Of the Principles of Human Knowledge

Of the Principles of Human Knowledge.
Source: Of the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). From very old edition. First 20 or so pages.
PART I
1. IT is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects
of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted
on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the
passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by
help of memory and imagination – either compounding, dividing,
or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid
ways. – By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their
several degrees and variations By touch I perceive hard and soft,
heat and cold, motion and resistance, and of all these more and
less either as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with
odours; the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds to
the mind in all their variety of tone and composition. – And as
several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come
to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one THING.
Thus, for example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and
consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted
one distinct thing, signified by the name apple; other
collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the
like sensible things – which as they are pleasing or disagreeable
excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth.
2. But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of
knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives
them; and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining,
remembering, about them. This perceiving, active being is what
I call MIND, SPIRIT, SOUL, or MYSELF. By which words I do not
denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from
them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby
they are perceived – for the existence of an idea consists in
being perceived.
3. That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by
the imagination, exist without the mind, is what everybody will
allow —And to me it is no less evident that the various SENSATIONS,
or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined
together (that is, whatever objects they compose), cannot exist
otherwise than in a mind perceiving them – I think an intuitive
knowledge may be obtained of this by any one that shall attend
to what is meant by the term exist when applied to sensible
things. The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see
and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed
- meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it,
or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was
an odour, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it
was heard; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or
touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like
expressions. – For as to what is said of the absolute existence
of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived,
that is to me perfectly unintelligible Their esse is percipi,
nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds
or thinking things which perceive them.
4. It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that
houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects,
have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being
perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance
and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the
world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question
may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction.
For, what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive
by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations?
and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any
combination of them, should exist unperceived?
5. If we thoroughly examine this tenet it will, perhaps, be found
at bottom to depend on the doctrine of abstract ideas.
For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish
the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived,
so as to conceive them existing unperceived ? Light and colours,
heat and cold, extension and figures – in a word the things we
see and feel – what are they but so many sensations, notions,
ideas, or impressions on the sense? and is it possible to separate,
even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part, I
might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed, divide
in my thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things
which, perhaps, I never perceived by sense so divided Thus, I
imagine the trunk of a human body without the limbs, or conceive
the smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself. So far,
I will not deny, I can abstract – if that may properly be called
abstraction which extends only to the conceiving separately
such objects as it is possible may really exist or be actually
perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does not
extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception.
Hence, as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without
an actual sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me
to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct
from the sensation or perception of it.
6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that
a man need only open his eyes to see them Such I take this important
one to be, viz. that all the choir of heaven and furniture of
the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty
frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind -
that their being is to be perceived or known; that consequently
so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist
in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either
have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some
Eternal Spirit – -it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving
all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part
of them any existence independent of a spirit. To be convinced
of which, the reader need only reflect, and try to separate in
his own thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its
being perceived.
7. From what has been said it is evident there is not any other
Substance than SPIRIT, or that which perceives. But, for the
fuller demonstration of this point, let it be considered the sensible
qualities are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, etc, i.e.
the ideas perceived by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an
unperceiving thing is a manifest contradiction; for to have an
idea is all one as to perceive; that therefore wherein colour,
figure, etc exist must perceive them; hence it is clear there
can be no unthinking substance or substratum of those ideas.
8. But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without
the mind, yet there may be things like them, whereof they are
copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in
an unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing
but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another
colour or figure. If we look but never so little into our own
thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness
except only between our ideas. Again, I ask whether those supposed
originals or external things, of which our ideas are the pictures
or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If they are,
then they are ideas and we have gained our point; but if you say
they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert
a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like
something which is intangible; and so of the rest.
9. Some there are who make a distinction betwixt, primary
and secondary qualities'. By the former they mean extension,
figure, motion, rest, solidity, impenetrability, and number; by
the latter they denote all other sensible qualities, as colours,
sounds, tastes, and so forth The ideas we have of these last they
acknowledge not to be the resemblances of anything existing without
the mind, or unperceived, but they will have our ideas of the
primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which exist
without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call matter.
- By Matter, therefore, we are to understand an inert, senseless
substance, in which extension, figure and motion do actually subsist.
But it is evident, from what we have already shewn, that extension,
figure, and motion are only ideas existing in the Mind, and that
an idea can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently
neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving
substance. Hence, it is plain that the very notion of what is
called Matter or corporeal substance involves a contradiction
in it.
10. They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the primary
or original qualities do exist without the mind, in unthinking
substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, sounds,
heat, cold, and suchlike secondary qualities, do not – which they
tell us are sensations existing in the mind alone, that depend
on and are occasioned by the different size, texture, and motion
of the minute particles of matter. This they take for an undoubted
truth, which they can demonstrate beyond all exception. Now, if
it be certain that those original qualities are inseparably united
with the other sensible qualities, and not, even in thought, capable
of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows that they exist
only in the mind But I desire any one to reflect and try whether
he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension
and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities. For
my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame
an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must withal give
it some colour or other sensible quality which is acknowledged
to exist only in the mind In short, extension, figure, and motion,
abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where
therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these be
also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere else.
11. Again, great and small, swift and slow,
are allowed to exist nowhere without the mind, being entirely
relative, and changing as the frame or position of the organs
of sense varies. The extension therefore which exists without
the mind is neither great nor small, the motion neither swift
nor slow, that is, they are nothing at all But, say you, they
are extension in general, and motion in general thus we see how
much the tenet of extended moveable substances existing without
the mind depends on that strange doctrine of abstract ideas. And
here I cannot but remark how nearly the vague and indeterminate
description of Matter or corporeal substance, which the modern
philosophers are run into by their on by principles, resembles
that antiquated and so much ridiculed notion of materia prima,
to be met with in Aristotle and his followers. Without extension
solidity cannot be conceived; since therefore it has been shewn
that extension exists not in an unthinking substance, the same
must also be true of solidity.
12. That number is entirely the creature of the mind, even though
the other qualities be allowed to exist without, it will be evident
to whoever considers that the same thing bears a different denomination
of number as the mind views it with different respects Thus, the
same extension is one, or three, or thirty-six, according as the
mind considers it with reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch.
Number is so visibly relative, and dependent on men's understanding,
that it is strange to think how any one should give it an absolute
existence without the mind. We say one book, one page, one line,
etc.; all these are equally units, though some contain several
of the others. And in each instance, it is plain, the unit relates
to some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily put together
by the mind.
13. Unity I know some will have to be a simple or uncompounded
idea, accompanying all other ideas into the mind That I have any
such idea answering the word unity I do not find; and if
I had, methinks I could not miss finding it on the contrary, it
should be the most familiar to my understanding, since it is said
to accompany all other ideas, and to be perceived by all the ways
of sensation and reflection To say no more, it is an abstract
idea.
14. I shall further add, that, after the same manner as modern
philosophers prove certain sensible qualities to have no existence
in Matter, or without the mind, the same thing may be likewise
proved of all other sensible qualities whatsoever. Thus, for instance,
it is said that heat and cold are affections only of the mind,
and not at all patterns of real beings existing in the corporeal
substances which excite them, for that the same body which appears
cold to one hand seems warm to another. Now, why may we not as
well argue that figure and extension are not patterns or resemblances
of qualities existing in Matter, because to the same eye at different
stations, or eyes of a different texture at the same station,
they appear various, and cannot therefore be the images of anything
settled and determinate without the mind? Again, it is proved
that sweetness is not really in the sapid thing, because the thing
remaining unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in
case of a fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable
to say that motion is not without the mind, since if the succession
of ideas in the mind become swifter the motion, it is acknowledged,
shall appear slower without any alteration in any external object.
15. In short, let any one consider those arguments which are thought
manifestly to prove that colours and tastes exist only in the
mind, and he shall find they may with equal force be brought to
prove the same thing of extension, figure, and motion – Though
it must be confessed this method of arguing does not so much prove
that there is no extension or colour in an outward object, as
that we do not know by sense which is the true
extension or colour of the object But the arguments foregoing
plainly shew it to be impossible that any colour or extension
at all, or other sensible quality whatsoever, should exist in
an unthinking subject without the mind, or in truth, that there
should be any such thing as an outward object.
16. But let us examine a little the received opinion – It is said
extension is a mode or accident [or Attribute] of Matter, and that Matter is
the substratum that supports it. Now I desire that you
would explain to me what is meant by Matter's supporting
extension. Say you, I have no idea of Matter and therefore cannot
explain it. I answer, though you have no positive, yet, if you
have any meaning at all, you must at least have a relative idea
of Matter; though you know not what it is, yet you must be supposed
to know what relation it bears to accidents, and what is meant
by its supporting them It is evident 'support' cannot here be
taken in its usual or literal sense – as when we say that pillars
support a building; in what sense therefore must it be taken?
