Amentum Services, Inc., f/k/a AECOM Management Services, Inc.
Docket: ASBCA 62835, ASBCA 62836, ASBCA 62837
Decision date: 2023-10-25

ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 
 
OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE D’ALESSANDRIS 
 
 In 2015, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Kennedy 
Space Center (KSC) awarded a contract for launch services to appellant, Amentum 
Services, Inc. (Amentum), formerly known as AECOM Management Services, Inc., 
which was, in turn, known as URS Federal Services at the time of award.
1  Amentum 
was the incumbent contractor at KSC; however, the contract awarded in 2015 was a 
firm-fixed-price contract, while the prior contract was a cost-type contract.  This 
change in contract type was at least partially responsible for several of the issues 
currently before the Board.  
 
 Amentum appeals from a contracting officer’s final decision denying various 
claims related to the contract.  Amentum’s first claim (ASBCA No. 62835) asserts that 
the government failed to satisfy the contract’s minimum ordering requirement.  The 
parties disagree as to when certain negotiated task orders should be recognized on the 
contract.  We hold that the amount of the task order was properly applied to the 
contract’s minimum ordering requirement in the year of award, but that the descoped 
amount must also be deducted from the minimum order amount for the year that it was 
awarded.  Accordingly, we find that the government failed to satisfy the minimum 
ordering amount.   
 
 
1 For simplicity we refer to appellant as Amentum throughout this opinion. 
Appeals of - )  
 )  
Amentum Services, Inc., f/k/a AECOM 
  Management Services, Inc. 
) 
) 
ASBCA Nos. 62835, 62836, 62837 
                       62838, 62839, 62840 
 )  
Under Contract No. NNK15OL50B )  
   
APPEARANCE FOR THE APPELLANT: Thomas M. Brownell, Esq. 
    Holland & Knight LLP 
    Tysons, VA 
 
APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: Scott W. Barber, Esq. 
    NASA Chief Trial Attorney 
 Samantha R. Cochran, Esq. 
Marshall D. McKellar, Esq. 
    Trial Attorneys 
    Kennedy Space Center, FL 

2 
 
 Amentum’s second claim (ASBCA No. 62836) asserts that the government 
improperly required Amentum to create a new contract line item, rather than pricing 
the work under a “downmode maintenance” provision of an existing line item.  
Regardless of the merits of Amentum’s argument, we hold that Amentum agreed to the 
pricing in a bilateral modification, and has waived whatever claim it might have had.  
Amentum’s third claim (ASBCA No. 62837) pertaining to the pricing of new tasks 
allegedly without the proper allocation of indirect costs, was similarly waived by a 
bilateral contract modification.   
 
 Amentum’s fourth claim (ASBCA No. 62838) asserts that NASA wrote a task 
out of the contract by developing a new source for jet fuel at KSC.  The contract at 
issue is an Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract with a minimum 
ordering requirement, not a requirements contract.  We hold that Amentum has not 
established a violation of the contract and has not demonstrated bad faith on the part of 
the government. 
 
 Amentum’s fifth claim (ASBCA No. 62839) seeks compensation for hurricane 
shutdowns at KSC.  We hold that the firm-fixed-price contact does not entitle 
Amentum to compensation.  Amentum’s sixth claim (ASBCA No. 62840) concerns an 
allegedly ambiguous contract term or mistake in bidding.  We hold that Amentum has 
not established that the contract was ambiguous or that it is entitled to recover pursuant 
to a mistaken bid.   
 
FINDINGS OF FACT APPLICABLE TO ALL APPEALS 
 
 Appellant AECOM Management Services, Inc. (AECOM) is a Delaware 
corporation.  Effective February 1, 2020, AECOM changed its name to Amentum 
Services, Inc. and is now known by that name.  (Stipulations of the Parties, filed 
Apr. 15, 2022 (jt. stip.) ¶ 1)  AECOM Management Services, in turn, was known as 
URS Federal Services at the time of award (id. ¶ 3).  The John F. Kennedy Space 
Center (KSC) is a NASA field center located in Florida.  (Id. ¶ 2) 
 
 NASA Contract No. NNK15OL50B (also known as the Kennedy Space Center 
Propellants and Life Support Services Contract, KPLSS, KPLSS I, or the contract) was 
a contract for the performance of launch-related operations and maintenance services 
at KSC.  Its main customers were KSC and the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station 
(CCAFS).  NASA awarded the contract to URS Federal Services (now Amentum) 
with a period of performance of October 1, 2015 – September 30, 2020.  (R4, tab 1 
at 2-3; jt. stip. ¶ 3)  The KPLSS contract was a successor to NASA’s Institutional 
Services Contract (ISC) (tr. 1/26-28).  The ISC contract was a cost-plus contract 
(tr. 2/134).  Amentum was the incumbent contractor on the ISC and had performed the 
work included in the KPLSS contract under ISC for a number of years (tr. 1/26–28). 
 

3 
 
 The new KPLSS IDIQ contract consisted of firm-fixed-price unit rates called 
Task Item Numbers (TINs).  These TINs were identified and described in the KPLSS 
Catalog of Services, Attachment J-02.  (R4, tab 2 at 101-39)  The government could 
also order services using Negotiated Task Orders (NETOs).  NETOs are for ordering 
services within the scope of KPLSS, but otherwise not in the main catalog of TINs.  
(Jt. stip. ¶ 5)  In addition, the contract provided for Contractor Third-Party Work 
(C3PW).  The contract, in attachment J-21, provides that the C3PW provisions are 
applicable to any work “performed by the Contractor on KSC and paid for via any 
agreement other than this contract, another NASA prime contract, or a NASA 
subcontract (at any tier)”2 (gov’t hrg., ex. 2 at 1).  
 
 On April 18, 2019, Amentum submitted a request for equitable adjustment 
(REA) concerning NASA’s failure to satisfy the minimum contract value, the 
downmode maintenance provision, the inability to charge overhead costs on new TINs 
and the jet fuel TIN (R4, tab 4 at 159-60).  NASA denied the REA on November 19, 
2019 (id. at 160).  Amentum submitted a claim asserting the four issues contained in 
its REA, plus claims pertaining to government hurricane shutdowns and the pricing 
issue pertaining to launch support services, as well as a claim pertaining to the 
2018-19 government shutdown due to a budget impasse that was not appealed to the 
Board (id.).  The contracting officer denied Amentum’s claim in a final decision dated 
February 16, 2021 (R4, tab 5 at 181-85).  Amentum timely appealed to the Board. 
 
 On February 4, 2022, the government filed a motion for summary judgment.  
Unfortunately, the motion was filed during an e-mail outage and the Board was 
unaware of the motion until receiving Amentum’s opposition on March 7, 2022.  On 
April 13, 2022, the government moved to stay the hearing pending resolution of its 
motion for summary judgment filed over two months earlier.  By order dated April 21, 
2023, we elected to defer consideration of the motion for summary judgment until the 
hearing, which was at that point less than a month away.3   
 
 
2 In other words, work performed by Amentum for third-parties on KSC count against 
the contract minimum because the work benefits from the use of KSC resources 
and facilities and may involve the use of government property (gov’t hrg., ex. 2 
at 1).   
3 Our decision is based upon the hearing record and is not a decision on the motion for 
summary judgment.   

4 
 
 Findings of Fact Pertaining to Claim 1 ASBCA No. 62835:  Minimum   
Contract Value 
 
 The KPLSS contract included a minimum contract value of $8 million per year: 
 
B.2 Contract Minimum 
The minimum contract value for each contract year, which 
includes all TOs issued, is $8,000,000, as shown in Table 
B.2.1.   
 
Any monies received by the Contractor for the same or 
similar ser vices offered under this contract, regardless of 
the customer requesting such service (s) and the 
contractual mechanism used to perform the work, shall be 
applied toward the minimum contract value. 
 
