Globe Trailer Manufacturing, Inc.
Docket: ASBCA 60713, ASBCA 60716
Decision date: 2021-01-28

ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 
 
Appeal of -- ) 
 ) 
Globe Trailer Manufacturing, Inc. ) 
 ) 
Under Contract No. W56HZV-11-D-0204  ) 
 
APPEARANCE FOR THE APPELLANT: Rodney W. Stieger, Esq. 
  Stinson LLP 
  Denver, CO 
  
APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: Arthur M. Taylor, Esq. 
  DCMA Chief Trial Attorney 
Michael T. Patterson, Esq. 
  Trial Attorney 
  Defense Contract Management Agency 
  Chantilly, VA 
 
OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE D’ALESSANDRIS 
 
 Pending before the Board is the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction filed by respondent, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA or 
government).  Appellant, Globe Trailer Manufacturing, Inc. (Globe) appeals from what 
it contends to be the deemed denial of its claim asserting constructive changes to a 
contract that was terminated for convenience in March 2014.  In October 2014, Globe 
filed a termination settlement proposal (TSP I) asserting entitlement to $7.2 million.  
The contracting officer found partial merit and issued a final decision granting Globe 
$987 thousand.  In December 2016, Globe appealed to the Board where the appeal was 
docketed as ASBCA No. 60979.  In June 2017, Globe submitted a revised TSP (TSP II), 
asserting entitlement to $21 million for a termination based on the commercial item 
clause and its asserted constructive changes to the contract.  The DCMA contracting 
officer did not issue a final decision regarding TSP II.  In July 2019, the Board issued its 
decision on cross-motions for summary judgment regarding the proper calculation of a 
termination settlement for a contract requiring first item testing.  Globe Trailer Mfg., 
Inc., ASBCA No. 60979, 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,392.  We held that Globe’s recovery in its TSP 
was limited to the first-item test contract line item amounts, and noted that Globe’s 
constructive change allegations were not properly before the Board.  Id. at 181,786.   
 
 Following the Board’s decision, the parties again entered into settlement 
discussions.  During these discussions, Globe provided government counsel with additional 
documentation, which it characterized as a supplement to its June 2017 TSP (TSP II 
Supplement) (gov’t mot., ex. G-7).  The transmittal email requested a contracting officer’s 
ASBCA No.  62594 

2 
decision on the costs (id.).  The email attached damages calculations and supporting 
documentation for its constructive change allegations (gov’t mot., exs. G-8 to -9).  The 
TSP II Supplement also included a certification of the claimed constructive change costs 
(id., ex. G-10).  The government subsequently informed Globe that the contracting officer 
would not issue a final decision, and Globe appealed to Board on the basis of a deemed 
denial.   
 
 The government filed a motion to dismiss Globe’s appeal for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, alleging that there was not a valid claim because the TSP II 
Supplement was provided to government counsel, rather than a contracting officer.  
The government additionally alleges that jurisdiction is lacking because the June 2017 
TSP II did not contain a sum certain while the TSP II Supplement did not request a 
final decision, and thus there was not a valid claim because no single document 
presented a valid claim.  We hold that the July 2017 TSP II was not a valid claim, but 
that the TSP II Supplement is a valid claim, and that Global has properly appealed 
from the deemed denial of that claim, and deny the government’s motion.   
 
STATEMENT OF FACTS (SOF) FOR PURPOSES OF THE MOTION 
 
On September 21, 2011, the U.S. Army awarded Contract No. W56HZV-11-D-0204 
and Delivery Order 0001 to Globe.  The Contract was a five-year requirements contract for 
M870A4 low-bed semitrailers and related deliverables.  (Compl. ¶ 7)1  Globe alleges that 
the government directed multiple constructive changes to the contract (compl. ¶¶ 13-48).   
 
Relevant to this appeal, the contract contained two termination for convenience 
clauses:  FAR 52.212-4(l) for commercial items; and the standard clause, FAR 52.249-2 
(compl. ¶ 50).  On March 11, 2014, the U.S. Army terminated the Contract for 
convenience of the Government stating that the termination was issued pursuant to the 
FAR 52.212-4(l) termination for convenience clause for commercial item contracts 
(compl. ¶ 49).  On November 12, 2014, Globe submitted its termination settlement 
proposal.  Pursuant to the government’s direction, Globe used Standard Form 1435 for 
an inventory-basis settlement proposal.  (Compl. ¶ 51)  On October 7, 2016, the 
Termination Contracting Officer (TCO) issued a final decision, applying the 
commercial item termination for convenience clause, and awarding Globe $987,345.76 
(compl. ¶¶ 52-53).   
 
