Getting the Message Through-Chapter 5

The United States managed to remain neutral in the European conflict
from August 1914 to April 1917. The nation had traditionally been isolated
and protected from Old World contests by its ocean moat, but such geographic
security could no longer be taken for granted when Germany's indiscriminate
use of submarine warfare violated the traditional rights of neutrals.
Americans' belief in an Allied victory had initially made the necessity
of preparations for war seem remote. But as the war in the west developed
into a bloody stalemate, the Allies' best efforts appeared able to guarantee
only more of the same. On the other hand, the dire prospect of a German
victory and the consequent disruption of the European balance of power
jeopardized U.S. national interests and spurred the call to arms.
Despite the clamor of the preparedness movement and the loss of American
lives at sea, President Woodrow Wilson moved cautiously from a policy
of strict neutrality to the adoption of a moralistic crusade "to
make the world safe for democracy." His insistence on neutrality
until nearly the eve of war, however, severely hampered preparedness
efforts by the War and Navy Departments. In his view, such activities
would not be "neutral." The Signal Corps, meanwhile, faced
the same difficulties as the rest of the Army in preparing its communicators
for duty overseas. But the Corps' problems were complicated by dissension
within its own ranks, the outcome of which would have a significant
impact on the branch's future.
Trouble in the Air
As the experiences in Mexico had clearly illustrated, all was not
well with the Signal Corps' Aviation Section. In fact, problems had
been brewing for several years. A series of investigations into the
section's activities from 1915 to 1917 revealed the growing tension
between those Corps members who flew and those who did not.1
When Col. David C. Shanks of the Inspector General's Department visited
the aviation school in San Diego to conduct the annual inspection in
January 1915, he made the unsettling discovery that, besides the hiring
of an aeronautical engineer, very little had been done in response to
the previous year's recommendations. In fact, a subsequent probe revealed
that Lt. Col. Samuel Reber, head of the Aviation Section, had suppressed
the critical report.2
Consequently, the
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Army's chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott, appointed an investigating
board headed by the inspector general, Brig. Gen. Ernest A. Garlington,
to examine the administration of the Aviation Section. (Garlington had
commanded the unsuccessful attempt to rescue Lieutenant Greely and his
men from the Arctic in 1883.) About the same time, Senator Joseph T.
Robinson of Arkansas called for an investigation of the air service.
While the Senate passed his resolution on 16 March, the day after the
1st Aero Squadron arrived in Columbus, the House did not concur, and
the congressional initiative ended.3
As part of its investigation, the Garlington board inquired into allegations
made by Lt. Col. Lewis E. Goodier that improper disbursements of flight
pay had been made to Capt. Arthur S. Cowan, commanding officer of the
San Diego school, and some of his staff. These men were not, Goodier
alleged, qualified pilots.4
The board, after a month of taking testimony, determined that Goodier's
allegations were true. In the meantime, however, a subsequent investigation
by the Office of the Judge Advocate General had ruled that Cowan could
retain his aviator rating and the extra pay.5
The Garlington board also found that the officers assigned to monitor
contracts with private airplane manufacturers had been accepting substandard
machines. The board held Chief Signal Officer Scriven and Colonel Reber
responsible for allowing unsafe aircraft to be used and further criticized
Scriven for not adequately supervising the Aviation Section. Secretary
of War Newton D. Baker concurred with the board's findings and censured
Scriven and Reber for failing to enforce and maintain discipline and
neglecting to observe military regulations. Baker also announced his
intention to reorganize the Aviation Section.6
Scriven, for his part, accused aviation officers of insubordination
and disloyalty.7
In April 1916, at Baker's request, the General Staff began its own
investigation into the organization and administration of the Aviation
Section. Lt. Herbert A. Dargue, the officer in charge of training at
San Diego, aired his grievances before the committee and added his voice
to those calling for the removal of aviation from the Signal Corps.
He complained that the Signal Corps had no unit fully equipped for field
service and no radio set for airplanes. Speaking on behalf of most of
the aviation officers, Dargue stated their belief that the Signal Corps
lacked an officer capable of commanding the Aviation Section. The General
Staff's report, completed at the end of June, recommended that the Aviation
Section be completely separated from the Signal Corps.8
Secretary Baker reacted with caution to the increasingly bitter controversy.
Although he did not detach aviation from the Signal Corps, he did remove
Reber as chief of the Aviation Section on 5 May 1916 and temporarily
replaced him with Capt. William Mitchell. Reber's dismissal ended his
official aviation duties and also effectively finished his career as
a Signal Corps officer. He went overseas during World War I, but he
did not receive any Signal Corps-related assignments. After returning
from France, he retired in 1919 with thirty-seven years of military
service. As a private citizen, he embarked upon a successful second
career with the Radio Corporation of America where his Signal Corps
experience served him well.9
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CAPTAIN ARNOLD
Baker selected Lt. Col. George O. Squier to succeed Reber as the head
of the Aviation Section upon the completion of Squier's tour as attaché
to London. As attaché, Squier had been able to observe European aviation
and had even conducted several secret missions to the front. His contacts
within the industrial and scientific communities as well as his long
association with Army aviation made him a good choice for the job. Upon
Squier's arrival in Washington, Captain Mitchell became his assistant.10
In his new position, Squier contended with pressure from outside as
well as inside the Army. The Aero Club of America, for example, criticized
the Signal Corps for failing to adequately promote aviation within the
National Guard, while the press, reacting to the misadventures in Mexico,
sharply castigated the entire program.11
Meanwhile, at San Diego Captain Cowan was relieved as commander of
the aviation school and replaced by Col. William A. Glassford, a signal
officer who had served in the Corps since 1874.12
Many of the staff and faculty also lost their jobs. Two pioneer aviators,
returning to aeronautical duty after completing other assignments, served
under Glassford: Capts. Frank P. Lahm and Henry H. Arnold. (While serving
as the school's supply officer, Arnold eventually overcame his fear
of flying that stemmed from his harrowing experience at Fort Riley several
years earlier.) But despite the change in administration, the troubles
at the school had not ended. Glassford, too, came under fire in January
1917 regarding his lack of vigor in searching for two pilots from the
school who had crashed in the Mexican desert. Fortunately they were
found by a civilian search party, alive but somewhat the worse for wear
after more than a week of wandering in the desert. Consequently, the
Inspector General's Department launched yet another inquiry, which recommended
that Glassford and several of his staff members be relieved. Glassford
retired on 11 April 1917, only five days after the declaration of war
with Germany.13
With Scriven's retirement in February 1917, Squier became the new
chief signal officer, and Lt. Col. John B. Bennet took over the duties
of the Aviation Section. In his last annual report as chief signal officer
Scriven remarked: "The plan of the General Staff, approved by the
Secretary of War, contemplates, and as I think very properly, the eventual
separation of the aviation service from the
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Signal Corps. The separation of this service from any technical corps
should take place when the Air Service is capable of standing alone.
This time has not yet come."14
After all the squabbles of the past few years, the Signal Corps and
its Aviation Section headed toward war still tethered uneasily to each
other.
"Over Here ": Mobilization and Training
Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare forced President
Wilson to request a declaration of war in April 1917. Following this
action came the daunting task of mobilizing the nation's resources,
both men and materiel, with which to fight. Even after war was declared
the Wilson administration found it difficult to define America's role
in the contest. The War Department initially felt no sense of urgency
regarding mobilization and foresaw no massive commitment of troops to
Europe. Military planners estimated that it would take about two years
to raise and train an army large enough to achieve victory in Europe.15
In the meantime, the administration could only provide moral support
to the Allied cause by responding to the French government's request
to immediately deploy one division. In May 1917 Secretary Baker authorized
the organization of the 1st Expeditionary Division (later redesignated
as the 1st Division), and its elements began arriving in France late
the following month. But these units needed extensive training before
they would be ready to enter the line.
The type of total war being waged in Europe required military forces
far greater than those the nation then had in uniform. Shortly after
the declaration of war Congress passed the Selective Service Act, which
President Wilson signed on 18 May 1917. Unlike the unsuccessful attempt
to draft recruits during the Civil War, this bill eliminated such unfair
practices as bounties, purchased exemptions, and substitutes. Moreover,
local civilian draft boards rather than a federal agency administered
the process. The law aroused little opposition, and about twenty-four
million men registered. Nearly three million of them entered the armed
forces between May 1917 and November 1918. Approximately forty-one thousand
men, or slightly over 17 percent of those inducted, joined the Signal
Corps.16
The selective service legislation also authorized the president to raise
the Regular Army and National Guard to war strength and to mobilize
the National Guard for federal service. It further created a third segment
of the defense structure, known as the National Army, a force to be
raised in two increments of 500,000 men each.17
For the Signal Corps, mobilization meant a rapid and vast expansion.
In April 1917 the ground troops of the Signal Corps consisted of 55
officers and 1,570 enlisted men. These soldiers were divided into 4
field signal battalions, 4 field telegraph battalions, and 6 depot companies
(administrative units with no fixed strength assigned to each territorial
department).18
Shortly after arriving in France, Pershing called for approximately
one million men to be sent over by the end of 1918. As Allied fortunes
declined, Pershing increased his request to one hundred divisions to
arrive by July 1919. These divisions would be organized in
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GENERAL SQUIER
accordance with new tables of organization calling for a "square"
structure-that is, a division comprising two infantry brigades, each
with two infantry regiments. The square divisions, based upon study
of the British and French armies, were to be larger than their predecessors
and include the necessary support troops to withstand sustained combat.
Pershing's request, meanwhile, would require the Signal Corps to supply
at least one hundred field signal battalions, or roughly twenty-five
thousand officers and men as organized in the spring of 1917. While
President Wilson ultimately approved a projected force of only eighty
divisions, the Signal Corps still faced a tremendous task.19
The training of the mass of men called to the colors for signal duty
overwhelmed the capacity of the Signal School at Fort Leavenworth. Thus,
in May 1917 the Corps established additional mobilization and training
camps at Little Silver, New Jersey (Camp Alfred Vail); Leon Springs,
Texas (Camp Samuel F. B. Morse); and the Presidio of Monterey, California.