17. If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers declare
themselves to mean by material substance, we shall find
them acknowledge they have no other meaning annexed to those sounds
but the idea of being in general. together with the relative
notion of its supporting accidents. The general idea of
Being appeareth to me the most abstract and incomprehensible of
all other; and as for its supporting accidents, thus, as we have
just now observed, cannot be understood in the common sense of
those words; it must therefore be taken in some other sense, but
what that is they do not explain. So that when I consider the
two parts or branches which make the signification of the words
material substance, I am convinced there is no distinct
meaning annexed to them. But why should we trouble ourselves any
farther, in discussing this material substratum or 'support'
of figure, and motion, and other sensible qualities? Does it not
suppose they have an existence without the mind? And is
not this a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable?
18. But, though it were possible that solid, figured, moveable
substances may exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas
we have of bodies, yet how is it possible for us to know this?
Either we must know it by Sense or by Reason – As for our senses,
By them we have the knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or
those things that are immediately perceived by sense, call them
what you will: but they do not inform us that things exist without
the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are perceived. This
the Materialists themselves acknowledge. – It remains therefore
that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it must
be by Reason inferring their existence from what is immediately
perceived by sense But what reason can induce us to believe the
existence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since
the very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend there is
any necessary connection betwixt them and our ideas? I say it
is granted on all hands-and what appears in dreams, frenzies,
and the like, puts it beyond dispute – that it is possible we
might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though there
were no bodies existing without resembling them. Hence, it is
evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for
the producing our ideas; since it is granted they are produced
sometimes, and might possibly be produced always in the same order
we see them in at present, without their concurrence.
19. But, though we might possibly have all our sensations without
them, yet perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive and explain
the manner of their production, by supposing external bodies in
their likeness rather than otherwise; and so it might be at least
probable there are such things as bodies that excite their ideas
in our minds. But neither can this be said; for, though we give
the materialists their external bodies, they by their own confession
are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced;
since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner
body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint
any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident the production of ideas
or sensations in our minds can be no reason why we should suppose
Matter or corporeal substances, since that is acknowledged
to remain equally inexplicable with or without this supposition.
If therefore it were possible for bodies to exist without the
mind, yet to hold they do so must needs be a very precarious opinion;
since it is to suppose, without any reason at all, that God has
created innumerable beings that are entirely useless, and serve
to no manner of purpose.
20. In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible
we should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might
have the very same reasons to think there were that we have now.
Suppose – what no one can deny possible – an intelligence without
the help of external bodies, to be affected with the same
train of sensations or ideas that you are, imprinted in the same
order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask whether that
intelligence hath not all the reason to believe the existence
of corporeal substances, represented by his ideas, and exciting
them in his mind, that you can possibly have for believing the
same thing ? Of this there can be no question – which one consideration
were enough to make any reasonable person suspect the strength
of whatever arguments he may think himself to have, for the existence
of bodies without the mind.
21. Were it necessary to add any farther proof against the Existence
of Matter, after what has been said, I could instance several
of those errors and difficulties (not to mention impieties) which
have sprung from that tenet. It has occasioned numberless controversies
and disputes in philosophy, and not a few of far greater moment
in religion. But I shall not enter into the detail of them in
this place, as well because I think arguments a posteriori
are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if I mistake not
sufficiently demonstrated a priori, as because I shall
hereafter find occasion to speak somewhat of them.
22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am needlessly prolix
in handling this subject For, to what purpose is it to dilate
on that which may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in
a line or two, to any one that is capable of the least reflection?
It is but looking into your own thoughts, and so trying whether
you can conceive it possible for a sound, or figure, or motion,
or colour to exist without the mind or unperceived. This easy
trial may perhaps make you see that what you contend for is a
downright contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put the
whole upon this issue – if you can but conceive it possible for
one extended moveable substance, or, in general, for any one idea,
or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving
it, I shall readily give up the cause. And, as for all that compages
of external bodies you contend for, I shall grant you its existence,
though you cannot either give me any reason why you believe it
exists, or assign any use to it when it is supposed to exist I
say, the bare possibility of your opinions being true shall pass
for an argument that it is so.
23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to
imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a
closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so,
there is no difficulty in it; but what is all this, I beseech
you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which
you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame
the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you yourself
perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing
to the purpose it only shews you have the power of imagining or
forming ideas in your mind; but it does not shew that you can
conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without
the mind. To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive
them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest
repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of
external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own
ideas. But the mind, taking no notice of itself, is deluded
to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of
or without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended
by or exist in itself. A little attention will discover to any
one the truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary
to insist on any other proofs against the existence of material
substance.
24. It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our own thoughts,
to know whether it be possible for us to understand what
is meant by the absolute existence of sensible objects
in themselves, or without the mind. To me it is
evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction, or
else nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I know no
readier or fairer way than to entreat they would calmly attend
to their own thoughts; and if by this attention the emptiness
or repugnancy of those expressions does appear, surely nothing
more is requisite for their conviction. It is on this therefore
that I insist, to wit, that the absolute existence of unthinking
things are words without a meaning, or which include a contradiction.
This is what I repeat and inculcate, and earnestly recommend to
the attentive thoughts of the reader.
25. All our ideas, sensations, notions, or the things which we
perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly
inactive – there is nothing of Power or Agency included in them
So that one idea or object of thought cannot produce or make any
alteration in another.
- To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else
requisite but a bare observation of our ideas. For, since they
and every part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that
there is nothing in them but what is perceived; but whoever shall
attend to his ideas, whether of sense or reflection, will not
perceive in them any power or activity; there is, therefore, no
such thing contained in them A little attention will discover
to us that the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness
in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an idea to do anything,
or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything neither can
it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is evident
from sect 8. Whence it plainly follows that extension, figure,
and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say, therefore,
that these are the effects of powers resulting from the configuration,
number, motion, and size of corpuscles, must certainly be false.
26. We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are anew
excited, others are changed or totally disappear There is therefore
some Cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces
and changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality, or idea,
or combination of ideas is clear from the preceding section. It
must therefore be a substance; but it has been shewn that there
is no corporeal or material substance: it remains therefore that
the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or Spirit.
27. A Spirit is one simple, undivided, active being – as it perceives
ideas it is called the Understanding, and as it produces
or otherwise operates about them it is called the Will.
Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit; for, all
ideas whatever, being passive and inert, (vid sect 25,) cannot
represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts.
A little attention will make it plain to any one that to have
an idea which shall be like that active principle of motion
and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature
of Spirit, or that which acts; that it cannot be of itself perceived,
but only by the effects which it produceth. – If any man shall
doubt of the truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect
and try if we can frame the idea of any Power or Active Being;
and whether he has ideas of two principal powers, marked by the
names Will and Understanding, distinct from each
other, as well as from a third idea of Substance or Being in general,
with a relative notion of its supporting or being the subject
of the aforesaid powers which is signified by the name Soul or
Spirit. This is what some hold; but, so far as I can see, the
words will, soul, spirit, do not stand for
different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something
which is very different from ideas, and which, being an Agent,
cannot be like unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever. [Though
it must be owned at the same time that we have some notion of
soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind; such as willing,
loving, hating – inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning
of these words].
28. I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary
and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than
willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy;
and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way for another.
This making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate
the mind active. Thus much is certain and grounded on experience:
but when we talk of unthinking agents, or of exciting ideas exclusive
of Volition, we only amuse ourselves with words.
29. But, whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find
the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence
on my will, when in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in
my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine
what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and
so likewise as to the hearing and other senses, the ideas imprinted
on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some
other Will or Spirit that produces them.
30. The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than
those of the Imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order,
and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those Which are
the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or
series – the admirable connection whereof sufficiently testifies
the wisdom and benevolence of its Author Now the set rules or
established methods wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us
the ideas of sense, are called the laws of nature; and
these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and such
ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary
course of things.
31. This gives us a sort of foresight which enables us to regulate
our actions for the benefit of life. And without this we should
be eternally at a loss; we could not know how to act anything
that might procure us the least pleasure, or remove the least
pain of sense. That food nourishes sleep refreshes, and fire warms
us; that to sow in the seedtime is the way to reap in the harvest;
and in general that to obtain such or such ends, such or such
means are conducive – all this we know, not by discovering any
necessary connection between our ideas, but only by the
observation of the settled laws of nature, without which we should
be all in uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no more know
how to manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just
born.
