Mindseeker, Inc.
Docket: ASBCA 63197
Decision date: 2024-08-29

ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 
 
OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE HERZFELD 
ON THE GOVERNMENT’S MOTIONS 
 
The Department of the Army moves to dismiss Mindseeker, Inc.’s 
(Mindseeker), appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to (1) Mindseeker’s alleged failure to 
convert its request for equitable adjustment (REA) into a Contract Disputes Act (CDA) 
claim and (2) its alleged failure to present the complaint’s breach allegation regarding 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the contracting officer.  We grant the 
motion in part and deny the motion in part. 
 
STATEMENT OF FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF THE MOTIONS 
 
On January 5, 2018, the U.S. Army Health Contracting Activity (Army) and 
Mindseeker entered a contract (Contract) for Mindseeker to provide medical coding 
services to the United States Medical Command using the government-provided 
browser-based Application Virtualization Hosting Environment (AVHE) (R4, tab 1 
at 1, 4, 40).   
 
On November 18, 2019, Mindseeker submitted a “Request for Price 
Modification” seeking costs for (1) recovery of health and welfare increases mandated 
by the government under the Service Contract Act, (2) lost production due to the 
government-imposed downtime for the AVHE system, (3) recovery of wage 
Appeal of - )  
 )  
Mindseeker, Inc. ) ASBCA No. 63197 
 )  
Under Contract No. W81K04-18-D-0002 )  
   
APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT: Stephanie D. Wilson, Esq. 
Rachael C. Haley, Esq. 
Charles L. Bonani, Esq. 
    Berenzweig Leonard, LLP 
    McLean, VA 
 
APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: Dana J. Chase, Esq. 
  Army Chief Trial Attorney       
 MAJ Heather M. Martin, JA 
MAJ Joshua B. Fix, JA 
MAJ Harry M. Parent III, JA 
  Trial Attorneys 

2 
 
determination increases mandated by the government under the Service Contract Act, 
and (4) a price increase per coded record (R4, tab 2 at 68).  The request concluded:  
“Mindseeker appreciates the opportunity to present our concerns and requests for the 
Government to consider.  We are ready, willing, and able to meet with you at your 
request and convenience to discuss one or all of the contents of the letter” (id. at 75). 
 
On February 21, 2020, the Army’s contract specialist requested that Mindseeker 
provide additional information to “validate your numbers” for the downtime request 
(app. supp. R4, tab 63 at 203).  On February 26, 2020, Mindseeker provided additional 
information for 11 months regarding the downtime request (app. supp. R4, tab 63 
at 201).   
 
On July 10, 2020, Mindseeker submitted a revised request for price 
modification, labeling it a “Request for Equitable Adjustment” (R4, tab 5 at 95).  
Mindseeker acknowledged that Mindseeker and the Army had resolved the two price 
modifications for costs related to health and welfare increases and wage determination 
increases required by the Service Contract Act (id. at 95).  Mindseeker still sought 
payment for government-imposed downtime for the AVHE system and a price 
increase for each coded record (id.).  Mindseeker included additional monthly data to 
support its request for payment for the government downtime, including requesting 
“an Equitable Adjustment of $615,199, for this unexpected loss” (id. at 98, 102-16).  
Mindseeker also provided additional information to support its price increase for the 
coded records, including requesting the Army either (A) provide a per unit price 
increase from $2.90 to $3.90 or (B) include a new contract line item number to pay for 
systems downtime hours “greater than 0.4%” per fiscal year with an hourly rate of 
$44.95 (id. at 99-101).  Similar to its request for a price modification, the “REA” 
concluded:  “Mindseeker appreciates the opportunity to present our concerns and 
requests for the Government to consider.  We are ready, willing, and able to meet with 
you at your request and convenience to discuss the requests presented herewith” (id. 
at 101).   
 
Mindseeker’s president continued to communicate with the Army’s contract 
specialist and updated the “REA,” particularly providing information for additional 
months of downtime losses and increasing the amount for equitable adjustment to 
$677,614 (app. supp. R4, tabs 107-08).  In November 2020, Mindseeker’s president 
asked the Army’s contract specialist for “an estimated date that this will be resolved” 
(app. supp. R4, tab 104 at 527).  The Army contract specialist responded that, “I’m 
hopeful we can have this resolved within the next 60 days” (id.). 
 
On December 9, 2020, the Army’s contract specialist asked that Mindseeker 
“include the verbiage below” on a revised letter and sign it: 
 

3 
 
I certify that the claim is made in good faith; that the 
supporting data are accurate and complete to the best of 
my knowledge and belief; that the amount requested 
accurately reflects the contract adjustment for which the 
contractor believes the Governmnet [sic] is liable; and I am 
duly authorized to certify the claim on behalf of the 
contractor. 
 
