Alderman Building Co., Inc.
Docket: ASBCA 58082
Decision date: 2022-04-28

ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 
 
Application Under the Equal Access 
  to Justice Act of -- 
) 
) 
 
 )  
Alderman Building Co., Inc. ) ASBCA No. 58082-EAJA 
 )  
Under Contract No. N40085-09-D-5321 )  
   
APPEARANCE FOR THE APPLICANT: Marilyn H. David, Esq. 
    D’Iberville, MS 
 
APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: Craig D. Jensen, Esq. 
    Navy Chief Trial Attorney 
 Russell Shultis, Esq. 
Genifer M. Tarkowski, Esq. 
    Trial Attorneys 
 
OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE SHACKLEFORD 
ON APPLICANT’S EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT APPLICATION 1 
 
Applicant, Alderman Building Co., Inc. (Alderman), submitted an Application for 
Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Other Fees & Expenses under the Equal Access to Justice 
Act (EAJA), 5 U.S.C. § 504, as amended.  The underlying appeal arose from a sponsored 
subcontractor claim seeking unabsorbed home office overhead during government-caused 
delays.  See Alderman Bldg. Co., ASBCA No. 58082, 20-1 BCA ¶ 37,613.  We assume 
familiarity with that decision.  We find that Alderman is an eligible, prevailing party, and 
that the government’s position was not substantially justified.  Accordingly, we grant 
Alderman’s application, but reduce the requested recovery amount. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
The underlying appeal involved a March 27, 2009, task order for supplies or 
services under Contract No. N40085-09-D-5321 awarded to Alderman for renovations of 
the interior, repairs to building systems, and incidental work, on building M403 at Marine 
Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.  Id. at 182,566.  Alderman entered into a 
subcontract with Big John’s Electric Co. Inc. (Big John’s), for labor, equipment, 
materials, and supplies for specified portions of the interior repairs to the building.  Id. 
 
While the solicitation provided that the contract start date would be 10 days after 
award, we found that contract performance was characterized by repeated 
                                              
1 Judge Alexander Younger, who authored the underlying decision on entitlement and 
quantum, has retired. 

2 
government-caused delays that aggregated to 263 days and pushed the start work date 
into February 2010.  Id. 
 
By letter dated August 18, 2011, Alderman submitted a pass-through claim for 
$20,518, on behalf of Big John’s, for Eichleay damages.  Id. at 182,568.  While the 
appeal was pending, Alderman’s proffered expert calculated that the correct amount of 
the claim should be $56,548.  Id.  The contracting officer (CO) denied the claim in its 
entirety.  Id. 
 
Our May 21, 2020, decision on the merits, found that Alderman was entitled to 
Eichleay damages.  Id. at 182,574-76.  While we found that the Navy did not explicitly 
require Alderman or Big John’s to place their workforces on standby, Alderman 
demonstrated by indirect evidence that it had to place its forces on standby.  Id. 
at 182,574-75.  We also found that while Big John’s made efforts to obtain replacement 
work, it was unable to obtain sufficient replacement work to compensate for the 
disruptive effect of the multiple delays.  Id. 182,575-76.  Accordingly, we found that 
Alderman was entitled to recover $34,795 for Eichleay damages.  Id. at 182,576. 
 
As a separate category of relief, we denied Alderman’s contention, independent of 
the Eichleay formula, that it was entitled to $21,753 in direct costs of standby.  Id. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
To recover under the EAJA, an applicant must timely file its application, establish 
it is an eligible party as defined by the EAJA, and prove that it was a prevailing party in 
the underlying action.  Asia Commerce Network, ASBCA No. 58623, 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,352 
at 181,621 (citing Rex Sys., Inc., ASBCA No. 52247, 02-1 BCA ¶ 31,760 at 156,854).  An 
application may be denied if the government’s position was substantially justified or when 
special circumstances make an award unjust.  Asia Commerce Network, 19-1 BCA  
¶ 37,352 at 181,621; see also 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1).  As a partial waiver of sovereign 
immunity, the EAJA is to be strictly construed in favor of the United States.  Ardestani v. 
I.N.S., 502 U.S. 129,137 (1991).
 
