Alderman Building Company, Inc.
Docket: ASBCA 58082
Decision date: 2013-08-08

ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 
Appeal of--
Alderman Building Company, Inc. 
Under Contract No. N40085-09-D-5321 
APPEARANCE FOR THE APPELLANT: 
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APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: 
ASBCA No. 58082 
Marilyn H. David, Esq. 
Biloxi, MS 
Ronald J. Borro, Esq. 
Navy Chief Trial Attorney 
Genifer M. Tarkowski, Esq. 
Trial Attorney 
OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE YOUNGER 
ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION 
AND 
APPELLANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REQUEST 
FOR DE CLARA TORY RULING 
In this sponsored appeal regarding a contract for the renovation and interior repair 
of a building, the Navy moves for partial summary judgment, contending chiefly that the 
appeal is barred by a release, and alternatively, that we lack jurisdiction because appellant 
fails to state a sum certain and has failed to submit certain of its claims to the contracting 
officer for decision. In response to the motion, appellant Alderman Building Co., Inc. 
(Alderman) principally asserts the negative of the Navy's propositions. Alderman has 
also cross-moved for summary judgment, contending principally that the record 
establishes that the parties excepted the present claims from the release. Alderman also 
seeks a declaratory judgment permitting the addition of further direct and indirect costs to 
its claim. We deny as moot the Navy's motion for summary judgment and grant in part 
and deny in part its motion to dismiss, and we deny Alderman's cross-motion for partial 
summary judgment. We deny Alderman's request for a declaratory ruling. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF THE MOTIONS 
1. By date of27 March 2009, the Navy awarded a Task Order for Supplies or 
Services under Contract No. N40085-09-D-5321 to appellant Alderman for renovations 
to 
the interior, repairs to building systems, and incidental related work, on a building at 
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina (R4, tab 1 at 1 ). The Task Order provided "[t]he entire 
work ... shall be completed by 3/22/2010" (id. at 3). 

2. The contract contained various standard clauses, including FAR 52.233-1, 
DISPUTES (JUL 2002); FAR 52.242-14, SUSPENSION OF WORK (APR 1984); FAR 52.243-3, 
CHANGES-TIME-AND-MATERIALS OR LABOR-HOURS (SEPT 2000); and FAR 52.243-4, 
CHANGES (JUN 2007) (R4, tab 5.6 at 11 of31, tabs 5.7, 5.8, 5.9). 
3. Thereafter, by date of 8 April2009, Alderman entered into a subcontract with 
Big John's Electric Co., Inc. (Big John's) for labor, equipment, materials, and supplies 
for specified portions of the interior repairs to the building (R4, tab 5.12 at 1 ). The 
subcontract provided that "time is of the essence," and that Big John's was to "begin 
work within seven (7) days after notification" by Alderman (id. at 2). 
4. Contract performance was characterized by repeated delays in starting work. 
Thus, despite the original completion date of22 March 2010 (statement 1), it appears 
undisputed that Big John's did not start work until19 February 2010 (R4, tab 5.38 at 2, 
tab 5.50). 
5. By letter to the contracting officer dated 18 August 20 11, Alderman submitted 
an uncertified claim on behalfofBig John's for $20,518, allegedly due to government 
delay in the start of the work (R4, tab 5.0). The claim is divided into nine issues, many of 
which are alternative to each other. The issues are tied to 68 supporting documents that 
were included with the claim package. We summarize the issues as follows: 
(a) Issue 1: Alderman seeks recovery for Big John's "unabsorbed overhead for 
the repeated and uncertain delays by the Navy" in the start date. 
(b) Issue 2: Alderman seeks that the Navy "honor the binding settlement 
agreement," in which Alderman asserts that Navy personnel agreed to settle Big 
John's claim for $20,519, representing $20,261 for Big John's extended overhead 
and $257 for Alderman's bond premium. 
(c) In Issue 3: Alderman asserts that it is entitled to recover for Big John's 
under the Eichleay formula. 