In 1918 the Signal Corps transferred its activities at Camp Morse and
Fort Leavenworth to Camp Meade, Maryland, where it had earlier opened
a radio school in December 1917. In addition, many of the nation's colleges
and universities offered technical training for prospective Signal Corps
personnel.20
To fight a total war such as that in Europe, the nation, and the Signal
Corps in particular, had to mobilize its technological, scientific,
and economic resources as never before. Consequently a huge bureaucracy
emerged, familiar to us today as the military-industrial complex but
unparalleled at that time, to coordinate the many war-related activities.
Not only did the War Department balloon in size, but the civilian side
of government likewise underwent tremendous expansion.21
To obtain needed technical expertise in communications, the Army called
upon the private sector. While the United States lagged behind Europe
in some major technological areas such as aviation, it led the world
in the field of telephone technology, thanks largely to the achievements
of the Bell System. Unlike its European allies, the U.S. government
did not control the national telegraph and telephone systems in peacetime.
As a preparedness measure, the War Department in 1916 had begun issuing
commissions in the Signal Corps Officers' Reserve Corps to executives
of leading commercial telephone and tele-
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graph companies. John J. Carty, chief engineer of the American Telephone
and Telegraph Company (AT&T), figured prominently in this group.
Commissioned as a major in the Signal Reserve, Carty undertook the recruitment
of men from the Bell System and other communications companies.22
The Army needed a variety of specialists: telephone and telegraph operators,
linemen, and cable splicers, to name a few. (As previously noted, the
prewar Signal Corps had only four telegraph battalions.) The recruitment
of men already possessing the requisite skills obviously lightened the
Signal Corps' training load. Ultimately the Bell System provided twelve
telegraph battalions to the war effort (numbered 401 to 412) that served
at the army and corps levels. Each unit comprised men drawn from a regional
company. The 406th Telegraph Battalion, for example, contained employees
from Pennsylvania Bell, while the 411th came from Pacific Bell. The
Signal Corps obtained another four battalions from railway telegraph
organizations.23
Western Electric, the manufacturing arm of the Bell System, additionally
furnished two radio companies: Company A, 314th Field Signal Battalion,
and Company A, 319th Field Signal Battalion.24
In order to release men for the front lines, the Army employed approximately
two hundred women telephone operators to serve overseas. These women,
who retained their civilian status, became members of the Signal Corps
Female Telephone Operators Unit.25
They are perhaps better known as the "Hello Girls." In order
to operate switchboards in France and England, they needed to be fluent
in both French and English. Moreover, because the Army contained few
French-speaking operators, these women no doubt made inter-Allied communications
proceed much more smoothly. Beginning in November 1917, the Signal Corps
recruited women from the commercial telephone companies; to obtain enough
bilingual operators, the Corps also accepted untrained volunteers who
met the language requirement. After a training period, the first detachment
of women, in the charge of chief operator Grace Banker, departed from
New York City early in March 1918. Soon members of the unit were operating
telephone exchanges of the American Expeditionary Forces in Paris, Chaumont,
and seventy-five other cities and towns in France as well as in London,
Southampton, and Winchester, England.26
The Navy had taken the lead in mobilizing science by establishing
the Naval Consulting Board in 1915. Composed of representatives of the
nation's leading engineering societies and chaired by Thomas A. Edison,
its major activity became the screening of inventions submitted by private
citizens.27
The following year the National Academy of Sciences created the National
Research Council and offered its services to the government to coordinate
military-related research. The council's membership embraced governmental,
educational, and industrial organizations. Chief Signal Officer Squier
served on the council's Military Committee along with the heads of the
other technical bureaus of the Army and Navy. With his scientific background,
Squier actively promoted the council's efforts and exerted considerable
control over its activities in general. First of all, Robert A. Millikan,
professor of physics at the University of Chicago and the council's
exec-
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"HELLO GIRLS"
OPERATE A SWITCHBOARD AT CHAUMONT,
FRANCE
utive officer, became a major in the Signal Corps Officers' Reserve
Corps and served as head of the Signal Corps' new Science and Research
Division, established in October 1917. The division's offices were located
in the building housing the National Research Council, and many of the
council's scientists donned uniforms and served under Millikan. Through
the Officers' Reserve program, the Signal Corps recruited additional
scientists and engineers from the private sector.28
In the past the Signal Corps' Engineering Division had performed
what is now called research and development in its laboratories on Pennsylvania
Avenue and at the Bureau of Standards.29
But the wartime demand for new and improved communication methods fostered
a greater specialization of functions. In July 1917 the chief signal
officer established a separate Radio Division with electrical engineering
becoming a section of the new Equipment Division. After several reorganizations
within the Signal Office, electrical and radio engineering were reunited
as sections of the Research and Engineering Division in July 1918.30
Radio research activities soon outgrew the Signal Corps' existing laboratory
space. Thus, in the spring of 1918, the Corps transferred this work
to new facilities at Little Silver, New Jersey, where a training camp
had already been established. At Camp Vail, located on the site of a
former racetrack, laboratory buildings and several airplane hangars
soon appeared. Later the post would become known as Fort Monmouth.31
The primary mission of the Signal Corps' laboratories was the development
of new types of radios, both air and ground. The Army needed radios
for many
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different purposes-air-to-ground and plane-to-plane communication,
aerial fire-control, direction-finding, and, of course, for ground
tactical communication. Not only did radios have to be made in large
numbers for the first time, they needed to be constructed sturdily enough
to withstand the rigors of combat. In other words, they had to be rugged,
reliable, and portable. To achieve these goals, the Radio Division devoted
considerable effort to the improvement of vacuum tubes. While these
devices had been used prior to the war, in particular as telephone signal
repeaters or amplifiers, they had never been mass-produced. Western
Electric and General Electric manufactured thousands for the Army. The
engineering facilities of these and many other companies provided significant
assistance to the Signal Corps in developing radio apparatus. The Army
also benefited from advances in radio design made by the Navy. The profusion
of new equipment prompted the Signal Corps to adopt standard nomenclature
for its items, and the now familiar letters SCR began to appear. This
designation originally stood for "set, complete, radio" but
has come to signify "Signal Corps radio."32
Despite the conscientious efforts by government and industry, the
limited duration of America's involvement in the war left little time
for the development and application of new technology, and the United
States relied chiefly on Allied radio equipment. Nevertheless, the Signal
Corps made some breakthroughs, especially in airborne radiotelephony,
an achievement on which General Squier placed great emphasis. Not only
would radio allow the pilot and his observer to communicate more easily
between themselves (instead of using hand signals) as well as with the
ground, it would also make voice-commanded squadrons possible. An aero
squadron based at Camp Vail made nearly one hundred flights per week
to test new equipment. In a public demonstration held in early 1918,
President and Mrs. Wilson talked with a pilot flying over the White
House. While some aerial radiotelephone apparatus arrived in France
by the fall of 1918, it did not see use in combat. The Signal Corps
also experimented with land-based radiotelephone equipment, but it did
not attain notable success prior to the Armistice. Although most of
the new devices failed to reach fruition before the war ended, they
had a profound effect on communications in the post­war period, for
out of these wartime efforts grew the American radio broadcasting industry
in the 1920s.33
The electrical engineering section's work was initially hampered by
the transfer of both of the Signal Corps' laboratories to the Radio
Division. With the relocation of the radio facilities to Camp Vail,
electrical engineering returned to the laboratory on Pennsylvania Avenue.
The section's responsibilities included the preparation of drawings
and specifications for all Signal Corps equipment to be produced, except
for radios. It also investigated inventions submitted to the Signal
Corps by private citizens.34
The section's developmental efforts concentrated on designing and adapting
equipment suitable to conditions on the battlefields of France. While
the Signal Corps based its field telephone on a model manufactured by
Western Electric for the Forest Service, the Corps also developed a
special type of phone for use when wearing a gas mask.35
Among their other projects, the sec-
[172]
tion's electrical engineers made improvements in the design of animal-drawn
wire carts, making them relatively light in weight yet strong enough
to carry heavy­duty wire. They also worked on the manufacture of a new
type of wire for field lines known as twisted pair, which the Signal
Corps had initially tested in Mexico. This wire derived its name from
its composition of two wires twisted about each other and covered with
insulation. Each wire, in turn, was composed of seven fine wires, four
bronze and three steel. By using twisted pair, also known as outpost
wire, circuits could be made secure because they did not utilize a ground
return that the enemy could easily tap. The wire was manufactured in
various colors in order to readily identify connections in the field:
for example, red for lines to the artillery and yellow to regimental
headquarters. To enable a man on foot to lay and pick up this wire,
the section designed a breast reel that held about a half-mile of wire.
Unfortunately, twisted pair's original light rubber insulation led to
poor performance when wet and caused at least one unit to refer to
it as "please don't rain wire." The wire was subsequently
improved with heavier insulation.36
In the late summer of 1916 Congress created the Council of National
Defense to facilitate national economic and industrial mobilization.
Despite its name, this body did not set policy but rather acted as a
central planning office to coordinate military needs with the nation's
industrial capabilities. The council included the secretaries of war,
navy, interior, agriculture, commerce, and labor, with Secretary of
War Baker serving as chairman. Congress also established an advisory
commission to the council comprising seven prominent specialists from
the private sector. The commission, in turn, divided its work among
several committees, each headed by the member with expertise in that
area. Daniel Willard, president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad,
chaired the Transportation and Communication Committee on which Chief
Signal Officer Squier served. Both the National Research Council and
the Naval Consulting Board worked in conjunction with the Council of
National Defense.37
Within the War Department, decentralization hindered mobilization
efforts because the various bureaus continued to act independently.
The resulting chaos crippled the Army's supply system while the nation's
entrance into the war necessitated better coordination. The Signal Corps
competed with all the other branches for its supplies, and the War
Department waited until January 1918 to establish a centralized Purchasing
Service within the Office of the Chief of Staff.38
Meanwhile, in July 1917 the Council of National Defense had created
the War Industries Board which, under the chairmanship of Bernard Baruch,
ultimately wielded considerable influence over the setting of priorities
and the fixing of prices for items purchased by both the United States
government and the Allies. Although military representatives sat on
the board's various commodities sections, the Army successfully resisted
civilian control of its purchasing.39
American business faced the challenge of creating several new industries
to replace products supplied by belligerent nations, particularly Germany.