 
 I.  Timely Application 
 
An application under the EAJA must be filed within 30 days after the Board’s 
disposition of the appeal has become final.  5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(2).  The Board issued its 
decision on May 21, 2020.  Read receipt email messages confirm that both Alderman and 
the Navy received the Board’s decision on May 21, 2020.  The Board received Alderman’s 
EAJA application on June 22, 2020.  Because this was within the 120 days permitted for an 
appeal of the decision plus the 30 days permitted for filing under the EAJA, we consider 
the application timely.  Benjamin S. Notkin & Assocs., ASBCA No. 29336, 87-1 BCA 
¶ 19,483 at 98,455. 
 

3 
 II.  Prevailing Party 
 
The EAJA application must show that the applicant was the prevailing party.  
5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(2).  Alderman was the prevailing party in the underlying appeal.  The 
Board sustained the appeal and determined that Alderman was entitled to recover 
$34,795.  Alderman, 20-1 BCA ¶ 37,613 at 182,576.  The government’s response to the 
EAJA application also concedes that Alderman was the prevailing party (gov’t resp. at 2). 
 
 III.  Eligibility 
 
The EAJA application must also show that the applicant is eligible to receive an 
award.  5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(2).  “A party is generally eligible for consideration of an award 
of costs under the EAJA if it is an entity having a net worth of no more than $7,000,000 
and no more than 500 employees at the time the adversary adjudication was initiated.”  
K&K Indus., Inc., ASBCA No. 61189, 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,353 at 181,627; see also 5 U.S.C. 
§ 504(b)(1)(B)(ii).  “Net worth is determined by subtracting an applicant’s total liabilities 
from its total assets.”  Kostmayer Constr., LLC, ASBCA No. 55053, 09-2 BCA ¶ 34,302 
at 169,440 (citing Broaddus v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 380 F.3d 162,  
167 (4th Cir. 2004)). 
 
Alderman initiated the underlying appeal in April 2012.  In order to demonstrate 
its net worth at that time, Alderman submitted copies of its Form 1120-S, U.S. Income 
Tax Return for an S Corporation, from 2011 and 2012 with its EAJA application (app. 
br., exs. 4-5).  The Schedule L, Balance Sheets, on these returns show Alderman’s net 
worth is below the statutory threshold on each return (id. at 44, 48).  Alderman also 
submitted an affidavit from its President in 2012 attesting that its maximum number of 
employees never exceeded 50 employees (app. br., ex. 3).
2  There is no apparent 
objection from the government regarding Alderman’s exhibits.  After review of the 
documents, we are satisfied that Alderman is an eligible party. 
 
 IV.  Substantial Justification 
 
An application may be denied if the government’s position was substantially 
justified or when special circumstances make an award unjust.  Asia Commerce Network, 
19-1 BCA ¶ 37,352 at 181,621; 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1).  “The government bears the burden 
to show that its position was substantially justified.”  K&K Indus., Inc., 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,353 
at 181,628 (citing Amaratek, ASBCA Nos. 59149, 59395, 15-1 BCA ¶ 35,866 at 175,348).  
In order to prevail, the government must “demonstrate that ‘a reasonable person could 
think [the government’s position is] correct, that is [that] it has a reasonable basis in law 
and fact.’”  Pro-Built Constr. Firm, ASBCA No. 59278, 18-1 BCA ¶ 36,975 at 180,116 
                                              
2 Alderman also submitted an affidavit, tax returns, and payroll history summary 
pertaining to its subcontractor demonstrating that Big John’s also qualifies as an 
eligible party (app. br., exs. 6-9). 

4 
(quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 n.2 (1988)).  “Substantial justification 
applies to the entirety of the litigation position and not just the posture on individual 
issues.”  K&K Indus., 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,353 at 181,628.  “[T]he government position is more 
likely to be substantially justified when greater ‘legal uncertainty’ is presented.”  SST 
(Supply & Serv. Team) GmbH, ASBCA No 59630, 18-1 BCA ¶ 36,932 at 179,932 (citing 
Rex Sys., Inc., ASBCA No. 52247, 02-1 BCA ¶ 31,760 at 156,855). 
 