(R4, tab 1 at 28)  The contract defines “TO” as “task order” in multiple places (e.g., 
R4, tab 1 at 7, 73, tab 3 at 157) and provides that services will be ordered by task order 
(R4, tab 1 at 73 ( FAR 52.216-18)).  The $8 million minimum contract value was 
based upon an estimate of the amount of propellants and life support work that NASA 
and the Air Force had purchased in FY 2013 and 2014 and that they were thus willing 
to guarantee (see tr. 2/144-45).  Amentum’s bid price for the KPLSS I Contract, based 
upon the NASA-provided Best Estimated Quantities (BEQs), was approximately $7.4 
million (tr. 1/29-30).  Based upon prior years’ experience, NASA expected the 
winning bid to be in the range of $10-13 million (tr. 3/14).  During proposal 
discussions, NASA requested additional information from Amentum regarding its 
overall pricing methodology because the total evaluated price was below the minimum 
contract value (R4, tab 21 at 293; jt. stip. ¶ 39).  Amentum did not change its bid price 
when NASA questioned it in discussions with Amentum prior to award of the contract 
(tr. 1/38-39).  Amentum’s representative, Mr. Larry Ostarly, testified that Amentum 
was able to reduce its price to NASA by using corporate resources to provide human 
resources, contracts, and procurement services, which otherwise would have been 
charged direct to the contract (tr. 1/42-43). 
 

5 
 
 During FY 2016, which ended on September 30, 2016, NASA and the Air 
Force ordered TIN and Negotiated Task Order (NETO) work under the KPLSS 
Contract as follows (R4, tab 7 at 208): 
 
 TINs NETOs Total 
NASA  $5,200,991.95 $638,581.59 $5,839,573.54 
Air Force $2,309,395.64 $134,045.69 $2,443,441.33 
Total $7,510,387.59 $772,627.28 $8,283,014.87 
 
 As early as April or May 2016, the government issued a request for proposal to 
Amentum for a NETO for relief valve testing that was not covered under the existing 
KPLSS TINs (tr. 2/153-54).  Amentum responded to the RFP in August 2016 
(tr. 2/155).  On September 14, 2016, 16 days before the end of the fiscal year, after 
evaluating Amentum’s proposal, NASA issued Task Order NNK16OM20T (20T), in 
the amount of $444,951.06, for installation of a relief valve test kit (app. supp. R4, 
tab 30 at 2).     
 
 After award of task order 20T, Amentum received a bid from a second vendor, 
at a price approximately $300,000 less than the first vendor (tr. 1/180-81).  The 
equipment from the second vendor met the specifications set forth in NASA’s RFP for 
task order 20T and Amentum could have simply delivered the new equipment and kept 
the $300,000 in savings (tr. 2/42).  Instead, Amentum proposed a reduction in the price 
of task order 20T and NASA agreed, resulting Modification No. 1, dated May 19, 
2017, which descoped task order 20T by $334,050.76, to a total of $110,900.30 (app. 
supp. R4, tab 30 at 4).  The task order modification to descope task order 20T includes 
the following release language:  
 
[Amentum] hereby releases the Government from any and 
all liability or claims under this contract for any further 
equitable adjustments attributable to such facts or 
circumstances giving rise to proposal dated April 7, 2017, 
and all revisions thereto. 
 
(App. supp. R4, tab 30 at 5)   
 
 On September 28, 2016, 2 days before the end of FY 2016, the Air Force issued 
task order FA2521-16-F-0194, in the amount of $134,045.69, for the relocation of 

6 
 
3 mobile storage units from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS)4 to Patrick 
Air Force Base (PAFB)5 (app. supp. R4, tab 31 at 1-6).  The two task orders issued in 
September 2016 could not have been performed during FY 2016 (tr. 1/178-80, 184).   
 
 T ask orders issued for TINs were funded incrementally, in advance, by NASA 
and the Air Force.  Any remaining funds at the end of the contract year were 
deobligated by NASA and the Air Force.  (Tr. 1/50-52, 2/158-59)  For TIN-based 
orders, NASA subtracted the deobligated funds from the contract minimum value for 
the year in which the task order was initially issued (id.; tr. 2/159-60).  
  
DECISION Claim 1 ASBCA No. 62835:  Minimum Contract Value 
 
 As noted in the facts above, the contract had a minimum ordering requirement 
of $8 million in FY2015.  The total contract value for issued task orders was 
$8,283,014.87 (jt. stip. ¶ 7).  Amentum contends that the ordered amount is overstated 
due to two negotiated task orders that were issued in the final days of the performance 
period and that were not capable of being performed during the fiscal year.  
Additionally, the task order for the test kit was descoped during FY2017, reducing the 
task order amount by $334,050.76.  With these deductions, Amentum contends that the 
actual ordered amount is $7,704,017.12 (app. br. at 16).  The government contends 
that the task orders were properly recorded in the fiscal year issued and contends that 
the deobligated amount should be credited against the orders in the year the task order 
was modified (gov’t resp. at 26-33).   
 
 Claim 1 requires that we interpret contract paragraph B.2 to determine whether 
the government failed to satisfy the minimum ordering requirement.  The contract 
provides that: 
 
B.2 Contract Minimum 
The minimum contract value for each contract year, which 
includes all TOs issued, is $8,000,000, as shown in 
Table B.2.1.   
 
Any monies received by the Contractor for the same or 
similar services offered under this contract, regardless of 
the customer requesting such service (s) and the 
contractual mechanism used to perform the work, shall be 
applied toward the minimum contract value. 
 
 
4 Now known as Cape Canaveral Space Force Station (CCSFS) 
5 Now known as Patrick Space Force Base (PSFB) 

7 
 
(R4, tab 1 at 28)6  The contract defines “TO” as “task order” in multiple places (e.g., 
R4, tab 1 at 7, 73, tab 3 at 157) and provides that services will be ordered by task order 
(R4, tab 1 at 73 (FAR 52.216-18)).  Applying the plain meaning of paragraph B.2, we 
conclude that “TO” includes all task orders, including both task item number (TIN) 
task orders and negotiated task orders (NETOs).  Thus, the first paragraph of 
section B.2 is clear that the government was required to “issue” task orders in the 
minimum amount of $8,000,000.  We accord the term “issued” its ordinary meaning 
and conclude that the government issued over $8 million in task orders in FY 2016.  
  
 However, we must also interpret the second paragraph of clause B.2 in 
connection with paragraph B.1.  The parties submitted a joint stipulation of fact that 
the reference to “the same or similar services” in clause B.2 was a reference to NETOs 
(jt. stip. ¶ 5).  However, at the hearing, NASA asserted a new theory, that the reference 
to “the same or similar services” in clause B.2 was a reference to Contractor Third-
Party Work (C3PW).  The contract, in attachment J-21, provides that it is applicable to 
any work “performed by the Contractor on KSC and paid for via any agreement other 
than this contract, another NASA prime contract, or a NASA subcontract (at any tier)” 
(gov’t hrg., ex. 2 at 1).  Testimony at the hearing provided that the clause was intended 
to prevent the contractor from performing work for third parties, such as SpaceX, and 
bypassing NASA.  No C3PW work was performed during the relevant period.  
Amentum’s deputy program manager, Mr. Korte, acknowledged at the hearing that 
CP3W work would have counted against the contract minimum if received during the 
applicable period (tr. 2/26).  
  
 As an initial matter, contract interpretation is a question of law, so we are not 
bound to accept the parties’ joint stipulation as to the meaning of clause B.2.  The 
second paragraph refers to “the same or similar services . . . regardless of the customer 
requesting such service (s) and the contractual mechanism used to perform the work.”  
We interpret this clause to apply to work, such as C3PW work, being performed for 
parties other than NASA or the Air Force and not performed pursuant to government 
task orders (either TIN or NETO).  Thus, read in conjunction with attachment J-21, we 
hold that the “monies received” language in paragraph 2 does not apply to task order 
work, and that the government satisfied the minimum contract value (subject to the 
deobligation issue discussed below) by ordering $8 million in task orders.  This is 
consistent with our holding in WSP USA Solutions, Inc., ASBCA No. 62674, 22-1 
BCA ¶ 38,219 at 185,628, that pricing for a task order is set when the task order is 
 
6 This language was modified in the follow-on KPLSS II contract to provide that 
subsequent modifications to task order values would be applied to the year in 
which the modification is issued (app. supp. R4, tab 27 at 3, ¶ B.2).  We do not 
use the language of a subsequent contract to interpret the meaning of the 
original contract.  See, e.g., Capital Servs., Inc., ASBCA Nos. 40510, 40511, 
91-1 BCA ¶ 23,310 at 116,907. 