In connection with the Signal Corps' operations, most high-quality
optical lenses for field glasses and cameras had formerly been imported
from Germany or
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Belgium, now occupied by German forces. Such companies as Bausch
& Lomb of Rochester, New York, stepped in to fill the void. Meanwhile,
citizens were urged to lend their binoculars to the military services.
Germany had also produced most photographic chemicals and materials
which American firms, such as the Eastman Kodak Company, now began to
manufacture.40
While the majority of Signal Corpsmen served overseas, there remained
important communication duties to handle on the home front. Prior to
the war the Corps had installed, maintained, and operated the telephone
systems at most Army posts. The tremendous growth of wartime facilities,
however, overwhelmed the branch's resources, and the Army turned to
the local telephone companies for assistance. The Army contracted with
the Bell System to provide the central office plants and to tie the
post systems into the commercial wire network. Moreover, the Army hired
civilian operators to handle the increased message traffic. The Signal
Corps continued to operate the Alaska communication system, and signal
units performed construction, maintenance, and operations in the Canal
Zone, Hawaii, and the Philippines. Meanwhile, the chronic troubles along
the Mexican border kept the 7th Field Signal Battalion busy during the
war years.41
The Signal Corps did not become involved, however, in the types of
intelligence-gathering operations it had conducted during the War with
Spain, such as the monitoring of cable traffic. Although a Military
Information Division had been created as part of the General Staff in
1903 (superseding the Military Information Division within The Adjutant
General's Office), it had subsequently diminished in importance, becoming
a committee in the 2d (War College) Section of the General Staff. In
1917 the Army established a military intelligence section on the staff,
which by the end of the war had achieved division status. During World
War I the director of military intelligence, rather than the chief signal
officer, acted as the chief military censor, while overseas the chief
of the Intelligence Section, AEF, handled similar responsibilities.42
Likewise, the Signal Corps did not control the national civilian
communication systems during World War I. The president did not take
over the commercial telephone and telegraph systems until July 1918,
and then he placed them under the postmaster general.43
As with other aspects of the war, however, the government created a
sizable and overlapping bureaucracy to control the flow of information
both within the country and with the outside world. In October 1917
the president established the Censorship Board to censor communications
by mail, cable, radio, telegraph, and telephone between the United States
and foreign nations. But the chief signal officer was not a member;
again, the postmaster general administered those operations. In addition,
the Transportation and Communication Committee of the Council of National
Defense, on which the chief signal officer did serve, dealt with the
adaptation of the telephone and telegraph lines to defense needs. In
the case of cable communications, the Navy exercised censorship. The
director of naval communications became the chief cable censor, and
his authority extended to include the War Department cable to Alaska.
The Navy also regulated radio trans­missions beginning as early as 1914.
Stations owned by foreign firms caused par-
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ticular concern lest they might be conveying military information.
With the nation's entry into the war, the Navy assumed control over
all radio stations, taking over those needed for naval communications
and closing the rest.44
Once mobilized, the Signal Corps stood ready to provide communications
at home in support of its operations overseas. In October 1917 the chief
signal officer's rank was raised to that of a major general. To better
handle his multifarious duties, Squier reorganized his office on several
occasions as the war progressed. By April 1918 its principal divisions
included Administration, Air, Civilian Personnel, Equipment, Land, Medical,
Science and Research, and Supply. The Land Division had responsibility
for organization and training (exclusive of aviation), telegraph and
telephone service, radio station maintenance, and coast artillery fire
control. Because of their significance, the activities of the Air Division
will be discussed in detail below. With the wartime expansion, the Signal
Office scrambled to find enough space for its personnel in sixteen different
buildings scattered throughout the nation's capital.45
"Over There ": Organization
and Training
When General Pershing set sail for Europe on 28 May 1917 aboard the
British steamship Baltic, his key staff officers accompanied him. Among
them was Col. Edgar Russel, whom Pershing had designated as chief signal
officer of the American Expeditionary Forces. (Russel was promoted to
brigadier general in the National Army on 5 August 1917.) A contemporary
of Squier from the West Point class of 1887, Russel had begun his service
with the Signal Corps during the War with Spain and for several years
had headed the Corps' Electrical Division. Most recently he had served
as chief signal officer of the Southern Department under Pershing's
command. After stopping in England, where Russel observed British signal
practices, Pershing and his staff arrived in France on 13 June and set
up their headquarters in Paris.46
Within AEF headquarters, Pershing placed the Signal Corps under the
Line of Communications, later redesignated as the Services of Supply,
which included the AEF's technical services.47
Russel, in turn, divided his own office into several divisions, the
major ones being Engineering, Telegraph and Telephone, Supplies, Radio,
Photographic, Pigeons, and Research and Inspection.48
The Research and Inspection Division, modeled after similar organizations
in the British and French armies, operated in conjunction with the scientific
efforts being conducted in the United States. The Signal Corps maintained
a laboratory in Paris, and among the civilian scientists recruited to
work there was Edwin H. Armstrong, the young electrical engineer from
Columbia University who had discovered the capabilities of de Forest's
audion. Commissioned as a captain, Armstrong began developing the superheterodyne
radio receiver, which greatly amplified weak signals and enabled precise
tuning. Unfortunately, he could not perfect it prior to the Armistice.
After the war Armstrong became known as the father of FM (frequency-modulated)
radio.49
Another primary project of the divi-
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GENERAL RUSSEL
sion was designing radios for tanks. Moreover, inspection detachments
from this division, located at supply depots and factories, checked
all Signal Corps apparatus received from the United States or purchased
from the Allies before distributing them to the troops.50
For the first few months Russel and his staff undertook the planning
and organization of signal operations for the AEF The chief signal officer's
responsibilities included:
all that pertains to the technical
handling and maintenance of the U.S. military telegraph and telephone
lines and radio stations of the American Army in France. He will
exercise supervision over the duties of the Signal Corps in connection
with the construction, operation and maintenance of all telegraph,
telephone and radio installations of the system.51
His duties did not include aviation, which was managed by a separate
Air Service created by Pershing.
Russel initially leased telephone and telegraph service from the
French, but they had few lines and little equipment to spare. Moreover,
their equipment was antiquated by American standards, and the French
did not "multiplex" their lines to allow them to carry simultaneously
both telephone and telegraph traffic. Such a system required far less
wire and fewer poles, an important consideration given wartime shortages
of material and transport.52
Consequently, planning soon began for the construction of an all-American
wire network to serve the strategic communication needs of the AEF.
This system as initially conceived would run 400 miles across France
to connect the initial base port of St. Nazaire with the rear of the
American sector of operations at Gondrecourt.53
In September 1917 two Bell battalions, the 406th and 407th Telegraph
Battalions, began construction. In keeping with modern American methods,
the system ultimately incorporated repeaters, the latest in telephone
technology, which had recently made coast-to-coast service possible
in the United States.54
As AEF operations expanded, so did the extent of the wire network. By
the end of the war, the Signal Corps built over 1,700 miles of permanent
pole lines and strung nearly 23,000 miles of wire. The entire strategic
network, to include wires leased from and maintained by the French,
totaled approximately 38,000 miles.55
Transatlantic communication also ranked high on Russel's list of priorities,
and the experience he had acquired with underwater cables in Alaska
proved
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TELEGRAPH OPERATING ROOM AT
CHAUMONT
invaluable. Due to the limitations of existing radio technology,
cables remained the most reliable means of long-distance communication.
Early in the war the British had severed Germany's cable connections
with the United States, and the British and French governments had appropriated
and rerouted these cables for their own use. German submarines posed
a constant threat, however, and the presence of this underwater menace
kept repairs from being made. To ensure transatlantic communication
in the event that cable connection was lost, the Navy expanded its series
of high-powered radio stations along the Atlantic coast and constructed
a station at Bordeaux, France, which became known as Radio Lafayette.
The Navy cooperated with the Signal Corps in the use of this system.
The British, meanwhile, laid a cable across the English Channel for
the Corps' use.56
While the U.S. Army established itself in France, Pershing dealt
with the complexities of Allied command relationships. From the outset,
in accordance with Secretary Baker's instructions, Pershing remained
adamant on one point: that the Americans would fight independently and
not be amalgamated with other Allied troops. He had to resist the intense
pressure applied by Allied leaders who were desperate for manpower after
three years of brutal combat and horrific losses. During the spring
of 1917 the French Army had been further weakened by mutiny, while the
British suffered enormous casualties in Flanders. Moreover, the outbreak
of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in November 1917 led to the collapse
of the Eastern Front the following spring, thus freeing large numbers
of German troops for fighting in the west. Despite these circumstances,
Pershing held his ground.
[177]
In September 1917 Pershing transferred his headquarters to Chaumont,
located on the Marne River about 150 miles southeast of Paris in Lorraine
province. Russel moved along with him. Some Signal Corps operations
remained based in Paris, such as photography, research and inspection,
meteorology, and procurement of supplies.57
Because the sector of the front around Chaumont had been quiet for some
time, Pershing considered it a good place for American forces to eventually
enter the line. Meanwhile, at Gondrecourt elements of the 1st Division,
including its 2d Field Signal Battalion, awaited the start of combat
training.58
With the arrival of American troops, tactical communication in the
forward areas came under the control of the Zone of Advance. Col. George
S. Gibbs, who had served with the Volunteer Signal Corps during the
War with Spain and the Philippine Insurrection, became chief signal
officer, Zone of Advance, as well as assistant chief signal officer
of the AEF. He described his job as follows:
The day's work in the zone of the advance division was quite like
that in the lost and found department of a big railroad. There were
hurried trips to inspect equipment and correct requisitions. Lost shipments
were traced by telephone and sometimes by automobile. Material for
training was needed at once, and the normal means of delivery was neither
fast enough nor sure enough. The personal service from the office Chief
Signal Officer gave assistance right where it was needed, and no signal
outfit was allowed to remain in doubt or in need.59
Moreover, each army, corps, and division had a chief signal officer
who coordinated the signal operations of his unit and carried out the
orders of the chief signal officer, AEF. In March 1918 Russel moved
his office to Tours, the headquarters of the Services of Supply, while
Gibbs remained at Chaumont.60
Organizationally, signal units needed to adapt to conditions on the
Western Front. Trench warfare demanded changes in the structure of the
field signal battalion, specifically in the size of the outpost signal
company. As originally organized with five officers and seventy-five
men, the outpost company could not meet the communications requirements
of a square division. Working at the front lines to connect brigade
and regimental headquarters, these men had an extremely dangerous job.