The Navy maintains it was substantially justified in litigating the claim for 
Eichleay damages.  It raises three bases for why it was substantially justified.  First, the 
Navy argues that it reasonably believed Alderman and Big John’s could not prove their 
workforces were on standby (gov’t resp. at 3-4).  Second, the Navy argues that it had no 
other choice than to litigate the claim because Alderman and Big John’s failed to provide 
adequate documentation supporting the alleged costs (gov’t resp. at 4-5).  Lastly, the 
Navy notes that Alderman rejected a reasonable settlement offer (gov’t resp. at 5-6). 
 
1.  Standby 
 
The Navy notes that it “never explicitly directed Alderman or Big John’s to be on 
standby, prior to contract performance” (gov’t resp. at 3), which we agreed with in our 
2020 decision.  Alderman, 20-1 BCA ¶ 37,613 at 182,568 (“[T]he Navy did not explicitly 
require Alderman or Big John’s to place their workforces on standby.”).  “In order to 
recover unabsorbed overhead costs using the Eichleay formula, Eichleay Corp., ASBCA 
No. 5183, 60-2 BCA ¶ 2688, aff’d on reconsid., 61-1 BCA ¶ 15,117, [Alderman] had to 
show that it was required unreasonably to stand-by during the period of the delay without 
staff reduction and that it was impractical to take on additional jobs during this period.”  
Alvarez & Assocs. Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 50185, 97-2 BCA ¶ 29,320 at 145,789 
(citing Daly Constr. Inc. v. Garrett, 5 F.3d 520 at 522 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 
We previously addressed the question of standby in our December 9, 2014 
decision on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.  See Alderman Bldg. Co., 
ASBCA No. 58082, 15-1 BCA ¶ 35,841 at 175,273-74.  In that decision we found that 
the evidence “show[ed] that [Alderman] had employees on standby during the delay 
period, but [left] open the question of whether they were ‘required to be ready to resume 
work’ by the Navy.”  Id. at 175,274 (citing P.J. Dick Inc. v. Principi, 324 F.3d 1364, 
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  Thus, we found that there was a triable issue regarding standby.  
Alderman, 15-1 BCA ¶ 35,841 at 175,274. 
 
While we agreed with the Navy that it did not explicitly order Alderman or Big John’s 
to place their workforces on standby (Alderman, 20-1 BCA ¶ 37,613 at 182,568), Alderman 
asserted it was entitled to Eichleay damages based on indirect evidence of standby (app. 
reply br. at 5-6).  In cases where the CO does not issue an explicit order to be on standby, the 
contractor must prove standby by indirect evidence.  P.J. Dick, 324 F.3d at 1371. 
 

5 
On the question of indirect evidence, we found “that contract performance was 
characterized by repeated government-caused delays that aggregated to 263 days . . . .”  
Alderman, 20-1 BCA ¶ 37,613 at 182,566.  We found it was “the Navy’s practice to 
afford Alderman and Big John’s little advanced notification of the delays in the project’s 
start dates.”  Id. at 182,568.  Ultimately, we concluded it was necessary and reasonable 
for Alderman to keep its workforce on standby due to the “dwindling period of 
performance with no time extension” coupled with the threat of liquidated damages.  Id. 
at 182,575. 
 
The Navy’s response to the EAJA application did not discuss the indirect evidence 
of standby.  The fact that the Board agreed with the Navy on the question of whether 
there was an explicit order to be on standby, does not equate to the Navy’s overall 
litigation position being substantially justified.  “Substantial justification applies to the 
entirety of the litigation position and not just the posture on individual issues.”  K&K 
Indus., 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,353 at 181,628.  This is particularly applicable here, where the 
established law allowed the contractor to prove standby without an explicit order; 
specifically, by indirect evidence. 
 
