{
    "pages": [
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            "page_number": 1,
            "text": ""
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            "text": ""
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            "page_number": 3,
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        },
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            "page_number": 4,
            "text": "Information Security\nFUNDAMENTALS\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 5,
            "text": "AUERBACH PUBLICATIONS\nwww.auerbach-publications.com\nTo Order Call: 1-800-272-7737 •  Fax: 1-800-374-3401\nE-mail: orders@crcpress.com\nAsset Protection and Security Management\nHandbook\nPOA Publishing\nISBN: 0-8493-1603-0\nBuilding a Global Information Assurance\nProgram\nRaymond J. Curts and Douglas E. Campbell\nISBN: 0-8493-1368-6\nBuilding an Information Security Awareness\nProgram\nMark B. Desman\nISBN: 0-8493-0116-5\nCritical Incident Management\nAlan B. Sterneckert\nISBN: 0-8493-0010-X\nCyber Crime Investigator's Field Guide\nBruce Middleton\nISBN: 0-8493-1192-6\nCyber Forensics: A Field Manual for Collecting,\nExamining, and Preserving Evidence of\nComputer Crimes\nAlbert J. Marcella, Jr. and Robert S. Greenfield\nISBN: 0-8493-0955-7\nThe Ethical Hack: A Framework for Business\nValue Penetration Testing\nJames S. Tiller\nISBN: 0-8493-1609-X\nThe Hacker's Handbook: The Strategy Behind\nBreaking into and Defending Networks\nSusan Young and Dave Aitel\nISBN: 0-8493-0888-7\nInformation Security Architecture:\nAn Integrated Approach to Security in the\nOrganization\nJan Killmeyer Tudor\nISBN: 0-8493-9988-2\nInformation Security Fundamentals\nThomas R. Peltier\nISBN: 0-8493-1957-9\nInformation Security Management Handbook,\n5th Edition\nHarold F. Tipton and Micki Krause\nISBN: 0-8493-1997-8\nInformation Security Policies, Procedures, and\nStandards: Guidelines for Effective Information\nSecurity Management\nThomas R. Peltier\nISBN: 0-8493-1137-3\nInformation Security Risk Analysis\nThomas R. Peltier\nISBN: 0-8493-0880-1\nInformation Technology Control and Audit\nFredrick Gallegos, Daniel Manson,\nand Sandra Allen-Senft\nISBN: 0-8493-9994-7\nInvestigator's Guide to Steganography\nGregory Kipper\n0-8493-2433-5\nManaging a Network Vulnerability Assessment\nThomas Peltier, Justin Peltier, and John A. Blackley\nISBN: 0-8493-1270-1\nNetwork Perimeter Security: Building Defense\nIn-Depth\nCliff Riggs\nISBN: 0-8493-1628-6\nThe Practical Guide to HIPAA Privacy and\nSecurity Compliance\nKevin Beaver and Rebecca Herold\nISBN: 0-8493-1953-6\nA Practical Guide to Security Engineering and\nInformation Assurance\nDebra S. Herrmann\nISBN: 0-8493-1163-2\nThe Privacy Papers: Managing Technology,\nConsumer, Employee and Legislative Actions\nRebecca Herold\nISBN: 0-8493-1248-5\nPublic Key Infrastructure: Building Trusted\nApplications and Web Services\nJohn R. Vacca\nISBN: 0-8493-0822-4\nSecuring and Controlling Cisco Routers\nPeter T. Davis\nISBN: 0-8493-1290-6\nStrategic Information Security\nJohn Wylder\nISBN: 0-8493-2041-0\nSurviving Security: How to Integrate People,\nProcess, and Technology, Second Edition\nAmanda Andress\nISBN: 0-8493-2042-9\nA Technical Guide to IPSec Virtual\nPrivate Networks\nJames S. Tiller\nISBN: 0-8493-0876-3\nUsing the Common Criteria for IT Security\nEvaluation\nDebra S. Herrmann\nISBN: 0-8493-1404-6\nOTHER INFORMATION SECURITY BOOKS FROM AUERBACH\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 6,
            "text": "AUERBACH PUBLICATIONS\nA CRC Press Company\nBoca Raton   London   New York   Washington, D.C.\nInformation Security\nFUNDAMENTALS\nThomas R. Peltier\nJustin Peltier\nJohn Blackley\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 7,
            "text": "This book contains information obtained from authentic and highly regarded sources. Reprinted material\nis quoted with permission, and sources are indicated. A wide variety of references are listed. Reasonable\nefforts have been made to publish reliable data and information, but the author and the publisher cannot\nassume responsibility for the validity of all materials or for the consequences of their use.\nNeither this book nor any part may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic\nor mechanical, including photocopying, microfilming, and recording, or by any information storage or\nretrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher.\nThe consent of CRC Press does not extend to copying for general distribution, for promotion, for creating\nnew works, or for resale. Specific permission must be obtained in writing from CRC Press LLC for such\ncopying.\nDirect all inquiries to CRC Press, 2000 N.W. Corporate Blvd., Boca Raton, Florida 33431. \nTrademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are\nused only for identification and explanation, without intent to infringe.\nVisit the CRC Press Web site at www.crcpress.com\n© 2005 by CRC Press LLC \nAuerbach is an imprint of CRC Press LLC\nNo claim to original U.S. Government works\nInternational Standard Book Number 0-8493-1957-9\nLibrary of Congress Card Number 2004051024\nPrinted in the United States of America  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  0\nPrinted on acid-free paper\nLibrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data\nPeltier, Thomas R.\nInformation security fundamentals / Thomas R. Peltier, Justin Peltier, John Blackley.\np.   cm.\nIncludes bibliographical references and index.\nISBN 0-8493-1957-9 (alk. paper)\n1. Computer security. 2. Data protection. I. Peltier, Justin. II. Blackley, John A. III.\nTitle.\nQA76.9.A25P427 2004\n005.8—dc22\n2004051024\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 8,
            "text": "Dedication\nTo our spouses, friends, children, and colleagues; without them we would\nbe without direction, support, and joy.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 9,
            "text": "Contents \nAcknowledgments\nIntroduction\nChapter 1\nOverview\n1.1\nElements of Information Protection\n1.2\nMore Than Just Computer Security\n1.2.1\nEmployee Mind-Set toward Controls\n1.3\nRoles and Responsibilities\n1.3.1\nDirector, Design and Strategy\n1.4\nCommon Threats\n1.5\nPolicies and Procedures\n1.6\nRisk Management\n1.7\nTypical Information Protection Program\n1.8\nSummary\nChapter 2\nThreats to Information Security\n2.1\nWhat Is Information Security?\n2.2\nCommon Threats\n2.2.1\nErrors and Omissions\n2.2.2\nFraud and Theft\n2.2.3\nMalicious Hackers\n2.2.4\nMalicious Code\n2.2.5\nDenial-of-Service Attacks\n2.2.6\nSocial Engineering\n2.2.7\nCommon Types of Social Engineering\n2.3\nSummary\nChapter 3\nThe Structure of an Information Security \nProgram\n3.1\nOverview\n3.1.1\nEnterprisewide Security Program\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 10,
            "text": "3.2\nBusiness Unit Responsibilities\n3.2.1\nCreation and Implementation of Policies and Standards\n3.2.2\nCompliance with Policies and Standards\n3.3\nInformation Security Awareness Program\n3.3.1\nFrequency\n3.3.2\nMedia\n3.4\nInformation Security Program Infrastructure\n3.4.1\nInformation Security Steering Committee\n3.4.2\nAssignment of Information Security Responsibilities\n3.4.2.1\nSenior Management\n3.4.2.2\nInformation Security Management\n3.4.2.3\nBusiness Unit Managers\n3.4.2.4\nFirst Line Supervisors\n3.4.2.5\nEmployees\n3.4.2.6\nThird Parties\n3.5\nSummary\nChapter 4\nInformation Security Policies\n4.1\nPolicy Is the Cornerstone\n4.2\nWhy Implement an Information Security Policy\n4.3\nCorporate Policies\n4.4\nOrganizationwide (Tier 1) Policies\n4.4.1\nEmployment\n4.4.2\nStandards of Conduct\n4.4.3\nConflict of Interest\n4.4.4\nPerformance Management\n4.4.5\nEmployee Discipline\n4.4.6\nInformation Security\n4.4.7\nCorporate Communications\n4.4.8\nWorkplace Security\n4.4.9\nBusiness Continuity Plans (BCPs)\n4.4.10 Procurement and Contracts\n4.4.11 Records Management\n4.4.12 Asset Classification\n4.5\nOrganizationwide Policy Document\n4.6\nLegal Requirements\n4.6.1\nDuty of Loyalty\n4.6.2\nDuty of Care\n4.6.3\nFederal Sentencing Guidelines for Criminal Convictions\n4.6.4\nThe Economic Espionage Act of 1996\n4.6.5\nThe Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)\n4.6.5\nSarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act\n4.6.6\nHealth Insurance Portability and Accountability \nAct (HIPAA)\n4.6.7\nGramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA)\n4.7\nBusiness Requirements\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 11,
            "text": "4.8\nDefinitions\n4.8.1\nPolicy\n4.8.2\nStandards\n4.8.3\nProcedures\n4.8.4\nGuidelines\n4.9\nPolicy Key Elements\n4.10\nPolicy Format\n4.10.1 Global (Tier 1) Policy\n4.10.1.1 Topic\n4.10.1.2 Scope\n4.10.1.3 Responsibilities\n4.10.1.4 Compliance or Consequences\n4.10.1.5 Sample Information Security Global Policies\n4.10.2 Topic-Specific (Tier 2) Policy\n4.10.2.1 Thesis Statement\n4.10.2.2 Relevance\n4.10.2.3 Responsibilities\n4.10.2.4 Compliance\n4.10.2.5 Supplementary Information\n4.10.3 Application-Specific (Tier 3) Policy\n4.11\nSummary\nChapter 5\nAsset Classification\n5.1\nIntroduction\n5.2\nOverview\n5.3\nWhy Classify Information?\n5.4\nWhat Is Information Classification?\n5.5\nWhere to Begin?\n5.6\nInformation Classification Category Examples\n5.6.1\nExample 1\n5.6.2\nExample 2\n5.6.3\nExample 3\n5.6.4\nExample 4\n5.7\nResist the Urge to Add Categories\n5.8\nWhat Constitutes Confidential Information\n5.8.1\nCopyright\n5.9\nEmployee Responsibilities\n5.9.1\nOwner\n5.9.1.1\nInformation Owner\n5.9.2\nCustodian\n5.9.3\nUser\n5.10\nClassification Examples\n5.10.1 Classification: Example 1\n5.10.2 Classification: Example 2\n5.10.3 Classification: Example 3\n5.10.4 Classification: Example 4\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 12,
            "text": "5.11\nDeclassification or Reclassification of Information\n5.12\nRecords Management Policy\n5.12.1 Sample Records Management Policy\n5.13\nInformation Handling Standards Matrix\n5.13.1 Printed Material\n5.13.2 Electronically Stored Information\n5.13.3 Electronically Transmitted Information\n5.13.4 Record Management Retention Schedule\n5.14\nInformation Classification Methodology\n5.15\nAuthorization for Access\n5.15.1 Owner\n5.15.2 Custodian\n5.15.3 User\n5.16\nSummary\nChapter 6\nAccess Control\n6.1\nBusiness Requirements for Access Control\n6.1.1\nAccess Control Policy\n6.2\nUser Access Management\n6.2.1\nAccount Authorization\n6.2.2\nAccess Privilege Management\n6.2.3\nAccount Authentication Management\n6.3\nSystem and Network Access Control\n6.3.1\nNetwork Access and Security Components\n6.3.2\nSystem Standards\n6.3.3\nRemote Access\n6.4\nOperating System Access Controls\n6.4.1\nOperating Systems Standards\n6.4.2\nChange Control Management\n6.5\nMonitoring System Access\n6.5.1\nEvent Logging\n6.5.2\nMonitoring Standards\n6.5.3\nIntrusion Detection Systems\n6.6\nCryptography\n6.6.1\nDefinitions\n6.6.2\nPublic Key and Private Key\n6.6.3\nBlock Mode, Cipher Block, and Stream Ciphers\n6.6.4\nCryptanalysis\n6.7\nSample Access Control Policy\n6.8\nSummary\nChapter 7\nPhysical Security\n7.1\nData Center Requirements\n7.2\nPhysical Access Controls\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 13,
            "text": "7.2.1\nAssets to be Protected\n7.2.2\nPotential Threats\n7.2.3\nAttitude toward Risk\n7.2.4\nSample Controls\n7.3\nFire Prevention and Detection\n7.3.1\nFire Prevention\n7.3.2\nFire Detection\n7.3.3\nFire Fighting\n7.4\nVerified Disposal of Documents\n7.4.1\nCollection of Documents\n7.4.2\nDocument Destruction Options\n7.4.3\nChoosing Services\n7.5\nAgreements\n7.5.1\nDuress Alarms\n7.6\nIntrusion Detection Systems\n7.6.1\nPurpose\n7.6.2\nPlanning\n7.6.3\nElements\n7.6.4\nProcedures\n7.7\nSample Physical Security Policy\n7.8\nSummary\nChapter 8\nRisk Analysis and Risk Management\n8.1\nIntroduction\n8.2\nFrequently Asked Questions on Risk Analysis\n8.2.1\nWhy Conduct a Risk Analysis?\n8.2.2\nWhen to Conduct a Risk Analysis?\n8.2.3\nWho Should Conduct the Risk Analysis?\n8.2.4\nHow Long Should a Risk Analysis Take?\n8.2.5\nWhat a Risk Analysis Analyzes\n8.2.6\nWhat Can the Results of a Risk Analysis Tell an \nOrganization?\n8.2.7\nWho Should Review the Results of a Risk Analysis?\n8.2.8\nHow Is the Success of the Risk Analysis Measured?\n8.3\nInformation Security Life Cycle\n8.4\nRisk Analysis Process\n8.4.1\nAsset Definition\n8.4.2\nThreat Identification\n8.4.3\nDetermine Probability of Occurrence\n8.4.4\nDetermine the Impact of the Threat\n8.4.5\nControls Recommended\n8.4.6\nDocumentation\n8.5\nRisk Mitigation\n8.6\nControl Categories\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 14,
            "text": "8.7\nCost/Benefit Analysis\n8.8\nSummary\nChapter 9\nBusiness Continuity Planning\n9.1\nOverview\n9.2\nBusiness Continuity Planning Policy\n9.2.1\nPolicy Statement\n9.2.2\nScope\n9.2.3\nResponsibilities\n9.2.4\nCompliance\n9.3\nConducting a Business Impact Analysis (BIA)\n9.3.1\nIdentify Sponsor(s)\n9.3.2\nScope\n9.3.3\nInformation Meeting\n9.3.4\nInformation Gathering\n9.3.5\nQuestionnaire Design\n9.3.6\nScheduling the Interviews\n9.3.7\nConducting Interviews\n9.3.8\nTabulating the Information\n9.3.9\nPresenting the Results\n9.4\nPreventive Controls\n9.5\nRecovery Strategies\n9.5.1\nHot Site, Cold Site, Warm Site, Mobile Site\n9.5.2\nKey Considerations\n9.5.2.1\nPeople\n9.5.2.2\nCommunications\n9.5.2.3\nComputing Equipment\n9.5.2.4\nFacilities\n9.6.\nPlan Construction, Testing, and Maintenance\n9.6.1\nPlan Construction\n9.6.1.1\nCrisis Management Plan\n9.6.1.2\nPlan Distribution\n9.6.2\nPlan Testing\n9.6.2.1\nLine Testing\n9.6.2.2\nWalk-through Testing\n9.6.2.3\nSingle Process Testing\n9.6.2.4\nFull Testing\n9.6.2.5\nPlan Testing Summary\n9.6.3\nPlan Maintenance\n9.7\nSample Business Continuity Plan Policy\n9.8\nSummary\nGlossary\nBibliography\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 15,
            "text": "Acknowledgments\nAn organization that has moved to the forefront of creating usable infor-\nmation for the information security professional is the National Institute\nof Standards and Technology (NIST). The NIST 800 Series of Special\nPublications is a great source of information that many security profes-\nsionals have provided over the years. Joan Hash and the other dedicated\npeople who work at NIST have added greatly to the profession.\nThe Computer Security Institute (CSI) has been the leader in the\ninformation security industry since 1974 and continues to provide leader-\nship and direction for its members and the industry as a whole. John\nO’Leary has been the constant in all the changes seen in this industry.\nThe new CSI management team of Julie Hogan, Chris Keating, and Jennifer\nStevens continues to provide the tools and classes that the security\nprofessional needs to be successful. The new team has blended well with\nthe CSI seasoned veterans of Pam Salaway, Kimber Heald, Frederic Martin,\nNancy Baer, and Joanna Kaufman.\nNo one has all of the answers to any question, so the really “smart”\nperson cultivates good friends. Having been in the information security\nbusiness for nearly 30 years, I have had the great good fortune of having\na number of such friends and fellow professionals. This group of long-\ntime sources of great information include Mike Corby, Terri Curran, Peter\nStephenson, Merrill Lynch, Bob Cartwright, Pat Howard, Cheryl and Carl\nJackson, Becky Herold, Ray Kaplan, Genny Burns, Anne Terwilliger,\nPatrice Rapalus, David Lynas, John Sherwood, Herve Schmidt, Antonio\nand Pietro Ruvolo, Wayne Sumida, Caroline Hamilton, Dan Erwin, Lisa\nBryson, and William H. Murray.\nMy working buddies must also be acknowledged. My son Justin is the\ngreatest asset any father — and more importantly, any information security\nteam — could ever hope for. Over the past two years, we have logged\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 16,
            "text": "nearly 150,000 air miles together, and each day we learn something new\nfrom each other.\nThe other working buddy is John Blackley, a strange Scotsman who\nmakes our life more fun and interesting. I have worked with John since\n1985 and have marveled at how well he takes obtuse concepts and\ncondenses them so that even management types understand.\nWho can leave out their publisher? Certainly not me; Rich O’Hanley\nhas taken the time to discuss security issues with numerous organizations\nto understand what their needs are and then presented these findings to\nus. A great deal of our work here is a direct result of what Rich discovered\nthe industry wanted. Rich O’Hanley, not only the world’s best editor and\ntask master, but a good friend and source of knowledge. Thanks Rich!\nAnd finally I extend a thank-you to my editor Andrea Demby. She\ntakes the time to take the raw manuscript and put it into a logically\nflowing work. She sometimes has to ask me the same question more than\nonce, but finally I get what needs to be done.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 17,
            "text": "Introduction\nThe purpose of information security is to protect an organization’s valuable\nresources, such as information, computer hardware, and software. Through\nthe selection and application of appropriate safeguards, security helps the\norganization’s mission by protecting its physical and financial resources,\nreputation, legal position, employees, and other tangible and intangible\nassets. To many, security is sometimes viewed as thwarting the business\nobjectives of the organization by imposing poorly selected, bothersome\nrules and procedures on users, managers, and systems. Well-chosen secu-\nrity rules and procedures do not exist for their own sake — they are put\nin place to protect important assets and thereby support the overall\nbusiness objectives.\nDeveloping an information security program that adheres to the prin-\nciple of security as a business enabler is the first step in an enterprise’s\neffort to build an effective security program. Organizations must continually\n(1) explore and assess information security risks to business operations;\n(2) determine what policies, standards, and controls are worth implement-\ning to reduce these risks; (3) promote awareness and understanding among\nthe staff; and (4) assess compliance and control effectiveness. As with other\ntypes of internal controls, this is a cycle of activity, not an exercise with\na defined beginning and end.\nThis book was designed to give the information security professional\na solid understanding of the fundamentals of security and the entire range\nof issues the practitioner must address. We hope you will be able to take\nthe key elements that comprise a successful information security program\nand implement the concepts into your own successful program.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 18,
            "text": "Chapter 1\nOverview\nThe purpose of information protection is to protect an organization’s\nvaluable resources, such as information, hardware, and software. Through\nthe selection and application of appropriate safeguards, security helps the\norganization meet its business objectives or mission by protecting its\nphysical and financial resources, reputation, legal position, employees,\nand other tangible and intangible assets. We will examine the elements\nof computer security, employee roles and responsibilities, and common\nthreats. We will also examine the need for management controls, policies\nand procedures, and risk analysis. Finally, we will present a comprehensive\nlist of tasks, responsibilities, and objectives that make up a typical infor-\nmation protection program.\n1.1 Elements of Information Protection\nInformation protection should be based on eight major elements:\n1.\nInformation protection should support the business objectives or\nmission of the enterprise. This idea cannot be stressed enough. All\ntoo often, information security personnel lose track of their goals\nand responsibilities. The position of ISSO (Information Systems\nSecurity Officer) has been created to support the enterprise, not\nthe other way around.\n2.\nInformation protection is an integral element of due care. Senior\nmanagement is charged with two basic responsibilities: a duty of\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 19,
            "text": "loyalty — this means that whatever decisions they make must be\nmade in the best interest of the enterprise. They are also charged\nwith a duty of care — this means that senior management is\nrequired to protect the assets of the enterprise and make informed\nbusiness decisions. An effective information protection program\nwill assist senior management in meeting these duties.\n3.\nInformation protection must be cost effective. Implementing con-\ntrols based on edicts is counter to the business climate. Before any\ncontrol can be proposed, it will be necessary to confirm that a\nsignificant risk exists. Implementing a timely risk analysis process\ncan complete this. By identifying risks and then proposing appro-\npriate controls, the mission and business objectives of the enterprise\nwill be better met.\n4.\nInformation protection responsibilities and accountabilities should\nbe made explicit. For any program to be effective, it will be\nnecessary to publish an information protection policy statement\nand a group mission statement. The policy should identify the roles\nand responsibilities of all employees. To be completely effective,\nthe language of the policy must be incorporated into the purchase\nagreements for all contract personnel and consultants.\n5.\nSystem owners have information protection responsibilities outside\ntheir own organization. Access to information will often extend\nbeyond the business unit or even the enterprise. It is the respon-\nsibility of the information owner (normally the senior level manager\nin the business that created the information or is the primary user\nof the information). One of the main responsibilities is to monitor\nusage to ensure that it complies with the level of authorization\ngranted to the user.\n6.\nInformation protection requires a comprehensive and integrated\napproach. To be as effective as possible, it will be necessary for\ninformation protection issues to be part of the system development\nlife cycle. During the initial or analysis phase, information protec-\ntion should receive as its deliverables a risk analysis, a business\nimpact analysis, and an information classification document. Addi-\ntionally, because information is resident in all departments through-\nout the enterprise, each business unit should establish an individual\nresponsible for implementing an information protection program\nto meet the specific business needs of the department.\n7.\nInformation protection should be periodically reassessed. As with\nanything, time changes the needs and objectives. A good informa-\ntion protection program will examine itself on a regular basis and\nmake changes wherever and whenever necessary. This is a dynamic\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 20,
            "text": "and changing process and therefore must be reassessed at least\nevery 18 months.\n8.\nInformation protection is constrained by the culture of the organi-\nzation. The ISSO must understand that the basic information pro-\ntection program will be implemented throughout the enterprise.\nHowever, each business unit must be given the latitude to make\nmodifications to meet its specific needs. If your organization is\nmultinational, it will be necessary to make adjustments for each\nof the various countries. These adjustments will have to be exam-\nined throughout the United States. What might work in Des Moines,\nIowa, may not fly in Berkeley, California. Provide for the ability\nto find and implement alternatives.\nInformation protection is a means to an end and not the end in itself.\nIn business, having an effective information protection program is usually\nsecondary to the need to make a profit. In the public sector, information\nprotection is secondary to the agency’s services provided to its constancy.\nWe, as security professionals, must not lose sight of these goals and objectives.\nComputer systems and the information processed on them are often\nconsidered critical assets that support the mission of an organization.\nProtecting them can be as important as protecting other organizational\nresources such as financial resources, physical assets, and employees. The\ncost and benefits of information protection should be carefully examined\nin both monetary and nonmonetary terms to ensure that the cost of controls\ndoes not exceed the expected benefits. Information protection controls\nshould be appropriate and proportionate.\nThe responsibilities and accountabilities of the information owners,\nproviders, and users of computer services and other parties concerned\nwith the protection of information and computer assets should be explicit.\nIf a system has external users, its owners have a responsibility to share\nappropriate knowledge about the existence and general extent of control\nmeasures so that other users can be confident that the system is adequately\nsecure. As we expand the user base to include suppliers, vendors, clients,\ncustomers, shareholders, and the like, it is incumbent upon the enterprise\nto have clear and identifiable controls. For many organizations, the initial\nsign-on screen is the first indication that there are controls in place. The\nmessage screen should include three basic elements:\n1.\nThe system is for authorized users only\n2.\nThat activities are monitored\n3.\nThat by completing the sign-on process, the user agrees to the\nmonitoring\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 21,
            "text": "1.2 More Than Just Computer Security\nProviding effective information protection requires a comprehensive\napproach that considers a variety of areas both within and outside the\ninformation technology area. An information protection program is more\nthan establishing controls for the computer-held data. In 1965 the idea of\nthe “paperless office” was first introduced. The advent of third-generation\ncomputers brought about this concept. However, today the bulk of all of\nthe information available to employees and others is still found in printed\nform. To be an effective program, information protection must move\nbeyond the narrow scope of IT and address the issues of enterprisewide\ninformation protection. A comprehensive program must touch every stage\nof the information asset life cycle from creation to eventual destruction.\n1.2.1\nEmployee Mind-Set toward Controls\nAccess to information and the environments that process them are\ndynamic. Technology and users, data and information in the systems, risks\nassociated with the system, and security requirements are ever changing.\nThe ability of information protection to support business objectives or the\nmission of the enterprise may be limited by various factors, such as the\ncurrent mind-set toward controls.\nA highly effective method of measuring the current attitude toward\ninformation protection is to conduct a “walk-about.” After hours or on a\nweekend, conduct a review of the workstations throughout a specific area\n(usually a department or a floor) and look for just five basic control activities:\n1.\nOffices secured\n2.\nDesk and cabinets secured\n3.\nWorkstations secured\n4.\nInformation secured\n5.\nDiskettes secured\nWhen conducting an initial “walk-about,” the typical office environment\nwill have a 90 to 95 percent noncompliance rate with at least one of these\nbasic control mechanisms. The result of this review should be used to\nform the basis for an initial risk analysis to determine the security require-\nments for the workstation. When conducting such a review, employee\nprivacy issues must be remembered.\n1.3 Roles and Responsibilities\nAs discussed, senior management has the ultimate responsibility for pro-\ntecting the organization’s information assets. One of these responsibilities\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 22,
            "text": "is the establishment of the function of Corporate Information Officer (CIO).\nThe CIO directs the organization’s day-to-day management of information\nassets. The ISSO and Security Administrator should report directly to the\nCIO and are responsible for the day-to-day administration of the informa-\ntion protection program.\nSupporting roles are performed by the service providers and include\nSystems Operations, whose personnel design and operate the computer\nsystems. They are responsible for implementing technical security on the\nsystems. Telecommunications is responsible for providing communication\nservices, including voice, data, video, and fax.\nThe information protection professional must also establish strong work-\ning relationships with the audit staff. If the only time you see the audit staff\nis when they are in for a formal audit, then you probably do not have a\ngood working relationship. It is vitally important that this liaison be estab-\nlished and that you meet to discuss common problems at least each quarter.\nOther groups include the physical security staff and the contingency\nplanning group. These groups are responsible for establishing and imple-\nmenting controls and can form a peer group to review and discuss controls.\nThe group responsible for application development methodology will\nassist in the implementation of information protection requirements in the\napplication system development life cycle. Quality Assurance can assist\nin ensuring that information protection requirements are included in all\ndevelopment projects prior to movement to production.\nThe Procurement group can work to get the language of the informa-\ntion protection policies included in the purchase agreements for contract\npersonnel. Education and Training can assist in developing and conducting\ninformation protection awareness programs and in training supervisors in\nthe responsibility to monitor employee activities. Human Resources will\nbe the organization responsible for taking appropriate action for any\nviolations of the organization’s information protection policy.\nAn example of a typical job description for an information security\nprofessional is as follows:\n1.3.1\nDirector, Design and Strategy\nLocation: Anywhere, World\nPractice Area: Corporate Global Security Practice\nGrade:\nPurpose: To create an information security design and\nstrategy practice that defines the technology structure\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 23,
            "text": "needed to address the security needs of its clients. The\ninformation security design and strategy will comple-\nment security and network services developed by the\nother Global Practice areas. The design and strategy\npractice will support the clients’ information technology\nand architecture and integrate with each enterprise’s\nbusiness architecture. This security framework will pro-\nvide for the secure operation of computing platforms,\noperating systems, and networks, both voice and data,\nto ensure the integrity of the clients’ information assets.\nTo work on corporate initiatives to develop and imple-\nment the highest quality security services and ensure\nthat industry best practices are followed in their imple-\nmentation.\nWorking Relationships: This position reports in the Global\nSecurity Practice to the Vice President, Global Security.\nInternal contacts are primarily Executive Management,\nPractice Directors, Regional Management, as well as\nmentoring and collaborating with consultants. This posi-\ntion will directly manage two professional positions:\nManager, Service Provider Security Integration; and\nService Provider Security Specialist. Frequent external\ncontacts include building relationships with clients,\nprofessional information security organizations, other\ninformation security consultants; vendors of hardware,\nsoftware, and security services; and various regulatory\nand legal authorities.\nPrinciple Duties and Responsibilities: The responsibilities\nof the Director, Design and Strategy include, but are\nnot limited to, the following:\n\u0001\nDevelop global information security services that will\nprovide the security functionality required to protect\nclients’ information assets against unauthorized disclo-\nsure, modification, and destruction. Particular focus ar-\neas include:\n\u0001\nVirtual private networks\n–\nData privacy\n–\nVirus prevention\n–\nSecure application architecture\n–\nService provider security solutions\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 24,
            "text": "\u0001\nDevelop information security strategy services that can\nadapt to clients’ diverse and changing technological\nneeds.\n\u0001\nWork with Network and Security practice leaders and\nconsultants; create sample architectures that communi-\ncate the security requirements that will meet the needs\nof all client network implementations.\n\u0001\nWork with practice teams to aid them from the concep-\ntion phase to the deployment of the project solution.\nThis includes a quality assurance review to ensure that\nthe details of the project are correctly implemented\naccording to the service delivery methodology.\n\u0001\nWork with the clients to collect their business require-\nments for electronic commerce, while educating them\non the threats, vulnerabilities, and available risk miti-\ngation strategies.\n\u0001\nDetermine where and how you should use cryptogra-\nphy to provide public key infrastructure and secure\nmessaging services for clients.\n\u0001\nParticipate in security industry standards bodies to en-\nsure that strategic information security needs will be\naddressed.\n\u0001\nConduct security focus groups with the clients to cultivate\nan effective exchange of business plans, product devel-\nopment, and marketing direction to aid in creating new\nand innovative service offerings to meet client needs.\n\u0001\nContinually evaluate vendors’ product strategies and\nfuture product statements, and advise which will be\nmost appropriate to pursue for alliances, especially in\nthe areas of:\n–\nVirtual private networks\n–\nData privacy\n–\nVirus prevention\n–\nSecure application architecture\n–\nService provider security solutions\n\u0001\nProvide direction and oversight of hardware- and soft-\nware-based cryptography service development efforts.\nAccountability: Maintain the quality and integrity of the\nservices offered by the Global Security Practice. Review\nand report impartially on the potential viability and prof-\nitability of new security services. Assess the operational\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 25,
            "text": "efficiency, compliance with industry standards, and\neffectiveness of the client network designs and strate-\ngies that are implemented through the company’s pro-\nfessional service offerings. Exercise professional\njudgment in making recommendations that may impact\nbusiness operations.\nKnowledge and Skills:\n\u0001\n10 Percent Managerial and Practice Management:\n–\nAbility to supervise a multidisciplinary team and a small\nstaff; must handle multiple tasks simultaneously; ability to\nteam with other Practice Directors and Managers to develop\nstrategic service offerings\n–\nWillingness to manage or to personally execute necessary\ntasks, as resources are required\n–\nExcellent oral, written, and presentation skills\n\u0001\n40 Percent Technical:\n–\nIn-depth technical knowledge of information processing\nplatforms, operating systems, and networks in a global dis-\ntributed environment\n–\nAbility to identify and apply security techniques to develop\nservices to reduce clients’ risk in such an environment\n–\nTechnical experience in industrial security, computer sys-\ntems architecture, design, and development, physical and\ndata security, telecommunications networks, auditing tech-\nniques, and risk analysis principles\n–\nExcellent visionary skills that focus on scalability, cost effec-\ntiveness, and implementation ease\n\u0001\n20 Percent Business:\n–\nKnowledge of business information flow in a multinational,\nmultiplatform networked environment\n–\nSolid understanding of corporate dynamics and general busi-\nness processes; understanding of multiple industries\n–\nGood planning and goal-setting skills\n\u0001\n20 Percent Interpersonal:\n–\nMust possess strong consulting and communication skills\n–\nMust have the ability to work with all levels of management\nto resolve issues\n–\nMust understand and differentiate between tactical and stra-\ntegic concepts\n–\nMust be able to weigh business needs with security require-\nments\n–\nMust be self-motivating\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 26,
            "text": "Attributes: Must be mature, self-confident, and perfor-\nmance oriented. Will clearly demonstrate an ability to\nlead technological decisions. Will establish credibility\nwith personal dedication, attention to detail, and a\nhands-on approach. Will have a sense of urgency in\nestablishing security designs and strategies to address\nnew technologies to be deployed addressing clients’\nbusiness needs. Will also be capable of developing\nstrong relationships with all levels of management.\nOther important characteristics include the ability to\nfunction independently, holding to the highest levels\nof personal and professional integrity. Will be an excel-\nlent communicator and team player.\nSpecific requirements include:\n\u0001\nBachelor’s degree (Master’s degree desirable)\n\u0001\nAdvanced degree preferred\n\u0001\nFifteen or more years of information technology con-\nsulting or managerial experience, eight of those years\nspent in information security positions\n\u0001\nCISM or CISSP certification preferred (other appropriate\nindustry or technology certifications desirable)\nPotential Career Path Opportunities: Opportunities for\nprogression to a VP position within the company.\n1.4 Common Threats\nInformation processing systems are vulnerable to many threats that can\ninflict various types of damage that can result in significant losses. This\ndamage can range from errors harming database integrity to fires destroy-\ning entire complexes. Losses can stem from the actions of supposedly\ntrusted employees defrauding a system, from outside hackers, or from\ncareless data entry. Precision in estimating information protection-related\nlosses is not possible because many losses are never discovered, and\nothers are hidden to avoid unfavorable publicity.\nThe typical computer criminal is an authorized, nontechnical user of\nthe system who has been around long enough to determine what actions\nwould cause a “red flag” or an audit. The typical computer criminal is an\nemployee. According to a recent survey in “Current and Future Danger:\nA CSI Primer on Computer Crime & Information Warfare,” more than\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 27,
            "text": "80 percent of the respondents identified employees as a threat or potential\nthreat to information security. Also included in this survey were the\ncompetition, contract personnel, public interest groups, suppliers, and\nforeign governments.\nThe chief threat to information protection is still errors and omissions.\nThis concern continues to make up 65 percent of all information protection\nproblems. Users, data entry personnel, system operators, programmers,\nand the like frequently make errors that contribute directly or indirectly\nto this problem.\nDishonest employees make up another 13 percent of information\nprotection problems. Fraud and theft can be committed by insiders and\noutsiders, but it more likely to be done by a company’s own employees.\nIn a related area, disgruntled employees make up another 10 percent of\nthe problem. Employees are most familiar with the organization’s infor-\nmation assets and processing systems, including knowing what actions\nmight cause the most damage, mischief, or sabotage.\nCommon examples of information protection-related employee sabo-\ntage include destroying hardware or facilities, planting malicious code\n(viruses, worms, Trojan horses, etc.) to destroy data or programs, entering\ndata incorrectly, deleting data, altering data, and holding data “hostage.”\nThe loss of the physical facility or the supporting infrastructure (power\nfailures, telecommunications disruptions, water outage and leaks, sewer\nproblems, lack of transportation, fire, flood, civil unrest, strikes, etc.) can\nlead to serious problems and make up 8 percent of information protection-\nrelated problems.\nThe final area comprises malicious hackers or crackers. These terms\nrefer to those who break into computers without authorization or exceed\nthe level of authorization granted to them. While these problems get the\nlargest amount of press coverage and movies, they only account for five\nto eight percent of the total picture. They are real and they can cause a\ngreat deal of damage. But when attempting to allocate limited information\nprotection resources, it may be better to concentrate efforts in other areas.\nTo be certain, conduct a risk analysis to see what the exposure might be.\n1.5 Policies and Procedures\nAn information protection policy is the documentation of enterprisewide\ndecisions on handling and protecting information. In making these deci-\nsions, managers face difficult choices involving resource allocation, com-\npeting objectives, and organization strategy related to protecting both\ntechnical and information resources as well as guiding employee behavior.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 28,
            "text": "When creating an information protection policy, it is best to understand\nthat information is an asset of the enterprise and is the property of the\norganization. As such, information reaches beyond the boundaries of IT\nand is present in all areas of the enterprise. To be effective, an information\nprotection policy must be part of the organization’s asset management\nprogram and be enterprisewide.\nThere are as many forms, styles, and kinds of policy as there are\norganizations, businesses, agencies, and universities. In addition to the\nvarious forms, each organization has a specific culture or mental model\non what and how a policy is to look and who should approve the\ndocument. The key point here is that every organization needs an infor-\nmation protection policy. According to the 2000 CSI report on Computer\nCrime, 65 percent of respondents to its survey admitted that they do not\nhave a written policy. The beginning of an information protection program\nis the implementation of a policy. The program policy creates the organi-\nzation’s attitude toward information and announces internally and externally\nthat information is an asset and the property of the organization and is\nto be protected from unauthorized access, modification disclosure, and\ndestruction.\nThis book leads the policy writer through the key structure elements\nand then reviews some typical policy contents. Because policies are not\nenough, this book teaches the reader how to develop standards, proce-\ndures, and guidelines. Each section provides advice on the structural\nmechanics of the various documents, as well as actual examples.\n1.6 Risk Management\nRisk is the possibility of something adverse happening. The process of\nrisk management is to identify those risks, assess the likelihood of their\noccurrence, and then taking steps to reduce the risk to an acceptable\nlevel. All risk analysis processes use the same methodology. Determine\nthe asset to be reviewed. Identify the risk, issues, threats, or vulnerabilities.\nAssess the probability of the risk occurring and the impact to the asset\nor the organization should the risk be realized. Then identify controls that\nwould bring the impact to an acceptable level.\nThe book entitled Information Security Risk Analysis (CRC Press, 2001)\ndiscusses effective risk analysis methodologies. It takes the reader through\nthe theory of risk analysis:\n1.\nIdentify the asset.\n2.\nIdentify the risks.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 29,
            "text": "3.\nPrioritize the risks.\n4.\nIdentify controls and safeguards.\nThe book will help the reader understand qualitative risk analysis; it\nthen gives examples of this process. To make certain that the reader gets\na well-rounded exposure to risk analysis, the book presents eight different\nmethods, concluding with the Facilitated Risk Analysis Process (FRAP).\nThe primary function of information protection risk management is the\nidentification of appropriate controls. In every assessment of risk, there\nwill be many areas for which it will not be obvious what kinds of controls\nare appropriate. The goal of controls is not to have 100 percent security;\ntotal security would mean zero productivity. Controls must never lose\nsight of the business objectives or mission of the enterprise. Whenever\nthere is a contest for supremacy, controls lose and productivity wins. This\nis not a contest, however. The goal of information protection is to provide\na safe and secure environment for management to meet its duty of care.\nWhen selecting controls, one must consider many factors, including\nthe organization’s information protection policy. These include the legis-\nlation and regulations that govern your enterprise along with safety,\nreliability, and quality requirements. Remember that every control will\nrequire some performance requirements. These performance requirements\nmay be a reduction in user response time; additional requirements before\napplications are moved into production or additional costs.\nWhen considering controls, the initial implementation cost is only the\ntip of the “cost iceberg.” The long-term cost for maintenance and moni-\ntoring must be identified. Be sure to examine any and all technical\nrequirements and cultural constraints. If your organization is multinational,\ncontrol measures that work and are accepted in your home country might\nnot be accepted in other countries.\nAccept residual risk; at some point, management will need to decide\nif the operation of a specific process or system is acceptable, given the\nrisk. There can be any number of reasons that a risk must be accepted;\nthese include but are not limited to the following:\n\u0001\nThe type of risk may be different from previous risks.\n\u0001\nThe risk may be technical and difficult for a layperson to grasp.\n\u0001\nThe current environment may make it difficult to identify the risk.\nInformation protection professionals sometimes forget that the manag-\ners hired by our organizations have the responsibility to make decisions.\nThe job of the ISSO is to help information asset owners identify risks to\nthe assets. Assist them in identifying possible controls and then allow\nthem to determine their action plan. Sometimes they will choose to accept\nthe risk, and this is perfectly permissible.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 30,
            "text": "1.7 Typical Information Protection Program\nOver the years, the computer security group responsible for access control\nand disaster recovery planning has evolved into the enterprisewide infor-\nmation protection group. This group’s ever-expanding roles and respon-\nsibilities include:\n\u0001\nFirewall control\n\u0001\nRisk analysis\n\u0001\nBusiness Impact Analysis (BIA)\n\u0001\nVirus control and virus response team\n\u0001\nComputer Emergency Response Team (CERT)\n\u0001\nComputer crime investigation\n\u0001\nRecords management\n\u0001\nEncryption\n\u0001\nE-mail, voice-mail, Internet, video-mail policy\n\u0001\nEnterprisewide information protection program\n\u0001\nIndustrial espionage controls\n\u0001\nContract personnel nondisclosure agreements\n\u0001\nLegal issues\n\u0001\nInternet monitoring\n\u0001\nDisaster planning\n\u0001\nBusiness continuity planning\n\u0001\nDigital signature\n\u0001\nSecure single sign-on\n\u0001\nInformation classification\n\u0001\nLocal area networks\n\u0001\nModem control\n\u0001\nRemote access\n\u0001\nSecurity awareness programs\nIn addition to these elements, the security professional now has to ensure\nthat standards, both in the United States and worldwide, are examined\nand acted upon where appropriate. This book discusses these new stan-\ndards in detail.\n1.8 Summary\nThe role of the information protection professional has changed over the\npast 25 years and will change again and again. Implementing controls to\nbe in compliance with audit requirements is not the way in which a\nprogram such as this can be run. There are limited resources available\nfor controls. To be effective, the information owners and users must accept\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 31,
            "text": "the controls. To meet this end, it will be necessary for the information\nprotection professionals to establish partnerships with their constituencies.\nWork with your owners and users to find the appropriate level of controls.\nUnderstand the needs of the business or the mission of your organization.\nAnd make certain that information protection supports those goals and\nobjectives.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 32,
            "text": "Chapter 2\nThreats to Information \nSecurity\n2.1 What Is Information Security?\nInformation security is such a wide-ranging topic that it can be rather\ndifficult to define precisely what it is. So when it came time for me to try\nto define it for the introduction of this chapter, I was stuck for a long\nperiod of time. Following the recommendation of my wife, I went to the\nbest place to find definitions for anything — the dictionary. I pulled up\nthe Merriam-Webster dictionary online and came up with these entries:\nMain Entry: in⋅for⋅ma⋅tion\nPronunciation: “in′f r ma– ′sh n\nFunction: noun\n1: the communication or reception of knowledge or intel-\nligence\n2 a (1): knowledge obtained from investigation, study, or\ninstruction\n(2): INTELLIGENCE, NEWS\n(3): FACTS, DATA b : the attribute inherent in and\ncommunicated by one of two or more alternative\nsequences or arrangements of something (as\nnucleotides in DNA or binary digits in a computer\ne\ne\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 33,
            "text": "program) that produce specific effects c (1) : a\nsignal or character (as in a communication system\nor computer) representing data (2) : something\n(as a message, experimental data, or a picture)\nwhich justifies change in a construct (as a plan\nor theory) that represents physical or mental\nexperience or another construct d : a quantitative\nmeasure of the content of information; specifi-\ncally : a numerical quantity that measures the\nuncertainty in the outcome of an experiment to\nbe performed\n3: the act of informing against a person\n4: a formal accusation of a crime made by a prosecuting\nofficer as distinguished from an indictment presented\nby a grand jury\n—in′for⋅ma′tion⋅al, adjective\n—in′for⋅ma′tion⋅al⋅ly, adverb\nAnd for security, my result was this:\nMain Entry: se⋅cu⋅ri⋅ty\nPronunciation: sikyur′i t e\n–  \nFunction: noun\nInflected Form(s): plural -ties\n1: the quality or state of being secure: as a : freedom\nfrom danger : SAFETY b: freedom from fear or anxiety\nc: freedom from the prospect of being laid off <job\nsecurity>\n2a: something given, deposited, or pledged to make\ncertain the fulfillment of an obligation b: SURETY\n3: an evidence of debt or of ownership (as a stock\ncertificate or bond)\n4a: something that secures: PROTECTION b (1): mea-\nsures taken to guard against espionage or sabotage,\ncrime, attack, or escape (2): an organization or depart-\nment whose task is security\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 34,
            "text": "So even after looking up information security in this dictionary, I still\ndid not have a good way to describe and explain what information security\nwas. Considering that I have worked in information security for almost\nnine years now, it was a little unsettling to not be able to define, at the most\nbasic level, what I really did. The greatest difficulty in defining information\nsecurity is, to me, because it is a little bit like trying to define infinity. It\njust seems far too vast for me to easily comprehend. Currently, information\nsecurity can cover everything from developing the written policies that\nan organization will follow to secure its information, to the implementation\nof a user’s access to a new file on the organization’s server. With such a\nwide range of potential elements, it often leaves those in information\nsecurity feeling as if they are a bit of the “Jack of all trades — and master\nof none.” To give you a better feeling of the true breadth of information\nsecurity, we will cover some of the more common aspects of information\nsecurity in brief. All of the facets that we cover in the next few paragraphs\nare discussed in more detail throughout the remainder of the book.\nThe first and probably most important aspect of information security\nis the security policy (see Figure 2.1). If information security were a person,\nthe security policy would be the central nervous system. Policies become\nthe core of information security that provides a structure and purpose for\nall other aspects of information security. To those of you who may be a\nbit more technical, this may come as a surprise. In the documentation for\nFIGURE 2.1\nSecurity Wheel\nSecurity \nPolicy\nSecure\nTest\nImprove\nMonitor\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 35,
            "text": "their Cisco PIX® product, the folks at Cisco® even refer to the security\npolicy as the center of security. RFC 2196 “Site Security Handbook” defines\na security policy as “a formal statement of the rules by which people who\nare given access to an organization’s technology and information assets\nmust abide.” Because of the central nature of security policies, you cannot\ndiscuss information security without mentioning security policies.\nAnother aspect of information security is organizational security. Orga-\nnizational security takes the written security policy and develops the\nframework for implementing the policy throughout the organization. This\nwould include tasks such as getting support from senior management,\ncreating an information security awareness program, reporting to an\ninformation steering committee, and advising the business units of their\nrole in the overall security process. The role of information security is still\nso large that there are many other aspects beyond just the organizational\nsecurity and security policy.\nYet another aspect of information security is asset classification. Asset\nclassification takes all the resources of an organization and breaks them\ninto groups. This allows for an organization to apply differing levels of\nsecurity to each of the groups, as opposed to security settings for each\nindividual resource. This process can make security administration easier\nafter it has been implemented, but the implementation can be rather\ndifficult. However, there is still more to information security.\nAnother phase of information security is personnel security. This can\nbe both fun and taxing at the same time. Personnel security, like physical\nsecurity, can often be a responsibility of another person and not the sole\nresponsibility of the information security manager. In small organizations,\nif the word “security” is in your job description, you may be responsible\nfor everything. Personnel security deals with the people who will work\nin your organization. Some of the tasks that are necessary for personnel\nsecurity are creating job descriptions, performing background checks,\nhelping in the recruitment process, and user training.\nAs mentioned in the previous paragraph, physical security is a com-\nponent of information security that is often the responsibility of a separate\nperson from the other facets of information security. Even if physical\nsecurity is some other person’s responsibility, the information security\nprofessional must be familiar with how physical security can impact\ninformation security as a whole. Many times when an organization is\nthinking of stopping a break-in, the initial thought is to stop people from\ncoming in over the Internet — when in fact it would be easier to walk\ninto the building and plug into the network jack in the reception area.\nFor years I have heard one particular story, which I have never been able\nto verify, that illustrates this example very well.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 36,
            "text": "Supposedly, the CEO of a large company stands up in the general\nsession of a hacker conference and announces, “This is a waste of time.\nMy organization is so secure that if anyone here can break into our\ncomputers, I’ll eat my hat.”\nSomeone in the audience decides that the CEO needs to learn a lesson.\nThe attacker decides to break into the organization, not by using the\nInternet or their telecommunication connection, but instead decides to\ntake a physical approach to the attack. The attacker walks in the front\ndoor of the organization, walks to the second floor server room and\nproceeds to enter. Supposedly, the server room was having HVAC prob-\nlems, so the door had to be propped open to allow the excess heat out.\nThe attacker walks through the rows of devices in the server room and\nwalks up to each of the cabinets and reads the electronically generated\nlabel on each device. When he finds the rack with the device marked\n“Firewall,” he realizes he has found what he was seeking. The attacker\nthen proceeded to turn off the firewall, disconnect the cables, and remove\nthe firewall from the rack. The attacker followed this by hoisting the\nfirewall up onto his shoulder and walking into the CEO’s office.\nWhen the attacker entered the CEO’s office, he had only one thing to\nsay. He asked, “What kind of sauce would you like with your hat?”\nPhysical security is much like information security in that it can be\nimmense in its own right. Physical security can encompass everything\nfrom closed-circuit television to security lighting and fencing, to badge\naccess and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC). One area of\nphysical security that is often the responsibility of the information security\nmanager is backup power. The use of uninterruptible power supplies\n(UPS) are usually recommended even if your organization has other power\nbackup facilities such as a diesel generator.\nHowever, there is still more to information security. Another area of\ninformation security is communication and operations management. This\narea can often be overlooked in smaller organizations because it is often\nmistakenly considered “overhead.” Communication and operations man-\nagement encompass such tasks as ensuring that no one person in an\norganization has the ability to commit and cover up a crime, making sure\nthat development systems are kept separate from production systems, and\nmaking sure that systems that are being disposed of are being disposed\nin a secure manner. While it is easy to overlook some of these tasks,\ndoing so can create large security holes in an organization.\nAccess control is another core component of information security.\nFollowing the analogy used previously, if information security is the central\nnervous system of information security, access control would be the skin.\nAccess control is responsible for allowing only authorized users to have\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 37,
            "text": "access to your organization’s systems and also for limiting what access an\nauthorized user does have. Access control can be implemented in many\ndifferent parts of information systems. Some common places for access\ncontrol include:\n\u0001\nRouters\n\u0001\nFirewalls\n\u0001\nDesktop operating system\n\u0001\nFile server\n\u0001\nApplications\nSome organizations create something often referred to as a “candyland.”\nA “candyland” is where the organization has moved the access to just one\nor two key points, usually on the perimeter. This is called a “candyland”\nbecause the organization has a tough crunchy exterior, followed by a soft\ngooey center. In any organization, you want access control to be in as\nmany locations as your organization’s support staff can adequately manage.\nIn addition to the previously mentioned components of information\nsecurity, system development and maintenance is another component that\nmust be considered. In many of the organizations that I have worked for,\nwe never followed either of these principles. One area of system devel-\nopment and maintenance has been getting a lot of attention lately. Patch\nmanagement would be a task from the maintenance part of system\ndevelopment and maintenance. This is a task that has many information\nsecurity professionals referring to themselves as “patch managers.” With\nsuch a large number of software updates coming out so frequently for\nevery device on the network, it can be difficult — if not impossible —\nfor support staff to keep everything up-to-date. And all it takes is one\nmissed patch on any Internet-facing system to provide attackers a potential\nentry point into your organization. In addition to keeping systems up-to-\ndate with patches, system development is another area that should be\nsecurity-minded. When a custom application is written for your organiza-\ntion, each component or module of the application must be checked for\nsecurity holes and proper coding practices. This is often done quickly or\nnot at all, and can often lead to large exposure points for the attacker.\nIn addition to keeping our systems secure from attackers, we also need\nto keep our systems running in the event of a disaster — natural or\notherwise. This becomes another facet of information security, and is often\ncalled business continuity planning. Every information security profes-\nsional should have some idea of business continuity planning. Consider\nwhat you would do if the hard drive in your primary computer died. Do\nyou have a plan for restoring all your critical files?\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 38,