(d) Issue 4, Pass-Through Claim (labeled Issue 3): Alderman generally asserts 
that "Big John's meets the legal requirements for a pass-through claim." 
(e) Issue 5 (labeled Issue No.4): Alderman asserts that "[t]he periods of 
delay ... are compensable to Alderman (for Big John's damages) under the 
Suspension of Work clause." 
(f) Issue 6 (labeled Issue No.5): Alderman likewise asserts entitlement under 
the Changes clause. 
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(g) Issue 7 (labeled Issue No. 6): Alderman asserts that "[t]he periods of 
delay ... are compensable to [it] (for Big John's damages) as a breach of prime 
contract, causing Big John's to incur damages as a result, and/or its subcontract to 
be breached." 
(h) Issue 8 (labeled Issue No.7): Alderman propounds that the periods of 
delay are compensable as a breach of a duty "not to increase a contractor's costs of 
contract performance." 
(i) Issue 9 (labeled as Issue No. 8): Alderman asserts entitlement to $20,518 
as the amount that the claim is said to be worth, and as the amount that the 
contracting officer allegedly agreed to as a settlement. Alderman also asserts 
entitlement to interest under paragraph of the Disputes clause. (R4, tab 5.0 at 8, 
10, 13-15; see statement 2) 
6. By date of 19 January 2012, the contracting officer denied the claim in its 
entirety (R4, tab 6). Alderman thereafter brought this timely appeal. 
7. By date of20 February 2012, Alderman's president executed a release 
providing that, in consideration of a specified sum, Alderman: 
[D]oes, and by the receipt of said sum shall, for itself, its 
successors and assigns, remise, release and forever discharge 
the Government, its officers, agents, and employees, of and 
from all liabilities, obligations and claims whatsoever in law 
and in equity under or arising out of said contract. 
(Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Jurisdiction (mot.), ex. A) The release does not reflect that Alderman's president, or 
anyone else on behalf of Alderman, reserved any rights. 
8. Alderman's lengthy complaint is in 15 counts. Styling the counts as Alderman 
does, we summarize them as follows: 
(a) Count I: Ordered & Constructive Suspensions of Work. In general, 
Alderman alleges that the Navy "delayed the start of Big John's work, by delaying 
the Notice to 
Proceed and by successively revising the date the job site would be 
available and work could start" (com pl. -,r 27). Alderman then makes particular 
allegations regarding the delays in the start date, and alleges that the delays were 
unreasonable, that they were due to the Navy's convenience, and alleges 
entitlement to extended and unabsorbed home office overhead costs on behalf of 
Big John's (id. -,r-,r 28-46). 
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(b) Count II: Breach of Contract Re Settlement Agreement. In general, 
Alderman alleges that, in 2010, it exchanged a series of emails regarding its claim 
with Navy personnel, culminating in a 1 September 2010 email to Alderman from 
a supervisory construction manager in the Navy, who asked whether a $20,518 
amount for was acceptable (id. ~~ 48-59). Alderman alleges that it "accepted the 
Navy's offer," forming a binding settlement agreement, which the Navy thereafter 
refused to honor (id. ~~ 60-74). Alderman seeks payment of the settlement 
amount, "plus interest, plus breach of contract damages" (id. ~ 75). 
(c) Count III: Eichleay Claim & Prerequisites. In general, Alderman alleges 
that it meets the requirements for application of the Eichleay formula, even though 
it did not begin performance (id. ~~ 77-92). 
(d) Count IV: Pass-Through Claim. In general, Alderman alleges that its 
present claim "and this Complaint" satisfy the requirements for a pass-through 
claim (id. ~~ 95-1 00). 
(e) Count V: Acceleration of Work and Loss of Efficiency. Alderman alleges 
that both it and Big John's "are entitled to compensation for accelerating the work 
to meet the time constraints imposed by the Navy" (id. ~ 1 02). Alderman alleges 
that, because of the delayed start date and related factors, Big John's "had to 
increase its workforce, equipment, and normal and overtime hours to meet the 
deadline for completing the work," for which it and Big John's are entitled to 
"compensation for increased resources and for loss of efficiency" (id. ~~ 102, 
105). 
