Parsons Government Services, Inc.
Docket: ASBCA 60662
Decision date: 2025-06-03

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ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 
DECISION BY ADMINSTRATIVE JUDGE WOODROW ON 
APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
T
his dispute centers around a requirements contract awarded to Parsons 
Government Services, Inc. (Parsons) for the provision of Military Operations in Urban 
Terrain (MOUT) training systems (the HS MOUT contract).  Parsons contends that the 
HS MOUT contract obligated the government to procure all of its urban training 
systems needs from Parsons during this period.  However, the government awarded 
other contracts for allegedly similar work to different companies, prompting Parsons 
to allege a breach of the contract’s requirements clause.  Parsons argues the contract 
covered a broad range of MOUT supplies and services, while the government 
maintains its obligations were limited to specific contract line item numbers (CLINs) 
requested by the Marine Corps’ training center acquisition arm (the Marine Corps 
System Command Program Manager for Training Systems or PM TRASYS). 
P
arsons moves for partial summary judgment on Parsons’ first claim issue, 
alleging that the government breached the requirements provision of the contract, 
as alleged in Parsons’ First Cause of Action (compl. ¶¶ 94-99).  We deny the motion, 
holding that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment. 
Appeal of - )  
)  
Parsons Government Services, Inc. ) ASBCA No. 60662 
)  
Under Contract No. M67854-09-D-8000 )  
APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT: Michael R. Rizzo, Esq. 
Mary E. Buxton, Esq. 
  Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP 
  Los Angeles, CA 
APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: Allison M. McDade, Esq. 
  Navy Chief Trial Attorney 
Anthony Hicks, Esq. 
  Trial Attorney 

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STATEMENT OF FACTS (SOF) FOR PURPOSES OF THE MOTION 
 
A.  HS MOUT Contract 
 
1.  On November 10, 2008, Parsons submitted to PM TRASYS its technical 
proposal in response to Solicitation No. M67854-07-R-8147 for Military Operations 
in Urban Terrain (MOUT) Training Systems (gov’t resp., ex. B at GOVPROD967606, 
946124-25).  PM TRASYS “serves as the training systems acquisition arm for the 
Marine Corps” and is the “one specific agency” with the responsibility to ensure that 
US Marines “receive proper material, weaponry, tutelage, education, equipment and 
systems for training” (gov’t resp., ex. C at GOVPROD1811368-69). 
 
2.  On March 18, 2009, PM TRASYS awarded Contract No. M67854-09-D-
8000, a requirements contract, to Parsons (R4, tab 1 at 1) (HS MOUT contract).  The 
contract’s period of performance spanned from March 2009 to March 2014.  HS 
MOUT stands for Home Station Military Operations in Urban Terrain.  HS MOUT 
systems provide a tactical training environment for US Marines prior to their 
deployment to the Middle East and are comprised of structures, buildings, and 
components that Parsons would assemble to replicate environments that soldiers would 
encounter in the Middle East.  The purpose of a MOUT training system is “to ensure 
that Marines are properly trained prior to deployment for real world operations in the 
Third World” (R4, tab 1 at 1139). 
 
3.  The contract’s scope of work (SOW) stated that the contractor was to 
“perform a mix of engineering analysis, design, fabrication, and installation of MOUT 
Training Systems” and that the systems were to be “non-permanent, modular, 
reconfigurable, removable” (R4, tab 2A at 1295). 
 
4.  The estimated value of the HS MOUT Contract was approximately $978 
million (R4, tab 1 at 1). 
 
B.  CLINs in the HS MOUT Contract 
 
5.  The contract details an urban terrain training system built from standard, 
commercially available materials (R4, tab 1B at 1169).  The training system is to be 
modular, non-permanent, reconfigurable, and relocatable (id. at 1169, 1172; R4, 
tab 1A at 1139). 
 
6.  The contract allows for the MOUT training systems to be used for non-live 
fire, live-fire, or a combination of both types of training, and includes structures, 
utilities, roads, tunnels, courtyards, and targets (R4, tab 1A at 1139; tab 1B at 1169). 
 

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7.  The contract included nearly 5000 CLINs detailing supplies and services, as 
outlined in Section B of the contract (R4, tab 1 at 1-967). 
 