8 
 
placed.  In WSP, the contractor argued that the tasks ordered in one contract year, 
should be billed at the rate applicable to the contract year in which the task was 
actually performed.  The language of paragraph B.2 does not specify when in the fiscal 
year the government will place the orders, so we reject Amentum’s argument that 
orders placed late in the fiscal year that could not be performed during the fiscal year 
do not count toward the minimum order value.   
 
 This does not end our analysis, because NASA deobligated a portion of task 
order 20T.  As set out in the facts, NETO 20T was awarded for a test kit.  After the TO 
was awarded in the amount of $444,951.06, Amentum received another response to its 
solicitation, offering a test kit that satisfied the specifications, and Amentum revised its 
proposal to $110,900.30.  Amentum, to its credit, informed NASA about the late 
response and agreed to a bilateral modification on May 19, 2017, decreasing TO 20T 
by $334.050.76.  This raises the novel question of whether a reduction in the value of 
the task order, occurring in a subsequent fiscal year, should be deducted from the 
contract award amount in the year the TO was awarded, or the year of the 
modification, or at all.  Surprisingly, this appears to be a question of first impression.  
The parties did not cite to any case law on the question, and we were unable to locate 
any authority on the subject.   
 
 The government argues, based upon the GAO Red Book of fiscal law, that the 
task order was an unmatured obligation, subject to cancellation, but that the agency 
obligation was fixed at the time of award (gov’t resp. at 32).  Thus, the government 
argues that the obligation was valid when issued, so it should count against the 
contract minimum order value and a descope should apply to the year of the 
modification because the contractor controls performance (id.).  However, fiscal law 
provisions relate to agency budgeting, not contractual rights.  Hearing testimony 
demonstrated that for the TIN-based task orders, work ordered but not performed or 
ultimately not needed by the government would be descoped and that the government 
would deobligate the funds for the year in which the task order was issued (tr. 2/158-
60).  The government argues that “there is no evidence in the record to show that 
negotiated task orders . . . would be descoped or deobligated in the same way” (gov’t 
resp. at 31).  However, it is equally true that there is no evidence in the record, that the 
NETOs should be treated different from other task orders.  Further, the government 
asserts that the descope or deobligation of a NETO is a “rare occurrence” and that the 
“often lengthy performance periods” require that the deobligated amount apply against 
the contract minimum for the year in which the modification occurs (id.).  However, 
the government cites no authority for this position.   
 
 Based on the record before us, and with the contract being silent on the 
treatment of deobligated funds, we hold that the deobligated task order amount, 
$334,050.76, should be deducted from the ordering amount for the year the task order 
was issued, consistent with NASA’s treatment of TIN-based task orders.  Accordingly, 

9 
 
the government ordered $7,948,964.11 during the FY2015 ordering period—
$51,035.89 less than the minimum order amount.7  The government’s failure to order 
the minimum quantity is a breach of contract.   
 
 The government additionally argues that Amentum waived its claim for failure 
to order the minimum quantity by agreement to the bilateral contract modification that 
descoped the task order (gov’t resp. at 33).  The modification contained the following 
release language:  
 
The parties hereto agree that this supplemental agreement 
represents a complete and equitable adjustment.  URS 
hereby releases the Government from any and all liability 
or claims under this contract for any further equitable 
adjustments attributable to such facts or circumstances 
giving rise to proposal dated April 7, 2017, and all 
revisions thereto. 
 
(App. supp. R4, tab 30 at 5)  The government fails to explain how its failure to meet 
the minimum ordering requirement is within the scope of the release which, by its 
terms, applies to “further equitable adjustments attributable to such facts and 
circumstances giving rise to [the] proposal dated April 7, 2017.”  The amount of 
services ordered by the government was not a “fact or circumstance giving rise to the 
proposal,” hence, we hold that Amentum did not waive its claims by signing the 
bilateral modification and that the Air Force breached the contract by failing to order 
the contractual minimum amount.   
 
 Findings of Fact Pertaining to Claim 2 ASBCA No. 62836:  SSPF Reduced 
Maintenance 
 
 The KPLSS contract included TIN 510 for “Fixed Systems Maintenance – 
SSPF Systems” that provided routine maintenance for different types of systems 
across two buildings within the Space Station Processing Facility (SSPF): 
 
Fixed System Maintenance – Space Station Processing 
Facility (SSPF) shall include all tasks and resources 
necessary to maintain the assigned pneumatic, cryogenic 
and vent systems at the following facilities:  
M7-0360 Space Station Processing Facility GO
2 
LN2/GN2Ghe Bair 
 
7 Amentum asserts that TO NNK160M17T was partially descoped on January 8, 2018, 
and that it will address the specific shortfall in the quantum phase (app. br. at 16 
n.3).   

10 
 
M7-0361A Ammonia Vapor Containment Building GN2 
 
(R4, tab 2 at 122)  After KPLSS was awarded, the International Space Station 
department (which occupied the facilities covered by TIN 510) determined that for the 
foreseeable future it no longer needed a subset of systems in these facilities (app. supp. 
R4, tab 32 at 2).  The department wanted to deactivate the unneeded subset and stop all 
routine maintenance on that subset of systems, while continuing the routine 
maintenance of the remaining active subset of systems (R4, tab 8 at 212-13; tab 1 
at  243–45).  The unneeded subset of systems was deactivated under task order 
NNK15539043R, dated August 1, 2016 (R4, tab 13 at 242–45). 
 
 The parties subsequently disagreed regarding the proper way to modify the 
contract to provide the reduced level of service.  The contract contained attachment 
J-02 which described “Maintenance Services” in § 00500 as follows: 
 
Maintenance Services are for fixed systems at a customer 
location or facility, or customer dedicated or owned mobile 
and portable equipment.  Customer dedicated equipment 
and fixed systems may be for a specific customer or a 
specific subset of customers that is not shared by multiple 
customers. Active Maintenance requires all the 
maintenance as stated within the appliable OMI or job 
plan.  
 
(R4, tab 2 at 120)  The same section of Attachment J-02 § 00500 describes 
“downmode maintenance” as follows: 
 
For the fixed system maintenance, downmode maintenance 
will be the active maintenance with (1) no filter change-out 
required and (2) relief valve operational check within three 
years of previous operational check. Any non-routine 
maintenance on the 00500 services TINS shall be 
negotiated on an as-needed basis and executed through 
issuance of a TO utilizing TIN XXX702 Technician 
Hourly Rate and the cost of replacement parts.  
 
(Id.)  The Contract contains the following definition for “Downmode:”  
Downmoded:  Systems or Equipment that has no current 
requirement but may in the future.  The system or 
equipment will be stored and little or no maintenance will 
occur as based on the OMI or JP requirements.  If the 
equipment is needed, it can be returned to active status.  

11 
 
 
(R4, tab 3 at 143)  The Contract contains the following language in section B.1:   
Downmode Maintenance:  If a customer requires the 
downmode maintenance, as described in Attachment J-02, 
Catalog of Services to be Provided, Series 00500 
Maintenance Services for Fixed Systems, the Contractor 
will be notified 30 days in advance of the applicable 
Government Fiscal Year (GFY).  The maintenance will be 
performed at a downmode level for the entirety of the 
GFY.  The percent reduction will be applied to the 
applicable TINs for which downmode maintenance will be 
performed.  The percentage for any applicable downmode 
TIN is decreased by 3.0%.  
 
