quest2a

1. Epistemology is the study of the origin, structure, and extent of
reality.
2. When I say I know something, I do not always have to believe what
I claim to know.
3. Even though only true propositions can be known, it
is possible to believe a proposition that is false.
4. Because rationalism does not rely on sense experience for knowledge,
it is inappropriate to speak of a "rationalist epistemology."
5. Because rationalism does not rely on sense experience, it cannot
account for how we know anything.
6. Because rationalism does not rely on sense experience, it cannot
provide justified true beliefs (i.e., knowledge) about a priori propositions.
7. According to Plato, the eternal Forms or Ideas are the universal
characteristics by which things are what they are and are known as what
they are.
8. In Plato's account, Meno's Paradox refers to the problem of explaining
how someone can remember anything about the realm of the Forms after the
shock of being born into this world.
9. Plato's Forms are copies of the things we experience in this world.
10. According to Plato, our knowledge about things in the sensible
world is not based on sense experience but on our a priori apprehension
of the Forms.
11. Plato's theory of recollection is his way of explaining how we know
perfect or ideal instances of things (e.g., what a perfect triangle is)
even though we have never experienced such things with our senses.
12. In his account of the Divided Line, Plato says that objects of reason
and understanding (e.g., mathematical objects and Forms) depend on objects
of belief and imagination (e.g., sensible objects) to be known.
13. In Plato's Allegory of the Cave, the figures that cast shadows on
the back wall of the cave are supposed to be understood as the Forms in
terms of which things outside of the Cave are intelligible.
14. According to Plato, to understand a thing means being able to conceive
the thing in terms of the concept or logos by which it is intelligible.
15. According to Plato, the Form of the Good is the ultimate cause or
rationale for every meaningful or intelligible thing.
16. For Plato, all knowledge (as opposed to opinion) is innate insofar
as it is based on reasoning that cannot have been obtained through sense
experience.
17. Plato's rationalism is a foundationalist epistemology because
it assumes that real knowledge is possible only if it is based on some
certain, unchanging priniciples (which in Plato's case are the Forms).
18. According to Descartes, we cannot say that we know things
about the world based on sense experience because we can be deceived by
our senses or might simply be dreaming.
19. According to Descartes, knowledge is justified only if it is based
on an undoubtable principle or belief.
20. In order to know that he exists, Descartes first has to prove that
his bodily senses can be trusted when they reveal to him that he is behaving
in a thinking manner.
21. The methodic doubt by which Descartes hopes to achieve certainty
and a foundation for claims of knowledge is, for him, both a real and reasonable
doubt about the existence of things.
22. Descartes' "methodic doubt" is intended to raise doubts about illusions,
dreams, and occasionally sense experiences--but not about beliefs concerning
the self, God, or one's own body.
23. According to Descartes, since sense experience is sometimes
deceiving, it cannot be the ultimate and indubitable (undoubtable) basis
for knowledge.
24. An a priori statement is one whose truth/falsity
is known without having to appeal to experience.
25. An a posteriori statement is one whose truth/falsity is known
without having to appeal to experience.
26. Even though a posteriori propositions can sometimes
be universal, they are never necessary (that is, they are always contingent).
27. The point of Descartes' appeal to an evil genius
(as opposed to his discussion of illusions and dreams) is to raise doubts
about his knowledge of a posteriori propositions.
28. The point of Descartes' discussion of the evil genius (as opposed
to his discussion of illusions and dreams) is to show that our faith in
sense experience is unjustified.
29. The point of Descartes' appeal to an evil genius (as
opposed to his discussion of illusions and dreams) is to raise doubts about
his knowledge of a priori propositions.
30. Descartes uses the methodic doubt to show that there
is at least one thing that can be known with absolute certainty, namely,
that he exists.
31. By means of his "methodic doubt," Descartes is able to show
that there is one thing we can know with absolute certainty--namely, that
we cannot know anything with certainty.
33. In order for the self to exist, Descartes argues, there must
be an infinite being (God) in terms of which the self's knowledge of itself
as a finite existence is intelligible.
34. Because Descartes knows of God only through his sense experience
of the world, his argument that if he exists then God must exist is based
on a posteriori propositions.
35. By means of his wax example Descartes wants to show how our
ideas of substance and identity are not based on sense experience.
36. Descartes claims that when we know a physical object
(e.g., wax) clearly and distinctly, we do not rely on our intellect or
reason but rather think of the object solely by means of our senses.
37. Philosophical skepticism claims that nothing exists.
38. Epistemology does not consider skepticism as a legitimate
theory because skepticism claims that we can never be completely justified
in our beliefs.
