlement agreement covering the claims 
it asserted pursuant to the Land Lease (app. opp’n at 1) - which are the subject of this 
appeal.  GLJ’s opposition brief contains no challenge to the enforceability of the 
settlement agreement or any argument that it is somehow inoperable.  Indeed, 
appellant signed the settlement agreement on August 24, 2022, 21 days after the 
August 3, 2022, ADR proceedings and acquiesced to its terms (SOF ¶¶ 5-6).  
Appellant also admits in its Statement of Undisputed Material Facts that it “readily 
accepted” the $10,000 check in settlement of its claims (app. opp’n at 1).
4 
 
 Pursuant to the settlement agreement, GLJ consented  “to dismiss with prejudice 
ASBCA No. 62964” and to, within 10 days after payment of the settlement amount, 
“file with the ASBCA a motion for dismissal of the Appeal with prejudice” (SOF ¶ 8).  
In the event GLJ did not seek dismissal within 10 days of receipt of payment in full of 
the settlement amount, the settlement agreement granted the government the right to 
“move to dismiss the appeals [sic] with prejudice,” and stated that “GLJ will not 
oppose such [a] motion” (id.).  After receipt of payment, appellant did not seek 
dismissal of the appeal and, accordingly, the government now seeks summary 
judgment on GLJ’s Land Lease claims (gov’t mot. at 1, 3).  The government’s motion 
is a proper exercise of its right to dismiss the appeal pursuant to the terms of the 
 
4 Appellant did not challenge (or even discuss) any of the factual assertions set forth in 
the government’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts set forth in the 
government’s motion (see gov’t mot. at 1-3, ¶¶ 1-10; app. opp’n at 1-2).   

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settlement agreement, a right which appellant expressly agreed not to oppose.  Based 
upon the above, we conclude that the government is entitled to summary judgment 
here.  Colorado River Materials, Inc., ASBCA No. 57751, 13-1 BCA ¶ 35,233 
at 172,992 (granting summary judgment to the government based upon settlement 
agreement’s release and accord and satisfaction); Supreme Foodservice GMBH, 16-1 
BCA ¶ 36,387 at 177,394 (“An unambiguous release in a settlement agreement can be 
amenable to summary judgment”) (citations omitted). 
 
IV.  The Board Lacks Jurisdiction to Adjudicate Any Claims Arising Out of the 
Right of Entry Agreement or Enforce the Alleged Verbal Agreement 
Discussed During ADR Proceedings 
 
 Appellant’s opposition brief requests that we issue an order “enforcing” a 
verbal agreement regarding compensation for damages arising out of the Right of 
Entry Agreement.  Appellant alleges that a verbal agreement was reached during the 
August 3, 2022, ADR proceedings.  (App. opp’n at 1-2)  As we discuss below, this 
Board lacks jurisdiction to grant the relief appellant requests. 
 
 Our jurisdiction is governed by the CDA, 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-71 09.  It is 
undisputed that GLJ’s appeal, and our jurisdiction here, arises out of the Land Lease, 
not the Right of Entry Agreement (SOF ¶ 1).  The verbal agreement GLJ requests we 
enforce here is based upon alleged damages arising out of the Right of Entry 
Agreement, not the Land Lease (SOF ¶ 4). 
 
 Pursuant to the CDA, our jurisdiction is “dependent upon the contractor’s 
submission of its claim to the [contracting officer] and a final decision on, or the 
deemed denial of, the claim.”  CCIE & Co., ASBCA Nos. 58355, 59008, 14-1 BCA 
¶ 35,700 at 174,816 (citing 41 U.S.C. § 7103-7105; M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. 
United States, 609 F.3d 1323, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  “[W]here there is no claim, 
there can be no effective decision from which to appeal.”  Sweet Star Logistic Serv., 
ASBCA No. 62082, 20-1 BCA ¶ 37,704 at 183,045 (quoting Mawaraa AlBihar Co., 
ASBCA No. 58585, 13-1 BCA ¶ 35,426 at 173,783).  Although GLJ alleges that a 
verbal agreement was reached during ADR proceedings in this appeal, the demands or 
assertions encompassed by that alleged agreement were never the subject of a CDA 
claim submitted to a contracting officer for a final decision.  As such, GLJ’s alleged 
verbal agreement does not meet jurisdictional prerequisites of the CDA.  Moreover, as 
GLJ admits, the verbal agreement was “never formalized into a written contract” (app. 
opp’n at 1).  Accordingly, the verbal agreement does not provide an independent basis 
upon which this Board would have jurisdiction to issue an order enforcing its terms.  
Winter v. FloorPro, Inc., 570 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (ASBCA’s jurisdiction 
is governed by the CDA, which is a waiver of sovereign immunity and must be strictly 
construed). 

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CONCLUSION 
 
 The government’s motion for summary judgment is granted and the appeal is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
 
 Dated:  May 7, 2024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DAVID B. STINSON 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
I concur 
 
 
 
OWEN C. WILSON 
Administrative Judge 
Acting Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 I concur 
 
 
 
 MICHAEL N. O’CONNELL 
Administrative Judge 
Vice Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 
 
 I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the 
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA No. 62964, Appeal of GLJ, 
Inc., rendered in conformance with the Board’s Charter. 
 
 Dated:  May 7, 2024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PAULLA K. GATES-LEWIS 
Recorder, Armed Services 
Board of Contract Appeals