2.  Documentation Supporting the Alleged Costs 
 
The Navy argues that it was substantially justified because Alderman and Big John’s 
failed to provide adequate documentation supporting the alleged costs incurred (gov’t resp. 
at 4-5).  The Navy maintains that this is demonstrated by the multiple supplements that 
Alderman’s proffered expert made to his report (id. at 4).  We are not persuaded by the 
Navy’s argument.  “The government bears the burden to show that its position was 
substantially justified.”  K&K Indus., Inc., 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,353 at 181,628.  The fact that 
Alderman’s expert provided multiple supplements to his report does not in itself 
demonstrate that Alderman failed to provide documentation supporting the alleged costs.  
The Navy has failed to meet its burden in demonstrating how the documentation was 
insufficient. 
 
3.  Navy’s Settlement Offer 
 
Finally, the Navy maintains that Alderman’s alleged rejection of a reasonable 
settlement offer in November 2015 left the Navy with no other choice than to continue 
litigating the appeal (gov’t resp. at 5-6).  The Navy notes that its settlement offer was 
close to Alderman’s ultimate recovery amount (id. at 5).  The rejection of a settlement 
offer may be “relevant to the reasonableness of the EAJA fees and costs that are to be 
awarded.”  C.H. Hyperbarics, Inc., on behalf of William J. Miller, Jr., Trustee, ASBCA 
No. 49375 et al., 05-2 BCA ¶ 32,989 at 163,494.  We address the relevance of the 
settlement negotiations in greater detail below in the quantum section of this decision.  
The Navy, however, has raised this issue as a factor in its substantial justification 
argument, which we do not find relevant here. 
 

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4.  Substantial Justification Conclusion 
 
Based upon our review of the record, the Navy has not persuaded us that its 
position was substantially justified. 
 
 V.  Special Circumstances 
 
The government has not contended that there are any special circumstances that 
would make an award of fees and costs unjust.  5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1).  We conclude that 
no special circumstances exist to preclude an EAJA award. 
 
 VI.  Quantum 
 
Alderman initially sought an enhanced attorneys’ fees rate of $200 per hour (app. 
br. at 7).  In response, the Navy properly noted that the Board has long held that it does 
not have discretion to award attorneys’ fees in excess of the EAJA prescribed rate of  
$125 per hour (gov’t resp. at 7-8).  See also Optimum Servs., Inc., ASBCA Nos. 58755, 
59952, 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,816 at 179,431-32.  Alderman’s reply brief revised its requested 
EAJA award amount downward to account for the $125 per hour rate (app. reply br. at 28).  
To the extent that this is still an open issue, we find that Alderman’s attorneys’ fees rate is 
limited to $125 per hour. 
 
The parties also agree that an EAJA award should not include any amounts for 
time spent on the denied direct costs of standby claim (app. br. at 6; gov’t resp. at 10; 
app. reply br. at 28).  See also C.H. Hyperbarics, 05-2 BCA ¶ 32,989 at 163,491 (“Where 
separate claims are involved they should be treated as separate lawsuits, and no fee 
should be awarded for services on unsuccessful claims.”).  In the underlying appeal, we 
denied the direct costs of standby claim and deducted the claimed amount from the 
overall recoverable amount.  Alderman, 20-1 BCA ¶ 37,613 at 182,576.  Accordingly, 
Alderman’s EAJA award will not include any amounts for time spent on the denied direct 
costs of standby claim. 
 
We now turn to the remaining areas of disagreement between the parties.  The 
Navy’s primary argument is that the Board should limit Alderman’s EAJA award amount to 
its attorneys’ fees and costs from the issuance of the contracting officer’s final decision 
(COFD) on January 19, 2012,
3 to the rejection of the Navy’s $34,000 settlement offer in 
November 2015 (gov’t resp. at 5-7).  The Navy also notes that the parties’ decision not to 
                                              
3 We agree with the Navy that the date of the COFD is the beginning of the “adversary 
adjudication” for purposes of the EAJA (gov’t resp. at 9).  See also Levernier 
Const., Inv. v. United States, 947 F.2d 497, 500 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  Alderman’s 
requested attorneys’ fees and costs include amounts prior to January 19, 2012, 
but these amounts are relatively minor in comparison to its overall EAJA award 
request. 

7 
move forward with a planned alternative dispute resolution (ADR) session in February 2016 
was another lost opportunity to resolve the appeal and should be considered in determining 
a reasonable EAJA award (gov’t resp. at 8-9). 
 