On December 21, 2016, Globe appealed the TCO’s final decision to the Board 
(compl. ¶ 54).  The Board docketed the appeal as ASBCA No. 60979.  On February 24, 
                                              
1 We assume the truth of the non-jurisdictional allegations in Globe’s complaint for the 
purposes of this motion.  However, the Board is permitted to make findings of 
fact regarding disputed jurisdictional facts.  L-3 Communications Integrated 
Sys., L.P., ASBCA Nos. 60713, 60716, 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,865 at 179,625. 

3 
2017, the parties jointly requested that the Board suspend the proceedings to allow 
Globe to file a commercial items settlement proposal, and a traditional government 
contract settlement proposal (compl. ¶ 55).  On June 30, 2017, Globe submitted a 
revised termination settlement proposal.  In its revised proposal, Globe claimed it was 
entitled to additional money under both the commercial items and standard termination 
clauses.  Moreover, Globe asserted it was entitled to additional compensation for 
constructive changes.  (Compl. ¶¶ 58-59)  Specifically, the TSP II alleged constructive 
changes including:  (1) a change to the gross vehicle weight; (2) a requirement to build 
deck extensions outside the payload area; (3) designating defective electrical 
specifications; (4) requiring a trailer attachment shackle for the loaded prime mover; 
(5) requiring a quality assurance plan exceeding contract specifications; 
(6) “recommending” that Globe provide an additional trailer and additional testing; and, 
(7) other miscellaneous changes (gov’t mot., ex. G-5 at 39-46).  Globe’s TSP II 
contained a detailed calculation of its asserted damages (id. at 53-82), including a profit 
calculation (id. at 94-112); however, Globe’s calculations did not break-out the costs 
associated with the asserted constructive changes.  Rather, Globe’s TSP II claimed its 
costs for all work it performed in a single calculation, without breaking-out the cost of 
the asserted extra-contractual constructive changes (id. at 53-82).    
 
After the parties’ settlement negotiations reached an impasse, the parties filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment in ASBCA No. 60979 (compl. ¶ 62).  At the 
time of the cross-motions, the contracting officer had not issued a final decision on 
Globe’s revised settlement proposal, and Globe had not appealed from a deemed 
denial of its revised settlement proposal (compl. ¶ 65).  On July 11, 2019, the Board 
issued its decision on the cross-motions for summary judgment regarding the proper 
calculation of a termination settlement in a contract requiring first item testing.  Globe 
Trailer, 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,392.  With our jurisdiction premised solely upon an appeal of 
TSP I, we held that Globe’s recovery was limited to the first-item test contract line 
item amounts, because its contract provided that work beyond first-item tests was 
performed at Globe’s risk.  Id. at 181,786.  We additionally noted that “[r]esolution of 
Globe’s motion, to the extent it alleges constructive change either as a factual issue 
regarding the percentage of contract work completed in the termination for 
convenience provision, or as a stand-alone basis for recovery, is not properly before 
the Board.”  Id.    
 
Following receipt of the Board’s decision, the parties again entered into 
settlement negotiations (compl. ¶ 66).  On February 4, 2020, Globe submitted what it 
characterized as a position statement to the termination contracting officer (compl. ¶ 66).  
In response, the government requested a cost breakdown for the asserted constructive 
changes (compl. ¶ 67).  By email on June 11, 2020, Globe provided supplemental 
materials to the government, including a spreadsheet with a cost breakdown for the 
asserted constructive changes (compl. ¶ 68).  Globe included a certification for the 

4 
supplemental materials (id.).  The email was addressed and sent to government counsel 
(gov’t mot., ex. G-7).  The email provided in part: 
 
I’m attaching the supplemental materials reflecting the sum 
certain sought in Globe’s constructive change claim, along 
with a certification of the updated amount.  Globe’s 
constructive claim was included in its June 2017 TSP and 
also addressed in its most recent Position Statement 
provided to the government on February 4, 2020 (which 
I’ve attached here as well for your convenience).   
 