39. A solipsist is someone who doubts whether anything
else exists other than his or her own mind.
40. According to Descartes, no all-good God would permit us ever
to make mistakes about what we claim to know about the world using our
senses.
41. According to Descartes, the criteria or principles
for determining whether a claim is true are clarity and distinctness.
42. By assuming that knowledge is possible by reasoning alone,
rationalists like Plato and Descartes conclude that the only things we
ever know to exist are our minds and their ideas.
Multiple Choice
43. Which of the following IS NOT a necessary characteristic
for saying that Mary knows that today is Monday?
(a) It must be, in fact, true that today is Monday.
(b) Mary must be able to give a reason or justification for
thinking that today is Monday.
(c) Mary could not have been tricked into thinking that today
is any day other than Monday.
(d) Mary must believe that today is Monday.
44. To say that you know that there is life on other planets
necessarily implies that you believe there is life on other planets, that
you have reasons to back up your belief, and that:
(a) life on other planets is perhaps vastly different from what
we are used to.
(b) you can trust your senses when you see extraterrestrial
life forms.
(c) you have experienced life on other planets personally.
(d) there is, in fact, life on other planets.
45. In order for me to know that birds fly, it must be true that
birds do fly, because:
(a) if it were not the case that birds fly, then I would know
that which is not true; in short, I would know no thing: I would not know.
(b) whenever I claim to know something, I have to rely on what
I have been taught.
(c) if it is true that birds fly (as it, in fact, is), then
I cannot be mislead into thinking otherwise.
(d) unless I have seen birds fly I will not believe others when
they tell me that birds do, in fact, fly.
46. For Plato, ordinary sensible objects exist and are knowable as examples
or instances of Ideas or "Forms" that do not exist in our ordinary sensible
world. Forms do not exist in the sensible world because Forms:
(a) are generalizations of our sensible experiences that depend
on our imaginations when we are asked the right kinds of questions.
(b) would not exist unless there were individual things in the
sensible, experienced world by means of which the Forms could be known.
(c) are not individual things but are rather the universal essences
or natures by which individual things are what they are and are known.
(d) are constantly changing and are thus useless in providing
any knowledge about things in our ordinary sensible experience.
47. According to Plato the Forms in terms of which all sensible objects
exist and are known must exist apart from the sensible world
because:
(a) the only Forms that exist in the sensible world are abstractions
(e.g., triangularity, justice) but not real things (e.g., mud, hair).
(b) sensible objects (e.g., triangles drawn on the chalkboard)
exist and are known only in terms of Forms that exist in a supersensible
realm.
(c) the sensible world is the world that "makes sense" of appearances,
the world in terms of which Forms get their meaning.
(d) we truly know something only in terms of its unchanging,
perfect essence, and everything that appears to us in the sensible world
changes or is imperfect.
48. In Plato's idealism, the unchanging Ideas or "Forms" in terms of
which sensible objects both exist and are known must transcend (that is,
exist beyond) the changing realm of appearances; because if Forms changed,
then:
(a) the only things in the sensible world that we could ever
experience would be concepts.
(b) the sensible realm (in contrast to the intelligible realm)
would consist only of copies of real things.
(c) nothing in the experienced world could be or be identified
as one determinate thing or another.
(d) the sensible world would consist of unchanging Forms.
49. In his discussion of the Divided Line, Plato says that, in
contrast to mere belief or opinion, knowledge is a belief for which
we give reasons or justifications by appealing:
(a) to what our senses reveal to us about how things appear
to us, not how they really are.
(b) beyond the Forms to images of goodness, beauty, and truth
obtained from particular objects.
(c) to what we sincerely believe is true about the Forms based
on our experiences in the world.
(d) beyond sense experience to unchanging ideas (Forms) that
are perceived as rationally ordered.
50. In Plato's Divided Line, an ordinary sensible thing (e.g., your
desk) is an object of belief but is not an object of understanding or reason.
To think of it as an object of understanding or reason, we would have to
conceive of it:
(a) based on what we can picture using our senses or based on
what we know from sensation.
(b) as a thing that exists only in our minds or that exists
in the physical, sensible world apart from minds.
(c) in purely mathematical terms or in terms of the Form that
identifies it as an object in the first place.
(d) as a concept that is more real than the Form that identifies
it as an object in the first place.
51. In Plato's allegory of the cave, the Forms and mathematical objects
(e.g., triangles) are represented by things outside the cave and shadows
or reflections of things outside the cave. Inside the cave the objects
carried by the figures in front of the fire and the shadows cast on the
wall by those objects represent:
(a) the things we normally experience using our senses, the
realm of appearances.