Consequently, upon Pershing's recommendation, the War Department expanded
the company's enlisted strength to 280 men. As reorganized, the company
was divided into a headquarters section and four regimental sections.
These regimental sections, each containing an officer and sixty-five
men, would remain attached to infantry signal platoons (part of the
headquarters company of an infantry regiment) for the duration of trench
warfare. In open warfare the sections would be withdrawn to form a division
reserve.61
Moreover, a new unit came into existence, the depot battalion, comprising
15 officers and 400 men, which became a source of replacement personnel
overseas. Finally, all Signal Corps personnel not assigned to tactical
organizations became members of service companies that were located
at the base ports, supply depots, and headquarters.62
Because of the scarcity of experienced soldiers in the AEF, considerable
training took place in France. To this end, Pershing established a series
of Army
[178]
schools at Langres that included those for technical training. This
system included three schools for signal instruction: one for the training
of personnel from field units; one for officer candidate training; and
a third for radio operators. Due to the demand for signal officers,
the candidates' school took precedence at Langres while corps-level
schools trained commissioned and noncommissioned officers from field
units. A three-month course for candidates was eventually developed
at Langres which provided instruction in all types of signal equipment
as well as in administration, discipline, and field service regulations.
Besides Signal Corps personnel, the Langres schools trained communicators
from the Infantry, Artillery, Engineers, and Air Service.63
Additional education took place at the divisional level in accordance
with a three-phase training plan devised by Pershing. Beginning with
the 1st Division, soldiers learned the techniques of trench warfare
as well as the handling of such weapons as the hand grenade and the
machine gun. French units conducted the preliminary training, which
included the digging of practice trenches to familiarize the men with
the conditions they would be facing. Members of the 2d Field Signal
Battalion, the first signal unit to undergo this process, received instruction
in both French and British signaling methods and went to the front to
observe signal equipment in action.64
Soon they would be putting their newly acquired skills to the test.
"Over the Top ": Signalmen
in Battle
On 21 October 1917 the units of the 1st Division began spending trial
periods in the trenches. For a month one battalion at a time from each
regiment spent ten days with a French division. A detachment from the
2d Field Signal Battalion supported each infantry battalion. Although
stationed in a quiet area, the division experienced its first combat
on the night of 2-3 November when the Germans bombarded and raided a
portion of the sector, killing several Americans. During the attack
signalmen received their initiation in repairing lines under fire.65
At the end of November the 1st Division pulled back for a final month
of instruction in open warfare tactics, training upon which Pershing
had insisted despite French objections. In January 1918, six months
after its arrival in France, the division began defending its own portion
of the line, a sector northwest of Toul.66
Pershing continued to follow a similar training sequence with subsequent
units as they arrived. Meanwhile, many American officers and Secretary
Baker, not to mention the British and French, grew impatient with the
slow progress. Costly campaigns like that at Caporetto, Italy, in October
1917 continued to bleed the Allies white. Without substantial infusions
of American troops, the Allies could lose the war.67
Fortunately, with the arrival in France of the 2d Division (half Army
and half Marine), as well as two National Guard divisions, the 26th
and the 42d, the Americans slowly but surely began to build their strength.68
Hoping to win a final victory before the Americans could save the
Allies, the Germans launched a massive offensive in the spring of 1918.
They began in
[179]
March by attacking the British lines along the Somme River, with
the objective of splitting the British and French armies. Ironically,
what they finally achieved was the speedier entry of American troops
into the fighting. The Allies increased their pressure upon Pershing
to amalgamate American servicemen with their units, but he remained
firm about the eventual formation of an independent American army. After
prolonged negotiations, Pershing agreed to allow the British to trans­port
six American divisions to France, where they would train with British
units. He further agreed that during May and June shipment of combat
elements of these divisions (infantrymen and machine gunners) would
receive priority, with artillery, signal, and other support units to
follow. Ten divisions ultimately went to France under this program.69
While this arrangement delayed Pershing's plans for the formation of
an American army, it bolstered Allied morale in the face of the German
onslaught. Furthermore, during the spring crisis the Allies formed a
unified command, headed by General (later Marshal) Ferdinand Foch of
France, to better coordinate operations.
Meanwhile, on 28 May 1918 the 1st Division launched the first American
offensive at Cantigny, in the Picardy region of northern France. This
village, located on high ground in the center of a German salient in
the French lines, had already seen considerable fighting. Prior to the
attack the division carefully outlined and rehearsed the details of
its combat debut.70
Signal planning constituted an important part of the process. In
front of Cantigny the 2d Field Signal Battalion established a communications
network adapted to the conditions of trench warfare. In general, from
division headquarters forward, telephone lines ran to each infantry
battalion as well as between adjoining battalions. But the traditional
lance poles did not prove suitable for use in the trenches. Instead,
the wires were strung on short (four-foot) stakes or run along the trench
walls. The major trunk lines were placed in special shallow trenches
(known as carniveaux) or buried several feet underground
to provide protection from enemy shelling and from foot and vehicle
traffic.71
At division headquarters the telephone switchboards were installed in
underground dugouts where they could withstand artillery bombardment.
Liaison with the artillery was maintained by telephone, and from the
division to the rear, pole, or aerial, lines ran back to the corps with
which it served. Forward from the battalions to the frontline companies
the Signal Corps employed earth telegraphy, which worked by driving
iron poles into the ground to pick up electrical currents by means of
electrical induction. This system was also referred to as T.P.S., from
the French telegraphie par sol.72 Earth
telegraphy did not provide a very secure form of communication because
the Germans could just as easily pick up the messages. Since it did
not depend upon wires, however, it was less vulnerable to artillery.
Due to its limited range, this technique was used primarily at the front.
Wireless sets provided another means of communication, but not yet
a reliable one. When necessary, visual signals supplemented these other
methods.73
The thorough preparation paid off, for the 1st Division initially
took Cantigny fairly easily. During the battle the signal troops went
"over the top" close behind
[180]
SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS AT THE FRONT
the advancing infantry "and maintained remarkably satisfactory
liaison throughout."74
The repair teams sustained many casualties, however, due to heavy concentrations
of poison gas. While the enemy repeatedly knocked the division's telephones
and radios out of action, the earth telegraphy stations remained in
operation. But holding on to the town proved more difficult. The Germans
launched several counterattacks, and fighting continued for three days.
When the battle finally ended on 31 May, the 1st Division had suffered
substantial losses but remained in possession of its prize. Moreover,
it had demonstrated that the doughboys could fight.75
With this successful introduction to combat, American units began
to shoulder more of the burden of warfare. The 2d Division, fighting
in such costly battles as Belleau Wood and Vaux, helped the French
to stop the German advance toward Paris in the area of Château-Thierry.
By mid-July the German offensive had ground to a halt. For its part
in the defense, the 3d Division earned the nickname "Rock of the
Marne." With the influx of American troops, the Allies launched
a counteroffensive, known as the Aisne-Marne campaign. The deadlock
on the Western Front was finally broken, and the tide of battle began
to turn.
As a result of these events, Pershing's plan for an independent American
army at last was realized. In August 1918 Pershing assumed command of
the newly created U.S. First Army. Lt. Col. Parker Hitt served as the
army's chief signal officer.76
Comprising two corps and nineteen divisions, its initial objective
[181]
was the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient that had jutted into
the Allied lines for four years. The salient spread across the plain
between the Meuse and the Moselle rivers in eastern France. The First
Army, supported by French units and a huge Allied aerial force controlled
by Col. William Mitchell, launched its attack on 12 September.77
As always, the Signal Corps played a vital role in the operation.
For example, members of the 55th Telegraph and 317th Field Signal Battalions,
assigned to the V Corps, had to dig a cable trench six feet deep and
one kilometer long to establish connection with the 26th Division. The
trench ran through a hill of nearly solid rock, and the men had no explosives
available. "For three days and two nights the signal men had one
piece of bread and one cup of coffee a meal each. There was no rest.
When a man fainted from exhaustion his comrades worked the harder, and
even the officers in charge wielded picks and shovels with them.78
To handle communications with the French units, six of the women telephone
operators served at First Army headquarters, less than fifteen miles
from the front.79
The Americans carefully planned the attack on St. Mihiel and maintained
its secrecy. Though the Germans expected such an assault, they did not
know when it would occur. Caught unaware before they had fully carried
out an intended withdrawal, they offered minimal opposition. Advancing
rapidly through what for four years had been no man's land, the first
American units entered St. Mihiel on 13 September. By 16 September the
campaign had come to a successful conclusion; the salient had been
eliminated and an all-American army had won its first victory.80
Before the fighting at St. Mihiel had ended, the Allies began preparations
for a final offensive. The American contribution would be known as the
Meuse-Argonne campaign. In addition to the First Army, American units
participating in the Allied effort included the 2d and 36th Divisions,
which served with the French, and the II Corps, which fought with the
British. Beginning on 26 September, American and French divisions attempted
to surround the German forces in the Argonne Forest of eastern France.
Along with the British and Belgian armies fighting to the north, the
Allies planned to drive the Germans out of France before winter. The
Allies would then push north toward Sedan (a city that France had lost
to Germany in 1870) to cut the vital railroad line that supplied the
German Army. All told, more than a million Americans, most of them with
little or no combat training or experience, took part in this campaign.
Meanwhile the newly created U.S. Second Army (organized 20 September
1918) occupied the old St. Mihiel sector.
Although the troops initially made substantial progress, they eventually
bogged down as the Germans increased their resistance. The defenders
occupied a series of well-fortified positions, known collectively as
the Hindenburg Line, against which the Americans made costly frontal
assaults. From the Argonne foothills on the left and the Heights of
the Meuse on the right, German batteries delivered devastating artillery
fire upon the attackers. In addition to the enemy, the inexperienced
soldiers faced difficulties of transportation and command and control.
The formidable ter-
[182]
TESTING A TELEPHONE LINE LEFT BEHIND
BY THE GERMANS AT ST.
MIHIEL
rain, heavily forested and cut by ravines, hindered movement of any
type, and the existing roadways were usually jammed with men and vehicles.
Man-made obstacles, especially barbed wire, presented additional impediments.