8.  CLINs 0001-0003, 1642-1644, 2642-2644, and 3642-3644 are firm-fixed 
price CLINs dedicated to design engineering (R4, tab 1 at 2-3, 322-23, 643-44, 965-
66). 
 
9.  CLINs 0004, 1646, 2646, and 3646 are also firm-fixed price and cover the 
provision of technical data and information reports (R4, tab 1 at 3, 323, 645, 966). 
 
10.  CLINs 1000-1080, 2000-2080, and 3000-3080 are firm-fixed price and 
relate to live-fire shoot house structures and training, with specifications detailed in 
contract section 3.7 (R4, tab 1 at 4-44, 324-64, 645-85; tab 1B at 1178-86).  These 
include components like façade systems and ballistic protection (id. at 44-70, 364-90, 
686-711). 
 
11.  CLINs 1133-1498, 2133-2498, and 3133-3498 are firm-fixed price and 
pertain to non-live fire shoot house structures and training, detailed in contract 
section 3.8 (R4, tab 1 at 70-253, 390-573, 712-894; tab 1B at 1186-1200).  These 
include items like minarets and guard towers (id. at 196-253, 516-573, 838-894). 
 
12.  CLINs 1499-1507, 2499-2507, and 3499-3507 are firm-fixed price and 
cover relocatable and modular building configurations, with specifications in contract 
section 3.9 (R4, tab 1 at 253-57, 573-77, 895-99; tab 1B at 1200-20). 
 
13.  CLINs 1508-1510, 2508-2510, and 3508-3510 are time and material 
CLINs, covering labor, materials, and professional services for training site 
preparation (R4, tab 1 at 258, 578, 899-900, 1220-38). 
 
14.  CLINs 1511-1641, 2511-2641, and 3511-3641 cover additional items like 
faux elements, HVAC systems, and electrical systems, at the discretion of PM 
TRASYS (R4, tab 1 at 259-321, 579-642, 901-64). 
 
15.  CLINs 4000-4999 are designated as “TBD” (To Be Determined) “with 
respect to a particular geographic region or assignment” (R4, tab 1 at 967). 
 
16.  The HS MOUT contract includes CLINs 1645, 2645, and 3645 for “over 
and above” (OAWR) work requests, allowing for flexibility in addressing unforeseen 
training requirements (R4, tab 1 at 323, 644, 966, 1169). 
  

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C.  Exceptions to the Requirements Provision 
 
17.  The HS MOUT contract excludes certain work from Parsons’ 
responsibilities, including work related to the CA MOUT contract, the TVCS 
Instrumentation contract installation, and the Targetry contract (app. mot. at 13-14; 
R4, tab 1A at 1139). 
 
D.  Relevant FAR Clauses in the HS MOUT Contract 
 
18.  The contract incorporated Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) clause 
52.216-21, REQUIREMENTS (OCT 1995), which states, in relevant part: 
 
[T]he Government shall order from the Contractor all the 
supplies or services specified in the Schedule that are 
required to be purchased by the Government activity or 
activities specified in the Schedule. 
 
(R4, tab 1 at 1126-27) 
 
19.  The HS MOUT contract included an order limitation of $250,000 as set 
forth in FAR 52.216-19, ORDER LIMITATIONS (OCT 1995): 
 
Minimum Order... When the Government requires supplies 
or services covered by this contract in an amount of less 
than $250,000 . . . the Government is not obligated to 
purchase, nor is the Contractor obligated to furnish, those 
supplies or services under the contract. 
 
(R4, tab 1 at 1126) 
 
20.  In total, the government issued multiple delivery orders to Parsons for a 
total contract value of approximately $185 million in requirements (app. mot. at 3).  
 
E.  The ADA Investigation 
 
21.  In 2015, the Department of the Navy initiated an Anti-Deficiency Act 
(ADA) violation investigation into PM TRASYS’ conduct under the HS MOUT 
Contract (app. supp. R4, tab 27).  The final investigative report found total violations 
in the amount of $70,133,853.19 under 31 U.S.C. § 1517(a) and 31 U.S.C. 
§ 1341(a)(l)(A) on 17 of the 34 Delivery Orders issued under the HS MOUT contract 
(id. at 2).  The violations generally involved the incorrect use of funds, other than 
military construction (MILCON) funds, because the contract required construction 
(R4, tab 27 at 8-36).  The ADA Report found that the violations occurred between 

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2009, when the HS MOUT Contract was awarded, and 2013, when the final funding 
modifications were processed (id. at 2). 
 