(App. supp. R4, tab 109 at 554).  Notably, the Contract incorporated by reference both 
the Disputes clause and the Requests for Equitable Adjustment clause (R4, tab 1 at 10, 
12) (incorporating by reference Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.212-4(d) 
(JAN 2017), which in turn incorporates FAR 52.233-1 – Disputes; and Defense 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 252.243-7002(b)).  The 
certification language requested by the Army contract specialist matches the language 
for certification of a claim under the Disputes clause.  (Compare app. supp. R4, 
tab 109 at 554 with FAR 52.233-1(d)(2)(iii)).  The Army contract specialist also added 
up Mindseeker’s proposed downtime losses and “came up with $677,616.00 versus 
$677,614.00” (app. supp. R4, tab 109 at 554).   
 
Later that day, on December 9, 2020, Mindseeker’s president responded and 
acknowledged that the Army contract specialist’s calculation was correct (app. supp. 
R4, tab 110 at 557).  Mindseeker’s president attached a revised “request for equitable 
adjustment” with the corrected dollar amount and the certification: 
 
I certify that the claim is made in good faith; that the 
supporting data are accurate and complete to the best of 
my knowledge and belief; that the amount requested 
accurately reflects the contract adjustment for which the 
contractor believes the Government is liable; and I am duly 
authorized to certify the claim on behalf of the contractor. 
 
(App. supp. R4, tab 110 at 557; R4, tab 6 at 121, 124).  As it had previously, 
Mindseeker closed the letter:  “Mindseeker appreciates the opportunity to present our 
concerns and requests for the Government to consider.  We are ready, willing, and able 
to meet with you at your request and convenience to discuss the requests presented 
herewith” (R4, tab 6 at 124).   
 
On August 25, 2021, the Army’s contract specialist requested that Mindseeker’s 
president submit a revised “document” including the costs of downtime losses from 
December 2020 (when Mindseeker last submitted a revised REA with claim 
certification) through “the present” (app. supp. R4, tab 134 at 681).  On August 26, 
2021, Mindseeker responded to the request by submitting a revised document updating 
its downtime losses through July 2021, which now totaled $924,384 (R4, tab 13 

4 
 
at 204).  As it previously had done, Mindseeker continued to call the document an 
REA, minimally revised the text (continuing to include the same closing), and again 
included the claim certification language from the Disputes clause (R4, tab 13 at 199, 
207).   
 
On September 16, 2021, Mindseeker’s president followed up with the Army’s 
contract specialist “respectfully requesting an update” regarding the REA, recounting 
that the contract specialist had previously stated he needed to “first draft the 
mod[ification] and then present to” the contracting officer (app. supp. R4, tab 141 
at 720).  The Army’s contract specialist responded the same day, stating that “the 
Contracting Officer’s Decision document is just about complete,” and he intended to 
provide it to the contracting officer the following day (app. supp. R4, tab 114 at 719).   
 
On October 15, 2021, Mindseeker’s president emailed the Army’s contract 
specialist to “see if you have a status update on the Contracting Officer’s Decision 
Document” (app. supp. R4, tab 146 at 741).  On October 19, 2021, after the two 
talked, Mindseeker’s president followed up by asking the contract specialist to nudge 
the contracting officer to have agency counsel “render a timely decision” (app. supp. 
R4, tab 145 at 737).  On October 22, 2021, the contract specialist responded that 
agency attorneys were reviewing the decision and expected to complete that review by 
Thursday of the following week (app. supp. R4, tab 146 at 740).   
 
In November 2021, a different Army contracting officer – the branch chief – 
assumed responsibilities for this Contract (gov’t mot., ex. G-1 – Smith declaration 
¶ 4).  On January 6, 2022, Mindseeker’s president emailed the cognizant contracting 
office seeking to talk with someone about the “outstanding REA” (R4, tab 17 at 232).  
The Army branch chief spoke with Mindseeker’s president, who “expressed concern 
over the fact that the Government has not yet rendered a decision” and indicated 
Mindseeker had a meeting with their congressional representative the following week 
(id. at 230).  They discussed “that there is not a firm deadline associated with the 
REA,” and the branch chief felt that Mindseeker’s president understood “that it would 
not be the case if converted to a claim” (id. at 230; gov’t mot., ex. G-1 – Smith 
declaration ¶¶ 11-12). 
 