(f) Count VI: Interference with Contract and Failure to Cooperate. Alderman 
alleges that the Navy breached its duties to cooperate and not to hinder 
performance by failing to make the site available to Big John's to start work on 
time (id. ~~ 107-08). 
(g) Count VII: Breach of Warranty of Work-Start Date and Site Availability. 
Alderman alleges that, each time that the Navy failed to make the site available on 
the promised start date, it breached a warranty of site availability, for which 
Alderman is entitled to damages for '"an amount to be proved at trial" (id. ~~ 113-14). 
(h) Count VIII: Breach ofGovernment Duty Not to Increase Contractor's 
Costs of Performance. Alderman alleges that the delays in the start date caused 
Big John's "to incur damages and/or its subcontract to be breached" (id. ~ 117). 
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(i) Count IX: Breach of Duty of Good Faith & Fair Dealing. Alderman 
alleges that the Navy is liable for damages to it for breaching the parties' "binding 
settlement agreement" to pay Big John's for delay damages (id. ~~ 120, 123). 
G) Count X: Changes. Alderman alleges that the periods of"delay, 
acceleration, and increased costs" that it has alleged are compensable under the 
Changes clause (id. ~ 125). 
(k) Count XI: Breach of Contract. Alderman alleges in the alternative that 
"[t]he periods of delay, acceleration, extra costs, etc." alleged in the complaint 
"are compensable to Alderman (for Big John's damages) as a breach of prime 
contract" (id. ~ 128). 
(1) Count XII: Quantum Meruit. Alderman alleges that, in the alternative, it is 
entitled to the extended overhead incurred by Big John's on a theory of quantum 
meruit (id. ~~ 131-35). 
(m) Count XIII: Equitable and Promissory Estoppel. Alderman alleges that the 
facts relating to the delayed start satisfy the elements of both promissory and 
equitable estoppel, precluding the Navy from not paying Big John's extended 
overhead and the amount due under the alleged settlement agreement (id. ~~ 138-41). 
(n) Count XIV: Remedy Requested. Alderman seeks $20,518, and prays that 
the Board "enforce the binding settlement agreement ... regarding Big John's 
damages ... for the same amount" (id. ~~ 143,145). 
( o) Count XV: Interest. Alderman seeks interest "computed in accordance 
with [the Disputes clause], the Prompt Payment Act, and all other applicable law" 
(id. ~ 148). 
9. With respect to relief, for Count I (see statement 8(a)) and Counts IV through 
XIV (see statements 8(d}-8(n)), Alderman seeks an equitable adjustment "in the amount 
of at least $20,218, plus amounts to be adduce[ d] at trial" (com pl. at 34 ). For Counts II 
and III (see statements 8(b)-8(c)), and XI (see statement 8(k)), Alderman seeks $20,218 
(id.). For Count XIII (see statement 8(m)), Alderman seeks to "estop Alderman [sic] 
from refusing to pay Big John's the monies owed, which amounts to at least $20,218, and 
amounts to be adduced at 
trial" (id.). For count XV (see statement 8(o)), Alderman seeks 
an award to Big John's of interest due under law (id.). Finally, Alderman seeks 
"attorney's fees with pre- and post-judgment interest ... and all costs of litigation" (id. 
at 34-35). 
10. With its opposition to the Navy's motion, Alderman has filed two exhibits 
from individuals with personal knowledge of the execution of the final release: (a) a 
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17 February 2012 email exchange between John Henderson, Alderson's project manager, 
and Melissa Schumaker, Alderman's accounts manager, with a copy sent to Meghan J. 
Hislop and Kelly J. Cannon, two Navy civilians; and (b) the affidavits of Mr. Alderman 
and Mr. Henderson. 