            "text": "If you are like me, you probably never plan for a hard drive failure\nuntil after the first one happens. For me, it actually took many failed hard\ndrives before I became more diligent in performing home backups of my\ncritical files. In a large organization, just having an idea what you would\ndo in the event of a disaster is not enough. A formal plan must be written,\ntested, and revised regularly. This will ensure that when something much\nworse than a hard drive dying happens to your organization, everyone\nwill know exactly what to do.\nThe last aspect of information security discussed here is compliance.\nNow you may be thinking that compliance is someone else’s job. And\nyou might be telling the truth; but if we go back to our analogy that if\ninformation security were a person with security policy being the back-\nbone and access control being the skin, then compliance would be the\nimmune system. I know that might be a rather odd comparison, but\ncompliance is a component of information security and I like to think of\nthe compliance folks like a partner to the security folks. Many information\nsecurity professionals spend some time reviewing and testing an informa-\ntion system for completeness and adequacy, and that is compliance.\nSo maybe now you see why information security is so difficult to\ndefine — it is just huge! With all the phases from policy to telecommu-\nnications, there is a lot to it. All the phases are equally important, because\nwhen it comes to threats to an organization, a breakdown in any of the\nphases of information security can present a gaping hole to the attacker.\nThis is why the information security professional must have an under-\nstanding of all the aspects of information security.\n2.2 Common Threats\nFrom the hacker sitting up until all hours of the night finding ways to\nsteal the company’s secrets, to the dedicated employee who accidentally\nhits the delete key, there are many foes to information security. Due to\nthe many different types of threats, it is a very difficult to try to establish\nand maintain information security. Our attacks come from many different\nsources, so it is much like trying to fight a war on multiple fronts. Our\ngood policies can help fight the internal threats and our firewall and\nintrusion detection system can help fight the external threats. However,\na failure of one component can lead to an overall failure to keep our\ninformation secure. This means that even if we have well secured our\ninformation from external threats, our end users can still create information\nsecurity breaches. Recent statistics show that the majority of successful\ncompromises are still coming from insiders. In fact, the Computer Security\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 39,
            "text": "Institute (CSI) in San Francisco estimates that between 60 and 80 percent\nof network misuse comes from inside the enterprise.\nIn addition to the multiple sources of information security attacks, there\nare also many types of information security attacks. In Figure 2.2, a well-\nknown model helps illustrate this point. The information security triad\nshows the three primary goals of information security: integrity, confiden-\ntiality, and availability. When these three tenets are put together, our\ninformation will be well protected.\nThe first tenet of the information security triad is integrity. Integrity is\ndefined by ISO-17799 as “the action of safeguarding the accuracy and\ncompleteness of information and processing methods.” This can be inter-\npreted to mean that when a user requests any type of information from\nthe system, the information will be correct. A great example of a lack of\ninformation integrity is commonly seen in large home improvement ware-\nhouses. One day, I ventured to the local home improvement mega-mart\nlooking for a hose to fix my sprinkler system. I spent quite some time looking\nfor the hose before I happened upon a salesperson. Once I had the\nsalesperson’s attention, I asked about the location and availability of the\nhoses for which I was looking. The salesperson went to his trusty computer\nterminal and pulled up information about the hose I needed. The sales-\nperson then let me know that I was in luck and they had 87 of the\nparticular type of hose I needed in stock. So I inquired as to where these\nhoses could be found in the store and was told that just because the\ncomputer listed 87 in the store, this did not mean that there really were\nany of the hoses. While this example really just ruined my Sunday, the\nintegrity of information can have much more serious implications. Take\nyour credit rating; it is just information that is stored by the credit reporting\nagencies. If this information is inaccurate, or does not have integrity, it\ncan stop you from getting a new home, a car, or a job. The integrity of\nthis type of information is incredibly important, but is just as susceptible\nto integrity errors as any other type of electronic information.\nFIGURE 2.2\nCIA Triad\nAvailability\nIntegrity\nConfidentiality\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 40,
            "text": "The second tenet of the information security triad is confidentiality.\nConfidentiality is defined by ISO-17799 as “ensuring that information is\naccessible only to those authorized to have access to it.” This can be one\nof the most difficult tasks to ever undertake. To attain confidentiality, you\nhave to keep secret information secret. It seems easy enough, but remember\nthe discussion on threat sources above. People from both inside and outside\nyour organization will be threatening to reveal your secret information.\nThe last tenet of the information security triad is availability. Once\nagain, ISO-17799 defines availability as ensuring that authorized users have\naccess to information and associated assets when required. This means\nthat when a user needs a file or system, the file or system is there to be\naccessed. This seems simple enough, but there are so many factors working\nagainst your system availability. You have hardware failures, natural disas-\nters, malicious users, and outside attackers all fighting to remove the\navailability from your systems. Some common mechanisms to fight against\nthis downtime include fault-tolerant systems, load balancing, and system\nfailover.\nFault-tolerant systems incorporate technology that allows the system\nto stay available even when a hardware fault has occurred. One of the\nmost common examples of this is RAID. According to the folks over at\nlinux.org, the acronym RAID means redundant array of inexpensive disks.\nI have heard much debate as to what those letters actually stand for, but\nfor our purposes, let us just use that definition. RAID allows the system\nto maintain the data on the system even in the event of a hard drive\ncrash. Some of the simplest mechanisms to accomplish this include disk\nmirroring and disk duplexing. With disk mirroring, the system would have\ntwo hard drives attached to the same interface or controller. All data would\nbe written to both drives simultaneously. With disk duplexing, the two\nhard drives are attached to two different controllers. Duplexing allows for\none of the controllers to fail without the system losing any availability of\nthe data. However, the RAID configuration can get significantly more\ncomplex than disk mirroring or disk duplexing. One of the more common\nadvanced RAID solutions is RAID level 5. With level 5, RAID data is striped\nacross a series of disks, usually three or more, so that when any one drive\nis lost, no information is destroyed. The disadvantage with using any of\nthe systems mentioned above is that you lose some of the storage space\nfrom the devices. For example, a RAID 5 system with five 80-gigabyte\nhard drives would only have 320 gigabytes of actual storage. For more\ninformation on RAID, see Table 2.1.\nThe technologies just mentioned provide system tolerance but do not\nprovide improved performance under heavy utilization conditions. To\nimprove system performance with heavy utilization, we need load bal-\nancing. Load balancing allows the information requests to be spread across\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 41,
            "text": "a large number of servers or other devices. Usually a front-end component\nis necessary to direct requests to all of the back-end servers. This also\nprovides tolerance, due to the fact that the front-end processor can just\nredirect the requests to the remaining servers or devices.\nA technology that would lie between load balancing and RAID in terms\nof most availability would be system failover. With a failover environment,\nwhen the primary processing device has a hardware failure, a secondary\ndevice begins processing. This is a common technology to use with\nfirewalls. In most organizations, to avoid having the firewall be a single\npoint of failure on the network, the organization implements two firewalls\nTABLE 2.1\nRAID Chart\nRAID Level\nActivity\nName\n0\nData striped over several drives. No \nredundancy or parity is involved. If one \nvolume fails, the entire volume is unusable. \nIt is used for performance only.\nStriping\n1\nMirroring of drives. Data is written to two \ndrives at once. If one drive fails, the other \ndrive has the exact same data available.\nMirroring\n2\nData striping over all drives at the bit level. \nParity data is created with a hamming code, \nwhich identifies any errors. This level \nspecifies the use of up to 39 disks: 32 for \nstorage and 7 for error recovery data. This \nis not used in production today.\nHamming code \nparity\n3\nData striping over all drives and parity data \nheld on one drive. If a drive fails, it can be \nreconstructed from parity drive.\nByte-level parity\n4\nSame as level 3, except data is striped at the \nblock level instead of the byte level.\nBlock-level parity\n5\nData is written in disk sector units to all \ndrives. Parity is written to all drives also, \nwhich ensures that there is not a single \npoint of failure.\nInterleave parity\n6\nSimilar to level 5 but with added fault \ntolerance, which is a second set of parity \ndata written to all drives.\nSecond parity \ndata (or double \nparity)\n10\nData is simultaneously mirrored and striped \nacross several drives and can support \nmultiple drive failures.\nStriping and \nmirroring\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 42,
            "text": "that communicate with each other. In the event that the primary firewall\ncannot communicate with the secondary firewall, the secondary firewall takes\nover and begins processing the data.\nAs discussed, the job of the information security manager is difficult.\nThere are many tasks that must be done to adequately protect the resources\nof an organization, and one slip along any of them can lead to a system\nbreach. This is why the task of defending information systems is rather\ndifficult. In the next section we look at other ways that your systems can\nbe attacked.\n2.2.1\nErrors and Omissions\nWhile error and omissions do not get the headlines of international hackers\nand the latest work propagating through the e-mail system, it is still the\nnumber-one threat to our systems. Because we cannot deny access to all\nof the user community, it becomes difficult to protect our systems from\nthe people who need to use it day in and day out. Errors and omissions\nattack the integrity component of the CIA triad. To help fight these mistakes,\nwe can use some of the following security concepts.\nThe first security concept that will help fight error and omissions is\n“least privilege.” If we give our users only the most minimal set of\npermissions they need to perform their job functions, then we reduce the\namount of information that can be accidentally contaminated. Using least\nprivilege can create additional overhead on the support staff members\nwho are tasked with applying the access controls to the user community.\nHowever, it will be worth the additional changes to keep the integrity of\nour information systems.\nAnother principle that can help is performing adequate and frequent\nbackups of the information on the systems. When the user causes loss of\nthe integrity of the information resident on the system, it may be easiest\nto restore the information from a tape backup made the night before.\nTape backups are one of the essential tools of the information security\nmanager and can often be the only recourse against a successful attack.\n2.2.2\nFraud and Theft\nIf your end users are not accidentally destroying data but are maliciously\ndestroying the information, then you may have a completely different type\nof attack. For most employees it is difficult to imagine a fellow employee\ncoming into work every day under a ruse, but it does happen. As previously\nstated, employees are responsible for more successful intrusions than\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 43,
            "text": "outsiders. It becomes very difficult to find the source of internal attacks\nwithout alerting the attacker that you suspect him of wrong-doing. The\nbest line of defense against fraud and theft by your internal employees\nis to have well-defined policies. Policies can make it easier for the\ninformation security manager to collect data on the suspected wrong-doer\nto prove what bad acts the employee has performed.\nIf you have well-defined policies in your organization, the information\nsecurity manager can use forensic techniques to gather evidence that will\nhelp provide proof of who performed the attack. While the entire breadth\nof forensics is beyond the scope of this book, we do spend a little time\nhere discussing forensics from a high level.\nComputer forensics allows a trained person to recover evidence from\ncomputer systems. The first rule of computer forensics is: “do no harm.”\nThis means that if you are not sure what to do, do not do anything to\nthe system. The first goal of computer forensics is to leave the system in\nas pristine condition as possible. This may run counter-intuitive to the\ntechnology professional whose instincts want to look at the system to\ndetermine exactly what is going on and how it happened. Every time the\ntechnical professional moves the mouse or touches the keyboard to enter\na command, the system is changing. This makes the evidence gathered\nfrom the system more suspect. After all, how would one determine what\nwas done by the suspected employee and what was done by the profes-\nsional investigating the activity?\nThere are many places that evidence of the activity may be left.\nFirewalls, server logs, and the client workstation are all places that should\nbe investigated to determine if any evidence remains. When it comes to\nthe client workstation, the first step in computer forensics is very non-\ntechnical. In this first step the security or support staff should be contacted\nto see what details they know about the system. One of the biggest\npotential problems would be if the client is using a hard drive encryption\nutility. The reason for this is that the second step is to “pull the plug.” If\nyou pull the plug on a system that has an encrypted hard drive, you may\nnever be able to determine what information is on that system. We talk\nmore about encryption in a later chapter of this book.\nAssuming that you are able to confirm that there is no hard drive\nencryption on the suspect system, the next step is as mentioned above —\npull the plug. Now, if the system is a laptop, pulling the plug will not\nshut down the system; it will just run off of a battery. In the case of the\nlaptop, you need to pull the plug and remove the battery as well. In any\ncase, once the system is powered off, the hard drive in the system should\nbe turned over to a qualified professional. Please note that there are\nactually many more steps in the forensic process that are just beyond on\nthe scope of this book.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 44,
            "text": "Once the qualified professional has the suspect system, or at least the\nhard drive, he or she will then make a bit-stream backup of the hard\ndrive. A bit-stream backup is different from a regular tape backup in that\nit makes an exact copy of the hard drive. A bit-stream backup does not\njust copy the files and the file system; it copies everything. The blank\nspace, the slack space, file fragments, and everything else get copied to\na second hard drive. The reason for this is that all the data recovery\nprocesses will be done on the second hard drive, leaving the original\nhard drive in its pristine state and it will not be modified. All data recovery\nprocesses performed on the system will also be performed on the backup\ncopy of the hard drive.\nOnce the copy is made, a comparison of the hard drives will be done\nusing an integrity technology called an MD5 hash (see Figure 2.3). The\ndefinition of an MD5 hash, as taken from the MD5 Web page, is as follows:\n[The MD5 algorithm] takes as input a message of arbitrary length\nand produces as output a 128-bit “fingerprint” or “message\ndigest” of the input. It is conjectured that it is computationally\ninfeasible to produce two messages having the same message\ndigest, or to produce any message having a given prespecified\ntarget message digest.\nIn essence, MD5 is a way to verify data integrity, and is much\nmore reliable than checksum and many other commonly used\nmethods.\nOnce the MD5 hashes are made from each hard drive, the correspond-\ning values can then be compared. If these values are the same, then the\ntwo drives are identical; if the MD5 values are different, then the bit-\nstream backup failed and the drives are different. MD5 hashes are quite\ncommonly used to verify the integrity of a file. The values can be used\nto ensure that a file was not modified during download and can also be\nused as a component of a digital signature.\nAfter the hard drives have been compared and found to be identical,\nthe forensic professional would then begin looking at the hard drive for\nevidence that the attack was launched from that machine. The forensics\nprofessional will try to recover deleted files, will look for file fragments\nin slack space, and will also look through the data files on the suspect\nsystem to see if any evidence is present. If any evidence is found on the\nsystem, the forensic professional will document the evidence and turn it\ninto a final written report.\nBecause we have been looking at the damage that internal employees\ncan carry out against our information systems, let us look at the other\ncommunity that can also cause destruction to our data — the outsiders.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 45,
            "text": "FIGURE 2.3\nWeb Site with MD5 Values\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 46,
            "text": "2.2.3\nMalicious Hackers\nThere are several groups of Internet users out there that will attack\ninformation systems. The three primary groups are hackers, crackers, and\nphreaks. While common nomenclature is to call all three of the groups\n“hackers,” there are some differences between the groups. A hacker is a\nuser who penetrates a system just to look around and see what is possible.\nThe etiquette of hackers is that after they have penetrated the system,\nthey will notify the system administrator to let the administrator know\nthat the system has a vulnerability. It is often said that a hacker just wants\nsecurity to be improved on all Internet systems. The next group, the\ncrackers, are the group to really fear. A cracker has no etiquette on\nbreaking into a system. Crackers will damage or destroy data if they are\nable to penetrate a system. The goal of crackers is to cause as much\ndamage as possible to all systems on the Internet. The last group, phreaks,\ntries to break into an organization’s phone system. The phreaks can then\nuse the free phone access to disguise the phone number from which they\nare calling, and also stick your organization with the bill for long-distance\nphone charges.\nThe ways a hacker will attack a system can vary tremendously. Each\nattacker has his own bag of tricks that can be used to break into a system.\nThere are several books on just the subject of hacking currently available,\nbut we will cover the basic hacker methodology briefly here.\nThe basic hacker methodology has five main components: reconnais-\nsance, scanning, gaining access, maintaining access, and covering tracks.\nIt might seem odd to think of a methodology for hackers; but as with\nanything else, time matters. So to maximize time, most hackers follow a\nsimilar methodology.\nThe first phase in the methodology is the reconnaissance phase. In this\nphase, the attacker tries to gain as much information as possible about the\ntarget network. There are two primary ways an attacker can do this: active\nand passive. Most attackers would generally begin with passive attacks.\nThese passive attacks can often generate a lot of good information about\nthe network or organization the hacker wants to attack. The hacker would\noften begin by reading through the target organization’s Web site to see\nif any information can be gained. The attacker would look for contact\ninformation for key employees (this can be used for social engineering),\ninformation on the types of technology used at the organization, and any\nother nugget of information that could be used in an attack. After the\nattacker has gone through the Web site, he would probably move to\nInternet search engines to find more information about the network he\nwishes to attack. He would be looking for bad newsgroup postings, posts\nat sites for people who are upset with the company, and any other details\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 47,
            "text": "that could help in the attack. The attacker would then look for information\nin the DNS servers for the attack organization. This would provide a list\nof server and corresponding IP addresses. Once this is done, the hacker\nwould move to active attacking.\nTo perform an active reconnaissance attack, a hacker would perform\nping sweeps, SNMP network scans, banner grabbing, and other similar\nattacks. The attacks would help the attacker weed out the number of\ndead IP addresses and find the live hosts to move on to the next phase —\nscanning.\nAn attacker would begin scanning, looking for holes to compromise\nto gain access to the network. The attacker would scan all servers that\nare available on the Internet, looking for known vulnerabilities. These\nvulnerabilities could be in a poorly written Web-enabled application or\nfrom applications that have known security vulnerabilities in them. The\nattacker would also look at the organization’s firewall and routers to see\nif vulnerabilities exist there as well. Once an attacker has compiled a list\nof vulnerabilities, he would then move on to the next stage — gaining\naccess.\nThere are many ways for an attacker to gain access to the target\nnetwork. Some of the more common entry points into the network are\nthrough the target server’s OS (operating system), through an application\nthat was developed in-house, as well as through an application with\nknown vulnerabilities, through the network devices that can be seen from\nthe Internet, and if all else fails the attacker will perform a denial-of-\nservice attack. Once the attacker has access, all he wants to do is make\nsure that he can keep it.\nTo maintain access, an attacker would commonly upload a custom\napplication onto the compromised server. This application would then be\na back door into the target organization, and would allow the attacker to\ncome and go at will. In addition to uploading new programs, an attacker\ncan alter existing programs on the system. The advantage of doing this\nis that a well-informed administrator may know the files on his system\nand he might recognize that new files have been installed on his servers.\nBy modifying already-existing files, the system would appear to be unmod-\nified at first glance. A common way of doing this is with a group of files\ncalled a rootkit. A rootkit allows an attacker to replace normal system\nfiles with files of the same name that also have Trojan horse functionality.\nThe new system files would allow the attacker in just as if he added\nadditional files to the target server. An attacker may not need long access\nto the system and he might just wish to download the existing programs\nor data off the target server. Once an attacker has determined his mech-\nanism for getting back into the server, the last step in the hacker meth-\nodology is to cover his tracks.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 48,
            "text": "To cover his tracks, an attacker would go through the system audit\nlog files and remove any trace of the attacker on the system. This would\nhide his access from the system administrator and would also leave less\nevidence behind in case the system administrator wishes to have a\nforensics examination performed on the compromised host. The level of\nskill of an attacker is often apparent in this phase. A crude attacker might\ndelete an entire log file, thus making it easy for the system administrator\nto determine that someone has been in the system; but a more skillful\nattacker might just modify his log entries to show that the traffic was\noriginating from a different IP address.\n2.2.4\nMalicious Code\nWhile malicious users can attack your system, programs released by the\nsame group of people will often be more successful in reaching the\nprotected parts of your organization. Malicious code is defined as any\ncode that is designed to make a system perform any operation with the\nknowledge of the system owner. One of the fastest ways to introduce\nmalicious code into a target organization’s protected network is by sending\nthe malicious code via e-mail.\nThere are many different types of malicious code. This chapter dis-\ncusses a few of the more common ones, including virus, worm, Trojan\nhorse, and logic bomb. The most commonly thought of type of malicious\ncode is the virus. A virus is a code fragment, or a piece of code, that can\nbe injected into target files. A virus then waits, usually until the file is\nopened or accessed, to spread to another file where the malicious code\nis then injected into that file. With a virus-infected system, one can often\nfind in excess of 30,000 infected files. There are many different types of\nviruses; there are viruses that attack the boot sector of the hard drive,\nthere are file system infectors, there are macro viruses that use the Office\nscripting functionality, and there are viruses for all major operating systems.\nAnother type of malicious code is the worm. A worm is typically a\ncomplete file that infects in one place on a given system and then tries\nto replicate to other vulnerable systems on the network or Internet. A\nnumber of the highly publicized attacks have been worms. Nimda is one\nexample of a recent, highly publicized attack that was a worm.\nTrojan horses are a different type of malicious code and can be quite\ndeceiving to the end user. A Trojan horse appears to have a legitimate\nfunction on the surface, but also has malicious code underneath. There\nare a number of freeware programs on the Internet that allow an attacker\nto insert malicious code into most of the common executables. The only\nway to help stop the Trojan horses is to educate the end user to not open\nfile attachments unless they know exactly what the attachment will do.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 49,
            "text": "The final type of malicious code discussed here is the logic bomb.\n“Logic bomb” is a generic term for any type of malicious code that is\nwaiting for a trigger event to release the payload. This means that the\ncode could be waiting for a period of time (e.g., one month) before it\nexecutes. A well-known example of a logic bomb was the Michelangelo\nattack. This logic bomb was waiting for Michelangelo’s birthday before it\nwould trigger the malicious code.\n2.2.5\nDenial-of-Service Attacks\nAs an attacker if you cannot get access to the target network, often the\nbest thing that you can do is make sure that no one gets access to the\nnetwork. Enter the denial-of-service attack. The denial-of-service or DoS\nattack is designed to either overwhelm the target server’s hardware\nresources or overwhelm the target network’s telecommunication lines. For\nyears there were a number of common “one-to-one” DoS attacks. In these\nattacks, the hacker would launch an attack from his system against the\ntarget server or network. Syn floods, Fin floods, Smurfs, and Fraggles are\nall examples of these “one-to-one” attacks. While all these attacks remain\nsuccessful on some target networks today, most organizations have imple-\nmented technology to stop these attacks from causing a service disruption\nin their organizations.\nIn February 2000, DoS attacks hit the next level. In this month, a\nnumber of high-profile targets were taken offline by the next generation\nof DoS attacks — the distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. These\nDDoS attacks were no longer the familiar “one-to-one” attacks of the past.\nThese attacks used zombie hosts to create a “many-to-one” attack. These\nzombie hosts were devices that were compromised and had code\nuploaded onto them that would allow for a master machine to contact\nthem, and have them all release the DoS attack at the same time. There\nwere tens of thousands of zombie hosts available and the attacker could\nuse a number of common tools from which to launch the attack. Some\nof the common tools were Trinoo, TFN2K, and stacheldraht. These tools\nwere pretty straightforward to use and allowed an attacker to release a\ndevastating attack against the target.\nThe new DDoS attacks are very difficult to defend against. Most of\nthe tools denied service not by overwhelming the processing server, but\nby flooding the telecommunications lines from the Internet service pro-\nvider (ISP). Most organizations are still vulnerable to this type of attack.\nThe mechanism that has curtailed most DDoS attacks is by trying to\nminimize the number of zombie-infected hosts available. As soon as a\nnew and better infection mechanism surfaces, another round of DDoS\nattacks is sure to spring up.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 50,
            "text": "2.2.6\nSocial Engineering\nSocial engineering is the name given to a category of security attacks in\nwhich someone manipulates others into revealing information that can be\nused to steal data, access to systems, access to cellular phones, money,\nor even your own identity. Such attacks can be very simple or very\ncomplex. Gaining access to information over the phone or through Web\nsites that you visit has added a new dimension to the role of the social\nengineer.\nThis section examines ways in which people, government agencies,\nmilitary organizations, and companies have been duped into giving infor-\nmation that has opened them up to attack. Low-tech as well as the newer\nforms of electronic theft are discussed.\nSocial engineering is the acquisition of sensitive information or inap-\npropriate access privileges by an outsider, based upon the building of an\ninappropriate trust relationship with insiders. Note that the term “outsider”\ndoes not refer only to nonemployees; an outsider can be an employee\nwho is attempting to circumvent established policies and standards.\nThe goal of social engineering is to trick someone into providing\nvaluable information or access to that information or resource. The social\nengineering exploiter preys on qualities of human nature, such as:\n\u0001\nThe desire to be helpful. We have trained our employees well. Make\nsure the customer is satisfied. The best way to a good appraisal\nis to have good responses from those needing assistance. Most of\nour employees want to be helpful and this can lead to giving away\ntoo much information.\n\u0001\nA tendency to trust people. Human nature is to actually trust others\nuntil they prove that they are not trustworthy. If someone tells us\nthat he is a certain person, we usually accept that statement. We\nmust train our employees to seek independent proof.\n\u0001\nThe fear of getting into trouble. Too many of us have seen negative\nreaction by superiors because verification of identity took too long\nor because some official was offended. Management must support\nall employees who are doing their assignment and protecting the\ninformation resources of the enterprise.\n\u0001\nThe willingness to cut corners. Sometimes we get lazy. We post\npasswords on the screen or leave important material lying out for\nanyone to see.\nWhat scares most companies about social engineers is that the sign of\ntruly successful social engineers is that they receive what they are looking\nfor without raising any suspicion. It is the bad social engineers we know\nabout, not the good ones.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 51,
            "text": "According to the Jargon Dictionary, “wetware” is the human being\nattached to a computer system. People are usually the weakest link in\nthe security chain. In the 1970s, we were told that if we installed access\ncontrol packages, we would have security. In the 1980s, we were encour-\naged to install effective antivirus software to ensure that our systems and\nnetworks were secure. In the 1990s, we were told that firewalls would\nlead us to security. Now in the 21st century, it is intrusion detection\nsystems or public key infrastructure that will lead us to information\nsecurity. In each and every iteration, security has eluded us because the\nsilicon-based products must interface with carbon-based units. It is the\nhuman factor that will continue to appear in our discussion on social\nengineering.\nA skilled social engineer will often try to exploit this weakness before\nspending time and effort on other methods to crack passwords or gain\naccess to systems. Why go to all the trouble of installing a sniffer on a\nnetwork when a simple phone call to an employee will gain the needed\nuser id and password. Social engineering is the most difficult form of\nattack to defend against because it cannot be defended with hardware or\nsoftware alone. A successful defense will require an effective information\nsecurity architecture, starting with policies and standards and following\nthrough with a vulnerability assessment process.\n2.2.7\nCommon Types of Social Engineering\nWhile the greatest area for success is human-based interaction by the\nsocial engineer, there are also some computer-based methods that attempt\nto retrieve the desired information using software programs to either gather\ninformation or deny service to a system. One of the most ingenious\nmethods was first introduced into the Internet in February 1993. The user\nattempting to log on to the system was met with the normal prompt, and,\nafter entering the correct user id and password, had the system begin the\nprompt all over again. What happened was that a social engineer managed\nto get a program installed in front of the normal sign-on routine, gathered\nthe information, and then passed the prompt to the real sign-on process.\nAccording to published articles at the time, more than 95 percent of regular\nusers had their access codes compromised.\nToday we see the use of Web sites as a common ploy to offer something\nfree or a chance to win something on the Web site or to gain important\ninformation. At a Michigan firm in 1998, the network administrator installed\na 401(k) information Web site that required employees to register with\nthe site to obtain information on their 401(k) program. After giving such\ninformation as account id, password, social security number, and home\naddress, the Web site returned a message that indicated it was still under\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 52,
            "text": "construction. Within a week, nearly every employee with a 401(k) plan,\nincluding senior management, had attempted to register on the Web site.\nOther forms of social engineering have been classified into various\ngroups. The first two are Impersonation and Important User. These are\noften used in combination with one another. The 1991 book Cyberpunk\nby Katie Hafner and John Markoff describes the actions of one Susan\nHadley (aka Susan Thunder). Using an easily accessible military computer\ndirectory, she was able to obtain the name of the individual in charge.\nShe used her basic knowledge of military systems and terminology as she\ncalled a military base to find out the commanding officer of the secret\ncompartmentalized information facility. She sweet-talked her way into\nobtaining the name of the major’s secretary and then hung up.\nUsing this information, she changed tactics. She switched from being\nnonchalant to authoritative. Her boss, the major, was having problems\naccessing the system and she wanted to know why. Using threats, she\ngot the access and, according to her, was in the system within 20 minutes.\nPretending to be someone you are not, or schmoozing your way to\nthe information you need; these are typical examples of how social\nengineers work to obtain the information they need. They will often\ncontact the help desk and drop names of other employees. Once they\nhave what they need to gain further access, they will attack a more\nvulnerable person — one who has information but not necessarily the\nclout to challenge anyone of “authority.”\nPerhaps two of the oldest forms of social engineering are dumpster\ndiving and shoulder surfing. The dumpster diver is willing to get dirty to\nget the information he needs. Too often companies throw out important\ninformation. Sensitive information, manuals, and phone directories should\nbe shredded before disposing.\nThe shoulder surfer will look over someone’s shoulder to gain pass-\nwords or PIN numbers. A few years ago, one of the news magazine shows\ndid a session on phone card fraud. During one sequence, the reporter\nwas given a new phone calling card and told to use it at Grand Central\nStation in New York City. While she made the call, the undercover police\ncounted at least five people surfing her PIN number. One even turned to\nthe cameraman to make sure he got the number too.\nThe final two types of human-based social engineering are third-party\nauthorization and tech support. The typical third-party authorization occurs\nwhen the social engineer drops the name of a higher-up who has the\nauthority to grant access. It is usually something like “Ms. Shooter says\nits OK” or “Before she went on vacation, Ms. Shooter said I should call\nyou to get this information.” The social engineer may well have called\nthe authority’s’ office to find out if she was out. Remember that most\nsocial engineers are internal.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 53,
            "text": "The tech support method is where the social engineer pretends to be\nsomeone from an infrastructure group and wants a user to access the\nsystem while the social engineer scopes out the connection. They will\nnormally ask for the user’s account id and password so that they can see\nit cross the network. In a recent vulnerability assessment of a large Texas-\nbased insurance provider, 12 employees were called by “network admin-\nistration,” which was actually the security staff posing as network admin-\nistration. The employees were told that the network was experiencing\nconnection problems, that they had installed a scope on the fiber con-\nnections, and then asked the employees to log on to the system. They\nrequested the account id and password to use as a verification that the\ndata was being properly sent. Three employees did not answer the phone\ncall. Eight out of the other nine gave the information requested. One\nemployee was not able to give out his password because he could not\nfind the Post-It note on which he had it written.\nSome potential security breaches are so mundane that they hardly\nseem to be a concern. With all the fires that we have to fight each day\nand the deadlines we have to meet, sometimes the most obvious are often\noverlooked:\n\u0001\nPasswords. The number-one access point for social engineers is\nthe good old-fashioned password. After all of the awareness pro-\ngrams and reminder cards, we still find that employee-generated\npasswords are too short or too easy to guess. System-generated\npasswords are too long and employees have to write them down\nto remember them. Even today, some systems do not require that\npasswords be changed. We find this most often in e-mail systems\nand Internet accounts. We recommend an assessment of the pass-\nword length and interval for change standards; determine if they\nstill meet the current needs of the user community.\n\u0001\nModems. Every company has more modems than they know about.\nEmployees and contractors will add a modem to a system and\nthen install products such as pcAnywhere or Carbon Copy to\nimprove their remote access time. We recommend that war dialers\nbe used at least twice a year to check on modems.\n\u0001\nHelp desk. Put in place processes that can assist the help-desk\nemployee in verifying who is on the other end of the phone call.\n\u0001\nWeb sites. There are two problems here: the dummy site that gathers\ninformation and the legal site that gives away too much informa-\ntion. Many hackers use the information they gather from the\nenterprise Web site to launch attacks on the network. Make certain\nthat the information available will not compromise the information\nresources of the enterprise.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 54,
            "text": "A social engineer can simply walk in and behave like an employee.\nOur employees have not been trained to challenge strangers. Or if they\nhave been trained, there has not been enough reinforcement of the\nchallenge process. Require that all personnel on site wear appropriate\nidentification. Some organizations require only visitors to wear badges.\nTherefore, to become an employee, a visitor must simply remove the\nbadge. Sell the principle that employee identification is not just a security\nmeasure, but rather a process to protect the employees in the workplace.\nBy ensuring that only authorized personnel are permitted access, the\nemployees will have a safe work environment.\nBecause there is neither hardware nor software available to protect an\nenterprise against social engineering, it is essential that good practices be\nimplemented. Some of those practices might include:\n\u0001\nRequire anyone there to perform service to show proper identifi-\ncation.\n\u0001\nEstablish a standard that passwords are never to be spoken over\nthe phone.\n\u0001\nImplement a standard that forbids passwords from being left lying\nabout.\n\u0001\nImplement caller ID technology for the help desk and other support\nfunctions.\n\u0001\nInvest in shredders and have one on every floor.\nPolicies, procedures, and standards are an important part of an overall\nantisocial engineering campaign. To be effective, a policy should:\n\u0001\nNot contain standards or directives that may not be attainable\n\u0001\nStress what can be done and stay away from what is not allowed\nas much as possible\n\u0001\nBe brief and concise\n\u0001\nBe reviewed on a regular basis and kept current\n\u0001\nBe easily attainable by the employees and available via the com-\npany intranet\nTo be effective, policies, procedures, and standards must be taught\nand reinforced to the employees. This process must be ongoing and must\nnot exceed six months between reinforcement times. It is not enough to\njust publish policies and expect employees to read, understand, and\nimplement what is required. They need to be taught to emphasize what\nis important and how it will help them do their jobs. This training should\nbegin at new employee orientation and continue throughout employment.\nWhen a person becomes an ex-employee, a final time of reinforcement\nshould be done during the exit interview process.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 55,
            "text": "Another method to keep employees informed and educated is to have\na Web page dedicated to security. It should be updated regularly and\nshould contain new social engineering ploys. It could contain a “security\ntip of the day” and remind employees to look for typical social engineering\nsigns. These signs might include behaviors such as:\n\u0001\nRefusal to give contact information\n\u0001\nRushing the process\n\u0001\nName-dropping\n\u0001\nIntimidation\n\u0001\nSmall mistakes\n\u0001\nRequesting forbidden information or access\nAs part of this training or education process, reinforce a good catch.\nWhen employees do the right thing, make sure they receive proper\nrecognition. Train the employees on who to call if they suspect they are\nbeing social engineered.\nApply technology where you can. Consider implementing trace calls if\npossible, or at least caller ID where available. Control overseas long-distance\nservices to most phones. Ensure that physical security for the building. \nA social engineer with enough time, patience, and resolve will even-\ntually exploit some weakness in the control environment of an enterprise.\nEmployee awareness and acceptance of safeguard measures will become\nour first line of defense in this battle against the attackers. The best defense\nagainst social engineering requires that employees be tested and that the\nbar of acceptance be raised regularly.\n2.3 Summary\nSecurity professionals can begin this process by making available a broad\nrange of supporting documentation available to all personnel. Many\nemployees respond positively to anecdotes relating to social engineering\nattacks and hoaxes. Keep the message fresh and accurate.\nInclude details about the consequences of successful attacks. Do not\ndiscuss these attacks in terms of how security was circumvented, but\nrather their impact on the business or mission of the enterprise. These\nattacks can lead to a loss of customer confidence, market share, and jobs.\nEmployees at all levels of the enterprise need to understand and believe\nthat they are important to the overall protection strategy. Without all\nemployees being part of the team, the enterprise, its assets, and its\nemployees will be open to attack from both external and internal social\nengineers. With training and support, one can lessen the impact of these\nkinds of attacks.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 56,
            "text": "Chapter 3\nThe Structure of \nan Information \nSecurity Program\n3.1 Overview\nThe structure of an information security program is its performance at\nevery level of the organization. The reach of the program, how each\nbusiness unit supports the program, and how every individual carries out\nhis or her duties as specified in the program all determine how effective\nthe program will be.\nUniform participation in the program is necessary if its results are to\njustify an organization’s investment. From senior management, through\nbusiness unit management, to every individual member of an organization,\nall must be seen — for varying reasons — to give the same level of\nsupport to the information security program’s aims and objectives. If there\nare levels or areas in an organization where support is seen as weak, this\nwill cause gaps in the effectiveness of the program and weaken the entire\ninformation security structure. Like an unpopular law (the 55 mph speed\nlimit comes to mind), when a requirement to follow good business\npractices is ignored by some — and effective information security is good\nbusiness practice, more will come to think they need not comply either.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 57,
            "text": "3.1.1\nEnterprisewide Security Program\nThe aim of the information security practitioner should be to have a uniform\ninformation security program that spans the whole enterprise. Many organi-\nzations have strong and weak areas; a good example might be a financial\nservices organization in which everyone but the stock traders abides by\nstrong information security standards. The stock traders, however, feel that\nthey work under so much pressure that learning and complying with infor-\nmation security standards would be too much of an impediment to their\nwork. In an organization such as this, the management of the stock traders\nmight have enough influence to hold off efforts to enforce compliance.\nIf we use a castle as an analogy for a strong information security\nprogram, then having all but one department in compliance with standards\nis equivalent to leaving open a gate in the castle walls. Having said that,\ninformation security practitioners cannot — by themselves — ensure that\nthe information security program is applied in a uniform way across the\nentire organization. Only the organization’s management can do this job.\nOf course, it is the job of the information security practitioner to provide\nthe organization’s management with the tools necessary to do that job.\nA measured security strategy based on the organization’s business\nobjectives and attitude toward risk is the foundation for a uniform program.\nBuilding information security policies and standards on that strategy is\nthe next step, and helping the organization achieve compliance with those\npolicies and standards follows. The information security practitioner can\nhelp the organization achieve a uniform, enterprisewide security program\nby leading efforts to create and implement policies and standards, by\neducating all levels of employees within the organization on acceptable\nsecurity-related practices, and by acting as a consultant to help business\nunits address specific problems in a way that is consistent with practice\nin other parts of the organization.\nAn enterprisewide security program then is necessary to make sure\nthat everyone knows the rules and abides by them and, by doing so,\nmakes sure that the enterprise information is given the protection desired\nby the enterprise’s senior management. An organization structure must be\nset up to ensure effective communication — both of policy and standards\nto the entire organization and of issues from the entire organization to\nthe decision makers. The organization structure should involve:\n\u0001\nInformation Security Management who provide direction for the\nprogram, advice to the entire organization, and a focal point for\nresolving security issues\n\u0001\nInternal Audit who report on information security practices to the\nAudit Committee and, through the Audit Committee, to the orga-\nnization’s directors and other senior management\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 58,
            "text": "\u0001\nA Steering Committee composed of the heads of all business units\nwho — among their other duties — take direction from the\norganization’s senior management and make sure it is translated\ninto working practices\n\u0001\nSecurity Coordinators in each business unit who, with the support\nand cooperation of Information Security Management, implement\nthe instructions of the steering committee\n\u0001\nSecurity Administrators in each business unit who maintain the access\ncontrols and other tools used as controls to protect information\n\u0001\nA Security Working Team that gets its support and direction from\nInformation Security Management and the Steering Committee and\nthat focuses on plans to implement new and amended information\nsecurity processes and tools so that the implementation has the\nlowest possible impact on the organization\nOf course, no information security practitioner should attempt to\nimpose this structure on an organization where it clearly does not fit, but\nthe broad responsibilities outlined above must be carried out if the\ninformation security program is to have robust support in the organization.\nAn illustration of the organization structure — and suggested lines of\nreport — is shown in Figure 3.1.\n3.2 Business Unit Responsibilities\nWhen discussing business unit responsibilities, it makes sense to separate\nthem into two areas: the creation and implementation of policies and\nstandards and compliance with those policies and standards.\n3.2.1\nCreation and Implementation of Policies \nand Standards\nThe development of policies and standards requires the involvement of\nevery business unit. Each business unit — at some point in its chain of\nauthority to senior management — must be represented in the process\nto review and approve policies.\nFor the policies to be as robust as possible and to represent the needs\nof the entire enterprise, each business unit must be represented in two\nways: (1) some member of the chain of authority for each business unit\nmust have the opportunity to approve policies (or withhold approval);\nand (2) a number of members of the chain of authority must be given\nthe opportunity to review and comment on the policies. See Table 3.1\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 59,
            "text": "FIGURE 3.1\nOrganization Structure\nBusiness\nUnit\n(Business\nSecurity\nCoordinator)\n \nInformation \nSecurity \nManagement\nInternal Audit\n(Information\nSystems Audit)\nBusiness Unit Heads\nInformation Security\n Group\nChairman\n(Director)\nAudit \nCommittee\nDirectors\nInformation Security Administrators\nInformation Security\nSecurity\nWorking Team\nKey\nAdvice and Observation\nOperating and Reporting\nAudit of Contro ls\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 60,
            "text": "for a sample table in which the responsibilities in the policy development\nprocess can be laid out. A simple table, we lay out the officers and\nmanagers involved in the process on one axis and the policies we intend\nto review or develop on the other. At each intersection, we place an R —\nindicating the responsibility to review indicated policy. Some organizations\nuse a table like this but make a difference between those responsible for\nonly review — where their comments may or may not be included in\nrevisions, at the discretion of the Information Security Manager. Other\nmay be denoted with a C, which indicates that they have the right to\ncomment on policy and, of course, their comments must be incorporated\nin revised drafts.\nGenerally, in large organizations, this means that management at the\nDirector or Vice President level approves policy after management and\nstaff at lower levels have reviewed it and provided their comments. The\napproval at the higher level usually involves a Steering Committee approach\n(discussed later).\nIn the process for drafting and implementing standards, the responsi-\nbilities change slightly. In this case, business units have the responsibility\nfor writing information security standards for their area of responsibility.\nFor example, standards for Personnel security could best be written by\nHuman Resources (with input from Information Security, of course). Once\nTABLE 3.1\nSample Responsibilities\nPolicy\nInfo. Sec.\nSec. \nOrganization\nAsset \nClassification\nPersonnel\nPhysical\nNetwork \nManagement\nSystem Access\nSystems Devel.\nBCP\nCompliance\nReviewer\nCEO\nSVP, Refining\nSVP, Marketing\nSVP, Dev. & Tech.\nPresident, Asphalt Ref.\nVP, Finance\nGeneral Auditor\nGeneral Counsel\nVP, Corp. Planning\nGM, HR\nGM, Risk Mgmt.\nSenior Consultant\nCISO\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 61,
            "text": "again, however, each business unit must provide someone who can review\ninformation security standards for their impact on their business unit. That\nperson will then advise their representative on the group that approves\nstandards for the enterprise.\nWhen policies and standards have been approved, it is the responsi-\nbility of each business unit to assist in their implementation.\n3.2.2\nCompliance with Policies and Standards\nMoving beyond the drafting and implementation of policies and standards,\neach business unit — through its management — has the responsibility\nto ensure constant compliance with those policies and standards. It is of\nlittle use to ignore information security policies and standards until an\naudit is performed and then have to devote a significant effort to remedial\nor “catch-up” work. This culture will tend to repeat itself (rather than\nviewing compliance as a normal business practice) and thus will contin-\nually create gaps in protection and exposure to risk for the company’s\ninformation. A better practice is for business unit management to learn\nwhat is necessary for compliance with information security policies and\nstandards and then use that knowledge to improve the business practices\nwithin the unit.\nAnother responsibility within business units is, of course, the enforce-\nment of compliance. If there is confusion about the difference between\ncompliance itself and the enforcement of compliance, perhaps one can\nview compliance as a normal practice and enforcement as the action to\nbe taken when one finds noncompliance. For example, the management\nof a business unit might consider making compliance with information\nsecurity policies and standards a performance issue — at least in the\nexception. While it might — for many reasons — be difficult to have\ninformation security made part of the performance improvement and\nmeasurement process across an entire organization, it is less difficult to\npersuade business unit managers that it can be made so in cases where\nfailure to comply has been found.\nConsider, for example, a policy statement that says all means of\naccess — IDs, passwords, tokens, etc. — are confidential to the individual\nto whom they are issued. If an individual is known to habitually share\nhis ID or password (or seek to share others’), then that individual’s\nperformance review or performance plan could include a requirement to\nchange that behavior in a fixed time — “John Doe will ensure that, over\nthe course of the next 12 months, he will not be found sharing his or\nothers’ means of access. Otherwise, further disciplinary action (and it can\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 62,
            "text": "be specified here) will ensue. It is expected that, even after this 12-month\nperiod expires, John Doe will continue to comply with company policies.”\n3.3 Information Security Awareness Program\nThe purpose of a security awareness program is in clearly demonstrating\nthe “who, what, and why” of the policies and standards. Reading alone\nis not the most effective method of absorbing information and, once read,\nthe message of the policies and standards are easily forgotten in the stress\nof the working day. If an organization wishes its policies and standards\nto have perpetual effect, it should commit to a perpetual program of\nreinforcement and information — a security awareness program.\nProblems with budget may stop your employee information security\nawareness program before it gets properly started. Those who control\nbudgets need to show due diligence by demonstrating the effect or the\npotential return on investment for every dollar spent and information\nsecurity awareness programs are notoriously difficult to quantify in this\nway. What is the return on investment? Increased employee awareness?\nAnd how does that contribute to the profitability of the enterprise? These\nare difficult numbers to demonstrate.\nHowever, if we look at things that an organization would like to avoid,\njustifying the cost of an employee information security awareness program\ncan get easier. Most information security programs struggle with things\nsuch as access control (password management, sharing computer sessions,\netc.), e-mail practices, and virus management; so, if your Information\nSecurity staff can find a way to address these issues as benefits of the\ninformation security awareness program, then you have a way to justify\nexpense for that program.\nThe way to address these issues is through measurement. Information\nSecurity staff must understand what it is that they are trying to improve\n(and “security awareness” is too fuzzy a subject to talk about improving).\nIf your organization is trying to improve users’ access control habits, then\nInformation Security start must start by finding ways to measure them.\nThese can include password cracking software such as lophtcrack or sam-\npling walk-throughs where a given number of workstations are observed\nand a record made of how many are left unattended and logged on.\nSimilarly, if your organization wants to improve e-mail habits, obser-\nvation of e-mail traffic before any security awareness activity will be\nnecessary. Some organizations have made use of “honeypot” e-mails —\nin other words, e-mails that coax users into behavior that we will later\nteach them to avoid practicing — to measure the effect of their information\nsecurity awareness program on e-mail habits.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 63,
            "text": "Audit findings and workpapers will also provide valuable measure-\nments at no cost to the Information Security department.\nAs for the content and mechanics of the awareness program, the\nfollowing general advice should prove useful.\n3.3.1\nFrequency\nOne of the main factors in the success of the employee information security\nawareness program will be the frequency with which the message is\ndelivered to staff. If the message is delivered too often, it will become\nbackground noise — easily ignored. On the other hand, we want the\nmessage to be in employees’ minds as much as possible, so delivering\nthe message too infrequently can be as damaging as delivering it too often.\nInformation security awareness programs are basically advertising —\nwith an educational message. The messages might begin with a PowerPoint\npresentation, which focuses heavily on:\n\u0001\nInformation security policies\n\u0001\nInformation ownership\n\u0001\nInformation classification\n\u0001\nGood information security practices\nBecause employee information security awareness is an ongoing pro-\ncess, the messages will vary over the first year according to how much\ninformation security program activity has already taken place and how\nwell the implementation of other information security program compo-\nnents has gone.\nIn the first year, you should aim to deliver the messages outlined\nabove, plus messages on:\n\u0001\nInformation security standards\n\u0001\nInformation security monitoring\n\u0001\nInformation security performance measurement\n\u0001\nMore information security good practices\nOf course, while delivering these messages, the employee information\nsecurity awareness should also reinforce the original messages.\n3.3.2\nMedia\nOne of the main factors in the success of the employee information security\nawareness program will be the composition of the media used. Each\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 64,