F.  Work Allegedly Diverted to Other Contractors 
 
22.  On January 22, 2008, prior to the award of the HS MOUT contract, PM 
TRAYSYS awarded contract 8017 to Ahntech, Inc. (Ahntech) (app. supp. R4, tab 6 
at 1).  The contract was for “Contractor Operation and Maintenance Services (COMS) 
with Supply Support” for Marine Corps facilities at 29 Palms, California and Yuma, 
Arizona (id. at 111, 116). 
 
23.  In its complaint, Parsons identified 20 contracts that were awarded to 
contractors other than Parsons during the period from June 2009 to March 2014 and 
that allegedly were for work that was within the HS MOUT scope of work (compl. 
¶¶ 24, 25). 
 
24.  In its supplemental brief, Parsons identified an additional six contracts that 
allegedly were diverted to other contractors during the HS MOUT period of 
performance (app. supplemental br. 4-7). 
 
I.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Parsons filed a motion for partial summary judgment, supported by a 
declaration from counsel and attached documentation.  The Government filed a 
response.  On April 12, 2024, Parsons filed supplemental briefing and supplemental 
facts in support of its original motion for partial summary judgment.  In its 
supplemental brief, Parsons cited the findings of an internal Army criminal 
investigation into alleged Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA) violations, which concluded that 
the government improperly used non-MILCON (military construction) funds for 
construction work under the HS MOUT contract.  Parsons argued this motivated the 
government to divert work to other contractors to avoid further funding violations and 
undermined the government’s argument that diverted construction contracts were 
outside the scope of the HS MOUT contract.  (App. supplemental br. at 2-3, 8).  
Additionally, Parsons identified six new diverted contracts totaling nearly $25M, 
further evidencing a pattern of diversion and increasing its claimed damages.  
 
The government has not yet filed a response to Parson’s supplemental brief 
because it is awaiting further action from the Board on the pending motion for partial 
summary judgment (Bd. corr. ltr. dtd. September 5, 2024). 
 
On March 11, 2025, Parsons filed a request to bifurcate entitlement and 
quantum on the issues pending in its motion for partial summary judgment.  On 

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April 1, 2025, the government wrote stating its opposition to bifurcation and asking 
the Board to rule upon appellant’s motion as submitted. 
 
II.  THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS 
 
Parsons argues that the HS MOUT Contract was a requirements contract, 
obligating the government to order all its needs for MOUT training systems from 
Parsons during the contract’s period of performance from March 2009 to March 2014 
(app. mot. at 8; app. supplemental br. at 7).  Parsons claims that the government 
breached the contract by awarding at least 26 other contracts, valued at over $102 
million, to different companies for work that fell within the scope of the HS MOUT 
contract (app. mot. at 6; app. supplemental br. at 7-8).  Parsons contends that these 
diverted contracts covered MOUT supplies and services that Parsons was capable 
of providing under the broad scope of its contract, as evidenced by the contract’s 
language, the large number of CLINs, and the inclusion of an “over and above work 
request” (OAWR) clause (app. mot. at 12; app. supplemental br. at 7).  Parsons also 
argues that none of the limited exceptions to the requirements clause applied to these 
diverted contracts (app. mot. at 13; app. supplemental br. at 8).  
 
In its supplemental brief, Parsons highlights an Army investigation finding that 
the government improperly used non-MILCON funds for construction under the HS 
MOUT contract, arguing this motivated the government to divert work to other 
contractors to avoid further ADA violations, thus undermining the government’s 
argument that the diverted work was outside the scope of the original contract. 
 
Additionally, Parsons identified six new diverted contracts totaling nearly 
$25M, further evidencing a pattern of diversion and increasing its claimed damages.  
These contracts, Parsons argues, fall within the HS MOUT Contract scope and were 
even categorized as “HS MOUT” by PM TRASYS.  (App. supplemental br. at 7, 9, 
11)  As a result of the breach, Parsons claims financial harm and seeks damages for 
lost profits, overhead, and G&A (app. mot at 15; app. supplemental br. at 11). 
 