32. And yet this consistent uniform working, which so evidently
displays the goodness and wisdom of that Governing Spirit whose
will constitutes the laws of nature, is so far from leading our
thoughts to him, that it rather sends them wandering after second
causes For, when we perceive certain ideas of Sense constantly
followed by other ideas and we know this is not of our own doing,
we forthwith attribute power and agency to the ideas themselves,
and make one the cause of another, than which nothing can be more
absurd and unintelligible Thus, for example, having observed that
when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous figure we at
the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called heat,
we do from thence conclude the sun to be the cause of heat. And
in like manner perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to
be attended with sound, we are inclined to think the latter the
effect of the former.
33. The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature
are called real things. and those excited in the Imagination
being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed
ideas, or images of things, which they copy and represent.
But then our sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct,
are nevertheless ideas, that is, they exist in the mind, or are
perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. The
ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that
is, to be more strong, ordered, and coherent that the creatures
of the mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the
mind. They are also less dependent on the spirit, or thinking
substance which perceives them, in that they are excited by the
will of another and more powerful Spirit; yet still they are ideas,
and certainly no idea, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise
than in a mind perceiving it.
34. Before we proceed any farther it is necessary we spend some
time in answering objections which may probably be made against
the principles we have hitherto laid down. In doing of which,
if I seem too prolix to those of quick apprehensions, I desire
I may be excused, since all men do not equally apprehend things
of this nature, and I am willing to be understood by every one.
First, then, it w ill he objected that by the foregoing
principles all that is real and substantial in nature is banished
out of the world, and instead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas
takes place. All things that exist only in the mind, that is,
they are merely notional. What therefore becomes of the sun, moon,
and stars? What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees,
stones; nay, even of our own bodies? Are all these but so many
chimeras and illusions on the fancy? – To all which, and whatever
else of the same sort may be objected, I answer, that by the principles
premised we are not deprived of any one thing in nature. Whatever
we see, feel, hear, or any wise conceive or understand, remains
as secure as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a rerum
natura and the distinction between realities and chimeras
retains its full force. This is evident from sect 20, 30, and
33, where we have shewn what is meant by real things, in
opposition to chimeras or ideas of our own framing; But
then they both equally exist in the mind, and in that sense are
alike ideas.
35. I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that
we can apprehend either by sense or reflection. That the things
I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist,
I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence
we deny is that which Philosophers call Matter or corporeal
substance. And in doing of this there is no damage done to the
rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. The Atheist
indeed will want the colour of an empty name to support his impiety;
and the Philosophers may possibly find they have lost a great
handle for trifling and disputation.
36. If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or reality
of things, he is very far from understanding what hath been premised
in the plainest terms I could think of. Take here an abstract
of what has been said: – There are spiritual substances, minds,
or human souls, which will or excite ideas in themselves at pleasure;
But these are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect of others they
perceive by Sense – which, Being impressed upon them according
to certain Rules or laws of Nature, speak themselves the effects
of a Mind more powerful and wise than human spirits. These latter
are said to have more reality in them than the former;
- by which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and
distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving
them. And in this sense the sun that I see by day is the real
sun, and that which I imagine by night is the idea of the former.
In the sense here given of reality, it is evident that
every vegetable star, mineral, and in general each part of the
mundane system, is as much a real being by our principles
as by any other whether others mean anything by the term reality
different from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own
thoughts and see.
37. It will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit,
that we take away all corporeal substances. To this my answer
is, that if the word substance be taken in the vulgar sense
- for a combination of sensible qualities, such as extension,
solidity, weight, and the like – this we cannot be accused of
taking away; but if it be taken in a philosophic sense – for
the support of accidents or qualities without the mind – then
indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one maybe said to
take away that which never had any existence, not even in the
imagination.
38. But after all, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat
and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas I acknowledge it does
so – the word idea not being used in common discourse to
signify the several combinations of sensible qualities which are
called things; and it is certain that any expression which
varies from the familiar use of language will seem harsh and ridiculous.
But this doth not concern the truth of the proposition, which
in other words is no more than to say, we are fed and clothed
with those things which we perceive immediately by our senses.
The hardness or softness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure, or
suchlike qualities, which, combined together, constitute the several
sorts of victuals and apparel, have been shewn to exist only in
the mind that perceives them; and this is all that is meant by
calling them ideas; which word, if it was as ordinarily
used as thing, would sound no harsher nor more ridiculous
than it. I am not for disputing about the propriety, but the truth
of the expression. If therefore you agree with me that we eat
and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of sense, which
cannot exist unperceived or without the mind, I shall readily
grant it is more proper or conformable to custom that they should
be called things rather than ideas.
39. If it be demanded why I make use of the word idea,
and do not rather in compliance with custom call them things;
I answer, I do it for two reasons – first, because the term thing,
in contradistinction to idea, is generally supposed to
denote somewhat existing without the mind; secondly, because thing
hath a more comprehensive signification than idea, including
spirit or thinking things as well as ideas. Since therefore the
objects of sense exist only in the mind, and are withal thoughtless
and inactive, I choose to mark them by the word idea, which
implies those properties.
40. But, say what we can, some one perhaps may be apt to reply,
he will still believe his senses, and never suffer any arguments,
how plausible soever, to prevail over the certainty of them. Be
it so; assert the evidence of sense as high as you please, we
are willing to do the same. That what I see, hear, and feel doth
exist, that is to say, is perceived by me, I no more doubt than
I do of my own being. But I do not see how the testimony of sense
can be alleged as a proof for the existence of anything which
is not perceived by sense. We are not for having any man
turn sceptic and disbelieve his senses; on the contrary, we give
them all the stress and assurance imaginable; nor are there any
principles more opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid
down, as shall be hereafter clearly shewn.
41.Secondly, it will be objected that there is a great
difference betwixt real fire for instance, and the idea of fire,
betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt, and actually being
so: if you suspect it to be only the idea of fire which you see,
do but put your hand into it and you will be convinced with a
witness. This and the like may he urged in opposition to our tenets.
To all which the answer is evident from what hath been already
said, and I shall only add in this place, that if real fire he
very different from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain
that it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain;
and yet nobody will pretend that real pain either is, or can possibly
be, in an unperceiving thing, or without the mind, any more than
its idea.
42.Thirdly, it will be objected that we see things actually
without or at a distance from us, and which consequently do not
exist in the mind; it being absurd that those things which are
seen at the distance of several miles should be as near to us
as our own thoughts. In answer to this, I desire it may be considered
that in a dream we do oft perceive things as existing at a great
distance off, and yet for all that, those things are acknowledged
to have their existence only in the mind.
43. But, for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be worth
while to consider how it is that we perceive distance and
things placed at a distance by sight. For, that we should in truth
see external space, and bodies actually existing in it – some
nearer, and others farther off – seems to carry with it some opposition
to what hath been said of their existing nowhere without the mind.
The consideration of this difficulty it was that gave birth to
my Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, which was published
not long since – wherein it is shewn that distance or outness
is neither immediately of itself perceived by sight, nor yet apprehended
or judged of by lines and angles, or anything that hath a necessary
connection with it; but that it is only suggested to our thoughts
by certain visible ideas and sensations attending vision, which
in their own nature have no manner of similitude or relation either
with distance or things placed at a distance; but, by a connection
taught us by experience, they come to signify and suggest them
to us, after the same manner that words of any language suggest
the ideas they are made to stand for; insomuch that a man from
blind and afterwards made to see, would not, at first sight, think
the things he saw to be without his mind, or at any distance from
him See sect 41 of the forementioned treatise.
44. The ideas of sight and touch make two species entirely distinct
and heterogeneous The former are marks and prognostics of the
latter. That the proper objects of sight neither exist without
the mind, nor are the images of external things, was shewn even
in that treatise. Though throughout the same the contrary be supposed
true of tangible objects – not that to suppose that vulgar error
was necessary for establishing the notion therein laid down, but
because it was beside my purpose to examine and refute it in a
discourse concerning Vision. So that in strict truth the
ideas of sight when we apprehend by them distance and things placed
at a distance, do not suggest or mark out to us things actually
existing at a distance, but only admonish us what ideas of touch
will be imprinted in our minds at such and such distances of time,
and in consequence of such and such actions. It is, I say, evident
from what has been said in the foregoing parts of this treatise,
and in sect 147 and elsewhere of the Essay concerning Vision,
that visible ideas are the language whereby the governing Spirit
on whom we depend no informs us what tangible ideas He is about
to imprint upon us, in case we excite this or that motion in our
own bodies But for a fuller information in this point I refer
to the Essay itself.
45.Fourthly, it will be objected that from the foregoing
principles it follows things are every moment annihilated and
created anew. The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived;
the trees therefore are in the garden, or the chairs in the parlour,
no longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them. Upon
shutting my eyes all the furniture in the room is reduced to nothing,
and barely upon opening them it is again created – In answer to
all which, I refer the reader to What has been said in sect 3,
4, &c, all I desire he will consider whether be means
anything by the actual existence of an idea distinct from its
being perceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I could
make, I am not able to discover that anything else is meant by
those words and I once more entreat the reader to sound his own
thoughts, and not suffer himself to be imposed on by words. If
he can conceive it possible either for his ideas or their archetypes
to exist without being perceived, then I give up the cause; but
if he cannot, he will acknowledge it is unreasonable for him to
stand up in defence of he knows not what, and pretend to charge
on me as an absurdity the not assenting to those propositions
which at bottom have no meaning in them.