(R4, tab 1 at 7) 
 The government never considered using the downmode maintenance provision 
of the contract to address the reduction in maintenance at the SSPF, and instead 
created a new TIN 528 (tr. 2/165).  In estimating the cost of new TIN 528, NASA 
estimated that the remaining active systems would require significantly fewer labor 
hours than the hours required under TIN 510; resulting in an estimated 56.6% 
reduction in required labor hours for the contractor (R4, tab 64 at 1; jt. Stip. ¶ 20).  
More specifically, NASA estimated that the reduced maintenance required by TIN 528 
would result in labor savings of approximately 348.48 labor hours in the first year (R4, 
tab 64 at 1). 
 
 On January 6, 2016, NASA sent Amentum a request for proposal to price the 
new TIN, named 528 SSPF Reduced Maintenance, to perform regular maintenance on 
the remaining active subset of SSPF systems (R4, tab 8 at 212-13; jt. Stip. ¶ 21).  In 
proposing its price for the new TIN 528, Amentum estimated the labor and other costs 
that it would save in no longer maintaining the deactivated equipment (R4, tab 9 
at 218).  It estimated labor hour savings of approximately 416 hours per year (roughly 
a 20% greater reduction than the government’s own estimate) in the first contract year 
and submitted a price of $1,851.20 per month less than its TIN 510 price, for a 
proposed TIN 528 price of $12,064.39 per month (jt. Stip. ¶ 22).  Amentum stated in 
its proposal: 
 
To price this new TIN, [Amentum] used negotiated TIN 
510 as a basis and then descoped hours for the work that is 
not needed under the reduced maintenance.  [Amentum] 
priced: -416 hours for GFY2016, -500 hours for GFY2017, 
GFY2018, and GFY2020, and -420 hours for GFY2019 

12 
 
based on the removal of the following equipment from the 
SSPF Fixed Maintenance Systems (TIN 510). 
 
(R4, tab 9 at 218; jt. Stip. ¶ 23)  Amentum stated in its proposal that it used TIN 701 
(Labor Services for Engineers) and TIN 702 (Labor Services for Technicians) as a 
basis for its proposed labor rates in TIN 528 and clarified that TINs 701 and 702 were 
“fully burdened through G&A [General and Administration] and profit.  This rate also 
includes a factor that represents materials/ODCs [Other Direct Costs] per hour” and 
because “the TIN rate is fully burdened through G&A, and no additional materials and 
ODCs are being proposed, no additional G&A is being priced” (R4, tab 9 at 219; jt. 
Stip. ¶ 24).  The contract required offerors to propose fully burdened rates (R4, tab 1 
at 7).   
 
 In response, NASA requested that Amentum submit a new proposal, from the 
“bottom [] up” (tr. 2/74-75).  NASA also requested that Amentum use TINs 701 and 
702 to price labor in the new TIN 528 (tr. 2/74-76).  Testimony at the hearing 
demonstrated that when Amentum bid on KPLSS, it did not fully burden the labor 
rates in TINs 701 and 702:  “They were burdened through G&A and profit, but they 
had no allocation for any of the cost pools. . . . [W]e assumed we would be using 
[those TINs] infrequently” (tr. 2 /110–11).  “[W]e only captured labor, fringe, G&A 
and fee on those.  We did not spread any of the cost pools because we didn’t feel that 
those would be executed as much as some of the other work” (tr. 2/55–56).  NASA 
agreed to Amentum’s revised TIN 528 proposal, except for its proposed 6.5% profit 
percentage.  NASA counteroffered for 4% profit because a 4% profit applied across 
the rest of the contract; the proposed work was within KPLSS’s original scope; and the 
proposed work carried risk and technological innovation levels commensurate to the 
rest of the KPLSS contract.  (R4, tab 10 at 222-24)  Amentum, through its contract 
administrator, Lisa Shirah, accepted NASA’s counteroffer (R4, tab 11 at 226).  
Amentum’s program manager, Mr. Ostarly, testified that Amentum entered into the 
bilateral modification “just because we got wore out” and that they “rolled and 
accepted the TINs” (tr. 1/88).  NASA and Amentum executed bilateral modifications 9 
and 10, which added TIN 528 to KPLSS.  Both modifications include release language 
providing that:  “This supplemental agreement is entered into pursuant to authority of 
Mutual Agreement of the Parties” (R4, tab 12 at 228, 235). 
 
 NASA subsequently agreed that Amentum could add indirect cost pools in 
proposing pricing, but it did not permit Amentum to apply the indirect cost pools to 
TIN 528 (tr. 2/76-78).  NASA incorporated the change into the Solicitation for 
KPLSS II which states: 
 
(3) The Government recognizes that original TIN prices 
may include a variety of costs not directly related to 
performance of each TIN . . . .  Therefore, when 

13 
 
negotiating new or existing TINs during contract 
performance, the Contractor may propose an amount that 
represents such apportionment of cost pools applicable to 
the new TIN price being negotiated.   
 
(App. supp. R4, tab 27 at 4)   
DECISION Claim 2 ASBCA No. 62836:  Downmode Maintenance 
 
 Amentum alleges two errors on the part of NASA:  first, that TIN 510 
contained a “downmode” maintenance provision that should have been used to price 
the services rather than creating a new TIN 528; and second that Amentum should 
have been allowed to price TIN 528 by subtracting the labor saved from the TIN 510 
price, rather than calculating a “bottom-up” price using labor rates that were not fully-
burdened in Amentum’s proposal (app. br. at 22).  Although not fully developed in the 
briefing, the distinction between top down and bottom up pricing is because Amentum 
failed to fully burden the TIN 701 and 702 labor rates with cost pool allocations 
(tr. 2/55-56, 110-11), despite solicitation instructions to propose fully burdened pricing 
(R4, tab 1 at 7).  Thus, a “top down” calculation deducting the labor savings from TIN 
510 would include overhead charges for cost pools (and, in fact could overcompensate 
Amentum to the extent that the labor hour deductions calculated using TINs 701 and 
702 would not reduce the cost pool allocation) but a “bottom up” calculation would 
exclude cost pools in the labor burden for all the labor hours in the TIN.   
 
 However, we need not venture deep into the weeds to determine Amentum’s 
cost pool overhead burden because Amentum agreed to TIN 528 in a bilateral contract 
modification.  That is, Amentum and NASA agreed that Amentum would perform the 
work specified in TIN 528 in exchange for the payments specified in TIN 528.  A 
bilateral modification constitutes an accord and satisfaction where the parties agree to 
a substituted performance, here a new TIN, in satisfaction of a claim.  See, e.g., Moore 
Overseas Constr. Co., ENGBCA No. PCC-125, 98-1 BCA ¶ 29,682 at 147,029.  The 
parties’ contractual obligations have been discharged by performance, and there is 
nothing for the Board to review, because Amentum has not alleged facts sufficient to 
cause us to review the contract modification.  For example, the Board may decline to 
enforce a bilateral modification where the government possessed superior knowledge, 
breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing, where there was a differing site 
condition, or government caused delay.  However, Amentum simply alleges that the 
parties should have agreed to a different dollar amount.  Amentum does not allege that 
it was coerced into signing the modification.  In fact, Mr. Ostarly testified that he just 
was worn down and gave up (tr. 1/88).   
 
 Amentum argues that the release language in the modification does not prevent 
it from seeking to reopen the modification (app. reply at 11).  Amentum cites 

14 
 
Advanced Bus. Concepts, Inc., ASBCA No. 55002, 06-1 BCA ¶ 33,271 at 164,893 for 
the proposition that a bilateral modification does not bar a later claim on the 
modification.  However Advanced Bus. Concepts is easily distinguished.  That 
decision was on a motion for summary judgment and was not a decision on the merits.  
In addition, in Advanced Business Concepts there was evidence that the parties had 
continued negotiating the terms of the modification after the date of the bilateral 
modification.  Id.  Amentum asserts that  “the parties continued to revisit the issue of 
the proper pricing of new TINs through the remainder of KPLSS I until NASA finally 
agreed with Amentum’s position” (app. reply at 10 (citing tr. 2/76-78)).  However, the 
testimony cited by Amentum was that NASA agreed to wage rates including additional 
overhead costs in negotiating new additional TINs after TIN 528 (and the TINs in 
dispute in claim 3 below).  There was no testimony of continued negotiations 
regarding TIN 528 (or the claim 3 TINs).   
 