On January 24, 2022, the branch chief issued a decision denying Mindseeker’s 
“REA” (R4, tab 18 at 240).  The Army’s branch chief prefaced his decision by 
characterizing how he viewed Mindseeker’s submission:   
 
Although Mindseeker’s 26 August updated/revised REA 
included a Contract Disputes Act certification (see, e.g., 
41  U.S.C. § 7103(b)(1); FAR 52.233-1(d)(2)(iii)), the 
language and tenor of that document, as well as other 
contemporaneous communications between Mindseeker 

5 
 
and the Government at the time that the updated/revised 
REA was submitted, indicate that the 26 August 
updated/revised REA is in fact a ‘request for equitable 
adjustment’ rather than a ‘claim’ submitted pursuant to the 
subject contract’s Disputes clause, FAR 52.233-1, 
DISPUTES (MAY 2014). 
 
(R4, tab 18 at 233).  Instead, the branch chief asserted that the August 26, 2021 revised 
REA “satisfies the requirement for a contractor submitting an REA in excess of the 
simplified acquisition threshold to certify that the request is made in good faith and 
that supporting data are accurate and complete to the best of the certifier’s knowledge 
and belief” (id. at 233).   
 
Substantively, the Army’s branch chief denied Mindseeker’s request asserting 
that Mindseeker failed to “establish that performance disruptions actually occurred; 
that such performance disruptions, if they occurred, resulted exclusively from AVHE 
System downtime and that they were solely attributable to the Government” (id. at 239 
(emphasis in original)).  The Army concluded that Mindseeker’s claimed lost 
production was “speculative” and it had failed to include sufficient “supporting 
evidence to substantiate its actual performance” (id.).  The Army denied the equitable 
adjustment of $924,384 for the alleged government downtime disruptions (id.).  The 
Army also denied Mindseeker’s request for a price increase per coded record, 
explaining that the Contract included a firm fixed-price contract line item for that 
payment and Mindseeker bore the risk of any foreseeable changes (id. at 239-40).   
 
On February 16, 2022, Mindseeker appealed to the Board.  In addition to 
appealing its submitted claim, Mindseeker’s complaint also asserted:  “[A]s no 
remedial action was taken to address the defective AVHE uptime stated in the 
Contract’s PWS Paragraph 1.5.1.1, the government’s failure to act in good faith when 
considering Mindseeker’s REA was a breach of contract” (compl. ¶ 8; amend. compl. 
¶ 8).   
 
DECISION 
 
The Army asserts that Mindseeker failed to convert its REA to a CDA claim by 
failing to request a sum certain for part of its claim and failing to request a contracting 
officer’s final decision for the entire claim.  We disagree, in part.  Mindseeker properly 
requested a contracting officer’s decision for its claim for downtime losses but failed 
to make a demand as a matter of right and failed to assert a sum certain for its request 
for a new contract line item to pay it an increased rate for each coded record or an 
hourly rate for future downtime losses.  The Army also asserts that Mindseeker raised 
a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in its complaint that the 

6 
 
contractor failed to present to the contracting officer.  Mindseeker did not address this 
assertion in its briefs. 
I.   Standard of Review 
 
Mindseeker, as the proponent of the Board’s jurisdiction, bears the burden of 
establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.  Najmaa Alshimal Co., 
ASBCA No. 62701, 21-1 BCA ¶ 37,872 at 183,899.  We rely on the record for fact-
finding when evaluating whether jurisdiction exists.  Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., 
Inc., ASBCA No. 62681 et al., 22-1 BCA ¶ 37,974 at 184,426.   
 
Though the Board’s rules have no equivalent to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(B)(6) or 
12(c), “we permit motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted.”  Fluor Intercontinental, Inc., ASBCA No. 62550, 22-1 BCA ¶ 38,105 
at 185,095.  We assess whether a complaint and claim contain “sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”’ 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  “We are not limited to the four-corners of the complaint, 
but look also to the contractor’s or government’s claim – the wellspring of our 
jurisdiction” and may review “‘matters incorporated by reference or integral to the 
claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items appearing 
in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint whose authenticity is 
unquestioned,’ as appropriate.”  Fluor, 22-1 BCA ¶ 38,105 at 185,096 (quoting 5B 
C
HARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1357 (3d 
ed.)). 
 