            "text": "media element has its strengths and weaknesses and so media for delivery\nmust be carefully selected to ensure that the message of the program is\ncommunicated as effectively as possible. To rely on one medium — that\nis, video, posters, PowerPoint presentations, etc. — would deaden the\nmessage. Staff would become used to seeing whatever medium or media\nwere chosen and would begin to ignore it. The key is to use a mix of\nmedia and a frequency of message delivery that achieves the level of\nconsciousness of security issues that the organization has chosen.\nWe live in a video generation. News, entertainment, streaming video\non the Internet, advertising, and education all come at us in video format.\nIt makes sense then to consider custom video as a medium for delivering\nthe employee information security awareness message — at least in part.\nThe main “plus” of custom video, of course, is the sense of immediacy. The\n“minus” — equally obvious — is cost. However, there are a number of\norganizations that offer already-made information security awareness videos.\nHowever, most organizations still rely on presentation software such\nas PowerPoint. It is familiar and, if done right, can still add some “zip”\nto the message — the biggest “plus” of using it. Other plusses are that\npresentation software is easy to use and easy to modify. You should\nconsider using PowerPoint for your initial employee information security\nawareness offering and should not plan to use any more PowerPoint\npresentations during the first year. (We have all been subjected to “death\nby PowerPoint,” the feeling that comes when presentations lack presence,\ngo on too long, or are too frequent. Too many PowerPoint presentations\nwill quickly kill audience interest in the program.)\nWhether using video or presentation software, you must consider\nputting the definitive version of the presentation on the organization’s\nWeb server. Note that this has the potential to create bandwidth problems\nand should be discussed with IT before any plans are made. However,\nhaving the definitive version of any presentation on the company’s Web\nserver does allow universal access and provides savings from lower travel\nand “training the trainer” costs. Some companies — rich in bandwidth —\nstream the presentation to all company sites; but for those who do not\nhave this bandwidth (or do not want to use it for this purpose), putting\nthe definitive version on the company’s Web server is still a good idea,\nbecause it allows people to access the definitive version of the presentation\nat a time convenient to them.\nIn addition to the media outlined above, one must consider the use\nof booklets, brochures, newsletters, and “giveaway” items to supplement\nthe core media of the program. Most people react well to something they\ncan hold in their hand; and while the readership rate of booklets, etc.,\nmay be low, any number of employees who read this material enhances\nthe effectiveness of the media already discussed.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 65,
            "text": "3.4 Information Security Program Infrastructure\nThe “infrastructure” discussed here is the mechanism within the organi-\nzation that supports good information security practices. From the senior\nmanagement who sit on the Information Security Steering Committee, to\nthe responsibilities of every employee to practice good information secu-\nrity habits, the infrastructure must be robust and educated in order for\nthe information security program to bring full benefit to the organization.\n3.4.1\nInformation Security Steering Committee\nAs previously stated, the Information Security Steering Committee should\nideally be comprised of senior managers (director or VP level) representing\nevery major business element of the organization. To round out the\ncommittee — to provide the best possible contribution at that level to the\ninformation security program — Internal Audit, Legal, Human Resources,\nand, where appropriate, organized labor should also sit on the committee.\nThe Information Security Steering Committee generally meets no more\nthan monthly and, in some organizations, as infrequently as quarterly. The\npurpose of the committee is to provide a forum where major issues can\nbe presented (along with proposed resolutions) and where the organiza-\ntion’s wishes and needs for the information security program can be set\nout. When major changes in business processes, new business processes,\nand major new technologies are introduced, it is at the Information Security\nSteering Committee level that direction for the information security pro-\ngram — with respect to these changes — will be found. Generally, when\nsuch a situation is proposed, the management of the Information Security\ngroup will propose to the committee their views on what controls should\nlook like in the changed environment and the Information Security Steering\nCommittee will accept or amend those views.\nFor example, in the case of a merger or acquisition, the information\nsecurity group will study the proposed action and decide on a strategy\nto bring the merged or acquired company to the same level of control as\nthe parent organization. The information security group will then present\nthe proposed action to the Information Security Steering Committee, which\nwill approve the strategy or direct that changes be made. As the merger\nor acquisition proceeds, the Information Security group will report\nprogress and details to the committee on a predefined frequency.\n3.4.2\nAssignment of Information Security Responsibilities\nEven in the early stages of the 21st century, there are still organizations\nthat look to the management of the Information Security unit to take complete\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 66,
            "text": "responsibility for all information security activities in the organization. And\nalmost every organization with that outlook has an information security\nprogram that is failing.\nInformation security is an organizationwide responsibility that touches\nevery person. While the Information Security unit must act as a source of\nguidance and advice, the program can only succeed when all parties in\nthe organization recognize their responsibility to protect information and\nexercise that responsibility. The protection of information is no more than\na part of doing business — as much a part as making sure that more\ntangible assets as, say, money in a bank or products made by a manu-\nfacturing company are physically protected.\n3.4.2.1\nSenior Management\nThe simplest way to state senior management’s responsibility for informa-\ntion security comes from Franklin Roosevelt’s maxim — “The Buck Stops\nHere.” Senior management personnel of any organization are the ultimate\ndecision makers and, as such, have the ultimate responsibility for deciding\nhow the organization will handle risk.\nIt is widely accepted that senior management, under the Foreign\nCorrupt Practices Act, has a responsibility to make sure that information\nsecurity (as an element of risk) is adequately addressed in the organization.\nIn some industries — government, financial services, and healthcare spring\nmost quickly to mind — senior management has clearly defined, regulated\nresponsibilities to ensure that information is protected to a level equal to\nits perceived value to the organization.\nOutside the legal requirements, senior management is responsible for:\n\u0001\nMaking sure that audit recommendations pertaining to the protec-\ntion of information are addressed in a timely and adequate manner\n\u0001\nParticipating in the activities of the Information Security Steering\nCommittee (where such a body exists) to guide the activities of\nthe information security effort\n\u0001\nOverseeing the formation, management, and performance of the\ninformation security unit; this includes providing adequate\nresources (budget, manpower, etc.) to make sure that senior man-\nagement requirements for information security can be carried out\n\u0001\nParticipating in the effort to educate the organization’s staff about\ntheir responsibilities for protecting information\n\u0001\nReviewing and approving information security policies and strate-\ngies for the organization\n\u0001\nProviding resolution for information security issues that are of such\nmagnitude or urgency that they must be addressed on an organiza-\ntionwide basis\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 67,
            "text": "3.4.2.2\nInformation Security Management\nThe function of Information Security Management has been likened,\nvariously, to “corporate policeman” and “referee.” In a well-ordered infor-\nmation security program, Information Security Management will avoid\nbeing seen as the corporate policeman but might end up doing a great\ndeal of work as a referee. As this section makes clear, Information Security\nManagement is responsible for the information security practices of the\ninformation security unit — and nowhere else. For other units, Information\nSecurity provides services and advice, but the responsibility for protection\nof information within those units lies squarely on the management and\nstaff of those units. In cases where conflicts arise because of differing\nopinions on how to implement information security measures, Information\nSecurity Management can be seen as an arbiter — or referee — of what\nis acceptable (acting, of course, under the direction of the organization’s\nsenior management).\nThe Information Security Management of an organization must be able\nto:\n\u0001\nDrive the effort to create, publish, and implement information secu-\nrity policies and standards. While the responsibility for the creation\nof policies and standards does not belong to Information Security\nManagement, they should be best equipped to act as an agent to\nmake sure these things are created and to project-manage the effort\nto implement.\n\u0001\nCoordinate the creation and testing of business continuity plans.\nThere is still some argument over whether or not business conti-\nnuity planning ought to be a function of information security, and\nI recognize that there may be some environments where it is not\ndesirable that information security and business continuity planning\nnot be managed by the same organization. However, given the\ncloseness of the objectives of information security and continuity\nplanning, I wholeheartedly endorse the idea that business conti-\nnuity planning is a function that should fall under the control of\nInformation Security Management.\n\u0001\nManage the information security effort within the information secu-\nrity unit. Just as all business unit managers have the responsibility\nof making sure that information stored and processed by their unit\nis protected to a level equal to its value, so Information Security\nManagement must take care of security databases and paper files,\nand protect them from threats.\n\u0001\nAdminister information security software tools on behalf of the\norganization. “On behalf of the organization” is a very powerful\nphrase here because no information security unit should make\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 68,
            "text": "decisions about access to information. The information is owned\nby other pieces of the organization and so the responsibility for\ndeciding access rules lies with other parts of the organization\n(guided by policies and standards). Information Security Manage-\nment is only responsible for making sure that those access rules\nare implemented.\n\u0001\nProvide enough education and awareness programs to the organi-\nzation. This begs the question, “What is enough?,” and the glib\nanswer is, “Whatever senior management decides is enough.” A\nmore useful answer, however, is that enough education and aware-\nness is the amount that provides the information necessary for\neveryone in the organization to know what his or her information\nsecurity responsibilities are.\nIn all the above responsibilities, the most important — from my point of\nview — is the responsibility to acquire and communicate knowledge\nwithin the organization. This should be a major part of an Information\nSecurity manager’s job description and is the activity that will contribute\nmost to an organization’s successful effort to protect its information.\n3.4.2.3\nBusiness Unit Managers\nAs already discussed, the information security program can only work if\nit is supported throughout the organization, and business unit managers\nmay be the most important group of people when it comes to making\nthat happen. If business unit managers do not buy into the idea that\ninformation security is important, then no amount of effort on the part of\nthe Information Security manager will make it work in that unit. Once\none unit fails to support the concepts of good information security, a\ndomino effect can happen with employees in other units taking an attitude\nof, “Well, if they don’t bother, why should I?”\nBusiness unit managers deserve special attention from Information\nSecurity Management for this reason. Efforts to persuade business unit\nmanagers to support the program will help make sure that the program\nis applied evenly across the organization and will reduce the number of\nweak spots in the organization’s defense.\nBusiness unit managers support the information security program by:\n\u0001\nParticipating in the process of reviewing policies. Business unit\nmanagers must feed comments to senior management on every\ninformation security policy proposed for the organization, because\nit is the business unit manager who will enforce the policy within\nthe unit.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 69,
            "text": "\u0001\nCreating input for information security standards. Standards are\nmore business-unit specific than policies (network support writes\nnetwork security standards, Human Resources writes personnel\nsecurity standards, etc.) and, with help from Information Security,\nbusiness unit managers must write standards that their unit can\nlive with and that adequately protect the information used by the\nunit.\n\u0001\nMeasuring information security within the unit. While Information\nSecurity will provide the metrics and the mechanisms for measuring\nthe effect of the information security program, the business unit\nmanagers themselves benefit from taking responsibility for the\nmeasurement. Less negative audit comments and fewer disruptive\nevents are two clear benefits from this kind of proactive stance.\n\u0001\nEnforcing compliance with policies and standards. Information\nSecurity can report violations of policy and standards, but only\nbusiness unit managers can initiate remedial and disciplinary action\nin response. Without such remedial and disciplinary action, policies\nand standards are soon seen as “toothless” and are ignored very\nquickly afterward.\n\u0001\nSupporting information security education and awareness. The\ninformation security education and awareness program can only\nsucceed with the clear cooperation of business unit managers.\nFrom basic cooperation in providing resources and scheduling\nevents to a directive to adopt the messages delivered by the\nprogram, business unit managers’ support is crucial.\n\u0001\nMaking sure resources are available to draft, test, and maintain\nbusiness continuity plans under the coordination of the Information\nSecurity manager or the IS manager’s designee.\n3.4.2.4\nFirst Line Supervisors\nOften seen as “the front line” in information security, first line supervisors\nare on the one hand seen to be examples to judge the level of support\nfor information security and, on the other hand, enforcers of policies and\nstandards. First line supervisors often carry out duties delegated by busi-\nness unit managers and are a key piece of the communication chain that\nallows an organization to monitor its information security program.\nFirst line supervisors:\n\u0001\nMonitor their employees’ activities in light of organization infor-\nmation security policies and standards — directing better compli-\nance where appropriate and reporting incidents of noncompliance\nto business unit managers.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 70,
            "text": "\u0001\nCommunicate security issues to Information Security, senior man-\nagement (through business unit managers), and through them to\nthe Information Security Steering Committee.\n\u0001\nIn organizations where information security is included as a per-\nformance measurement, comment on individual employees’ perfor-\nmance with respect to information security at performance\nappraisal time.\n\u0001\nSupport the information security policy by reinforcing the messages\ncontained in the education and awareness elements of the program.\n3.4.2.5\nEmployees\nWhen asked to describe the information security responsibilities of\nemployees, it would be easy (but not helpful) to say, “Everything else”\nand in a sense it would be true. Generally, employees are asked to comply\nwith information security policies and standards and little else.\nHowever, information security programs only work well when all\nemployees participate, and employees participate most willingly when\nthey feel they have a real role to play. Simply complying with policies\nand standards seems passive and might be done by all employees given\nenough support from business unit managers and first line supervisors.\nMore active participation from employees can be encouraged in areas\nsuch as reporting security concerns — and it should be stated like this.\nMost organizations talk of employees “reporting security breaches” to their\nsupervisors but get very little cooperation as a result because very few\nemployees feel comfortable telling tales about their co-workers.\nFrom general security issues (perhaps seen in the press) to topics of\nconcern that are specific to the organization, employees should be encour-\naged to see the process as simply passing on information or asking for\nclarification. This line of communication helps make sure that the scarce\nresources of the Information Security unit are party to as much information\nas possible about the state of the organization’s program and about outside\nsecurity news.\n3.4.2.6\nThird Parties\nThird parties (contractors, vendors, etc.) are responsible for complying\nwith the information security policies and standards of the organization\nwith which they are contracted or to which they provide goods or services.\nThis must be clearly stated in any contract that binds two organizations.\nWhere any waiver to this rule is allowed, it must only be to state that the\ncontractor or vendor must provide protection for the purchasing organi-\nzation’s information to an equal or greater degree than the purchasing\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 71,
            "text": "organization itself. Such contractual terms should be the subject of any\nservice level agreement (SLA) between the purchasing organization and\nany contractor or vendor.\nWhere contractors or vendors operate in a site operated by the pur-\nchasing organization, they are subject to the same rules and methods of\nenforcement as full-time employees of the organization. Where the con-\ntractors or vendors operate on their own or others’ premises, the contract\nshould state that the purchasing organization has the right to audit the\ncontractors’ or vendors’ information security programs at the times of the\npurchasing organization’s choosing.\n3.5 Summary\nThe structure of an information security program is its performance in\nevery level of the organization. The reach of the program, how each\nbusiness unit supports the program, and how every individual carries out\nhis or her duties as specified in the program all determine how effective\nthe program is going to be. Uniform participation in the program is\nnecessary if its results are to justify an organization’s investment. From\nsenior management, through business unit management, to every individ-\nual member of an organization, all must be seen — for varying reasons —\nto give the same level of support to the information security program’s\naims and objectives. If there are levels or areas in an organization where\nsupport is seen to be weak, this will cause gaps in the effectiveness of\nthe program and will weaken the whole information security structure.\nLike an unpopular law (the 55 mph speed limit comes to mind), when a\nrequirement to follow good business practices is ignored by some — and\neffective information security is good business practice — more will come\nto think that they need not comply either.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 72,
            "text": "Chapter 4\nInformation Security \nPolicies\n4.1 Policy Is the Cornerstone\nThe cornerstone of effective information security architecture is a well-\nwritten policy statement. This is the wellspring of all other directives,\nstandards, procedures, guidelines, and other supporting documents. As\nwith any foundation, it is important to establish a strong footing. As will\nbe discussed, a policy performs two roles: one internal and one external.\nThe internal portion tells employees what is expected of them and\nhow their actions will be judged. The external portion tells the world how\nthe enterprise is run, that there are policies that support sound business\npractices, and that the organization understands that protection of assets\nis vital to the successful execution of its mission.\nIn any discussion regarding written requirements, the term “policy” has\nmore than one meaning. To some, a policy is the directive of senior\nmanagement on how a certain program is run, what its goals and objectives\nare, and to whom responsibilities are assigned. The term “policy” may refer\nto the specific security rules for a particular system, such as ACF2 rule sets,\nRACF permits, or intrusion detection system policies. Additionally, policy\nmay refer to entirely different matters, such as specific management deci-\nsions that set an organization’s e-mail privacy policy or Internet usage policy.\nThis chapter examines three different forms of policy statements: the\ngeneral program policy (Tier 1), the topic-specific policy (Tier 2), and the\nsystem- or application-specific policy (Tier 3).\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 73,
            "text": "4.2 Why Implement an Information \nSecurity Policy\nSecurity professionals often view the overall objective of an information\nsecurity program as being to protect the integrity, confidentiality, and\navailability. While this is true from a security perspective, it is not the\norganization objective. Information is an asset and is the property of the\norganization. As an asset, management is expected to ensure that an\nappropriate level of controls are in place to protect this resource.\nAn information protection program should be part of any organization’s\noverall asset protection program. This program is not established to meet\nsecurity needs or audit requirements; it is a business process that provides\nmanagement with the processes needed to perform the fiduciary respon-\nsibility. Management is charged with a trust to ensure that adequate\ncontrols are in place to protect the assets of the enterprise. An information\nsecurity program that includes policies, standards, and procedures will\nallow management to demonstrate a standard of care.\nAs information security professionals, it is our responsibility to imple-\nment policies that reflect the business and mission needs of the enterprise.\nThis chapter examines the reasons why information security policies are\nneeded and how they fit into all elements of the organization. The\ndevelopment of information security policies is not an information tech-\nnology or audit responsibility, nor do they remain solely in these areas.\nThe concept of information security must permeate through all of the\norganization’s policies.\nThis chapter discusses eleven organizationwide policies and, at a\nminimum, what each should have with reference to information security.\nThe policies initially discussed are high-level (Tier 1) organizationwide\npolicies and include the following:\n\u0001\nEmployment practices\n\u0001\nEmployee Standards of Conduct\n\u0001\nConflict of Interest\n\u0001\nPerformance Management\n\u0001\nEmployee Discipline\n\u0001\nInformation Security\n\u0001\nCorporate Communications\n\u0001\nProcurement and Contracts\n\u0001\nRecords Management\n\u0001\nAsset Classification\n\u0001\nWorkplace Security\n\u0001\nBusiness Continuity Planning\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 74,
            "text": "We discuss the different levels of Tier 2 policies (topic specific) and\nTier 3 policies (application specific) throughout the remainder of the book.\n4.3 Corporate Policies\nMost organizations have a standard set of policies that govern the way\nthey perform their business (see Figure 4.1). There are at least eleven\nTier 1 policies; this means that a policy is implemented to support the\nentire business or mission of the enterprise. There are also Tier 2 policies;\nthese are topic-specific policies and address issues related to specific\nsubject matter. The Tier 3 policies address the requirements for using and\nsupporting specific applications. Later in the book we present examples\nof a number of each of these policies; for now we present the Tier 1\npolicy title and a brief description of what the policy encompasses.\n4.4 Organizationwide (Tier 1) Policies\n4.4.1\nEmployment\nThis is the policy that describes the processes required to ensure that all\ncandidates get an equal opportunity when seeking a position with the\norganization. This policy discusses the organization’s hiring practices and\nnew employee orientation. It is during the orientation phase that new\nemployees should receive their first introduction to the information security\nrequirements. Included in this process is a Nondisclosure Agreement or\nConfidentiality Agreement. These agreements require the signatory to keep\nconfidential information secret and generally remain in effect even after\nthe employee leaves the organization.\nThe employment policies should also include condition-of-employment\nrequirements such as background checks for key management levels or\ncertain jobs. A side part to the Employment policy and the Performance\npolicy is the publication of job descriptions for every job level. These\ndescriptions should include what is expected of employees regarding\ninformation security requirements.\n4.4.2\nStandards of Conduct\nThis policy addresses what is expected of employees and how they are\nto conduct themselves when on company property or when representing\nthe organization. This policy normally discusses examples of unacceptable\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 75,
            "text": "FIGURE 4.1\nCorporate Policies\nInformation\nSecurity\nCorporate\nCommunications\nWorkplace\nSecurity\nBusiness\nContinuity\nPlanning\nRecords\nManagement\nCorporate Policies\nCorporate\nOrganization\nAsset\nClassification\nEmployment\nEmployee\nStandards\nof Conduct\nConflict of\nInterest\nProcurement\nand Contracts\nPerformance\nManagement\nEmployee\nDiscipline\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 76,
            "text": "behavior (dishonesty, sleeping on the job, substance abuse, introduction\nof unauthorized software into company systems) and the penalties for\ninfractions. Also included in this policy is a statement that “Company\nmanagement has the responsibility to manage enterprise information,\npersonnel, and physical properties relevant to their business operations,\nas well as the right to monitor the actual utilization of these enterprise assets.”\nInformation security should also address confidential information:\n“Employees shall also maintain the confidentiality of corporate information.\n(See Asset Classification policy.)” A discussion on unacceptable conduct\nis generally included in an employee code of conduct policy; this should\ninclude a discussion on unauthorized code and copyright compliance.\n4.4.3\nConflict of Interest\nCompany employees are expected to adhere to the highest standards of\nconduct. To assure adherence to these standards, employees must have\na special sensitivity to conflict-of-interest situations or relationships, as\nwell as the inappropriateness of personal involvement in them. While not\nalways covered by law, these situations can harm the company or its\nreputation if improperly handled. This is where discussions about due\ndiligence will be addressed. Many organizations restrict conflict-of-interest\npolicy requirements to management levels; all employees should be\nrequired to annually review and sign a responsibility statement.\n4.4.4\nPerformance Management\nThis policy discusses how employee job performance is to be used in\ndetermining an employee’s appraisal. Information security requirements\nshould be included as an element that affects the level of employee\nperformance. As discussed, having job descriptions for each job assignment\nwill ensure that employees are reviewed fairly and completely at least\nannually on how they do their job and part of that includes information\nsecurity.\n4.4.5\nEmployee Discipline\nWhen things go wrong, this policy outlines the steps that are to be taken.\nAs with all policies, it discusses who is responsible for what and leads\nthose individuals to more extensive procedures. This policy is very impor-\ntant for an effective information security program. When an investigation\nbegins, it may eventually lead to a need to implement sanctions on an\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 77,
            "text": "employee or group of employees. Having a policy that establishes who\nis responsible for administering these sanctions will ensure that all involved\nin the investigation are properly protected.\n4.4.6\nInformation Security\nThe bulk of the remainder of this book addresses writing an effective\ninformation security policy. This is the cornerstone of the information\nsecurity program and works in close harmony with the enterprisewide\nAsset Classification Policy and the Records Management Policy. This policy\nestablished the concept that information is an asset and the property of\nthe organization, and that all employees are required to protect this asset.\n4.4.7\nCorporate Communications\nInstead of individual, topic-specific policies on such items as voice-mail,\ne-mail, inter-office memos, outside correspondence, a single policy on\nwhat is and is not allowed in organization correspondence can be imple-\nmented. This policy will support the concepts established in the Employee\nStandards of Conduct, which address employee conduct and include\nharassment whether sexual, racial, religious, or ethnic. The policy also\ndiscusses libelous and slanderous content and the organization’s position\non such behavior.\nThe policy also addresses requests from outside organizations for\ninformation. This will include media requests for information as well as\nrepresenting the organization by speaking at or submitting whitepapers\nfor various business-related conferences or societies.\n4.4.8\nWorkplace Security\nThis policy addresses the need to provide a safe and secure work envi-\nronment for the employees. The need to implement sound security prac-\ntices to protect employees, organization property, and information assets\nis established here. Included in this policy are the basic security tenets of\nauthorized access to the facility, visitor requirements, property removal,\nand emergency response plans, which include evacuation procedures.\n4.4.9\nBusiness Continuity Plans (BCPs)\nFor years this process was relegated to the Information Technology\ndepartment and consisted mainly of the IT disaster recovery plan for the\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 78,
            "text": "processing environment. The proper focus for this policy is the establish-\nment of business unit procedures to support restoration of critical business\nprocesses, applications, and systems in the event of an outage.\nIncluded in the Business Continuity Plan Policy are the needs for\nbusiness units to:\n\u0001\nEstablish effective continuity plans.\n\u0001\nConduct business impact analyses for all applications, systems, and\nbusiness processes.\n\u0001\nIdentify preventive controls.\n\u0001\nCoordinate the business unit BCP with the IT disaster recovery plan.\n\u0001\nTest the plan and train its employees on the plan.\n\u0001\nMaintain the plan to a current state of readiness.\n4.4.10\nProcurement and Contracts\nThis policy establishes the way in which the organization conducts its\nbusiness with outside firms. This policy addresses those items that must\nbe included in any contract, and this includes language that discusses the\nneed for third parties to comply with organization’s policies, procedures,\nand standards.\nThis policy is probably one of the most important for information\nsecurity and other organization policies and standards. We can only write\npolicies and establish standards and procedures for employees; all other\nthird parties must be handled contractually. It is very important that the\ncontract language references any policies, standards, and procedures that\nare deemed appropriate.\nAll too often I have reviewed policies that contained language that\nwas something like “the policy applies to all employees, contractors,\nconsultants, per diem, and other third parties.” Just because this language\nappears in a policy does not make it effective. Third parties must be\nhandled contractually. Work with the procurement group and legal staff\nto ensure that purchase orders and contracts have the necessary language.\nIt would be wise to include a confidentiality or nondisclosure agreement.\nAn example of a confidentiality agreement is included in the Sample Policy\nand Standards section of this book.\n4.4.11\nRecords Management\nThis policy was previously referred to as Records Retention, but the\nconcept has been refined. Most organizations know that there will be a\ntime when it will be necessary to destroy records. The Records Management\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 79,
            "text": "Policy will establish the standards for ensuring information is there as\nrequired by regulations and when it is time to properly dispose of the\ninformation. This policy normally establishes:\n\u0001\nThe record name\n\u0001\nA brief description of the record\n\u0001\nThe owning department\n\u0001\nThe required length of time to keep the record\n4.4.12\nAsset Classification\nThis policy establishes the need to classify information, the classification\ncategories, and who is responsible for doing so. It normally includes the\nconcepts of employee responsibilities, such as the Owner, Custodian, and\nUser. It is a companion policy to the Records Management Policy in that\nit adds the last two elements in information records identification. In\naddition to the four items identified in the Records Management Policy,\nthe Asset Classification Policy adds:\n\u0001\nThe classification level\n\u0001\nThe owner’s job title\n4.5 Organizationwide Policy Document\nThroughout the enterprisewide policy document, references to information\nsecurity and the information security program should be incorporated.\nThese concepts should begin with a review of the enterprise’s shared\nbeliefs that usually discuss such important concepts as teamwork, account-\nability, communication, continuous improvement, and benchmarking.\nBecause of the increased emphasis on proper conduct, a formal discussion\nof the enterprise’s support of due diligence concepts should be established.\nThe use of the term “accountability” when establishing organization\ngoals and beliefs allows the enterprise to commit to the concept that it\nis willing to accept accountability for the results of decisions made to\nsupport the business process or mission of the enterprise. To ensure that\nappropriate, informed business decisions are made in an open climate of\ndiscussion and research, a formal risk analysis process should be imple-\nmented to document all management decisions.\nBy establishing this level of accountability, the enterprise is creating a\nclimate of due diligence throughout the entire organization. A formal\nbusiness-related risk analysis process will ensure that all decisions are\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 80,
            "text": "made quickly and efficiently and that the process is recorded. This will\nallow third parties to examine the process and verify that due diligence\nwas performed.\nAs a security professional, it is very important that due diligence is\nestablished as an enterprise objective and guiding principle. Risk analysis\nwill ensure that all decisions are based on the best needs of the enterprise\nand that prudent and reasonable controls and safeguards are implemented.\nWith the implementation of more stringent reporting mechanism and laws\n(Sarbanes–Oxley) or international standards such as British Standards\n7799 (BS 7799) or ISO 17799, the formal adoption of a risk analysis\nprocess will assist in proving the enterprise is being managed in a proper\nmanner.\nAnother important element found in most enterprisewide policy docu-\nments is a section on Organizational Responsibilities. This section is where\nthe various mission statements of the enterprise organizations reside, along\nwith any associated responsibilities. For example:\n\u0001\nAuditing. Auditing assesses the adequacy of and compliance with\nmanagement, operating, and financial controls, as well as the\nadministrative and operational effectiveness of organizational units.\n\u0001\nInformation Security. Information Security (IS) is to direct and\nsupport the company and affiliated organizations in the protection\nof their information assets from intentional or unintentional disclo-\nsure, modification, destruction, or denial through the implementation\nof appropriate information security and business resumption plan-\nning policies, procedures, and guidelines.\nOther organizations that should be included in the Organizational\nResponsibilities section include (see Figure 4.2):\nFIGURE 4.2\nCorporate Policy Document\nCorporate\nOrganization\nOrganization Charts\nResponsibility Statements\n(Missions/Charters)\nManagement Groups\nCorporate Committees\n(IS Steering Committee)\n(4.1.2, 4.1.7, 12.2.1, 12.2.2, 12.3.1)\nISO Sections\n(3.1.1, 4.1.1, 4.1.4, 11.1.2, 12.2.1)\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 81,
            "text": "\u0001\nCorporate and Public Affairs\n\u0001\nFinance and Administration\n\u0001\nGeneral Counsel\n\u0001\nInformation Security Organization\n\u0001\nHuman Resources\nIncluded in the opening section of an enterprisewide policy document\nis a discussion on enterprise committees. Standing committees are estab-\nlished to develop, to present for executive decision, and, where empow-\nered, to implement recommendations on matters of significant, ongoing\nconcern to the enterprise. Certain committees administer enterprise pro-\ngrams for which two or more organizations share responsibility.\nThe Information Security Steering Committee identified in ISO 17799\n(4.1.1) and discussed as a requirement in the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act\n(GLBA) is required to involve the board of directors in the implementation\nof an enterprisewide information program. The first key responsibility of\nthis committee is the approval and implementation of the Information\nSecurity Charter as well as the Information Security Policy and the Asset\nClassification Policy. In addition to these two enterprisewide policies, the\ncommittee is responsible for ensuring that adequate supporting policies,\nstandards, and procedures are implemented to support the information\nsecurity program.\nThe Information Security Steering Committee (ISSC) consists of repre-\nsentatives from each of the major business units and is chaired by the\nChief Information Security Officer (CISO).\nThe ISSC is also the group responsible for reviewing and approving\nthe results of the enterprisewide business impact analysis that establishes\nthe relative criticality of each business process, application, and system\nused in the enterprise. The results of the BIA are then used as input to\ndevelop business continuity plans for the enterprise and for the business\nunits. The ISSC is also responsible for reviewing and certifying the BCPs.\nTo ensure adequacy, the BCPs must be exercised at least annually and\nthe exercise reports are presented to the ISSC.\nThe key responsibilities established for the ISSC include:\n\u0001\nApprove the enterprise’s written information security program:\nrequired in ISO 17799, BS 7799, and Gramm–Leach–Bliley.\n\u0001\nOversee the development, implementation, and maintenance of\nthe information security program: required in Gramm–Leach–Bliley.\n\u0001\nAssign specific responsibility for the program implementation:\nrequired in ISO 17799, BS 7799, and Gramm–Leach–Bliley.\n\u0001\nReview reports of the state of information security throughout the\nenterprise: required in Gramm–Leach–Bliley.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 82,
            "text": "4.6 Legal Requirements\nAre there legal and business requirements for policies and procedures?\nThe answer to that question is a resounding yes. Not only are there\nrequirements, but the laws and acts define who is responsible and what\nthey must do to meet their obligations. The directors and officers of a\ncorporation are required under the Model Business Corporation Act, which\nhas been adopted in whole or in part by a majority of states, to perform\ntwo specific duties: a duty of loyalty and a duty of care.\n4.6.1\nDuty of Loyalty\nBy assuming office, senior management commits allegiance to the enter-\nprise and acknowledges that the interest of the enterprise must prevail\nover any personal or individual interest. The basic principle here is that\nsenior management should not use its position to make a personal profit\nor gain other personal advantage. The duty of loyalty is evident in certain\nlegal concepts:\n\u0001\nConflict of interest: Individuals must divulge any interest in outside\nrelationships that might conflict with the enterprise’s interests.\n\u0001\nDuty of fairness: When presented with a conflict of interest, the\nindividual has an obligation to act in the best interest of all parties.\n\u0001\nCorporate opportunity: When presented with “material inside infor-\nmation” (advanced notice on mergers, acquisitions, patents, etc.),\nthe individual will not use this information for personal gain.\n\u0001\nConfidentiality: All matters involving the corporation should be\nkept in confidence until they are made public.\n4.6.2\nDuty of Care\nIn addition to owing a duty of loyalty to the enterprise, the officers and\ndirectors also assume a duty to act carefully in fulfilling the important\ntasks of monitoring and directing the activities of corporate management.\nThe Model Business Corporation Act established legal standards for com-\npliance. A director shall discharge his or her duties:\n\u0001\nIn good faith\n\u0001\nWith the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would\nexercise under similar circumstances\n\u0001\nIn a manner he or she reasonably believes is in the best interest\nof the enterprise\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 83,
            "text": "4.6.3\nFederal Sentencing Guidelines \nfor Criminal Convictions\nThe Federal Sentencing Guidelines define executive responsibility for\nfraud, theft, and antitrust violations, and establish a mandatory point\nsystem for federal judges to determine appropriate punishment. Because\nmuch fraud and falsifying corporate data involves access to computer-held\ndata, liability established under the Guidelines extend to computer-related\ncrime as well. What has caused many executives concern is that the\nmandatory punishment could apply even when intruders enter a computer\nsystem and perpetrate a crime.\nWhile the Guidelines have a mandatory scoring system for punishment,\nthey also have an incentive for proactive crime prevention. The require-\nment here is for management to show “due diligence” in establishing an\neffective compliance program. There are seven elements that capture the\nbasic functions inherent in most compliance programs:\n1.\nEstablish policies, standards, and procedures to guide the workforce.\n2.\nAppoint a high-level manager to oversee compliance with the\npolicies, standards, and procedures.\n3.\nExercise due care when granting discretionary authority to employees.\n4.\nAssure compliance policies are being carried out.\n5.\nCommunicate the standards and procedures to all employees and\nothers.\n6.\nEnforce the policies, standards, and procedures consistently\nthrough appropriate disciplinary measures.\n7.\nEstablish procedures for corrections and modifications in case of\nviolations.\nThese guidelines reward those organizations that make a good-faith\neffort to prevent unethical activity; this is done by lowering potential fines\nif, despite the organization’s best efforts, unethical or illegal activities are\nstill committed by the organization or its employees. To be judged effec-\ntive, a compliance program need not prevent all misconduct; however, it\nmust show due diligence in seeking to prevent and detect inappropriate\nbehavior.\n4.6.4\nThe Economic Espionage Act of 1996\nThe Economic Espionage Act (EEA) of 1996 for the first time makes trade\nsecret theft a federal crime, subject to penalties including fines, forfeiture,\nand imprisonment. The act reinforces the rules governing trade secrets in\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 84,
            "text": "that businesses must show that they have taken reasonable measures to\nprotect their proprietary trade secrets in order to seek relief under the EEA.\nIn “Counterintelligence and Law Enforcement: The Economic Espionage\nAct of 1996 versus Competitive Intelligence,” author Peter F. Kalitka\nbelieves that given the penalties companies face under the EEA, that\nbusiness hiring outside consultants to gather competitive intelligence\nshould establish a policy on this activity. Included in the contract language\nwith the outside consultant should be definitions of:\n\u0001\nWhat is hard-to-get information?\n\u0001\nHow will the information be obtained?\n\u0001\nDo they adhere to the Society of Competitive Intelligence Profes-\nsionals Code of Ethics?\n\u0001\nDo they have accounts with clients that may be questioned?\n4.6.5\nThe Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)\nFor 20 years, regulators largely ignored the FCPA. This was due in part\nto an initial amnesty program under which nearly 500 companies admitted\nviolations. Now the federal government has dramatically increased its\nattention to business activities and is looking to enforce the act with vigor.\nTo avoid liability under the FCPA, companies must implement a due\ndiligence program that includes a set of internal controls and enforcement.\nA set of policies and procedures that are implemented and audited for\ncompliance are required to meet the test of due diligence.\n4.6.5\nSarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act\nThe Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act was signed into law on July 30, 2002, and\nthe provisions of the act have a meaningful impact on both public\ncompanies and auditors. Two important sections of the act are:\n1.\nSection 302 (Disclosure Controls and Procedures or “DC&P”)\nrequires quarterly certification of financial statements by the CEO\nand CFO. The CEO and CFO must certify the completeness and\naccuracy of the filings and attest to the effectiveness of internal\ncontrol.\n2.\nSection 404 (Internal Control Attest) requires annual affirmation of\nmanagement’s responsibility for internal controls over financial\nreporting. Management must attest to the effectiveness based on\nan evaluation, and the auditor must attest to and report on man-\nagement’s evaluation.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 85,
            "text": "4.6.6\nHealth Insurance Portability and Accountability \nAct (HIPAA)\nThe Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), also\nknown as Kassebaum-Kennedy, after the two senators who spearheaded\nthe bill. Passed in 1996 to help people buy and keep health insurance\n(portability), even when they have serious health conditions, the law sets\nbasic requirements that health plans must meet. Because states can and\nhave modified and expanded upon these provisions, consumer protections\nvary from state to state. The law expanded to include strict rules for\nprivacy and security of health information, giving individuals more control\nover how their health information is used. The privacy and security rules\nwithin HIPAA govern the use, disclosure, and handling of any identifiable\npatient information by “covered” healthcare providers. The law covers the\ninformation in whatever form it is seen or heard, and applies to the\ninformation in whatever manner it is to be used.\n4.6.7\nGramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA)\nThe Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA) was signed into law in 1999. Its\nprimary purpose is to provide privacy of customer information by financial\nservices organizations and comprehensive data protection measures are\nrequired. Depending on the financial institutions’ supervisory authority,\nGLBA compliance audits are conducted by either the Office of the Comp-\ntroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve Systems (Fed), the\nFederal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), or the Office of Thrift\nSupervision (OTS). All financial services organizations must comply with\nGLBA data protection requirements. These requirements do not pertain\nonly to providers receiving federal funds.\nThe GLBA requires financial institutions to:\n\u0001\nInsure the security and confidentiality of customer records and\ninformation.\n\u0001\nProtect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security\nor integrity of such records.\n\u0001\nProtect against unauthorized access.\n4.7 Business Requirements\nIt is a well-accepted fact that it is important to protect the information\nessential to an organization, in the same way that it is important to protect\nthe financial assets of the organization. Unlike protecting financial assets,\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 86,
            "text": "which have regulations to support their protection, the protection of\ninformation is often left to the individual employee. As with protecting\nfinancial assets, everyone knows what the solutions are for protecting\ninformation resources. However, identifying these requirements is not\ngood enough; to enforce controls, it is necessary to have a formal written\npolicy that can be used as the basis for all standards and procedures.\n4.8 Definitions\n4.8.1\nPolicy\nA policy is a high-level statement of enterprise beliefs, goals, and objectives\nand the general means for their attainment for a specified subject area.\nWhen we hear discussions on intrusion detection systems (IDS) monitoring\ncompliance to company policies, these are not the policies we are dis-\ncussing. The IDS is actually monitoring standards, which we will discuss\nin more detail later, or rule sets or proxies. We will be creating policies\nsuch as the policy on information security shown in Table 4.1.\nLater in this chapter we will examine a number of information security\npolicies and then critique them based on an established policy template.\nTABLE 4.1\nSample Information Security Policy\nInformation Security Policy\nBusiness information is an essential asset of the Company. This is true of all\nbusiness information within the Company, regardless of how it is created,\ndistributed, or stored and whether it is typed, handwritten, printed, filmed,\ncomputer-generated, or spoken.\nAll employees are responsible for protecting corporate information from\nunauthorized access, modification, duplication, destruction, or disclosure,\nwhether accidental or intentional. This responsibility is essential to Company\nbusiness. When information is not well protected, the Company can be harmed\nin various ways, such as significant loss to market share and a damaged reputation.\nDetails of each employee’s responsibilities for protecting Company informa-\ntion are documented in the Information Protection Policies and Standards\nManual. Management is responsible for ensuring that all employees under-\nstand and adhere to these policies and standards. Management is also respon-\nsible for noting variances from established security practices and for initiating\ncorrective actions.\nInternal auditors will perform periodic reviews to ensure ongoing compliance\nwith the Company information protection policy. Violations of this policy will be\naddressed as prescribed in the Human Resource Policy Guide for Management.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 87,
            "text": "4.8.2\nStandards\nStandards are mandatory requirements that support individual policies.\nStandards can range from what software or hardware can be used, to\nwhat remote access protocol is to be implemented, to who is responsible\nfor approving what. We examine standards in more detail later in this\nbook. When developing an information security policy, it will be necessary\nto establish a set of supporting standards. Table 4.2 shows an example\nof what the standards for a specific topic might look like.\n4.8.3\nProcedures\nProcedures are mandatory, step-by-step, detailed actions required to suc-\ncessfully complete a task. Procedures can be very detailed. Recently I was\nreviewing change management procedures, like the one shown in\nTable 4.3, and found one that consisted of 42 pages. It was very thorough,\nbut I find it difficult to believe that anyone had ever read the entire\ndocument. We discuss procedures in more detail later in this book.\nTABLE 4.2\nExample of Standards\nInformation Systems Manager/Team Leader\nManagers with responsibility for Information Systems must carry out all the\nappropriate responsibilities as a Manager for their area. In addition, they will\nact as Custodian of information used by those systems but owned by other\nmanagers. They must ensure that these owners are identified, appointed, and\nmade aware of their responsibilities.\nAll managers, supervisors, directors, and other management-level people\nalso have an advisory and assisting role to IS and non-IS managers with respect\nto:\n\u0001\nIdentifying and assessing threats\n\u0001\nIdentifying and implementing protective measures (including compli-\nance with these practices)\n\u0001\nMaintaining a satisfactory level of security awareness\n\u0001\nMonitoring the proper operation of security measures within the unit\n\u0001\nInvestigating weaknesses and occurrences\n\u0001\nRaising any new issues or circumstances of which they become aware\nthrough their specialist role\n\u0001\nLiaising with internal and external audit\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 88,
            "text": "TABLE 4.3 \nSample Application Change Management Procedure\nGeneral\nThe System Service Request (SSR) is used to initiate and document all program-\nming activity. It is used to communicate customer needs to Application De-\nvelopment (AD) personnel. An SSR may be initiated and prepared by a\ncustomer, a member of the AD staff, or any other individual who has identified\na need or requirement, a problem, or an enhancement to an application. No\ntasks are to be undertaken without a completed SSR.\nSystem Service Request\nGeneral\nThis form, specifying the desired results to be achieved, is completed by the\ncustomer and sent, together with supporting documentation, to AD. The re-\nquest may include the identification of a problem or the documentation of a\nnew request. Customers are encouraged to submit their request in sufficient\ndetail to permit the AD project leader to accurately estimate the effort needed\nto satisfy the request, but it may be necessary for the project leader to contact\nthe customer and obtain supplementary information. This information should\nbe attached to a copy of the SSR.\nAfter the requested programs have been completed, the agreed-upon Ac-\nceptance tests will be conducted. After the customer has verified that the\nrequest has been satisfied, the customer will indicate approval on the SSR.\nThis form will also be used to document that the completed project has been\nplaced into production status.\nProcessing\nThis section describes the processing of a System Service Request:\n1.\nThe customer initiates the process by completing the SSR and forwarding\nit to the appropriate Project Manager (PM) or the Director of Application\nDevelopment.\n2.\nThe SSR is received in the AD department. Regardless of who in AD\nactually receives the SSR, it must be delivered to the appropriate PM.\n3.\nIf the PM finds the description of requirements on the SSR inadequate\nor unclear, the PM will directly contact the customer for clarification.\nWhen the PM fully understands the requirements, the PM will prepare\nan analysis and an estimate of the effort required to satisfy the request.\nIn some cases, the PM may feel that it is either impossible or impractical\nto satisfy the request. In this case, the PM will discuss with the customer\nthe reasons why the request should not be implemented. If the customer\nreaffirms the request, the PM and Director of AD will jointly determine\nwhether to appeal the customer’s decision to the Information Systems\nSteering Committee for a final ruling on the SSR.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 89,
            "text": "4.\nIf the project estimate is forty (40) hours or less, the detailed design\nshould be reviewed with the customer. After design concurrence has\nbeen reviewed, the PM will project the tentative target date (TTD) for\ncompletion of the SSR. In setting the TTD, the PM will take into consid-\neration the resources available and other project commitments. The TTD\nwill be promptly communicated to the requesting customer.\n5.\nIf the project estimate exceeds forty (40) hours, the SSR and any supple-\nmental project documentation will be forwarded to the ISSC for review,\npriority determination, and authorization to proceed.\nThe committee will determine whether the requested change is to be\nscheduled for immediate implementation, scheduled for future imple-\nmentation, or disapproved. If the request is disapproved, it is immediately\nreturned to the customer, together with an explanation of the reason(s)\nfor disapproval. If it is approved for implementation, a priority designation\nis made and the SSR is returned to AD for implementation scheduling.\nAfter implementation authorization has been received, the detailed\ndesign should be reviewed with the customer. After design concurrence\nhas been received, the PM will project a TTD for completion of the\nproject. In setting a TTD, the PM will take into consideration the resources\navailable and other project commitments. The TTD will be promptly com-\nmunicated to the customer.\n6.\nThe PM will coordinate with AD personnel and other IT management and\nstaff personnel (such as Database Administration, User Support Services,\nNetwork Administration, etc.) if their resources will be required to satisfy\nthis request, or if there will be an operational or procedural impact in\nthe other areas.\n7.\nThe PM will contact the customer to discuss, in detail, the test(s) that are\nto be conducted.\n8.\nWhen Acceptance Testing (AT) has been completed and the customer\nhas verified the accuracy of the results obtained, the customer will indi-\ncate their approval to place the project into production by signing the\nSSR.\n9.\nThe Production Control Group (PCG) will place the project into produc-\ntion status. The PM will complete the bottom portion of the SSR, docu-\nmenting that the project has been placed into production. The PM will\nlog the status of the request as “completed” and file a copy of the SSR.\nThe PM will promptly notify the customer that the project has been\ncompleted and placed into production.\nRetention of Forms and Documentation\nAll documentation associated with the processing of each SSR will be retained\nfor at least twelve (12) months.\nTABLE 4.3 (continued)\nSample Application Change Management Procedure\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 90,