46. It will not be amiss to observe how far the received principles
of philosophy are themselves chargeable with those pretended absurdities.
It is thought strangely absurd that upon closing my eyelids all
the visible objects around me should be reduced to nothing; and
yet is not this what philosophers commonly acknowledge, when they
agree on all hands that light and colours, which alone are the
proper and immediate objects of sight, are mere sensations that
exist no longer than they are perceived? Again, it may to some
perhaps seem very incredible that things should be every moment
creating, yet this very notion is commonly taught in the schools.
For the Schoolmen, though they acknowledge the existence of matter,
and that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it, are nevertheless
of opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine conservation,
which by them is expounded to be a continual creation.
47. Farther, a little thought will discover to us that though
we allow the existence of Matter or corporeal substances yet it
will unavoidably follow, from the principles which are now generally
admitted, that the particular bodies, of what kind soever, do
none of them exist whilst they are not perceived. For, it is evident,
from sect 11 and the following sections, that the Matter philosophers
contend for is an incomprehensible somewhat, which hath none of
those particular qualities whereby the bodies falling under our
senses are distinguished one from another. But, to make this more
plain, it must be remarked that the infinite divisibility of Matter
is now universally allowed, at least by the most approved and
considerable philosophers, who, on the received principles, demonstrate
it beyond all exception. Hence, it follows there is an infinite
number of parts in each particle of Matter which are not perceived
by sense. The reason therefore that any particular body seems
to be of a finite magnitude, or exhibits only a finite number
of parts to sense, is, not because it contains no more, since
in itself it contains an infinite number of parts, but because
the sense is not acute enough to discern them. In proportion therefore
as the sense is rendered more acute, it perceives a greater number
of parts in the object, that is, the object appears greater, and
its figure varies, those parts in its extremities which were before
unperceivable appearing now to bound it in very different lines
and angles from those perceived by an obtuser sense. And at length,
after various changes of size and shape, when the sense becomes
infinitely acute the body shall seem infinite During all which
there is no alteration in the body, but only in the sense. Each
body therefore, considered in itself, is infinitely extended,
and consequently void of all shape and figure. – From which it
follows that, though we should grant the existence of Matter to
be never so certain, yet it is withal as certain, the Materialists
themselves are by their own principles forced to acknowledge,
that neither the particular bodies perceived by sense, nor anything
like them, exists without the mind. Matter, I say, and each particle
thereof, is according to them infinite and shapeless, and it is
the mind that frames all that variety of bodies which compose
the visible world, any one whereof does not exist longer than
it is perceived.
48. But, after all, if we consider it, the objection proposed
in sect 45 will not be found reasonably charged on the principles
we have premised, so as in truth to make an objection at all against
our notions For, though we hold indeed the objects of sense to
he nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived, yet
we may not hence conclude they have no existence except only
while they are perceived by us; since there may be some other
spirit that perceives them though we do not wherever bodies are
slid to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood
to mean this or that particular mind, but all minds whatsoever.
It does not therefore follow from the foregoing principles that
bodies are annihilated and created every moment, or exist not
at all during the intervals between our perception of them.
49.Fifthly, it may perhaps be objected that if extension
and figure exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind is
extended and figured; since extension is a mode or attribute which
(to speak with the schools) is predicated of the subject
in which it exists – I answer, those qualities are in the mind
only as they are perceived by it – -that is, not by way of mode
or attribute, but only by way of idea; and it no
more follows the soul or mind is extended, because extension exists
in it alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because those
colours are on all hands acknowledged to exist in it, and nowhere
else. As to what philosophers say of 'subject' and 'mode,' that
seems very groundless and unintelligible. For instance, in this
proposition – 'a die is hard, extended, and square,' they will
have it that the word die denotes a subject or substance,
distinct from the hardness, extension and figure which are predicated
of it, and in which they exist. This I cannot comprehend: to me
a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things which are
termed its modes or accidents. And, to say 'a die is hard, extended,
and square' is not to attribute those qualities to a subject distinct
from and supporting them, but only an explication of the meaning
of the word die.
50.Sixthly, you will say there have been a great many
things explained by matter and motion; take away these and you
destroy the whole corpuscular philosophy, and undermine those
mechanical principles which have been applied with so much success
to account for the phenomena. In short, whatever advances have
been made, either by ancient or modern philosophers, in the study
of Nature do all proceed on the supposition that corporeal substance
or Matter doth really exist – To this I answer that there is not
any one phenomenon explained on that supposition which may not
as well be explained without it, as might easily be made appear
by an induction of particulars. To explain the phenomena, is all
one as to shew. Why, upon such and such occasions, we are affected
with such and such ideas. But how Matter should operate on a Spirit,
or produce any idea in it, is what no philosopher will pretend
to explain; it is therefore evident there can be no use of Matter
in Natural Philosophy. Besides, they who attempt to account for
things do it not by corporeal substance, but by figure, motion,
and other qualities, which are in truth no more than mere ideas,
and therefore cannot be the cause of anything, as hath been already
shewn. See sect 25.
51.Seventhly, it will upon this be demanded whether it
does not seem absurd to take away Natural Causes, and ascribe
everything to the immediate operation of Spirits ? We must no
longer say upon these principles that fire heats, or water cools,
but that a Spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man be deservedly
laughed at, who should talk after this manner? I answer, he would
so, in such things we ought to 'think with the learned, and speak
with the vulgar.' They who to demonstration are convinced of the
truth of the Copernican system do nevertheless say 'the sun rises,'
'the sun sets,' or 'comes to the meridian; 'and if they affected
a contrary style in common talk it would without doubt appear
very ridiculous. A little reflection on what is here said will
make it manifest that the common use of language would receive
no manner of alteration or disturbance from the admission of our
tenets.
52. In the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may be retained,
so long as they excite in us proper sentiments or dispositions
to act in such a manner as is necessary for our well-being, how
false soever they may he if taken in a strict and speculative
sense. Nay, this is unavoidable, Since, propriety being regulated
by custom, language is suited to the received opinions, which
are not always the truest. Hence it is impossible – even in the
most rigid, philosophic reasonings – so far to alter the bent
and genius of the tongue we speak as never to give a handle for
cavillers to pretend difficulties and inconsistencies But a fair
and ingenuous reader will collect the sense from the scope and
tenor and complexion of a discourse, making allowances for those
inaccurate modes of speech which use has made inevitable.
53.As to the opinion that there are no corporeal Causes, this
has been heretofore maintained by some of the Schoolmen, as it
is of late by others among the modern philosophers, who, though
they allow Matter to exist, yet will have God alone to
be the immediate efficient cause of all things. These men saw
that amongst all the objects of sense there was none which had
any power or activity included in it; and that by consequence
this was likewise true of whatever bodies they supposed
to exist without the mind, like unto the immediate objects of
sense But then, that they should suppose an innumerable multitude
of created beings, which they acknowledge are not capable of producing
any one effect in nature, and which therefore are made to no manner
of purpose, since God might have done everything as well without
them – this I say, though we should allow it possible, must yet
be a very unaccountable and extravagant supposition.
54. In the eighth place, the universal concurrent Assent
of Mankind may be thought by some an invincible argument in behalf
of Matter, or the existence of external things. Must we suppose
the whole world to be mistaken ? And if so, what cause can be
assigned of so widespread and predominant an error? I answer,
first, that, upon a narrow inquiry, it will not perhaps be found
so many as is imagined do really believe the existence of Matter
or things without the mind Strictly speaking to believe that which
involves a contradiction, or has no meaning in it, is impossible,
and whether the foregoing expressions ale not of that sort, l
refer it to the impartial examination of the reader. In one sense,
indeed, men may be said to believe that Matter exists; that is,
they act as if the immediate cause of their sensations, which
affects them every moment, and is so nearly present to them, were
some senseless unthinking – being. But, that they should clearly
apprehend any meaning marked by those words, and form thereof
a settled speculative opinions is what l am not able to conceive.
This is not the only instance wherein men impose upon themselves,
by imagining they believe those propositions which they have often
heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in them.
55. But secondly, though we should grant a notion to be never
so universally and steadfastly adhered to, yet this is hut a weak
argument of its truth to whoever considers what a vast number
of prejudices and false opinions are everywhere embraced with
the utmost tenaciousness, by the unreflecting (which are the far
greater) part of mankind. There was a time when the antipodes
and motion of the earth were looked upon as monstrous absurdities
even by men of learning and if it be considered what a small proportion
they bear to the rest of mankind, we shall find that at this day
those notions have gained but a very inconsiderable footing in
the world.