 Amentum also cites (with regard to claim 3 below, but equally applicable here) 
to Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. V. United States, 129 F.3d 1226, 1235-36 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(MBTA) for the proposition that we must take into account the circumstances 
surrounding a mutual contract modification to determine if it is an integrated 
settlement (app. br. at 27 n.8).  Once again, the authority is easily distinguished.  In 
MBTA the Federal Circuit was reviewing a grant of summary judgment when it held 
that it was appropriate to consider the circumstances surrounding a cost that had been 
disputed for three years before the parties signed a change order, in determining 
whether the change order was intended to be a fully integrated settlement of a disputed 
issue.  MBTA, 129 F.3d at 1235-36.  Here, NASA accepted Amentum’s proposal.  At 
the hearing there was conflicting testimony as to whether NASA directed to Amentum 
to calculate its proposal using a “bottom-up” method (tr. 2/74-75, 108-09).  NASA did 
question the profit rate on Amentum’s proposal, and Amentum accepted the change 
from 6.5 percent to 4 percent (R4, tab 10 at 222).  The bilateral contract modification 
contains no reservations of rights, and states that the “supplemental agreement is 
entered into pursuant to authority of Mutual Agreement of the Parties” (R4, tab 12 
at 228, 235).  For the reasons stated above, we deny appeal No. 62836. 
 
Findings of Fact Pertaining to Claim 3 ASBCA No. 62837:  TINs 224-27 
 
 During March and April 2016, the parties negotiated the addition of four new 
task item numbers (TINs 224-27) to the contract, to include the provision of cylinders 
of specialty gases (R4, tab 15 at 248-60, tab 16 at 261-63).  Amentum’s proposal used 
negotiated TIN 701A (Engineering Hourly Rate) and TIN 702A (Technician Hourly 
Rate) from Table B.1.1 of the KPLSS contract.  These rates were “fully burdened 
through G&A and profit.”  (R4, tab 15 at 253, 258)  Amentum additionally provided 
that:  “While G&A is normally applied to labor and non-labor, since we are utilizing 
negotiated fully burdened labor TINs, we are only applying G&A to non-labor in this 

15 
 
proposal” (id. at 253-54, 259).  As with TIN 528 in claim 2 above, Amentum initially 
proposed a 6.5% profit to the non-labor aspect of TINs 224–227 (id. at 253-54, 259). 
 
 NASA accepted Amentum’s proposal, except for the proposed 6.5% profit, and, 
for the same reasons as in TIN 528, NASA countered with a 4% profit (R4, tab 10 
at 222, tab 16 at 262–63).  Amentum accepted this counteroffer (R4, tab 16 at 262).  In 
April 2016, the parties entered into bilateral Modification 8 with the statement that 
“This supplemental agreement is entered into pursuant to authority of Mutual 
Agreement of the Parties” (R4, tab 17 at 265).   
 
DECISION Claim 3 ASBCA No. 62837:  TINs 224-27 
 
 The resolution of claim 3 is similar to that of claim 2.  Once again, Amentum 
asserts that it should have been able to propose new labor rates for new TINs (app. br.  
26).  Left unsaid is that Amentum wanted to propose new labor rates because of its 
failure to burden the labor hours for TINs 701 and 702 with indirect cost pool 
allocations despite the solicitation’s requirement that bidders propose fully burdened 
labor rates in the TINs (R4, tab 1 at 7).  Once again, Amentum entered into a bilateral 
modification with NASA to add the new TINs.  As with claim 2, we find that the 
bilateral modification constitutes an accord and satisfaction where the parties agree to 
a substituted performance, here a new TIN, in satisfaction of a claim.  See, e.g., Moore 
Overseas Constr. Co., 98-1 BCA at 147,029.  The parties’ obligations were discharged 
through performance.  Amentum’s argument that we must consider the circumstances 
surrounding the modification is rejected for the same reasons as in count 2.  For the 
reasons stated above, appeal No. 62837 is denied. 
 
Findings of Fact Pertaining to Claim 4 ASBCA No. 62838:  Jet Fuel TIN 
 
 The total evaluated contract price for KPLSS consisted of the sum of all the 
offeror’s proposed unit prices multiplied by the government-provided “Best Estimated 
Quantity” (BEQs) for each TIN for all years, plus the proposed price for phase-in (see 
R4, tab 20 at 288-89).  The RFP for KPLSS sates, “[n]otwithstanding the BEQs, there 
will be no stated minimum or maximum quantities, per TIN, in the resulting contract.  
BEQs are for evaluation purposes only and do not represent an obligation commitment 
by the Government” (R4, tab 18 at 278). 
 
 Contract TIN 220A – Bulk Kerosene required Amentum to provide jet fuel to 
the customer’s location using a tanker or refueler (R4, tab 2 at 113).  Amentum’s fully 
loaded price for jet fuel was $6.99 per gallon for FY 2016, and slightly more in 
subsequent years (see R4, tab 1 at 9).  The fully-loaded price for TIN 220A included 
the cost of maintenance of fuel-pumping facilities (app. supp. R4, tab 44 at 3).  The 
TIN price was deemed to be too expensive by some users, and NASA subsidized the 
cost of fuel for those customers (tr. 1/55-57, 168-69).   

16 
 
 
 In early 2018, NASA customer Space Florida, which leased from NASA the 
former Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF), developed its own jet fuel fueling capability 
and discontinued use of KPLSS for that purpose.  In addition, NASA and the Air 
Force stopped using the KPLSS contract facilities and purchased jet fuel from Space 
Florida (tr. 1/57).  This change greatly reduced use of the KPLSS jet fuel equipment 
(app. supp. R4, tab 47 at 3).  By notice dated June 15, 2018, NASA directed Amentum 
to deplete the existing commodity inventory and excess all equipment supporting jet 
fuel support operations (id. at 3, 6).  NASA did not issue a contract modification or 
change order deleting TIN 220A, which remained part of the contract (see tr. 1/57).  
Billings under TIN 220A declined from 47,332 gallons in FY 2016 to 6,857 gallons in 
FY 2018, to 0 gallons in FY 2019 and FY 2020 (R4, tab 4 at 170).   
 
DECISION Claim 4 ASBCA No. 62838:  Jet Fuel TIN 
 
 As detailed above, the KPLSS contract had a guaranteed total contract value, 
but did not have guaranteed minimum values for individual TINs.  A single award 
IDIQ contract does not provide exclusivity to the contractor.  Travel Ctr. V. Barram, 
236 F.3d 1316, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  The proposals were evaluated based on BEQs 
but the BEQ amounts were not contract minimums.  Amentum asserts that it is entitled 
to compensation because it had an expectation that it would be able to sell jet fuel 
under the contract (app. br. at 28).  Amentum’s theory of recovery is not clear in its 
briefing.  Amentum asserts that the minimum quantity requirement of an IDIQ 
contract “does not constitute the outer limit of all of the Government’s legal 
obligations” (id. (quoting Cmty. Consulting Int’l, ASBCA No. 53489, 02-2 BCA 
¶ 31,940 at 157,789)).  Amentum also appears to allege a breach of the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing, asserting that NASA “cooperated with Space Florida . . . in its 
efforts to develop an independent jet fueling facility” (app. br. at 27).   
 