            "text": "4.8.4\nGuidelines\nGuidelines are more general statements designed to achieve the policy’s\nobjectives by providing a framework within which to implement proce-\ndures. Whereas standards are mandatory, guidelines are recommendations.\nAn everyday example of the difference between a standard and a guideline\nwould be a stop sign, which is a standard, and a “Please Keep Off the\nGrass” sign, which would be nice but it is not a law.\nSome organizations issue overall information security policies and\nstandards documents. These can be a mix of Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3\npolicies and their supporting standards and guidelines (see Figure 4.3).\nWhile it is appropriate to include policies in a document such as this, it\nis considered impractical to include standards, procedures, or guidelines\nin Tier 1 policies.\n4.9 Policy Key Elements\nThe information security policy should cover all forms of information. In\n1965, the computer industry introduced the concept of the “paperless\noffice.” The advent of third-generation computers had many in management\nbelieving that all information would be stored and secured electronically\nand that paper would become obsolete. When talking to management about\nestablishing an information security policy, it will be necessary to discuss\nwith them the need to extend the policy to cover all information wherever\nit is found and in whatever format. Computer-held information makes up\na small percentage of the organization’s entire information resources. Make\nsure the policy meets the needs of the organization.\n4.10 Policy Format\nThe actual physical format (layout) of the policy will depend on what\npolicies look like in your own organization. Policies are generally brief\nin comparison to procedures and normally consist of one page of text\nusing both sides of the paper. In my classes I stress the concept of brevity.\nHowever, it is important to balance brevity with clarity. Utilize all the\nwords you need to complete the thought, but fight the urge to add more\ninformation.\nYears ago we had a young priest visit our parish and his homily that\nweekend included a discussion on the concept of imprinting. This concept\nis normally covered in a basic psychology class and is an early social\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 91,
            "text": "FIGURE 4.3\nOverall Information Security Policies and Standards Documents\nSupporting\nProcedures\nStandards\nSupporting\nProcedures\nStandards\nSupporting\nProcedures\nStandards\nSupporting\nProcedures\nStandards\nSystems\nDevelopment\nand\nMaintenance\nSupporting\nProcedures\nStandards\nSupporting\nProcedures\nStandards\nSupporting\nProcedures\nStandards\nSecurity\nOrganization\nOperations\nManagement\nPersonnel\nSecurity\nCompliance\nAccess\nControl\nAsset\nClassification\nand Control\nBusiness\nContinuity\nPlanning\nInformation\nSecurity\nPolicy\nTier 2\nPolicies\nTier 1\nPolicies\nAsset\nClassification\nPolicy\nInformation\nSecurity\nArchitecture\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 92,
            "text": "behavior among birds and is a process that causes the newly hatched\nbirds to become rapidly and strongly attached to social objects such as\nparents or parental surrogates. While a number of us understood what\nhe was talking about, the majority of the parish just stared at him blankly.\nSo he continued to add explanation after explanation until his homily\nlasted about 45 minutes. When writing a policy, balance the attention\nspan time limit with what needs to be addressed. Keep it brief but make\nit understandable.\nThere are three types of policies and you will use each type at different\ntimes in your information security program and throughout the organiza-\ntion to support the business process or mission. The three types of policies\nare:\n1.\nGlobal (Tier 1). These are used to create the organization’s overall\nvision and direction.\n2.\nTopic-specific (Tier 2). These address particular subjects of concern.\n3.\nApplication-specific (Tier 3). These focus on decisions taken by\nmanagement to control particular applications (financial reporting,\npayroll, etc.) or specific systems (budgeting system).\nWe discuss the information security architecture and each category\nsuch as those shown in Figure 4.4.\nFIGURE 4.4\nTopic-Specific (Tier 2) Policies\nSecurity\nOrganization\nAsset\nClassification\nand Control\nPersonnel\nSecurity\nPhysical and\nEnvironmental\nSecurity\nComputer\nand Network\nManagement\nInformation\nSecurity\nE-Mail\nSecurity\nAntivirus\nAcceptable\nUse of the\nInternet\nSystem\nAccess\nControl\nSystems\nDevelopment\nand\nMaintenance\nBusiness\nContinuity\nPlanning\nCompliance\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 93,
            "text": "4.10.1\nGlobal (Tier 1) Policy\nUnder the Standard of Due Care, and charged with the ultimate responsibility\nfor meeting business objectives or mission requirements, senior management\nmust ensure that necessary resources are effectively applied to develop the\ncapabilities to meet the mission requirements. Senior management must\nincorporate the results of the risk analysis process into the decision-making\nprocess. Senior management is also responsible for issuing global policies\nto establish the organization’s direction in protecting information assets.\nAn information security policy will define the intent of management\nand its sponsoring body with regard to protecting the information assets\nof the organization. It will include the scope of the program — that is,\nwhere it will reach and what information is included in this policy. Finally,\nthe policy will establish who is responsible for what.\nThe components of a global (Tier 1) policy typically include four char-\nacteristics: topic, scope, responsibilities, and compliance or consequences.\n4.10.1.1\nTopic\nThe topic portion of the policy defines what specifically the policy is going\nto address. Because the attention span of readers is limited, the topic must\nappear quickly, say in the opening or topic sentence. I normally suggest\n(note it is a guideline, not a standard) that the topic sentence also include\na “hook.” That is, why I as a reader should continue to read this policy.\nSo in the opening sentence we will want to convey two important elements:\n(1) the topic (it should have something to do with the title of the policy),\nand (2) the hook (why the reader should continue reading the policy).\nAn opening topic sentence might read as follows:\n“Information created while employed by the company is the\nproperty of the company and must be properly protected.”\n4.10.1.2\nScope\nThe scope can be used to broaden or narrow either the topic or the\naudience. In an information security policy statement, we could say that\n“information is an asset and the property of the company and all employ-\nees are responsible for protecting that asset.” In this sentence we have\nbroadened the audience to include all employees. We can also say\nsomething like “Business information is an essential asset of the Company.\nThis is true of all business information within the Company, regardless of\nhow it is created, distributed, or stored and whether it is typed, handwrit-\nten, printed, filmed, computer-generated, or spoken.” Here, the writer\nbroadened the topic to include all types of information assets.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 94,
            "text": "Another example of broadening the scope might be as follows: “Infor-\nmation of the Company, its subsidiaries and affiliates in electronic form,\nwhether being transmitted, or stored, is a key asset of the Company and\nmust be protected according to its sensitivity, criticality, and value.” Here,\nthe topic subject is narrowed to “electronic form.” However, the audience\nis broadened to include “subsidiaries and affiliates.”\nWe can also use the scope concept to narrow the topic or audience.\nIn an Employment Agreement Policy, the audience is restricted to a specific\ngroup such as the following:\nThe parties to this Agreement dated (specify) are (Name of\nCompany), a (specify state and type of company) (the “Com-\npany”) and (Name of Employee) (the “Executive”).\nThe Company wishes to employ the Executive, and the Exec-\nutive wishes to accept employment with the Company, on the\nterms and subject to the conditions set forth in this Agreement.\nIt is therefore agreed as follows:…\nHere, the policy is restricted to Executives and will then go on to\ndiscuss what can and cannot be done by the executives. A sample\nEmployment Agreement Policy is contained in Section 4.10.2: Topic-\nSpecific (Tier 2) Policy. \n4.10.1.3\nResponsibilities\nTypically, this section of the policy will identify who is responsible for\nwhat. When writing, it is better to identify the “who” by job title and not\nby name. Here again, the Office Administrator’s Reference Guide can be\nof great assistance. The policy will want to identify what is expected from\neach of the stakeholders.\n4.10.1.4\nCompliance or Consequences\nWhen business units or employees are found in a noncompliant situation,\nthe policy must spell out the consequences of these actions. For business\nunits or departments, if they are found in noncompliance, they are\ngenerally subject to an audit item and will have to prepare a formal\ncompliance response.\nFor employees, being found in noncompliance with a company policy\nwill mean they are in violation of the organization’s Employee Standards\nof Conduct and will be subject to consequences described in the Employee\nDiscipline Policy.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 95,
            "text": "4.10.1.5\nSample Information Security Global Policies\nThe next few pages examine sample information security policies and\ncritique them. The written policy should clear up confusion, not generate\nnew problems. When preparing a document for a specific audience,\nremember that the writer will not have the opportunity to sit down with\neach reader and explain what each item or sentence means. The writer\nwill not be able to tell every person how the policy will impact the reader’s\ndaily assignments. When writing a policy, know the audience. For a global\n(Tier 1) policy, the audience is the employee base.\nUsing the general employee population as a base, let us examine a\nfew policies (see Table 4.4, Table 4.5, Table 4.6, and Table 4.7), and see\nif they have the four key elements we should be looking for. We will\nwant to see if these policies have:\n1.\nTopic (including a topic and a “hook”)\n2.\nScope (whether it broadens or narrows the topic or the audience\nor both)\n3.\nResponsibilities (based on job titles)\n4.\nCompliance or consequences\nTable 4.4 (Example 1) addresses the checklist as follows:\n1.\nTopic: “Information is a valuable corporate asset …. As such, steps\nwill be taken to protect information…”\n2.\nResponsibilities: “The protection of these assets is a basic manage-\nment responsibility.”\n3.\nScope: “Ensuring that all employees understand their obligation to\nprotect these assets.”\n4.\nCompliance: “Noting variance from established security practice\nand for initiating corrective action.”\nThis policy is a good start. However, the topic is vague and that is\nnot acceptable. The most important goal of any writing is to quickly\nidentify the topic. Without the title, we have only a vague idea of where\nthe document is leading us.\nWhen the policy establishes responsibilities, it will work best if you\nuse an active verb. In this example, the writer diminishes the verb and\nmakes it passive by adding the gerund “ing” to the verbs “identify,”\n“ensure,” and “note.” Try to avoid the passive tense whenever possible.\nWhen identifying levels of management, most organizations have estab-\nlished a scheme for how differing levels are referred to in print. Normally,\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 96,
            "text": "Management with an uppercase M refers to senior management and\nlowercase management refers to line management or supervision.\nIn the policy in Table 4.4, the writer referred to the “employing officer.”\nFor many enterprises, an officer is the most senior level of management.\nOfficers may rank up there with the board of directors. The Chief Executive\nOfficer, Chief Financial Officer, etc. are examples of this management\nlevel. It is pretty safe to assume that the writer did not intend for such a\nhigh-ranking individual to be involved in this policy.\nTable 4.5 (Example 2) addresses the checklist as follows:\n1.\nTopic. The policy statement establishes that “company information…\nthat would violate company commitments… or compromise…com-\npetitive stance…” must be protected.\n2.\nResponsibilities. The policy does establish “Employee responsibili-\nties;” however, if there is to be a reference to another document,\nthere are two standards and one guideline that must be followed:\n\u0001\nThe referenced document must exist.\n\u0001\nThe reader must be able to easily access the referenced document.\n\u0001\nReferencing other documents should be used judiciously.\nTABLE 4.4\nA Utility Company’s Information Security Policy: Example 1\nInformation Security Policy\nInformation is a valuable corporate asset. Business continuity is heavily\ndependent upon the integrity and continued availability of certain critical\ninformation and the means by which that information is gathered, stored,\nprocessed, communicated, and reported. As such, steps will be taken to pro-\ntect information assets from unauthorized use, modification, disclosure, or\ndestruction, whether accidental or intentional. The protection of these assets\nis a basic management responsibility. Employing officers are responsible for:\n\u0001\nIdentifying and protecting computer-related information assets within\ntheir assigned area of management control\n\u0001\nEnsuring that these assets are used for management-approved purposes\nonly\n\u0001\nEnsuring that all employees understand their obligation to protect these\nassets\n\u0001\nImplementing security practices and procedures that are consistent with\nthe Company Information Asset Security Manual and the value of the\nasset\n\u0001\nNoting variance from established security practice and for initiating cor-\nrective action\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 97,
            "text": "3.\nScope. Here, the policy makes a mistake in the first section; the\npolicy actually narrows the scope of the material to be protected\nby stating that “company information…that would violate company\ncommitments…or compromise…competitive stance…..” This state-\nment in fact narrows the overall policy direction to only that\ninformation which meets this specific criterion.\n4.\nCompliance. Straight out: you violate, you pay the penalty. This\nmay be a bit harsh. Remember that part of policy implementation\nis acceptance. A better way to state this consequence might be,\n“Employees found to be in violation of this policy will be subject\nto the measures described in the Employee Discipline Policy.”\nAlthough the policy in Table 4.5 does meet one of the main require-\nments of a policy — that it be brief — it appears to be too brief. Some\nvery important elements are omitted, especially what role management\nwill play in this policy and how compliance will be monitored. The policy\nalso seems to exclude information about personnel.\nThe opening sentence discusses the “policy” of the company. The\ndocument was drafted as a policy statement, so it is not necessary to add\nthe term “policy” to the text. Let the words establish what the policy is.\nNow let us review the policy statement we used as an example earlier\nin this chapter (see Table 4.6).\nFor this critique, we examine the policy (Table 4.6) sentence by sen-\ntence. Each sentence is numbered, based on where it appears in the policy\nstatement.\n1.\n“Business information is an essential asset of the Company.”\n\u0001\nThis starts out as a topic sentence but it leaves out the hook.\nTABLE 4.5\nA Power Company’s Information Security Policy: Example 2\nInformation Security\nPolicy Statement\nIt is the policy of the Power and Light Company to protect all company\ninformation from disclosures that would violate company commitments to\nothers or would compromise the competitive stance of the company.\nEmployee Responsibilities\nEmployee responsibilities are defined in Company Procedure AUT 15. Viola-\ntions of these responsibilities are subject to appropriate disciplinary action\nup to and including discharge, legal action, or having the matter referred to\nlaw enforcement agencies.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 98,
            "text": "2.\n“This is true of all business information within the Company,\nregardless of how it is created, distributed, or stored and whether\nit is typed, handwritten, printed, filmed, computer-generated, or\nspoken.”\n\u0001\nThis is scope; it addresses all the various types of information\nthat could be included.\n3.\n“All employees are responsible for protecting corporate information\nfrom unauthorized access, modification, duplication, destruction,\nor disclosure, whether accidental or intentional.”\n\u0001\nHere, finally is the hook. It also has scope in that it includes\nall employees.\n4.\n“This responsibility is essential to Company business.”\n\u0001\nThis is probably additional scope but appears to be part of an\nexplanation. When developing a policy, it is not necessary to\ninclude why the policy was created. Explaining the why will\nbe handled in the policy awareness program.\n5.\n“When information is not well protected, the Company can be\nharmed in various ways, such as significant loss to market share\nand a damaged reputation.”\nTABLE 4.6\nA Healthcare Provider’s Information Security Policy: Example 3\nInformation Security Policy\nBusiness information is an essential asset of the Company. This is true of all\nbusiness information within the Company, regardless of how it is created,\ndistributed, or stored and whether it is typed, handwritten, printed, filmed,\ncomputer-generated, or spoken.\nAll employees are responsible for protecting corporate information from\nunauthorized access, modification, duplication, destruction, or disclosure,\nwhether accidental or intentional. This responsibility is essential to Company\nbusiness. When information is not well protected, the Company can be harmed\nin various ways, such as significant loss to market share and a damaged repu-\ntation.\nDetails of each employee’s responsibilities for protecting Company informa-\ntion are documented in the Information Protection Policies and Standards\nManual. Management is responsible for ensuring that all employees under-\nstand and adhere to these policies and standards. Management is also respon-\nsible for noting variances from established security practices and for initiating\ncorrective actions.\nInternal auditors will perform periodic reviews to ensure ongoing compli-\nance with the Company information protection policy. Violations of this policy\nwill be addressed as prescribed in the Human Resource Policy Guide for\nManagement.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 99,
            "text": "\u0001\nThis is definitely why the policy is important. To be clear on\nthis point, the policy needs to be as clear and concise as\npossible. Try to avoid adding why the policy was created. After\nthe policy has been around for a few years and becomes part\nof the culture of the organization, it will seem superfluous to\nhave these words in the policy.\n6.\n“Details of each employee’s responsibilities for protecting Company\ninformation are documented in the Information Protection Policies\nand Standards Manual.”\n\u0001\nRemember our two standards and one guideline about refer-\nencing other works: (1) the document has to exist; (2) it has\nto be easily accessible to the reader; and (3) use this tactic\ninfrequently. Note in sentence 6 that the author changes infor-\nmation type from “business” information to “company” informa-\ntion. This could add confusion for the reader. Strive to be\nconsistent throughout the policy.\n7.\n“Management is responsible for ensuring that all employees under-\nstand and adhere to these policies and standards.”\n\u0001\nHere, the sentence begins with “Management.” Is the uppercase\n“M” for the beginning of the sentence or is it to identify a level\nof management? When writing a sentence like this, it is better\nto start with an adjective such as “Company Management.” This\nwill reduce the confusion for the reader.\n8.\n“Management is also responsible for noting variances from estab-\nlished security practices and for initiating corrective actions.”\n\u0001\nThe same critique as sentence 7. This is a reference to respon-\nsibilities and also what to do if a business unit is found to be\nin a noncompliant condition.\n9.\n“Internal auditors will perform periodic reviews to ensure ongoing\ncompliance with the Company information protection policy.”\n\u0001\nThis sentence causes great concern. This is what auditors do,\nso it is not necessary to include a statement such as this in the\npolicy. Additionally, if this sentence remains, then the policy\nrequires that only internal auditors can conduct reviews of this\npolicy. Remember, when writing anything, to be very careful\nwith what you say. The words will be interpreted by each\nreader in the manner that best meets their needs.\n10.\n“Violations of this policy will be addressed as prescribed in the\nHuman Resource Policy Guide for Management.”\n\u0001\nAs discussed in the review of sentence 7, the rules on other\ndocuments apply. This is the final compliance issue as it\naddresses what occurs when employees are in a noncompliant\ncondition.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 100,
            "text": "We now examine one last sample policy (see Table 4.7). This one\nappears to have all the elements. I recommend that when you critique\nsomething that you read in through completely. Then go back and dissect\nit sentence by sentence. Look for our four key elements: (1) topic, (2) scope,\n(3) responsibilities, and (4) compliance.\nThe opening paragraph is captioned “policy”; this should give us the\ninformation we need. It does contain some of the topic sentence we\ndiscussed earlier. It has half the requirements we would like to see; it\nlacks the “hook.” The second sentence contains the scope.\nUnder “Responsibilities” we find the “hook” in the first item. Item\nnumbers two, three, and four seem to be elements that we would normally\nfind in an Asset Classification policy. When I talked to the people who\ndeveloped this policy, I was told that the company had gone through a\npaper-reduction process during the past couple of years and had stream-\nlined its operating documents quite a bit. The new philosophy was that\nno new policies would be created. After about a year of campaigning and\naudit comments, the management approval team authorized one new policy.\nThe team took advantage and combined the Information Security Policy and\nthe Asset Classification Policy into the Information Protection Policy. What\nthey did was correct based on the current climate of their organization.\nThe final section (Compliance) discusses the compliance issues and\nincludes some interesting requirements that management must implement\nto be compliant with this policy. The Information Protection Group\ndeveloped a set of policies, standards, and guidelines that could be used\nby the various departments as a template for their own supporting doc-\numents. A sample of this type of document is included in the book under\nthe section “Information Security Reference Guide.”\n4.10.2\nTopic-Specific (Tier 2) Policy\nWhere the global (Tier 1) policy is intended to address the broad orga-\nnizationwide issues, the topic-specific (Tier 2) policy is developed to focus\non areas of current relevance and concern to the organization. Manage-\nment may find it appropriate to issue a policy on how an organization\nwill approach Internet usage or the use of the company-provided e-mail\nsystem. Topic-specific policies may also be appropriate when new issues\narise, such as when implementing a recently enacted law requiring pro-\ntection of particular information (GLBA, HIPAA, etc.). The global (Tier 1)\npolicy is usually broad enough that it does not require modification over\ntime, whereas topic-specific (Tier 2) policies are likely to require more\nfrequent revisions as changes in technology and other factors dictate.\nTopic-specific policies (see Figure 4.5) will be created most often by\nan organization. We examine the key elements in the topic-specific policy.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 101,
            "text": "TABLE 4.7\nA Utility Company’s Information Protection \nPolicy: Example 4\nInformation Protection\nPolicy\nInformation is a company asset and is the property of the Your Company.\nYour Company information includes information that is electronically gen-\nerated, printed, filmed, typed, stored, or verbally communicated. Informa-\ntion must be protected according to its sensitivity, criticality, and value,\nregardless of the media on which it is stored, the manual or automated\nsystems that process it, or the methods by which it is distributed.\nResponsibilities\n1.\nEmployees are responsible for protecting corporate information from\nunauthorized access, modification, duplication, destruction, or dis-\nclosure.\n2.\nEmployees responsible for creating, administering, or using corporate\ninformation are identified as information owners, custodians, and users\nwith responsibilities to protect information under their control.\na.\nOwner: Employees responsible for the creation or use of the infor-\nmation resource. Owners are responsible to define safeguards that\nassure the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of the informa-\ntion assets. Owners are also responsible to place information in\nthe proper classification so that it can be obtained by those who\nneed the information to perform their assigned duties (see Section\n4 below).\nb. Custodian: Employees responsible for maintaining the safeguards\nestablished by the owner. The custodian is designated by the owner.\nc.\nUsers: Employees responsible for using and safeguarding informa-\ntion under their control according to the directions of the owner.\nUsers are authorized access to information assets by the owner.\n3.\nAccess to information will be granted by the owner to those with an\napproved business need.\n4.\nAll corporate information shall be classified by the owner into one of\nthree classification categories:\na.\nConfidential: Information that, if disclosed, could violate the pri-\nvacy of individuals, reduce the company’s competitive advantage,\nor cause damage to the company.\nb. Public: Information that has been made available for public distri-\nbution through authorized company channels. (See Corporate\nCommunications Policy.)\nc.\nInternal Use: Information that is intended for use by employees\nwhen conducting company business. Information that does not\nqualify as Confidential or Public is classified as Internal Use.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 102,
            "text": "When creating an Information Security Policies and Standards document,\neach section in the document will normally begin with a topic-specific\npolicy. The topic-specific policy will narrow the focus to one issue at a\ntime. This will allow the writer to focus on one area and then develop a\nset of standards to support this particular subject.\nWhereas Tier 1 policies are approved by the Information Security\nSteering Committee, topic-specific (Tier 2) policies can be issued by a\nsingle senior manager or director.\nAs with Tier 1 policies, Tier 2 policies will address management’s\nposition on relevant issues. It is necessary to interview management to\ndetermine what their concerns are and what is it that they want to have\noccur. The writer will then take this information and incorporate into the\nfollowing structure.\n4.10.2.1\nThesis Statement\nThis is similar to the topic section discussed in the Tier 1 policies, but it\nalso adds more information to support the goals and objectives of the\npolicy and management’s directives. This section will be used to discuss\nthe issue in relevant terms and what conditions are included. If appro-\npriate, it may be useful to specify the goal or justification for the policy.\nThis can be useful in gaining compliance with the policy.\nWhen developing a Workstation Standards document, a topic-specific\npolicy on appropriate software, with supporting standards, would include\na discussion of “company-approved” software. This policy would define\nTABLE 4.7 (continued)\nA Utility Company’s Information Protection \nPolicy: Example 4\nCompliance\n1.\nEach Manager shall:\na.\nDevelop and administer an information protection program that\nappropriately classifies and protects corporate information under\ntheir control.\nb. Implement an employee awareness program to ensure that all\nemployees are aware of the importance of information and the\nmethods employed for its protection.\nc.\nEstablish an information records retention schedule in compli-\nance with applicable laws and regulations.\n2.\nEmployees who fail to comply with the policies will be considered in\nviolation of Your Company’s Employee Standards of Conduct and will\nbe subject to appropriate corrective action.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 103,
            "text": "FIGURE 4.5\nTopic-Specific Policies by Section\nInformation\nSecurity\nAsset\nClassification\nSection 5\nTier 1\nPersonnel\nSecurity\nSection 6\nPhysical and\nEnvironmental\nSection 7\nCommunications\nand Operations\nSection 8\nAccess\nControl\nSection 9\nSystems\nDevelopment\nSection 10\nBCP\nSection 11\nTier 1\nTier 1\nPolicy\nSection 3\nTier 2 Policies\nTier 2 Policies\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 104,
            "text": "what is meant by “company-approved” software, which might be “any\nsoftware not approved, purchased, screened, managed, and owned by\nthe organization.” The policy would also discuss the conditions required\nto have software approved.\nOnce the terms and conditions have been discussed, the remainder of\nthis section would be used to state management’s position on the issue.\n4.10.2.2\nRelevance\nThe Tier 2 policy also needs to establish to whom the policy applies. In\naddition to whom, the policy will want to clarify where, how, and when\nthe policy is applicable. Is the policy only enforced when employees are\non the work-site campus, or will it extend to off-site activities? It is\nnecessary to identify as many of the conditions and terms as possible.\n4.10.2.3\nResponsibilities\nThe assignment of roles and responsibilities is also included in Tier 2\npolicies. For example, the policy on company-approved software will have\nto identify the process to get software approved. This would include the\nauthority (by job title) authorized to grant approval and a reference to\nwhere this process is documented.\nThis is a good time to discuss deviations from policy requirements. I\nhave established a personal standard in that I never discuss how an entity\ncan gain a dispensation from the policy. I do not like to state that “this\nis the policy and all employees must comply, except those of you that\ncan find a way around the policy.” Most organizations have a process to\ngain an approved deviation from a policy or standard. This normally\nrequires the petitioner to submit a business case for the deviation, along\nwith alternative controls that would satisfy the spirit of the policy. If some\norganization or person wants a deviation from the policy, let them discover\nwhat the process is.\n4.10.2.4 Compliance\nFor a Tier 2 policy, it may be appropriate to describe, in some detail, the\ninfractions that are unacceptable and the consequences of such behavior.\nPenalties may be explicitly stated and should be consistent with the Tier\n1 Employee Discipline Policy. Remember: when an employee is found in\na noncompliant situation, it is management and Human Resources that\nare responsible for disciplining the individual.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 105,
            "text": "4.10.2.5\nSupplementary Information\nFor any Tier 2 policy, the appropriate individuals in the organization to\ncontact for additional information, guidance, and compliance should be\nindicated. Typically, the contact information would be specified by job\ntitle, not by individual name. It may also be prudent to identify who is\nthe owner of this policy. This information will provide the reader with\nthe appropriate information if he or she has suggestions on how to\nimprove the policy.\nTo be effective, a policy requires visibility. Visibility aids implementa-\ntion of the policy by helping to ensure that it is fully communicated\nthroughout the organization. Management presentations, videos, panel\ndiscussions, guest speakers, question and answer forums, and newsletters\nwill increase visibility. The organization’s Information Security Awareness\nProgram can effectively notify users of new policies. The New Employee\nOrientation program can also be used to familiarize new employees with\nthe organization’s policies.\nWhen introducing policies, it is important to ensure that management’s\nsupport is clear, especially in areas where employees feel inundated with\ndirectives, regulations, or other requirements. Organization policies are the\nvehicles used to emphasize management’s commitment to effective internal\ncontrols and their expectations for employee support and compliance.\nTable 4.8 provides an example of a Tier 2 (topic-specific) policy.\nThe Senate Policy discusses what is allowed and what is not allowed.\nIt identifies where a member can go to get additional information on\nproper usage. In the section indicated by “Scope and Responsibility,” item 1\nestablishes the topic or thesis statement of this policy.\nItem 3 assigns Responsibilities and major headings B and C provide\nSupplemental Information. The only area not apparently covered by this\npolicy is Compliance. It also identifies who is responsible for overseeing\nor monitoring of activities. Item 1 under “Scope and Responsibility”\ndiscusses the thesis statement or topic. Under the circumstances, it may\nbe appropriate to omit the compliance or consequences in the policy.\nLet us now examine another sample Internet Usage Policy (see Table\n4.9). This is an interesting Tier 2 policy in that it adds a “Statement of\nCompliance” section that the Internet user is to read and sign. I have\nencountered a number of policies that use this tactic. A word of warning\nabout usage and responsibility statements; they must be revisited annually\nto ensure employees remember that they signed such a document. It is\nimportant that this reminder be part of an annual information security\nawareness program. This will ensure that the desired effect remains active.\nA typical Usage and Responsibility Statement might look like the one\nin Table 4.10.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 106,
            "text": "TABLE 4.8 \nTier 2 Sample Internet Usage Policy: Example 1\nU.S. Senate Internet Services Usage Rules and Policies\nPolicy for Internet Services\nA. SCOPE AND RESPONSIBILITY\n1.\nSenate Internet Services (“FTP Server, Gopher, World Wide Web, and\nElectronic mail”) may only be used for official purposes. The use of Senate\nInternet Services for personal, promotional, commercial, or partisan polit-\nical or campaign purposes is prohibited.\n2.\nMembers of the Senate, as well as Committee Chairmen and Officers of\nthe Senate, may post to the Internet Servers information files that contain\nmatter relating to their official business, activities, and duties. All other\noffices must request approval from the Committee on Rules and Admin-\nistration before posting material on the Internet Information Servers.\n3.\nIt is the responsibility of each Senator, Committee Chairman, Officer of the\nSenate, or office head to oversee the use of the Internet Services by his or\nher office and to ensure that the use of the services is consistent with the\nrequirements established by this policy and applicable laws and regulations.\n4.\nOfficial records may not be placed on the Internet Servers unless other-\nwise approved by the Secretary of the Senate and prepared in accordance\nwith Section 501 of Title 44 of the United States Code. Such records\ninclude, but are not limited to bills, public laws, committee reports, and\nother legislative materials.\nB. POSTING OR LINKING TO THE FOLLOWING MATTER IS PROHIBITED\n1.\nPolitical matter:\na.\nMatter that specifically solicits political support for the sender or any\nother person or political party, or a vote or financial assistance for any\ncandidate for any political office is prohibited.\nb. Matter that mentions a Senator or an employee of a Senator as a\ncandidate for political office, or that constitutes electioneering, or that\nadvocates the election or defeat of any individuals, or a political party\nis prohibited.\n2.\nPersonal matter:\na.\nMatter that, by its nature, is purely personal and is unrelated to the\nofficial business activities and duties of the sender is prohibited.\nb. Matter that constitutes or includes any article, account, sketch, narra-\ntion, or other text laudatory and complimentary of any Senator on a\npurely personal or political basis rather than on the basis of perfor-\nmance of official duties as a Senator is prohibited.\nc.\nReports of how or when a Senator, the Senator’s spouse, or any other\nmember of the Senator’s family spends time other than in the perfor-\nmance of, or in connection with, the legislative, representative, and\nother official functions of such Senator is prohibited.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 107,
            "text": "d. Any transmission expressing holiday greetings from a Senator is pro-\nhibited. This prohibition does not preclude an expression of holiday\ngreetings at the commencement or conclusion of an otherwise proper\ntransmission.\n5.\nPromotional matter:\na.\nThe solicitation of funds for any purpose is prohibited.\nb. The placement of logos or links used for personal, promotional, com-\nmercial, or partisan political or campaign purposes is prohibited.\nC. RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF INTERNET SERVICES\n1.\nDuring the 60-day period immediately preceding the date of any primary\nor general election (whether regular, special, or runoff) for any national,\nstate, or local office in which the Senator is a candidate, no Member may\nplace, update, or transmit information using a Senate Internet Server (“FTP\nServer, Gopher, and World Wide Web), unless the candidacy of the Sen-\nator in such election is uncontested.\n2.\nElectronic mail may not be transmitted by a Member during the 60-day\nperiod before the date of the Member’s primary or general election unless\nit is in response to a direct inquiry.\n3.\nDuring the 60-day period immediately before the date of a biennial general\nfederal election, no Member may place or update on the Internet Server\nany matter on behalf of a Senator who is a candidate for election, unless\nthe candidacy of the Senator in such election is uncontested.\n4.\nAn uncontested candidacy is established when the Rules Committee\nreceives written certification from the appropriate state official that the\nSenator’s candidacy may not be contested under state law. Since the can-\ndidacy of a Senator who is running for re-election from a state that permits\nwrite-in votes on elections day without prior registration or other advance\nqualification by the candidate may be contested, such a Member is subject\nto the above restrictions.\n5.\nIf a Member is under the restrictions as defined in subtitle C, paragraph\n(1), above, the following statement must appear on the homepage: (“Pur-\nsuant to Senate policy this homepage may not be updated for the 60-day\nperiod immediately before the date of a primary or general election”).\nThe words “Senate Policy” must be hypertext linked to the Internet ser-\nvices policy on the Senate Home Page.\n6.\nA Senator’s homepage may not refer or be hypertext linked to another\nMember’s site or electronic mail address without authorization from that\nMember.\n7.\nAny Links to Information not located on a Senate Internet Server must be\nidentified as a link to a non-Senate server.\nTABLE 4.8 (continued)\nTier 2 Sample Internet Usage Policy: Example 1\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 108,
            "text": "TABLE 4.9 \nSample Internet Usage Policy: Example 2\nInternet Usage Policy\nOverview\nThe Brother’s Institute will provide access to the information resources of the\nInternet to assist in supporting teaching and learning, research, and informa-\ntion handling skills. This represents a considerable commitment of Institute\nresources in the areas of telecommunications, networking, software, storage,\nand cost.\nThis Internet Usage Policy is designed to outline for staff and students the\nconditions of use for these resources.\nGeneral\nInternet access is provided as an information and learning tool and is to be\nused for Institute and curriculum related purposes only.\nAll existing Institute policies and regulations apply to a user’s conduct on\nthe Internet, especially (but not exclusively) those that deal with unacceptable\nbehavior, privacy, misuse of Institute resources, sexual harassment, informa-\ntion and data security, and confidentiality.\nThe Institute has software systems that can monitor and record all Internet\nusage, and record each chat, newsgroup, or e-mail message. The Institute\nreserves the right to do this at any time. No user should have any expectation\nof privacy as to his or her Internet usage.\nThe Institute reserves the right to inspect any and all files stored on the\nnetwork in order to ensure compliance with Institute policies.\nThe Institute will use independently supplied software and data to identify\ninappropriate or sexually explicit Internet sites. We will block access from\nwithin our networks to all such sites that we know of.\nIf you find yourself connected accidentally to a site that contains sexually\nexplicit or offensive material, you must disconnect from that site immediately,\nregardless of whether that site had been previously deemed acceptable by\nany screening or rating program.\nNo user may use the Institute’s Internet facilities to deliberately disable or\noverload any computer system or network, or to circumvent any system in-\ntended to protect the privacy or security of another user.\nFile Downloading\nAny software or files downloaded via the Internet onto the Institute network\nbecome the property of the Institute.\nAny such files or software may be used only in ways that are consistent with\ntheir licenses or copyrights.\nNo user may use Institute facilities knowingly to download or distribute\nillegal software or data. The use of Institute resources for illegal activity will\nbe grounds for immediate dismissal.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 109,
            "text": "Any file that is downloaded must be scanned for viruses before it is run or\naccessed.\nNo user may use the Institute’s Internet facilities to deliberately propagate\nany virus.\nVideo and audio streaming and downloading represent significant data\ntraffic, which can cause local network congestion. Video and audio download-\ning are prohibited unless for agreed demonstration purposes.\nChats, Newsgroups, and E-Mail\nEach user of the Internet facilities must identify him or herself honestly, ac-\ncurately, and completely (including Institute status and function if requested)\nwhen participating in chats or newsgroups, or when setting up accounts on\noutside computer systems.\nOnly those users who are duly authorized to speak to the media on behalf\nof the Institute may speak or write in the name of the Institute to any news-\ngroup or Web site.\nOther users may participate in newsgroups or chats in the course of infor-\nmation research when relevant to their duties, but they do so as individuals,\nspeaking only for themselves.\nThe Institute retains the copyright to any material posted to any forum,\nnewsgroup, chat, or World Wide Web page by any employee in the course of\nhis or her duties.\nUsers are reminded that chats and newsgroups are public forums and it is\ninappropriate to reveal confidential Institute information.\nOffensive material should not be e-mailed. Anyone found doing this will be\nsubject to severe disciplinary action.\nPasswords and IDs\nAny user who obtains a password or ID for an Internet resource must keep\nthat password confidential.\nUser IDs and passwords will help maintain individual accountability for\nInternet resource usage.\nThe sharing of user IDs or passwords obtained for access to Internet sites\nis prohibited.\nSecurity\nThe Institute has installed routers, firewalls, proxies, Internet address screen-\ning programs, and other security systems to assure the safety and security of\nthe Institute’s networks. Any user who attempts to disable, defeat, or circum-\nvent any Institute security facility will be subject to disciplinary action.\nOnly those Internet services and functions that have been documented for\neducation purposes within the Institute will be enabled at the Internet firewall.\nTABLE 4.9 (continued)\nSample Internet Usage Policy: Example 2\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 110,
            "text": "Another area that requires a Tier 2 policy is the proper use of electronic\nmail (e-mail). We examine two existing e-mail policies and compare them\nto the criteria we have established for these types of policies (see Table 4.11\nand Table 4.12).\nComputers that use their own modems to create independent data connec-\ntions sidestep our network security mechanisms. Therefore, any computer\nused for independent dial-up or leased-line connections to any outside com-\nputer or network must be physically isolated from the Institute’s internal\nnetworks.\nAny machine used for FTP must not contain any sensitive applications or\ndata, and Java will be disabled for users or networks running mission-critical\napplications such as the production of core financial and student information.\nStatement of Compliance\n“I have read the Institute’s Internet usage policy. I fully understand the terms\nof this policy and agree to abide by them. I realize that the Institute’s security\nsoftware may record for management use the Internet address of any site I\nvisit and keep a record of any network activity in which I transmit or receive\nany kind of file. I acknowledge that any message I send or receive may be\nrecorded and stored in an archive file for management use. I know that any\nviolation of this policy may lead to disciplinary action being taken.”\nTABLE 4.10\nSample Internet Usage and Responsibility Statement\nInternet Usage and Responsibility Statement\nI, _________________________________, acknowledge and understand that ac-\ncess to the Internet, as provided by the Company, is for management approved\nuse only. This supports Peltier Associates policies on Employee Standards of\nConduct and Information Classification, and among other things, prohibits\nthe downloading of games, viruses, inappropriate materials or picture files,\nand unlicensed software from the Internet.\nI recognize and accept that while accessing the Internet, I am responsible\nfor maintaining the highest professional and ethical standards, as outlined in\nthe Company policy on Employee Standards of Conduct.\nI have read and understand the policies mentioned above and accept my\nresponsibility to protect the Company’s information and reputation.\nName _________________________________ Date\nTABLE 4.9 (continued)\nSample Internet Usage Policy: Example 2\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 111,
            "text": "TABLE 4.11 \nSample E-Mail Usage Policy: Example 1\nCompany E-Mail Usage Policy\nPolicy\nCompany e-mail services are provided for official Company business use.\nPersonal e-mail is not official Company business, although minimal use of\ne-mail for personal communication is acceptable. E-mail may be monitored by\nauthorized system administrators. Abuse of the Company e-mail policy, out-\nlined herein, will be brought to the attention of the department director and\nmay result in disciplinary action.\nE-Mail Guidelines\n1.\nAll users of the Company e-mail system are expected to conduct them-\nselves in a legal, professional, and ethical manner.\n2.\nUsers are responsible for their information technology accounts, and may\nbe held accountable if someone uses their account with permission and\nviolates policy.\n3.\nThe Company e-mail system shall be used in accordance with Federal and\nState law and Company policies, and may not be used as a vehicle to\nharass or intimidate.\n4.\nCompany information technology resources are provided to employees\nfor the purpose of business, research, service, and other work-related\nactivities. Access to information technology resources is granted to an\nindividual by the Company for that individual’s sole use, and that use\nmust be in furtherance of the mission and purpose of the Company.\nInformation technology resources must be shared among users in an\nequitable manner. The user may not participate in any behavior that\nunreasonably interferes with the fair use of information technology\nresources by another.\n5.\nThe Company reserves the right, without notice, to temporarily limit or\nrestrict any individual’s use and to inspect, copy, remove, or otherwise\nalter any data, file, or system resource that may undermine the authorized\nuse of any information technology facility. This is intended to protect the\nintegrity of the Company’s information technology facilities and its users\nagainst unauthorized or improper use.\n6.\nUsers must use only those information technology resources that the\nCompany has authorized for their individual use. Users are authorized\nto access, use, copy, modify, or delete files and data on their own account.\nUsers are not authorized to perform any of these functions on another\nuser’s account or a Company system.\n7.\nUser privacy is not to be violated. It is the responsibility of the user to\nprotect their privacy. Users should not leave a password where it can be\neasily found, give a password to someone else, or leave confidential\ninformation on a screen where it could be viewed by an unauthorized\nperson, or leave a public PC or terminal signed on and unattended.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 112,
            "text": "The opening paragraph spells out what this policy is about, what is\nunacceptable behavior, that activities are subject to monitoring and that\nnoncompliance will be referred to management. This is a good, strong\nopening statement. The remainder of the policy supports the other objec-\ntives of proper e-mail usage.\nItems 1, 2, 8, and 9 discuss compliance issues. Item 4 discusses the\nrelevance issues, and items 4, 5, and 7 handle responsibility concerns. I\nhave only one real problem with this policy and that is the use of the\nterm “guideline.” Over the years, my research into policy writing has led\nme to believe that in many instances the term “guideline,” when used in\na policy like the one above, really means “standard.”\nWhen writing policies, it is important to use the language that is\naccepted in your organization. When I worked for a global manufacturing\ncorporation, we learned that the term “should” meant “must.” It was known\nas a “Company should.” That meant that whenever you saw the word\n“should” in a policy, standard, or procedure, you were to consider it\nmandatory. The company felt that use of the term “must” was harsh. So\nit would substitute a less harsh term to make the requirement more\npalatable. The term “shall” meant that the reader had an option to use or\nnot use whatever was discussed. So for this company, “should” meant\n“standard” and “shall” meant “guideline.”\nResearch the writing requirements of your organization and make\ncertain you incorporate any idiosyncrasies into your writing. By under-\nstanding the form, you will be better able to ensure that the substance is\nread and accepted.\n8.\nNonbusiness-related chain e-mail messages are not to be forwarded using\nany Company resource. Chain e-mail is defined as any message sent to\none or more people that instructs the recipient to forward it to multiple\nothers and contains some promise of reward for forwarding it or threat\nof punishment for not doing so. Chain e-mail messages can have tech-\nnological, social, and legal ramifications. Chain e-mail messages have the\nability to clog an entire network and degrade the ability of employees to\ndo their work. Heavy traffic due to chain e-mail messages can disrupt not\nonly the e-mail service but other network activities as well.\n9.\nUsers may not intentionally obscure, change, or forge the date, time,\nphysical source, logical source, or other label or header information on\nelectronic mail, files, or reports.\nDepartments should contact the ISD Help Desk to report all problems with\ne-mail.\nTABLE 4.11 (continued)\nSample E-Mail Usage Policy: Example 1\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 113,
            "text": "TABLE 4.12\nSample E-Mail Policy: Example 2\nElectronic Mail Policy\n1.\nEvery company employee is responsible for ensuring that the electronic\nmail (“E-Mail”) system is used properly and in accordance with this\npolicy. Any questions about this policy should be directed either to the\nHuman Resources Department or to the Company’s E-Mail Administrator.\n2.\nThe E-Mail system of the Company is part of the business equipment\nand technology platform and should be used for Company purposes\nonly. Personal business should not be conducted by means of the E-Mail\nsystem.\n3.\nEmployees should disclose information or messages from the E-Mail\nsystem only to authorized employees.\n4.\nEmployees do not have a personal privacy right in any matter created on,\nreceived through, or sent from the Company E-Mail system. Employees\nshould not enter personal matters into the E-Mail system. The Company,\nin its discretion, reserves the right to monitor and to access any matter\ncreated on, received through, or sent from the E-Mail system.\n5.\nNo messages or information should be entered into the Company E-Mail\nsystem without a good business reason for doing so. Copies of E-Mail\nmessages should be sent only for good business reasons.\n6.\nEven if you have a password for the E-Mail system, it is impossible to\nassure the confidentiality of any message created on, received through,\nor sent from the Company E-Mail system. Any password you use must\nbe known to the Company, as the Company may need to access this\ninformation in your absence.\n7.\nThe provisions of the Company’s no solicitation–no distribution policy\n(see Employee Handbook) apply fully to the E-Mail system.\n8.\nNo E-Mail message should be created or sent that may constitute intim-\nidating, hostile, or offensive material on the basis of sex, race, color,\nreligion, national origin, sexual orientation, or disability. The Company’s\nPolicy against sexual or other harassment applies fully to the E-Mail\nsystem, and any violation of that policy is grounds for discipline up to\nand including discharge.\n9.\nThe Company expressly reserves the right to access, retrieve, read, and\ndelete any communication that is created on, received through, or sent\nin the E-Mail system to assure compliance with this or any other Com-\npany policy.\n10.\nAny employee who becomes aware of misuse of the E-Mail system\nshould promptly contact either the Human Resources Department or\nthe E-Mail Administrator.\n11.\nYour signature indicates your understanding of this policy and your\nconsent to its contents.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 114,
            "text": "The sample e-mail policy in Table 4.12 has some problems. The\nopening paragraph is not as strong as the one contained in Example 1\n(Table 4.11). Items 1 and 7 discuss the business need for using the e-mail\nsystem. I strongly recommend that when writing a policy, try to avoid the\nterm “for company business only.” We all know that e-mail and Internet\naccess will be used at times for personal communications or research.\nThe real intent is to prohibit the improper use of these business tools.\nLook at these forms of communication as you would the use of the\ncompany-provided phones. Be consistent in your requirements. If the\nphone on an employee’s desk should be used for company business only\nand this policy is enforced, then it is safe to use that language for other\nforms of communication. However, if the phone system policy use allows\nfor limited employee personal use, then the other communication-related\npolicies should reflect this concept. A better term would be “for manage-\nment-approved activities.”\nItems 3, 6, and 8 discuss privacy issues for the company and the\ncompany’s right to monitor activities. When developing this kind of\nconcept, be sure to include the legal staff and human resources in the\nreview of the policy language.\nI have to admit that I do not care for item 5. It goes against all that\nwe know about passwords and defeats any attempt to bring individual\naccountability into the company culture. If employees are to create con-\nfidential passwords and then are required to give them to “the Company,”\nthen there is no individual accountability. Breaching the confidentiality of\nthe password makes it now public domain.\nIn the section entitled Sample Topic-Specific Policies, we have assem-\nbled draft copies of Tier 2 policies that support the ISO 17799 areas of\nconcern. These sample Tier 2 policies are intended to be used as a guide\nfor language and possible content. As with any policy examples, please\nread them carefully and make certain that they are appropriate for your\norganization.\n4.10.3\nApplication-Specific (Tier 3) Policy\nGlobal-level (Tier 1) and topic-specific (Tier 2) policies address policy on\na broad level (see Figure 4.6); they usually encompass the entire enterprise.\nThe application-specific (Tier 3) policy focuses on one specific system or\napplication. As the construction of an organization information security\narchitecture takes shape, the final element will be the translation of Tier 1\nand Tier 2 policies down to the application and system level.\nMany security issue decisions apply only at the application or system\nlevel. Some examples of these issues include:\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 115,
            "text": "\u0001\nWho has the authority to read or modify data?\n\u0001\nUnder what circumstances can data be read or modified?\n\u0001\nHow will remote access be controlled?\nTo develop a comprehensive set of Tier 3 policies, use a process that\ndetermines security requirements from a business or mission objective.\nTry to avoid implementing requirements based on security issues and\nconcerns. Remember that the security staff has been empowered to\nsupport the business process of the organization. Typically, the Tier 3\npolicy is more free form than Tier 1 and Tier 2 policies. As you prepare\nto create Tier 3 policies, keep in mind the following concepts:\n\u0001\nUnderstand the overall business objectives or mission of the enter-\nprise.\n\u0001\nUnderstand the mission of the application or system.\n\u0001\nEstablish requirements that support both sets of objectives.\nTypical Tier 3 policies may be as brief as the sample shown in Table\n4.13. This Tier 3 policy is brief and to the point. It establishes what is\nrequired, who is responsible, and where to go for additional information\nand help.\nWe can use the policy in Table 4.14 to point out a few items that\ntypically make for bad reading in a policy. When writing, try to avoid\nmaking words stand out. This is particularly true of words that cause people\nto react negatively. In this policy the writer likes to use uppercase words\nfor emphasis: “MUST,” “LATE TIMECARDS,” “YOU MUST BE ACCURATE.”\nI find that when words appear like this, the writer was in an agitated\nstate and was taking out his or her personal frustrations on the policy.\nWhile what was said in this policy was fairly good, the tone was very\nnegative. The person who wrote this policy probably has a sign posted\nFIGURE 4.6\nTiers 1, 2, and 3\nInformation\nSecurity\nTier 1\nPersonnel\nSecurity\nTier 2\nJob\nDescriptions\nUser\nTraining\nSecurity\nIncidents\nTier 3\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 116,
            "text": "in his or her work area that reads “Poor planning on your part does not\nmake it a crisis on my part.”\nWhen I do network vulnerability assessments for companies, I like to\ndo a physical walk-through of the work area. I am on the lookout for\nwhat I call the “Dilbert factor.” This comic strip has given us many a great\nlaugh because we realize that it is our working environment that Scott\nAdams is identifying. However, be on the lookout for areas that have a\nhigh number of Dilbert cartoons posted. This is usually an area of\nemployees who are unhappy with someone or something in the work area.\nThese are the people who might write a policy like the one in Table 4.14.\nThe policy in Table 4.14 was written in a condescending manner and\ngives the impression that these highly skilled contractors are dummies.\nWrite in a positive tone and instruct the reader as to what is expected. It\nis important to identify the consequences of noncompliance, but channel\nthat into a specific subsection that identifies “Noncompliance.”\n4.11 Summary\nIn this chapter we discussed that the policy is the cornerstone of an\norganization’s information security architecture; and that a policy was\nimportant to establish both internally and externally what an organization’s\nposition on a particular topic might be. We define what a policy, standard,\nprocedure, and guideline is and what should be included in each of these\ndocuments or statements.\nThere are three types of policies, and you will use each type at different\ntimes in your information security program and throughout the organiza-\ntion to support the business process or mission. The three types of policies\nare:\nTABLE 4.13\nSample Application-Specific Policy\nAccounts Payable Policy\nAccounts payable checks are issued on Friday only. This will promote efficien-\ncy in the accounts payable function. To ensure your check is available, please\nhave your check request or invoice to the Financial Affairs office by close of\nbusiness on Monday.\nFor access to the online portion of the Accounts Payable System (APS),\nplease contact the APS System Administrator.\nThe APS Customer Help Desk is available to answer any additional ques-\ntions.\nWe appreciate your cooperation.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 117,