Conversely, the government maintains that its contractual obligation was 
limited to specific CLINs requested by PM TRASYS for non-permanent, 
reconfigurable MOUT systems.  The government argues the “over and above work 
request” clause was discretionary (gov’t resp. at 11-12).  For each of the diverted 
contracts, the government argues that the work was different from what Parsons was 
contracted to provide, often citing differences in the type of work (e.g., construction, 
maintenance), the beneficiary (e.g., Navy instead of Marines), or the awarding agency 
(gov’t resp. at 20-44).  The government also contends that some of the diverted 
contracts fell under specific exceptions in the HS MOUT contract, such as work 
associated with other named contracts, contracts below a certain dollar threshold, or 

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set-asides for small businesses (id. at 12, 21-30, 35-44).  Finally, the government 
challenges the accuracy and reliability of Parsons’ damage calculations (id. at 17-19). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
A.  Summary Judgment Standard 
 
We will grant summary judgment only if there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).  A material fact is one that may affect the 
outcome of the decision.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 
(1986). As the moving party, Parsons bears the burden of establishing the absence of 
any genuine issue of material fact, and we must resolve all significant doubt over 
factual issues in favor of the government.  Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 
812 F.2d 1387, 1390-91 (Fed. Cir. 1987).  Once Parsons has met its burden of 
establishing the absence of disputed material facts, then the government must set forth 
specific facts, not conclusory statements or bare assertions, to defeat the motion.  Pure 
Gold, Inc. v. Syntex (U.S.A.), Inc., 739 F.2d 624, 626-27 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  “A genuine 
issue of material fact arises when the nonmovant presents sufficient evidence upon 
which a reasonable fact finder, drawing the requisite inferences and applying the 
applicable evidentiary standard, could decide the issue in favor of the nonmovant.”  
C. Sanchez and Son, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1539, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 
Requirements contracts prioritize a buyer’s operational flexibility, allowing 
them to adjust consumption based on unpredictable needs – often in exchange for a 
premium price.  See MPG West, ASBCA No. 61100 et al., 22-1 BCA ¶ 38,203 
at 185,534 (on motion for reconsideration, describing Federal Circuit’s holding in 
Tech. Assistance, 150 F.3d at 1372).  While buyers have significant freedom to 
determine their requirements, this is not unlimited.  The law requires buyers to act in 
good faith, meaning variations in requirements must be driven by legitimate business 
reasons, not simply a desire to renegotiate the contract or avoid obligations.  
Decreasing requirements solely to gain a better deal is considered bad faith and can be 
legally challenged to protect the seller from undue hardship.  See Tech. Assistance 
Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 150 F.3d 1369, 1372, 1373-1374 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citations 
omitted).   
 
The “party alleging a breach of contract bears the burden of proving the 
breach.”  Tech. Assistance Int’l, 150 F.3d at 1373 (citing Perry v. Department of the 
Army, 992 F.2d 1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).  Thus, Parsons must prove that the 
government lacked a legitimate business reason for using other contractors.  
Otherwise, the government “will be presumed to have varied its requirements for valid 
business reasons, i.e., to have acted in good faith, and will not be liable for the change 
in requirements.”  Tech. Assistance In’l, 150 F.3d at 1373. 

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B.  Summary Judgment is Not Appropriate  
 
This appeal is not suitable for summary judgment at this stage for several 
reasons.  Initially, Parsons has not demonstrated the government acted in bad faith or 
lacked a legitimate business reason for using other contractors.  In its motion, Parsons 
does not dispute the initial government estimate of $978 million; instead, it argues the 
actual $184.4 million spent proves the government wrongly diverted work elsewhere 
(app. mot. at 10).  However, even if true, this argument does not provide enough 
evidence to demonstrate the government lacked a legitimate business reason for using 
other contractors. 
 
Second, the parties have a fundamental disagreement about what “supplies or 
services specified in the Schedule” of the contract actually covers.  This disagreement, 
and Parsons’ use of evidence outside the contract to support its interpretation, shows 
that the scope of this clause cannot be determined without further evidence, as the 
record is not sufficiently developed to resolve the dispute.  Finally, the parties disagree 
on many important facts relevant to the ultimate decision in this case. 
 
1.  A Hearing is Necessary to Determine the Scope of the Requirements 
Clause 
 
The HS MOUT contract incorporated the FAR clause 52.216-21 (Requirements), 
which states, in relevant part: 
 
[T]he Government shall order from the Contractor all the 
supplies or services specified in the Schedule that are 
required to be purchased by the Government activity or 
activities specified in the Schedule.  
 