The transportation problem exacerbated the already severe supply shortages
suffered by the Signal Corps in particular and the AEF in general.81
The Signal Corps further lacked sufficient numbers of vehicles to haul
its equipment. In May 1918 control of all motor vehicles had been placed
under the Motor Transport Corps, and "the officers handling Motor
Transport never understood that Signal Corps combat motor vehicles used
for laying wires and maintaining lines were
[183]
technical instruments of that business, not just so much truck tonnage."82
Consequently, signalmen sometimes had to carry poles on their backs
for several miles. Despite the exertions of the Signal Corps, communication
between divisions and corps often broke down, particularly in units
experiencing their first combat. As Pershing remarked regarding the
317th Field Signal Battalion, assigned to the V Corps, this unit "joined
on the eve of battle and had to learn its duties under fire."83
In this last ditch defense, the Germans hurled some of their best
battle-hardened units against the Allies. Nevertheless, despite slow
progress and mounting casualties, the French and American forces inexorably
pushed the Germans back. By 10 October, with the addition of more seasoned
soldiers from the St. Mihiel area, the Americans controlled the Argonne
Forest. But much bitter fighting remained between the Argonne and the
Meuse River before the Americans completely penetrated the Hindenburg
Line. Exhausted and demoralized after four years of combat, the Germans
had no fresh troops to throw into the fray, and the unrelenting pressure
applied by the Allies led the German government to sue for peace.
While diplomatic negotiations proceeded, Pershing prepared for the
final thrust by reorganizing his forces. Maj. Gen. Robert L. Bullard
became commander of the Second Army on 12 October, with Col. Hanson
B. Black as his chief signal officer. Four days later Maj. Gen. Hunter
Liggett assumed command of the First Army. Pershing, meanwhile, took
control of the new army group.84
After restoring his battered troops to combat readiness, Liggett resumed
the offensive on 1 November. Forcing the Germans to withdraw behind
the Meuse, the Americans pursued them in the direction of Sedan. During
this rapid advance, the Signal Corps succeeded in maintaining communications
by using the German permanent lines.85
American units had reached the outskirts of Sedan when the signing of
the Armistice ended the campaign and the war on 11 November 1918.86
Each signal unit participating in this campaign made its own unique
contribution to victory. One that merits specific mention is the 325th
Field Signal Battalion of the 92d Division, the only black signal unit
to serve in World War I. Arriving in France in June 1918, the 325th
had first undergone training and then served in the trenches of the
St. Die sector for four weeks before heading for the Argonne. A platoon
of the 325th, supporting the 368th Infantry, saw action during the
battle. In addition to their signal duties, several platoon members
volunteered to take a German machine gun nest encountered while scouting
a location for a new command post. One of these signalmen, Cpl. Charles
S. Boykin, was killed during this engagement, which ultimately succeeded
in capturing the enemy position.87
Throughout the Meuse-Argonne campaign, members of the Female Telephone
Operators Unit continued to work at First Army headquarters, now located
near Verdun, with the initial complement of six supplemented by seven
additional women. On 13 October a fire broke out in the barracks housing
the main switch-
[184]
MEMBERS OF THE 325TH
FIELD SIGNAL BATTALION
STRING WIRE IN NO MAN'S LAND
board. The women remained on duty until they were finally forced
to evacuate, but they returned to their posts within an hour. Their
devotion to duty won them a commendation from the chief signal officer
of the First Army.88
A detachment of women also served at Second Army headquarters, but not
during active operations. Grace Banker, who was chief operator at First
Army headquarters, received a Distinguished Service Medal for her wartime
efforts.89
While most signalmen served in France, some saw action in other locations.
In September 1918, Company D, 53d Telegraph Battalion, arrived in Vladivostok
to provide communications for American troops in Siberia. The following
month the 112th and 316th Field Signal Battalions, belonging to the
37th and 91st Divisions, respectively, went to Belgium to participate
in the fighting in the Ypres district. The Army also sent a detachment
of signal soldiers to Italy to serve with the signal platoon of the
332d Infantry.90
As for signaling methods, wire communications, in particular the field
telephone, proved to be the chief means of signaling used by the United
States Army during World War I. A field telephone could operate over
a range of from fifteen to twenty-five miles, and a field telegraph,
which required less current, could relay messages up to hundreds of
miles.91
The Signal Corps soon found, however,
[185]
that it had to make some adjustments to its equipment. It learned
early that the buzzer, which had operated well on the Mexican border
and was best suited to use on improvised field lines, could be easily
intercepted by the enemy. Later in the war improved buzzerphones came
into use.92
Furthermore, the inadequate insulation of outpost wire enabled the Germans
to intercept messages by means of leaks through the ground. The introduction
of heavier insulation alleviated the problem. Since the signalers left
most of this wire where it lay, the Army used tremendous quantities.
By the summer of 1918 the United States manufactured twenty thousand
miles of outpost wire per month.93
To increase mobility, the Signal Corps developed portable telegraph
and telephone stations, mounted on truck chassis. Because the truck's
engine supplied power to the storage batteries, each station could operate
independently. Myer's telegraph train had entered the age of the automobile.94
The Germans, influenced by the successful use of the telephone by
the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War, had discarded the telegraph
as obsolete in 1910. They entered World War I entrusting their communications
to the telephone and the radiotelegraph. The shortcomings of these methods,
especially for long-distance communications, soon caused the German
Army to reinstate wire telegraphy as part of its signaling system.95
Although radio held great promise for military communications, the
instruments available during World War I proved unsuitable for extensive
frontline use. The prewar radios used by the Signal Corps had been relatively
high-powered sets designed for a large operating area; they were not
meant to be used in the restricted conditions of trench warfare where
their inability to be finely tuned caused them to interfere with the
sets used by the Allies. Moreover, the spark-gap equipment weighed too
much-up to 500 pounds-to be easily moved and often broke down. With
the assistance of European radio experts, the Signal Corps developed
its own models and had approximately twenty-five different types in
production when the war ended. In the meantime, American forces used
French radios. Despite some improvements, particularly in the production
of vacuum tubes, "radio carried little of the war's communications
load," a fact that had a direct impact on the battlefield.96
The high combat casualty rates of World War I can partly be attributed
to the lack of a reliable wireless communications system. Once soldiers
went "over the top," they found themselves isolated. During
deafening artillery barrages a commander could not control his men with
his voice, and vision became limited amid the fog of battle. In order
to maintain contact, troops tended to move in groups that made them
easy targets for enemy machine gunners. Although wire lines were portable,
they could not last long under constant and withering artillery bombardment
that chewed them to bits; what the shellfire spared often fell victim
to the treads of tanks or other vehicles. With their communications
cut off, attackers found it difficult if not impossible to call for
reinforcements or artillery support.
The situation did not improve significantly under defensive conditions.
Shelling continued to destroy wire lines, and standard radio antennas
proved a
[186]
popular enemy target. To solve the latter problem, the Signal Corps
developed a loop set with a receiving antenna that lay on the ground
and a small loop connected with the spark gap that served as the transmitting
antenna.97
Radio's chief role was for intelligence purposes. While aviators handled
reconnaissance and intelligence gathering from the air, the signalmen
on the ground used their radios to obtain information about the enemy.
The Radio Division of the chief signal officer, AEF, had responsibility
for both air and ground radio operation, including radio intelligence,
and a radio section served with each field army.98
At intercept stations, Signal Corpsmen copied coded messages sent from
German ground radio stations and forwarded them to the radio sections
for decoding. In addition to those in the field, the Signal Corps operated
an intercept station at general headquarters. (At listening stations
located in no man's land, the Signal Corps similarly monitored enemy
telephone and telegraph messages.)99
Using goniometry, or direction finding by means of measuring angles,
Signal Corpsmen also obtained bearings on enemy radio transmitters so
that the location of the stations could be identified.100
Goniometric stations could also detect incoming airplanes from their
radio signals. Furthermore, from the amount of radio traffic, the strength
of enemy troops could be determined. Radios could also be used to divert
the Germans away from where attacks were being planned by broadcasting
false radio traffic. The Signal Corps successfully exercised this ploy
prior to the resumption of the offensive along the Meuse on 1 November
1918. The radio section of the Signal Corps worked closely with the
radio intelligence section of the General Staff, passing along the information
it collected for transcription and analysis regarding enemy operations
and intentions.101
Although cryptography, the enciphering and deciphering of messages
according to specified codes, had been included in the curriculum of
the Signal School since 1912, the Signal Corps had not strictly practiced
communications security prior to the war. The new War Department Telegraph
Code of 1915 had chiefly served as an economy measure to reduce the
length of transmissions, rather than as a means to assure their secrecy.102
In the AEF, however, the office of the chief signal officer included
a Code Compilation Section where officers devised the so-called River
and Lake Codes, which were distributed to the First and Second Armies,
respectively, for use in both wire and wireless communications. Maj.
Joseph O. Mauborgne, future chief signal officer and head of the Research
and Engineering Division, developed an improved field cipher device
which replaced the cipher disk. Mauborgne's apparatus, a cylinder with
twenty-six rotating disks, bore a striking similarity to one invented
by Thomas Jefferson when he was secretary of state to protect diplomatic
correspondence. However, the existence of the earlier device remained
unknown until 1922, when a researcher found its description among Jefferson's
papers.103
To enforce security, listening stations monitored friendly traffic for
lapses in procedure.104
While signal officers per­formed cryptography, military intelligence
officers conducted cryptanalysis, or the breaking of unknown codes.105
[187]
Despite advances in speed, electrical communications could not always
be relied upon to get the message through. Wire communications, in particular,
were extremely vulnerable to artillery fire and the ravages of wheeled
and tracked vehicles, not to mention enemy wire cutters. Thus, the Signal
Corps built a mea­sure of redundancy into its communications system
as insurance. Traditional communication methods, such as runners and
mounted messengers, continued to perform their services, with the use
of motorcycle dispatch riders constituting a modern variation. Signal
repair parties also used motorcycles, when they were available, to travel
to the scene of a problem.106
Visual signaling had likewise not entirely disappeared from the Signal
Corps' arsenal. The familiar red and white wigwag flags remained in
use to a limited extent, but the flagstaff underwent some changes. Since
the wooden staffs broke rather easily, the Corps contracted with a fishing
rod company to manufacture steel staffs.107
Other visual signaling methods included pyrotechnics (rockets, flares);
battery-powered electric lamps, based on a French model, to replace
the previously used acetylene type; and projector lamps. The heliograph
remained in the Army's inventory but received little if any use. To
communicate with airplanes, ground troops placed panels in various
prearranged patterns upon the ground.108
Carrier pigeons contributed another "low-tech" but effective
means of communication. In July 1917, impressed with the French and
British pigeon services, Pershing requested that pigeon specialists
be commissioned into the U.S. Army. The Signal Corps had used the birds
rather unsuccessfully in Mexico, but without properly trained handlers.