            "text": "1.\nGlobal (Tier 1) policies are used to create the organization’s overall\nvision and direction.\n2.\nTopic-specific (Tier 2) policies address particular subjects of con-\ncern. (We discuss the information security architecture and each\ncategory such as the one shown in Table 4.15.)\nTABLE 4.14\nSample Timecard Policy and Instructions\nTimecard Policy and Instructions\nAn original timecard/sheet MUST be turned in before your hours can be\nprocessed. Hours MUST be turned in before 10:00 am on Monday to have\nyour paycheck/direct deposit slip available on Thursday. If your timecard is\nturned in after noon on Wednesday, you will be paid the following week. We\ncan NOT guarantee paycheck availability for LATE TIMECARDS.\nThe timecard is our invoice; YOU MUST BE ACCURATE!\nAs with most BOX Group clients, you must work 40 straight time hours in\na week before you can get overtime pay. All hours should be listed in the\nregular hours column until you reach 40. After you have worked 40, all hours\nshould go in the overtime column. Overtime (premium) rates are based upon\nthe terms of BOX Group’s purchase order and any applicable tax codes. Be-\ncause of this, policy may vary from company to company or, depending upon\nyour position, pay rate, etc. Specific overtime rates will be discussed and\nagreed upon prior to starting your assignment. If you have any questions\nregarding overtime, contact your branch office.\nWhen you do not work a full 40 hours straight time during the week,\nSaturday’s hours must go toward straight time until you reach the necessary\n40 hours.\nONLY write on the timecard the hours you actually work.\nWhen you have a week in which a holiday occurs, you should leave the\nspace blank instead of hours in the regular hours column. The hours for a\nholiday are not counted toward your total hours worked for that week. If no\novertime hours were worked this week, your timecard total would be 32 hours.\nDuring a week that a holiday occurs, most BOX Group clients pay overtime\nover 32 hours in that week.\nIf you miss a day of work, hours should not be entered for that day.\nCopies of timecard: (Client timecard copies differ.)\n\u0001\nYellow/White Copies: Payroll/Invoice copies. Return to BOX Group.\n\u0001\nPink Copy: Branch copy. Return to BOX Group.\n\u0001\nBlue Copy: Customer copy Company you are working for/Supervisor.\n\u0001\nGoldenrod Copy: Employee copy. Keep your copy.\nIMPORTANT! Please note that your check will not be generated without the\noriginal timecard.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 118,
            "text": "3.\nApplication-specific policies focus on decisions taken by manage-\nment to control particular applications (financial reporting, payroll,\netc.) or systems (budgeting system).\nTABLE 4.15\nSample Information Security Policy\nInformation Security Policy\nPolicy Statement\nInformation is a company asset and is the property of the Company. Com-\npany information must be protected according to its value, sensitivity, and\ncriticality, regardless of the media on which it is stored, the manual or\nautomated systems that process it, or the methods used to distribute it.\nResponsibilities\n1.\nCompany officers and senior management are required to make sure\nthat internal controls are adequate to safeguard company assets —\nincluding company information.\n2.\nCompany line managers are responsible for making sure that all\nemployees are aware of and comply with this information security\npolicy, its supporting policies and standards, and all applicable laws\nand regulations.\n3.\nAll employees, regardless of their status (permanent, part-time, con-\ntract, etc.), are responsible for protecting information from unautho-\nrized access, modification, disclosure, and destruction.\nScope\n1.\nCompany information includes information that is electronically gener-\nated and information that is printed, typed, filmed, or verbally commu-\nnicated.\nCompliance\n1.\nCompany management is responsible for monitoring compliance with\nthis information security policy, its supporting policies and standards,\nand all applicable laws and regulations.\n2.\nEmployees, regardless of their status (permanent, part-time, contract,\netc.), who fail to comply with this information security policy, its sup-\nporting policies and standards, or any applicable law or regulation will\nbe considered in violation of their terms of employment and will be\nsubject to appropriate corrective action.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 119,
            "text": "Chapter 5\nAsset Classification\n5.1 Introduction\nWith the U.S. Congress on full alert regarding the protection of information\nassets and the international community certifying organizations to infor-\nmation security standards, the requirement for an asset classification policy\nis at hand. As a security professional, it is important for you to know that\nan asset or information classification policy is only one element in the\noverall information management process. The Information Classification\npolicy should be coupled with a Records Management policy.\nAny security standard or best practice should be founded on a solid\nfoundation of an asset classification. To ensure proper protection of our\ninformation resources, it is necessary to define what an owner is and how\nthat entity has ultimate responsibility for the information assets within its\nbusiness unit, and this includes classification and assigning retention require-\nments. By implementing an asset management scheme and supporting\nmethodology, we are able to determine required controls commensurate\nwith the sensitivity of the information as classified by the owner.\nThis chapter explores the need for policies, examines the contents of\nthese policies, and then critiques examples of these policies.\n5.2 Overview\nAs discussed in this chapter, information classification is only one of the\nelements in an effective information management program. Knowing what\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 120,
            "text": "we have and how important it is to the organization is key to the success\nfor the information security program. The implementation of this program\nrequires that representatives of the organization be charged with exercising\nthe organization’s proprietary rights. In addition, a full inventory of these\nassets must be conducted with a requirement for annual review established.\n5.3 Why Classify Information?\nOrganizations classify information to establish the appropriate levels of\nprotection for these resources. Because resources are limited, it is necessary\nto prioritize and identify what really needs protection (see Figure 5.1).\nOne of the reasons to classify information is to ensure that scarce resources\nwill go where they will do the most good. The return on investment for\nimplementing an encryption system to protect public domain information\nwould not be considered a sound business decision. All information is\ncreated equal, but not all information is of equal value.\nOf all the information found within an enterprise, only about ten\npercent of it is actually competitive advantage, trade secret, or personal\ninformation. The biggest portion of organization information is that which\nmust be accessed by employees to do their assigned tasks. The remaining\ninformation is that which has been available to the public through autho-\nrized channels. Information resources that are classified as “public” would\ninclude annual stockholders’ reports, press releases, and other authorized\npublic announcements.\nAn effective way of understanding the difference between internal use\ninformation and public information is to picture your organization’s con-\nnection to the Internet. The Web site and information contained on it that\nFIGURE 5.1\nInformation Classification Breakdown\n100% of All Enterprise Information\n80%\nInternal Use\nInformation\n10%\n10%\nConfidential\nInformation\nPublic\nInformation\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 121,
            "text": "is outside your zone of protection is your public information. Remember\nthat posting information to the public Web site is only done by the Web\nmaster and with the approval of the owner of the information. This is\nyour organization’s Internet connection.\nThe portion of Internet access that is behind your zone of protection\nand contains information for use by employees is your Intranet connection.\nThis area contains information that is unavailable to the outside world\nbut has been made accessible to employees for use while performing\ntheir assigned tasks.\nFor years, the information handling standard was that all information\nis closed until the owner opens it. This worked well in the mainframe\nenvironment when access control packages ruled the single platform of\ninformation processing. With the introduction of the client/server envi-\nronment and the multiple platforms operating situation, no single access\ncontrol package could handle all of the needs. With decentralized pro-\ncessing and then the move to connect to the Internet, the restrictions on\ninformation closure began to weaken. The operating concept during this\nperiod was that all information was open until the owner classified it and\nclosed access to it.\nNow we have gone full circle. As the decentralized processing envi-\nronment matured and national and international laws, statutes, and privacy\nconcerns became stronger, the information protection concept has reverted\nto all information access being closed until the owner opens access. For\nthis to be effective and to allow the organization to demonstrate due\ndiligence, it is incumbent upon the organization to establish an effective\ninformation classification policy and supporting handling standards.\nMost organizations do not have information that is all the same value\nor sensitivity. It is necessary to at least develop an initial high-level attempt\nat classification. This should be done, if for no other reason than to ensure\nthat budgeted resources are not misused in over-protecting nonsensitive,\nnoncritical information assets. Before employees can protect information\nassets, they must first have a policy that identifies classification levels and\nthen a methodology to implement the policy requirements. An information\nclassification policy that is not overly complex and a methodology that\nrelies on common sense and is facilitated by either information security\nor records management will make acceptance possible.\n5.4 What Is Information Classification?\nAn information or asset classification process is a business decision pro-\ncess. Information is an asset of the organization, and managers have been\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 122,
            "text": "charged with protecting and accounting for proper use of all assets. An\ninformation classification process will allow managers to meet this fiduciary\nresponsibility. The role of the information security professional — or even\ninformation systems personnel — is one of advice and consulting. The\nfinal decision is made by the business unit managers or, as we will define\nsoon, the asset owner.\nWhen preparing to develop the information classification policy, it is\nimportant to get input from the management team. As discussed in\nprevious chapters, knowing what management really wants will improve\nthe quality of the overall policy. It is important to ask questions to find\nout what they mean. When my daughter was about seven or eight years\nold, she came to me and asked, “Pa, where do we come from?” Well I\npretended to not hear her so I could research my answer. The next day\nI sat down with her and discussed the “facts of life” with her. She looked\nat me and said, “I know all that. What I want to know is where we come\nfrom. Terri Lynn comes from Tennessee and Pam comes from Kentucky.”\nSo before developing an answer, make sure you understand the question.\nWhen conducting interviews with management and other key person-\nnel, develop a set of questions to ensure a consistency in the direction\nof the responses. These questions might include some of the following:\n\u0001\nWhat are the mission-critical or sensitive activities or operations?\n\u0001\nWhere is mission-critical or sensitive information stored?\n\u0001\nWhere is this information processed?\n\u0001\nWho requires access to this information?\nThere are no hard and fast rules for determining what constitutes\nsensitive information. In some instances, it may be that the number of\npeople who require access may affect the classification. The real test of\nan information classification system is how easy is it for the reader to\nunderstand what constitutes sensitive information and what organization-\napproved label should be affixed to the information asset resource.\n5.5 Where to Begin?\nWith a clearer idea of what management is expecting, it is now time to\ndo some research. I like to contact my fellow information security profes-\nsionals and find out what they have done to answer problems that I have\nbeen assigned. By being a member of the Computer Security Institute (CSI),\nthe Information System Security Association (ISSA), and the Information\nSystems Audit and Control Association (ISACA), I have ready access to\npeople in my area that are usually willing to share examples of their work.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 123,
            "text": "When developing classification levels, I prefer to discuss the topic with\nfellow professionals. I recommend that you cultivate contacts in similar\nbusiness environments and see what your peers are doing. The Internet\ncan generate some examples of classification policies, but many of them\nare university or government agency related. Be careful of what you\nuncover in your research; while there are many good ideas and terms out\nthere, they are only good if they are applicable to your specific needs.\nUse the information gathered from fellow professionals as a starting\npoint. Your organization will have its own unique variation on the clas-\nsification policy and categories. We will examine a number of examples\nof information categories. If you are a government agency, or do work\nfor a government agency, be sure to check with your regulatory affairs\ngroup to determine if there are any government-imposed requirements.\n5.6 Information Classification Category Examples\n5.6.1\nExample 1\nUsing the information in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, the manager can\ndetermine the level of criticality of an information asset.\n5.6.2\nExample 2\nThis service provider has established five categories for use by managers\nin classifying information assets (see Table 5.3). Part of the reason for the\nuse of these categories is that the provider has experience with Department\nof Defense contracts and has become used to certain classification levels.\nThe concern I have with patterning a policy after a government standard\nis that there may be confusion as to what is government contact infor-\nmation and what is normal business information. Also, the number of\nemployees exposed to the government standards may impact the drafting\nof these standards.\n5.6.3\nExample 3\nI recently discussed the classification scheme shown in Table 5.4 with the\ncompany that created it to find out how they use the color coding. The\nsample Information Security Handbook included in this book also uses\ncolor codes for information classification. The company does not actually\nuse the colors to color-code the documents. Instead, the company iden-\ntifies the level of classification but requires the footer to contain “Company\nRed” or whatever color. It gives a good visual for the employees.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 124,
            "text": "5.6.4\nExample 4\nThe company also requires that specific levels of information contain\nappropriate markings to identify it as classified information (see Table 5.5).\nWe discuss an Information Handling Matrix later in this chapter. When\ncreating your organization’s handling requirements, use the following as\nthought starters:\nTABLE 5.1\nInformation Classification Category: Example 1\nMega Oil Corporation\n\u0001\nHIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL — Information whose unauthorized disclosure\nwill cause the corporation severe financial, legal, or reputation damage.\nExamples: acquisitions data, bid details, contract negotiation strategies.\n\u0001\nCONFIDENTIAL — Information whose unauthorized disclosure may cause\nthe corporation financial, legal, or reputation damage. Examples: employee\npersonnel and payroll files, competitive advantage information.\n\u0001\nGENERAL — Information that, because of its personal, technical, or busi-\nness sensitivity, is restricted for use within the company. Unless otherwise\nclassified, all information within Amoco is in this category.\nAt this point in the classification scheme, this company has included a\nmechanism to establish the criticality of the information. It has established its\nthree information classification categories and now adds three impact catego-\nries. Using these sets of definitions, the manager of information resources will\nbe able to determine how critical the asset is to the company.\n\u0001\nMAXIMUM — Information whose unauthorized modification and destruc-\ntion will cause the company severe financial, legal, or reputation damage.\n\u0001\nMEDIUM — Information whose unauthorized modification and destruc-\ntion may cause the company financial, legal, or reputation damage. Exam-\nples: electronic funds transfer, payroll, and commercial checks.\n\u0001\nMINIMUM — Although an error in this data would be of minimal con-\nsequence, this is still important company information and therefore will\nrequire some minimal controls to ensure a minimal level of assurance\nthat the integrity of the data is maintained. This applies to all data that\nis not placed in one of the above classifications. Examples: lease produc-\ntion data, expense data, financial data, and exploration data.\n\u0001\nCRITICAL — It is important to assess the availability requirements of\ndata, applications, and systems. A business decision will be required to\ndetermine the length of unavailability that can be tolerated prior to\nexpending additional resources to ensure the information availability\nthat is required. Information should be labeled “CRITICAL” if it is deter-\nmined that special procedures should be used to ensure its availability.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 125,
            "text": "\u0001\nMake no copies\n\u0001\nThird-party confidential\n\u0001\nAttorney–client privileged document\n\u0001\nDistribution limited to ____\n\u0001\nCovered by a nonanalysis agreement\n5.7 Resist the Urge to Add Categories\nKeep the number of information classification categories to as few as\npossible. If two possible categories do not require substantially different\ntreatment, then combine them. The more categories available, the greater\nthe chance for confusion among managers and employees. Normally, three\nor four categories should be sufficient to meet your organization’s needs.\nAdditionally, avoid the impulse to classify everything the same. To\nsimplify the classification process, some organizations have flirted with\nhaving everything classified as confidential. The problem with this concept\nTABLE 5.2\nCriticality Matrix\nBusiness Impact\nClassification Level\nMaximum\n1\n2\n3\nMedium\n2\n2\n3\nMinimum\n2\n3\n4\n1: Availability safeguards must be implemented.\n2: Availability safeguards should be implemented.\n3: Continue to monitor availability requirements.\n4: No additional action required at this time.\nTABLE 5.3\nInformation Classification Category: Example 2\nInternational Service Provider\n\u0001\nTop Secret — Information that, if disclosed, could cause severe impact\nto the company’s competitive advantage or business strategies.\n\u0001\nConfidential — Information that, if disclosed, could violate the privacy\nof individuals, reduce competitive advantage, or damage the company.\n\u0001\nRestricted — Information that is available to a specific subset of the\nemployee population when conducting company business.\n\u0001\nInternal Use— Information that is intended for use by all employees\nwhen conducting company business.\n\u0001\nPublic — Information that has been made available to the public through\nauthorized company channels.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 126,
            "text": "TABLE 5.4\nInformation Classification Category: Example 3\nGlobal Manufacturer\n\u0001\nCompany Confidential Red — Provides a significant competitive advan-\ntage. Disclosure would cause severe damage to operations. Relates to or\ndescribes a long-term strategy or critical business plans. Disclosure would\ncause regulatory or contractual liability. Disclosure would cause severe\ndamage to our reputation or the public image. Disclosure would cause a\nsevere loss of market share or the ability to be first to market. Disclosure\nwould cause a loss of an important customer, shareholder, or business\npartner. Disclosure would cause a long-term or severe drop in stock value.\nStrong likelihood somebody is seeking to acquire this information.\n\u0001\nCompany Confidential Yellow — Provides a competitive advantage. Dis-\nclosure could cause moderate damage to the company or an individual.\nRelates to or describes an important part of the operational direction\nof the company over time. Provides important technical or financial\naspects of a product line or a business unit. Disclosure could cause a\nloss of customer or shareholder confidence. Disclosure could cause a\ntemporary drop in stock value. Very likely that some third party would\nseek to acquire this information.\n\u0001\nCompany Confidential Green — Might provide a business advantage\nover those who do not have access to the same information. Might be\nuseful to a competitor. Not easily identifiable by inspection of a product.\nNot generally known outside the company or available from public\nsources. Generally available internally. Little competitive interest.\n\u0001\nCompany Public — Would not provide a business or competitive advan-\ntage. Routinely made available to interested members of the general\npublic. Little or no competitive interest.\nTABLE 5.5\nInformation Classification Category: Example 4\n\u0001 Company CONFIDENTIAL — A subset of Company Internal information, the\nunauthorized disclosure or compromise of which would likely have an\nadverse impact on the company’s competitive position, tarnish its reputation,\nor embarrass an individual. Examples: customer, financial, pricing, or person-\nnel data; merger/acquisition, product, or marketing plans; new product\ndesigns, proprietary processes and systems.\n\u0001 Company INTERNAL — All forms of proprietary information originated or\nowned by the Company, or entrusted to it by others. Examples: organization\ncharts, policies, procedures, phone directories, some types of training materials.\n\u0001 Company PUBLIC — Information officially released by the Company for\nwidespread public disclosure. Example: press releases, public marketing\nmaterials, employment advertising, annual reports, product brochures, the\npublic Web site, etc.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 127,
            "text": "is that confidential information requires special handling. This would\nviolate the concept of placing controls only where they are actually\nneeded. This method would require the organization to waste limited\nresources protecting assets that do not really require that level of control.\nAnother pitfall to avoid is to take the information classification cate-\ngories developed by another enterprise and adopt them verbatim as your\nown. Use the information created by other organizations to assist in the\ncreation of your organization’s unique set of categories and definitions.\nIn some government sectors there are five categories for information\nclassification (Top-Secret, Secret, Confidential, Restricted, and Unclassi-\nfied). In addition to these categories, there are additional impact levels of\nSensitive and Nonsensitive. Using this scheme, it would be possible to\nhave an information asset of higher concern if it is classified Restricted/Sen-\nsitive compared to one that is classified Confidential/Nonsensitive. In\naddition, information labeled as Unclassified has the classification level of\nUnclassified, so it has actually been classified. Sometimes I think Joseph\nHeller in Catch 22 actually established a guideline for government and\nindustry to use when developing standards and policies.\n5.8 What Constitutes Confidential Information\nThere are a number of ways to look at information that can be classified\nas confidential. We examine a number of statements relating to confidential\ninformation. The first is a general statement about sensitive information:\nFor a general definition of what might constitute confidential informa-\ntion, it may be sufficient to define such information as:\nInformation that is disclosed could violate the privacy of indi-\nviduals, reduce the company’s competitive advantage, or could\ncause damage to the organization.\nThe Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA) defines “trade secret”\ninformation to include “all forms and types of financial, business, scientific,\ntechnical, economic, or engineering information,” regardless of “how it is\nstored, complied, or memorialized.” The EEA criminalizes the actions of\nanyone who:\n\u0001\nSteals, or without authorization, appropriates, takes, carries away,\nor conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade secret\n\u0001\nWithout authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photo-\ngraphs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates,\ntransmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a trade\nsecret\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 128,
            "text": "\u0001\nReceives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to\nhave been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without\nauthorization\n\u0001\nConspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense\ndescribed in the EEA under the heading “conspiracy”\nThere are a number of other information classification types that you\nmay have heard about over the years. Let us take just a minute to review\ncopyright, patent, and trademark.\n5.8.1\nCopyright\nAt regular intervals, employees will be creating new work in the form of\napplication programs, transactions, systems, Web sites, etc. To protect the\norganization from loss of created material, enterprise policies on copyright\nownership must be implemented and all employees must be reminded of\nthese policies on a regular basis.\nUnlike other forms of intellectual property protection, the basis for\ncopyright occurs at the creation of an original work. Although government\ncopyright offices grant copyrights, every original work has an inherent\nright to a copyright and is protected by that right even if the work is not\npublished or registered.\nAll original works of authorship created by employees for a company\nare the property of the company and are protected by the copyright law.\nThe copyright also applies to consultants doing work for your organization\nwhile under a purchase order or other contractual agreement. Unless there\nis an agreement to the contrary, any work created by a contractor under\ncontract to an organization is owned by the organization, not the contractor.\nThe types of work that qualify for copyright protection include:\n\u0001\nAll types of written works\n\u0001\nComputer databases and software programs (including source\ncode, object code, and micro code)\n\u0001\nOutput (including customized screens and printouts)\n\u0001\nPhotographs, charts, blueprints, technical drawings, and flowcharts\n\u0001\nSound recordings\nA copyright does not protect:\n\u0001\nIdeas, inventions, processes, and three-dimensional designs (these\nare covered by patent law)\n\u0001\nBrands, products, or slogans (covered by trademark law)\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 129,
            "text": "The information classification policy you will be developing discusses\norganization confidential information. Typically, this type of information\nwill consist of either competitive advantage or trade secret information or\npersonal information.\nThe laws regarding trade secret information were developed from the\nduty of good faith imposed generally in commercial dealings. A trade\nsecret is commonly defined as information deriving actual or potential\neconomic value by virtue of its not being readily ascertainable through\nproper means by the public, and which is the subject of reasonable efforts\nto maintain its secrecy. The legal system protects the owner (in our case,\nthe organization) from someone who uses improper means to learn the\ntrade secret, either directly or indirectly. Therefore, anyone using improper\nmeans to learn the trade secret has breached a duty of good faith in\ndealing with the trade secret owner.\nThe breach of that duty of good faith usually takes the form of an\nabuse of a confidence, the use of improper means to ascertain the secret,\nor a breach of contract. Anyone involved in the breach of that duty is\nliable for trade secret stealing.\nThe laws or requirements governing trade secret and competitive\nadvantage information are well established and offer substantial penalties\nfor noncompliance. The area of personal information has become hotter\nduring the past couple years. The passage of the Health Insurance Portability\nand Accountability Act (HIPAA), Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA), Euro-\npean Union privacy laws, and organizations such as Privacy International\nare working to increase the safeguards required for personal information.\nAny policy and supporting standards on information classification levels\nmust take into account not only the trade secret and competitive advantage\ninformation, but also include any personal information about employees,\ncustomers, clients, and other third parties.\nEarlier in this chapter we examined a number of examples of infor-\nmation classification categories. Now we add one other important element:\nthe role of employees in the information classification process.\n5.9 Employee Responsibilities\nWhen doing research for this section of the book, I came across the\nfollowing policy statement:\nThe “Information Owner” means the party who confides the\nreferenced Confidential Information to the other party, the\nConfidant. Despite the name, the Information Owner benefits\nfrom a Confidentiality Engagement with respect to Confidential\nInformation that it owns or possesses.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 130,
            "text": "These two sentences have five terms that require the reader to get\nfurther definitions. As I attempted to determine exactly what it means to\n“confide,” I was sent to a hypertext page that explained that it meant to\n“entrust” the information to a “confident,” which means the “party receiving\nthe information” and at that point I started looking elsewhere for examples.\nThe two policy sentences above provide a good example of what\nshould be avoided when writing a policy, or writing anything. The\ndocument referenced came from an organization with strong roots in the\nlegal and government sectors. If this is your audience, then this is the\nlanguage for you. If not, try to think like Henry David Thoreau and\nsimplify.\nThere are typically three areas of employee responsibility: owner, user,\nand custodian. We discuss each of these concepts and examine how other\norganizations have defined these responsibilities.\n5.9.1\nOwner\nThe information owner is the entity within the organization that has been\nassigned the responsibility to exercise the organization’s proprietary rights\nand grant access privileges to those with a true business need. This role\nis normally assigned to the senior level manager within the business unit\nwhere the information asset was created or is the primary user of that\nasset. The managers will have the ultimate responsibility for compliance\nbut will probably delegate the day-to-day activities to some individual\nwho reports to them.\n5.9.1.1\nInformation Owner\nThe person who creates, or initiates the creation or storage, of the\ninformation is the initial owner. In an organization, possibly with divisions,\ndepartments, and sections, the owner becomes the unit itself, with the\nperson responsible designated the “head” of the unit.\nThe information owner is responsible for ensuring that:\n\u0001\nThere exists an agreed-upon classification hierarchy, and this hier-\narchy is appropriate for the types of information processed for that\nbusiness unit.\n\u0001\nClassify all information stored into the agreed types and create an\ninventory (listing) of each type.\n\u0001\nFor each document or file within each classification category,\nappend its agreed (confidentiality) classification. Its availability\nshould be determined by the respective classification.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 131,
            "text": "\u0001\nEnsure that, for each classification type, the appropriate level of\ninformation security safeguards is available (e.g., the log-on con-\ntrols and access permissions applied by the Information Custodian\nprovide the required levels of confidentiality).\n\u0001\nPeriodically check to ensure that information continues to be\nclassified appropriately and that the safeguards remain valid and\noperative.\nI am not certain what being designated “head” actually means, but I do\nnot believe I would want that title. The term “initial owner” may also lead\nthe reader to believe that someone else may come along and become the\n“final” or “ultimate” leader.\nWe now review the owner definition from a global media organization.\nOwners are authorized employees to whom responsibility has been\ndelegated for the creation or use of specific business data by the business\nunit that “owns” the data. Owners are responsible for defining require-\nments for safeguards that ensure the confidentiality, availability, and\nintegrity of the information. Owners are also responsible for placing\ninformation in the proper classification so that those who need the\ninformation to perform their assigned duties can obtain it. The owner\nprovides requirements for security for the information to the custodian.\nThe custodian implements the controls to meet the owner’s requirements.\nThis is a fairly good definition. The only element that I might add is the\nrequirement that the Owner monitor the safeguards to ensure Custodian\ncompliance. Let us examine one more example.\nA. Owner: Is the company management of an organizational\nunit, department, etc. where the information is created, or that\nis the primary user of the information. Owners have the respon-\nsibility to:\n1.\nIdentify the classification level of all corporate information within\ntheir organizational unit\n2.\nDefine and implement appropriate safeguards to ensure the con-\nfidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information resource\n3.\nMonitor safeguards to ensure their compliance and report situations\nof noncompliance\n4.\nAuthorize access to those who have a business need for the\ninformation\n5.\nRemove access from those who no longer have a business need\nfor the information\nWe will see variations on this definition in the following section.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 132,
            "text": "5.9.2\nCustodian\nThe next responsibility we must create is that of the information custodian.\nThis entity is responsible for protecting the information asset based on\nthe requirements established by the owner. In an organization that has\nan information systems organization, the operations group might be con-\nsidered the custodian of client data and information. They neither have\nthe right to permit anyone access to the information asset, nor can they\nalter the information in any way without approval from the owner. This\nwould include any programming or system upgrades that would modify\nthe information or the output from applications and transactions.\nAn Information Custodian is the person responsible for over-\nseeing and implementing the necessary safeguards to protect\nassets, at the level classified by the information owner.\nThis could be the System Administrator, controlling access to a\ncomputer network; or a specific application program or even\na standard filing cabinet.\nThis example started out well but finished oddly. Giving examples of\nwhat might be considered a custodian is good. Trying to liken a filing\ncabinet to the opening sentence where the policy identifies the custodian\nas a “person.” When writing, remember to go back and read what you\njust wrote to make sure the concepts match from beginning to end. Do\nnot try to be cute. Stick to the subject and make sure you say exactly\nwhat needs to be said.\nCustodians are authorized system support persons or organiza-\ntions (employees, contractors, consultants, vendors, etc.)\nresponsible for maintaining the safeguards established by own-\ners. The owner designates the custodian. The custodian is the\n“steward of the data” for the owner; that is, the Data Center\nmay be the custodian for business application “owned” by a\nbusiness unit.\nThe use of the term “steward of the data” brings out a point that needs\nto be made. Some organizations and cultures prefer other terms than the\nones discussed here. When I was younger, I played Pony League baseball\nfor a team called the “Custodians.” Our uniforms were the most realistic\nbecause we had the name on the front and numbers on the back. The\nother teams had names such as “Tigers” and “Braves” but had some\nadvertisement about their sponsor on the back. It was not until we played\na few games that the other team started calling us the janitors. Custodian\nto some is a noble name; to others, maybe not so noble. So choose your\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 133,
            "text": "terms wisely. “Curator,” “keeper,” and “guardian” are other terms that\nmight work.\nRecently we were doing work for HIPAA compliance and developing\npolicies for a hospital. When we discussed the definition for “user,” the\nhospital staff started to chuckle and told us that the term “user” had a\ntotally different meaning there and we needed to find another term.\nB. Custodian: Employees designated by the owner to be\nresponsible for maintaining the safeguards established by the\nowner.\nIt is important to remember that when using the term “employee,” we\nare actually discussing the virtual employee. We can only write policy for\nemployees; for all third parties, a contract must contain compliance\nlanguage. Thus, it is perfectly acceptable to identify “employees” even if\nwe know that someone other than an employee might actually perform the\nfunction. This is true for all employee responsibilities except “owner.” The\nowner must be an employee; after all, it is the organization’s information.\n5.9.3\nUser\nThe final element is the user. This individual is granted permission by the\nowner to access the information asset. The user must use the information\nin the manner agreed upon with the owner. The user has no other rights.\nWhen granting access, the owner should use the concept of “least privi-\nlege.” This means the user is granted only the access he or she specifically\nneeds to perform a business task, and no more.\nAn information user is the person responsible for viewing,\namending, or updating the content of the information assets.\nThis can be any user of the information in the inventory created\nby the information owner.\nThe inventory discussed here is addressed in both the classification\npolicy and the records management policy, including who has been\nassigned access needs to be tracked. The custodian is generally responsible\nfor providing the tools to monitor the user list.\nUsers are authorized system users (employees, contractors,\nconsultants, vendors, etc.) responsible for using and safeguard-\ning information under their control according to the directions\nof the owner. Users are authorized access to information by\nthe owner.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 134,
            "text": "The final example is similar to the definition used above:\nC. User: Employees authorized by the owner to access infor-\nmation and use the safeguards established by the owner.\n5.10 Classification Examples\nThis section examines attributes and examples of different classification\ncategories, and presents examples of organization information classifica-\ntion policies.\n5.10.1\nClassification: Example 1\nCritique of Example 1 (Table 5.6) — This is an actual classification policy\n(very high level) for the executive branch of a national government. There\nis little here to help the average user. This is an example of a program\nor general policy statement; however, a topic-specific policy statement\nmay have been more beneficial. Perhaps the next two examples will\nprovide more information.\n5.10.2\nClassification: Example 2\nCritique of Example 2 (Table 5.7) — The policy seems to stress competitive\nadvantage information in its opening paragraphs. It does not appear to\naddress personal information about employees or customers. It does pro-\nvide for these topics as categories under “Confidential” but it never really\nTABLE 5.6\nInformation Classification Policy: Example 1\nInformation Classification\n\u0001\nPolicy: Security classifications should be used to indicate the need and\npriorities for security protection.\nObjective: To ensure that information assets receive an appropriate level of\nprotection.\nStatement: Information has varying degrees of sensitivity and criticality. Some\nitems may require an additional level of security protection or special handling.\nA security classification system should be used to define an appropriate set of\nsecurity protection levels, and to communicate the need for special handling\nmeasures to users.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 135,
            "text": "TABLE 5.7 \nInformation Classification Policy: Example 2\nClassification Requirements\nClassified data is information developed by the organization with some effort\nand some expense or investment that provides the organization with a com-\npetitive advantage in its relevant industry and that the organization wishes to\nprotect from disclosure.\nWhile defining information protection is a difficult task, four elements serve\nas the basis for a classification scheme:\n1.\nThe information must be of some value to the organization and its com-\npetitors so that it provides some demonstrable competitive advantage.\n2.\nThe information must be the result of some minimal expense or invest-\nment by the organization.\n3.\nThe information is somewhat unique in that it is not generally known in\nthe industry or to the public or may not be readily ascertained.\n4.\nThe information must be maintained as a relative secret, both within and\noutside the organization, with reasonable precautions against disclosure\nof the information. Access to such information could only result from\ndisregarding established standards or from using illegal means.\nTop Secret (Secret, Highly Confidential)\nAttributes:\n\u0001\nProvides the organization with a very significant competitive edge\n\u0001\nIs of such a nature that unauthorized disclosure would cause severe\ndamage to the organization\n\u0001\nIt shows specific business strategies and major directions\n\u0001\nIs essential to the technical or financial success of a product\nExamples:\n\u0001\nSpecific operating plans, marketing strategies\n\u0001\nSpecific descriptions of unique parts or materials, technology intent\nstatements, new technologies and research\n\u0001\nSpecific business strategies and major directions\nConfidential (Sensitive, Personal, Privileged)\nAttributes:\n\u0001\nProvides the organization with a significant competitive edge\n\u0001\nIs of such a nature that unauthorized disclosure would cause damage\nto the organization\n\u0001\nShows operational direction over an extended period of time\n\u0001\nIs extremely important to the technical or financial success of a product\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 136,
            "text": "mentions them by name. This appears to be a policy that is somewhat\nlimited in scope. Additionally, it does not establish the scope of the\ninformation (is it computer generated only or exactly what information is\nbeing addressed?). The employee responsibilities are missing. What is\nmanagement’s responsibility with respect to information classification, and\nwhat is expected of the employees? Finally, what are the consequences\nof noncompliance?\nExamples:\n\u0001\nConsolidated revenue, cost, profit, or other financial results\n\u0001\nOperating plans, marketing strategies\n\u0001\nDescriptions of unique parts or materials, technology intent statements,\nnew technological studies and research\n\u0001\nMarket requirements, technologies, product plans, and revenues\nRestricted (Internal Use)\nAttributes:\n\u0001\nAll business-related information requiring baseline security protection,\nbut failing to meet the specified criteria for higher classification\n\u0001\nInformation that is intended for use by employees when conducting\ncompany business\nExamples:\n\u0001\nBusiness information\n\u0001\nOrganization policies, standards, procedures\n\u0001\nInternal organization announcements\nPublic (Unclassified)\nAttributes:\n\u0001\nInformation that, due to its content and context, requires no special\nprotection, or\n\u0001\nInformation that has been made available to the public distribution\nthrough authorized company channels\nExamples:\n\u0001\nOnline public information, Web site information\n\u0001\nInternal correspondence, memoranda, and documentation that do not\nmerit special controls\n\u0001\nPublic corporate announcements\nTABLE 5.7 (continued)\nInformation Classification Policy: Example 2\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 137,
            "text": "5.10.3\nClassification: Example 3\nCritique of Example 3 (Table 5.8) — Examples 2 and 3 are very similar.\nExample 3 does address the role of the owner but fails to define what\nan owner is. It does not address the issue of noncompliance, and the\nscope of the policy is vague.\n5.10.4\nClassification: Example 4\nCritique of Example 4 (Table 5.9) — The intent of the policy states that\n“Information is a corporate asset and is the property of Corporation.” The\nscope of the policy states that “Corporate information includes electroni-\ncally generated, printed, filmed, typed, or stored.” The responsibilities are\nwell-established. The issue of compliance is the only policy element that\nappears lacking.\n5.11 Declassification or Reclassification \nof Information\nPart of an effective information classification program is the ability to\ncombine the requirements with a Records Management Policy. Information\nassets must be protected, stored, and then destroyed, based on a policy\nand a set of standards. The Information Classification Policy will ensure\nthat an owner is assigned to each asset, that a proper classification is\nassigned, and that an information handling set of standards will help\nmaintain control of information copies.\nThe Records Management Policy requires the owner to provide a brief\ndescription of the information record and the record retention require-\nments. These requirements will be a set of standards that support the\nRecords Management Policy. We briefly examine what typically is part of\nthe Records Management Policy.\n5.12 Records Management Policy\nAn organization’s records are one of its most important and valuable\nassets. Almost every employee is responsible for creating or maintaining\norganization records of some kind, whether in the form of paper, computer\ndata, optical disk, electronic mail, or voice-mail. Letters, memoranda, and\ncontracts are obviously information records, as are things such as a desk\ncalendar, an appointment book, or an expense record.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 138,
            "text": "TABLE 5.8 \nInformation Classification Policy: Example 3\nINFORMATION CLASSIFICATION\nIntroduction\nInformation, wherever it is handled or stored (for example, in computers, file\ncabinets, desktops, fax machines, voice-mail), needs to be protected from\nunauthorized access, modification, disclosure, and destruction. All informa-\ntion is not created equal. Consequently, segmentation or classification of\ninformation into categories is necessary to help identify a framework for\nevaluating the information’s relative value and the appropriate controls re-\nquired to preserve its value to the company.\nThree basic classifications of information have been established. Organiza-\ntions may define additional subclassifications as necessary to complete their\nframework for evaluating and preserving information under their control.\nWhen information does require protection, the protection must be consis-\ntent. Often, strict access controls are applied to data stored in the mainframe\ncomputers but not applied to office workstations. Whether in a mainframe,\nclient/server, workstation, file cabinet, desk drawer, waste basket, or in the\nmail, information should be subject to appropriate and consistent protection.\nThe definitions and responsibilities described below represent the mini-\nmum level of detail necessary for all organizations across the company. Each\norganization may decide that additional detail is necessary to adequately\nimplement information classification within their organization.\nCorporate Policy: All information must be classified by the owner\ninto one of three classifications: Confidential, Internal Use or Public.\n(From Company Policy on Information Management)\nConfidential\nDefinition: Information that, if disclosed, could:\n\u0001\nViolate the privacy of individuals,\n\u0001\nReduce the company’s competitive advantage, or\n\u0001\nCause damage to the company.\nExamples: Some examples of Confidential information are:\n\u0001\nPersonnel records (including name, address, phone, salary, performance\nrating, social security number, date of birth, marital status, career path,\nnumber of dependents, etc.),\n\u0001\nCustomer information (including name, address, phone number, energy\nconsumption, credit history, social security number, etc.),\n\u0001\nShareholder information (including name, address, phone number,\nnumber of shares held, social security number, etc.),\n\u0001\nVendor information (name, address, product pricing specific to the com-\npany, etc.),\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 139,
            "text": "Organizations are required by law to maintain certain types of records,\nusually for a specified period of time. The failure to retain such documents\nfor these minimum time periods can subject an organization to penalties,\nfines, or other sanctions, or could put it at a serious disadvantage in\n\u0001\nHealth insurance records (including medical, prescription, and psycho-\nlogical records),\n\u0001\nSpecific operating plans, marketing plans, or strategies,\n\u0001\nConsolidated revenue, cost, profit, or other financial results that are not\npublic record,\n\u0001\nDescriptions of unique parts or materials, technology intent statements,\nor new technologies and research that are not public record,\n\u0001\nSpecific business strategies and directions,\n\u0001\nMajor changes in the company’s management structure, and\n\u0001\nInformation that requires special skill or training to interpret and employ\ncorrectly, such as design or specification files.\nIf any of these items can be found freely and openly in public records, the\ncompany’s obligation to protect from disclosure is waived.\nInternal Use\nDefinition: Classify information as Internal Use when the information is in-\ntended for use by employees when conducting company business.\nExamples: Some examples of Internal Use information are:\n\u0001\nOperational business information/reports,\n\u0001\nNoncompany information that is subject to a nondisclosure agreement\nwith another company,\n\u0001\nCompany phone book,\n\u0001\nCorporate policies, standards, and procedures, and\n\u0001\nInternal company announcements.\nPublic\nDefinition: Classify information as Public if the information has been made\navailable for public distribution through authorized company channels. Public\ninformation is not sensitive in context or content, and requires no special\nprotection.\nExamples: The following are examples of Public information:\n\u0001\nCorporate Annual Report\n\u0001\nInformation specifically generated for public consumption, such as pub-\nlic service bulletins, marketing brochures, and advertisements)\nTABLE 5.8 (continued)\nInformation Classification Policy: Example 3\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 140,
            "text": "TABLE 5.9 \nInformation Classification Policy: Example 4\nInformation Management\n1.\nGeneral\nA. Corporate information includes electronically generated, printed,\nfilmed, typed, or stored.\nB. Information is a corporate asset and is the property of Corporation.\n2.\nInformation Retention\nA. Each organization shall retain information necessary to the conduct\nof business.\nB. Each organizational unit shall establish and administer a records\nmanagement schedule in compliance with applicable laws and reg-\nulations, and professional standards and practices, and be compat-\nible with Corporate goals and expectations.\n3.\nInformation Protection\nA. Information must be protected according to its sensitivity, criticality,\nand value, regardless of the media on which it is stored, the manual\nor automated systems that process it, or the methods by which it\nis distributed.\nB. Employees are responsible for protecting corporate information\nfrom unauthorized access, modification, destruction, or disclosure,\nwhether accidental or intentional. To facilitate the protection of\ncorporate information, employee responsibilities have been estab-\nlished at three levels: Owner, Custodian, and User.\n1) Owner: Company management of the organizational unit where\nthe information is created, or management of the organizational\nunit that is the primary user of the information. Owners are\nresponsible to:\na) Identify the classification level of all corporate information\nwithin their organizational unit,\nb) Define appropriate safeguards to ensure the confidentiality,\nintegrity, and availability of the information resource,\nc) Monitor safeguards to ensure they are properly imple-\nmented,\nd) Authorize access to those who have a business need for the\ninformation, and\ne) Remove access from those who no longer have a business\nneed for the information.\n2) Custodian: Employees designated by the owner to be responsi-\nble for maintaining the safeguards established by the owner.\n3) User: Employees authorized by the owner to access information\nand use the safeguards established by the owner.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 141,
            "text": "litigation. Therefore, every organization should implement a Record Man-\nagement Policy to provide standards for maintaining complete and accurate\nrecords to ensure that employees are aware of what records to keep and\nfor how long, what records to dispose of, and how to dispose of them.\nThe cost of storage and administration problems involved in retaining\nmaterial beyond its useful life are a few important reasons to establish a\nRecords Management Policy. Consideration should also be given to the\nimpact that a failure to produce subpoenaed records might have on the\norganization when defending itself against a lawsuit. Determining the\nproper retention periods for information records is a requirement in today’s\noperating environment. Information records should be kept only as long\nas they serve a useful purpose or until legal requirements are met. At the\nend of the retention period, records should be destroyed in a verifiable\nmanner. Implementing effective information classification and records\nmanagement policies makes sound business sense and shows that man-\nagement is practicing due diligence.\nBefore drafting a Records Management Policy, consult with your legal\nstaff to ensure that the policy reflects any relevant statutes. The retention\nstandards that support the policy should be reviewed annually when\nconducting an organizationwide information asset inventory.\nC. Each Vice President shall appoint an Organization Information\nProtection Coordinator who will administer an information protec-\ntion program that appropriately classifies and protects corporate\ninformation under the Vice President’s control and makes employ-\nees aware of the importance of information and methods for its\nprotection.\n4.\nInformation Classification: To ensure the proper protection of corpo-\nrate information, the owner shall use a formal review process to classify\ninformation into one of the following classifications:\nA. Public: Information that has been made available for public distri-\nbution through authorized company channels. (Refer to Commu-\nnication Policy for more information.)\nB. Confidential: Information that, if disclosed, could violate the privacy\nof individuals, reduce the company’s competitive advantage, or\ncould cause significant damage to the company.\nC. Internal Use: Information that is intended for use by all employees\nwhen conducting company business. Most information used in the\ncompany would be classified Internal Use.\nTABLE 5.9 (continued)\nInformation Classification Policy: Example 4\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 142,
            "text": "5.12.1\nSample Records Management Policy\nSee Table 5.10 for a sample Records Management Policy.\n5.13 Information Handling Standards Matrix\nLater in the book we discuss standards and how they support the imple-\nmentation of the policy. Because information classification and records\nmanagement are unique in their standards requirements, it is appropriate\nto give examples now of what these standards might look like. When\ndeveloping your standards, use these as a guideline — not a standard.\n5.13.1\nPrinted Material\nSee Table 5.11 for an information handling matrix for printed material.\n5.13.2\nElectronically Stored Information\nSee Table 5.12 for an information handling matrix for electronically stored\ninformation.\n5.13.3\nElectronically Transmitted Information\nSee Table 5.13 for an information handling matrix for electronically trans-\nmitted information.\n5.13.4\nRecord Management Retention Schedule\nSee Table 5.14 for a sample record retention schedule.\n5.14 Information Classification Methodology\nThe final element in an effective information classification process is to\nprovide management and employees with a method to evaluate informa-\ntion and provide them with an indication of where the information should\nbe classified (see Table 5.15). To accomplish this, it may be necessary to\ncreate information classification worksheets. These worksheets can be\nused by the business units to determine what classifications of information\nthey have within their organization.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 143,
            "text": "TABLE 5.10 \nSample Records Management Policy\nRecords Management Policy\nIntroduction\nIt is the policy of the Company to accommodate the timely storage, retrieval,\nand disposition of records created, utilized, and maintained by the various\ndepartments. The period of time that records are maintained is based on the\nminimum requirements set forth in State and Federal retention schedules.\n1.\nRole of Retention Center\nThe role of the Retention Center is to receive, maintain, destroy, and service\ninactive records that have not met their disposition date. Each business unit\nis to establish schedules to comply with the minimum amount of time records\nshould be maintained in compliance with State and Federal guidelines. Re-\ntention requirements apply whether or not the records are transferred to the\nRetention Center. Copies of the schedules must be maintained by the busi-\nness unit and available for inspection.\n2.\nRole of the Records Manager\nThe role of the Records Manager is to administer the Records Management\nprogram. The Records Manager is well acquainted with all records and record\ngroups within an agency and has expertise in all aspects of records manage-\nment. The duties of the Records Manager include planning, development,\nand administration of records management policies. These duties also in-\nclude the annual organizationwide inventory of all information assets to be\nconducted by the business unit manager with reports sent to the Records\nManager.\n3.\nRole of Management Personnel\nManagement Personnel are responsible for records under their control.\n4.\nRole of Departmental Records Coordinator\nThe Departmental Records Coordinator is to be a liaison between the de-\npartment and the Retention Center. It is recommended that each department\nappoint a Records Coordinator in writing. The letter of appointment should\ninclude the Records Coordinator’s full name, department, and telephone\nextension. The letter should be forwarded to the Retention Center and main-\ntained on file.\n5.\nType of Documents Maintained in Retention Center\n5.1\nRecord Retention accepts only public records that are referenced\nin the State Retention Schedule, except student transcripts. Copies\nof student transcripts may be obtained from Records and Admis-\nsions located at the Student Service Center.\n5.2\nRecord Retention does not accept personal, active, or nonrecords.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 144,