56. But it is demanded that we assign a Cause of this Prejudice,
and account for its obtaining in the world. – To this I answer,
that men knowing they perceived several ideas, whereof they
themselves were not the authors – as not being excited from
without nor depending on the operation of their wills this made
them maintain those ideas or objects of perception had an existence
independent of and without the mind, without ever dreaming that
a contradiction was involved in those words. But, philosophers
having plainly seen that the immediate objects of perception
do not exist without the mind, they in some degree corrected the
mistake of the vulgar, but at the same time run into another which
seems no less absurd, to wit, that there are certain objects really
existing without the mind, or having a subsistence distinct from
being perceived, of which our ideas are only images or resemblances,
imprinted by those objects on the mind. And this notion of the
philosophers owes its origin to the same cause with the former,
namely, their being conscious that they were not the authors
of their own sensation, which they evidently knew were imprinted
from without, and which therefore must have some cause distinct
from the minds on which they are imprinted.
57. But why they should suppose the ideas of sense to be excited
in us by things in their likeness, and not rather have recourse
to Spirit which alone can act, may be accounted for, first, because
they were not aware of the repugnancy there is, as well in supposing
things like unto our ideas existing without, as in attributing
to them power or activity. Secondly, because the Supreme Spirit
which excites those ideas in our minds, is not marked out and
limited to our view by any particular finite collection of sensible
ideas, as human agents are by their size, complexion, limbs, and
motions. And thirdly, because his operations are regular and uniform.
Whenever the course of nature is interrupted by a miracle, men
are ready to own the presence of a superior agent. But, when we
see things go on in the ordinary course and concatenation, though
it be an argument of the greatest wisdom, power, and goodness
in their creator, is yet so constant and familiar to us that we
do not think them the immediate effects of a FREE SPIRIT; especially
since inconsistency and mutability in acting, though it be an
imperfection, is looked on as a mark of freedom.
58.Tenthly, it will be objected that the notions we advance
are inconsistent with several sound truths in Philosophy and Mathematics.
For example, the motion of the earth is now universally admitted
by astronomers as a truth grounded on the clearest and most convincing
reasons. But, on the foregoing principles, there can be no such
thing. For, motion being only an idea, it follows that if it be
not perceived it exists not: but the motion of the earth
is not perceived by sense. – I answer, that tenet, if rightly
understood, will be found to agree with the principles we have
premised; for, the question whether the earth moves or not amounts
in reality to no more than this! to wit whether we have reason
to conclude, from what has been observed by astronomers, that
if we were placed in such and such circumstances, and such or
such a position and distance both from the earth and sun, we should
perceive the former to move among the choir of the planets, and
appearing in all respects like one of them and this, by the established
rules of nature which we have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably
collected from the phenomena.
59. We may, from the experience we have had of the train and succession
of ideas in our minds, often make, I will not say uncertain conjectures,
but sure and well-grounded predictions concerning the ideas we
shall he affected with pursuant to a great train of actions, and
be enabled to pass a right judgment of what would have appeared
to us, in case we were placed in circumstances very different
from those we are in at present. Herein consists the knowledge
of nature, which may preserve its use and certainty very consistently
with what hath been said. It will be easy to apply this to whatever
objections of the like sort may be drawn from the magnitude of
the stars, or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature.
60. In the eleventh place, it will he demanded to what purpose
serves that curious organisation of plants, and the animal mechanism
in the parts of animals; might not vegetables grow, and shoot
forth leaves and blossom and animals perform all their motions
as well without as with all that variety of internal parts so
elegantly contrived and put together; which, being ideas, have
nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary
connection with the effects ascribed to them? If it be a Spirit
that immediately produces every effect by a fiat or act
of his will, we must think all that is fine and artificial in
the works, whether of man or nature, to be made in vain. By this
doctrine though an artist has made the spring and wheels, and
every movement of a watch, and adjusted them in such a manner
as he knew would produce the motions he designed, yet he must
think all this is done to no purpose, and that it is an intelligence
which directs the index, and points to the hour of the day. If
so, why may not the Intelligence do it without his being at the
pains of making the movements and putting them together? Why does
not an empty case serve as well as another ? And how comes it
to pass that whenever there is any fault in the going of a watch,
there is some corresponding disorder to be found in the movements,
which being mended by a skilful hand all is right again ? The
like may be said of all the Clockwork of Nature, great part whereof
is so wonderfully fine and subtle as scarce to be discerned by
the best microscope. In short, it will be asked, how, upon our
principles, any tolerable account can be given, or any final cause
assigned, of an innumerable multitude of bodies and machines,
framed with the most exquisite art, which, in the common philosophy
have very apposite uses assigned them, and serve to explain abundance
of phenomena?
61. To all which I answer, first, that though there were some
difficulties relating to the administration of Providence, and
the uses by it assigned to the several parts of nature which I
could not solve by the foregoing principles, yet this objection
would be of small weight against the truth and certainty of those
things which may be proved a priori, with the utmost evidence
and rigour of demonstration. Secondly, but neither are the received
principles free from the like difficulties; for, it may still
be demanded to what end God should take those roundabout methods
of effecting things by instruments and machines, which no one
can deny might have been effected by the mere command of His will
without all that apparatus: nay, if we narrowly consider it, we
shall find the objection may he retorted with greater force on
those who hold the existence of those machines without the mind;
for it has been made evident that solidity, bulk, figure, motion,
and the like have no activity or efficacy in them,
so as to be capable of producing any one effect in nature. See
sect 25. Whoever therefore supposes them to exist (allowing the
supposition possible) when they are not perceived does it manifestly
to no purpose; since the only use that is assigned to them, as
they exist unperceived, is that they produce those perceivable
effects which in truth cannot be ascribed to anything but Spirit.
62. But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be observed that
though the fabrication of all those parts and organs be not absolutely
necessary to the producing any effect, yet it is necessary
to the producing of things in a constant regular way according
to the laws of nature. There are certain general laws that
run through the whole chain of natural effects these are learned
by the observation and study of nature, and are by men applied
as well to the framing artificial things for the use and ornament
of life as to the explaining the various phenomena – which explanation
consists only in shewing the conformity any particular phenomenon
hath to the general laws of nature, or, which is the same thing,
in discovering the uniformity there is in the production
of natural effects; as will be evident to whoever shall attend
to the several instances wherein philosophers pretend to account
for appearances. That there is a great and conspicuous use
in these regular constant methods of working observed by the Supreme
Agent hath been shewn in sect 31. And it is no less visible that
a particular size, figure, motion, and disposition of parts are
necessary, though not absolutely to the producing any effect,
yet to the producing it according to the standing mechanical laws
of nature Thus, for instance, it cannot be denied that God, or
the Intelligence that sustains and rules the ordinary course of
things, might, if He were minded to produce a miracle, cause all
the motions on the dial-plate of a watch, though nobody had ever
made the movements and put them in it but yet, if He will act
agreeably to the rules of mechanism – by Him for wise ends established
and maintained in the creation – it is necessary that those actions
of the watchmaker, whereby he makes the movements and rightly
adjusts them, precede the production of the aforesaid motions;
as also that any disorder in them be attended with the perception
of some corresponding disorder in the movements, which being once
corrected all is right again.
63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the Author
of nature display His overruling power in producing appearances
out of the ordinary series of things. Such exceptions from the
general rules of nature are proper to surprise and awe men into
an acknowledgment of the Divine Being but then they are to be
used but seldom, otherwise there is a plain reason why they fail
of that effect. Besides, God seems to choose the convincing our
reason of his attributes by the works of nature, which discover
so much harmony and contrivance in their make, and are such plain
indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author, rather
than to astonish us into a belief of His Being by anomalous and
surprising events.
64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall observe
that what has been objected in sect 60 amounts in reality to no
more than this ideas are not anyhow and at random produced, there
being a certain order and connection between them, like to that
of cause and effect there are also several combinations of them
made in a very regular and artificial manner, which seem like
so many instruments in the hand of nature that, being hid
as it were behind the scenes, have a secret operation in producing
those appearances which are seen on the theatre of the world,
being themselves discernible only to the curious eye of the philosophers.
But, since one idea cannot be the cause of another, to what purpose
is that connection? And, since those instruments – being barely
inefficacious perceptions in the mind – are not subservient
to the production of natural effects, it is demanded why they
are made; or, in other words, what reason can be assigned why
God should make us, upon a close inspection into his works, behold
so great variety of ideas so artfully laid together, and so much
according to rule; it not being credible that He would be at the
expense (if one may so speak) of all that art and regularity to
no purpose?