In November 1917, the Signal Corps' Pigeon Service received official
authorization, and a table of organization for a pigeon company to serve
at army level was published the following June. The company comprised
9 officers and 324 soldiers and provided a pigeon group to each corps
and division.109
By the war's end the Signal Corps had sent more than fifteen thousand
trained pigeons to the AEF.110
Probably the most famous use of pigeons occurred during the fighting
in the Argonne Forest in October 1918 when elements of the 77th Division,
commanded by Maj. Charles W Whittlesey, became separated and trapped
behind the German lines. These units became known as the "Lost
Battalion." When runners could no longer get through, Whittlesey
employed pigeons to carry messages back to division headquarters requesting
supplies and support. After several days without relief, with hope for
survival fading and friendly artillery fire raining down, the men pinned
their lives on their last bird, Cher Ami, to get word back to silence
the guns. With one eye gone, his breast bone shattered, and a leg missing,
Cher Ami completed his mission. In recognition of his remarkable accomplishment,
Cher Ami received a medal and a pension.111
Although the Signal Corps had been taking pictures since the 1880s,
World War I marked the first time that photography had been assigned
to the branch as an official function. In July 1917 the Corps established
a Photographic Section responsible for both ground and aerial photography
at home and abroad.112
A
[188]
SIGNAL CORPS
PHOTOGRAPHER OPERATES A CAMOUFLAGED CAMERA IN FRANCE
school for land photography opened at Columbia University in January
1918, followed six weeks later by an aerial photography school at the
Eastman Kodak Company in Rochester, New York.
Signalmen began documenting the war aboard the Baltic, taking still
and motion pictures of Pershing and his staff. The Army controlled all
combat photography, and civilian photographers were not permitted to
operate within the zone of the AEF. A photographic unit served with
each division and consisted of one motion-picture operator, one still
photographer, and their assistants. Each army and corps headquarters
had a photo detachment of one officer and six men.113
Photographic units also served with such private agencies as the American
Red Cross and the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) to document
their activities. Photographic technology had progressed considerably
since the days of Mathew Brady, and a combat photographer in World War
I could develop a picture in fifteen minutes using a portable darkroom.
By 1 November 1918 the Signal Corps had taken approximately 30,000 still
pictures and 750,000 feet of motion pictures that were used for training,
propaganda, and historical purposes. Wartime censorship kept the public
from seeing the most graphic images, however. The Signal Corps' invaluable
photographic collection resides today in the National Archives.114
[189]
Aerial photography included pictures taken from planes and balloons.
As a new discipline, it required the development of suitable equipment
and techniques. The Signal Corps' aerial photographers performed photo
reconnaissance and aerial mapping that provided valuable intelligence
about enemy forces and their disposition. Edward J. Steichen, who later
became one of the world's most famous photographers, served as an officer
in the Photographic Section of the Air Service, AEF.115
Another Signal Corps function, dormant for many years, gained new
prominence: meteorology. Before the United States entered the war,
the British, French, and German armies had created meteorological sections.
Commanders needed meteorological information for many purposes: to support
antiaircraft and long­range artillery; aviation; sound ranging to detect
enemy artillery; and general operational planning. The use of gas warfare
also required knowledge of wind currents and velocity. Russel soon discovered
that he, too, needed weather warriors and requested that trained observers
be sent overseas. Consequently, in June 1917, the Signal Corps established
the Meteorological Section, and Lt. Col. Robert A. Millikan of the Science
and Research Division drew up plans for the meteorological service both
at home and in Europe.116
Because the Signal Corps no longer contained trained meteorologists,
Squier sought the assistance of the National Research Council and other
outside agencies to obtain qualified men. Ironically, many of the Corps'
wartime meteorological personnel came from the ranks of the Weather
Bureau.117
One such individual, William R. Blair, received a commission as a major
in the Signal Corps' Officers Reserve Corps and became chief of the
Meteorological Service in the AEE.118
Beginning in May 1918 the section established stations at aviation
and artillery training centers. Stations in the combat zone were normally
linked to corps headquarters by telephone but transmitted information
to tactical units by radio. The meteorological section of the AEF eventually
numbered 49 officers and 404 men divided among 33 forecasting and observation
stations.119
Meanwhile, within the United States the Signal Corps set up its first
weather station in November 1917 at a familiar location, Fort Omaha,
Nebraska. Eventually the Corps had stations at most Army posts and flying
fields.120
Through a variety of means, the Signal Corps successfully supplied
communications to the front lines, and its casualty figures reflected
that fact. Its total of 2,840 casualties ranked second only to the Infantry.
This figure is particularly impressive because the Signal Corps (less
its Aviation Section) comprised only about 4 percent of the total AEF.121
Over three hundred decorations, both American and foreign, were awarded
to Signal Corps personnel, but none of them received the Medal of Honor.122
Following the Armistice, Pershing had warm words of praise for his signal
soldiers who "in spite of serious losses in battle, accomplished
their work, and it is not too much to say that without their faithful
and brilliant efforts and the communications which they installed, operated,
and maintained, the successes of our Armies would not have been achieved."123
[190]
The Signal Corps Loses
Its Wings
The European powers, utilizing the aviation establishments they had
developed in the preceding years, made World War I the first air war.
Germany entered the conflict with nearly one thousand planes; France
with about three hundred; and England approximately two hundred fifty.124
Despite being the first country to give its army wings, the United States
was not prepared for participation in aerial combat. In April 1917 the
Signal Corps' Aviation Section comprised just 52 officers and 1,100
men plus 210 civilian employees. Its inventory contained just 55 planes,
all of which were training models.125
The Signal Corps had no combat aircraft because it continued to stress
aviation's reconnaissance mission. The War Department reinforced this
view by retaining aviation within the Signal Corps instead of making
it a separate service. Although Congress had finally appropriated substantial
sums for the aviation program, "the sudden availability of funds,"
as Maj. Benjamin D. Foulois observed, "does not buy an instant
air force."126
This lesson, unfortunately, would be learned the hard way.
As with other aspects of the war, the Army had done little planning
for aviation, and the small scale on which aerial activities had previously
been conducted provided few lessons upon which the Aviation Section
could draw. Furthermore, while the United States remained a neutral
power, the Allies had been reluctant to allow American observers to
study air operations. When asked by Congress in 1914 whether we were
keeping up with foreign developments, Colonel Reber had replied, "As
far as it is possible to say, we are keeping abreast of conditions that
we do not know anything about."127
There had been a few exceptions, however. In addition to Squier's secret
visits to the front while an attaché in England, another signal officer,
Maj. William Mitchell, had gone abroad in March 1917.128
Yet the United States had gained very little current information on
which to base its aerial program.
Once the United States entered the war, the Allies expected it to
contribute significantly to the aviation effort. After three years of
fighting, their air as well as ground forces were nearing exhaustion.
In a telegram to President Wilson dated 24 May 1917, French Premier
Alexandre Ribot requested that the United States provide 4,500 planes,
5,000 pilots, and 50,000 mechanics by the spring of 1918. He further
asked that the Americans build 2,000 airplanes and 4,000 engines each
month. Unfortunately, the cable did not specify the types of planes
or the proportions in which they should be produced. Ribot's request
nonetheless became the basis for the War Department's aviation program.129
Fulfilling the order would be quite an accomplishment for a nation
that had no aviation industry to speak of: only about one thousand planes,
both military and civilian, had been built in the United States from
1903 to 1916.130
In fact, the nation had only about a dozen aircraft manufacturing companies,
the Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Corporation being the largest.131
Nevertheless, various government officials, including the members of
the Council of National Defense and the Aircraft Production Board, optimistically
assumed that the automotive industry could quick-
[191]
GENERALS FOULOIS
AND PERSHING
ly convert its mass production techniques to the building of aircraft.132
They believed America would rise to the challenge. As Howard Coffin,
former president of the Hudson Motor Car Company and now head of the
Aircraft Production Board, remarked in a speech in New York on 8 June,
"The road to Berlin lies through the air. The eagle must end this
war."133
In the press, headlines heralded that American planes would soon "darken
the skies of Europe." Even Chief Signal Officer Squier remained
undaunted by the job ahead and spoke of our "winged cavalry"
that would "sweep the Germans from the sky."134
The onerous task of turning Ribot's cable into a concrete pro­gram
fell to Major Foulois. Sharing the prevailing optimism but with a sense
of urgency, he came up with a total figure of nearly 17,000 planes (12,000
for combat and 4,900 for training) and 24,000 engines to be manufactured
during the next year. He estimated the cost of such a program at nearly
two-thirds of a billion dollars.135
In keeping with the Signal Corps' emphasis on reconnaissance, observation
and pursuit planes (to protect the former) predominated in Foulois'
plan over the offensive aircraft that had become so important as the
war progressed. Foulois, having recently been promoted to brigadier
general, became the chief of the Aeronautical Division in the Office
of the Chief Signal Officer on 30 July 1917, and he served in that capacity
until November 1917 when he went overseas to direct aviation at the
front. Hap Arnold, having been promoted to full colonel in August 1917,
became the division's executive officer.136
Despite its ambitious goals, the aviation program suffered from a
fatal flaw-decentralization of control. In addition to the Signal Corps,
a large number of agencies and individuals, both military and civilian,
had a voice in its development: Coordination between them proved difficult
if not impossible.137
In 1915, Congress had created the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
(NACA) "to supervise and direct the scientific study of the problems
of flight" and also "to direct and conduct research and experiment
in aeronautics."138
The committee consisted of up to 12 members appointed by the president:
2 from the Army; 2
[192]
from the Navy; 1 each from the Smithsonian, the Weather Bureau, and
the Bureau of Standards; and up to 5 other qualified individuals, either
civilian or military. Initially Scriven and Reber were the Army's representatives,
with Scriven serving as chairman in 1915 and 1916.139
The Aircraft Production Board, created by the Council of National Defense
in May 1917, supervised the manufacturing activities of both the Army
and the Navy. Both General Squier and his naval counterpart, Admiral
David W Taylor, sat on this board along with various prominent businessmen.
