ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 
Appeals of -- ) 
) 
K-Con, Inc. ) 
) 
Under Contract Nos. W912SV-13-F-0100 ) 
W912SV-13-F-0121 ) 
APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT: 
APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: 
ASBCA Nos. 60686, 60687 
Robert J. Symon, Esq. 
Aron C. Beezley, Esq. 
Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP 
Washington, DC 
Raymond M. Saunders, Esq. 
Army Chief Trial Attorney 
MAJ Christopher M. Coy, JA 
Trial Attorney 
OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE WOODROW 
ON APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
On 6 February 2017, appellant, K-Con, Inc., timely moved for reconsideration of 
the Board's 12 January 2017 decision. K-Con, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 60686, 60687, 17-1 
BCA ~ 36,632. In its motion for reconsideration, K-Con contends that the Board 
improperly ignored K-Con's argument in its brief concerning the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois' opinion in Faerber Elec. Co. v. Atlanta 
Tri-Com, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 240 ( 1992). In addition, K-Con requests that the Board 
reconsider its ruling in light of FAR 12.301, which addresses the clauses to be 
incorporated into commercial item contracts. 
DISCUSSION 
In deciding a motion for reconsideration, we examine whether the motion is based 
upon newly discovered evidence, mistakes in our findings of fact, or errors of law. Zulco 
International, Inc., ASBCA No. 55441, 08-1BCA~33,799 at 167,319. A motion for 
reconsideration does not provide the moving party the opportunity to reargue its position 
or to advance arguments that properly should have been presented in an earlier 
proceeding. See Dixon v. Shinseki, 741 F.3d 1367, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2014). We do not 
grant motions for reconsideration absent a compelling reason. JF. Taylor, Inc., ASBCA 
Nos. 56105, 56322, 12-2 BCA ~ 35,125 at 172,453. 

I. Faerber Electric Does Not Compel a Different Result 
K-Con first contends that the Board improperly ignored K-Con' s argument in its 
initial brief concerning the U.S. District Court's opinion in Faerber Electric. Although 
K-Con acknowledges that decisions of United States District Courts are not binding on 
the Board, it contends that we should find the Court's decision persuasive, particularly 
given the absence of Board precedent on the precise issue. 
Faerber Electric holds that, absent a bond being obtained, there is no claim 
directly under the Miller Act statute. We did not hold that the Miller Act is self­
implementing in the sense that it creates a cause of action. Instead, we held that, pursuant 
to the Christian doctrine, the bonding requirements set forth in the Miller Act (and 
codified at FAR 52.228-15) are mandatory clauses that must be included in government 
construction contracts if they are omitted. We did not reach the further question - at 
issue in Faerber Electric - of whether a subcontractor possesses a right of action to sue 
the prime contractor ifthe prime contractor did not obtain a bond in connection with its 
contract with the government. 
While it is true that Faerber Electric concluded that the Miller Act is not 
implicitly incorporated into any federal contract covered by the Act, it did so in the 
context of determining whether a subcontractor possessed a right of action against a 
prime contractor based on the presumption that the prime contractor would have obtained 
a bond pursuant to the Miller Act. 795 F. Supp. at 246 (citing, inter alia, G.L. Christian 
& Assocs. v. United States, 320 F.2d 345, 350-51 (1963)). Because the prime 
contractor's contract with the government did not include a bonding requirement, and the 
prime contractor did not obtain a bond, there was no bond on which the subcontractor 
could sue. The Court refused to create an implied cause of action to fill the lacuna 
created when both the contractor and the government contracting officer ignore the 
bonding requirement. 
The conclusion in Faerber Electric - that the Miller Act bonding requirement is 
not implicitly incorporated into federal contracts covered by the Act - did not rest on 
analysis of the Christian doctrine. Specifically, Faerber Electric did not delve into 
whether the bonding requirement is a mandatory contract clause that expresses a 
significant or deeply ingrained strand of public procurement policy. G.L. Christian & 
Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418, 424, 427 (Ct. Cl. 1963). Instead, Faerber 
Electric 's analysis focused on whether the Miller Act bonding requirement should be 
incorporated into the government contract for the purpose of creating a private right of 
action. Faerber Electric cited the Supreme Court's ruling in Universities Research 
Association, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981) for a precedential test to determine 
whether a statute may create an implied right of action. 
2 

For these reasons, we did not consider Faerber Electric persuasive and did not 
rely on it in our analysis of the Christian doctrine. 
II. Consideration of FAR 12.301 Does Not Alter Our Holding 
K-Con next contends that FAR 52.228-15 should not be incorporated into the 
contracts at issue because they are commercial items contracts (app. mot. at 3). K-Con 
relies on FAR 12.301, Solicitation Provisions and Contract Clauses for the Acquisition of 
Commercial Items, which sets forth the solicitation provisions and clauses to be included 
in a contract for the acquisition of commercial items (app. mot. at 3). K-Con contends 
that, because FAR 52.228-15 is not among the clauses listed in FAR 12.301, it is not 
mandatory in commercial items contracts (id.). 
We rejected this very argument in our original decision when we held that "[b ]oth 
contracts at issue in this appeal were for the 'construction, alteration, or repair of any 
public building"' as that phrase is defined in the Miller Act. 17-1 BCA ii 36,632 at 
178,413. We further held that "the Miller Act applies to construction contracts, even 
when those contracts are solicited as commercial items, and requires those contracts to 
contain FAR 52.228-15." Id. at 178,414. We see no reason to abandon this holding 
merely because the Army elected to use commercial items procurement procedures to 
contract for the construction of these buildings. 
Moreover, by its terms, FAR 12.301 does not preclude the extant incorporation of 
FAR 52.228-15 into commercial items contracts. FAR 12.30l(a) states that commercial 
items contracts "shall, to the maximum extent practicable, include only those clauses -
( 1) Required to implement provisions of law or executive orders applicable to the 
acquisition of commercial items; or (2) Determined to be consistent with customary 
commercial practice" (emphasis added). As we concluded in our original decision, the 
record evidence demonstrates that these contracts were for construction-related activities 
and involved 
the types of risks generally associated with construction projects. 17-1 
BCA ii 36,632 at 178,413-14. Therefore, we properly concluded that the contracts must 
include FAR 52.228-15. 
Ultimately, K-Con recycles arguments made in its original motion. A motion for 
reconsideration is not the place to present arguments previously made and rejected. 
"[W]here litigants have once battled for the court's decision, they should neither be 
required, nor without good 
reason permitted, to battle for it again. Motions for 
reconsideration do not afford litigants the opportunity to take a 'second bite at the apple' 
·or to advance arguments that properly should have been presented in an earlier 
proceeding." Dixon, 741 F.3d at 1378 (citations omitted); see also Avant Assessment, 
LLC, ASBCA No. 58867, 15-1BCAii36,137 at 176,384. 
3 

CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, K-Con' s motion for reconsideration is denied. 
Dated: 8 May 20 I 
7 
I concur 
MARK N. STEMPLER / 
Administrative Judge 
Acting Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
I concur 
~· 
RICHARD SHACKLEFORD 
Administrative Judge 
Vice Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the 
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA Nos. 60686, 60687, Appeals of 
K-Con, Inc. rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. 
Dated: 
4 
JEFFREY D. GARDIN 
Recorder, Armed Services 
Board of Contract Appeals