11. With respect to the 17 February 2012 emails, the first is from Mr. Henderson 
to Ms. Schumaker regarding "Final Payment," with a copy to Ms. Hislop and 
Mr. Cannon. Mr. Henderson stated in his email that he had spoken to Ms. Hislop and 
Mr. Cannon and that, "[i]fwe pursue the claim issue it will be in court and our closing 
out the project will not affect our ability of how we proceed with the [contracting 
officer's final decision] letter." He asked Ms. Hislop to "please shoot me a reply 
confirming this was our discussion." Shortly thereafter, Ms. Hislop replied, "Confirm." 
(Alderman's (1) Opposition to Navy's Motion for Summary Judgment & to Dismiss; 
(2) Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; (3) Request for Declaratory Ruling; 
and (4) Supporting Memorandum (app. opp'n), ex. 3) 
12. In his affidavit, Mr. Alderman attests that he directed Mr. Henderson to advise 
the Navy that: 
[W]e did not want to do anything that would jeopardize 
Alderman's ability to pursue the [pending pass-through] claim 
and issues related to push-back of the contract start-date, 
including by closing out the project by signing a release. I had 
directed Mr. Henderson to negotiate an exception for the 
claim ... from all project close-out documents, which would 
include the release and final payment. 
(App. opp'n, ex. 2 at 2) Mr. Alderman further attests that Mr. Henderson reported back 
to him that the Navy personnel "specifically agreed ... [t]hat Alderman excepted its claims 
and issues related to the push-back of the contract start-date from the project ... close-out 
documents, including the release" (id.). 
13. In his affidavit, Mr. Henderson attests that, in negotiations with Ms. Hislop 
and Mr. Cannon, he "made it clear that Alderman specifically excepted its claims, which 
included those related to the push-back of the contract start-date, from any project 
closeout or release and payment" (app. opp'n, 
ex. 1 at 1). He further attests that 
"Ms. Hislop and Mr. Cannon expressed the desire, on behalf of the Navy, for Alderman 
not to hold up project close-out and release while waiting for the claims, and they 
expressed that they saw that the solution would be to state an exception for the claims," 
which he states the parties accomplished through the 17 February 2012 email exchange 
(see statement 11) (id. at 2). 
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14. It is not evident from the present record whether either Ms. Hislop or 
Mr. Cannon had contracting officer authority at the time that they are said to have agreed 
to except the claim from the release. While Ms. Hislop appears to have been a 
contracting officer during some of the performance period (e.g., R4, tab 5.50), both she 
and Mr. Cannon are typically identified as contract specialists in the record (e.g., R4, 
tab 5.0 at 11, 13, tab 5.55; compl. ,-r 69; see also compl. and answer ,-r 97). 
15. By order dated 25 July 2012, we determined that Alderman's "request for 
attorney's fees at this stage in the 
proceedings is premature and thus not properly before 
this Board," Alderman not having qualified 
as a prevailing party under the Equal Access 
to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(2). 
DECISION 
In its original motion papers, the Navy contended that it was entitled to summary 
judgment because the final release that Alderman executed bars the present pass-through 
claim. In the alternative, the Navy moved to dismiss all but the unabsorbed overhead 
claim on the grounds that Alderman has failed to state a sum certain for any of the other 
claims and had not previously presented them to the contracting officer. 
In response to the Navy's motion for summary judgment, Alderman urged that its 
pre-dispute interpretation that it could continue to pursue its claims was made known to 
the Navy before execution of the release, which itself was not an integrated writing. 