The supplemental sum certain materials include a summary 
pdf (which provides a high-level overview of the 
spreadsheet data), and an excel spreadsheet containing the 
back-up data supporting Globe’s constructive change 
claim.   
 
We look forward to receiving the Contracting Officer’s 
Final Decision on or before July 13, 2020.   
 
(Id.) 
 
The summary file attached to the email asserted entitlement in the amount of 
$4,565,642.58 (gov’t mot., ex. G-8).  The certification was attached to a separate email, 
also sent on June 11, 2020, and again addressed and sent to government counsel (gov’t 
mot., ex. G-10).  The certification, signed by Globe’s President, Jeffrey K. Walters, Sr., 
provides: 
 
This is to certify that this Constructive Change Costs 
Supplement to the June 30, 2017 Termination Settlement 
Proposal is made in good faith, that the supporting data are 
accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and 
belief, that the amount claimed accurately reflects the 
termination costs for which the contractor believes the 
Government is liable and that I am duly authorized to 
certify this termination settlement proposal on behalf of the 
contractor.   
 
(Id.) 
 
 The government states in its motion to dismiss that government counsel 
forwarded Globe’s February 4, 2020 position statement, and the June 11, 2020 emails 
to the contracting officer on June 15, 2020 (gov’t mot. at 5).  By email on June 22, 

5 
2020, government counsel informed Globe that the contracting officer would not issue 
a final decision (compl. ¶ 69).  On June 29, 2020, Globe filed a Notice of Appeal to the 
Board based upon an alleged “deemed denial of its Certified Claim for constructive 
changes to Contract Number W56HZV-11-D-0204” and identifying the amount in 
dispute as $4,565,642.58 (Notice of Appeal).  On July 2, 2020, the Board docketed the 
appeal as ASBCA No. 62594. 
 
DECISION 
 
 I.  Standard of Review  
 
 Globe bears the burden of proving the Board’s subject matter jurisdiction by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 
746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988); United Healthcare Partners, Inc., ASBCA No. 58123, 
13 BCA ¶ 35,277 at 173,156.  Pursuant to the CDA 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-09, a contractor 
may, “within 90 days from the date of receipt of a contracting officer’s decision” 
under 41 U.S.C. § 7103, appeal the decision to an agency board.  41 U.S.C. § 7104(a).  
Our reviewing court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, has 
held that CDA jurisdiction requires “both a valid claim and a contracting officer’s final 
decision on that claim.”  M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 
1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing James M. Ellett Constr. Co. v. United States, 93 
F.3d 1537, 1541-42 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).   
 
 II.  Globe Asserted A Proper CDA Claim in the TSP II Supplement 
 
 The government asserts that the Board lacks jurisdiction because Globe failed 
to file a valid CDA claim (gov’t mot. at 10).  According to the government, Globe’s 
TPS II Supplement does not constitute a valid claim for two reasons: it was submitted 
to government counsel rather than a contracting officer; and it failed to make a written 
demand or assertion for a sum certain amount (id.).  Globe opposes the government’s 
motion, pointing to the June 2017 TSP II, rather than the June 2020 TSP II 
Supplement, as the claim establishing jurisdiction before the Board (app. resp. at 1).  
Globe further contends that, even if the June 2017 TSP II was not a valid claim, the 
TSP II combined with the TSP II Supplement constitutes a valid claim (id. at 14).  
Globe also requests that, if we determine that there is not a valid claim, that we make a 
finding that Globe is not time-barred from asserting a new claim (id. at 17-20).   
 

6 
  A.  Jurisdictional Requirements for the Board to Review a CDA Claim 
 
 The CDA does not define the term “claim,” thus, we turn to the definition 
contained in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR):  
 
Claim means a written demand or written assertion by one 
of the contracting parties seeking, as a matter of right, the 
payment of money in a sum certain, the adjustment or 
interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising 
under or relating to the contract.  However, a written 
demand or written assertion by the contractor seeking the 
payment of money exceeding $100,000 is not a claim 
under 41 U.S.C. chapter 71, Contract Disputes, until 
certified as required by the statute.  A voucher, invoice, or 
other routine request for payment that is not in dispute 
when submitted is not a claim.  The submission may be 
converted to a claim, by written notice to the contracting 
officer as provided in 33.206(a), if it is disputed either as to 
liability or amount or is not acted upon in a reasonable 
time. 
 