II Mindseeker Converted its REA into a Claim for its Downtime Losses but  
not for its Proposed Modification for Future Hourly Increases 
 
The Federal Circuit has pointed to three objective criteria to assess whether a 
submission is a claim rather than a routine request or an REA:  (1) the submission 
must meet the definition of a “claim” as defined by the Disputes clause in a contract 
(and FAR); (2) the submission includes a CDA certification (or some type of sworn 
statement that can be perfected into a CDA certification); and (3) the contractor must 
request a final decision from the contracting officer.  Zafer Constr. Co. v. United 
States, 40 F.4th 1365, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 2022).  “To determine whether a contractor 
has submitted a CDA claim, we apply a common sense analysis, looking at specific 
communications on a case-by-case basis and the ‘totality of the correspondence 
between the parties.’”  Najmaa, 21-1 BCA ¶ 37,872 at 183,899 (quoting CCIE & Co., 
ASBCA Nos. 58355, 59008, 14-1 BCA ¶ 35,700 at 174,816).  Mindseeker’s 
submissions for downtime losses (although not its request for a unit price increase) 
meet these criteria.  Thus, as discussed below, Mindseeker submitted a claim for 

7 
 
downtime losses and properly appealed a contracting officer’s final decision on that 
claim.   
 
A. Mindseeker’s Downtime Losses Met the Definition of a Claim, But its 
Request to Add a Line Item for Future Losses Did Not 
 
Mindseeker’s submissions regarding its downtime losses meet the definition of 
a “claim.”  The Contract’s Disputes clause includes the FAR definition of a claim:  
“[A] written demand or written assertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a 
matter of right, the payment of money in a sum certain, the adjustment or 
interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating to this 
contract.”  FAR 52.233-1(c) (incorporated by reference in the Contract, R4, tab 1 at 10 
(incorporating by reference FAR 52.212-4(d)); see also FAR 2.101 (same definition of 
claim).  The FAR definition of a claim governs the use of the term under the CDA.  
Zafer, 40 F.4th at 1367 (citing Todd Constr., L.P. v. United States, 656 F.3d 1306, 
1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).  A CDA claim need not take “‘any particular form or use any 
particular wording,’ . . . so long as it has ‘a clear and unequivocal statement that gives 
the contracting officer adequate notice of the basis and amount of the claim.’”  Hejran 
Hejrat Co. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 930 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 
2019) (quoting M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1323, 1327 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) and Contract Cleaning Maint., Inc. v. United States, 811 F.2d 586, 
592 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).   
 
A contractor can meet the requirement of a “written demand or written 
assertion” regarding the basis of the claim by submitting a document that provides 
“detailed factual bases for its alleged losses . . . .”  Hejran Hejrat, 930 F.3d at 1357-58.  
The Army asserts that Mindseeker’s written submissions cannot meet the definition of 
a claim because the contractor labeled these documents “REAs” (gov’t supp. br. at 6; 
gov’t reply br. at 6).  However, even if labeled an “REA” and subjectively treated as 
an “REA” by the parties, the request may still constitute a claim.  Hejran Hejrat, 930 
F.3d at 1357 (concluding that a request labeled as an “REA” constituted a claim); 
Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (concluding 
REA constituted a claim because the “REA satisfies all the requirements listed for a 
CDA ‘claim’ according to the plain language” of the FAR’s definition of a claim).   
 
Here, nearly every filing (whether labeled a “request for price modification” or 
an “REA”) included a clear and unequivocal statement explaining the basis of 
Mindseeker’s downtime losses claim for each month and for its request to modify the 
Contract to increase the price per unit for coded records (R4, tabs 2, 4-6, 13; app. supp. 
R4, tab 110).  Mindseeker provided documentation to support its request to recover 
alleged costs for downtime losses (R4, tabs 5-6).  On several occasions, the Army 
asked Mindseeker to update the calculation of its downtime losses and include similar 
supporting documentation for the additional months of downtime losses (app. supp. 

8 
 
R4, tabs 63, 107, 134).  Thus, Mindseeker made a written demand or written assertion 
as required to meet the definition of a claim. 
 
Next, we turn to whether the submissions adequately explained the amount of 
the claim, which requires assessing whether the contractor has included a sum certain 
in its submission.  Zafer, 40 F.4th at 1369 (assessing whether a contractor provided 
“detailed factual bases for its alleged losses, and a sum certain based on those losses” 
(quoting Hejran Hejrat, 940 F.3d at 1357-58)); Najmaa, 21-1 BCA ¶ 37,872 
at 183,899 (“To provide notice for the amount of any monetary claim, the contractor 
must provide a sum certain in its written communication to the contracting officer.”) 
(citing Sweet Star Logistic Serv., ASBCA No. 62082, 20-1 BCA ¶ 37,704 at 183,046).  
Although subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim rather than lack of 
jurisdiction, “the need to state a sum certain in submitting a claim under the CDA is a 
mandatory rule provided for in the FAR.”  ECC Int’l Constructors, LLC v. Sec’y of 
Army, 79 F.4th 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2023). 
 