65. To all which my answer is, first, that the connection of ideas
does not imply the relation of cause and effect,
but only of a mark or sign with the thing signified.
The fire which I see is not the cause of the pain I suffer upon
my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of it. In like
manner the noise that I hear is not the effect of this or that
motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the sign thereof.
Secondly, the reason why ideas are formed into machines, that
is, artificial and regular combinations, is the same with that
for combining letters into words. That a few original ideas may
be made to signify a great number of effects and actions, it is
necessary they be variously combined together. And, to the end
their use be permanent and universal, these combinations must
be made by rule, and with wise contrivance. By this
means abundance of information is conveyed unto us concerning
what we are to expect from such and such actions, and what methods
are proper to be taken for the exciting such and such ideas -
which in effect is all that I conceive to be distinctly meant
when it is said that, by discerning the figure, texture, and mechanism
of the inward parts of bodies, whether natural or artificial,
we may attain to know the several uses and properties depending
thereon, or the nature of the thing.
66. Hence, it is evident that those things which, under the motion
of a cause co-operating or concurring to the production of effects,
are altogether inexplicable, and run us into great absurdities,
may be very naturally explained, and have a proper and obvious
use assigned to them, when they are considered only as marks or
signs for our information. And it is the searching after and endeavouring
to understand this language (if I may so call it) of the Author
of Nature, that ought to be the employment of the natural philosopher;
and not the pretending to explain things by corporeal causes,
which doctrine seems to have too much estranged the minds of men
from that Active Principle, that supreme and wise Spirit 'in whom
we live, move, and have our being'.
67. In the twelfth place, it may perhaps be objected that
- though it be clear from what has been said that there can be
no such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid, figured,
moveable substance existing without the mind, such as philosophers
describe. Matter, – yet, if any man shall leave out of his idea
of matter the positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity and
motion, and say that he means only by that word an inert, senseless
substance, that exists without the mind or unperceived, which
is the occasion of our ideas, or at the presence whereof
God is pleased to excite ideas in us- – it doth not appear but
that Matter taken in this sense may possibly exist. – In answer
to which I sav, first, that it seems no less absurd to suppose
a substance without accidents, than it is to suppose accidents
without a substance. But secondly, though we should grant this
unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can it
be supposed to be ? That it exists not in the mind is agreed;
and that it exists not in place is no less certain – since
all place or extension exists only in the mind, as hath been already
proved. It remains therefore that it exists nowhere at all.
68. Let us examine a little the description that is here given
us of Matter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived;
for this is all that is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless,
unknown substance; which is a definition entirely made up of negatives,
excepting only the relative notion or its standing under or supporting.
But then it must be observed that it supports nothing at all,
and how nearly this comes to the description of a nonentity
I desire may be considered. But, say you, it is the unknown
occasion, at the presence of which ideas are excited in us
by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything can be
present to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflection,
nor capable of producing any idea in our minds, nor is at all
extended, nor hath any form, nor exists in any place. The words
'to be present,' when thus applied, must needs be taken in some
abstract and strange meaning, and which I am not able to comprehend.
69. Again, let us examine what is meant by occasion. So
far as I can gather from the common use of language, that word
signifies either the agent which produces any effect, or else
something that is observed to accompany or go before it in the
ordinary course of things. But when it is applied to Matter as
above described, it can be taken in neither of these senses; for
Matter is said to be passive and inert, and so cannot be an agent
or efficient cause It is also unperceivable, as being devoid of
all sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of our perceptions
in the latter sense – as when the burning my finger is said to
be the occasion of the pain that attends it. What therefore can
be meant by calling Matter an occasion? This term is either
used in no sense at all, or else in some very distant from its
received signification.
70. You will perhaps say that Matter, though it be not perceived
by us, is nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion
of exciting ideas in our minds. For, say you, since we observe
our sensations to be imprinted in an orderly and constant manner,
it is but reasonable to suppose that there are certain constant
and regular occasions of their being produced. That is to say,
that there are certain permanent and distinct parcels of Matter,
corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do not excite them
in our minds, or anywise immediately affect us, as being altogether
passive and unperceivable to us, they are nevertheless
to God, by whom they are perceived, as it were so many
occasions to remind him when and what ideas to imprint on our
minds – that so things may go on in a constant uniform manner.
71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of Matter
is here stated, the question is no longer concerning the existence
of a thing distinct from Spirit and idea, from perceiving
and being perceived; but whether there are not certain Ideas,
of I know not what sort, in the mind of God which are so many
marks or notes that direct him how to produce sensations in our
minds in a constant and regular method – much after the same manner
as a musician is directed by the notes of music to produce that
harmonious strain and composition of sound which is called a tune
though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes, and
may be entirely ignorant of them. But, this notion of Matter (which
after all is the only intelligible one that I can pick from what
is said of unknown occasions) seems too extravagant to deserve
a confutation.
Besides, it is in effect no objection against what we have advanced,
viz that there is no senseless unperceived substance.
72. If we follow the light of reason, we shall, from the constant
uniform method of our sensations, collect the goodness and wisdom
of the Spirit who excites them in our minds; but this is all that
I can see reasonably concluded from thence. To me, I say, it is
evident that the being of a Spirit infinitely wise, good, and
powerful is abundantly sufficient to explain all the appearances
of nature. But, as for inert, senseless Matter; nothing
that I perceive has any the least connection with it, or leads
to the thoughts of it. And I would fain see any one explain any
the meanest phenomenon in nature by it or shew any manner of reason,
though in the lowest rank of probability, that he can have for
its existence, or even make any tolerable sense or meaning of
that supposition. For, as to its being an occasion, we have, I
think, evidently shewn that with regard to us it is no occasion.
It remains therefore that it must be, if at all, the occasion
to God of exciting ideas in us; and what this amounts to we have
just now seen.
73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives which
induced men to suppose the existence of material substance;
that so having observed the gradual ceasing and expiration of
those motives or reasons, we may proportionally withdraw the assent
that was grounded on them. First, therefore, it was thought that
colour, figure, motion, and the rest of these sensible qualities
or accidents, did really exist without the mind; and for this
reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking substratum
or substance wherein they did exist – since they could not be
conceived to exist by themselves. Afterwards, in process of time,
men being convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the
sensible, secondary qualities had no existence without
the mind, they stripped this substratum or material substance
of those qualities – leaving only the primary ones, figure,
motion, and suchlike, which they still conceived to exist without
the mind, and consequently to stand in need of a material support.
But, it having been shewn that none even of these can possibly
exist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them,
it follows that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being
of Matter, nay, that it is utterly impossible that there should
be any such thing – so long as that word is taken to denote an
unthinking substratum of qualities or accidents wherein
they exist without the mind.
74. But – though it be allowed by the Materialists themselves
that Matter was thought of only for the sake of supporting accidents,
and, the reason entirely ceasing, one might expect the mind should
naturally, and without any reluctance at all, quit the belief
of what was solely grounded thereon – yet the prejudice is riveted
so deeply in our thoughts, that we can scarce tell how to part
with it, and are therefore inclined, since the thing itself
is indefensible at least to retain the name, which we apply
to I know not what abstracted and indefinite notions of Being,
or Occasion, though without any show of reason, at least so far
as I can see. For, what is there on our part, or what do we perceive,
amongst all the ideas, sensations, notions which are imprinted
on our minds, either by sense or reflection, from whence may be
inferred the existence of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion?
and, on the other hand, on the part of an All-sufficient Spirit,
what call there be that should make us believe or even suspect
He is directed by an inert occasion to excite ideas in our minds?
75. It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of prejudice
and much to be lamented, that the mind of man retains so great
a fondness, against all the evidence of reason, for a stupid
thoughtless Somewhat, by the interposition whereof it would
as it were screen itself from the Providence or God, and remove
Him farther off from the affairs of the world. But, though we
do the utmost we can to secure the belief of Matter; though, when
reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support our opinion on the
bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulge ourselves
in the full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason to
make out that poor possibility, yet the upshot of all is – that
there are certain unknown ideas in the mind of God; for
this, if anything, is all that I conceive to be meant by occasion
with regard to God. And this at the bottom is no longer contending
for the thing, but for the name.
76. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of God,
and whether they may be called by the name Matter, I shall
not dispute. But, if you stick to the notion of an un thinking
substance or support of extension, motion, and other sensible
qualities, then to me it is most evidently impossible there should
be any such thing; since it is a plain repugnancy that those qualities
should exist in or be supported by an unperceiving substance.
77. But, say you, though it be granted that there is no thoughtless
support of extension and the other qualities or accidents which
we perceive, yet there may perhaps be some inert, unperceiving
substance or substratum of some other qualities, as incomprehensible
to us as colours are to a man born blind, because we have not
a sense adapted to them. But, if we had a new sense, we should
possibly no more doubt of their existence than a blind man made
to see does of the existence of light and colours. – I answer,
first, if what you mean by the word Matter be only the
unknown support of unknown qualities, it is no matter
whether there is such a thing or no, since it no way concerns
us; and I do not see the advantage there is in disputing about
we know not what, and we know not why.