FAR 2.101.  The Federal Circuit has held that an additional jurisdictional requirement 
is that a claim be submitted in writing and contain a “clear and unequivocal statement 
that gives . . . adequate notice of the basis and amount of the claim.”  Contract 
Cleaning Maint., Inc. v. United States, 811 F.2d 586, 592 (Fed. Cir. 1987); 
M. Maropakis Carpentry, 609 F.3d at 1327.   
 
 The Board treats a determination regarding the adequacy of a claim to be 
jurisdictional.  See, e.g., CCIE & Co., ASBCA Nos. 58355, 59008, 14-1 BCA ¶ 35,700 
at 174,816.  “The statement of claim must provide a basis for meaningful dialogue 
between the parties aimed toward settlement or negotiated resolution of the claim if 
possible, or for adequate identification of the issues to facilitate litigation should that 
be necessary.”  Blake Constr., Co., ASBCA No. 34480 et al., 88-2 BCA ¶ 20,552 
at 103,890; see also Holk Dev., Inc., ASBCA Nos. 40579, 40609, 90-3 BCA ¶ 23,086 
at 115,939. 
 
  B.  The June 2017 TSP II Is Not A Valid CDA Claim 
 
 We hold that Globe’s June 2017 TSP II was not a valid CDA claim.  While the 
TSP II nominally meets the requirements of claim because it was submitted in writing 
to the contracting officer, was a demand for payment of money as of right, was in a 
sum certain amount and was certified (gov’t mot., ex. G-5), the binding precedent of 
the Federal Circuit, holds that a TSP is not a claim.  James M. Ellett Constr. Co. v. 

7 
United States, 93 F.3d 1537, 1543-44 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  The government contends that 
the June 2017 TSP II was not a valid claim because it did not request a sum certain 
amount for the constructive change claim, and did not make a written request or 
assertion seeking a contracting officer’s final decision (gov’t mot. at 1).  We agree, 
although our holding is more nuanced than the government’s argument. 
 
 The government’s first argument, that Globe’s TSP II did not assert a claim for 
payment of money in a sum certain is premised upon two purported requirements that 
are not actually contained in the CDA.  First, the government contends that Globe 
failed to assert a claim for a sum certain amount because the TSP II, which clearly 
contained a sum certain amount,2 did not break-out a sum certain amount for the 
constructive change claim (gov’t reply at 3).  Second, the government contends that 
Globe failed to assert a claim in a sum certain amount because its constructive change 
claim was improperly asserted in a termination settlement proposal, rather than a 
stand-alone claim (gov’t reply at 2, 7).  Conversely, Globe contends that the TSP II 
was a valid CDA claim because it was a non-routine sum certain request for payment 
(app. resp. at 2) and was not required to expressly request a contracting officer’s final 
decision because the submission of TSP II triggered the same obligations as TSP I, 
which was the subject of a contacting officer’s final decision, and because TSP II 
impliedly requested a final decision (id. at 7-11).    
 
 The government’s first argument, that Globe failed to assert a sum certain, is 
partially correct.  The CDA does not contain a requirement that the “sum certain” 
contain a specific itemization of costs.  As Globe notes (app. resp. at 12), it is 
well-established that a “contractor’s claim ‘need not include a detailed breakdown of 
costs. . . .  [T]he contractor may supply adequate notice of the basis and amount of the 
claim without accounting for each cost component.’”  H.L. Smith, Inc. v. Dalton, 49 F. 
3d 1563, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Lockheed Martin Corp., ASBCA No. 53226, 
03-1 BCA ¶ 32,059 at 158,465-66; Applied Tech. Associates, Inc., ASBCA No. 49200, 
96-2 BCA ¶ 28,394 at 141,800.   
 
 Here, Globe presented a detailed breakdown of costs, but did not break-out the 
labor and materials associated with its allegations of constructive change from the 
labor and materials associated with performing the work it alleges was within the 
scope of the contract (gov’t mot., ex. G-5 at 53-82).  This likely would have been 
sufficient to provide the Board with jurisdiction to entertain its appeal if the TSP II 
were a claim.  However, a TSP is not a claim, rather “[w]hen a contractor submits a 
termination settlement proposal, it is for the purpose of negotiation, not for a 
                                              
2 Globe’s submission of a claim asserting two claim amounts based on the same facts 
but two legal theories satisfies the sum certain requirement.  See Heyl & 
Patterson, Inc. v. O’Keefe, 986 F.2d 480, 484 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (rev’d on other 
grounds Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). 