Alderman contended that parol evidence reflects that the parties intended that the release 
would except the present claim, and that the release should now be reformed to reflect 
that intent. (App. opp'n at 9) 
A. Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
In moving for summary judgment, the Navy's original position was 
straightforward. It stressed the terms of the final release, which it argued are 
unambiguous and should be interpreted according to their plain meaning, without resort 
to extrinsic evidence. Given these terms, Alderman's failure to reserve any rights, and its 
acceptance of final payment, the Navy contended that the claim was barred and that was 
entitled to summary judgment. (Mot. at 11) 
In opposition, Alderman urged that extrinsic evidence from affidavits and emails is 
admissible and establishes that the Navy agreed to except Alderman's claim for push-back 
of the project's start date. Alderman advanced the propositions that its pre-dispute 
interpretation was known to the Navy, that the release is not an integrated writing, and that 
parol evidence establishes the parties' contemporaneous intent to except the present claim 
from the scope of the release. (App. opp'n at 4-9) Alderman also told us that reformation 
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of the release is required due to either mutual mistake or unilateral mistake, and that the 
release is ambiguous (id. at 9-14 ). 
After Alderman filed its opposition, the Navy changed its position. In its reply 
brief, the Navy announced that it "withdr[ew] that portion of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment asserting that Appellant's claim of unabsorbed overhead was released in the 
signed final release" (Respondent's Reply to Appellant's Opposition to Navy's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Navy's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (gov't 
reply br.) at 8). The Navy now concedes that the email exchange attached to 
Mr. Alderman's affidavit (see statements 10-13) "raises a material factual dispute," 
precluding summary judgment on the issue (gov't reply br. at 8). 
In evaluating the Navy's motion, and Alderman's cross-motion, we do not address 
Count V, as well as those portions of Counts X and XI (see statements 8(e), 8G)-(k)). As 
we explain below in connection with the Navy's motion to dismiss, we lack jurisdiction 
over the acceleration allegations in those three counts. 
With respect to other aspects of the motion and cross-motion for summary 
judgment, we agree that the email exchange and the accompanying affidavits of 
Mr. Alderman and Mr. Henderson, as well as the Navy's concession, raise a genuine 
issue of material fact, precluding summary judgment regarding the finality of the release. 
At most, the emails (see statement 11 ), can be read as an agreement to preserve some sort 
of claim, notwithstanding project close-out. The terms of that claim, however, cannot be 
extracted from the emails. For their part, the affidavits also do not support summary 
judgment. Mr. Alderman, the author of the first affidavit, was not present at the disputed 
meeting (see statement 12). Mr. Henderson, the author of the second affidavit, speaks of 
an agreement concerning "claims, which included those related to the push-back of the 
contract start-date" (statement 13), a phrase that begs the question of the scope of any 
exception. 
We also deny Alderman's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. With 
cross-motions, "[t]he fact that both parties have moved for summary judgment does not 
mean that [we] must grant [summary] judgment as a matter of law for one side or the 
other; summary judgment in favor of either party is not proper if disputes remain as to 
material facts." Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1391 
(Fed. Cir. 1987). With cross-motions, we "must evaluate each party's motion on its own 
merits." BMY, A Division ofHarsco Corp., ASBCA No. 38172,93-2 BCA ~ 25,704 
at 127,868. 
Alderman tells us that it is entitled to summary judgment because the Navy's 
concession regarding the email exchange and the affidavit of Mr. Alderman are not 
sufficient to establish that "the exception to the release was limited to a claim for 
unabsorbed overhead using the Eichleay formula" (Alderman's Reply to Navy's 
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Opposition to Alderman's (1) Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
(2) Request for Declaratory Ruling; and Supporting Memorandum (app. reply hr.) at 22). 
Alderman further argues that the Navy's concession that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact concerning the release does not defeat Alderman's cross-motion regarding 
unconscionability and equitable estoppel (app. reply hr. at 24-25). 
We deny the cross-motion for two principal reasons. First, assuming that there 
was an exception to the release, the record leaves open the authority of the Navy 
personnel who assertedly agreed to except the claim from the release. It is hornbook law 
that "[a] contract with the United States ... requires that the Government representative 
who entered or ratified the agreement had actual authority to bind the United States." 