(b) things such as mud and hair that do not seem to have a Form
by which they are intelligible.
(c) the Forms we remember after we have sensible experiences
and recover from the shock of being born.
(d) things that are understood when we try to use reason alone
without the benefit of relying on our senses as well.
52. Plato indicates that the knowledge of pure reason is preferable
to conceptual understanding, because knowing that something is a
certain kind of thing is not as good as knowing:
(a) how we come to learn what to call a thing in virtue of our
own experiences.
(b) the logos or rationale of the thing, that is, why it is
the way it is.
(c) why we differ among ourselves about what we claim to know.
(d) the difference between knowledge and opinion as outlined
in Plato's divided line image.
53. Like most rationalists, Plato defines knowledge as justified true
belief. In terms of this definition, we might be able to claim
to
know something as true which might actually be false, but it is impossible
for us really to know something that is false. Why?
(a) Because to know something that is false is to know no real
thing, nothing (i.e., not to know at all).
(b) Because what we know as true is ultimately based on what
we claim to know as true.
(c) Because we cannot give a justification or reason for believing
in something that is false.
(d) Because in contrast to our knowledge of the unchanging Forms,
beliefs about particular objects can change.
54. According to Plato, we can attain knowledge only by seeing beyond
this world of particular, changing objects to the true essences or Forms
in terms of which things in this world are intelligible. For example,
we know what triangularity is not from comparing sensible triangles but
by thinking of the ideal of triangularity in terms of which these sensible
figures are recognized as triangles. From this Plato concludes that
all knowledge (as opposed to opinion) is innate, because:
(a) from the moment we are born we know what things are in the
world in terms of ideas that we get through our senses.
(b) since we are born with senses (that is, our senses are innate),
we can know things about the sensible world with certainty as long as we
rely on the senses alone.
(c) our knowledge of the world is not really of the sensible
world itself but of the world grasped mathematically and ideally.
(d) since our absolutely certain knowledge of things cannot
be based on the changing things in sensible experience, it must merely
be triggered by sensible experience.
55. "When a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the light
of reason only, and without any assistance of sense, and perseveres until
by pure intelligence he arrives at the perception of the absolute good,
he at last finds himself at the end of the intellectual world. . . . Dialectic,
and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principle and is the only
science which does away with hypotheses in order to make her ground secure."
Here Plato indicates how hypothetical knowledge cannot provide the foundation
of dialectical knowledge, because hypotheses simply:
(a) explain sense experiences in terms of general concepts which
themselves are not explained.
(b) show how particular objects of experience cause us to recall
innate ideas.
(c) describe sense experience without providing an explanation
for dialectical methods.
(d) reject the use of reason, preferring instead dialectic, to
achieve knowledge.
56. Plato's suggestion that knowledge is innate or remembered as a result
of being triggered by experience is in response to a paradox he sets up
for himself. The paradox, now referred to as Meno's Paradox, has
to do with the question of:
(a) how knowledge of the Forms can ever be anything other than
a generalization of experience.
(b) how a person can remember anything about the realm of the
Forms after the shock of being born into this world.
(c) how anyone can recognize the correct answer to a question
without already knowing the answer.
(d) how concepts bound to the realm of becoming have meaning
only when associated with the realm of Being.
57. According to Descartes, illusions and dreams often appear as real
as ordinary sense experience, but they obviously cannot provide us with
any certainty about the world. Because sense experience is also often
mistaken, it too cannot provide a dependable ground for knowledge.
Given such a situation, he concludes, the most responsible thing that a
true searcher for truth can do is to engage in methodic doubt--that is,
a doubt about:
(a) those things for which we have good reason to doubt.
(b) only those things for which we have no good reason to doubt.
(c) contingent but not necessary truths.
(d) everything, even if such a doubt seems unreasonable.
58. After noting that we sometimes have been deceived by our
senses, Descartes argues that we cannot rely on any sense experience
as the basis for knowledge because:
(a) even in our dreams we experience the same kinds of
objects that we experience while awake.
(b) without our sense experiences we would not know what words
like "doubt" mean.
(c) a posteriori propositions always depend for their
truthfulness on sense experience.
(d) we never know which sense experiences are accurate, so we
should play it safe and doubt them all.
59. Which of the following is an a priori proposition?
(a) All material objects are extended (that is, they take up
space).
(b) Some material objects are heavier than others.