Mindseeker’s submissions included a sum certain for the downtime losses 
portion of its claim, clearly asserting losses that increased as additional months passed 
from $615,199 to $677,614 to $924,384 (R4, tab 5 at 98, tab 13 at 204; app. supp. R4, 
tabs 107-08).  Indeed, the Army understood this sum certain so thoroughly that the 
Army’s contract specialist even corrected a calculation error in one of Mindseeker’s 
submissions and requested that Mindseeker re-submit with the corrected dollar amount 
(app. supp. R4, tab 109 at 554).   
 
On the other hand, Mindseeker’s request to modify the contract to increase the 
price per unit for each coded record or, alternatively, to add a new line item to 
reimburse Mindseeker for each hour of future downtime suffers from two problems.  
First, because Mindseeker seeks a modification relating to a future monetary payment, 
it has not made a “demand for something due or believed to be due” to meet the FAR’s 
requirement to demand money as a “matter of right.”  Lockheed Martin Aeronautics 
Co. v. Sec’y of Air Force, 66 F.4th 1329, 1335-36 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (internal citation 
omitted).  
 
Second, Mindseeker’s request for an increased unit price does not satisfy the 
sum certain requirement because Mindseeker’s submission fails to quantify the 
number of units (without which we cannot apply a mathematical calculation to derive 
a total sum).  Strobe Data, Inc., ASBCA No. 60123, 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,214 at 176,694-95 
(concluding that a submission seeking costs as “profit per unit” failed to state a sum 
certain because it included an “uncertain” number of units); Howell Tool & 
Fabricating, Inc., ASBCA No. 47630, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,474 at 136,866 (“Appellant’s 
14 December 1993 letter contained a request for a price increase of $21.18 per unit, 
but it is not clear for how many units appellant seeks the price increase; lacking that 

9 
 
information, the request for compensation was not for a sum certain and was, 
therefore, not a claim.”).1   
 
Ultimately, we conclude that Mindseeker has shown that its submissions meet 
the FAR definition of a “claim” regarding its downtime losses.  But, Mindseeker has 
failed to show its unit price request for future monetary payments meets the FAR 
definition of a “claim” because Mindseeker failed to make the demand as a matter of 
right and failed to include a sum certain.  We dismiss this component of its claim 
without prejudice to Mindseeker submitting a new claim and appealing it, even though 
the failure to show a sum certain constitutes a failure to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted.  ECC Int’l, 79 F.4th at 1380 (“A claim that does not state a sum 
certain has not sufficiently pleaded the elements of a claim under the CDA and may be 
denied by the contracting officer and dismissed on appeal to the boards or Court of 
Federal Claims for failure to state a claim.”).  The Federal Circuit anticipated that a 
contractor would have the opportunity “to timely revise and refile its claim to specify 
the sum certain” after a board or court dismisses for failure to state a claim.  ECC Int’l, 
79 F.4th at 1370.  While dismissal for failure to state a claim usually (but not always) 
results in dismissal with prejudice, here “dismissal without prejudice” best meets the 
Federal Circuit’s intent because it results in “dismissal without barring the plaintiff 
from returning later, to the same court, with the same underlying claim.”  Semtek Int’l 
Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505 (2001); cf. also Rollins v. 
Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 132-33 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (stating that F
ED. R. 
CIV. P. 41(b) gives a district court “discretion to dismiss a complaint without prejudice 
when the district court concludes that the circumstances so warrant” even when 
dismissal involves failure to state a claim under 12(b)(6)) (Kavanaugh, J. concurring).2   
 
1 Notably, Mindseeker did not assert before the contracting officer or argue before the 
Board that it was seeking a non-monetary remedy of reforming the Contract 
through a modification for future costs, which would have met the requirement 
to make a demand “as a matter of right.”  See Alliant Techsys., Inc. v. United 
States, 178 F.3d 1260, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that contractor made a 
demand “as a matter of right” by asserting “specific contractual and legal 
grounds for its interpretation” of a contract option).  Mindseeker also would not 
have needed to meet the sum certain requirement.  See Ebasco Envtl., ASBCA 
No. 44547, 93-3 BCA ¶ 26,220 at 130,490 (“It does not include the amount of 
the claim, but it was not necessary to do so since appellant seeks the adjustment 
of contract terms to correct a mistake rather than monetary relief.”); 
FAR 33.205(b) (“A contractor’s allegation that it is entitled to rescission or 
reformation of its contract in order to correct or mitigate the effect of a mistake 
shall be treated as a claim under the Disputes statute.”). 
2 The Federal Circuit also raised the specter of forfeiture if the government fails to 
timely challenge the absence of a sum certain.  ECC Int’l, 79 F.4th at 1380.  