            "text": "5.3\nRecord Retention stores only inactive and permanent records until\nfinal disposition according to State and Federal retention schedules.\nExamples include personnel files, purchase orders, grade books, or\nsurveys.\n5.4\nRecord Retention receives and stores inactive permanent records\nfrom TVI departments until final disposition according to State and\nFederal retention guidelines.\n5.5\nRecord Retention ensures records are classified according to State\nand Retention guidelines.\n5.6\nRecord Retention ensures records are tracked and entered into an\nelectronic records management software system that tracks record\nboxes, assigns retention schedules, and records permanent box\nnumbers, destruction dates, and shelf locations.\n6.\nServices\n6.1\nIf a department has obsolete records that are deemed confidential\nor sensitive, or copies of nonrecords, a special request for shredding\nmay be sent to the Record Retention Center. The records can be\nshredded by the Record Retention Center staff or transferred to the\nState Record Center for destruction.\n6.2\nDepartments must complete a Request for Destruction form for\nconfidential or nonrecords to be shredded. Departments are re-\nquired to purchase forms from Central Stores at Shipping & Receiv-\ning.\n6.3\nThe Record Retention Center provides consulting services to de-\npartments on filing systems and maintenance of records.\n7.\nTransferring Records\n7.1\nDepartments should transfer records to Record Retention for stor-\nage in January, July, and October.\n7.2\nRecords with a retention period of two years or more should be\ntransferred to Record Retention.\n8.\nRecord Retrieval\n8.1\nRecords are retrieved and delivered to customers by request, given\na 24-hour notice.\n8.2\nRecords can be retrieved for customers on an emergency basis as\nrequested.\n8.3\nManagement personnel, the records coordinator, or the requester\nwill sign for receipt of records. Records are to be checked out for\nno longer than 30 days. If a longer period is required, a written\nrequest should be sent to the Retention Center. If records are\nchecked out for more than a year, the records will be permanently\nwithdrawn from inventory.\nTABLE 5.10 (continued)\nSample Records Management Policy\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 145,
            "text": "To complete this worksheet, the employee would fill in the information\nrequested at the top of the worksheet:\n\u0001\nOrganization: the department designated as the information owner\n\u0001\nGroup: the reporting group of the individual performing the infor-\nmation classification process\n8.4\nPermanent Withdrawal: If a department wishes to withdraw a record\npermanently from storage, forward a request to Record Retention by\nphone, fax, or inter-office mail. The department will complete a With-\ndrawal Request form and the records will be deleted from inventory.\n8.5\nSecond-Party Withdrawal: If a department requests a record origi-\nnating from another department, then the requesting department\nmust contact the department of origin to obtain authorization. The\ndepartment of origin will contact Record Retention for records with-\ndrawal. The department requester must view the requested records\nat the Record Retention Center.\n8.6\nRecords should not be returned via inter-office mail due to the\nconfidential nature of the documents.\n9.\nRecord Destruction\n9.1\nRecord Retention destroys records according to State guidelines in\nJanuary, July, and October.\n9.2\nRecords are destroyed by Record Retention according to State and\nFederal guidelines when legal requirements are met. A Destruction\nRequest form will be sent to the originating department for review\nand signature by the Departmental Records Coordinator and by\nmanagement personnel. Only when the Destruction Request has\nbeen reviewed, signed, and returned to Record Retention will the\nexpired records be destroyed. Authorized personnel will shred con-\nfidential records. If departments wish to keep the records past their\nassigned destruction date, management personnel can extend the\ndate no longer than one year unless a litigation, audit, or investiga-\ntion is pending. Records kept by the department past the retention\ndate of destruction will be permanently withdrawn from inventory.\n9.3\nAll records scheduled for destruction are reviewed by the Institute’s\nRecords Manager and by State Records Analysts for approval.\n10. Supplies\n10.1 Records must be stored in the appropriate record retention boxes,\nwhich are obtained from Central Stores at Shipping & Receiving.\n10.2 Storage Ticket forms and Request for Destruction forms are ob-\ntained from Central Stores at Shipping & Receiving.\nTABLE 5.10 (continued)\nSample Records Management Policy\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 146,
            "text": "\u0001\nReview Performed by/Phone: the name and phone number of the\nindividual performing the review\n\u0001\nDate: the date of the review\n\u0001\nInformation Name/Description: an identifier or description of the\ninformation being reviewed\nTABLE 5.11\nInformation Handling Matrix for Printed Material\nPrinted Material Handling Standards\nConfidential\nInternal Use\nPublic\nLabeling of \ndocuments\nDocument should \nidentify owner and be \nmarked “CONFIDEN-\nTIAL” on cover or title \npage\nNo special \nrequirements\nDocument may \nbe marked \n“PUBLIC” on \ncover or title \npage\nDuplication of \ndocuments\nInformation owner to \ndetermine permissions\nDuplication \nfor business \npurposes \nonly\nNo special \nrequirements\nMailing of \ndocuments\nNo classification mark-\ning on external enve-\nlope; “CONFIDENTIAL” \nmarking on cover \nsheet; confirmation of \nreceipt at discretion of \ninformation owner\nMailing re-\nquirements \ndetermined \nby informa-\ntion owner\nNo special \nrequirements\nDisposal of \ndocuments\nOwner observed physi-\ncal destruction beyond \nability to recover\nControlled \nphysical \ndestruction\nNo special \nrequirements\nStorage of \ndocuments\nLocked up when not in \nuse\nMaster copy \nsecured \nagainst \ndestruction\nMaster copy \nsecured \nagainst \ndestruction\nRead access to \ndocuments\nOwner establishes user \naccess rules; generally \nhighly restricted\nOwner estab-\nlishes user \naccess rules, \ngenerally \nwidely \navailable\nNo special \nrequirements; \ngenerally avail-\nable within \nand outside \ncompany\nReview of \ndocument \nclassification \nlevel\nInformation owner to \nestablish specific \nreview date (not to \nexceed one year)\nInformation \nowner to \nreview at \nleast annually\nNo special \nrequirements\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 147,
            "text": "TABLE 5.12\nInformation Handling Matrix for Electronically \nStored Information\nElectronically Stored Information Handling Matrix\nConfidential\nInternal Use\nPublic\nStorage on fixed \nmedia (access \ncontrolled)\nUnencrypted\nUnencrypted\nUnencrypted\nStorage on fixed \nmedia (not ac-\ncess controlled)\nEncrypted\nUnencrypted\nUnencrypted\nStorage on re-\nmovable media\nEncrypted\nUnencrypted\nUnencrypted\nRead access to in-\nformation (in-\ncludes \nduplication)\nInformation owner \nto authorize indi-\nvidual users \nInformation \nowner to define \npermissions on \nuser, group, or \nfunction basis\nNo special \nrequirements\nUpdate access to \ninformation \nInformation owner \nto authorize indi-\nvidual users\nInformation \nowner to define \npermissions on \nuser, group, or \nfunction basis\nInformation \nowners to \ndefine \npermissions\nDelete access to \ninformation\nInformation owner \nto authorize indi-\nvidual users; user \nconfirmation \nrequired\nInformation \nowner to define \npermissions on \nuser, group, or \nfunction basis; \nuser confirma-\ntion required \nInformation \nowner to \ndefine \npermissions\nPrint hard copy \nreport of infor-\nmation\nOutput to be \nrouted to a \npredefined, \nmonitored printer\nInformation \nowner to define \npermissions\nNo special \nrequirements\nInternal labeling \nof information at \nthe application \nor screen/display \nlevel\nNotification of \n“CONFIDENTIAL” \nto appear at top \nof display\nNo special re-\nquirements\nNotification of \n“PUBLIC” \nmay optional-\nly appear at \ntop of display\nExternal labeling \nof exchangeable \nmedia\nMedia must identi-\nfy owner and be \nmarked CONFI-\nDENTIAL\nMarking at \ndiscretion of \nowner\nNo special \nrequirements\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 148,
            "text": "In the section for Information Name/Description, it is necessary to enter\nthe information type. For example:\n\u0001\nEmployee Records:\n\u0001\nEmployee performance review records\n\u0001\nTimecards\n\u0001\nEmployee discipline documents\n\u0001\nPay records\n\u0001\nMedical records\nTABLE 5.12 (continued)\nInformation Handling Matrix for Electronically \nStored Information\nElectronically Stored Information Handling Matrix\nConfidential\nInternal Use\nPublic\nDisposal of \nelectronic media \n(diskettes, tapes, \nhard disks, etc.)\nOwner observed \nphysical \ndestruction \nbeyond ability to \nrecover\nPhysical \ndestruction\nNo special \nrequirements\nDisposal of \ninformation\nDelete by fully \nwriting over \ninformation\nDelete files \nthrough normal \nplatform delete \ncommand, \noption, or \nfacility\nNo special \nrequirements\nReview of \nclassified \ninformation for \nreclassification\nInformation owner \nto establish \nspecific review \ndate (not to \nexceed one year)\nInformation \nowner to \nreview annually\nInformation \nowner to \nreview \nannually\nLogging access \nactivity\nLog all access \nattempts; \ninformation \nowner to review \nall access and \nviolation attempts\nLog all violation \nattempts; \ninformation \nowner reviews \nas \nappropriate\nNo special \nrequirements\nAccess report \nretention \nrequirements\nInformation owner \nto determine \nretention of \naccess logs (not to \nexceed one year)\nInformation \nowner to \ndetermine \nretention of \nviolation logs \n(not to exceed \nsix months)\nNo special \nrequirements\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 149,
            "text": "\u0001\nGroup Administrative Records:\n\u0001\nMonthly status reports\n\u0001\nYearly status reports\n\u0001\nYearly business objectives\n\u0001\nBusiness Process Records\n\u0001\nPurchasing contracts\n\u0001\nQuarterly financial reports\n\u0001\nProject management tasks, schedules\n\u0001\nReference manuals\n\u0001\nContract negotiations\nTABLE 5.13\nInformation Handling Matrix for Electronically \nTransmitted Information\nElectronically Transmitted Information Handling Standards\nConfidential\nInternal Use\nPublic\nBy FAX\nAttended at receiving \nFAX\nInformation \nowner to define \nrequirements\nNo special \nrequirements\nBy WAN\nConfirmation of \nreceipt required; \nencryption optional\nNo special \nrequirements; \nencryption \noptional\nNo special \nrequirements\nBy LAN\nConfirmation of \nreceipt required; \nencryption optional\nNo special \nrequirements; \nencryption \noptional\nNo special \nrequirements\nBy inter-\noffice mail\nNo external labeling \non envelope; normal \nlabeling on \ndocument\nNo special \nrequirements\nNo special \nrequirements\nBy voice-mail\nConfirmation of \nreceipt required \n(sender); remove \nmessage after receipt \n(recipient) \nNo special \nrequirements\nNo special \nrequirements\nBy electronic \nmessaging \n(e-mail)\nConfirmation of \nreceipt required; \nencryption optional\nNo special \nrequirements\nNo special \nrequirements\nBy wireless or \ncellular \nphone\nDo not transmit\nNo special \nrequirements\nNo special \nrequirements\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 150,
            "text": "TABLE 5.14\nSample Record Retention Schedule\nRecords Management (Retention) Schedule\nRecord\nRetain\nRecord\nRetain\nAccounts payable \nschedules\nPermanent\nGeneral ledgers\nPermanent\nAccounts receivables \nschedules\nPermanent\nInsurance policies\nUntil \nexpiration\nBank drafts and paid \nnotices\n10 Years\nInternal repair orders \n(hardcopy only)\n7 Years\nBank statements and \nreconciliations\n10 Years\nInternal sales journals\nPermanent\nBills of lading\n7 Years\nJournal vouchers\nPermanent\nCancelled checks\n10 Years\nMiscellaneous schedules\nPermanent\nCash disbursements \njournals\nPermanent\nNew and used vehicle \nrecords\n7 Years\nCash receipts journals\nPermanent\nNew vehicle sales journals\nPermanent\nClaims register\n7 Years\nOffice receipts\n7 Years\nCorporate minutes \nbook\nPermanent\nParts, accessories, and \nservice sales journals\nPermanent\nCorrespondence\n10 Years\nPayroll journals\nPermanent\nCounter tickets\n7 Years\nPrepaid and accrued \nexpense schedule\n2 Years\nCPA audit reports\nPermanent\nProperty tax returns\nPermanent\nCredit memos\n7 Years\nPurchase journals\nPermanent\nCustomer files\n7 Years\nPurchase orders\n7 Years\nCustomer repair orders \n(both office and hard \ncopy)\n7 Years\nReceiving reports\n7 Years\nDocuments pertaining \nto litigation\nPermanent\nRepair order check sheet\n2 Years\nDuplicate deposit slips\n10 Years\nRepair orders — internal \n(office copy only)\n2 Years\nEmployee earning and \nhistory record\nPermanent\nSales invoices\n7 Years\nEmployment contracts\nPermanent\nSalesperson’s commission \nreports\nPermanent\nFederal revenue agents’ \nreports and related \npapers\nPermanent\nSocial security tax returns\nPermanent\nFederal tax returns\nPermanent\nState and local sales tax \nreturns\nPermanent\nFinancial statements\nPermanent\nState annual reports\nPermanent\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 151,
            "text": "\u0001\nOperations Information:\n\u0001\nBusiness partner information\n\u0001\nAsset allocation\n\u0001\nTrading activities\n\u0001\nProduction formulas\n\u0001\nProduction cost information\n\u0001\nCustomer lists\n\u0001\nDistribution Records:\n\u0001\nDistribution models\n\u0001\nInventory records\n\u0001\nParts supplies\nUsing the definitions, the person(s) performing the review would place\na checkmark in the appropriate column; only one checkmark for each\nitem being reviewed. This process would allow the user department to\nidentify all the various types of information found in the department and\nthen be able to determine under which classification they probably fall.\n5.15 Authorization for Access\nTo establish a clear line of authority, some key concepts must be estab-\nlished. As discussed above, there are typically three categories of employee\nresponsibilities. Depending on the specific information being accessed,\nan individual may fall into more than one category. For example, an\nemployee with a desktop workstation becomes the owner, custodian, and\nuser. To better help understand the concepts, the responsibilities of each\ncategory are listed below.\nTABLE 5.14 (continued)\nSample Record Retention Schedule\nRecords Management (Retention) Schedule\nRecord\nRetain\nRecord\nRetain\nGeneral journals\nPermanent\nState franchise tax returns\nPermanent\nSundry invoices\n7 Years\nTimecards\n2 Years\nFederal and state \nunemployment tax \nreturns\nPermanent\nUsed and repossessed \nvehicles journals\nPermanent\nVehicle invoices\n7 Years\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 152,
            "text": "TABLE 5.15\nInformation Classification Worksheet\nInformation Classification Review Worksheet\nOrganization: ________________________________________________________ Group: __________________________________\nReview Performed by/Phone: __________________________________________ Date: ____________________________________\nInformation \nName/Description\nStorage \nMedium\nClassifications (Select One)\nCONFIDENTIAL\nRESTRICTED\nINTERNAL USE\nPUBLIC\nIf disclosed, could violate the \nprivacy of individuals, reduce \nthe company’s competitive \nadvantage, or cause damage \nto the company.\nIntended for use by a \nsubset of employees when \nconducting company \nbusiness (usually \nregulatory requirement)\nIntended for use \nby all employees \nwhen conducting \ncompany \nbusiness.\nMade available for \npublic distribution \nthrough authorized \ncompany channels.\nEmployee Records\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\nGroup Administrative \nRecords\n1\n2\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 153,
            "text": "3\n4\n5\n6\n7\nBusiness Process Records\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 154,
            "text": "5.15.1\nOwner\nMinimally, the information owner is responsible for:\n\u0001\nJudging the value of the information resource and assigning the\nproper classification level\n\u0001\nPeriodically reviewing the classification level to determine if the\nstatus should be changed\n\u0001\nAssessing and defining appropriate controls to ensure that infor-\nmation created is properly safeguarded from unauthorized access,\nmodification, disclosure, or destruction\n\u0001\nCommunicating access and safeguard requirements to the informa-\ntion custodian and users\n\u0001\nProviding access to those individuals with a demonstrated business\nneed for access\n\u0001\nAssessing the risk of loss of the information and ensuring that\nadequate safeguards are in place to mitigate the risk to information\nintegrity, confidentiality, and availability\n\u0001\nMonitoring safeguard requirements to ensure that information is\nbeing adequately protected\n\u0001\nEnsuring that a business continuity plan has been implemented\nand tested to protect information availability\n5.15.2\nCustodian\nAt a minimum, the custodian is responsible for:\n\u0001\nProviding proper safeguards for processing equipment, information\nstorage, backup, and recovery\n\u0001\nProviding a secure processing environment that can adequately\nprotect the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of information\n\u0001\nAdministering access requests to information properly authorized\nby the owner\n5.15.3\nUser\nThe user is responsible for:\n\u0001\nUsing the information only for the purpose intended\n\u0001\nMaintaining the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of infor-\nmation accessed\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 155,
            "text": "Being granted access to information does not imply or confer authority\nto grant other users access to that information. This is true whether the\ninformation is electronically held, printed, hardcopy, manually prepared,\ncopied, or transmitted.\n5.16 Summary\nInformation classification drives the protection control requirements and\nthis allows information to be protected to a level commensurate to its\nvalue to the organization. The cost of over-protection is eliminated and\nexceptions are minimized. With a policy and methodology, specifications\nare clear and accountability is established.\nThere are costs associated with implementing a classification system.\nThe most identifiable costs include labeling classified information, imple-\nmenting and monitoring controls and safeguards, and proper handling of\nconfidential information.\nInformation, wherever it is handled or stored, needs to be protected\nfrom unauthorized access, modification, disclosure, and destruction. All\ninformation is not created equal. Consequently, segmentation or classifi-\ncation of information into categories is necessary to help identify a\nframework for evaluating the information’s relative value. By establishing\nthis relative value, it will be possible to establish cost effective controls\nthat will preserve the information asset for the organization.\nThe information classification program will require the identification\nof the record type, the owner, and the classification level. Two thirds of\nthis information may already be gathered by the records management\nprogram. Link these two vital processes together to ensure that employee\ntime is not wasted on redundant activities. By combining the effort, the\norganization will have a better overall information security program.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 156,
            "text": "Chapter 6\nAccess Control\nWhat is access control? Access control is the technical mechanism that\nrestricts unauthorized users from the system, grants access to authorized\nusers, and limits what authorized users can do on the system. As such,\naccess controls in addition to security policy are the key components of\ninformation security. There are several ways in which an organization can\nimplement access control. There are two popular models to follow when\nit comes to access control: mandatory and discretionary.\n6.1 Business Requirements for Access Control\n6.1.1\nAccess Control Policy\nIn mandatory access control, the permission granted on the system is\ndefined by policy. This is often used in highly secure and government\ninstallations. This policy requires a process known as labeling, where each\nuser, file, and system is grouped in security categories. Most private-sector\nbusinesses stay away from mandatory access control because of the\nincreased overhead in labeling all users and systems. With mandatory\naccess control, each user is given a label or security clearance, which\nthen governs the amount of access the person will have on the system.\nAnother popular access control system is discretionary access control.\nWith discretionary access, permissions are not granted by policy but rather\ngranted by the data or system owner. The reduced overhead of discre-\ntionary access control makes it more applicable to most private-sector\ncompanies. With discretionary access control there is also the possibility\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 157,
            "text": "that a user will have the ability to grant permissions as well. Think of this\nas similar to the administrator permission inside Microsoft operating\nsystems.\nRegardless of which access control system is followed — mandatory\nor discretionary — the organization should always follow another access\ncontrol principle. This principle is known as least privilege. Least privilege\nis the absolute minimum amount of permissions necessary for the user\nto perform his or her job function; it is the amount of access that should\nbe given to the system. This ensures that users will not have additional\npermissions beyond what is necessary, and allows for a reduced impact\non the integrity of system data if a user begins performing malicious acts\nor accidental errors and omissions.\n6.2 User Access Management\n6.2.1\nAccount Authorization\nAccount authorization is also known as user registration. Whatever you\ncall this process, the function of it will remain the same. This process\nallows for authorized users to establish initial access to the system and,\nmoreover, what access on the system they will have. Unfortunately, more\noften than not, organizations tend to use an ad hoc approach to user\nregistration. It is recommended to have defined policies and procedures\nthat govern new account creation and access permissions. This process\ntakes place in most types of access control technologies but has an\nincreased role in access control that uses digital certificates. This is due\nto the fact that the digital certificate must be generated and distributed to\nthe end user; the process can be somewhat automated using a technology\nknown as a registration authority.\n6.2.2\nAccess Privilege Management\nAfter a user has been with a company for a long period of time, access\npermissions may no longer align with current job responsibilities. The\ninformation security manager should have a procedure in place to review\naccess permissions on a regular basis and make sure that the permissions\nare appropriate based on the job function of the user. Moreover, the\ninformation security manager should also review accounts on the system\nto make sure that all user accounts have a corresponding user. It is\ncommon for users who have left the company to still have valid user\naccounts on the system. As previously mentioned, there should be a\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 158,
            "text": "procedure in place when an employee is terminated so that the access is\nrevoked quickly.\n6.2.3\nAccount Authentication Management\nIn addition to managing the ongoing user permissions and revoking no\nlonger needed accounts, the information security manager should also\nhave a password management scheme in place. Passwords should be\nchanged on a regular basis; the current industry standard is around\n30 days. However, the time to change passwords should reflect the security\nnecessary to protect the information on the system. It is not uncommon\nfor an organization to change passwords every 90 days, or longer. In\naddition to having users change their passwords regularly, passwords\nshould be well selected. A well-selected password will be at least eight\ncharacters in length, not based on a dictionary word, and contain at least\none unique character. The reason for these criteria is to make it more\ndifficult for an attacker to use a password cracking utility quickly. There\nare two primary types of password cracking utilities: dictionary and brute\nforce. A dictionary password cracking utility is freely available on the\nInternet and will a have word list of around 60,000 common words. An\nattacker will typically begin a password attack using the dictionary cracking\ntool. This tool, while not guaranteed to succeed in the attack, is much\nfaster than the brute-force password cracking tool. A brute-force password\ncracking tool, also freely available from the Internet, will try every possible\ncombination of characters until it is successful. In recent tests, we have\nseen that cracking an 11-character password with a brute-force password\ncracking tool over a wide area network can take in excess of a month.\nThis means that if you have a good password change policy, you will\nchange the password before the brute-force password cracking utility has\nadequate time to break the password.\nWith the common end user having, on average, an eight-character\npassword to remember for information technology resources, it can be\ndifficult for him or her to remember all of the passwords that are suffi-\nciently long and unique while also having the passwords change every\n30 days. There is a technology available to help the information security\nmanager and the end user with password management. This technology\nis single sign-on. The advantage to single sign-on is that each user has\nonly one password to remember for access to all network resources. This\nallows the administrator to make the password both more complex and\nchanged more frequently without a large increase in the number of calls\nto the help desk from those who have forgotten to reset their passwords.\nSingle sign-on technology has been beaten about the past few years, and\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 159,
            "text": "is often still thought of as a mythical technology. In actuality, single sign-\non may not be possible but reduced sign-on is a very real possibility.\nThere are two primary approaches to single sign-on: script-based single\nsign-on and host-based single sign-on. With script-based single sign-on, the\nuser logs in to the primary network operating system and when this\nhappens, the operating system runs a log-in program, often called a log-\nin script, that will authenticate the user to other systems on the network.\nThe disadvantage to using this type of single sign-on is that the password\nstored in the log-in script is often stored in plaintext, which means that no\nencryption is used to protect the password in the file. Any entity that reads\nthis file will be able to recover the username and password for that user.\nAlso, these username and password combinations are often transmitted on\nthe network in plaintext. This allows any malicious user with a network\nsniffer to capture the username and password. A network sniffer (see Figure\n6.1) is a utility available for free on the Internet that is used to read all the\nnetwork packets on a network segment. This utility can be used for\ntroubleshooting, but can also be used maliciously to record log-in attempts.\nThe second type of single sign-on implementation is much more\ncommonly used than the script-based method mentioned previously. This\nsecond type is known as host-based single sign-on because it uses a\nFIGURE 6.1\nNetwork Sniffer\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 160,
            "text": "centralized authentication server or host. This implementation requires the\nuser to log into the authentication server and, when the user tries to\naccess other network resources, those applications contact the authenti-\ncation server to verify the user’s access. There are a large number of\nprotocols that can be used for this type of single sign-on. Some of the\nmore common include Kerberos and RADIUS. There are a large number\nof secondary authentication protocols that are not used as often; these\ninclude protocols such as SESAME and RADIUS’ successor, DIAMETER.\nMany of these authentication protocols can be configured to send the\nusername and password encrypted, and this can stop malicious users from\nintercepting the username and password with a network sniffer.\n6.3 System and Network Access Control\n6.3.1\nNetwork Access and Security Components\nProtecting networking resources is one of the areas of information security\nthat currently receives the most focus. When thinking of security, senior\nmanagement often envisions firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and\nother technological solutions, but often overlooks the importance of\nintegrating these with the existing user community. In this section we\nfocus on the technical components of network security and how the\ntechnologies can be utilized to improve network security.\nMany network devices are left in default or very similar to default\nconfigurations. While leaving these devices in this state is often easier, it\ncan be a severe detriment to security. Most devices in this configuration\nare running many unnecessary services; and while the user community\ndoes not use these services, malicious users on the network can exploit\nthe vulnerabilities in these services. To minimize the amount of security\nholes in the network, the information security manager must disable or\nremove all the unnecessary services on the devices. This can quickly\nbecome a double-edged sword because determining which services are\nunnecessary can disable functionality of the system. If you ever have a\nfew spare minutes, look in the control panel on your Microsoft Windows\nsystem and see how many services are running on that system, but do\nnot disable any service unless you know what the service does. It is very\neasy to make a nonfunctional system this way.\nNormally, a user with the appropriate access control is able to use any\nPC or workstation on the local area network to run an application or\naccess certain data. However, where such data or system is classified as\nsensitive or requires restricted physical access, an enforced path may be\napplied. This is a straightforward configuration setting, performed by the\ninformation security manager, whereby access is restricted to a specific\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 161,
            "text": "workstation or range of workstations. Enforcing the path will provide\nadded security because it reduces the risk of unauthorized access, espe-\ncially where such a workstation is itself within a secure zone, requiring\nphysical access codes or other physical security mechanisms.\nThe typical network uses user authentication, wherein a user provides\na username for identification and a password for authentication. In some\nnetworks the authentication requires not just user authentication but node\nauthentication as well. There are many different ways to get node authen-\ntication; it can be from a digital certificate issued to the machine, based\non the system’s IP address, or from the systems hardware address itself.\nUsing any of these authentication components with the user authentication\ncomponent is not a good idea. With the exception of the digital certificate,\nit is very easy to change an IP address or hardware address to “spoof”\nan address of an authorized machine (see Figure 6.2). Spoofing the user\non the rogue machine changes the system or IP address of the system to\nbe that of another system that is trusted or permitted on network. The\ntask of using hardware address node authentication was offered as a\nsecurity solution to the problems with wireless networks. This authenti-\ncation was easily bypassed with spoofing, leading to the same security\nproblems that existed previously.\nAnother key component of network security is to have network mon-\nitoring in place. One of the easiest ways to have the security of monitoring\nthe network is to implement remote port protection. This would allow an\ninformation security manager to see if a new port becomes active on a\nswitch or hub. “Port” is the term for one of the hardware interfaces on a\nhub or switch. Most hubs or switches are classified by the number of\nports on them. You will often hear of 24 port switches, which means that\nthere are 24 slots for network cables to be connected to the switch. In\nmost environments, there are ports that are not used and left open. If an\nattacker is able to get physical access to the switch, he can plug a new\nnetwork device into the open port in the switch. Because this might lead\nto a security breach, the information security manager should be notified\nif one of these switch ports that is left open suddenly becomes active.\nThis is where having remote port detection can provide security.\nYet another way to keep your network secure is to minimize the\nnumber of devices on a network that interact. To do this, the information\nsecurity manager may choose to have network segregation. There are\nmany mechanisms for getting segregation in the network. These include\nusing physical distance, virtual local area networks, network address\ntranslation, and routing. To use physical distance, the information security\nmanager does not allow the groups of network devices to be connected\nto the same hubs or switches as the other networks. This seems rather\ncrude, but it can be quite effective. Imagine that, on a multi-floor building,\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 162,
            "text": "FIGURE 6.2\nSpoofing Hardware\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 163,
            "text": "the Research & Development department occupies the fourth floor and\nno other user community needs to access this department. To stop other\nusers from accessing this department, the information security manager\ncan simply choose to not have the Research & Development department\nshare the hub or switch with the other networks. While this method\nrequires additional hardware, it is the easiest to manage. If additional\nhardware is not available, the information security manager may choose\nto do the same segregation logically. To do this, the information security\nmanager would use virtual local area networks. This allows one physical\nswitch to be split into multiple logical switches. While the security using\nthe virtual local area networks is not as good as the actual physical\nnetwork, it can be quite good. The information security manager may\nchoose to segregate the networks using address translation and routing.\nIn both of these examples, the information security manager will use the\ndifferent IP address ranges that have been administratively assigned to\nblock communication between networks. The only real drawback to using\nthis type of method for network segregation is if your organization is\nusing Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP). If your network uses\nDHCP, a server will automatically assign an IP address for all devices\nplugged into that network segment. A user can bypass the security of\nnetwork address translation and routing by plugging the device into a\nnew location and receiving a new IP address.\nOf course, one of the most often thought of mechanisms for getting\nnetwork segregation is to use a firewall. Firewalls were originally an iron\nwall that protected train passengers from engine fires. These walls did\nnot protect the engineer. This might be a lesson for information security\nmanagers. In early networks, a firewall was a device that protected one\nsegment of a network from failures in other segments. However, the more\nmodern firewall is a device that protects an internal network from mali-\ncious intruders on the outside. All firewalls use the concept of screening,\nwhich means the firewall receives all the network traffic for a given\nnetwork, and it inspects the traffic and either allows or denies the traffic\nbased on the configuration rules on the firewall device itself. Many early\nfirewalls would have a set of rules that would deny traffic that was not\nnecessary for the business to function. Eventually, this migrated from a\nlist of traffic to deny and accepting all other types of traffic, to a list of\ntraffic to accept and denying all other types of traffic. This is often said\nto be a “deny all” firewall unless it is an expressly permitted type of\nfirewall. These types of firewalls are currently the most common. There\nare three primary types of technology currently in use: the packet filter,\nthe stateful inspection, and the proxy-based firewalls.\nThe packet filter firewall was the first firewall released and is often\nconsidered the simplest firewall. It works off a list of static rules and\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 164,
            "text": "makes the determination based on the source IP address, destination IP\naddress, source port, and destination port. With a packet filter firewall,\none of the common rules necessary to permit the network to have Web-\nbased Internet access is a rule that allows all high ports (those above\n1024) from all Internet sources into the organization. This allows any hosts\non the Internet to send packets into the network over a high port and\nthe firewall will permit it. This creates a rather large security hole in the\norganization.\nThe two second-generation firewalls — the stateful inspection and\nproxy — do not have this security hole. The stateful inspection firewall\nfunctions similar to the packet filter firewall but has a small database that\nallows for the dynamic creation of rules that allow for response traffic to\nenter back into the firewall. This provides end users with the ability to visit\nWeb pages without creating the rule necessary for the response traffic to\nbe allowed in. The stateful inspection firewall will dynamically allow the\nresponse traffic in if the traffic was permitted outbound.\nThe proxy-based firewall has nothing in common with the packet filter\nfirewall. The proxy-based firewall actually functions by maintaining two\nseparate conversations. One conversation occurs between the client and\nthe proxy firewall, and the other conversation occurs between the desti-\nnation server and the proxy firewall. The proxy firewall uses more of the\nIP packet to make the determination of whether or not to permit the traffic.\nThis often causes some performance degradation, but can give increased\nsecurity.\nThe information security manager often has to decide between easier\nadministration and increased security. This is the case when it comes to\ncontrol of the network routing. There are a number of routing protocols\n(such as RIP, OSPF, and BGP) that can be used. Anytime one of these\nrouting protocols is used, it can make administration easier, but there is\nthe security risk of having an intruder send false information over the\nrouter update protocol and corrupting the router’s information table.\n6.3.2\nSystem Standards\nThere is difficulty in supporting multiple systems for the information\nsecurity manager and the support staff. To minimize the differences\nbetween systems, it might be in the best interests of your organization to\ncreate a standard. This standard would then be a recommended guideline\nfor how the systems should be configured and what software packages\nshould be installed on the systems. This will also help minimize the\namount of non-standard applications that will be installed but can have\na dangerous security impact on the network.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 165,
            "text": "6.3.3\nRemote Access\nRemote access is a favorite target of hackers because they are trying to\ngain remote access to your organization’s network. As such, additional\nsecurity controls must be deployed to protect remote access and remote\naccess services. Some of the more commonly deployed technologies\ninclude virtual private networking (VPN) and two-factor authentication.\nVirtual private networking takes advantage of encryption technologies to\nhelp minimize the exposure of allowing outside users to have access to\nthe network.\nTwo-factor authentication is another technology that can help protect\nremote access. It uses multiple types of authentication technologies to\nprovide for stronger authentication. Authentication can often be broken\ndown into three categories: something the user has, something the user\nknows, and something the user is. The most commonly used authentication\ncomes from the “something the user knows” category. This would include\nthings such as:\n\u0001\nPasswords\n\u0001\nPINs\n\u0001\nPassphrases\nFrom the “something the user has” category, we would be looking at\nauthentication components such as:\n\u0001\nSmart cards\n\u0001\nMagnetic cards\n\u0001\nHardware tokens\n\u0001\nSoftware tokens\nAnd from the “something the user is” category, we would be looking at\nbiometrics and other behavior-based authentication systems. Biometric\ndevices use unique characteristics of each person, including:\n\u0001\nFingerprints\n\u0001\nRetina patterns\n\u0001\nHand geometry\n\u0001\nPalm prints\nTwo-factor authentication takes an authentication component from two\nof the groups mentioned above. This requires more than just a username\nand password to get access. Because remote access connections to the\nnetwork originate from outside the network, it is a prime location for\nstronger authentication controls.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 166,
            "text": "6.4 Operating System Access Controls\n6.4.1\nOperating Systems Standards\nAs discussed previously, standards can minimize the amount of customi-\nzation of employee workstations and this can minimize the difficulty in\nperforming system and network maintenance. This can be extended further\nthrough the use of operating system standards. These standards are\nprovided by a number of sources, including the manufacturer, third-party\nsecurity organizations, and the government. One of the most common\nsources of operating system standards is the National Institute of Standards\nand Technology (NIST). NIST provides standard profiles for varying levels\nof system security configurations for most common operating systems. In\nsome cases, there are utilities to audit the system against the standard\nconfiguration and point out where the system configuration is lacking in\nmeeting the required security profile. These standards cover the complete\nrange of operating system security, from the typical workstation to the\nhighly secure server. These standards allow the information security man-\nager to have a more detailed account of the modifications necessary to\nappropriately configure system security. The NIST standards are available\nfrom http://csrc.nist.gov.\n6.4.2\nChange Control Management\nOne of the most unglamorous areas of information security is the change\ncontrol process. In many small organizations, change control is omitted\naltogether and administration changes are made through an ad hoc pro-\ncess. While not having a change control process reduces administrative\noverhead, the resulting drawbacks are pretty severe. I know that there\nwere a number of organizations where I was the primary security admin-\nistrator and spent the first few weeks of the job just running through the\nexisting configurations trying to figure out what the previous administrator\nhad done. This process can be as simple or as complex as your organi-\nzation requires. In one organization, we implemented a simple change\ncontrol process wherein a simple paper form was filled out, the changed\nwas discussed at the next staff meeting, and the form was then stored in\na folder next to the server on which the change was made. With a small\nnumber of servers and a tiny support staff, this process was adequate.\nWith very large companies where the number of information technology\nsupport personnel can number in the hundreds or thousands, a process\nneeds to be much more scalable and detailed. A more advanced change\ncontrol process follows.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 167,
            "text": "\u0001\nStep 1: Request of change is formally made. This requires that the\nproposed change is documented in written form.\n\u0001\nStep 2: Analyze request. After the written request is made, a formal\nrisk assessment may be necessary to determine if the change will\nhave a severe impact on network security.\n\u0001\nStep 3: Develop the implementation strategy. During this step, the\nactual way the change will be made is discussed, responsibilities\nare defined, and the implementation schedule is devised.\n\u0001\nStep 4: Calculate the costs of this implementation. This step will\nallow for the appropriate budget to be put together to implement\nthe change. A cost analysis may be done to see if the change\nmakes fiscal sense for the organization.\n\u0001\nStep 5: Review any security implications. This step determines how\nthe level of risk for the organization will change once the change\nis made. Often, the change will be made in a development (non-\nproduction) environment before the actual change is made to\nproduction systems. Having the change made in the development\nnetwork allows for security testing to be done prior to any changes\nthat would affect the production network.\n\u0001\nStep 6: Record change request. In this step, all of the documentation\nfrom the previous step is compiled.\n\u0001\nStep 7: Submit change request for approval. At this point, all of the\ndocumentation is put together and submitted to the information\nsecurity steering committee for approval.\n\u0001\nStep 8: Develop change. If the change requires that code be written\nor new software be acquired, the basis for the plan is done here.\n\u0001\nStep 9: Recode segments of the system. In this step, if the change\nrequires that software be written, then the software is written. This\nwould also be where a new system is developed in the develop-\nment network and tested.\n\u0001\nStep 10: Link these changes to the formal change control request.\n\u0001\nStep 11: Submit software for testing and quality approval. Here,\nthe quality control or quality assurance group would review the\nchange for adequacy.\n\u0001\nStep 12: Repeat until quality is adequate.\n\u0001\nStep 13: Implementation. The code, system, or configuration change\nis move into production at this point. If your organization has a\nformal promotion to production sequence, it should be followed.\n\u0001\nStep 14: Update the version information. At this point, all the\nchanges have been implemented, so the next phase is to update\nthe documentation and the user training materials, and to inform\nthe user community of the change.\n\u0001\nStep 15: Report changes to management. In this step, tell manage-\nment that the change has been made and is working properly.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 168,
            "text": "The process listed above includes many steps that are not needed for\nall organizations. Each organization is unique and the change control\nprocess should be modified to fit the organization. The most important\nsteps are there to ensure that all changes are submitted, approved, tested,\nand recorded. This ensures that no changes are made without the change\ncontrol process.\n6.5 Monitoring System Access\n6.5.1\nEvent Logging\nMost current systems allow for enabling audit logs, and more and more\nsystems are enabling logging by default. As an information security man-\nager, you need to verify that event logging is enabled and is adequate\nfor the relative security level of the system. In addition to enabling the\nlogging, the log files must be reviewed regularly to detect possible security\nbreaches. With all of the logs coming from all of the different sources,\nlog correlation has become a hot issue during the past few years. If your\norganization has numerous intrusion detection systems, firewalls, and\ncritical servers, it might be more useful to move to a central log recording\nsystem. These systems can also manage one of the more difficult compo-\nnents of log analysis: time synchronization. Many system clocks lose or\ngain time as the system stays in an operating production environment. A\ncentral log reporting system can also function as a network time server\nto help all system clocks stay synchronized.\n6.5.2\nMonitoring Standards\nIn organizations that wish to use information security monitoring, it is a\ngood practice to include a warning banner on the systems before a user\nis authenticated. These warning banners should have three components:\n1.\nThis system is for authorized users only.\n2.\nAll activities on this system are monitored\n3.\nBy completing the log-on process, you are agreeing to the monitoring.\nThe warning banner should not include the name of the organization\nto which the system belongs; that information would be useful for social\nengineering and other attacks. Also, the warning banner should never\ninclude the “welcome” greeting. The best way to avoid legal issues with\nwarning banners is to keep them simple; include only what needs to be\nincluded and nothing else.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 169,
            "text": "6.5.3\nIntrusion Detection Systems\nAs previously discussed with single sign-on implementations, some tech-\nnology has been the target of a bit of bad publicity lately. Intrusion\ndetection systems also fall into this category. Intrusion detection systems\n(IDS) are designed to function like a burglar alarm on your house — from\na technical standpoint, of course. These systems should record suspicious\nactivity against the target system or network, and should alert the infor-\nmation security manager or support staff when an electronic break-in is\nunderway. The biggest downfall with IDS products is the necessary level\nof customization “of the box.” Without significant amounts of customiza-\ntion, the IDS will produce a large number of false-positive alerts. A false\npositive is created when the IDS alerts the support staff to an event that\nwill not have an impact on the target system. For example, a Code Red\nattack against and Apache Web server will not work, but the IDS may\nstill sound the alarm.\nUnderneath the hood, IDS products function either as a host-based\nintrusion detection system (HIDS) or a network-based intrusion detection\nsystem (NIDS). There are positives and negatives with each type. With\nan HIDS product, the product protects the system by monitoring a single\nsystem. There are a number of different ways that an HIDS can monitor\nthe system. One of the more common ways is for the HIDS product to\nmonitor all network traffic entering or leaving the host. The HIDS product\ncan also function by monitoring the log files on the system itself. The\ndisadvantage of using an HIDS product is that the product, by its very nature,\ncannot detect common network preamble attacks such as a ping sweep.\nA network-based intrusion detection system (NIDS) works by moni-\ntoring a network segment to determine if the network traffic matches the\npattern of a well-known network attack. This type of system can detect\npreamble attacks such as a ping sweep, but can be fooled by high network\ncongestion and encryption. Also, the NIDS can have a lag time for new\nnetwork attacks being written to the intrusion detection system profile. A\nnew network attack may bypass the NIDS device until the attack pattern\ncan be written and the NIDS updated.\nIn recent years, the IDS have been moving toward a next generation\nof security technology known as the intrusion prevention system (IPS)\n(see Figure 6.3). The IPS functions as a traditional IDS system with\nincreased functionality. The IPS also takes on the functionality of a firewall,\nan antivirus system, and a vulnerability scanner. These components help\nreduce the number of false positives with the vulnerability scanner func-\ntionality. The package can test for the vulnerability before sounding the\nalarm. In addition to minimizing the number of false positives, the func-\ntionality of the other components allows for increased protection.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 170,
            "text": "6.6 Cryptography\n6.6.1\nDefinitions\nThe final powerful weapon we look at in this chapter to assist the\ninformation security manager is cryptography. Cryptography is a branch\nof mathematics that transforms data to keep messages secret. The secrecy\nin cryptography has its basis in military operations. Cryptography was\nused to send messages from the central command to the troops on the\nbattlefield without the enemy being able to understand a message if they\nintercepted it. In the information security battle space of which we are a\npart, cryptography for us is the denial of access to our messages of\nunauthorized viewers. In addition to keeping our messages secret, we\nalso want to verify that our messages are coming from our central\ncommand. To do this, we use the concept of authenticity. In most\ninformation security environments, we can use a username and password\ncombination to verify the authenticity of the sender. However, in sending\na message between parties, it can be rather difficult to effectively use the\nFIGURE 6.3\nIDS to IPS Migration\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 171,
            "text": "username and password combination to authenticate the message. In\naddition to verifying that a message actually came from the appropriate\nperson and that only the intended recipient viewed the message, we also\nwant to ensure that the message was not modified along the way. To do\nthis, we use yet another component of cryptography— that of integrity.\nWhen we put all these components together, we get nonrepudiation. The\nmessage will be guaranteed to have come from the sender, gone only to\nthe recipient, and was not modified along the way.\nWhat is cryptography to the information security manager? Cryptogra-\nphy is the implementation of the science of secret writing. This is often\ncalled “applied cryptography” by academic sorts. In information security,\nthe cryptosystem is what provides the secrecy of the message. The secrecy\nour cryptosystem gives us is not absolute secrecy; it does not keep a\nmessage secret forever. Rather, the cryptosystem’s goal is to keep the\nmessage secret for such a period of time that if the cryptosystem were\ndefeated it would take longer than the time the message must be kept\nsecret. The goal of the cryptosystem is twofold: first is the time component\njust discussed and the second is the cost to defeat the cryptosystem. If it\ncosts our competitor more money to defeat our cryptosystem than the\ncosts of the message if it is read by our competitor, then the cryptosystem\nhas accomplished its goal. The amount of time, effort, and resources\nrequired to defeat the cryptosystem is known as the work factor. Work\nfactor does not just refer to the amount of CPU time necessary to defeat\nthe cryptosystem, but also the time necessary to develop the system that\nwill go about defeating the cryptosystem.\nIf a competitor is trying to break into our encrypted message by\ndefeating our cryptosystem, then our competitor is using cryptanalysis.\n“Cryptanalysis” is the term for trying to defeat the cryptosystem without\nthe appropriate key. What we would be doing with the cryptosystem if\nwe tested our cryptosystem for relative strength is called cryptology. \nOur cryptosystem transforms data from one form to another. The form\nthat is able to be read by anyone is called plaintext or cleartext. Once\nthe data has been processed through the cryptosystem, it becomes read-\nable by only the intended recipient. This type of scrambled data is called\nciphertext. As we discuss later, there are two primary mechanisms by\nwhich the data can be transformed. If it is transformed one character at\na time, it is called a stream cipher. If several characters from our message\nare processed by the cryptosystem at once, the cryptosystem is called a\nblock cipher. We further discuss stream and block ciphers in the following\nsections. As the cryptosystem transforms our plaintext into ciphertext, it\nis called enciphering. The reverse process of transforming ciphertext into\nplaintext is called deciphering. If you have ever tried to read a phone\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 172,
            "text": "message written by someone with messy handwriting, you have tried to\ndecipher a message.\nIn 1883, a mathematician named Auguste Kerckhoff published a paper\nin which he stated that the only secret component of a cryptosystem\nshould be the key. The component of the cryptosystem that actually\ntransforms the data is the algorithm. The algorithm is pretty easy to\ndistinguish from the rest of the cryptosystem; it is the part with all the\nmath involved. Kerckhoff stated that all encryption algorithms should be\npublicly known because this is the only way that an algorithm can be\nreviewed for security holes. He also stated that any algorithm that was\nnot publicly known would have more security holes than a publicly known\nalgorithm. This axiom is still true today, most cryptosystems use algorithms\nthat are publicly known. As previously discussed, Kerckhoff stated that\nthe only secret component should be the key. A key is the secret sequence\nthat governs the encipherment and decipherment of the message. It is\neasiest to think of the key as the password to your cryptosystem. If you\ndo not know the password or key, you cannot read the secret message.\nDue to the fact that the encryption key should always be kept secret,\nit can present a problem distributing keys to a user community. Many\nusers lose their encryption keys, and the data often must still be recovered.\nOne of the many components that allows for this data to be recovered\nis key clustering. With key clustering, another key can be used to encrypt\nand decrypt the data. Another term that works along with key clustering\nis “key escrow.” Key escrow occurs when a key, often used in emergency\npurposes, is distributed to different individuals. This allows for the recovery\nof data only when two people are working together. This stops an\nadministrator from using his key for malicious purposes.\nThe cryptosystem that you use to protect confidential messages in your\norganization can use many different types of encryption systems. Encryp-\ntion systems are how the cryptosystem and its algorithm can go about\ntransforming the data. There are many different types of encryption\nsystems and most algorithms can combine multiple types.\nThe first type of encryption system that we will look at is the classical\nsubstitution cipher. If you have ever pulled a secret decoder ring out of\na cereal box, then you have possessed a classical substitution cipher. A\nclassical substitution cipher will replace one letter from the plaintext\nmessage with another character to make the message encrypted. One of\nthe first cryptosystems used an algorithm known as the Caesar cipher.\nThe Caesar cipher substituted characters by shifting the alphabet three\nspaces off a certain letter. For example, if we pick the letter “A,” the\ncipher would move it forward three characters to the letter “D.” We could\nthen substitute all the letters “A” in our original message with the letter “D.”\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 173,
            "text": "Here is an example our original message:\nThis is a plaintext message\nOnce we have processed the messages through the Caesar cipher using\n“C” as our key, the encrypted message becomes:\nWklv lv d sodlqwhaw phvvdjh\nAs opposed to classical substitution ciphers, an algorithm could use a\ntransposition or permutation cipher. This cipher does not change one\nletter for another; rather, it changes the sequence of the letters in the\nmessage. A simple way to perform this operation is to write all the letters\nof a word in reverse order.\nHere is an example of the original message:\nThis is a plaintext message\nOnce we have processed the message through our transposition cipher,\nwe would end up with a message like this:\nsihT si a txetnialp egassem\nThere are many other encryption systems available. Another type of\ncipher is the poly-alphabetic cipher. The Caesar cipher that previously\ndiscussed is also an example of a poly-alphabetic cipher in that the\nmessage was switched from one alphabet (the one starting with the letter\n“A”) to a new alphabet (the one starting with the letter “D”). Another\ncipher is the running key cipher. With a running key cipher, all commu-\nnications come from a preagreed-upon set of characters. For example, I\ngive you the encrypted message 1234. It probably would not seem like\na very well-encrypted message. But what if we had previously agreed\nthat “1” would mean “building one,” “2” would mean “floor two,” “3”\nwould mean “room three,” and “4” would mean “room four”? And on the\nwhiteboard of room four there was a message written; then we would\nhave a secret message. Concealment is another type of encryption system.\nIf you skip every third word in a message, there may be a secret message\nhidden in it.\nSteganography is not exactly a form of cryptography; it is actually\nhiding in plain sight. The advantage of steganography is that no one can\ntell that a secret message is being sent. With cryptography, anytime a\nmessage is sent, someone could look at the message with a packet sniffer\nand determine that the message was encrypted. With steganography, the\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 174,