 Amentum’s first argument, citing Cmty. Consulting Int’l, asserts that there are 
additional legal obligations on the government beyond the minimum quantity 
requirement in an IDIQ contract.  In Cmty. Consulting the Board denied a motion to 
dismiss (treated as a motion for summary judgment) where the contractor asserted that 
the government had denied it the opportunity to compete for additional awards in a 
multiple award IDIQ contract.  Cmty. Consulting, 02-2 BCA ¶ 31,940 at 157,789.  The 
Board rejected the government’s argument that Community Consulting had received 
the guaranteed minimum award amount, and so was without a remedy.  Id.  Unlike in 
Cmty. Consulting, where the contract provided appellant with the right to compete for 
additional awards, here Amentum does not cite to contact provisions entitling it to 
relief such as a provision requiring NASA to purchase its jet fuel from Amentum or a 
contractual requirement to purchase a minimum amount of jet fuel.   
 

17 
 
 Turning to Amentum’s second argument, that NASA violated the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing, there is, of course, an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing 
in every government contract.  See, e.g., Scott Timber Co. v. United States, 692 F.3d 
1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  However, Amentum cites no support in the record of 
government actions breaching that duty, other than the contract modification, which 
simply notes that the shuttle landing facility “changed its supply source” due to Space 
Florida’s installation of a jet fuel tank (app. supp. R4, tab 47 at 3).  Amentum put no 
evidence of the alleged cooperation between NASA and Space Florida on the hearing 
record.  Instead, Amentum alleges, without citation to the record, that the contract 
provided Amentum with “what amounts to a franchise for pumping all or most of the 
jet fuel used at the Kennedy Space Center” (app. reply at 13).  The government 
presented the unrebutted testimony of the Contracting Officer’s Representative for the 
KPLSS contract, Mr. Jonathan Partridge, that to his knowledge nobody from NASA 
asked or encouraged Space Florida to develop its jet fuel facility (tr. 2/189-90).  On the 
record before us, we hold that Amentum has not demonstrated a government violation 
of a contract provision and has not demonstrated a breach of the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing.  Appeal No. 62838 is denied. 
 
 Findings of Fact Pertaining to Claim 5 ASBCA No. 62839:  Hurricane 
Shutdowns 
 
 The contract, as modified, incorporated NASA clause 1852.242-72 – DENIED 
ACCESS TO NASA FACILITIES (OCT 2015), which provides that NASA may deny 
contractor access to NASA facilities for various reasons including adverse weather 
such as hurricanes.  In the event of a facility closure, the contract clause provides that: 
 
(d) For the period that NASA facilities were not accessible 
to contractor employees, the contracting officer may – 
(1) Adjust the contract performance or delivery schedule 
for a period equivalent to the period the NASA facility was 
not accessible; 
(2) Forego the work; 
(3) Reschedule the work by mutual agreement of the 
parties; or  
(4) Consider properly documented requests for equitable 
adjustment, claim, or any other remedy pursuant to the 
terms and conditions of the contract. 
 
(Gov’t hrg., ex. 1 at 5)
8 
 
 
8 The applicable contract modification was not included in the Rule 4 file; however, 
the parties had previously stipulated to the language of the contract clause.   

18 
 
 NASA directed the shutdown of KSC for Hurricanes Matthew (October 5-11, 
2016—five days); Irma (September 8-15, 2017—seven days); and Dorian 
September  3-5, 2019—three days) for a total of fifteen days of base closure (jt. stip. 
¶ 33).  Amentum paid its employees during the first two hurricane shutdowns, not 
requiring them to take unpaid leave or personal time off (tr. 2/78).  However, 
Amentum did not pay its employees during the shutdown for Hurricane Dorian.  
Employees had the option of taking unpaid leave or personal time off (vacation pay).  
As a result, the union representing Amentum’s hourly workers filed a grievance.  
(Tr. 2/81-82; app. supp. R4, tab 59 at 2) 
 
 Apart from the “ride out” services performed for the Air Force during the 
hurricane shutdowns, Amentum did not perform any work on TINs or other work 
during the hurricane shutdowns.  Because the Kennedy Space Center was closed no 
governmental or commercial KPLSS customers ordered nor did Amentum perform 
any TIN work during the shutdowns.  (Tr. 2/42-43, 82–83) 
 
 Under the predecessor contract, ISC, a cost-plus contract, Amentum allowed 
employees to charge personal leave time or go unpaid during hurricane closures, and 
the government would pay for Amentum’s costs so Amentum could “pay the labor 
out” (tr. 2/14-15).  Amentum discussed with NASA the possibility of submitting an 
REA to recover its extra costs incurred during Hurricanes Matthew and Irma, but 
NASA told Amentum that it would not pay such an REA (tr. 2/44-45, 82-83).  
Amentum consequently chose not to submit an REA to NASA for Hurricanes Matthew 
and Irma at the time (see tr. 2/83).  Amentum did submit an REA to the Air Force for 
“ride-out” services performed for the Air Force during the hurricane shutdowns 
(tr. 2/82-83).  During each of the hurricane closures under KPLSS, the work that 
would have regularly been performed during that time was either canceled or 
rescheduled (tr. 2/19–21, 194–97).  During the hurricane closures, Amentum did not 
reassign its staff to any other non-KPLSS work (tr. 2/22).  NASA paid Amentum for 
all of the KPLSS work completed under the contract during the hurricane base 
closures, as well as the work that was rescheduled or adjusted after the shutdowns 
(tr. 2/198). 
 
 During the hearing in these appeals, there was conflicting testimony regarding 
the documentation supporting Amentum’s hurricane shutdown claims.  The conflicting 
testimony mostly concerns the sequence of events, such as whether a request occurred 
before or after Amentum’s certified claim.  At NASA’s request, Amentum reported to 
NASA the labor hours it had lost during the hurricanes (tr. 2/44-45, 114-18).  
Amentum filed a certified claim for costs incurred during the three hurricane 
shutdowns on June 19, 2020 (R4, tab 4 at 159-60).  The Contracting Officer, 
Michael Ahearn, contacted Amentum three times about the certified claim:  (1) in 
August 2020, to request additional time to respond to the claim; (2) in October 2020, 
to request additional time to respond to the claim; and (3) in January 2021, to inquire 

19 
 
whether Amentum had previously filed an REA concerning the hurricane shutdowns 
(app. supp. R4, tab 52 at 2-3; tr. 4/9-10).  Apart from the information concerning prior 
REAs requested in the January 21, 2021, email, Mr. Ahearn did not request any 
substantive information concerning the hurricane shutdown claim (app. supp. R4, 
tab 52 at 2; tr. 4/10).  Amentum’s Susan Germano searched for the information 
Mr. Ahearn requested but was unable to find either a previous REA or emails from 
Ms. Lisa Shirah.  The Shirah emails were inaccessible because they were on NASA 
servers to which Amentum no longer had access after Ms. Shirah left the company.  
(Tr. 4/11-12).  By email dated January 25, 2021, Ms. Germano advised Mr. Ahearn 
that she was unable to find the information he had requested (app. supp. R4, tab 52 
at 2).  The contracting officer requested no other information from Amentum and 
denied the claim 22 days later, on February 16, 2021 (tr. 3/145; R4, tab 5 at 184-85).  
In either its REA or its certified claim, Amentum never provided the government with 
any payroll data or pay stubs to verify it had paid its employees anything during the 
hurricane closures (tr. 2/114–17, 4/13, 16). 
 
DECISION Claim 5 ASBCA No. 62839:  Hurricane Shutdowns 
 
 Amentum seeks compensation pursuant to contract clause 1852.242-72 – 
DENIED ACCESS TO NASA FACILITIES (OCT 2015) (app. br. at 29-33).  
According to Amentum, the “‘[d]enied access to facilities’ is analogous to government 
delay of work in construction and other fixed-price contracts where the government is 
required to compensate the contractor for costs incurred due to changes in the scope of 
work and government-caused delays” (app. br. at 30).  However, Amentum ignores the 
distinction between “government-caused” delays and an act of God, such as a 
hurricane.  The contract provision provides that in the event of denied access to a 
NASA facility, the contracting officer has four options: adjusting the performance or 
delivery schedule; foregoing the work; rescheduling the work; or considering requests 
for equitable adjustment (gov’t hrg., ex. 1 at 5).  From this provision stating that a 
contracting officer “may” consider an equitable adjustment, Amentum asks us to find 
that the contracting officer was required to grant it an equitable adjustment.   
 