10 
 
 
B. Mindseeker Certified its Claim under the CDA and Disputes Clause 
 
Starting with its December 7, 2020 submission, Mindseeker certified its claim, 
including a statement with the four required elements to certify a claim under the CDA 
and the Contract’s Disputes clause.  Compare R4, tab 6 at 124, with FAR 52.233-
1(d)(2)(iii), and 41 U.S.C. §§ 7103(b)(1)(A)-(D); see also Zafer, 40 F.4th at 1367 
(discussing the statute).  Consistent with the CDA certification requirement, 
Mindseeker’s certification states that the signatory certifies “that the claim is made in 
good faith” and has the authority “to certify the claim on behalf of the contractor.”  
(R4, tab 6 at 124) (emphasis added); FAR 52.233-1(d)(2)(iii) (emphasis added); 41 
U.S.C. §§ 7103(b)(1)(A), (D) (emphasis added).  When Mindseeker amended its 
submission in August 2021, it again included the same signed certification for CDA 
claims (R4, tab 13 at 207).  Thus, Mindseeker properly certified its claim pursuant to 
the CDA and the Disputes clause. 
 
C. Mindseeker Requested a Final Decision 
 
The request requirement “focuses on whether, objectively, the document’s 
content and the context surrounding the document’s submission put the contracting 
officer on notice that the document is a claim requesting a final decision.”  Zafer, 
40 F.4th at 1368.  “[A] contractor’s submission may merely imply a request for a 
contracting officer decision without explicitly doing so.”  BAE Sys. Ordnance Sys., 
Inc., ASBCA No. 62416, 21-1 BCA ¶ 37,800 at 183,577.  Whether explicit or implicit, 
a submission need not use any “magic words” to make a request for a contracting 
officer’s final decision.  Hejran Hejrat, 930 F.3d at 1357. 
 
Here, the content and context of the correspondence between the Army and 
Mindseeker show that Mindseeker requested a final decision for a CDA claim.  
Mindseeker’s submissions started as an REA, but that changed when Mindseeker 
certified its submission beginning in December 2020 and again certified the amended 
submission in August 2021 (R4, tab 6 at 124, tab 13 at 207).  Previously, the Army 
had provided some price adjustments after negotiations of the REA for the two Service 
Contract Act issues prior to August 2020 (R4, tab 5 at 95).  But, the Army provided no 
relief on the two issues that Mindseeker later certified, which remain in dispute in this 
appeal.   
 
After Mindseeker inquired when its REA on these two remaining issues would 
be resolved, the Army contract specialist indicated that it would be resolved in 60 days 
– the time for issuance of a contracting officer’s final decision under the CDA (app. 
 
Here, however, the Army moved to dismiss at the beginning of this appeal on 
the same day its initial responsive pleading was due.   

11 
 
supp. R4, tab 104 at 527); 41 U.S.C. § 7103(f)(2).  Next, the Army’s contract specialist 
asked Mindseeker to submit a CDA certification with its updated claim in 
December 2020, further signaling a change in how these issues would be treated (app. 
supp. R4, tab 109 at 554).  In response, Mindseeker included a CDA certification that 
“satisfies all of the certification requirements for a claim, which go beyond what is 
required for a mere request for equitable adjustment.”  Zafer, 40 F.4th at 1369; JAAAT 
Tech. Servs., ASBCA No. 61792 et al., 21-1 BCA ¶ 37,878 at 183,953 (“An REA can 
be converted into a claim by the addition of a CDA certification . . . .”).  The Federal 
Circuit has credited a certification as a key fact serving to imply a request for a final 
decision because it can show, as it did here, a “formality lacking in the earlier 
submissions.”  Hejran Hejrat, 930 F.3d at 1358 (crediting an REA certification as 
evidence of a request for a contractor’s final decision); Zafer, 40 F.4th at 1369 
(crediting CDA certification).  Indeed, “[c]ertification plays a serious role in the 
statutory scheme because it triggers a contractor’s potential liability for a fraudulent 
claim . . . [and is] designed to discourage the submission of unwarranted contractor 
claims and to encourage settlement.”  Hejran Hejrat, 930 F.3d at 1358 (quoting Skelly 
& Loy v. United States, 685 F.2d 414, 418 n.11 (Ct. Cl. 1982)). 
 