            "text": "same person with a packet sniffer would only see a photo or a music file\ngo by. Steganography hides hidden messages in pictures or music files.\nThis technology is currently being used in more organizations, and the\nfear is that terrorist organizations are using similar technology. There was\nan Internet rumor spreading around rapidly in 2002 that terrorists were\nposting hidden messages in steganographed picture files on Internet\nauction sites. After some research, the rumor was found to be false.\nDo you remember your days of using pig Latin to speak in messages\nin front of your parents? Pig Latin was an example of a code. A code is\njust a generic term for agreeing on a system to hide messages.\nThere are also encryption machines. A machine that was most popular\nwas called the enigma machine. It had numerous rotors and switches that\nwere attached to a typewriter keyboard. When the wheels and switches\nwere turned by the Nazis in World War II, the machine would change\nthe keys pressed on the typewriter keyboard into another character on\nthe paper.\n6.6.2\nPublic Key and Private Key\nThe two primary types of algorithms are private key and public key\nalgorithms. Private key algorithms are easier to set up for a small number\nof users. All of the secrecy from private key algorithms comes from keeping\nthe key secure. The key, if exposed, will allow any person who has the\nkey to decrypt the message. Private key cryptography is also known as\nsymmetric cryptography because whatever process is done to encrypt the\nmessage, the reverse process is done to decrypt the message.\nIn public key cryptography, there are two keys that are related. The\ntwo keys in public key cryptography are known as the private key and\nthe public key. These keys are related so that anything encrypted with\nthe public key can be decrypted with the private key, and anything\nencrypted with the private key can be decrypted with the public key. The\nsecurity in public key cryptography is in keeping the private key secure.\nThe public key is called the public key because anyone can have access\nto it. Public key cryptography is also known as asymmetric cryptography\nbecause the process done to encrypt the message is not done in reverse\nto decrypt the message. The private key in public key cryptography acts\nas a trap door that decrypts a message encrypted with the public key.\nThere can be many components to implement public key cryptography.\nThe technical structures necessary to implement public key cryptography\nare collectively known as public key infrastructure (PKI). With PKI, public\nkeys are published as certificates on a certificate authority. PKI may have\nall of the following components:\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 175,
            "text": "\u0001\nCertification Authority (CA)\n\u0001\nRegistration Authority (RA)\n\u0001\nCertificate Repository\n\u0001\nCertificate Revocation List\n6.6.3\nBlock Mode, Cipher Block, and Stream Ciphers\nAs previously discussed, ciphers can either encrypt data a single character\nat a time (stream ciphers) or a number of characters at a time (block\nciphers). Figure 6.4 illustrates a block cipher encrypting a block of text\nat a time.\nAs opposed to a block cipher, a stream cipher encrypts the message\na bit of text at a time. This means that a stream cipher breaks a message\ndown into 1’s and 0’s before the message is encrypted. To encrypt the\nstream of 1’s and 0’s from the message, the stream cipher uses a component\nknown as a key stream generator. The key is then input into the key\nstream generator to generate a stream of random 1’s and 0’s. The original\nmessage is then put through a mathematical process known as exclusive\nORing (X-OR) where the two bits are compared. If the bit from the original\nmessage is a 1 and the bit from the key stream generator is a 1, then the\nencrypted message would send out a 0 or the first bit. If the two bits are\nthe same, the X-OR process yields 0; if the two bits are different, the\nprocess yields a 1.\nFIGURE 6.4\nBlock Cipher\nï \nBlock Ciphers\nDB1\nDB2\nDB3\nDB4\nCT1\nCT2\nCT3\nCT4\nData Block 1\nData Block 2\nData Block 3\nData Block 4\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 176,
            "text": "Consider the following example:\nOriginal message:\n1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1\nKey stream:\n0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0\n– – – – – – – – –\nEncrypted Message: 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1\nBecause a stream cipher is generally less complex in terms of lines of\ncode necessary to implement it, a stream cipher is often used in hardware\n(see Figure 6.5). The encryption protocol Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP),\nwhich is used by wireless networks, uses a stream cipher called RC4.\nBecause the randomness of the 1’s and 0’s coming from the key stream\ngenerator is critical to the security of a stream cipher, there are rules that\nmust apply to a key stream generator. A key stream generator must have\nlong periods where the key stream does not repeat. The key stream must\nbe functionally complex, which means that the key stream cannot be the\nkey and then the key in reverse and then the key. The key stream must be\nstatistically unpredictable, which means there are no patterns to the key\nstream. The key stream must be unbiased, which means there are as many\n1’s as 0’s. The key stream cannot be easily related to the key. All of these\nrules increase the security and secrecy of a stream cipher.\n6.6.4\nCryptanalysis\nBad guys do cryptanalysis. Well …, not just guys and not all of them are\nbad; but cryptanalysis is the process of trying to defeat cryptography\nFIGURE 6.5\nStream Cipher\nKey\nKeystream\nGenerator\nKeystream\n11010001\nPlaintext\n01001000\nCiphertext\n10011001\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 177,
            "text": "without the secret key. The most common type of cryptanalysis is the\nciphertext-only attack. This occurs when an attacker looks at the encrypted\nmessages with a utility such as a network sniffer and looks at the stream\nof ciphertext to see if patterns emerge. A twist on the ciphertext-only\nattack is known as a birthday attack. With a birthday attack, an attacker\nlooks at the stream of messages to find two or more messages that are\nthe same being transmitted. This is much more efficient than the attacker\nencrypting his own message and then watching the stream of encrypted\nmessages for one that matches his encrypted message. The birthday attack\ntakes advantage of the nonrandomness of the English language. Because\nsome words are used more frequently than others, those words will be\nencrypted more often than the others, and will show up more often in\nthe stream of encrypted words. There are many other types of attack a\ncryptanalyst can attempt. Following are some of the types of attack and\na brief summary of what the attack entails:\n\u0001\nKnown plaintext attack: sample of ciphertext and the correspond-\ning plaintext is available as well.\n\u0001\nChosen plaintext attack: cryptosystem is loaded with hidden key\nprovided and input of any plaintext. The attacker can then see the\noutput to determine how the algorithm functions.\n\u0001\nAdaptive chosen plaintext attack: same as above except you are\nable to choose plaintext samples dynamically, and alter your choice\nbased on results of previous encryptions.\n\u0001\nChosen ciphertext attack: the cryptanalyst may choose a piece of\nciphertext and attempt to obtain the corresponding decrypted\nplaintext.\n\u0001\nMan-in-the-middle attack: the attacker inserts himself during the\nkey exchange between parties and intercepts the encryption keys.\n\u0001\nTiming attacks: repeatedly measuring exact execution times of\ncryptographic operations.\n\u0001\nBrute-force attack: trying all keys until correct key is identified.\n\u0001\nRubber hose cryptanalysis: includes beating, threatening, and extort-\ning to get the secret key.\n6.7 Sample Access Control Policy\nSee Table 6.1 for a sample access control policy.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 178,
            "text": "TABLE 6.1\nSample Access Control Policy\nAccess Control Policy\nPolicy\nCOMPANY management and employees must implement effective controls to\nprevent unauthorized access to information held in information systems. Users\nof applications, systems, and business processes, including support staff, should\nbe provided with access to information and application systems based on indi-\nvidual business need requirements. All access is granted on a least-privilege\nmodel. That is, access is restricted to only most restrictive privileges granted\nbased on need of a specific job task.\nStandards\nAccess tools must be used to control access within application systems. Access\nto software and information is allowed only for authorized users. Only the least\namount of access to software and information — necessary to carry out the tasks\nfor which the access is needed — will be granted. Application systems shall:\n\u0001\nEnsure only the information owner and those people and processes autho-\nrized by the information owner have access to the application system\n\u0001\nProvide protection against using software utilities that bypass the system\nor application controls\n\u0001\nControl the use of other systems with which our information is shared, to\nchange or delete the information\nResponsibilities\n\u0001\nInformation resource owners must ensure compliance with this policy and\nonly they are authorized to grant access.\n\u0001\nAll employees of COMPANY, or any other third parties who access the\nCOMPANY’s applications and information, are to use the information based\non owner approval and do not have authority to grant access to other\nentities.\nScope\nThis policy applies to all COMPANY employees.\nContract language for all third-party personnel (full-time, part-time, or con-\ntract) shall identify specific COMPANY requirements for compliance. Failure to\nmeet the terms and conditions of the contract could lead to the termination of\nthe contract and possible legal reparation.\nCompliance\nEmployees who fail to comply with the policies will be considered to be in\nviolation of the COMPANY’s Employee Standards of Conduct and will be subject\nto appropriate corrective action.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 179,
            "text": "6.8 Summary\nIn this chapter we discussed many of the technologies available to the\ninformation security manager to help protect the network. We discussed\naccess control systems and the models for access control. We then dis-\ncussed single sign-on technologies and the positives and negatives of\neach. We also discussed common protocols used for host-based single\nsign-on. We then covered authentication and other mechanisms for authen-\ntication, including two-factor authentication. We then moved on to access\nand audit logs and how to use them, and this became the discussion on\nintrusion detection systems. We discussed the types of intrusion detection\nsystems and then the positives and negatives of each. After IDS, we\ndiscussed firewalls and the types of firewalls, and finally moved on to a\ndiscussion about encryption. All the topics discussed here were covered\nat a very high level, and several books have been written on each of the\ntechnologies. Refer to the reference section at the back of this book for\nfurther reading on any of these topics.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 180,
            "text": "Chapter 7\nPhysical Security\n7.1 Data Center Requirements\nThe nature of physical security for a data center should be one of\nconcentric rings of defense — with requirements for entry getting more\ndifficult the closer we get to the center of the rings. While company\nemployees, authorized visitors, and vendors might be allowed inside the\noutermost ring, for example, only data center employees and accompanied\nvendors might be allowed within the innermost ring (see Figure 7.1 for\nillustration).\nThe reason for this is obvious. If we take a number of precautions to\nprotect information accessed at devices throughout the organization, then\nwe must at least make sure that no damage or tampering can happen to\nthe hardware on which the information is stored and processed.\nTo take this idea of concentric rings of protection a little further, we\nshould start by considering the data center itself. Is the building that\nhouses the data center standing by itself, or is the data center in a building\nthat houses other functions? If the data center is in a dedicated building,\nwhat approaches are open to the building, and how well-protected are\nstaff members as they enter and leave the building? We may want to start\nbuilding a picture of the exterior of the building to show the “outer ring”\nof protection, including entrances and exits, car parking facilities, and\nlighting. This picture of the outer ring might look like the example in\nFigure 7.2.\nHaving said all that, the principle of consistency must still be applied.\nThere is no point in building physical access controls at a cost of several\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 181,
            "text": "million dollars if the potential damage that could be done to a data center\nis less than several tens of millions of dollars. Remember that the cost of\ncontrols must be consistent with the value of the asset being protected,\nand the definition of “consistent” depends on what risks your organiza-\ntion’s management decides to accept.\n7.2 Physical Access Controls\nWhen considering the physical access controls that are appropriate for\n(and consistent with) your organization, we must take into account a\nnumber of variables, including the assets to be protected, the potential\nthreat to those assets, and your organization’s attitude toward risk.\n7.2.1\nAssets to be Protected\nSome organizations may decide to centralize operations and, in the course\nof doing so, build large, expensive “server farms” on their premises. On\nthe other end of the scale, an organization might decide to take a\ndecentralized approach and distribute its computers and computing equip-\nment around the organization’s many buildings.\nThe amount of effort put into protecting physical assets in both of the\nabove scenarios might well come to the same total amount but would be\nFIGURE 7.1\nConcentric Rings of Protection\nPublic Area\nEmployees, \nauthorized visitors \nand vendors\nEmployees and\naccompanied\nvendors only\nPublic Area\nEmployees and\naccompanied\nvendors only\nEmployees, \nauthorized visitors \nand vendors\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 182,
            "text": "FIGURE 7.2\nOuter Ring of Protection\nPrimary Gate\nSecondary Gate\nGround Lighting\nParking Lot Lighting\nRoof Mounted Lighting\nFor Parking Lot\nHandicapped Entrance/Exit\nWooden Fence\nParking Lot Lighting\nFenceline Overgrown with brush\nCommerical Power\nPoints\nEntrance/Exit\nEntrance/Exit\nPrimary Gate\nSecondary Gate\nGround Lighting\nParking Lot Lighting\nRoof Mounted Lighting\nFor Parking Lot\nHandicapped Entrance/Exit\nWooden Fence\nParking Lot Lighting\nFenceline Overgrown with brush\nCommerical Power\nPoints\nEntrance/Exit\nEntrance/Exit\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 183,
            "text": "spent on different forms of protection. For a large server farm, several\nconcentric rings of technology-based protection and access control might\nbe appropriate whereas, for the distributed version, simply keeping indi-\nvidual servers in locked rooms might be sufficient. This is one variation\nto consider when choosing appropriate physical access controls.\n7.2.2\nPotential Threats\nWhen assessing potential threats, a large dose of common sense is often\nthe best tool. The threats that exist for high-profile commercial or politically\nsensitive operations differ very much from those faced by, say, a biscuit\nmanufacturer. Likewise, an operations center located in the middle of a\nturbulent city will face a much greater threat than one sited in an industry\npark in a semirural setting.\nWe must also take into account the nature and recent history of the\norganization itself. For example, if the organization is a stable and long-\nestablished one with no history of employee strife, then the threat coun-\ntermeasures (in the form of physical security measures) to take will be a\nlot less than if the organization has a reputation for having disgruntled\nemployees and disruptive activity on the premises. This is a second\nvariation to consider when choosing physical access controls.\n7.2.3\nAttitude toward Risk\nPerhaps the most common complaint among information security profes-\nsionals is that “they” do not understand the need for protective controls —\n“they” most often being management and senior management of the\norganization. Leaving aside the obvious rejoinder about it being the\nInformation Security Professional’s job to teach “them” about the need for\nprotective controls, we must point out that it is the function of any\norganization’s senior management to assess risk.\nDaily business activities involve constant risk assessment. Every deci-\nsion that is taken and that will influence how an organization does business\ninvolves a form of risk assessment in the act of making the decision.\nIt is no different with information security decisions. When facts and\nopinions have been made available to management and senior manage-\nment, it is their function to decide on how risks will be managed. It is a\nfact of life that some organizations are very risk-averse and some are not.\nIt is also a fact of life that individual managers have equally variable\nattitudes toward risk. These constitute the third set of variations to consider\nwhen choosing physical access controls.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 184,
            "text": "7.2.4\nSample Controls\nHaving looked at the complications involved in choosing appropriate\nphysical access controls, it becomes clear that no “one-size-fits-all” solution\nexists. Each organization must examine its own particular assets, risks,\nand attitudes toward risk before deciding on appropriate physical access\ncontrols. When that examination has been performed, the organization\nwill want to consider the following list of items when designing controls\nover physical access:\n\u0001\nPhysical security protection for IT equipment and systems should\nbe established, based on defined perimeters through strategically\nlocated barriers throughout the organization (already discussed at\nthe start of this chapter).\n\u0001\nThe security of the protection given must be consistent with the\nvalue of the assets or services being protected (already discussed\nat the start of this chapter).\n\u0001\nSupport functions and equipment are sited to minimize the risks\nof unauthorized access to secure areas or compromising sensitive\ninformation; for example, network engineers who will be called\non often to enter the data center should not have their workplace\nlocated away from the data center.\n\u0001\nPhysical barriers, where they are necessary, are extended from\nfloor to ceiling to prevent unauthorized entry and environmental\ncontamination. That is, walls that are meant to prevent access, slow\nthe spread of fire, or exclude dusty or polluted air must go all the\nway from the actual ceiling of the building to the solid floor of\nthe building and not just from a false ceiling to the raised floor.\n\u0001\nPersonnel other than those working in a secure area are not\ninformed of the activities within the secure area. While no one\nexpects a cloak of secrecy to be hung over the existence of a data\ncenter or other sensitive operation, details of the business con-\nducted inside a protected perimeter need not be known to anyone\nwho does not have access inside the perimeter.\n\u0001\nUnsupervised lone working in sensitive areas must be prohibited\n(both for safety and to prevent opportunities for malicious activities).\n\u0001\nComputer equipment managed by the organization is housed in\ndedicated areas separate from third-party-managed computer equip-\nment. Where a process or part of the organization’s computing\nactivity is carried out by a third party, that third party’s equipment\nshould be housed in an area that lets their engineers access the\nequipment without having access to the organization’s computer\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 185,
            "text": "equipment. Keeping the two entities’ equipment in separate cages\nin the same room can usually satisfy this.\n\u0001\nSecure areas, when vacated, must be physically locked and peri-\nodically checked.\n\u0001\nPersonnel supplying or maintaining support services are granted\naccess to secure areas only when required and authorized, and\ntheir access is restricted and their activities are monitored.\n\u0001\nUnauthorized photography, recording, or video equipment must\nbe prohibited within the security perimeters.\n\u0001\nEntry controls over secure areas must be established to ensure that\nonly authorized personnel can gain access; and a rigorous, audit-\nable procedure for authorizing access must be put in place.\n\u0001\nVisitors to secure areas must be supervised, and their date and\ntime of entry and departure will be recorded.\n\u0001\nVisitors to secure areas are granted access only for specific, autho-\nrized purposes.\n\u0001\nAll personnel must be required to wear visible identification within\nthe secure area. The necessary addition to this is that we must\nfoster a culture in which employees feel comfortable in challenging\nanyone who is in a secure area without visible identification.\n\u0001\nAccess rights to secure areas will be revoked immediately for staff\nwho leave employment.\n7.3 Fire Prevention and Detection\nFire prevention and detection standards vary according to the premises —\nwhether or not the premises also house materials or processes that increase\nthe risk of fire and whether or not the premises themselves are located\nin an area where fire risk is higher or lower.\nGenerally, the local fire authority (Fire Marshall in the United States) can\nbe consulted for advice on fire prevention and detection measures, and\narchitects and vendors of data center equipment are also ready to give advice.\nThere are, however, some fire prevention and detection precautions\nthat should be judged as standard and minimum requirements for premises\nthat house computers and critical information.\n7.3.1\nFire Prevention\nNo smoking is the first rule. Although this is a common requirement\nthroughout the United States at the time of writing, it is neither a federal\nlaw nor a universally implemented state law. However, the use of smoking\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 186,
            "text": "materials anywhere within a building that houses or processes critical\ninformation must be prohibited.\nAll flammable material — such as printer paper, plastic wrapping, and\ntapes — should be stored in an area separated from the main server or\ncomputer room by a fire-rated wall. Supplies for one day’s processing can\nbe kept in the server or computer room, but larger supplies must be stored\nseparately.\nFlammable or highly combustible materials must also be kept out of\nsuch premises. Where an organization produces, uses, or transports haz-\nardous materials, all such materials must be stored away from premises\nwhere critical information is stored or processed. Where janitorial staff\nuse flammable or combustible cleaning solvents, they should also be\nstored offsite. If that is not possible, they should be stored in an area that\nis behind a fireproof door and has its own smoke detecting equipment.\nMany organizations now find it prudent to limit the amount of electrical\npower used in each cabinet and cage in the data center. High use of\nelectrical power creates a build-up of heat and also creates the potential\nfor the build-up of static electricity — both fire hazards. Ventilation and\ngrounding are the keys, of course, to limiting the risk from these; but limiting\nthe amount of electrical power used in any physical area also reduces the\nchance of a heat or static electricity build-up. Most designers of data centers\nrecommend that the ambient temperature in data centers should not exceed\n74 degrees Fahrenheit (23 Centigrade) because that reduces the risk of such\nbuild-ups and also eases the control of humidity within the room.\nOf course, when controlling the temperature and humidity in an\nenclosed space, it is necessary to monitor them, and the system used to\nmonitor temperature and humidity in a data center must have the following\ncharacteristics:\n\u0001\nThe data gathered must be representative of the room being\nmonitored. That is, if only one sensor is used in the room, it is\nunlikely that a true picture of temperature and humidity will be\navailable. Fluctuations from one part of the room to the next will\nnot be detected and “hotspots” — unless they happen to occur\nunder the sensor — will go unnoticed.\n\u0001\nThe monitoring system must be capable of storing and presenting\nhistorical data. Seasonal and event-based fluctuations provide\nimportant indicators of how to manage temperature and humidity.\n\u0001\nThe monitoring system must be able to provide alarms when\ntemperature and humidity fall outside acceptable parameters. Fire,\nflood, or any failure of the heating or cooling systems are all critical\nevents, and the monitoring system must be able to alert staff to\ntheir occurrence.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 187,
            "text": "7.3.2\nFire Detection\nThe most common sources of fires in data centers include the electrical\nsystem and the hardware. Breakdowns in insulation and the resultant\nshort-circuiting can lead to intense heat that can melt materials or cause\na fire. Data center fires are often small or smoldering, with little effect on\nthe temperature in the room. Because the smoke itself can impact the\ncomputer hardware, it is necessary to employ a detection system that is\nsensitive to smoke and other products of combustion rather than the\ntemperature. The specific detection and extinguishing system depends on\nthe specific design and exposures of the individual data center area. In\nthe United States, NFPA 75 states that automatic detection equipment must\nbe installed to provide early warning of fire. The equipment used must\nbe a listed smoke detection type, and every installation of smoke detection\nequipment must be engineered for the specific area to be protected (giving\ndue consideration to air currents and patterns within the space to be\nmonitored).\nSmoke and fire detectors should be wired to a central alarm panel\nthat is continuously monitored and ideally is constructed so that any alarm\ngiven is repeated instantly at the nearest firehouse. Where permanent\nconnection to the firehouse is not possible, an external alarm should be\ninstalled to allow people outside the building to be notified and to raise\nthe alarm with the emergency services.\n7.3.3\nFire Fighting\nIn data centers, as much damage can be done by the fire suppression\nequipment as by the fire itself. Nonetheless, effective fire suppression systems\nmust be installed in data centers.\nA passive system reacts to smoke and fire without manual intervention.\nThe most common forms of passive suppression are sprinkler systems or\nchemical suppression systems. Sprinkler systems can be flooded (wet pipe)\nor pre-action (dry pipe). A flooded system means that the pipes are full at\nall times, which allows the system to discharge immediately upon detec-\ntion. A pre-action system will fill the sprinkler pipes upon an initial\ndetection, but will delay discharging until a second detection criteria has\nbeen met. Chemical total flooding systems work by suffocating the fire\nwithin the controlled zone. The suppression chemical most often found\nin data centers is Halon 1301. Halon is being eliminated in favor of the\nmore environmentally friendly FM200 or various forms of water suppres-\nsion. Carbon dioxide suppression systems are also used but can be a\nconcern due to operator safety issues in the instance of a discharge. These\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 188,
            "text": "can be used independently or in combination, depending on the exposures\nin the room, local ordinances, and insurance requirements.\nThe ideal system would incorporate both a gas system and a pre-action\nwater sprinkler system. The gas suppression systems are friendlier to\ncomputing equipment. Water sprinklers often cause catastrophic and irrep-\narable damage to the hardware, whereas the hardware in a room subjected\nto a gas discharge can often be brought back online soon after the room\nis purged.\nGas systems are, however, “one-shot” designs. If the fire is not put out\nin the initial discharge, there is no second chance. The gas system cannot\nbe reused until it is recharged or connected to a backup source. Water\nsystems can continue to address the fire until it has been brought under\ncontrol. While this is more likely to damage the hardware, it is also a\nmore secure means of protecting the building structure.\nWater suppression systems are often preferred or mandated by building\nowners or insurance companies. Water systems are also highly recom-\nmended in areas containing a high level of combustible materials use or\nstorage. The decision of what means of fire suppression to utilize must\nincorporate numerous factors, including the mission and criticality of the\ndata center operations.\n7.4 Verified Disposal of Documents\nWhile security precautions and fire prevention and suppression systems\ncan ensure the safety of information within data centers, often little is\ndone to protect information when it leaves the data center. Printed\ndocuments and documents on electronic media all leave the data center\nand, hopefully, fall under policies and standards for the protection of data\nthroughout the workplace. But when documents are disposed of, all too\noften the commonsense rules for protecting information are left behind.\nWe see documents clearly marked “Confidential” (or which, according\nto the content of the documents, should be clearly marked as such but\nare not) tossed into garbage cans and set out with the rest of the office\nrubbish. Where paper documents are collected, they are often left unat-\ntended — a convenient place for a wrong-doer to browse through a\ncompany’s paper output. In one facility I visited, the facility owners\nthoughtfully provided containers in which to dispose of confidential\ndocuments — large garbage cans clearly marked “Confidential Documents\nOnly”. Once again, a convenient receptacle for wrong-doers to search.\nIt makes sense, does it not, that if we are to spend any money or\neffort to protect information, then the “circle of protection” ought to\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 189,
            "text": "surround the information all the way to its destruction — and yet it so\noften does not.\n7.4.1\nCollection of Documents\nThe procedures for the collection of documents prior to their disposal\nshould be documented and taught to all employees — and should avoid\nusing large receptacles clearly marked “Confidential Documents Only.”\nEvery single department in the organization must have easy access to\nthe containers used to dispose of documents. Where it involves more than\na minute of time to properly dispose of a document, confidential docu-\nments will be put in garbage cans next to desks. Documents should be\ncollected at fixed points in receptacles lined with opaque bags so that\nwhen the bags are taken away for disposal, the documents cannot be\nread through the bags themselves.\nWhere documents are collected in bins, we have to make a decision\non whether or not to lock the bins. For locked bins, the advantages are\nthat paper is secure (relatively) once deposited in the bin and we can\ndemonstrate — to clients and auditors — that our information security\ncircle of protection encompasses documents ready for disposal. Disadvan-\ntages include the procedures necessary to track keys, the extra expense,\nand the added attraction (for wrong-doers) of a locked (versus unlocked)\ndocument bin.\nClearly, every organization must make its own decisions on how to\ncollect information destined for disposal, and those decisions will be based\non criteria already discussed in this book. One thing is certain, however,\nand that is: if a secure document disposal process does not exist, then\nsooner or later confidential documents will end up in the hands of\nsomeone who can use them to cause trouble for the company.\n7.4.2\nDocument Destruction Options\nThere are three basic options for destruction of documents: recycling\n(commonly called pulping), shredding, and burning; some organizations\nuse a combination of one or more of these.\nWhen considering recycling or pulping as an option, the following\nfactors must be taken into account:\n\u0001\nRecycling with a bonded service usually means contracting with a\nservice to have the paper hauled to a bonded recycler or directly\nto a bonded paper mill. All of the paper sent to the recycler should\nbe documented with shipping information. and a Certificate of\nDestruction should be received to certify that the paper was sent\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 190,
            "text": "directly to a specified location on a specific date and was destroyed\non a specific date.\n\u0001\nWhere bonded recycling service is not available or is prohibitively\nexpensive to use, we can perform an assessment of the recycler’s\nprocedures and facilities. If we find that recyclers handle and\nprocess paper in a manner that meets confidentiality standards for\nsecurity, then we may use them instead of the more expensive,\nbonded alternative.\nShredding paper increases its volume and sometimes produces a false\nsense of security. Less expensive shredders, in fact, only cut paper into\nribbons that can be easily pieced together again and read. Even when\nwe opt for a more expensive shredding option, we must consider the\nfollowing points:\n\u0001\nWhile shredding can be an effective way of disposing of docu-\nments, it is also expensive and labor intensive; and if other options\nare available, it might not be necessary. Some organizations do\ntheir own shredding with small, departmental shredders while\nothers choose to do it in a centralized fashion using a large,\nindustrial centralized shredder.\n\u0001\nSome organizations also decide to minimize on-site shredding by\nworking with a recycling hauler that provides secure services such\nas off-site shredding. These hauler companies pick up the paper\nfrom a central point and either shred it on site in mobile units or\ntransport it to a bulk shredding facility. These firms come under\nthe category of destruction firms, and they should always be able\nto provide a Certificate of Destruction.\n7.4.3\nChoosing Services\nDocument disposal and recycling functions are most often contracted\nservices. However, the organization’s responsibility for security of the doc-\numents does not end when they are removed from the facility. Making sure\nthat the documents are subject to secure and reasonable processes until the\ninformation is destroyed is still the organization’s facility’s responsibility.\n7.5 Agreements\nEveryone outside the organization that owns the documents who is\ninvolved in the destruction of the documents (including waste haulers,\nrecycling facilities, and landfill and incinerator owners) should sign an\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 191,
            "text": "agreement that states that they know they will be handling confidential\ninformation from the organization, and they agree to maintain the confi-\ndentiality of that information. The agreement must limit the vendor to use\nand disclosure of documents and the information contained in the docu-\nments to those uses stated in a contract.\nContractual language protecting the confidentiality of the waste should\nbe built into all contracts with solid waste and recycling haulers and\ninclude the following elements:\n\u0001\nSpecify the method of destruction or disposal.\n\u0001\nSpecify the time that will elapse between acquisition and destruc-\ntion or disposal of documents (or electronic media, if that is also\nto be disposed of).\n\u0001\nEstablish safeguards against breaches in confidentiality.\n\u0001\nIndemnify the organization from loss due to unauthorized disclosure.\n\u0001\nRequire that the vendor maintain liability insurance in specified\namounts at all times the contract is in effect.\n\u0001\nProvide proof of destruction or disposal.\nOne final point to consider when deciding how to dispose of docu-\nments is their collection in a loading dock area. We must secure our solid\nwaste compactors and containers by locking all accessible openings to\nthe compactor. Metal doors can be welded onto the compactors to allow\nthem to be easily locked. Ensure the loading dock is secure at all times.\nThe container for the documents and the loading dock itself must be\ndesigned to minimize or eliminate the risk of documents blowing around\nin the wind before or while they are being collected for disposal.\n7.5.1\nDuress Alarms\nIn many facilities, certain operations are carried out that place staff in\npositions of heightened vulnerability. For example, in a bank, tellers are\nat risk from criminals who rob the bank during business hours. In data\ncenters, employees who handle negotiable instruments (checks, stock\ncertificates, etc.) may also be at risk.\nWhere employees are performing jobs that increase the risk of their\nbeing vulnerable to coercion or attack, each employee’s workspace must\nbe provided with a duress alarm. The alarm activator (button or switch)\nshould be placed so that it can be used without its use being noticed by\nothers (a footswitch, for example, can be used without anyone watching\nbeing aware of its use).\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 192,
            "text": "The choice of whether the alarm should sound locally or not will be\nbased on an assessment of the type of risk the alarm is meant to indicate.\nThat is, if sounding the alarm locally is likely to increase the risk to the\nemployee setting off the alarm, then the alarm should not sound locally.\nBy the same token, if a local alarm might bring help more quickly or\nalleviate the situation, then one should be installed.\nWhether local or remote, all employees who might be called upon to\nrespond to the alarm must be trained in response techniques, and the\nresponse procedures must be kept up to date and stored at the place\nwhere responding employees normally work.\n7.6 Intrusion Detection Systems\nIn the context of physical security, intrusion detection systems mean tools\nused to detect activity on the boundaries of a protected facility. When we\ncommit to physically protecting the premises on which our staff work and\nwhich house our information processing equipment, we should carry out\nan exhaustive risk analysis and, where the threat requires, consider install-\ning a perimeter intrusion detection system (IDS).\nThe simplest IDS is a guard patrol. Guards who walk the corridors\nand perimeter of a facility are very effective at identifying attempts to\nbreak into the facility and either raising the alarm or ending the attempt\nby challenging the intruder. Of course, the most obvious shortcoming of\na guard patrol is that the patrol cannot be at all points of the facility at\nthe same time.\nThis leads to the next simplest IDS and that is video monitoring. We\ncan place video cameras at locations in the facility where all points in\nthe perimeter can be monitored simultaneously and, when an intrusion\nattempt is detected, the person charged with monitoring the video sur-\nveillance can raise an alarm.\n7.6.1\nPurpose\nOur first task in defining the requirements of an IDS is to define what is\nto be protected and what is the level and nature of the threat. For general\nthreats we might ask: How does anything from the outside get to the\ninside? Are parking lots secure? What is the mail delivery system? What\nis the environmental system exposure? What are the loading dock proce-\ndures? What building access controls exist?\nOther questions to ask in defining the purpose of the IDS relate to\nthe history of the facility. For example, has there been a specific parking\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 193,
            "text": "lot incident, grounds incident, or a property/facility trespassing incident?\nAre there general vulnerability concerns that may include trespass, assault,\nor intimidation? When was the last occurrence, and what were the circum-\nstances? Are the authorities aware and involved? Is there documentation\navailable for review?\nAnswering these questions will help define the purpose of the IDS\n(and what it needs to achieve). The next task is planning the system itself.\n7.6.2\nPlanning\nOf course, both of the examples given above should have been chosen\nas the result of a need identified by a risk assessment plus careful planning.\nThe planning should have been carried out with an objective to provide\na solution that addresses:\n\u0001\nSurveillance\n\u0001\nControl\n\u0001\nMaintenance\n\u0001\nTraining\nDuring the planning, the nature of the facility and the contents of the\nfacility themselves should be taken into account. For example, the IDS\nrequirements for a dedicated data center campus, situated on its own\ngrounds and surrounded by a perimeter fence, differ greatly from those\nfor a data center housed on the warehouse floor of a multi-story building\nin a city center.\n7.6.3\nElements\nThe planning should produce a draft design that addresses the require-\nments of the premises. The elements of intrusion detection required will\ndepend on the facilities; for example, the dedicated data center might\nrequire a perimeter fence, lighting on that fence and in the space between\nthe fence and the walls of the facility, video cameras, and then the\nperimeter system for the building itself. On the other hand, a facility\ncontained in a multi-use building will require intrusion detection systems\non the doors, windows, floors, walls, and ceilings of only the part of the\nfacility that contains the data center.\nElements to consider when installing an IDS include:\n\u0001\nVideo surveillance\n\u0001\nIllumination\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 194,
            "text": "\u0001\nMotion detection sensors\n\u0001\nHeat sensors\n\u0001\nAlarm systems for windows and doors\n\u0001\n“Break-glass” sensors (noise sensors that can detect the sound made\nby broken glass)\n\u0001\nPressure sensors for floors and stairs\n7.6.4\nProcedures\nWhatever tools or technologies are used in the IDS, the system will fail\nto provide security unless adequate procedures are put in place and\ntraining on those procedures is given to staff expected to monitor and\nreact to alarms created by the IDS.\nStaff should be trained twice a year on what IDS alarms mean and\nhow to respond to them. Those staff responsible for monitoring the IDS\nmust be taught to recognize intrusion attempts and how to respond\naccording to a response scale (i.e., when it is appropriate to respond in\nperson, when to respond with assistance from facility personnel, and when\nlaw enforcement should be called for assistance).\nProcedures should also include logging procedures that allow for all\nevents — not just events requiring responses — to be logged for audit\npurposes or for purposes of follow-up.\n7.7 Sample Physical Security Policy\nSee Table 7.1 for a sample physical security policy.\n7.8 Summary\nThe nature of physical security for a data center should be one of\nconcentric rings of defense — with requirements for entry getting more\ndifficult the closer we get to the center of the rings. The reason for this\nis obvious: if we take a number of precautions to protect information\naccessed at devices throughout the organization, then we must make at\nleast as sure that no damage or tampering can happen to the hardware\non which the information is stored and processed. Having said that, the\nprinciple of consistency must still be applied. There is no point in building\nphysical access controls at a cost of several million dollars if the potential\ndamage that could be done to a data center is less than several tens of\nmillions of dollars.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 195,
            "text": "TABLE 7.1\nSample Physical Security Policy\nPhysical Security\nPolicy\nIt is the responsibility of The Company management to provide a safe and\nsecure workplace for all employees.\nStandards\n\u0001\nThe Company offices will be protected from unauthorized access.\n\u0001\nAreas within buildings that house sensitive information or high-risk\nequipment will be protected against unauthorized access, fire, water,\nand other hazards.\n\u0001\nDevices that are critical to the operation of company business pro-\ncesses will be identified in the Company Business Impact Analysis (BIA)\nprocess and will be protected against power failure.\nResponsibilities\n\u0001\nSenior management and the officers of The Company are required to\nmaintain accurate records and to employ internal controls designed\nto safeguard company assets and property against unauthorized use\nor disposition.\n\u0001\nThe Company assets include but are not limited to physical property,\nintellectual property, patents, trade secrets, copyrights, and trade-\nmarks.\n\u0001\nAdditionally, it is the responsibility of Company line management to\nensure that staff is aware of and fully complies with the company’s\nsecurity guidelines and all relevant laws and regulations.\nCompliance\n\u0001\nManagement is responsible for conducting periodic reviews and audits\nto assure compliance with all policies, procedures, practices, stan-\ndards, and guidelines.\n\u0001\nEmployees who fail to comply with the policies will be treated as being\nin violation of the Employee Standards of Conduct and will be subject\nto appropriate corrective action.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 196,
            "text": "Chapter 8\nRisk Analysis and \nRisk Management\n8.1 Introduction\nRisk management is the process that allows business managers to balance\noperational and economic costs of protective measures and achieve gains\nin mission capability by protecting business processes that support the\nbusiness objectives or mission of the enterprise.\nSenior management must ensure that the enterprise has the capabilities\nneeded to accomplish its mission.\nMost organizations have tight budgets for security. To get the best bang\nfor the security buck, management needs a process to determine spending.\n8.2 Frequently Asked Questions on Risk Analysis\n8.2.1\nWhy Conduct a Risk Analysis?\nManagement is charged with showing that “due diligence” is performed\nduring decision-making processes for any enterprise. A formal risk analysis\nprovides the documentation that due diligence is performed.\nA risk analysis also lets an enterprise take control of its own destiny.\nWith an effective risk analysis process in place, only those controls and\nsafeguards that are actually needed will be implemented. An enterprise\nwill never again face having to implement a mandated control to “be in\ncompliance with audit requirements.”\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 197,
            "text": "8.2.2\nWhen to Conduct a Risk Analysis?\nA risk analysis should be conducted whenever money or resources are\nto be spent. Before starting a task, project, or development cycle, an\nenterprise should conduct an analysis of the need for the project. Under-\nstanding the concepts of risk analysis and applying them to the business\nneeds of the enterprise will ensure that only necessary spending is done.\n8.2.3\nWho Should Conduct the Risk Analysis?\nMost risk analysis projects fail because the internal experts and subject\nmatter experts are not included in the process. A process such as the\nFacilitated Risk Analysis Process (FRAP) takes advantage of the internal\nexperts. No one knows your systems and applications better than the\npeople who develop and run them.\n8.2.4\nHow Long Should a Risk Analysis Take?\nIt should be completed in days, not weeks or months. To meet the needs\nof an enterprise, the risk analysis process must be completed quickly with\na minimum impact on the employees’ already busy schedule.\n8.2.5\nWhat a Risk Analysis Analyzes\nRisk analysis can be used to review any task, project, or idea. By learning\nthe basic concepts of risk analysis, an organization can use it to determine\nif a project should be undertaken, if a specific product should be pur-\nchased, if a new control should be implemented, or if the enterprise is\nat risk from some threat.\n8.2.6\nWhat Can the Results of a Risk Analysis Tell \nan Organization?\nThe greatest benefit of a risk analysis is determining whether or not it is\nprudent to proceed. It allows management to examine all currently iden-\ntified concerns, prioritize the level of vulnerability, and then select an\nappropriate level of control or accept the risk.\nThe goal of risk analysis is not to eliminate all risk. It is a tool used\nby management to reduce risk to an acceptable level.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 198,
            "text": "8.2.7\nWho Should Review the Results of a Risk Analysis?\nA risk analysis is rarely conducted without a senior management sponsor.\nThe results are geared to provide management with the information it\nneeds to make informed business decisions. The results of a risk analysis\nare normally classified as confidential and are provided to only the sponsor\nand to those deemed appropriate by the sponsor.\n8.2.8\nHow Is the Success of the Risk Analysis Measured?\nThe tangible way to measure success is to see a lower bottom line for\ncost. Risk analysis can assist in this process by identifying only those\ncontrols that need implementation.\nAnother way that the success of a risk analysis is measured is if there\nis a time when management decisions are called into review. By having\na formal process in place that demonstrates the due diligence of manage-\nment in the decision-making process, this kind of inquiring will be dealt\nwith quickly and successfully.\nEffective risk management must be totally integrated into the organi-\nzation’s system development life cycle (SDLC). The typical SDLC has five\nphases and they can be termed almost anything. Regardless of what the\nphases are labeled, they all have the same key concepts:\n\u0001\nAnalysis\n\u0001\nDesign\n\u0001\nConstruction\n\u0001\nTest\n\u0001\nMaintenance\nThe National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) uses the\nfollowing terms: Initiation, Development or Acquisition, Implementation,\nOperation or Maintenance, and Disposal.\nAs Figure 8.1 illustrates, risk analysis is mapped throughout the SDLC.\nThe first time risk analysis is required occurs when there is a discussion\non whether or not a new system application of a business process is\nrequired.\nThe SDLC phases include:\n\u0001\nAnalysis: the need for a new system, application or process and\nits scope are documented.\n\u0001\nDesign: the system or process is designed and requirements are\ngathered.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 199,
            "text": "\u0001\nDevelopment: the system or process is purchased, developed, or\notherwise constructed.\n\u0001\nTest: system security features should be configured, enabled, tested,\nand verified.\n\u0001\nMaintenance: when changes or updates are made to the system,\nthe changes to hardware and software are noted and the risk\nanalysis process is revisited.\nRisk management activities include:\n\u0001\nAnalysis: identified risks are used to support the development of\nsystem requirements, including security needs.\n\u0001\nDesign: security needs lead to architecture and design trade-offs.\n\u0001\nDevelopment: the security controls and safeguards are created or\nimplemented as part of the development process.\n\u0001\nTest: safeguards and controls are tested to ensure that decisions\nregarding risks identified are reduced to acceptable levels prior to\nmovement to production.\n\u0001\nMaintenance: controls and safeguards are reexamined when\nchanges or updates occur, or at regularly scheduled intervals.\nFIGURE 8.1\nSystem Development Life Cycle\nCONSTRUCTION\nPHASE\nAPPLICATION DEVELOPMENT PHASES:\nANALYSIS\nPHASE\nDESIGN\nPHASE\nTEST\nPHASE\nMAINTENANCE\nPHASE\nFACILITATED\nRISK\nANALYSIS\nPROCESS\n(FRAP)\nCRITICALITY LIST\nAPPROVED\nBY\nMANAGEMENT\nANNUAL\nBCP\nREVIEW\nREVIEW\nFRAP\nFINDINGS\nBEGIN\nBCP\nPLAN\nINFORMATION\nCLASSIFICATION\nIDENTIFICATION\nP\nR\nO\nD\nU\nC\nT\nI\nO\nN\nSAFEGUARDS\nAPPROVED\nBY\nMANAGEMENT\nBUILD\nADEQUATE\nACCESS\nCONTROL\nPROCESS\nSAFEGUARDS\nIMPLEMENTED &\nREVIEW FRAP\nSAFE-\nGUARDS\nTESTED\nFACILITATED\nRISK\nANALYSIS\nPROCESS\n(FRAP)\nFACILITATED\nBUSINESS\nIMPACT\nANALYSIS\n(FBIA)\nPRE-SCREENING\nPROCESS\nREVIEW\nACCESS\nCONTROL\nLISTS\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 200,
            "text": "Risk management is an enterprise management responsibility. Each\ngroup has a different role and these roles support the activities of the\nother roles and responsibilities. Let us examine the typical roles found in\nan organization and what they are responsible for with regard to risk\nanalysis and risk management.\n\u0001\nSenior management. Under the Standard of Due Care, senior man-\nagement is charged with the ultimate responsibility for meeting\nbusiness objectives or mission requirements. Senior management\nmust ensure that necessary resources are effectively applied to\ndevelop the capabilities to meet the mission requirements. Senior\nmanagement must incorporate the results of the risk analysis pro-\ncess into the decision-making process.\n\u0001\nChief Information Security Officer (CISO). The CISO is responsible\nfor the organization’s planning, budgeting, and performance, includ-\ning its information security components. Decisions made in this\narea should be based on an effective risk management program.\n\u0001\nSystem and Information Owners. These are the business unit man-\nagers assigned as functional owners of organization assets and are\nresponsible for ensuring that proper controls are in place to address\nintegrity, confidentiality, and availability of the infor mation\nresources that they are assigned ownership. The term “owner” must\nbe established in the Asset Classification Policy.\n\u0001\nBusiness Managers. The managers (aka owners) are the individuals\nwith the authority and responsibility for making cost/benefit deci-\nsions essential to ensure accomplishment of organization mission\nobjectives. Their involvement in the risk management process\nenables the selection of business-orientated controls. The charge\nof being an owner supports the objective of fulfilling the fiduciary\nresponsibility of management to protect the assets of the enterprise.\n\u0001\nInformation Security Administrator (ISA; formerly ISSO). This is the\nsecurity program manager responsible for the organization’s secu-\nrity programs, including risk management. The ISA has changed\nits designation because the “officer” designation is normally\nrestricted to senior executives. The officers can be held personally\nliable if internal controls are not adequate.\n8.3 Information Security Life Cycle\nWhen implementing risk management, it will be necessary to view this\nprocess as part of the ongoing information security life cycle (see Figure\n8.2). As with any business process, the information security life cycle starts\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 201,
            "text": "with a risk analysis. Management is charged with showing that “due\ndiligence” is performed during decision-making processes for any enter-\nprise. A formal risk analysis provides the documentation that due diligence\nis performed. Typically, risk analysis results will be used on two occasions:\n(1) when a decision needs to be made and (2) when there arises a need\nto examine the decision-making process.\nA risk analysis also lets an enterprise take control of its own destiny.\nWith an effective risk analysis process in place, only those controls and\nsafeguards that are actually needed will be implemented. An enterprise\nwill never again face having to implement a mandated control to “be in\ncompliance with audit requirements.”\nA risk analysis should be conducted whenever money or resources\nare to be spent. Before starting a task, project, or development cycle, an\nenterprise should conduct an analysis of the need for the project. Under-\nstanding the concepts of risk analysis and applying them to the business\nneeds of the enterprise will ensure that only necessary spending is done.\nOnce a risk analysis has been conducted, it will be necessary to conduct\na cost and benefit analysis to determine which controls will help mitigate\nthe risk to an acceptable level at a cost the enterprise can afford. It is\nunwise to implement controls or safeguards just because they seem to be\nthe right thing to do or because other enterprises are doing so. Each\norganization is unique, and the levels of revenue and exposure are\ndifferent. By conducting a proper risk analysis, the controls or safeguards\nwill meet the enterprise’s specific needs.\nOnce the controls or safeguards have been implemented, it is appro-\npriate to conduct an assessment to determine if the controls are working.\nIn the information security profession, the term “vulnerability” has been\ndefined as a condition of a missing or ineffectively administered safeguard\nor control that allows a threat to occur with a greater impact or frequency,\nor both. When conducting an NVA (network vulnerability assessment), the\nteam will be assessing existing controls, safeguards, and processes that are\nFIGURE 8.2\nInformation Security Life Cycle\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 202,
            "text": "part of the network. This process, the assessment, will ensure that controls\nare effective and that they will remain so.\n8.4 Risk Analysis Process\nRisk analysis has three deliverables: (1) identify threats; (2) establish a\nrisk level by determining probability that a threat will occur and the impact\nif the threat does occur; and finally, (3) identification of controls and\nsafeguards that can reduce the risk to an acceptable level. As we examine\nthe risk analysis portion of the risk management process, we will discuss\nsix steps that will provide the three deliverables we need. Risk is a function\nof the probability that an identified threat will occur and then the impact\nthat the threat will have on the business process or mission of the asset\nunder review. We now examine the six steps necessary to perform the\nrisk analysis portion of the risk management process.\n8.4.1\nAsset Definition\nThe first step in the risk analysis process is to define the process, appli-\ncation, system, or asset that is going to have the risk analysis performed\nupon it. The key here is to establish the boundaries of what is to be\nreviewed. Most failed projects come to grief because the scope of the\nproject was poorly defined to begin with, or because the scope was not\nmanaged well and was allowed to “creep” until it was out of control. If\nwe are going to manage risk analysis as a project, then the asset definition\nmust be looked upon as a scope statement. All of the elements that go\ninto writing a successful scope statement should be used to define the\nasset and what will be expected from the risk analysis process.\nTo gather relevant information about the asset or process under review,\nthe risk management team can use a number of techniques. These include\nquestionnaires, on-site interviews, documentation review, and scanning tools.\nIt will be necessary to describe in words exactly what the risk analysis is\ngoing to review. Once it has been identified, it will be necessary to determine\nwhat resources will be needed to support the asset (platforms, operating\nsystems, personnel, etc.) and what business processes this asset will impact.\n8.4.2\nThreat Identification\nWe define a threat as an undesirable event that could impact the business\nobjectives or mission of the business unit or enterprise. Some threats come\nfrom existing controls that were either implemented incorrectly or have\npassed their usefulness and now provide a weakness to the system or\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 203,