 Amentum’s argument ignores the fact that the KPLSS contract was a 
firm-fixed-price contract, so the risk of increased performance costs, absent a contract 
provision providing otherwise, falls on the contractor.  See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 
ASBCA No. 32323, 90-1 BCA ¶ 22,602 at 113,426.  NASA clause 1852.242-72 – 
DENIED ACCESS TO NASA FACILITIES, provides that the contacting officer 
“may” take several actions in response to a denial of access to the base, including 
rescheduling the work, forgoing the work, or adjusting the delivery schedule, in 
addition to considering an equitable adjustment.  The evidence of record demonstrates 
that NASA paid Amentum for all of the KPLSS work completed under the contract 
during the hurricane base closures, as well as the work that was rescheduled or 
adjusted after the shutdowns (tr. 2/198).  To the extent Amentum is relying upon the 

20 
 
clause provision that the contracting officer “may” consider an equitable adjustment, 
such consideration would be reviewed pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard.  
See, e.g., Amatea/Grimberg JV, ASBCA No. 60426 et al., 23-1 BCA ¶ 38,366 
at 186,329-30.  Amentum has not established an abuse of discretion on the part of the 
contracting officer.  The parties’ dispute regarding the sufficiency of the payroll 
information is not relevant given that the contracting officer was not required to grant 
an equitable adjustment even if the payroll information were proven.  Appeal 
No. 62839 is denied. 
 
Findings of Fact Pertaining to Claim 6 ASBCA No. 62840:  Gaseous Nitrogen 
Support 
 
 The KPLSS contract contained fixed price tasks for launch support and gaseous 
nitrogen contingency support.  Launch support (TIN 212) typically involved a single 
technician, but one launch customer required a second technician (tr. 2/202-03).  
Gaseous nitrogen contingency support (TIN 223) involved setting-up equipment to 
provide liquid nitrogen in the event of an outage of the liquid nitrogen plant operated 
by Air Liquide, S.A. during a critical period for launch preparation (tr. 2/35-36).  
Unlike launch support, gaseous nitrogen support required between two and six 
technicians, depending on the customer and type of launch (tr. 3/42).  For any given 
launch for which TIN 223 was ordered, Amentum decided how many technicians or 
engineers were required to staff the TIN (tr. 2/211).  Information on how many 
technicians or engineers were required to staff the TINs was contained in the GSPN 
handbook, provided to offerors as part of the solicitation documents (tr. 2/209–11).  
Amentum developed the GSPN handbook under the ISC, KPLSS’s predecessor 
contract, and knew how many technicians or engineers were typically required to staff 
each TIN (tr. 2/210–11). 
 
 TIN 212, Launch Support, was defined as follows: 
 
Launch Support shall include all tasks and resources 
necessary to provide Ground Support Pneumatics (GSPN) 
console support at the CCF during a launch countdown or 
major test and required planning support.  This service 
includes personnel support required to fulfill customer 
requirements as well as the support DRD 1-15, Launch 
Readiness Statements; DRD 1-16, System Level Readiness 
Reviews; DRD 2-7, Launch Readiness Plans; and GSPN 
post-launch debriefings as described by PWS 3.1.D.i.   
 
(R4, tab 2 at 111) 
 

21 
 
 The contract defined TIN 223, GN2 [Gaseous Nitrogen] Contingency Support, 
as follows: 
 
GN2 Contingency Support shall include all tasks and 
resources necessary to provide a contingency GN2 source 
at the CCF to continue a launch countdown or major test in 
the event of a failure at the GN2 plant.  This service 
includes [Systems & Equipment] preparation and 
personnel support required to fulfill customer 
requirements.   
 
(R4, tab 2 at 114) 
 
 Also relevant to the appeal are TINs 701 (Engineer Hourly Rate) and 702 
(Technician Hourly Rate) (R4, tab 2 at 127).  Both TINs provide that the rate is to 
establish “the price for an engineer during normal shift for work that is not 
specifically described above” and “the price for either a propellant or life support 
technician during normal shift for work that is not specifically described above” (id.).  
Ms. Deborah Gorman, Amentum’s Business Operations Manager, testified that 
Amentum bid TIN’s 212 and 223 assuming that the TIN represented the hourly rate 
for a single worker (tr. 2/57).  This was because the number of workers could vary, 
and the TINs referenced TINs 701 and 702 which were bid on an hourly basis 
(tr. 2/57-58).  Ms. Gorman also testified that a lack of historical information on 
staffing for the TIN was an added source of confusion as to whether TIN 223 was 
being bid on a per worker basis (see tr. 2/58-59, 3/46). 
 
 Amentum’s bid prices for TINs 212, 223, 701 and 702 for FY 2016, beginning 
October 1, 2015, were:  
 
TIN  Description Price 
212A Launch Support $159.06 
212B Launch Support (off shift) $154.94 
223A GN2 Contingency Support $143.48 
223B GN2 Contingency Support (off shift) $365.26 
701A Engineer Hourly Rate $61.45 
701B Engineer Hourly Rate (off shift) $61.45 
702A Technician Hourly Rate $53.40 
702B Technician Hourly Rate (off shift) $77.72 
 
(R4, tab 1 at 9, 11)  Thus, TIN 212A, which typically required a single worker was 
billed at $159.06, while TIN 223A, which typically required 4 to 6 workers, was billed 
at $143.48.  However, for the off-shift work, TIN 223B was priced more than double 
the rate for TIN 212B ($365.26 vs. $154.94).   

22 
 
 
 In accordance with the KPLSS RFP, the government performed a FAR 15.404-
1(b), Price Analysis, evaluating proposals on the basis of the total evaluated price 
which consisted of the sum of all the offeror’s proposed unit prices multiplied by the 
government-provided BEQs for each TIN for all years, plus the proposed price for 
phase-in (R4, tab 20 at 288–89).  During proposal discussions, NASA requested 
additional information from Amentum regarding its overall pricing methodology 
because the total evaluated price was below the minimum contract value (R4, tab 21 
at 293).  Amentum’s response to this inquiry included the following statement: 
 
Business Case was developed by grouping specific TINs 
anticipated to be used regularly and ensuring allocations 
were spread among these TINs; purposely identifying TINs 
where work was more likely to occur (i.e. 300 series – Life 
Support, 500 – Fixed Systems Maintenance); allocations 
were not spread evenly among TINs. 
 
(R4, tab 21 at 293) 
 
 Also, during proposal discussions, NASA requested information from 
Amentum concerning its prices for the 300 Series “ELSA” TINs.  NASA pointed out 
pricing mistakes to Amentum with respect to those TINs (tr. 3/12–13).  The KPLSS 
source evaluation board understood that Amentum’s ELSA pricing was a mistake 
because the price for each ELSA TIN decreased when more units were ordered—that 
is, as originally proposed, the government could order five ELSA units at a price 
significantly lower than the price of ordering a single ELSA unit (tr. 3/12–13).  
Amentum changed its pricing on the ELSAs following proposal discussions (tr. 3/13–
14).  NASA also made note of discrepancies in the prices for TIN 223, but did not 
bring any alleged errors to the attention of Amentum (tr. 3/8-11).  The KPLSS source 
evaluation board believed that nuances in pricing of services could be built into 
Amentum’s business case; the source evaluation board did not request a full 
breakdown or specific elements of cost for each service, because it could not evaluate 
that information (tr. 3/15–16).  In bidding TIN 223, Amentum priced all tasks and 
resources necessary to provide one technician for one hour to perform GN
2 
contingency services.  Amentum’s Jerry Korte testified on cross-examination that he 
was aware that TIN 223 would require more than one person, and that he told this to 
the employees drafting the proposal (tr. 1/189-90).  He further testified that he was 
aware that the proposal did not propose a price high enough to cover four staff and that 
he questioned the pricing model (tr. 1/190).  He accepted the pricing as being a 
business decision to provide a more competitive bid (tr. 1/190-91).  He also testified to 
his understanding of Amentum’s pricing strategy of not spreading the price allocation 
evenly among TINs and pricing differently TINs that Amentum thought were more 
likely to be ordered (tr. 1/195-96)  Mr. Korte discovered an apparent bid error with 

23 
 
respect to TIN 223 shortly after award (tr. 1/150-51).  Korte brought the bid error to 
the attention of NASA’s Ken Madyda, who told him that nothing could be done about 
the error (tr. 1/158-59).  NASA’s then-Lead Contracting Officer, Marco Pochy, told 
Amentum, “[L]ook, you bid these prices.  We can order these TINs at these prices for 
the life of the contract.  And there’s really no recourse” (tr. 1/161).  
 