Moreover, if there was any doubt that Mindseeker had implicitly requested a 
decision, it remedied any ambiguity by explicitly requesting a decision in 
correspondence with the Army.  After amending its submission in August 2021, 
Mindseeker inquired with the Army contract specialist to request an update regarding 
its submission (app. supp. R4, tab 141 at 720).  The Army’s contract specialist 
responded the same day, stating that “the Contracting Officer’s Decision document is 
just about complete” (app. supp. R4, tab 141 at 719).  Several weeks later, Mindseeker 
sought a status update regarding the “Contracting Officer’s Decision Document” (app. 
supp. R4, tab 146 at 741).  And, then after the Army contract specialist spoke with 
Mindseeker’s president and explained it was subject to legal review, Mindseeker asked 
the contract specialist to nudge the contracting officer to have agency counsel “render 
a timely decision” (app. supp. R4, tab 145 at 737).  The Federal Circuit has greeted far 
more ambiguous contractor statements as sufficient to show an express request for a 
final decision.  James M. Ellett Constr. Co. v. United States, 93 F.3d 1537, 1544 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996) (“After ten months of fruitless negotiations, Ellett explicitly requested that 
the contracting officer settle its claim.  This demand is tantamount to an express 
request for a contracting officer’s decision.”).   
 
The Army says we should discount the CDA certification as proof of a request 
for a final decision because the Army contract specialist requested Mindseeker to add 
the CDA certification to its submission (gov’t reply br. at 3).  The Army then contends 
that Mindseeker never placed the Army on notice that it had converted its REA to a 
claim (gov’t supp. br. at 6; gov’t supp. reply br. at 3-5).  We disagree.  The Army 
placed itself on notice that Mindseeker was converting its REA to a CDA claim by 

12 
 
requesting that Mindseeker certify its REA using the CDA certification, which goes 
beyond an REA’s certification.  Zafer, 40 F.4th at 1367.  
 
The Army also asserts that Mindseeker understood it was submitting an REA, 
not a CDA claim, based on a conversation between Mindseeker’s president and the 
Army’s branch chief more than a year after Mindseeker certified its claim and months 
after explicitly asking for a decision (gov’t supp. br. at 8; gov’t supp. reply br. at 3-5).  
The Army claims that Mindseeker engaged in gamesmanship, even employing a “Jedi 
mind trick” to assert that the REA had been a claim that permitted this appeal (gov’t 
supp. br. at 10-13; gov’t supp. reply br. at 6-8).  The Federal Circuit has recognized 
that the overlap between an REA and CDA claim “might create room for 
gamesmanship” and a contracting officer might communicate whether the agency 
would issue a final decision or require the contractor to propose additional settlement 
terms to negotiate an REA.  Zafer, 40 F.4th at 1371.  However, “[t]he contracting 
officer could not retroactively turn a qualifying claim document into something else.”  
Hejran Hejrat, 930 F.3d at 1358.  Even while acknowledging the possibility of 
contractor gamesmanship, the Federal Circuit reiterated that “[r]equirements ‘that 
allow [ ] the government to unilaterally designate when a submission becomes a claim’ 
disrupt[ ] the balance of power between the government and contractors that the CDA 
sought to establish.’”  Zafer, 40 F.4th at 1370 (quoting Reflectone, 60 F.3d at 1582).   
 
Moreover, if any party engaged in gamesmanship, it was the Army, not 
Mindseeker.  Notably, the branch chief became the cognizant contracting officer for 
Mindseeker’s REA almost a year after Mindseeker’s submissions added the CDA 
certification (gov’t mot., ex. G-1 – Smith declaration ¶ 4).  If the branch chief treated 
Mindseeker’s submission as a claim, that meant interest began running over 13 months 
prior to the Army rendering a decision on the claim.  41 U.S.C. § 7109(a)(1) (“Interest 
on an amount found due a contractor on a claim shall be paid to the contractor for the 
period beginning with the date the contracting officer receives the contractor’s claim . . 
. .”); Zafer, 40 F.4th at 1370-71.  The branch chief’s decision engaged in some 
interpretive gymnastics by acknowledging that Mindseeker’s “REA included a 
Contract Disputes Act certification” but that “the language and tenor of that document, 
as well as other contemporaneous communications” indicated it should be treated as an 
REA, not a claim (R4, tab 18 at 233).  The branch chief’s analysis nearly turns the 
DFARS on its head because, typically, a CDA certification displaces an REA 
certification (not the other way around).  DFARS 243.204-71(c) (“If the contractor has 
certified a request for equitable adjustment in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 3862(a), and 
desires to convert the request to a claim under the Contract Disputes statute, the 
contractor shall certify the claim in accordance with FAR subpart 33.2.”). 
 