Conversely, Alderman’s primary argument is that the EAJA award amount should 
not be curtailed by the settlement negotiations or decision to call off the ADR session 
(app. reply br. at 12-27).  Alderman asserts that while the Board awarded it $34,795 for 
its Eichleay damages claim, this amounts to roughly $43,597.65 when interest is included 
(id. at 13).  Next, Alderman argues that the Navy’s $34,000 settlement offer “was not 
significant, because the $34,000 lump sum had to be apportioned among extended 
overhead, direct costs, interest, fees, and costs” (id. at 14).  Alderman contends that:   
 
[T]he Navy’s offer amounted to at most about $17,000 for 
extended overhead and direct costs.  Assuming, arguendo, 
that the $34,000.00 lump sum was to be divided equally 
between the extended overhead and direct costs claims on the 
one hand and interest, fees, and costs on the other, it would 
mean that 50% of the lump-sum, or $17,000.00, was the part 
of the lump sum offered for the extended overhead and direct 
costs claims. 
 
(id. at 15).  Further, Alderman asserts that it never rejected the Navy’s $34,000 settlement 
offer.  Rather, Alderman maintains the offer remained on the table as the parties began to 
consider ADR.  (Id. at 16)  Leading up to the ADR session, Alderman argues that the 
Navy engaged in bad faith negotiation tactics by “re-litigating” issues and lowering its 
offer in the Navy’s mediation statement (id. at 17-18).  Alderman notes that the parties 
mutually agreed to call off the ADR session (id. at 19).  Finally, Alderman asserts that its 
fees were reasonable and proportional to the amount recovered (id. at 19-27). 
 
The parties both cite States Roofing Corp., ASBCA No. 55505, 11-1 BCA ¶ 34,668 
as instructive in determining the reasonableness of an EAJA award amount (gov’t resp. 
at 9; app. reply br. at 12-13).  In States Roofing, the contractor “incurred $211,191 in fees 
and costs to obtain $352,976 (largely exclusive of CDA interest) just $2,976 more than the 
$350,000 settlement offered by the [government].”  11-1 BCA ¶ 34,668 at 170,781.  The 
Board found this amount to be “grossly disproportionate” and adopted a reasonableness 
approach to determine the final EAJA award amount.  Id.  We believe a similar approach 
is appropriate here. 
 
The parties agree that on November 4, 2015, the Navy made a $34,000 lump sum 
settlement offer (gov’t resp. at 5; app. reply br. at 16, ex. 17).  The Navy maintains that 
Alderman rejected the settlement offer (gov’t resp. at 5), while Alderman asserts that it 
never rejected the offer (app. reply br. at 16).  However, it is clear that on November 9, 
2015, the parties notified that Board that they agreed to pursue ADR.  The Board scheduled 
the ADR for February 17-18, 2016.  It is also clear that in anticipation of the ADR, on 

8 
February 3, 2016, the Navy submitted its mediation statement, which included a lump sum 
settlement offer of $20,421.60 (gov’t resp. at 8-9; app. reply br. at 17-18).  Thereafter, on 
February 9, 2016, the Board held a conference call during which the parties requested to 
cancel the ADR session. 
 
Similar to States Roofing, under the circumstances, we find it useful to look at 
Alderman’s attorneys’ fees and costs incurred before and after cancellation of the ADR 
session.  Alderman provided a breakdown of these costs in its rebuttal:   
 
Before Cancellation of the ADR Session 
 
Marilyn H. David, attorney’s fees  $37,968.75 
Russell S. Gill, attorney’s fees +   $3,125.00 
Legal expenses and costs + $11,282.47 
Deducting fees and costs for Direct Costs Claim –      $889.50 
Total: = $51,486.72 
 
(App. reply br. at 26) 
 
After Cancellation of the ADR Session 
 
Marilyn H. David, attorney’s fees  $25,843.75 
Legal expenses and costs + $25,318.09 
Deducting fees and costs for Direct Costs Claim –   $2,135.50 
Total: = $49,026.34 
 
(Id. at 27) 
 
Alderman’s revised requested EAJA award combines its attorneys’ fees and costs 
before and after the cancelled ADR session, totaling $100,513.06 ($51,486.72 + 
$49,026.34 = $100,513.06).  Alderman requests an additional $9,741.93 for preparation 
of its EAJA application and rebuttal.  Alderman’s revised total is $110,254.99 (id. at 34).  
Conversely, the Navy proposes that a reasonable EAJA award would be $42,233.78
4 
(gov’t resp. at 13). 
 