(SOF ¶ 18) 
 
This language is not intrinsically ambiguous.  However, Parsons and the 
government fundamentally disagree on the scope of the requirements clause, 
specifically regarding what constitutes “supplies or services specified in the Schedule. . 
. .” (id.).  The schedule of supplies and services encompasses nearly 5000 separate line 
items (SOF ¶ 7).  Our precedent requires us to compare the work done on each of the 
allegedly diverted contracts to the “supplies or services specified in the Schedule.”  
D.J Miller, 11-BCA ¶ 34,856 at 171,468.   
 
Parsons advocates for a broad interpretation encompassing various MOUT-
related needs (app. mot. at 8-10; app. reply at 5-12), while the government argues for a 
narrow interpretation limited to specific CLINs for design, fabrication, and installation 
of MOUT training systems (gov’t resp. at 9-13).  This fundamental disagreement over 

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the scope of the requirements clause demonstrates that the language is susceptible to 
more than one reasonable interpretation.  Barron Bancshares, Inc. v. United States, 
366 F.3d 1360, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
 
Parsons supports its broader interpretation of the requirements clause with the 
contracting officer’s statement and extensive testimony from other government 
employees (app. mot. at 12-15; app. reply at 14-16).  This reliance on extrinsic 
evidence further demonstrates that the contract language is ambiguous.  As the 
Federal Circuit held in Beta Sys., Inc. v. United States, 838 F.2d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1988), 
summary judgment is inappropriate when contract terms require consideration of 
external evidence.  838 F.2d at 1183 (citation omitted); see Sauer Constr., LLC, 
ASBCA No. 63738, 25-1 BCA ¶ 38,744 at 188,345 (citing Beta Sys., Inc., 838 F.2d 
at 1183 for the same proposition).  
 
The parties also make arguments concerning the limiting provisions of the 
requirements clause, such as specific exclusions, minimum dollar thresholds, and 
specific purchase requirements (app. mot. at 13-14; gov’t resp. at 12-13).  This debate 
suggests that requirements clause language is not entirely clear or comprehensive on 
its own.  The parties also disagree regarding the intended use and discretion of the 
“over and above work request” (OAWR) clause.  Parsons argues for a mandatory 
interpretation (app. reply at 15-16; app. supplemental br. at 7), while the government 
contends its use was discretionary (gov’t resp. at 11, 15). 
 
Finally, in its supplemental brief, Parsons introduces extrinsic evidence 
concerning an internal ADA investigation.  The ADA investigation found significant 
funding violations and concluded that the work performed by Parsons required 
military construction (MILCON) funds but was instead paid for with other 
appropriations.  Parsons contends that these findings undermine the government’s 
argument that the HS MOUT Contract included only supply and service work and 
did not include construction work (app. supplemental br. at 10-11).  Not only does this 
argument concerning the scope of the clause demonstrate the clause’s ambiguity, but 
Parsons’ reliance upon extrinsic evidence further undermines any contention that the 
scope of the requirements clause cannot be resolved without a hearing. 
 
2.  Disputed Facts Preclude Summary Judgment 
 
In addition to the ambiguity surrounding the scope of the requirements clause, 
the government raises a host of disputed facts concerning whether the allegedly 
diverted contracts were actually within the scope of Parsons’ contract, pointing to 
differences in the type of work, the beneficiary, and the awarding agency for each 
contract (gov’t resp. at 20 - 45).  Additionally, the government asserts that there are 
factual disputes concerning the applicability of various contractual exceptions and 

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limitations (gov’t resp. at 12), as well as whether Parsons possessed the capability 
to perform the work that was allegedly diverted. 
 
We conclude that summary judgment is not appropriate because numerous 
factual disputes remain regarding whether the government was obligated to award any 
of the 26 contracts allegedly diverted to other contractors to Parsons.  Instead of 
addressing each contract individually, we will focus on one contract as an example of 
the factual issues that must be resolved at hearing. 
 