78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense it could only furnish
us with new ideas or sensations; and then we should have the same
reason against their existing in an unperceiving substance
that has been already offered with relation to figure, motion,
colour, and the like. 'Qualities,' as hath been shewn, are nothing
else but sensations or ideas, which exist only in a minds
perceiving them; and this is true not only of the ideas we are
acquainted with at present, but likewise of all possible ideas
whatsoever.
79. But, you will insist, what if I have no reason to believe
the existence of Matter? what if I cannot assign any use to it
or explain anything by it, or even conceive what is meant by that
word? yet still it is no contradiction to say that Matter exists,
and that this Matter is in general a substance, occasion
of ideas; though indeed to go about to unfold the meaning or adhere
to any particular explication of those words may be attended with
great difficulties. I answer, when words are used without a meaning,
you may put them together as you please without danger of running
into a contradiction. You may say, for example, that twice two
is equal to seven so long as you declare you do not take the words
of that proposition in their usual acceptation but for marks of
you know not what. And, by the same reason, you may say there
is an inert thoughtless substance without accidents which
is the occasion of our ideas. And we shall understand just as
much by one proposition as the other.
80. In the last place, you will say, what if we give up
the cause of material Substance, and stand to it that Matter
is an unknown Somewhat – neither substance nor accident,
spirit nor idea, inert, thoughtless, indivisible, immoveable,
unextended, existing in no place ? I or, say you, whatever may
be urged against substance or occasion, or any other
positive or relative notion of Matter, hath no place at all, so
long as this negative definition of Matter is adhered to – I answer,
you may, if so it shall seem good, use the word 'Matter' in the
same sense as other men use 'nothing', and so make those terms
convertible in your style. For, after all, this is what appears
to me to be the result of that definition – the parts whereof
when I consider with attention, either collectively or separate
from each other, I do not find that there is any kind of effect
or impression made on my mind different from what is excited by
the term nothing.
81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the aforesaid definition is
included what doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing -
the positive abstract idea of quiddity, entity or
existence I own, indeed, that those who pretend to the
faculty of framing abstract general ideas do talk as if they had
such an idea, which is, say they, the most abstract and general
notion of all; that is, to me, the most incomprehensible of all
others. That there are a great variety of spirits of different
orders and capacities, whose faculties both in number and extent
are far exceeding those the Author of my being has bestowed on
me, I see no reason to deny. And for me to pretend to determine,
by my own few, stinted, narrow inlets of perception, what ideas
the inexhaustible power of the Supreme Spirit may imprint upon
them were certainly the utmost folly and presumption – since there
may be, for aught that I know, innumerable sorts of ideas or sensations,
as different from one another, and from all that I have perceived,
as colours are from sounds. But, how ready soever I may be to
acknowledge the scantiness of my comprehension with regard to
the endless variety of spirits and ideas that may possibly exist,
yet for any one to pretend to a notion of Entity or Existence,
abstracted from spirit and idea, from perceived
and being perceived, is, I suspect, a downright repugnancy and
trifling with words. — It remains that we consider the
objections which may possibly be made on the part of Religion.
82. OBJECTIONS DERIVED FROM THE SCRIPTURES ANSWERED.—Some there are
who think that, though the arguments for the real existence of
bodies which are drawn from Reason be allowed not to amount to
demonstration, yet the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point as
will sufficiently convince every good Christian that bodies do really
exist, and are something more than mere ideas; there being in Holy Writ
innumerable facts related which evidently suppose the reality of timber
and stone, mountains and rivers, and cities, and human bodies. To which I
answer that no sort of writings whatever, sacred or profane, which use
those and the like words in the vulgar acceptation, or so as to have a
meaning in them, are in danger of having their truth called in question
by our doctrine. That all those things do really exist, that there are
bodies, even corporeal substances, when taken in the vulgar sense, has
been shown to be agreeable to our principles; and the difference betwixt
things and ideas, realities and chimeras, has been distinctly explained.
See sect. 29, 30, 33, 36, &c. And I do not think that either what
philosophers call Matter, or the existence of objects without the mind,
is anywhere mentioned in Scripture.
83. NO OBJECTION AS TO LANGUAGE TENABLE.—Again, whether there can
be or be not external things, it is agreed on all hands that the
proper use of words is the marking our conceptions, or things only
as they are known and perceived by us; whence it plainly follows
that in the tenets we have laid down there is nothing inconsistent
with the right use and significancy of language, and that discourse,
of what kind soever, so far as it is intelligible, remains undisturbed.
But all this seems so manifest, from what has been largely set forth
in the premises, that it is needless to insist any farther on it.
84. But, secondly it will be urged that miracles do, at least, lose much
of their stress and import by our principles. What must we think of Moses'
rod? was it not really turned into a serpent; or was there only a change
of ideas in the minds of the spectators? And, can it be supposed that our
Saviour did no more at the marriage-feast in Cana than impose on the
sight, and smell, and taste of the guests, so as to create in them the
appearance or idea only of wine? The same may be said of all other
miracles; which, in consequence of the foregoing principles, must be
looked upon only as so many cheats, or illusions of fancy. To this I
reply, that the rod was changed into a real serpent, and the water into
real wine. That this does not in the least contradict what I have
elsewhere said will be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this business of
real and imaginary has been already so plainly and fully explained, and
so often referred to, and the difficulties about it are so easily
answered from what has gone before, that it were an affront to the
reader's understanding to resume the explication of it in its place. I
shall only observe that if at table all who were present should see, and
smell, and taste, and drink wine, and find the effects of it, with me
there could be no doubt of its reality; so that at bottom the scruple
concerning real miracles has no place at all on ours, but only on the
received principles, and consequently makes rather for than against what
has been said.
85. CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRECEDING TENETS.—Having done with the
Objections, which I endeavoured to propose in the clearest light,
and gave them all the force and weight I could, we proceed in the
next place to take a view of our tenets in their Consequences.
Some of these appear at first sight—as that several difficult and
obscure questions, on which abundance of speculation has been
thrown away, are entirely banished from philosophy. "Whether
corporeal substance can think," "whether Matter be infinitely divisible,"
and "how it operates on spirit"—these and like inquiries have given
infinite amusement to philosophers in all ages; but depending on the
existence of Matter, they have no longer any place on our principles.
Many other advantages there are, as well with regard to religion as the
sciences, which it is easy for any one to deduce from what has been
premised; but this will appear more plainly in the sequel.
86. THE REMOVAL OF MATTER GIVES CERTAINTY TO KNOWLEDGE.—From the
principles we have laid down it follows human knowledge may naturally
be reduced to two heads—that of ideas and that of spirits. Of each
of these I shall treat in order.
And first as to ideas or unthinking things. Our knowledge of these has
been very much obscured and confounded, and we have been led into very
dangerous errors, by supposing a twofold existence of the objects of
sense—the one intelligible or in the mind, the other real and without
the mind; whereby unthinking things are thought to have a natural
subsistence of their own distinct from being perceived by spirits. This,
which, if I mistake not, has been shown to be a most groundless and
absurd notion, is the very root of Scepticism; for, so long as men
thought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that their
knowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable to real
things, it follows they could not be certain they had any real knowledge
at all. For how can it be known that the things which are perceived are
conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind?
87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered only as
so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing
in them which is not perceived. But, if they are looked on as notes or
images, referred to things or archetypes existing without the mind, then
are we involved all in scepticism. We see only the appearances, and not
the real qualities of things. What may be the extension, figure, or
motion of anything really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible
for us to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear to our
senses. Things remaining the same, our ideas vary, and which of them, or
even whether any of them at all, represent the true quality really
existing in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for
aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel may be only phantom and vain
chimera, and not at all agree with the real things existing in rerum
natura. All this scepticism follows from our supposing a difference
between things and ideas, and that the former have a subsistence without
the mind or unperceived. It were easy to dilate on this subject, and show
how the arguments urged by sceptics in all ages depend on the supposition
of external objects.
88. IF THERE BE EXTERNAL MATTER, NEITHER THE NATURE NOR EXISTENCE
OF THINGS CAN BE KNOWN.—So long as we attribute a real existence to
unthinking things, distinct from their being perceived, it is not
only impossible for us to know with evidence the nature of any real
unthinking being, but even that it exists. Hence it is that we see
philosophers distrust their senses, and doubt of the existence of
heaven and earth, of everything they see or feel, even of their own
bodies. And, after all their labour and struggle of thought, they
are forced to own we cannot attain to any self-evident or demonstrative
knowledge of the existence of sensible things. But, all this doubtfulness,
which so bewilders and confounds the mind and makes philosophy
ridiculous in the eyes of the world, vanishes if we annex a meaning
to our words, and not amuse ourselves with the terms "absolute,"
"external," "exist," and such-like, signifying we know not what. I can as
well doubt of my own being as of the being of those things which I
actually perceive by sense; it being a manifest contradiction that any
sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at
the same time have no existence in nature, since the very existence of an
unthinking being consists in being perceived.
