ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 
Appeal of--
Enola Contracting Services, Inc. 
Under Contract No. W91247-l 1-D-0007 
APPEARANCE FOR THE APPELLANT: 
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APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: 
ASBCA No. 59526 
Mr. Allen Clark 
President 
Raymond M. Saunders, Esq. 
Army Chief Trial Attorney 
MAJ Jamal A. Rhinehardt, JA 
Trial Attorney 
OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE MCILMAIL ON APPELLANT'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
INTRODUCTION 
The Department of the Army (government) contracted with appellant, Enola 
Contracting Services, Inc. (Enola), including for the maintenance and repair of real 
property at Army installations in Georgia. The government terminated a number of 
task orders issued pursuant to the contract, and Enola appealed. Enola contends that 
the government's complaint 1 in this appeal does not state facts sufficient to constitute a 
cause of action against Enola with respect to six of the terminated task orders, and 
requests judgment on the pleadings in its favor with respect to those six task orders.2 
We deny the motion. 
DECISION 
Enola's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings requests judgment that the 
termination of Task Order Nos. 0139, 0164, 0165, 0166, 0167, and 0173 was 
wrongful. In reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, we must presume that 
the facts are as alleged in the complaint, and make all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the complainant. See Kolin Construction, Tourism, Industry and Trading Co., ASBCA 
1 As a termination for cause is a government claim, the government filed the 
complaint. 
2 Appellant's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings was filed by and briefed by 
counsel. Counsel withdrew on 24 April 2015 and advised the Board to 
communicate with Mr. Allen Clark. 

Nos. 56941, 57066, 11-1BCA~34,670 at 170,796. To state a claim, the complaint 
must allege facts plausibly suggesting a showing of entitlement to relief. Id. The 
factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. 
Id. This does not require the complainant to set out in detail the facts upon which the 
claim is based, but enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. 
Id. 
The government contends that Enola anticipatorily repudiated Task Order 
Nos. 0139, 0164, 0165, 0166, 0167, and 0173, justifying their termination for default. 
The government may terminate a contract when the contractor has anticipatorily 
repudiated the contract. Scott Aviation, ASBCA No. 40776, 91-3 BCA ~ 24,123 at 
120, 726. To demonstrate anticipatory repudiation, the government must prove that the 
contractor manifested to it a definite and unequivocal intention not to render the 
required performance. Id. 
Here, as the complaint alleges, we presume (without finding) the following. On 
25 March 2011, the government entered into an indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity 
contract with Enola, including for maintenance and repair of real property at 
Fort Stewart and Hunter Army Airfield, in Georgia (compl. ~ 11). Among the task 
orders the government issued pursuant to the contract were Task Order Nos. 0139, 
0164, 0165, 0166, 0167, and 0173 (id.~ 7). Enola failed to proceed with the work in 
accordance with the contracting officer's direction, failed to give adequate assurance 
that projects would be timely completed, expressed through words and conduct the 
intention not to complete the work on time, and specifically stated that it would "not 
be coming back to any of the jobsites and doing anymore [sic] work" (id.~ 40). On 
10 June 2014, the government issued Modification No. P00003, terminating for default 
16 task orders, including Task Order Nos. 0139, 0164, 0165, 0166, 0167, and 0173 (id. 
~ 33). 
Based upon the foregoing, we agree with the government that the complaint 
states a claim for relief, above the speculative level, that Enola anticipatorily 
repudiated Task Order Nos. 0139, 0164, 0165, 0166, 0167, and 0173, justifying their 
termination for default. Specifically, the allegation that Enola stated that it would not 
be coming back to any of the jobsites or be doing any more work, which we must 
presume to be true in reviewing Enola's motion, manifested a definite and unequivocal 
intention not to render required performance. It is not dispositive that, as Enola points 
out (app. mot. at 4), the complaint does not allege task-order specific facts concerning 
the performance of Task Order Nos. 0139, 0164, 0165, 0166, 0167, or 0173. (Indeed, 
although the complaint quotes documents that address the performance of specific task 
orders (comp I. ~~ 12-26), the complaint itself alleges task-order specific facts 
regarding the performance of only Task Order Nos. 0145, 0159, and 0160 (id.~~ 22, 
24, 25)). Consistent with the standard of review of a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, we draw the reasonable inference that when Enola stated that it would not 
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be returning to any of the jobsites or be doing any more work (id.~ 40), it meant that 
with respect to all of the task orders referenced in the complaint, including Task Order 
Nos. 0139, 0164, 
0165, 0166, 0167, and 0173. Of course, we have not found any facts 
concerning the performance of any of the task orders at issue in the appeal; that is for 
another day. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the motion for partial judgment on the pleadings is denied. 
Dated: 8 July 2015 
I concur 
Administrative Judge 
Acting Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
TIMOTHYP. 
Administrative ud e 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
I concur 
RICHARD SHACKLEFORD 
Administrative Judge 
Vice Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the 
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA No. 59526, Appeal of Enola 
Contracting 
Services, Inc., rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. 
Dated: 
3 
JEFFREY D. GARDIN 
R.ecorder, Armed Services 
Board of Contract Appeals