It became a separate entity in November 1917.140
A third body, the Joint Army and Navy Technical Aircraft Board, also
formed in May 1917, attempted to standardize the types of aircraft built
by each service.141
Pershing further complicated matters when he created the Air Service,
AEF, in June 1917. In his words, "as aviation was in no sense a
logical branch of the Signal Corps, the two were separated in the A.E.F.
as soon as practicable and an air corps was organized and maintained
as a distinct force."142
Although this separation worked well on the battlefield, it created
complications at home. Once the leaders in Washington put the aviation
program into place, they had to respond to orders received from Pershing
and his staff that often conflicted with the advice given by officers
in Europe reporting directly to the Signal Office. Members of Allied
missions to Washington also added their advice. The constantly changing
requirements for airplanes resulted in frequent revisions to the production
program, thus creating more delays than planes. The lack of a clear
direction to the aviation program, coupled with its decentralized control,
led to serious problems.143
The Joint Army and Navy Technical Aircraft Board was the first to
consider Foulois' proposal, approving it on 29 May. Having leaped this
hurdle, Squier decided to save time by bypassing the chain of command
and sent the plan directly to Secretary Baker. Baker, for his part,
endorsed the proposal and forwarded it directly to Congress without
consulting the General Staff. Responding to widespread public enthusiasm
for aviation, Congress appropriated $640 million, the largest sum appropriated
for a single purpose to that time, and President Wilson approved the
sum on 24 July.144
From the start, manufacturers faced a serious obstacle that hampered
production: the maze of patents controlling the manufacture of airplane
components. The automobile industry had earlier solved a similar situation
with a cross-licensing agreement through which the manufacturers pooled
their patents. The NACA, with Squier as a key participant in the negotiations,
played a critical role in working out a comparable arrangement for
the aircraft industry. In this case, the Manufacturers Aircraft Association
was formed to administer the agreement.145
It charged a flat fee for the use of each patent within the pool and,
in turn, reimbursed the patent holders. This consensus finally brought
an end to the patent fight between the Wright and Curtiss interests.146
Through Squier, the NACA became involved in the selection of a site
for an aviation proving ground for the Signal Corps. The location chosen,
what is now known as Langley Air Force Base in Newport News, Virginia,
also became the
[193]
site of the NACA's Langley Aeronautical Laboratory.147
As an active committee member, Squier also helped develop nomenclature
for the emerging aircraft industry. For example, he urged the adoption
of the word "airplane" to replace the previously used term,
"aeroplane."148
Even with the patent licensing agreements, the United States still
faced serious aircraft production problems. The assumption that the
nation's automobile industry could be easily converted to the manufacture
of airplanes did not prove valid. American airplanes were still chiefly
custom-built and could not readily be adapted to mass production. To
secure the necessary technical expertise, the government requested
that France, England, and Italy send to this country experienced aircraft
pilots, engineers, and designers to assist in developing both manufacturing
and training methods. To obtain up-to-date information from the front,
the chief signal officer dispatched a fact-finding mission to Europe.
Headed by Maj. Raynal C. Bolling, and hence known as the Bolling Commission,
the group left in mid-June to discuss aviation matters with the Allies
and to determine which types of aircraft the United States should build.149
At the end of July the group issued its report recommending four major
types of planes: the British De Haviland DH-4 for observation and daylight
bombing; the French SPAD and British Bristol for fighters; and the Italian
Caproni for night bombing.150
They even sent home models of these planes for the manufacturers to
follow. For training purposes, the Army adopted the Curtiss JN-4 (nicknamed
the Jenny). With these guidelines, the American production effort began.151
In addition to administrative obstacles, there remained many other
hurdles to clear before the aviation program got off the ground, especially
the procurement of the necessary raw materials. World War I planes remained
relatively fragile structures fashioned mainly of wood, preferably spruce,
which is lightweight yet strong and less prone to splintering than other
softwoods. The Allies, however, could not supply enough aircraft quality
timber to meet their wartime needs. Although the forests of the Pacific
Northwest contained bountiful supplies of the needed spruce, labor strife
prevented the mills from meeting the demand. Therefore, the Army stepped
in. In November 1917 the Signal Corps created the Spruce Production
Division with headquarters at Portland, Oregon. Its operation represents
one of the more unusual aspects of the Signal Corps' aviation-related
activities during World War I. Under the command of Col. Brice P Disque,
the division eventually employed nearly thirty thousand "spruce
soldiers" in the forests and lumber mills of the Northwest. In
a successful effort to ease the labor unrest, the Army organized civilian
forestry workers into a new union, the Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen.152
Planes also required fabric, usually linen, for covering their outer
surfaces. Before the war Belgium, Russia, and Ireland had been the principal
suppliers of flax. With Ireland remaining as the sole source following
Belgium's occupation by the Germans and the Russian revolution, another
material had to be found. Scientists at the Bureau of Standards developed
a suitable substitute made of mercerized cotton. With the change in
fabric, a new formula also had to be creat-
[194]
DE HAVILAND
AIRPLANES WITH LIBERTY ENGINES BEING MANUFACTURED
AT THE
DAYTON-WRIGHT COMPANY
ed for the "dope," a varnish-like substance used to coat
the fabric to protect, tighten, and waterproof it. Consequently, the
government oversaw the establishment of factories to produce the required
chemicals.153
The Signal Corps became involved in yet another new endeavor when it
became necessary to obtain castor beans from India and cultivate over
100,000 acres of them to yield the oil used to lubricate aircraft engines.154
Other impediments to production included the need to translate the
metric measurements used in European aircraft designs into inches and
feet. Besides the planes themselves, the Army also had to supervise
the manufacture of numerous auxiliary items, such as instrumentation;
machine guns, bombs, and other armament; radios; cameras; and special
clothing for the pilots.155
American pilots did not carry parachutes until the postwar period.156
Finally, shipping delays, with priority given to the movement of ground
troops, slowed the delivery of the planes and engines once they had
been built.
While the United States depended heavily on European aircraft technology,
it did contribute something new and noteworthy to military aviation:
the Liberty engine. Designed by two automotive engineers, Jesse G. Vincent
and Elbert J. Hall, the initial eight-cylinder model generated two hundred
horsepower and was
[195]
produced in less than six weeks. The twelve-cylinder version achieved
over three hundred horsepower, and further modification increased its
output to more than four hundred. The twelve-cylinder Liberty went into
mass production and became the standard American aircraft engine both
during and after the war.157
The Liberty finally solved the dilemma faced by the Wright brothers
and their successors since 1903 of finding an engine that was relatively
light yet could generate sufficient horsepower for sustained flight.158
While the Liberty engine itself met with success, efforts to adapt the
selected European-designed planes to accommodate it did not. Only the
De Havilands underwent successful conversion and mass production by
American manufacturers. De Haviland planes fitted with the twelve-cylinder
Liberty engine were called Liberty planes.159
Unfortunately, the De Havilands became better known as "flaming
coffins" because of their vulnerability to explosion upon being
hit.160
American factories had produced over 15,000 Liberty engines by the end
of the war, but only a fraction of these reached the front.161
Although Congress made generous wartime appropriations for aviation
(Squier requested a billion dollars for fiscal year 1919 and received
$800 million), the United States did not succeed in putting many planes
into the air. Fewer than one thousand American-built planes saw action,
despite the promises of darkened skies. Throughout the war American
pilots relied mainly upon French machines.162
While the Army struggled with its production plight, it had no trouble
attracting aviation personnel. Thousands volunteered, lured by the
romance of the Air Service and the possibility of becoming an "ace."
To screen these candidates, the Signal Corps pioneered in the use of
psychological testing.163
It lacked, however, the training facilities to turn these men into pilots.
At the outbreak of the war, the Army had just two permanent flight schools,
one at San Diego and another at Mineola, Long Island, which had been
established in 1916 for training National Guard and Reserve personnel.
A third field, a temporary facility at Essington, Pennsylvania (near
Philadelphia), had opened just five days before the United States entered
the conflict. As part of his planning function, Foulois had selected
sites for new installations, and eventually the War Department was operating
twenty-seven training fields within the United States. These included
Wilbur Wright Field, located on Huffman Prairie not far from Dayton,
Ohio, where the brothers had conducted many of their early experimental
flights and which is now part of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.164
During the summer of 1917, while the new fields were being built,
the Canadian government provided flying facilities in exchange for the
use of American fields during the winter. Moreover, many cadets, especially
in these early months of American involvement, received their training
in England, France, and Italy. In addition to the training fields at
home, the United States eventually constructed sixteen flying fields
in Europe, the largest being the aviation center at Issoudun, France,
that covered an area of thirty-six square miles.165
[196]
As the problems at San Diego had indicated, however, pilot training
was not a simple process. While it took three to four months to train
a ground soldier, the time required to adequately train a pilot could
be anywhere between six and nine months.166
First, prospective pilots underwent two to three months of ground, or
pre-flight, training at several leading universities where they studied
the theory and principles of flight.167
The students next moved on for six to eight weeks of preliminary flight
training at the Signal Corps aviation schools, which culminated in a
solo 60-mile cross-country flight.168
They then graduated to advanced training where they specialized in
reconnaissance, pursuit, or bomber flying. Once overseas, the pilots
underwent combat training behind the lines.169
In addition to flying, all pilots were instructed in aerial gunnery.