(c) All physical objects are seen sometime or other by some
human being.
(d) Some material objects are living creatures.
60. As the product of his methodic doubt, the proposition "I think,
therefore I am" provides Descartes with exactly what he as a rationalist
needs to develop an epistemology, namely:
(a) a criterion or rule by which to distinguish a priori
from a posteriori propositions.
(b) an indubitable, certain principle on which to ground all
other claims of knowledge.
(c) a way of distinguishing empiricist principles from rationalist
principles of knowledge.
(d) the basis for an a posteriori proof for the existence
of God.
61. Descartes argues that the cogito (I think, I exist)
is the foundation for all subsequent knowledge because it:
(a) provides an indubitable principle on which all other claims
of knowledge can be based.
(b) is the first step in Descartes' method of doubt.
(c) is not really known to be true but is rather something
that everyone believes.
(d) can be doubted just as much as anything else we might claim
to know.
62. Descartes appeals to the device of the evil genius to make sure
that we do not uncritically accept a priori propositions without
first allowing for the possibility that we might be wrong about them.
Why?
(a) Unlike a posteriori propositions that depend for
their truth or falsity on experience, a priori propositions are
known as true or false prior to experience.
(b) A priori propositions are both necessary and universal,
whereas a posteriori propositions are not.
(c) If there is the slightest possibility that we could be wrong
about the foundation of our knowledge, then everything based on that foundation
is questionable.
(d) The evil genius is Descartes' way of ensuring that he does
not forget how his whole project of methodic doubt is itself prior to any
experiences (and thus a priori).
63. Descartes' evil genie hypothesis is not intended to raise doubt
about whether our senses can be trusted or whether our bodies and the physical
world exist: the possibility of sense deception and dreaming has already
done that. The point of the evil genie hypothesis is to:
(a) make sure that we don't forget just how deceived we can
be about our senses, our body, and world.
(b) show how dreaming lacks the coherence of being awake and
thus cannot be confused with it.
(c) provide a means whereby we can escape from the skepticism
created by universal doubt.
(d) raise doubts about a priori beliefs and reasoning abilities
that do not depend on sense or being awake.
64. To know anything with certainty about the world, Descartes
first has to prove that God exists because:
(a) without God there is no reasonable hope for an afterlife
and thus no reason to act morally.
(b) a perfect (all-good) God would not allow us to be wrong
when we know things clearly and distinctly.
(c) if God's existence is doubtful, so is Descartes' existence;
so he has to prove that God exists.
(d) as the most important thing in the world, God is the first
thing that must be shown to exist.
65. Which of the following IS NOT a typical objection raised
against a rationalist view such as Descartes'?
(a) A priori propositions may be true, but they tell
us nothing about the way the world is.
(b) Sense experience may not be certain, but we are often justified
in claiming to know things based on it.
(c) We never really know physical objects other than as intelligible
(mathematical, quantifiable) objects.
(d) There is no agreement on which ideas or beliefs are self-evident
or innate.
66. According to the "epistemological turn" epitomized by Descartes'
philosophy, epistemology takes precedence over metaphysics. In other
words, in Descartes' philosophy:
(a) that which is real is more important than that which is imaginary.
(b) before we can know what exists, we must know what we can
know and what knowing means.
(c) knowing something to be true comes after believing something
to be true.
(d) nothing exists without first being known by human beings
to exist.
67. Descartes' wax example indicates how we can know what a thing (e.g.,
wax) is:
(a) in purely mathematical terms, without having to rely on what
our senses tell us about it.
(b) only after it has changed into something which it originally
is not.
(c) in terms about which even the evil genius could not have
tricked us.
(d) without having to relate scientific truth to religious belief.
68. Descartes' wax example is intended to show that the wax is the same
substance before and after it is melted, and this observation indicates
how:
(a) our senses portray the physical characteristics of wax in
purely non-sensible ways.
(b) our knowledge of sensible objects (e.g., wax) is based on
what reason, not sense, identifies.
(c) without sense experiences, we would not know whether the
wax before and after melting is the same.
(d) knowing that something is wax is the same thing as sensibly
experiencing something as wax.
69. Both Plato and Descartes are often identified as rationalists
because they agree generally on a series of beliefs that distinguish them
from empiricists. Which of the following IS NOT a typical
rationalist claim?
(a) Though sense experience is sometimes deceptive, it is necessary
for true knowledge.
(b) Sense experience cannot be trusted to provide knowledge.
(c) Reason alone must be the means for getting knowledge.
(d) Knowledge is based ultimately on innate ideas and a priori
principles.