After cancellation of the ADR session, Alderman incurred an additional 
$49,026.34 in attorneys’ fees and costs to obtain $34,795 (excluding interest) for its 
Eichleay damages claim.  This was just $795 more than the government’s $34,000 
settlement offer.  It was also only $14,373.40 more than the government’s proposed lump 
sum payment in its mediation statement.  Compared with either the Navy’s settlement 
                                              
4 As discussed above, the Navy’s proposed EAJA award limits recovery “from the 
issuance of the COFD on 19 January 2012 to the rejection of the Navy’s 
reasonable settlement offer in November 2015” (gov’t resp. at 13). 

9 
offer or the amount proposed in the mediation statement, we find Alderman’s attorneys’ 
fees and costs to be disproportionate to its ultimate recovery amount.  Accordingly, we 
find it reasonable to disregard those attorneys’ fee and costs incurred after cancellation of 
the ADR session. 
 
We have also considered the nature and relative complexity of the Eichleay 
damages claim, the relationship between it and the denied direct costs of standby claim, 
and degree of success Alderman obtained (app. reply br. at 12-13).  See also States 
Roofing, 11-1 BCA ¶ 34,668 at 178,781. 
 
Consistent with the aforementioned discussion, we believe a reasonable EAJA 
award includes only those attorneys’ fees and costs incurred before the cancelled ADR 
session and those associated with preparing the EAJA application.  We disregard those 
attorneys’ fees and costs incurred prior to issuance of the COFD and those relating to the 
denied direct costs of standby claim.  Alderman listed its attorneys’ fees and costs before 
cancellation of the ADR session as $51,486.72.  Alderman already deducted its fees and 
costs related to the denied direct costs of standby claim.  (App. reply br. at 26).  However, 
this amount does include some attorneys’ fees and costs incurred prior to issuance of the 
COFD.  We disregard the 25 hours ($3,125) attributed to Russell S. Gill, PLLC from 
April 27, 2011 to July 14, 2011 (see app. br., ex. 11 at 63-65).  We also deduct one hour 
($125) billed by attorney Marilyn H. David on January 8, 2012 (see app. br., ex. 12 
at 70).  Finally, we deduct $302.59 for legal expenses and costs incurred on July 20, 2011 
(see app. br., ex. 11 at 63).  After adding in the $9,741.93 for preparation of the EAJA 
application (see app. reply br. at 30-31), we conclude that an award of $57,676.06 is 
reasonable as summarized in the table below:   
 
EAJA AWARD 
 
Add Attorneys’ fees and costs before cancellation of ADR  $51,486.72 
Deduct 25 hours attributed to Russell Gill from April 27 to July 14, 2011 –   $3,125.00 
Deduct one hour billed by Marilyn David on January 8, 2012 –      $125.00 
Deduct legal expenses and costs incurred on July 20, 2011 –      $302.59 
Add costs for preparation of the EAJA application +   $9,741.93 
Total: = $57,676.06 
 
  

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CONCLUSION 
 
Alderman is awarded $57,676.06 in recoverable EAJA fees and costs. 
 
Dated:  April 28, 2022 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RICHARD SHACKLEFORD 
Administrative Judge 
Vice Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
I concur 
 
 
 
J. REID PROUTY 
Administrative Judge 
Acting Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 I concur 
 
 
 
 JAMES SWEET 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 
I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the 
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals on an application for fees and other expenses 
incurred in connection with ASBCA No. 58082-EAJA, Appeal of Alderman Building 
Co., Inc., rendered in conformance with 5 U.S.C. § 504. 
 
Dated:  April 28, 2022   
 
 
 
 
 
PAULLA K. GATES-LEWIS 
Recorder, Armed Services 
Board of Contract Appeals