Specialized radio and photographic personnel also had to be trained,
as well as mechanics to keep the planes in the air.170
The Air Service, AEF, could not make its presence felt at the front
until the last months of the war, and a detailed discussion of its combat
operations will not be given here. When the United States entered the
war, only the 1st Aero Squadron had been immediately available to serve
overseas, and it had arrived in Europe on 1 September 1917. The unit
received training in France as an observation squadron and became part
of the I Corps Observation Group under French tactical control.171
Although their service was relatively brief, American aviators gave
a good account of themselves.172
As part of its aviation program, the Signal Corps renewed its interest
in lighter-than-air craft. In Europe captive balloons were being used
for artillery observation, and the observers communicated with the ground
via telephone. Shortly after the declaration of war the Signal Corps
reopened its Balloon School at Fort Omaha.173
The Army also established balloon schools at Camp John Wise, Texas (near
San Antonio); Arcadia, California (later known as Ross Field); and Lee
Hall, Virginia. Veteran Army aeronaut Col. Charles deF. Chandler was
in charge of the Balloon Service, AEF, and seventeen balloon companies
eventually saw action.174
In addition, Millikan's Science and Research Division conducted a variety
of experiments with balloons, among them attempts to use them to distribute
propaganda.175
The beginning of the end for the Signal Corps' Aviation Section came
in November 1917 when Gutzon Borglum (later the sculptor of the presidents
at Mount Rushmore, South Dakota), a member of the Aero Club of America,
accused the War Department of plotting to give control of the aircraft
industry to the automobile manufacturers. With President Wilson's permission,
Borglum launched his own investigation of the aircraft industry.176
Hoping to reassure the public, Secretary of War Baker announced on 21
February 1918, just before leaving for France, that the first American
planes with Liberty engines were on their way to the front, giving the
impression that production was ahead of schedule. Rather than ease tensions,
he had added fuel to the fire. In actuality, only one DH-4 had been
shipped from Dayton, and it was destroyed when the Germans torpedoed
the ship carrying it to Europe. Not until May 1918 did the first
[197]
COLONEL DEEDS
American-built DH-4 fly in France.177
The press, meanwhile, had been printing exaggerated stories about the
thousands of American planes in France. Pershing, in response, sent
a cable to Baker on 28 February in which he urgently recommended that
the publication of such articles be stopped.178
As the public became aware of the shortcomings in the aviation program,
the backlash began.
Borglum, in his report to the president, claimed that the Aircraft
Production Board had squandered the hundreds of millions of dollars
appropriated by Congress. Singling out Edward A. Deeds, head of the
Signal Corps' Equipment Division and thereby in charge of aircraft procurement,
as the culprit, Borglum caused a sensation. Before the war Deeds had
gained prominence as a businessman in Dayton, having served as an executive
of the National Cash Register Company and as a founder of the Dayton
Engineering Laboratories Company (Delco). He was also one of the organizers
of the Dayton-Wright Airplane Company.179
To conduct his wartime work with the Signal Corps, Deeds had received
a commission as a colonel. Although Wilson ultimately repudiated Borglum,
the wheels of change had been set in motion as Congress and other agencies
began probing into aviation matters.180
Acting Secretary of War Benedict Crowell, in Baker's absence, had
ordered an investigation, as did Chief Signal Officer Squier and Howard
Coffin, chairman of the Aircraft Production Board.181
The Crowell committee's preliminary report, issued on 12 April, pointed
out that few soldiers had possessed any knowledge of aviation when the
program began, and a tremendous burden had fallen upon a relatively
small division of the Signal Corps. It recommended that military aviation
be immediately removed from the Signal Corps and that aviation eventually
become a separate department.182
During its own investigation, the Senate Committee on Military Affairs
questioned Deeds and found his answers to be satisfactory. Its final
report, however, labeled the aircraft program a "substantial failure."183
Amid the controversy, Squier did receive some support. Charles D.
Walcott, secretary of the Smithsonian and a member of the NACA, wrote
to the president on 15 April urging him to withdraw only aircraft production
from the Signal Corps' control.184
The public and press, however, feeling betrayed by the promises
[198]
of a vast aerial fleet, came down hard on the chief signal officer.
The New York Times was especially critical of Squier, judging him a "lamentable failure."185
On 24 April 1918 Secretary Baker initiated the actions that led to
the Signal Corps' loss of its aviation duties. On that date he created
two new entities within the Office of the Chief Signal Officer: the
Division of Aircraft Production and the Division of Military Aeronautics.
The latter had charge of the operation and maintenance of aircraft and
the training of personnel. John D. Ryan, former president of the Anaconda
Copper Company, became head of the Division of Aircraft Production,
while Brig. Gen. William L. Kenly became the director of the Division
of Military Aeronautics. Kenly had served as chief of the Air Service,
AEF, from August to November 1917.186
Chief Signal Officer Squier would henceforth devote his full attention
to the Signal Corps proper.187
The final separation came on 20 May 1918 when the president issued
an executive order completely detaching aviation duties from the Signal
Corps and placing them under the direct control of the secretary of
war. The Division of Military Aeronautics and the Bureau of Aircraft
Production thereupon became independent agencies within the War Department.
The Signal Corps continued to retain, however, responsibility for airborne
radio.188
But the scrutiny of the air service had not yet ended. Beginning in
May 1918 the Justice Department, at President Wilson's behest, launched
a thorough inquiry into the aeronautical program. Charles Evans Hughes,
former presidential candidate and future secretary of state and chief
justice of the Supreme Court, headed this probe.189
After five months of work, in which almost three hundred witnesses testified,
the attorney general turned over Hughes' findings to the president.
Aviation's problems, the report concluded, stemmed largely from disorganization
and incompetence rather that rampant corruption. Hughes had found evidence
of wrongdoing, however, on the part of Edward A. Deeds, against whom
Borglum had leveled serious charges.190
While Hughes cleared Deeds of Borglum's more sensational accusations
of major corruption and pro-Germanism, he found that Deeds had used
his position within the Signal Corps to benefit the Dayton-Wright Company.
Hughes also held him responsible for grossly misleading the public in
regard to the progress of the aircraft production program. His report
therefore recommended that Deeds be court-martialed, since he still
held his military commission.191
As for the chief signal officer, the investigation had found no "imputation
of any kind upon Gen. Squier's loyalty or integrity."192
With the imminent end of the war, however, the public outcry over aviation
abated, and an Army board of review subsequently exonerated Deeds of
any wrongdoing.193
As in any dispute, it is easy to cast blame, and Squier received
his share. Grover Loening, who became an aircraft manufacturer after
leaving the Army's employ in 1915, accused the chief signal officer
of being a dupe of the automobile manufacturers.194
Robert A. Millikan, who had directed the Signal Corps' Science and Research
Division, described Squier as a "strange character" who "considered
himself a scientist." Millikan further referred to Squier as "in
no sense an organizer nor a man of balanced judgment." While Millikan
credited Squier with "a will-
[199]
ingness to assume responsibility and go ahead," he nonetheless
disparaged his "quick, impulsive decisions."195
Deeds, on the other hand, who had also worked closely with the chief
signal officer, thought highly of his abilities.196
Whatever his strengths or weaknesses, Squier cannot be held solely
responsible for the Signal Corps' loss of aviation. The separation
of this function from the Corps had been impending for some time and
was probably inevitable. The pilots had always chafed under the control
of non-flyers. Aviation was fast becoming an armed service in its own
right, although it would not achieve independent status until after
World War II. Despite the controversy surrounding his wartime program,
Squier's significant contributions to aviation should not be overlooked.
He had played a central role in the development of Army aviation from
its inception, having urged the Army to investigate the Wrights' invention
and drafted the Army's initial airplane specifications.197
Moreover, he had overseen the greatest expansion of the aerial arm to
date while concurrently running the Signal Corps' ground operations.
That one man would have difficulty managing all these activities should
not be surprising.
Less than ten years had passed from the time the Army purchased its
first air­plane until the United States entered World War I and, on
balance, the Signal Corps' Aviation Section had achieved a great deal
by May 1918. Despite short comings and failures, which were not restricted
to the Signal Corps' operations alone, the Corps had laid the foundation
for the air program that the Army followed for the duration of the
war. From a one man/one plane air force in 1907, the Army's Air Service
had grown by November 1918 to nearly two hundred thousand officers,
men, and civilian workers. During the course of the war the Army had
received nearly seventeen thousand planes from both domestic and foreign
manufacturers.198
With the removal of the aviation function, the Signal Corps also lost
some prominent names from its rolls, among them Mitchell, Foulois, and
Arnold. While passing from the pages of Signal Corps history, these
men continued their notable careers with the Army's Air Service.199
The Signal Corps Comes of Age
The aviation story constituted yet another episode in the evolution
of the Signal Corps' mission as changes in technology constantly redefined
the nature of military communications. Once before the Signal Corps
had experienced the wrenching away of a major function, weather reporting,
only to see military meteorology achieve new importance under its auspices
during World War I.
In the case of the weather service, the cost of what was perceived
as a mostly civilian duty had grown too much for the military to justifiably
maintain. With aviation, the case was somewhat different. Clearly, aviation
performed a military mission, and its relationship to communication
was recognized and accepted. But aviation had outgrown its early beginnings
when reconnaissance was seen as its only military purpose. Now its combat
value was beginning to overshadow its other roles. Although Chief Signal
Officers Scriven and Squier had recognized
[200]
that aviation would eventually strike out on its own, they had not
been ready to let it go. As with the weather service, it took the touch
of scandal to precipitate events. But the Signal Corps' child, aviation,
had grown and matured much faster than its parent had anticipated. Like
any offspring, it was rebellious and agitated for independence, not
only from the Signal Corps but in the postwar period from the Army as
a whole.
Aviation aside, the Signal Corps as a branch was negotiating an institutional
rite of passage of its own. During the war it had multiplied its strength
by a factor of nearly thirty-five. Comprising just 55 officers and 1,570
men when Congress declared war, the Corps had grown to 2,712 officers
and 53,277 men when the war ended. These men were organized into 56
field signal battalions, 33 telegraph battalions, 12 depot battalions,
6 training battalions, and 40 service companies.200
Besides the huge increase in size, the Signal Corps that emerged from
World War I differed significantly in other ways from the organization
that had entered the conflict. The Corps had become a technical leader
with its own laboratories: It could no longer confine its scientific
work to the basement of the Signal Office in Washington. Along with
the unprecedented scale of Signal Corps operations came closer ties
with the nation's industrial leaders. While the Corps gained much in
strength and efficiency, it also lost something: the force of personality.
Figures such as Myer, Greely, and Squier would no longer loom as prominently
over and direct so closely the workings of what had become a complex
bureaucracy. Although powerful and important individuals would continue
to appear in subsequent chapters of the Signal Corps' history, the branch
no longer functioned as the sole province of one man: the chief signal
officer. In a sense, the Signal Corps had lost its innocence; as an
organization, it had reached maturity.201