89. OF THING OR BEING.—Nothing seems of more importance towards
erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be
proof against the assaults of Scepticism, than to lay the beginning
in a distinct explication of what is meant by thing, reality,
existence; for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence
of things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as we have
not fixed the meaning of those words. Thing or Being is the most
general name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds entirely
distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the
name. viz. spirits and ideas. The former are active, indivisible
substances: the latter are inert, fleeting, dependent beings, which
subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in minds or
spiritual substances. We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling
or reflexion, and that of other spirits by reason. We may be said to have
some knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and active beings,
whereof in a strict sense we have not ideas. In like manner, we know and
have a notion of relations between things or ideas—which relations are
distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be
perceived by us without our perceiving the former. To me it seems that
ideas, spirits, and relations are all in their respective kinds the
object of human knowledge and subject of discourse; and that the term
idea would be improperly extended to signify everything we know or have
any notion of.
90. EXTERNAL THINGS EITHER IMPRINTED BY OR PERCEIVED BY SOME OTHER
MIND.—Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do really exist;
this we do not deny, but we deny they can subsist without the minds which
perceive them, or that they are resemblances of any archetypes existing
without the mind; since the very being of a sensation or idea consists in
being perceived, and an idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, the
things perceived by sense may be termed external, with regard to their
origin—in that they are not generated from within by the mind itself,
but imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which perceives them.
Sensible objects may likewise be said to be "without the mind" in another
sense, namely when they exist in some other mind; thus, when I shut my
eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must be in another mind.
91. SENSIBLE QUALITIES REAL.—It were a mistake to think that what
is here said derogates in the least from the reality of things.
It is acknowledged, on the received principles, that extension,
motion, and in a word all sensible qualities have need of a support,
as not being able to subsist by themselves. But the objects perceived
by sense are allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities,
and consequently cannot subsist by themselves. Thus far it is agreed
on all hand. So that in denying the things perceived by sense an
existence independent of a substance of support wherein they may
exist, we detract nothing from the received opinion of their reality, and
are guilty of no innovation in that respect. All the difference is that,
according to us, the unthinking beings perceived by sense have no
existence distinct from being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in
any other substance than those unextended indivisible substances or
spirits which act and think and perceive them; whereas philosophers
vulgarly hold that the sensible qualities do exist in an inert, extended,
unperceiving substance which they call Matter, to which they attribute a
natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking beings, or distinct from
being perceived by any mind whatsoever, even the eternal mind of the
Creator, wherein they suppose only ideas of the corporeal substances
created by him; if indeed they allow them to be at all created.
92. OBJECTIONS OF ATHEISTS OVERTURNED.—For, as we have shown the
doctrine of Matter or corporeal substance to have been the main
pillar and support of Scepticism, so likewise upon the same foundation
have been raised all the impious schemes of Atheism and Irreligion.
Nay, so great a difficulty has it been thought to conceive Matter
produced out of nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient
philosophers, even of those who maintained the being of a God,
have thought Matter to be uncreated and co-eternal with Him. How
great a friend material substance has been to Atheists in all ages were
needless to relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible and
necessary a dependence on it that, when this corner-stone is once
removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground, insomuch
that it is no longer worth while to bestow a particular consideration on
the absurdities of every wretched sect of Atheists.
93. AND OF FATALISTS ALSO.—That impious and profane persons should
readily fall in with those systems which favour their inclinations,
by deriding immaterial substance, and supposing the soul to be
divisible and subject to corruption as the body; which exclude all
freedom, intelligence, and design from the formation of things,
and instead thereof make a self—existent, stupid, unthinking
substance the root and origin of all beings; that they should
hearken to those who deny a Providence, or inspection of a Superior
Mind over the affairs of the world, attributing the whole series
of events either to blind chance or fatal necessity arising from
the impulse of one body or another—all this is very natural. And,
on the other hand, when men of better principles observe the enemies
of religion lay so great a stress on unthinking Matter, and all
of them use so much industry and artifice to reduce everything to it,
methinks they should rejoice to see them deprived of their grand support,
and driven from that only fortress, without which your Epicureans,
Hobbists, and the like, have not even the shadow of a pretence, but
become the most cheap and easy triumph in the world.
94. OF IDOLATORS.—The existence of Matter, or bodies unperceived,
has not only been the main support of Atheists and Fatalists,
but on the same principle doth Idolatry likewise in all its various
forms depend. Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars,
and every other object of the senses are only so many sensations
in their minds, which have no other existence but barely being
perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship their
own ideas, but rather address their homage to that ETERNAL INVISIBLE MIND
which produces and sustains all things.
95. AND SOCINIANS.—The same absurd principle, by mingling itself with
the articles of our faith, has occasioned no small difficulties to
Christians. For example, about the Resurrection, how many scruples and
objections have been raised by Socinians and others? But do not the
most plausible of them depend on the supposition that a body is
denominated the same, with regard not to the form or that which is
perceived by sense, but the material substance, which remains the
same under several forms? Take away this material substance, about
the identity whereof all the dispute is, and mean by body what every
plain ordinary person means by that word, to wit, that which is
immediately seen and felt, which is only a combination of sensible
qualities or ideas, and then their most unanswerable objections
come to nothing.
96. SUMMARY OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF EXPELLING MATTER.—Matter being once
expelled out of nature drags with it so many sceptical and impious
notions, such an incredible number of disputes and puzzling questions,
which have been thorns in the sides of divines as well as philosophers,
and made so much fruitless work for mankind, that if the arguments
we have produced against it are not found equal to demonstration
(as to me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge,
peace, and religion have reason to wish they were.
97. Beside the external existence of the objects of perception, another
great source of errors and difficulties with regard to ideal knowledge is
the doctrine of abstract ideas, such as it has been set forth in the
Introduction. The plainest things in the world, those we are most
intimately acquainted with and perfectly know, when they are considered
in an abstract way, appear strangely difficult and incomprehensible.
Time, place, and motion, taken in particular or concrete, are what
everybody knows, but, having passed through the hands of a metaphysician,
they become too abstract and fine to be apprehended by men of ordinary
sense. Bid your servant meet you at such a time in such a place, and he
shall never stay to deliberate on the meaning of those words; in
conceiving that particular time and place, or the motion by which he is
to get thither, he finds not the least difficulty. But if time be taken
exclusive of all those particular actions and ideas that diversify the
day, merely for the continuation of existence or duration in abstract,
then it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it.
98. DILEMMA.—For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea
of time, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows
uniformly and is participated by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in
inextricable difficulties. I have no notion of it at all, only I hear
others say it is infinitely divisible, and speak of it in such a manner
as leads me to entertain odd thoughts of my existence; since that
doctrine lays one under an absolute necessity of thinking, either that he
passes away innumerable ages without a thought, or else that he is
annihilated every moment of his life, both which seem equally absurd.
Time therefore being nothing, abstracted from the sucession of ideas in
our minds, it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be
estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that
same spirit or mind. Hence, it is a plain consequence that the soul
always thinks; and in truth whoever shall go about to divide in his
thoughts, or abstract the existence of a spirit from its cogitation,
will, I believe, find it no easy task.
99. So likewise when we attempt to abstract extension and motion from all
other qualities, and consider them by themselves, we presently lose sight
of them, and run into great extravagances. All which depend on a twofold
abstraction; first, it is supposed that extension, for example, may be
abstracted from all other sensible qualities; and secondly, that the
entity of extension may be abstracted from its being perceived. But,
whoever shall reflect, and take care to understand what he says, will, if
I mistake not, acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alike
sensations and alike real; that where the extension is, there is the
colour, too, i.e., in his mind, and that their archetypes can exist only
in some other mind; and that the objects of sense are nothing but those
sensations combined, blended, or (if one may so speak) concreted
together; none of all which can be supposed to exist unperceived.
100. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object good, every one may
think he knows. But to frame an abstract idea of happiness, prescinded
from all particular pleasure, or of goodness from everything that is
good, this is what few can pretend to. So likewise a man may be just and
virtuous without having precise ideas of justice and virtue. The opinion
that those and the like words stand for general notions, abstracted from
all particular persons and actions, seems to have rendered morality very
difficult, and the study thereof of small use to mankind. And in effect
the doctrine of abstraction has not a little contributed towards spoiling
the most useful parts of knowledge.