3.  Disputed Facts Regarding the Ahntech Contract 
 
Parsons argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the 
government breached the requirements clause by awarding three delivery orders 
to Ahntech, Inc. under Contract No. M67854-08-C-8017.  Parsons claims that the 
work required of Ahntech, including shock-absorbing concrete (SACON) repair and 
maintenance for container-type structures, as well as the supply of live fire MOUTS, 
MOUT assault courses, and Conex boxes, fell within the scope of the HS MOUT 
Contract.  Parsons compares the specific work elements in the Ahntech contract to the 
CLINs in the HS MOUT Contract to demonstrate this overlap (app. mot. at 3-4). 
 
In response, the government raises several key areas of factual dispute.  First, 
the government contends that it awarded the base Ahntech contract (No. M67854-08-
C-8017) to Ahntech before the HS MOUT Contract, relieving it of any obligation to 
award that work to Parsons (gov’t resp. at 20-22).  The parties also disagree over the 
factual question of whether the work was procured by separate delivery orders or 
modifications to the base contract.  Parsons argues the relevant actions were delivery 
orders issued during the HS MOUT contract period (app. reply at 21-23).  However, 
the government maintains these were not delivery orders at all, but were contract 
modifications; as such, there is a genuine issue of material fact about whether Parsons 
was entitled to work under that modification (gov’t resp. at 21; gov’t facts at 25).  This 
disagreement – whether the government modified the contract or issued delivery 
orders for the disputed work – is a central factual issue, and it remains unclear whether 
either action would constitute a breach of the requirements clause.   
 
Second, the government argues that one of the modifications to the Ahntech 
contract increased its value by only $244,548.87 – an amount below the $250,000 
ordering threshold in the HS MOUT contract, and therefore was not work Parsons was 
entitled to perform (gov’t resp. at 21).  Parsons counters that the total work awarded to 
Ahntech exceeded $2 million, rendering the individual modification amount irrelevant.  
This creates a factual dispute over the overall value of the Ahntech contract increase 
and whether it was done to circumvent the ordering requirements of the HS-MOUT 
contract. 

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Third, the government disputes Parsons’ claim that the Ahntech contract had 
the same scope of work as the HS MOUT Contract.  The government contends that the 
Ahntech contract involved maintenance of live fire MOUTS, MOUT assault courses, 
and Conex boxes – not their supply (gov’t facts at 26).  It also disputes that the real 
property maintenance or explosive ordinance disposal storage container requirements 
in the Ahntech contract were covered by any corresponding CLINs in the HS MOUT 
contract (gov’t facts at 26, 27).  Finally, the government points out that the Ahntech 
contract, unlike the HS MOUT contract, lacked CLINs for live fire shoot houses and 
cement, further challenging any assertion of equivalence (gov’t facts at 28).  Parsons, 
however, contends that it did similar work under the HS MOUT contract, thereby 
demonstrating that it could have performed the work in the Ahntech contract (app. 
reply at 33). 
 
These discrepancies cannot be resolved by reviewing the contracts alone.  The 
Board must hear testimony about the work actually performed under both contracts 
to determine if Parsons was capable of performing the work assigned to Ahntech.  
Parsons’ assertion of overlap is insufficient to meet the standard for summary 
judgment.  As the Federal Circuit held in Mingus, any significant factual doubt must 
be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.  812 F.2d 1390-91. 
 
4.  Disputed Facts Regarding Parsons’ Damage Calculations 
 
In its most recent filing before the Board, Parsons requested that we bifurcate 
entitlement and quantum on the issues pending in its motion for partial summary 
judgment.  On April 1, 2025, the government wrote stating its opposition to bifurcation 
and asking the Board to rule upon appellant’s motion as submitted.  Because we 
conclude material factual disputes preclude us from granting summary judgment as to 
entitlement, there is no need to reach any conclusions relating to quantum.   
 
CONCLUSION  
 
For these reasons, we deny Parsons’ motion for partial summary judgment. 
 
 Dated:  June 3, 2025 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Signatures continued) 
 
 
 
KENNETH D. WOODROW 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 

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I concur 
OWEN C. WILSON 
Administrative Judge 
Acting Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
I concur 
MICHAEL N. O’CONNELL 
Administrative Judge 
Vice Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
I c
ertify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the 
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA No. 60662, Appeal of Parsons 
Government Services, Inc., rendered in conformance with the Board’s Charter. 
D
ated:  June 3, 2025 
PAULLA K. GATES-LEWIS 
Recorder, Armed Services 
Board of Contract Appeals