8 
contracting officer’s decision.  A settlement proposal is just that:  a proposal.”  James 
M. Ellett, 93 F.3d at 1543-44 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 49.001 (1995)).  Thus, to the extent 
that Globe was asserting a claim for constructive changes, it was combined with a 
negotiating proposal into a single dollar amount.  Because Globe did not break out a 
sum certain for the constructive change portion of the TSP II, there was not a 
determinable sum certain pertaining to the potential claim.    
 
 The government’s reliance upon GAP Instrument Corp., ASBCA No. 55041, 
06-2 BCA ¶ 33,375 at 165,457 for the proposition that the Board lacks jurisdiction to 
entertain new entitlement issues without a discernable sum certain, is misplaced (gov’t 
reply at 12).  In GAP, the contractor prevailed in a decision on entitlement; however, 
the parties were not able to agree on damages.  GAP then attempted to assert new 
claims that were not addressed in the entitlement decision, in its submission to the 
contracting officer seeking to quantify its damages consistent with the Board’s 
decision.  We held that GAP had not asserted a “claim” that we could exercise 
jurisdiction over under a theory of a deemed denial because there was no sum certain 
for the newly asserted claim.  GAP had asserted a single sum certain comprising both 
the new claims and the claims that had already been to the board.  GAP, 06-2 BCA 
¶ 33,375 at 165,457.   
 
 The government additionally alleges that Globe did not assert a sum certain in 
its TSP II because it asserted entitlement to compensation for purported constructive 
changes in a termination settlement proposal rather than in an engineering change 
proposal.  This argument fails because there is no requirement that a claim be 
presented in a particular format.  “We know of no requirement in the Disputes Act that 
a ‘claim’ must be submitted in any particular form or use any particular wording.”  
Contract Cleaning Maint., 811 F.2d at 592; see also Grunley-Walsh Constr. Co., 
ASBCA No. 30459, 88-1 BCA ¶ 20,279 at 102,620.   
 
 The government cites to Individual Dev. Associates, Inc., ASBCA No. 53910, 
04-2 BCA ¶ 32,740 at 161,925, for the proposition that constructive change costs 
cannot be asserted as part of a termination settlement (gov’t reply at 7).  However, 
Individual Development is not on point.  In that appeal, the contractor asserted that the 
termination for convenience was itself a change to the contract, despite the contract 
containing the standard termination clause.  Individual Development, 04-2 BCA 
¶ 32,740 at 161,925.  The language from Individual Development relied upon by the 
government in this appeal, “no change to the contract terms and conditions results 
from this termination” indicates that the termination itself was not a change to the 
contract and does not provide that a constructive change claim cannot be asserted in 
the same document as a termination settlement proposal.  Id.  Here, Globe is asserting 
a change to the contract independent of the government’s action of terminating the 
contract for convenience.        
 

9 
 We agree with the government that Globe failed to request a contracting 
officer’s final decision in submitting the TSP II.  As Globe notes (app. resp. at 10) 
Board precedent holds that a contractor need not expressly request a final decision.  
See, e.g., Grunley-Walsh, 88-1 BCA ¶ 20,279 at 102,620.  Rather, the request for a 
final decision can be implied by the circumstances surrounding the submission.  
However, here, Globe is arguing that it impliedly requested a contracting officer’s 
final decision by submitting a document expressly captioned as a TSP which is a 
document that is submitted “for the purpose of negotiation, not for a contracting 
officer’s decision.”  James M. Ellett, 93 F.3d at 1543.  Thus, we hold that Globe’s 
TSP II was not a valid CDA claim when submitted.3  
 
  C.  The June 2020 TSP II Supplement Was a Valid CDA Claim  
 
 The government asserts that Globe’s TSP II Supplement was not a claim 
because it was not provided to the contracting officer, and because Globe did not make 
a written demand or assertion (gov’t mot. at 10).  Globe contends that, to the extent the 
TSP II was not a claim, that the TSP II Supplement provided a sum certain and that the 
two documents, combined, created a valid claim.  Globe asserts that submission of the 
TSP II Supplement to government counsel was sufficient to establish jurisdiction and 
that its request for a contracting officer’s final decision was satisfied by the TSP II in 
June 2017 (app. resp. at 14-17).  We agree that the TSP II Supplement presents a valid 
claim. 
 