DECISION Claim 6 ASBCA No. 62840:  Gaseous Nitrogen Support 
 
 Amentum makes two arguments regarding the gaseous nitrogen claim.  First, 
Amentum alleges that TIN 223 was ambiguous as to whether it was an hourly price 
per engineer or an hourly price for all necessary labor.  Amentum argues that the 
provision should be construed against the drafter (NASA) and be interpreted as an 
hourly rate per engineer.  Second, if TIN 223 was not ambiguous, Amentum asserts 
that there was a bidding error that entitles it to relief.   
 
A. TIN 223 Is Not Ambiguous, And Even If It Were Ambiguous, The 
Ambiguity Would Be Patent 
 
 A ccording to Amentum, the description for TIN 223 is ambiguous because 
there are only four TINs in the KPLSS contract that are hourly rates, and each of the 
other hourly TINs were for single employees (app. br. at 34).  The other hourly TINs 
were 212, console support, and 701 and 702 Labor Services for Engineers and 
Technicians.  However, a comparison of the TINs does not support Amentum’s 
argument.  TINs 701 and 702 each provide that the rate is to establish “the price for an 
engineer during normal shift for work that is not specifically described above” and 
“the price for either a propellant or life support technician during normal shift for 
work that is not specifically described above” (R4, tab 2 at 127) (emphasis added).  
The language in TINs 701 and 702 are clear that the TIN applies to a single worker, 
“an engineer” or “a propellant or life support technician” (id.).  Conversely, TIN 223 
provides that it “shall include all tasks and resources necessary” for gaseous nitrogen 
contingency support “includ[ing] [Systems & Equipment] preparation and personnel 
support required to fulfill customer requirements” (id. at 114).    
 
 Both Amentum and the government claim that TIN 212 supports their 
interpretation of TIN 223.  Amentum asserts that TIN 212 was the hourly rate for a 
single worker, and thus the language that the launch support TIN “shall include all 
tasks and resources necessary to provide Ground Support Pneumatics (GSPN) console 
support at the CCF during a launch countdown or major test and required planning 
support” “include[ing] personnel support required to fulfill customer requirements” 
(id. at 111) was similar to the language in TIN 223 for multiple workers, making the 
language ambiguous.  The government, conversely, points to the fact that TIN 212 
could require two workers for some launch customers (see tr. 2/202-03), and thus 
arguing that the language in TINs 212 and 223 was not ambiguous.   

24 
 
 
 We find that the language in TIN 223 was unambiguous in requiring “all tasks 
and resources necessary” and that it was not an hourly rate per worker.  To the extent 
Amentum thought that it must be a cost per worker because of the variable staffing 
requirements of the TIN, it would be a patent ambiguity, requiring Amentum to 
inquire, rather than bidding on what it guessed the language to mean.  See, e.g., 
Lebolo-Watts Constructors 01 JV, LLC, ASBCA No. 59740 et al., 21-1 BCA ¶ 37,789 
at 183,432-33, aff’d, Lebolo-Watts Constructors 01 JV, LLC v. Army, 2022 WL 
499850 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 18, 2022) (nonprecedential).   
 
B. Amentum Has Not Established a Bidding Error 
 
 Amentum’s final argument is that there was a bidding error.  To recover for a 
bidding mistake, Amentum must establish that: 
 
(1) a mistake in fact occurred prior to contract award; (2) 
the mistake was a clear-cut, clerical or mathematical error 
or a misreading of the specifications and not a judgmental 
error; (3) prior to award the Government knew, or should 
have known, that a mistake had been made and, therefore, 
should have requested bid verification; (4) the Government 
did not request bid verification or its request for bid 
verification was inadequate; and (5) proof of the intended 
bid is established. 
 
McClure Elec. Constructors, Inc. v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 709, 711 (Fed. Cir. 1997).   
 
 Amentum contends that its bid error was clerical or due to a misreading of the 
specifications, because Amentum obviously bid the cost of a single technician (app. br. 
at 35).  Ms. Gorman’s testimony supports this point (tr. 2/57).  However, Mr. Korte’s 
testimony on cross-examination calls into question whether this was actually a 
judgmental error.  Mr. Korte admitted that he told the employees drafting the proposal 
that TIN 223 would require more than one worker, and that he was aware that the 
proposal did not propose a price high enough to cover four staff and that he questioned 
the pricing model, but accepted the pricing as being a business decision to provide a 
more competitive bid (tr. 1/189-91).  Even assuming that Amentum has established 
that its bid was a misreading of the specifications, we find that Amentum has not 
established by preponderated evidence that NASA knew or should have known that 
Amentum made a mistake in its bid.  The list of hourly TIN prices shows that 
Amentum bid $159.06 per hour for launch support (TIN 212A) which was typically 
performed by one technician, but sometimes two, and $143.48 for gaseous nitrogen 
contingency support (TIN 223A), which was typically performed by two to six 
technicians.  The government asserts that it was unaware of a bidding error because it 

25 
 
performed a FAR 15.404-1(b), Price Analysis, evaluating proposals on the basis of the 
total evaluated price which consisted of the sum of all the offeror’s proposed unit 
prices multiplied by the government-provided BEQs for each TIN for all years, plus 
the proposed price for phase-in (R4, tab 20 at 288-89).  Moreover, the government 
points to the fact that Amentum had used a bidding strategy that did not allocate costs 
evenly among TINs but “group[ed] specific TINs anticipated to be used regularly and 
ensuring allocations were spread among these TINs; purposely identifying TINs where 
work was more likely to occur” (R4, tab 21 at 293; see also tr. 1/195-96).    
Amentum’s proposal used a business strategy that sought to make its proposal more 
competitive by not allocating costs evenly among TINs.  This strategy resulted in TIN 
rates that were questioned by Amentum’s own employees (see, e.g., tr. 1/190).  Given 
Amentum’s pricing for certain TINs, such as TIN 212 being cheaper off-shift than 
regular shift while the off-shift rate for TIN 223 was more than double the regular shift 
rate, we conclude that the government did not know and should not have known of a 
pricing error regarding the TIN 212 and TIN 223 rather than it being a business 
decision.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 For the reasons stated above, we grant appeal ASBCA No. 62835 and return it 
to the parties to negotiate quantum.  Appeals ASBCA Nos. 62836, 62837, 62838, 
62839, and 62840 are denied.   
 
 Dated:  October 25, 2023
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DAVID D’ALESSANDRIS 
Administrative Judge 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
I concur 
 
 
 
RICHARD SHACKLEFORD 
Administrative Judge 
Acting Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 I concur 
 
 
 
 J. REID PROUTY 
Administrative Judge 
Vice Chairman 
Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals 
 


26 
 
 
 I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the 
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA Nos. 62835, 62836, 62837, 
62838, 62839, 62840, Appeals of Amentum Services, Inc., f/k/a AECOM Management 
Services, Inc., rendered in conformance with the Board’s Charter. 
 
 Dated:  October 26, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PAULLA K. GATES-LEWIS 
Recorder, Armed Services 
Board of Contract Appeals