Trauma Serv. Group v. United States, 104 F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The record 
does not establish which, if any, of the Navy personnel that Alderman cites in its 
argument had contracting officer warrants, or the amounts of those warrants (see 
statement 14). Second, apart from the authority issue, we reject the argument that the 
record supports summary judgment for Alderman. In ruling on the Navy's motion above, 
we have rejected 
the core proposition of Alderman's cross-motion, viz., that the email 
exchange and the affidavit of Mr. Alderman "establish the meaning and scope of the 
exception to the release" (app. reply hr. at 23). There is a 
triable issue regarding that 
proposition, and hence we cannot grant summary judgment for Alderman. 
We accordingly deny the Navy's motion for summary judgment as moot, and deny 
Alderman's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. 
B. Motion to Dismiss 
In moving to dismiss all but the unabsorbed overhead claim, the Navy asserts that 
Alderman alleges "ten (10) new claims in its complaint." The Navy characterizes these 
"new claims," and we correlate them to counts in the complaint (see statements 8(a), 
8(b ), 8(f)-(l)), as follows: 
* Estoppel and damages for ordered & constructive 
suspensions of work [Count I] 
* Breach of contract regarding a settlement agreement 
[Count II] 
*Acceleration of work and loss of efficiency [Count V] 
* Interference with contract and failure to cooperate 
[Count VI] 
* Breach [of] warranty work-start date and site availability 
[Count VII] 
* Breach of government duty not to increase contractor's 
costs of performance [Count VIII] 
* Breach [of] duty good faith and fair dealing [Count IX] 
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* Changes [Count X] 
* Breach of contract [Count XI] 
*Quantum meruit [Count XII] 
(Gov't reply br. at 8) The Navy urges that we dismiss these claims for lack of 
jurisdiction. In opposing the motion, Alderman urges that it has not alleged new claims 
in the complaint, "but rather 
legal theories or remedies arising from the operative 
facts ... presented in its claim" (app. reply br. at 3). 
The applicable legal principles are straightforward. Our jurisdiction turns in part 
on a "sum certain" claimed. Although the amount, if any, that Alderman may finally be 
entitled to is uncertain, we can say that it sought a "sum certain" of $20,518 in the claim 
(see statement 5(b)). 
The more important principle is that it is "the claim, and not the complaint, [that] 
determines the scope of our jurisdiction in this appeal" because a Contract Disputes Act 
claim "cannot properly be raised for the first time in a party's pleadings before the Board." 
American General Trading & Contracting, WLL, ASBCA No. 56758, 12-1 BCA ~ 34,905 
at 171,639. We articulated the corollary principles in Shaw Environmental, Inc., ASBCA 
No. 57237, 12-1 BCA ~ 34,956 at 171,844: 
Whether a claim before the Board is new or essentially the 
same as that presented to the [contracting officer] depends 
upon whether the claims derive from [the same] common or 
related operative facts. The assertion of a new legal theory of 
recovery, when based upon the same operative facts as the 
original claim, does not constitute a new claim. In 
determining a claim's scope, we are not limited to the claim 
document but can examine the totality of the circumstances . 
. . .If a claim raised in a complaint is essentially 
different in nature from the claim submitted to the 
[contracting officer] for decision, even if the additional claim 
does not increase the claimed amount, it is a new claim that 
we do not have jurisdiction to consider under the [Contract 
Disputes Act]. [Citations omitted] 
Applying these principles here, we deny the Navy's motion to dismiss with respect 
to Counts I, II, and III, which appear to rely upon "the same common or operative facts" 
as those set forth in Issues 1, 2 and 3 of the claim, regarding the delayed start of work and 
the alleged settlement agreement (see statements 5(a)-(c), 8(a)-(c)). For the same reason, 
we also deny the motion regarding seven other counts of the complaint. The facts alleged 
in these seven counts - Counts VI, VII, VIII, X, XI, XII, and XIII (see statements 
10 

8(f)-(h), 8G)-(m))- appear plainly comparable to the operative facts regarding the 
delayed start-date set out in Issue 1 of the claim (see statement 5(a)). The only exception 
to the foregoing would appear to be those portions of Counts X and XI containing 
allegations regarding acceleration (see statements 8G)-(k)). Similarly, four other counts 
of the complaint appear to be predicated upon the same operative facts regarding the 
alleged settlement agreement as those set forth in Issue 2 of the claim (see statement 
5(b)). Those counts are Counts II (addressed above), IX, XIII (addressed above), and 
XIV (see statements 8(b), 8(i), 8(m)-(n)). In addition, Count IV alleges the same legal 
theory regarding a pass-through claim as that set forth in Issue 4 of the claim (see 
statements 5(d), 8(d)). Finally, while we lack jurisdiction to award quantum meruit 
recovery, Beyley Construction Group Corp., ASBCA No. 55692, 08-2 BCA ~ 33,999 
at 168,141, the operative facts alleged in Count XII (see statement 8(1)) appear 
duplicative of those underlying the Eichleay theory in Alderman's claim (see statement 
5). 