 The government’s first argument, that Globe has not submitted a valid claim 
because it did not submit the TSP II Supplement to a contracting officer (gov’t mot. 
at 10-15), is easily dismissed.  As noted in the facts, the TSP II Supplement was 
provided to government counsel and government counsel forwarded the TSP II 
Supplement to the contracting officer (gov’t mot. at 5).  As Globe correctly notes, the 
contractor does not need to provide its claim directly to the contracting officer for 
jurisdiction to vest (app. resp. at 16-17).  “[T]he route by which the claim letter arrived 
on the contracting officer’s desk is of no jurisdictional relevance.”  Nat’l Gypsum Co., 
ASBCA No. 53259, 01-2 BCA ¶ 31,532 at 155,673 (citing Dawco Constr., Inc. v. 
United States, 930 F.2d 872, 879-80 (Fed. Cir. 1991), overruled in part on other 
grounds, Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F. 3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)).  The 
                                              
3 A TSP can ripen into a claim when settlement negotiations reach an impasse.  See, 
e.g., James M. Ellett, 93 F.3d at 1544.  Globe contends that its claim did not 
accrue until sometime between May 22, 2020 and June 22, 2020, when its 
settlement negotiations reached an impasse (app. resp. at 19-20).  The 
government’s motion does not raise a statute of limitations defense.  Because 
we hold that the TSP II Supplement creates a valid CDA claim, we do not reach 
the question of whether the TSP II was transformed into a claim due to an 
impasse in negotiations, or when such a claim would have accrued. 

10 
government concedes in its motion that government counsel forwarded the TSP II 
Supplement to the contracting officer (gov’t mot. at 5).  Thus, the jurisdictional 
requirement that a claim be submitted to the contracting officer is satisfied. 
 
 The government’s second argument, that the TSP II Supplement did not make a 
written assertion demanding payment of the sum certain amount, is a closer call.  
Considering the totality of the communications, we hold that Globe made a demand 
for payment.  While the government’s motion is based on the fact that Globe did not 
make a demand to the contracting officer, its argument ignores the June 11, 2020 email 
because it was sent to government counsel rather than directly to the contracting 
officer (gov’t mot. at 17-18).  For this reason, the government’s reliance upon our 
holding in Winding Specialists Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 37765, 89-2 BCA ¶ 21,737 is 
not relevant.  As discussed above, the fact that the letter was sent to government 
counsel rather than directly to the contracting officer is not jurisdictionally relevant.  
Globe’s June 11, 2020 email provides that Globe’s counsel had: 
 
[A]ttach[ed] the supplemental materials reflecting the sum 
certain sought in Globe’s constructive change claim, along 
with a certification of the updated amount.  Globe’s 
constructive claim was included in its June 2017 TSP and 
also addressed in its most recent Position Statement 
provided to the government on February 4, 2020 (which 
I’ve attached here as well for your convenience).  . . . We 
look forward to receiving the Contracting Officer’s Final 
Decision on or before July 13, 2020  
 
(Gov’t mot., ex. G-7)  Thus, the email and attachments, assert entitlement to a sum 
certain amount and request a decision from the contracting officer.  In addition, Globe 
included a certification of the claim amount.  This is all that is required for the Board 
to take jurisdiction of the claim.  
 
 Finally, as we hold that the TSP II Supplement forms a valid claim, we need not 
reach Globe’s request that we hold that a later submitted claim would be timely 
pursuant to the CDA’s statute of limitations (app. resp. at 17-20).4 
  
                                              
4 Although we do not reach the statute of limitations issue, we note that Globe is 
requesting an advisory opinion.    

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CONCLUSION 
 
 For the reasons stated above, the government’s motion to dismiss is denied.   
 
 Dated:  January 28, 2021 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DAVID D’ALESSANDRIS 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 
I concur 
 
 
RICHARD SHACKLEFORD 
Administrative Judge 
Acting Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 I concur 
 
 
 
 OWEN C. WILSON 
Administrative Judge 
Vice Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 


12 
 I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the 
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA No. 62594, Appeal of Globe 
Trailer Manufacturing, Inc., rendered in conformance with the Board’s Charter. 
 
 Dated:  January 28, 2021 
 
 
 
PAULLA K. GATES-LEWIS 
Recorder, Armed Services 
Board of Contract Appeals