The Army also asserts that the REA could not be a claim because each 
submission ended with language that appeared to seek settlement rather than demand a 
decision (gov’t mot. at 4-5; gov’t reply br. at 4).  In each REA, before and after 

13 
 
certification, Mindseeker stated it was “ready, willing, and able to meet with you at 
your request and convenience to discuss” the requests in each submission (R4, tab 2 
at 75, tab 5 at 101, tab 6 at 124, tab 13 at 207).  However, hortatory language seeking 
settlement does not signify that the submission is an REA rather than a claim.  As the 
Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated, “‘[t]here is no necessary inconsistency between’ 
a claim and ‘an expressed desire to continue to mutually work toward a claim’s 
resolution.’”  Zafer, 40 F.4th at 1370 (quoting Reflectone, 60 F.3d at 1583).  Thus, 
Mindseeker’s willingness to meet and discuss its claim with the Army does not negate 
that Mindseeker converted its REA to a claim. 
 
Finally, the Army asserts that its decision does not qualify as a “final decision” 
because the decision lacks the required notice of appeal rights to the contractor, and 
Mindseeker failed to advise the Army of this deficiency (gov’t supp. br. at 4-5, 8, 11).  
The CDA requires that a contracting officer’s final decision must provide a contractor 
with notice of its right to appeal to a board or file suit at the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims.  41 U.S.C. § 7103(e) (“The contracting officer’s decision shall state the 
reasons for the decision reached and shall inform the contractor of the contractor’s 
rights as provided in this chapter.”); FAR 33.211(a)(4)(v).  However, the CDA 
requires the contracting officer to include these appeal rights for the “protection of the 
contractor,” not the government.  Decker & Co v. West, 76 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 
1996); Kellogg, 22-1 BCA ¶ 37,974 at 184,429.  No harm arises where a contractor 
does not detrimentally rely on an agency’s failure to include the required CDA appeal 
rights in a contracting officer’s final decision.  Fla. Dep’t of Ins. v. United States, 
81 F.3d 1093, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Kellogg, 22-1 BCA ¶ 37,974 at 184,429.  
Mindseeker timely appealed the contracting officer’s final decision despite the 
agency’s failure to provide a notice of appeal rights.  Thus, “the failure to include 
appeal rights, will not render the otherwise valid final decision into an invalid 
decision.”  JAAAT, 21-1 BCA ¶ 37,878 at 183,951.   
III. Mindseeker Abandoned Its Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Allegation 
 
In its complaint, Mindseeker alleges:  “[A]s no remedial action was taken to 
address the defective AVHE uptime stated in the Contract’s PWS Paragraph 1.5.1.1, 
the government’s failure to act in good faith when considering Mindseeker’s REA was 
a breach of contract” (compl. ¶ 8; amend. compl. ¶ 8).  The Army asserts that 
Mindseeker failed to present this allegation to the contracting officer and, thus, the 
Board lacks jurisdiction to hear this allegation (gov’t mot. at 8; gov’t reply br. at 6-8); 
41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(1) (“Each claim by a contractor against the Federal Government 
relating to a contract shall be submitted to the contracting officer for a decision.”); 
Anthony & Gordon Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 61916, 21-1 BCA ¶ 37,887 at 184,001.  
Mindseeker has not responded to the Army’s argument.  Given Mindseeker’s complete 
failure to defend its breach allegation, “we consider this issue to have been 

14 
 
abandoned.”  Cellular Materials Int’l, Inc., ASBCA No. 61408, 22-1 BCA ¶ 38,022 
at 184,645.  Thus, we strike this breach allegation from the complaint. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we deny the Army’s motion to dismiss the downtime 
losses portion of Mindseeker’s claim because Mindseeker converted that portion of its 
REA to a claim.  We dismiss, without prejudice, the portion of Mindseeker’s claim 
seeking a modification to increase the per unit price per coded record or include a new 
contract line item for future system downtime hours.  Finally, we strike Mindseeker’s 
assertion of a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing from the complaint. 
 
 Dated:  August 29, 2024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DANIEL S. HERZFELD 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
I concur 
 
 
 
OWEN C. WILSON 
Administrative Judge 
Acting Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 I concur 
 
 
 
 MICHAEL N. O’CONNELL 
Administrative Judge 
Vice Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 
  

15 
 
 
 I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the 
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA No. 63197, Appeal of 
Mindseeker, Inc., rendered in conformance with the Board’s Charter. 
 
 Dated:  August 29, 2024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PAULLA K. GATES-LEWIS 
Recorder, Armed Services 
Board of Contract Appeals