Taking the foregoing together, therefore, we deny the Navy's motion with respect 
to: Counts I, II, III, IV, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII and XIV, except as to those 
portions of Counts X and XI containing allegations regarding acceleration. 
We grant the motion, however, regarding Count V, in which Alderman alleges 
acceleration and loss of efficiency, and those portions of Counts X and XI containing 
allegations of acceleration. Alderman does not appear to have sought relief for 
acceleration in its claim. 
In addition, proof of acceleration appears on this record to invoke facts beyond 
those necessary to the Eichleay claim that it did submit to the contracting officer. "The 
three elements necessary to recover Eichleay damages are: (1) a government-imposed 
delay occurred; (2) the government required the contractor to 'stand by' during the delay; 
and (3) while 'standing by,' the contractor was unable to take on additional work." 
Satellite Elec. Co. v. Dalton, 105 F.3d 1418, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Alderman appears to be 
alleging constructive acceleration, inasmuch as there is no allegation of an express order 
to accelerate. To recover for constructive acceleration, Alderman must prove: 
( 1) [T]hat the contractor encountered a delay that is excusable 
under the contract; (2) that the contractor made a timely and 
sufficient request for an extension of the contract schedule; 
(3) that the government denied the contractor's request for an 
extension or failed to act on it within a reasonable time; 
(4) that the government insisted on completion ofthe contract 
within a period shorter than the period to which the contractor 
would be entitled by taking into account the period of 
excusable delay, after which the contractor notified the 
government that it regarded the alleged order to accelerate as 
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a constructive change in the contract; and (5) that the 
contractor was required to expend extra resources to 
compensate for the lost time and remain on schedule. 
Fraser Constr. Co. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We cannot 
connect the operative facts necessary to the acceleration count to the operative facts in the 
claim, and hence we grant the Navy's motion regarding Count V and those portions of 
Counts X and XI containing allegations of acceleration. 
C. Request for Declaratory Ruling 
Alderman also seeks "a declaratory judgment under [FED. R. CIV. P.] 57, to the 
effect that the release ... does not preclude additional direct or indirect damages claims or 
costs ... relating to the Navy's push-back of the contract-start date" (app. opp'n at 26). 
We deny the request. We have concluded above that there are triable issues 
regarding the fmality of the release. Given that disposition, we cannot give the requested 
relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The Navy's motion to dismiss all claims other than the unabsorbed overhead claim 
is denied to the extent indicated. The Navy's motion for summary judgment regarding 
the unabsorbed overhead claim is denied as moot. Alderman's cross-motion for partial 
summary judgment is denied. Alderman's request for a declaratory ruling is denied. 
Dated: 8 August 2013 
(Signatures continued) 
12 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 

I concur I concur 
/~ . ~ ----<:s.s;?>~(S:---:: ~~~ ~ PETERD.TING ~ 
• 
Administrative Judge Administrative Judge 
Acting Chairman Acting Vice Chairman 
Armed Services Board Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals of Contract Appeals 
I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the 
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA No. 58082, Appeal of Alderman 
Building Company, Inc., rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. 
Dated: 
13 
JEFFREY D. GARDIN 
Recorder, Armed Services 
Board of Contract Appeals 
)