            "text": "platform that can be exploited to circumvent the intended behavior of\nthe control. This process is known as exploiting a vulnerability.\nWe will want to create as complete a list of threats as possible. Typically,\nthere are three major categories of threats:\n1.\nNatural threats: floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, landslides, ava-\nlanches, electrical storms, and other such events.\n2.\nHuman threats: events that are either enabled by or caused by\nhuman beings, such as unintentional acts (errors and omissions)\nor deliberate acts (fraud, malicious software, unauthorized access).\nStatistically, the threat that causes the largest loss to information\nresources remains human errors and omissions.\n3.\nEnvironmental threats: long-term power outages, pollution, chem-\nical spills, or liquid leakage.\nTo create a complete list of threats, there are a number of different\nmethods that can be used. These include developing checklists. While I\nthink checklists are important and should be used, I must caution you\nthat if used improperly, a checklist will impact the free flow of ideas and\ninformation. So use them to ensure that everything gets covered or\nidentified, but do not make them available at the beginning of the process.\nAnother method of gathering threats is to examine historical data.\nResearch what types of events have occurred as well as how often they\nhave occurred. Once you have the threat, it may be necessary to determine\nthe annual rate of occurrence (ARO). This data can be obtained from a\nnumber of sources. For natural threats, the National Weather Center is a\ngood place to obtain these rates of occurrence. For accidental human\nthreats, an insurance underwriter will have the figures. For deliberate\nthreats, contact local law enforcement or the organization’s security force.\nFor environmental threats, facilities management and the local power\ncompanies will have the relevant information.\nThe method I like best is brainstorming. I like to get a number of\npeople (stakeholders) together and give them a structure to focus their\nthoughts on, and then let them identify all the threats they can think of.\nWhen we brainstorm, there are no wrong answers. We want to ensure\nthat all threats get identified. Once we have completed the information\ngathering, then we will clean up duplicates and combine like threats.\n8.4.3\nDetermine Probability of Occurrence\nOnce a list of threats has been finalized, it is necessary to determine how\nlikely that threat is to occur. The risk management team will want to\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 204,
            "text": "derive an overall likelihood that indicates the probability that a potential\nthreat may be exercised against the risk analysis asset under review. It\nwill be necessary to establish definitions on probability and a number of\nother key terms. We will discuss sample definitions as soon as we finish\naddressing the six steps of risk analysis.\n8.4.4\nDetermine the Impact of the Threat\nHaving determined the probability that a threat might occur, it will then\nbe necessary to determine the impact that the threat will have on the\norganization. Before determining the impact value, it is necessary to ensure\nthat the scope of the risk analysis has been properly defined. It will be\nnecessary to ensure that the risk management team understands the objec-\ntives or mission of the asset under review and how it impacts the\norganization’s overall mission or objectives.\nWhen determining the risk level (probability and impact), it will be\nnecessary to establish the framework from which the evaluation is to\noccur. That is, how will existing controls impact the results? Typically,\nduring the initial review, the threats are examined as if there are no\ncontrols in place. This will provide the risk management team with a\nbaseline risk level from which you can identify the controls and safeguards\nand measure their effectiveness.\nAlthough we make the assertion that no controls are in place, in the\nscope statement we will identify assumptions and constraints. These\nassumptions might include the concepts that a risk analysis has been\nperformed on the supporting infrastructure elements and that appropriate\ncontrols have been implemented. This will mean that such an activity\nmust have taken place or is scheduled to take place as soon as possible.\nBy establishing these assumptions, the risk management team can focus\non the threats and impacts related directly to the asset under review.\nThe results of the review of probability and impact is the determination\nof a risk level that can be assigned to each threat. Once the risk level is\nestablished, then the team can identify appropriate actions. Steps two and\nthree determine the likelihood that a given threat might occur, the mag-\nnitude of the impact should the threat occur, and the adequacy of controls\nalready in place. The final element will be to identify controls for those\nhigh-level threats that have no control or whose control is inadequate.\nThe risk level process will require the use of definitions for probability\nand impact, as well as definitions of levels. The following are sample\ndefinitions and how they might be used by the risk management team\n(see Table 8.1):\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 205,
            "text": "\u0001\nProbability: the likelihood that a threat event will occur.\n\u0001\nHigh probability: very likely that the threat will occur within\nthe next year.\n\u0001\nMedium probability: possible that the threat will occur during\nthe next year.\n\u0001\nLow probability: highly unlikely that the threat will occur during\nthe next year.\n\u0001\nImpact: the measure of the magnitude of loss or harm to the value\nof an asset.\n\u0001\nHigh impact: shutdown of critical business unit that leads to a\nsignificant loss of business, corporate image, or profit.\n\u0001\nMedium impact: short interruption of critical process or system\nthat results in a limited financial loss to a single business unit.\n\u0001\nLow impact: interruption with no financial loss.\n8.4.5\nControls Recommended\nAfter assigning the risk level, the team will identify controls or safeguards\nthat could possibly eliminate the risk or at least reduce the risk to an\nacceptable level. Remember that one of the goals of risk analysis is to\ndocument the organization’s due diligence when making business deci-\nsions. Therefore, it is important to identify as many controls and safeguards\nas possible. By doing this the team will be able to document all the\noptions that were considered.\nThe are a number of factors that need to be considered when recom-\nmending controls and alternative solutions. For example, how effective is\nthe recommended control? One way to determine the relative effectiveness\nis to perform the risk level process (probability and impact) to the threat\nwith the control in place. If the risk level is not reduced to an acceptable\npoint, then the team may want to examine another option.\nTABLE 8.1\nProbability Impact Matrix\nProbability\nImpact\nHigh\nA\nB\nC\nMedium\nB\nB\nC\nLow\nB\nC\nD\nA: Corrective action must be implemented.\nB: Corrective action should be implemented.\nC: Requires monitor.\nD: No action required at this time.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 206,
            "text": "There may also be legal and regulatory requirements to implement\nspecific controls. With so many new and expanding requirements mandated\nby government agencies, controlling boards, and laws, it will be necessary\nfor the risk management team to be current on these requirements.\nWhen selecting any type of control, it will be necessary to measure\nthe operational impact on the organization. Every control will have an\nimpact in some manner. It could be the expenditure for the control itself.\nIt could be the impact of productivity and turn-around time. Even if the\ncontrol is a new procedure, the effect on the employees must be reviewed\nand used in the determination on whether to implement or not.\nA final consideration is the safety and reliability of the control or\nsafeguard. Does the control have a track record that demonstrates that it\nwill allow the organization to operate in a safe and secure mode? The\noverall safety of the organization’s intellectual property is at stake. The\nlast thing that the risk management team wants to do is implement a\ncontrol that puts the enterprise at a greater risk.\nThe expenditure on controls must be balanced against the actual business\nharm. A good rule of thumb is that if the control costs more than the asset\nit is designed to protect, then the return on investment will probably be\nlow. One way to identify a good “bang for the buck” is to identify each\ncontrol and cross-reference it to all of the threats that could be mitigated\nby the implementation of that specific control. This process will provide\nthe team with an initial idea of which control is most cost effective.\nTo be effective, the risk analysis process should be applied across the\nentire organization. That is, all of the elements and methodology that make\nup the risk analysis process should be standard and all business units\ntrained in its use. The output from the risk analysis will lead the organization\nto identify controls that should reduce the level of threat occurrence.\n8.4.6\nDocumentation\nOnce the risk analysis is complete, the results should be documented in\na standard format and a report issued to the asset owner. This report will\nhelp senior management, the business owner, make decisions on policy,\nprocedures, budget, and systems and management changes. The risk\nanalysis report should be presented in a systematic and analytical manner\nthat assesses risk so that senior management will understand the risks and\nallocate resources to reduce the risk to an acceptable level.\n8.5 Risk Mitigation\nRisk mitigation is a systematic methodology used by senior management\nto reduce organizational risk. The process of risk mitigation can be\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 207,
            "text": "achieved through a number of different methods. We will take a few\nminutes and discuss the six most common methods of risk mitigation.\n1.\nRisk assumption. After examining the threats and determining the\nrisk level, the team’s findings lead management to determine that\nit is the best business decision to accept the potential risk and\ncontinue operating. This is an acceptable outcome of the risk\nanalysis process. If, after completing the risk analysis process,\nmanagement decides to accept the risk, then it has performed its\ndue diligence.\n2.\nRisk alleviation. Senior management approves the implementation\nof the controls recommended by the risk management team that\nwill lower the risk to an acceptable level.\n3.\nRisk avoidance. This is where after performing the risk analysis,\nmanagement chooses to avoid the risks by eliminating the process\nthat could cause the risks; for example, foregoing certain functions\nor enhancements of a system or application that would place too\ngreat an exposure on the organization.\n4.\nRisk limitation. To limit the risk by implementing controls that\nminimize the adverse impact of a threat that would exercise a\nvulnerability. Typically, the controls would come from the security\narchitecture of controls that include the areas of avoidance, assur-\nance, detective, or recovery controls.\n5.\nRisk planning. This is a process where it is decided to manage\nrisk by developing an architecture that prioritizes, implements, and\nmaintains controls.\n6.\nRisk transference. Here, management transfers the risk using other\noptions to compensate for a loss such as purchasing an insurance\npolicy.\nWhichever risk mitigation technique is used, the business objectives\nor mission of an organization must be considered when selecting any of\nthese techniques. \n8.6 Control Categories\nIn the information security architecture there are four layers of controls.\nThese layers begin with Avoidance, then Assurance, then Detection, and\nfinally Recovery. Or you can create a set of controls that map to the\nenterprise, such as Operations, Applications, Systems, Security, etc. Map-\nping to some standard such as ISO 17799 is another option. When\nidentifying possible controls, it could be beneficial to categorize controls\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 208,
            "text": "into logical groupings. We examine two such groupings in Table 8.2 and\nTable 8.3.\nAnother way to map controls is by using some standard, such as ISO\n17799 (see Table 8.3).\nThe new regulations of HIPAA, GLBA, and SOX will require all of us\nto include these controls in our risk analysis controls selection process.\nTable 8.4 provides a HIPAA controls list example. The numbers in paren-\ntheses are the matching section number found in ISO 17799. ISO17799 is\nactually “a comprehensive set of controls comprising best practices in\ninformation security.” It is essentially, in part (extended), an internationally\nrecognized generic information security standard.\nIts predecessor, titled BS7799-1, has existed in various forms for a\nnumber of years, although the standard only really gained widespread\nrecognition following publication by ISO (the International Standards\nOrganization) in December 2000. Formal certification and accreditation\nwere also introduced around the same time.\nThe object of the controls list is to identify categories of controls that\nwill lead the team to determine the specific control required. When\ndeveloping your list, be sure to be thorough but do not be so pedantic\nthat the list of controls is similar to reading War and Peace.\n8.7 Cost/Benefit Analysis\nTo allocate resources and implement cost-effective controls, organizations,\nafter identifying all possible controls and evaluating their feasibility and\neffectiveness, should conduct a cost/benefit analysis. This process should\nbe conducted for each new or enhanced control to determine if the control\nrecommended is appropriate for the organization. A cost/benefit analysis\nshould determine the impact of implementing the new or enhanced control\nand then determine the impact of not implementing the control.\nRemember that one of the long-term costs of any control is the\nrequirement to maintain its effectiveness. It is therefore necessary to factor\nthis cost into the benefit requirement of any control. When performing a\ncost/benefit analysis, it is necessary to consider the cost of implementation\nbased on some of the following:\n\u0001\nCosts of implementation, including initial outlay for hardware and\nsoftware\n\u0001\nReduction in operational effectiveness\n\u0001\nImplementation of additional policies and procedures to support\nthe new controls\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 209,
            "text": "TABLE 8.2\nControls List by IT Group\nApplication \nControls\nApplication \nControl\nDesign and implement application controls \n(data entry edit checking, fields requiring \nvalidation, alarm indicators, password \nexpiration capabilities, checksums) to \nensure the integrity, confidentiality, and \navailability of application information.\nApplication \nControls\nAcceptance \nTesting\nDevelop testing procedures to be followed \nduring applications development and during \nmodifications to the existing application that \ninclude user participation and acceptance.\nApplication \nControls\nTraining\nImplement user programs (user performance \nevaluations) designed to encourage \ncompliance with policies and procedures in \nplace to ensure the appropriate utilization \nof the application.\nApplication \nControls\nTraining\nApplication developers will provide docu-\nmentation, guidance, and support to the op-\nerations staff (Operations) in implementing \nmechanisms to ensure that the transfer of \ninformation between applications is secure.\nApplication \nControls\nCorrective \nStrategies\nThe Development Team will develop \ncorrective strategies such as reworked \nprocesses, revised application logic, etc.\nOperations \nControls\nBackup\nBackup requirements will be determined and \ncommunicated to Operations, including a \nrequest that an electronic notification that \nbackups were completed be sent to the \napplication System Administrator. \nOperations will be requested to test the \nbackup procedures.\nOperations \nControls\nRecovery Plan\nDevelop, document, and test recovery \nprocedures designed to ensure that the \napplication and information can be \nrecovered, using the backups created, in the \nevent of loss.\nOperations \nControls\nRisk Analysis\nConduct a risk analysis to determine the level \nof exposure to identified threats and identify \npossible safeguards or controls.\nOperations \nControls\nAnti-Virus\n(1) Ensure LAN Administrator installs the \ncorporate standard antiviral software on all \ncomputers. (2) Training and awareness of \nvirus prevention techniques will be \nincorporated in the organization intrusion \nprevention program.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 210,
            "text": "TABLE 8.2 (continued)\nControls List by IT Group\nOperations \nControls\nInterface\nDependencies\nSystems that feed information will be \nidentified and communicated to Operations \nto stress the impact to the functionality if \nthese feeder applications are unavailable. \nOperations \nControls\nMaintenance\nTime requirements for technical \nmaintenance will be tracked and a request \nfor adjustment will be communicated to \nmanagement if experience warrants.\nOperations \nControls\nService Level \nAgreement\nAcquire service level agreements to establish \nlevel of customer expectations and \nassurances from supporting operations.\nOperations \nControls\nMaintenance\nAcquire maintenance and supplier \nagreements to facilitate the continued \noperational status of the application.\nOperations \nControls\nChange \nManagement\nProduction migration controls such as search \nand remove processes to ensure data stores \nare clean.\nOperations \nControls\nBusiness \nImpact \nAnalysis\nA formal business impact analysis will be \nconducted to determine the asset’s relative \ncriticality with other enterprise assets.\nOperations \nControls\nBackup\nTraining for a backup to the System \nAdministrator will be provided and duties \nrotated between them to ensure the \nadequacy of the training program.\nOperations \nControls\nBackup\nA formal employee security awareness \nprogram has been implemented and is \nupdated and presented to the employees at \nleast on an annual basis.\nOperations \nControls\nRecovery Plan\nAccess Sourced: Implement a mechanism to \nlimit access to confidential information to \nspecific network paths or physical locations.\nOperations \nControls\nRisk Analysis\nImplement user authentication mechanisms \n(such as firewalls, dial-in controls, Secure ID) \nto limit access to authorized personnel.\nPhysical \nSecurity\nPhysical \nSecurity\nConduct a risk analysis to determine the level \nof exposure to identified threats and identify \npossible safeguards or controls.\nSecurity \nControls\nSecurity \nAwareness\nImplement an access control mechanism to \nprevent unauthorized access to information. \nThis mechanism will include the capability \nof detecting, logging and reporting attempts \nto breach the security of this information.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 211,
            "text": "TABLE 8.2 (continued)\nControls List by IT Group\nSecurity \nControls\nAccess Control\nImplement encryption mechanisms (data, \nend-to-end) to prevent unauthorized access \nto protect the integrity and confidentiality of \ninformation.\nSecurity \nControls\nAccess Control\nAdhere to a change management process \ndesigned to facilitate a structured approach \nto modifications of the application, to \nensure appropriate steps, and that \nprecautions are followed. “Emergency” \nmodifications should be included in this \nprocess.\nSecurity \nControls\nAccess Control\nControl procedures are in place to ensure \nthat appropriate system logs are reviewed by \nindependent third parties to review system \nupdate activities.\nSecurity \nControls\nAccess Control\nIn consultation with Facilities Management, \nfacilitate the implementation of physical \nsecurity controls designed to protect the \ninformation, software, and hardware \nrequired of the system.\nSecurity \nControls\nPolicy\nDevelop policies and procedures to limit \naccess and operating privileges to those with \na business need.\nSecurity \nControls\nTraining\nUser training will include instruction and \ndocumentation on the proper use of the \napplication. The importance of maintaining \nthe confidentiality of user accounts, \npasswords, and the confidential and \ncompetitive nature of information will be \nstressed.\nSecurity \nControls\nReview\nImplement mechanisms to monitor, report, \nand audit activities identified as requiring \nindependent reviews, including periodic \nreviews of user IDs to ascertain and verify \nthe business need.\nSecurity \nControls\nAsset \nClassification\nThe asset under review will be classified using \nenterprise policies, standards, and \nprocedures on asset classification.\nSecurity \nControls\nAccess Control\nMechanisms to protect the database against \nunauthorized access, and modifications \nmade from outside the application, will be \ndetermined and implemented.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 212,
            "text": "\u0001\nCost of possibly hiring additional staff or, at a minimum, training\nexisting staff in the new controls\n\u0001\nCost of educating support personnel to maintain the effectiveness\nof the control\n8.8 Summary\nPractically no system or activity is risk-free, and not all implemented\ncontrols can eliminate the risk they intend to address. The purpose of\nrisk management is to analyze the business risks of a process, application,\nsystem, or other asset to determine the most prudent method for safe\noperation. The risk analysis team reviews these assets with the business\nobjectives as their primary consideration. We neither want, nor can we\nuse a control mechanism that reduces risk to zero. A security program\nthat has as its goal one-hundred percent security will cause the organiza-\ntion to have zero percent productivity.\nThe risk analysis process has two key objectives: (1) to implement\nonly those controls necessary and (2) to document management’s due\ndiligence. As security professionals we are aware that our goal is to provide\nsupport for the organization and to ensure that management objectives\nare met. By implementing an effective risk management and risk analysis\nprocess, this objective will be met and embraced by our user community.\nTABLE 8.2 (continued)\nControls List by IT Group\nSecurity \nControls\nManagement \nSupport\nRequest management support to ensure the \ncooperation and coordination of various \nbusiness units.\nSecurity \nControls\nProprietary\nProcesses are in place to ensure that \ncompany proprietary assets are protected \nand that the company is in compliance with \nall third-party license agreements.\nSystems \nControls\nChange \nManagement\nBackup requirements will be determined and \ncommunicated to Operations, including a \nrequest that an electronic notification that \nbackups were completed be sent to the app-\nlication System Administrator. Operations will \nbe requested to test the backup procedures.\nSystems \nControls\nMonitor \nSystem Logs\nDevelop, document, and test all recovery \nprocedures designed to ensure that the \napplication and information can be \nrecovered, using the backups created, in the \nevent of loss.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 213,
            "text": "TABLE 8.3\nControl List using ISO 17799\nISO 17799 Section\nCategory\nControl Description\nSecurity Policy\nPolicy (3.1)\nDevelop and implement an \nInformation Security Policy.\nOrganizational \nSecurity\nManagement \nInformation \nSecurity Forum \n(4.1)\nEstablish a corporate committee to \noversee information security. Develop \nand implement an Information \nSecurity Organization mission \nstatement.\nOrganizational \nSecurity\nSecurity of Third-\nParty Access (4.2)\nImplement a process to analyze third-\nparty connection risks and implement \nspecific security standards to combat \nthird-party connection risks.\nOrganizational \nSecurity\nSecurity \nRequirements in \nOutsourcing \nContracts (4.3)\nImplement standards and user training \nto ensure that virus detection and \nprevention measures are adequate.\nAsset \nClassification \nand Control\nAccounting of \nAssets (5.1)\nEstablish an inventory of major assets \nassociated with each information \nsystem.\nAsset \nClassification \nand Control\nInformation \nClassification \n(5.2)\nImplement standards for security \nclassification of the level of protection \nrequired for information assets.\nAsset \nClassification \nand Control\nInformation \nLabeling and \nHandling (5.2)\nImplement standards to ensure the \nproper handling of information \nassets.\nPersonnel \nSecurity\nSecurity in Job \nDescriptions (6.1)\nEnsure that security responsibilities \nare included in employee job \ndescriptions.\nPersonnel \nSecurity\nUser Training ((6.2)\nImplement training standards to \nensure that users are trained in \ninformation security policies and \nprocedures, security requirements, \nbusiness controls, and correct use of \nIT facilities.\nPersonnel \nSecurity\nResponding to \nSecurity \nIncidents and \nMalfunctions \n(6.3)\nImplement procedures and standards \nfor formal reporting and incident \nresponse action to be taken on \nreceipt of an incident report.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 214,
            "text": "TABLE 8.3 (continued)\nControl List using ISO 17799\nISO 17799 Section\nCategory\nControl Description\nPhysical and \nEnvironmental \nSecurity\nSecure Areas (7.1)\nImplement standards to ensure that \nphysical security protection exists, \nbased on defined perimeters through \nstrategically located barriers \nthroughout the organization.\nPhysical & \nEnvironmental \nSecurity\nEquipment \nSecurity (7.2)\nImplement standards to ensure that \nequipment is located properly to \nreduce risks of environmental \nhazards and unauthorized access.\nPhysical & \nEnvironmental \nSecurity\nGeneral Controls \n(7.3)\nImplement a clear desk/clear screen \npolicy for sensitive material to reduce \nrisks of unauthorized access, loss, or \ndamage outside normal working \nhours.\nCommunications \nand Operations \nManagement\nDocumented \nOperating \nProcedures (8.1)\nImplement operating procedures to \nclearly document that all operational \ncomputer systems are being operated \nin a correct, secure manner.\nCommunications \nand Operations \nManagement\nSystem Planning \nand Acceptance \n(8.2)\nImplement standards to ensure that \ncapacity requirements are monitored, \nand future requirements projected, to \nreduce the risk of system overload.\nCommunications \nand Operations \nManagement\nProtection from \nMalicious \nSoftware (8.3)\nImplement standards and user training \nto ensure that virus detection and \nprevention measures are adequate.\nCommunications \nand Operations \nManagement\nHousekeeping \n(8.4)\nEstablish procedures for making \nregular backup copies of essential \nbusiness data and software to ensure \nthat it can be recovered following a \ncomputer disaster or media failure.\nCommunications \nand Operations \nManagement\nNetwork \nManagement \n(8.5)\nImplement appropriate standards to \nensure the security of data in \nnetworks and the protection of \nconnected services from \nunauthorized access.\nCommunications \nand Operations \nManagement\nMedia Handling \nand Security (8.6)\nImplement procedures for the \nmanagement of removable computer \nmedia such as tapes, disks, cassettes, \nand printed reports.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 215,
            "text": "TABLE 8.3 (continued)\nControl List using ISO 17799\nISO 17799 Section\nCategory\nControl Description\nCommunications \nand Operations \nManagement\nExchanges of \nInformation and \nSoftware (8.7)\nImplement procedures to establish \nthat formal agreements exist, includ-\ning software escrow agreements when \nappropriate, for exchanging data and \nsoftware (whether electronically or \nmanually) between organizations.\nAccess Control\nBusiness require-\nment for System \nAccess (9.1)\nImplement a risk analysis process to \ngather business requirements to \ndocument access control levels.\nAccess Control\nUser Access \nManagement \n(9.2)\nImplement procedures for user \nregistration and deregistration access \nto all multiuse IT services.\nAccess Control\nUser \nResponsibility \n(9.3)\nImplement user training to ensure that \nusers have been taught good security \npractices in the selection and use of \npasswords.\nAccess Control\nNetwork Access \nControl (9.4)\nImplement procedures to ensure that \nnetwork and computer services that \ncan be accessed by an individual user \nor from a particular terminal are \nconsistent with business access \ncontrol policy.\nAccess Control\nOperating System \nAccess Control \n(9.5)\nImplement standards for automatic \nterminal identification to authenticate \nconnections to specific locations.\nAccess Control\nApplication \nAccess Control \n(9.6)\nImplement procedures to restrict access \nto applications system data and \nfunctions in accordance with defined \naccess policy and based on individual \nrequirements.\nAccess Control\nMonitoring \nSystem Access \nand Use (9.7)\nImplement standards to have audit trails \nrecord exceptions and other security-\nrelevant information, and that they are \nmaintained to assist in future investiga-\ntions and in access control monitoring.\nAccess Control\nRemote Access \nand \nTelecommuting \n(9.8)\nImplement a formal policy and \nsupporting standards that address the \nrisks of working with mobile \ncomputing facilities, including re-\nquirements for physical protection, \naccess controls, cryptographic tech-\nniques, backup, and virus protection.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 216,
            "text": "TABLE 8.3 (continued)\nControl List using ISO 17799\nISO 17799 Section\nCategory\nControl Description\nSystems \nDevelopment \nand \nMaintenance\nSecurity \nRequirements of \nSystems (10.1)\nImplement standards to ensure that \nanalysis of security requirements is \npart of the requirement analysis stage \nof each development project.\nSystems \nDevelopment \nand \nMaintenance\nSecurity in \nApplication \nSystems (10.2)\nImplement standards to ensure that \ndata input into applications systems is \nvalidated to ensure that it is correct \nand appropriate.\nSystems \nDevelopment \nand \nMaintenance\nCryptography \n(10.3)\nImplement policies and standards on \nthe use of cryptographic controls, \nincluding management of encryption \nkeys, and effective implementation.\nSystems \nDevelopment \nand \nMaintenance\nSecurity of System \nFiles (10.4)\nImplement standards. Is there strict \ncontrol exercised over the \nimplementation of software on \noperational systems?\nSystems \nDevelopment \nand \nMaintenance\nSecurity in \nDevelopment \nand Support \nEnvironments \n(10.5)\nImplement standards and procedures \nfor formal change control \nprocedures.\nBusiness \nContinuity \nManagement\nAspects of \nBusiness \nContinuity \nPlanning (11.1)\nImplement procedures for the \ndevelopment and maintenance of \nbusiness continuity plans across the \norganization.\nCompliance\nCompliance \nwith Legal \nRequirements \n(12.1)\nImplement standards to ensure that all \nrelevant statutory, regulatory, and \ncontractual requirements are \nspecifically defined and documented \nfor each information system.\nCompliance\nReviews of \nSecurity Policy \nand Technical \nCompliances \n(12.2)\nImplement standards to ensure that all \nareas within the organization are \nconsidered for regular review to \nensure compliance with security \npolicies and standards.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 217,
            "text": "TABLE 8.4\nHIPAA Controls List\nControl \nNumber\nHIPAA Section\nCategory\nControl Description\nAdministrative\n1\nRisk Analysis\nSecurity \nManagement \nProcess\nConduct an accurate and \nthorough assessment of the \npotential risks and vulner-\nabilities to the confidentiality, \nintegrity, and availability of \nElectronically Protected \nHealth Information (EPHI).\n2\nRisk \nManagement\nSecurity \nManagement \nProcess\nImplement security measures \nsufficient to reduce risks and \nvulnerabilities to a reasonable \nand appropriate level.\n3\nSanction Policy\nSecurity \nManagement \nProcess\nApply appropriate sanctions \nagainst workforce members \nwho fail to comply with the \nsecurity policies and proce-\ndures of the covered entity.\n4\nInformation \nSystem Activity \nReview\nSecurity \nManagement \nProcess\nImplement procedures to \nregularly review records of \ninformation systems activity.\n5\nPrivacy Officer\nAssigned \nSecurity \nResponsibility\nIdentify a single person \nresponsible for the \ndevelopment and \nimplementation of the policies \nand procedures supporting \nHIPAA compliance.\n6\nAuthorization/\nSupervision\nWorkforce \nSecurity\nImplement procedures for the \nauthorization and supervision \nof workforce members who \nwork with EPHI or in locations \nwhere it might be accessed.\n7\nWorkforce \nClearance \nProcedure\nWorkforce \nSecurity\nImplement procedures to \ndetermine that the access of a \nworkforce member to EPHI is \nappropriate.\n8\nTermination \nProcedure\nWorkforce \nSecurity\nImplement procedures for \nterminating access to EPHI \nwhen the employment of a \nworkforce member ends or as \nrequired by access \nauthorization policies.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 218,
            "text": "TABLE 8.4 (continued)\nHIPAA Controls List\nControl \nNumber\nHIPAA Section\nCategory\nControl Description\n9\nIsolate \nHealthcare \nClearinghouse \nFunctions\nInformation \nAccess \nManagement\nIf a Covered Entity (CE) \noperates a healthcare \nclearinghouse, it must \nimplement policies and \nprocedures to protect the \nEPHI maintained by the \nclearinghouse from \nunauthorized access by the \nlarger organization.\n10\nAccess \nAuthorization\nInformation \nAccess \nManagement\nImplement policies and \nprocedures for granting access \nto EPHI, for example, through \naccess to a workstation, \ntransaction, program, process, \nor other mechanism.\n11\nAccess \nEstablishment \nand \nModification\nInformation \nAccess \nManagement\nImplement policies and \nprocedures that, based on the \nentity’s access authorization \npolicies, establish, document, \nreview, and modify a user’s \nright of access to a \nworkstation, transaction, \nprogram, or process.\n12\nSecurity \nReminders\nSecurity \nAwareness \nand Training\nImplement a security \nawareness and training \nprogram for all members of \nthe workforce, including \nmanagement.\n13\nProtection from \nMalicious \nSoftware\nSecurity \nAwareness \nand Training\nPeriodic security reminders.\n14\nLog-in \nMonitoring\nSecurity \nAwareness \nand Training\nProcedures guarding against, \ndetecting, and reporting \nmalicious software.\n15\nPassword \nManagement\nSecurity \nAwareness \nand Training\nProcedures to monitor log-in \nattempts and report \ndiscrepancies.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 219,
            "text": "TABLE 8.4 (continued)\nHIPAA Controls List\nControl \nNumber\nHIPAA Section\nCategory\nControl Description\n16\nResponse and \nReporting\nSecurity \nIncident \nProcedures\nIdentify and respond to \nsuspected or known security \nincidents; mitigate, to the \nextent practicable, harmful \neffects of the security \nincidents that are known to \nthe CE; and document security \nincidents and their outcomes.\n17\nData Backup\nContingency \nPlan\nEstablish and implement \nprocedures to create and \nmaintain retrievable exact \ncopies of EPHI.\n18\nDisaster \nRecovery Plan\nContingency \nPlan\nEstablish (and implement as \nneeded) procedures to restore \nany loss of data.\n19\nEmergency \nMode \nOperations \nPlan\nContingency \nPlan\nEstablish (and implement as \nneeded) procedures to enable \ncontinuation of critical \nbusiness processes to assure \naccess to EPHI and to provide \nfor adequate protection of \nEPHI while operating in \nemergency mode.\n20\nTesting and \nRevision \nProcedures\nContingency \nPlan\nImplement procedures for \nperiodic testing and revision \nof contingency plans.\n21\nApplications \nand Data \nCriticality\nContingency \nPlan\nAssess the relative criticality of \nspecific applications and data \nin support of other \ncontingency plan \ncomponents.\nPhysical Safeguards\n22\nContingency \nOperations\nFacility Access \nControl\nEstablish (and implement as \nneeded) procedures that allow \nfacility access in support of \nrestoration of lost data under \nthe disaster recovery plan and \nemergency mode operations \nplan in the event of an \nemergency.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 220,
            "text": "TABLE 8.4 (continued)\nHIPAA Controls List\nControl \nNumber\nHIPAA Section\nCategory\nControl Description\n23\nFacility Security \nPlan\nFacility Access \nControl\nImplement policies and \nprocedures to safeguard the \nfacility and the equipment \ntherein from unauthorized \nphysical access, tampering, \nand theft.\n24\nAccess Control \nand Validation \nProcedures\nFacility Access \nControl\nImplement procedures to \ncontrol and validate a person’s \naccess to facilities based on \ntheir role or function, \nincluding visitor control, and \ncontrol of access to software \nprograms for testing and \nrevision.\n25\nMaintenance \nRecords\nFacility Access \nControl\nImplement policies and \nprocedures to document \nrepairs and modifications to \nthe physical components of a \nfacility that are related to \nsecurity.\n26\nWorkstation \nSecurity\nWorkstation \nUse\nImplement physical safeguards \nfor all workstations that access \nEPHI to restrict access to \nauthorized users.\n27\nDisposal\nDevice and \nMedia \nControl\nImplement policies and \nprocedures to address the \nfinal disposition of EPHI and \nthe hardware or electronic \nmedia on which it is stored.\n28\nMedia Re-use\nDevice and \nMedia \nControl\nImplement procedures for \nremoval of EPHI from \nelectronic media prior to re-\nuse.\n29\nAccountability\nDevice and \nMedia \nControl\nMaintain a record of the \nmovement of hardware and \nsoftware and any person \nresponsible for movement.\n30\nData Backup \nand Storage\nDevice and \nMedia \nControl\nCreate a retrievable, exact copy \nof EPHI, when needed, prior to \nmoving equipment.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 221,
            "text": "TABLE 8.4 (continued)\nHIPAA Controls List\nControl \nNumber\nHIPAA Section\nCategory\nControl Description\nTechnical Safeguards\n31\nUnique User \nIdentification\nAccess Control\nAssign a unique name and \nnumber for identifying and \ntracking user identity.\n32\nEmergency \nAccess \nProcedure\nAccess Control\nEstablish (and implement as \nneeded) procedures for \nobtaining necessary EPHI \nduring an emergency.\n33\nAutomatic \nLogoff\nAccess Control\nImplement electronic \nprocedures that terminate an \nelectronic session after a \npredetermined time of \ninactivity.\n34\nEncryption and \nDecryption\nAccess Control\nImplement a mechanism to \nencrypt and decrypt EPHI.\n35\nIntegrity\nAudit Controls\nImplement policies and \nprocedures to protect EPHI \nfrom improper alteration or \ndestruction.\n36\nBusiness \nAssociate \nContracts\nTransmission \nSecurity\nThe contract between the CE \nand its BA must meet the \n[following] requirements, as \napplicable:\nA CE is not in compliance if it \nknew of a pattern of activity or \npractice of the BA that \nconstituted a material breach \nor violation of the BA’s \nobligation under the contract, \nunless the CE took reasonable \nsteps to cure the breach or end \nthe violation and, if such steps \nwere unsuccessful, to:\n(A) terminate the contract, if \nfeasible; or\n(B) report the problem to the \nSecretary of HHS, if not.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 222,
            "text": "TABLE 8.4 (continued)\nHIPAA Controls List\nControl \nNumber\nHIPAA Section\nCategory\nControl Description\n37\nDocumentation\nPolicies and \nProcedures\nMaintain the policies and \nprocedures required by the \nsecurity rule in writing which \nmay be electronic; and if an \naction, activity, or assessment \nis required to be documented, \nmaintain a written record, \nwhich may be electronic.\n38\nTime Limit\nPolicies and \nProcedures\nRetain the documentation \nrequired by the Security Rule \nfor six years from the date of \nits creation or the date when it \nwas last in effect, whichever is \nlater.\n39\nAvailability\nPolicies and \nProcedures\nMake documentation available \nto those persons responsible \nfor implementing the \nprocedures to which the \ndocumentation pertains.\n40\nUpdates\nReview documentation \nperiodically, and update as \nneeded, in response to \nenvironmental and \noperational changes affecting \nthe security of the EPHI.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 223,
            "text": "Chapter 9\nBusiness Continuity \nPlanning\n9.1 Overview\nBusiness continuity planning is the process of ensuring that your organi-\nzation can continue doing business even when its normal facilities or\nplace of business is unavailable. In earlier years, many companies under-\ntook what they called “disaster recovery planning” — which was nothing\nmore than making sure that their computer operations could be resumed\nas quickly as necessary when the data center was unavailable. When\ncompanies tested their “disaster recovery plans,” some of them realized\nthat being able to recover data center operations was all very well but\npointless if the organization’s offices and other places of business — where\nthe functions provided by the data center were used — were also\nunavailable.\nBusiness continuity plans should certainly contain plans for recovering\nthe functionality of the data center, but the focus of a business continuity\nplan must be to return the organization to a “business as usual” state (or\nas close to it as possible) as quickly as possible after a disruptive event.\nDisruptive events can indeed be catastrophic — as indicated by the old\ntitle of “disaster recovery plan” or in such instances as what occurred at\nthe World Trade Center in 2001 — but are more frequently mundane in\ncharacter. For example, one company I know of had its front-office (as\nopposed to data center) operations interrupted by a lightning strike on\nan electricity transformer on the corner of the block. Hardly a “disaster”\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 224,
            "text": "in itself, but it did interrupt the electricity supply to the building, which\nthe local fire marshal promptly evacuated, requiring the company to enact\nits business continuity plan.\nBusiness continuity plans are notoriously difficult to sell to senior\nmanagement, and that is a cause for frustration among information security\nprofessionals. Creating and testing a business continuity plan (BCP) is a\nvery significant commitment of resources, and many executives take a\nwait-and-see approach to dealing with the risk of business interruption.\nSome organization managers (in some cases quite rightly) take the position\nthat the organization’s insurance coverage will provide in the event of an\ninterruption of normal business processes; but in most cases, no amount\nof insurance payment will compensate for the loss of a business that was\nslow to or failed to recover after a business interruption.\nAn approach to convincing reluctant organization managers to under-\ntake business continuity planning is to break the process into components\nand “sell” each component on its own values. This chapter examines the\ncomponents of a business continuity plan. It should be noted here that\nthis chapter is not an exhaustive guide to business continuity planning.\nThere are many fine organizations and publications dedicated to this\nactivity, and this chapter is meant only as a guide to the most common\nand necessary components of the business continuity planning process.\n9.2 Business Continuity Planning Policy\nAll components of an information security program depend for their\nlegitimacy on a policy statement that says, in effect, that “the organization\nwill do this and will do it because….” Business continuity planning policy\nmust serve the same purpose and must conform to the same requirements\nas every other information security policy.\nA policy is a high-level statement of beliefs and objectives for the\nenterprise. Because it is high level, it must be brief; and being brief\nincreases its readability. When writing a policy, it is as dangerous to say\ntoo much as it is to say too little. An organization’s policy will almost\ncertainly go through a rigorous process of review and comment by the\norganization’s senior management. That process is time consuming and\ntherefore costly, and it drives us to make sure that the process is invoked\nas seldom as possible. The implication is that a policy must be as close\nto timeless as possible. In other words, the contents of the policy should\nremain unchanged for as long as possible. This contributes a reason for\nthe policy to be brief — the more content included in a policy, the more\nlikely it is that the policy will need change.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 225,
            "text": "A business continuity planning policy should be easy to understand\n(it is sometimes suggested that our audience’s comprehension level is\nsixth grade) and should be applicable to the organization for which it is\nwritten — it should describe the needs of the organization and not simply\nbe a generic statement of BCP requirements. The BCP policy should be\nenforceable; it should not contain only statements of “motherhood and\napple pie” sentimentality but should use language that allows measurement\nof compliance. The policy should also clearly support the business objec-\ntives of the organization.\nThe actual format of the policy will depend on what policies normally\nlook like in your organization. This is important because the policy must\nbe reviewed, and those who are reviewing it will have a problem if it\ndoes not immediately look like other policies in the enterprise.\nIn general, a policy should contain four sections:\n1.\nPolicy statement\n2.\nScope\n3.\nResponsibilities\n4.\nCompliance\n9.2.1\nPolicy Statement\nThis is where we say what our policy is regarding business continuity\nplanning. It may seem too obvious to be worth explaining, but a remarkable\nnumber of organizations do publish “policies” that lack any discernable\nstatement of what the policy actually is.\n9.2.2\nScope\nThe scope establishes to whom the policy applies. Very often, the scope\nsays nothing more than “all employees” but some policies require more\ndetail — for example, when the policy applies in different ways depending\non whether employees are full-time, contract, or temporary.\n9.2.3\nResponsibilities\nHere the policy states “who does what” in relation to applying the policy\nthroughout the organization. It is advisable that, when talking about\nresponsibilities, we stay away from naming individuals and stick to talking\nabout positions — Senior Management, Information Security, etc.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 226,
            "text": "9.2.4\nCompliance\nThis is a statement of how compliance with the policy is going to be\nmeasured and, equally important, a statement of what will happen when\nnoncompliance or willful breach of a policy is discovered.\nTaking all of the above, a business continuity planning policy for your\norganization might look like that one in Table 9.1.\n9.3 Conducting a Business Impact Analysis (BIA)\nHaving said that there are many excellent sources of information on\nbusiness continuity planning, business impact analysis (BIA) is such an\nimportant part of “getting it right” in continuity planning that we should\nlook at it in detail here.\nWe conduct BIAs to find out the “maximum tolerable outage” for each\nof our organization’s business processes. That is, we need to know — for\neach business process — the maximum length of time the organization\ncan tolerate being without the process before its absence has a significant\nimpact on our ability to continue to do business. Establishing the “max-\nimum tolerable outage” for a business process is the same as establishing\nthe recovery time objective — which, in turn, will be an input when we\nstart to choose what our continuity planning strategy will be. (Continuity\nplanning strategy, while not discussed in this book, is the process of using\nthe output of the BIA to determine whether we will base our continuity\nplans on a “hot” — or fully equipped and ready to go — site or some\nother, less fully equipped version.)\nThe methods for conducting a BIA can be many and varied; thus, in\nthis book we discuss the most basic method: individual interviewing and\ninformation collation. There are some prerequisites for the interview\nprocess, however; steps we must take to make sure that the process goes\nsmoothly and that the information produced by the interviews is accepted\nas valid.\n9.3.1\nIdentify Sponsor(s)\nWe need a sponsor for the BIA as we will be taking up time with members\nof staff in every business department (or a number of departments in a\nlimited-scope BIA). The sponsor must carry some authority over the\norganization (or the part of the organization we will examine) so that he\nor she can require cooperation with the BIA process. The sponsor is also\ninvolved in reviewing the results of the BIA and in testing the results for\n“sanity.”\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 227,
            "text": "TABLE 9.1\nSample BCP Policy\nPolicy:\nIt is the policy of the (organization name) that it will create and maintain a\nBusiness Continuity Plan that will ensure the ability to continue to operate in\nthe event that access to normal business facilities is denied for any reason\nother than lawful intervention. The following measures will support those\nplans:\n\u0001\nA process to develop and maintain business continuity plans across the\norganization is in place.\n\u0001\n(Organization name) will maintain a single business continuity plan\nframework to ensure that all levels of the plan are consistent, and to\nidentify priorities for testing and maintenance.\n\u0001\n(Organization name) will carry out regular tests of business continuity\nplans — as defined in the standards that support this policy — to ensure\nthat they are effective.\n\u0001\nRegular updates to the business continuity plan will be carried out to\nprotect the investment in developing the initial plan, and to ensure its\ncontinuing effectiveness.\nScope:\nThis policy applies to all business operations of (organization name). It is\nintended that each business unit — defined at the level of those units managed\nby a Vice President — create and maintain its own business continuity plan\nand make sure it is compatible with the overall business continuity plan of\n(organization name).\nResponsibilities:\n(Organization name) officers and senior management have the responsibility\nto ensure that the measures listed in the policy statement are implemented\neffectively.\nCompliance:\n(Organization name) officers and senior management are required to ensure\nthat internal audit mechanisms exist to monitor and measure compliance with\nthis policy.\n(Organization name) line management has the responsibility to communi-\ncate the content of this policy, to measure compliance with this policy, and to\ntake appropriate action in areas of noncompliance.\nAll (organization name) employees, regardless of their status (permanent,\npart-time, contract, etc.), are required to comply with this policy. Failure to\ncomply with this policy will lead to disciplinary measures that may include\ndismissal.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 228,
            "text": "9.3.2\nScope\nMany organizations are too large to conduct a BIA for every unit in the\nenterprise at roughly the same time. Where that is the case, we must\nidentify which business units are going to participate in the BIA and —\nhaving acquired a sponsor with authority over those business units —\nclearly define the boundaries of the units and, by doing so, define the\nboundaries of the BIA. The boundaries can be defined by physical limits\nsuch as a specific location, by points in the business process (for example,\nwhen an invoice leaves a unit where it has been approved and goes to\na unit where it can be processed for payment), or by organizational\nauthority — perhaps all of the business units that report to a specific\nmanager or officer of the organization.\n9.3.3\nInformation Meeting\nHaving defined the scope of the BIA, the next step is to prepare and\ndeliver information about the BIA to the management of the business\nunit(s) that will be participating. The information meeting should tell\nmanagers — in detail — what is going to happen (how the BIA will be\nconducted), what is required (the kind of information that will be gath-\nered), what will be done with the information gathered and what the\nmanagers need to do — which is passed on to their staff — with what\nthey have learned in the information meeting and to nominate appropriate\nstaff to participate in the BIA. \n9.3.4\nInformation Gathering\nThe success of the BIA depends on gathering accurate information about\nthe business processes in the organization. To gather accurate information,\nwe must learn as much about the organization as we can before beginning\nthe BIA. This means gathering as much of the following as possible:\n\u0001\nOrganization and people: organization charts and other information\nthat identifies people and what they do; telephone directories can\nbe helpful.\n\u0001\nLocations and numbers: maps of physical locations and the number\nof people working at each location.\n\u0001\nConstraints: an understanding of any constraints on the BIA, such\nas times of the day or week when it is not convenient to schedule\ninterviews.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 229,
            "text": "9.3.5\nQuestionnaire Design\nOnce the sponsor and scope of the BIA have been identified and the\ninitial information meeting held, we can begin to design the questionnaire\nthat we will use during the BIA. The use of a questionnaire is critical\nbecause it ensures that everyone participating will be answering the same\nset of questions about their business; and if we prepare questionnaire\nsupport documents correctly, everyone will receive the same set of help\nand instructions on how to answer the questions.\nA simple BIA questionnaire is included in this chapter. In this question-\nnaire, respondents are asked to complete information about themselves,\nthe department in which they work, and the business function they are\nabout to describe. It follows then that a separate questionnaire must be\ncompleted for each business function included in the scope of the BIA.\nThe next part of the questionnaire deals with business processes —\nagain implying that a form must be completed for each business process\nin each department in the scope. The questionnaire asks the respondent\nto describe each business process, how often the process is performed\n(hourly, daily, etc.), and what critical time periods exist for each process.\nThis last section requires that the respondent complete information on\ntimes that are particularly important to the completion of each process,\nsuch as closing dates for payroll entry, lead times for check printing, etc.\nThe questionnaire asks the respondent to give an indication of the\nlength of time the organization could continue to function without this\nbusiness process. Here, the respondent is being asked to judge what\nwould happen if the process did not execute for given periods of time\n(four hours, twelve hours, etc.). It is important that the respondent is\nencouraged to think about the process from end-to-end — that is, the\nimpact on the organization if the process did not happen at all — as we\ndo not intend to do the BIA on a lower lever of granularity than the\nprocess as a whole.\nFinally, the questionnaire requires the respondent to list resources\nrequired to carry out the process in normal business circumstances and\nthose required to carry out the process in a recovery situation. While\nthese two entries may often be the same, they are sometimes not; and\nidentifying the times when they are different can be a difficult process.\nThis process is discussed more fully in the section entitled “Conducting\nInterviews” (Section 9.3.7).\nMore complex BIA questionnaires can be used to gather more infor-\nmation and produce more detailed information on the criticality of business\nprocesses. For example, a complex BIA questionnaire — in addition to the\ninformation gathered on the simple one — might ask for information on:\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 230,
            "text": "\u0001\nService level agreements to which the process in question must\nbe performed\n\u0001\nThe financial impact of the failure to perform the process\n\u0001\nThe financial contribution made to the organization by the perfor-\nmance of the process\n\u0001\nThe nonfinancial impacts (organization image, customer confi-\ndence, etc.) of the failure to perform the process\n\u0001\nThe dependencies that exist between the process in question and\nother processes or functions\n\u0001\nThe IT applications used in the process\n9.3.6\nScheduling the Interviews\nWhen preparatory steps are being completed, we need to consider a few\nthings about scheduling the interviews themselves. The first thing to\nconsider is the impact on the staff. A comprehensive BIA will rely on\nresponses from a large number of staff members and, because BIA\ninterviews can take a significant amount of time, careful scheduling is\nrequired to avoid compromising the ability of a business unit to carry out\nits business while interviews are going on.\nAt this point, the remainder of the BIA consists of conducting inter-\nviews, tabulating the results of those interviews, and presenting those\nresults; thus, it might be worthwhile pausing to take a look at a graphic\nthat represents the process so far. The graphic is shown in Figure 9.1.\nFIGURE 9.1\nBIA Partial Process\nIdentify BIA Sponsors\nDefine Scope of BIA\nConduct Information Meeting\nInformation Gathering\nQuestionnaire Design\nSchedule Interviews\nIdentify BIA Sponsors\nDefine Scope of BIA\nConduct Information Meeting\nInformation Gathering\nQuestionnaire Design\nSchedule Interviews\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 231,
            "text": "9.3.7\nConducting Interviews\nPrior to scheduling and conducting BIA interviews, we should have\nidentified the sponsor of the BIA and, through information meetings,\nequipped business unit managers to inform all who will be involved in\nthe BIA of what will happen and what is expected of them.\nIn addition, it is important that we equip ourselves with a meaningful\nquestionnaire for the BIA — along with supporting documents that explain\nthe purpose of the BIA and how to answer the questions. We should have\nprovided a copy of the BIA questionnaire and instructions — in advance of\nthe interview — to everyone who will be asked to complete a questionnaire.\nThe purpose of the interview is to complete the questionnaire. During\nthe interview, it may be necessary to take notes in addition to the\ninformation gathered on the questionnaire — as the perfect questionnaire\nhas yet to be designed. The notes might comment on such things as peak\nprocessing times, critical periods in the process, and the resources needed\nto recover the process.\nThe subject of resources may be the most difficult part of the interview.\nWhen asked to count the number of people, for example, who are\nnecessary to conduct the process in normal business circumstances and\nthen to estimate the number necessary to conduct the process in a recovery\nsituation, the interview subject might be tempted to give the same number.\nReasons for this might include an unwillingness to give the impression\nthat the process is currently overstaffed. It is helpful, at this stage in the\ninterview, to ask the interview subject to imagine that a recovery situation\nwould require less interaction with staff from other departments or having\ntheir staff work a slightly longer day than is necessary.\n9.3.8\nTabulating the Information\nIt is important that the information gathered from the interview be tabu-\nlated as soon as possible after concluding the interview. It is human nature\nto decide to take a note of some detail, believing that we will surely\nremember it, and then forget it if we allow too much time to elapse\nbetween the interview and tabulating the results of the interview.\nTabulating the information from the interviews should include produc-\ning summary sheets showing a list of the processes analyzed and the\nrelative criticality of each. How to show the relative criticality is a matter\nof choice (ranked by maximum allowable outage, ranked in ABC order,\nassigned a numerical value) and is less important than explaining the\nmeaning of the rankings to all involved.\nResults must be tabulated in a number of different ways for different\npurposes during the remainder of the continuity planning process. For\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 232,
            "text": "example, at some point in the process of deciding on a continuity strategy,\nwe will have to tabulate the resources required for each process. However,\nthe two most common needs for tabulated data are to show the business\nprocesses ranked by maximum tolerable outage and to show the business\nprocesses supported by each IT service. An example of each of these\ntables is shown in Table 9.2.\n9.3.9\nPresenting the Results\nThe tabulated results (see Table 9.3) of the interviews should be reported\nback to each interview participant, and participants should be asked to\nverify that the results fairly show the information they gave.\nTABLE 9.2\nBusiness Processes by Maximum Tolerable Outage\nBusiness Unit\nMaximum \nTolerable \nOutage\nBusiness Process\nIT Service\nWire transfer\n0 hours\nRetail account \nfunds transfer\nWide area network\nSWIFT terminal\nAccount maintenance\n0 hours\nReconciliation\nAccount balance\nAccount \nenquiries\n8 hours\nAccount enquiries\nWide area network\nAccount balance\nTABLE 9.3\nTabulated Results — Business Processes by IT Service\nIT Service\nBusiness Unit\nTime-Critical \nBusiness Function\nMaximum \nTolerable \nDowntime\nWide area network\nWire Transfer\nRetail account \nfunds transfer\n0 hours\nReconciliation\n0 hours\nAccount enquiries\nAccount enquiries\n8 hours\nSWIFT terminal\nWire Transfer\nRetail account \nfunds transfer\n0 hours\nAccount \nmaintenance\nWire Transfer\nRetail account \nfunds transfer\n0 hours\nAccount balance\nWire Transfer\nReconciliation\n0 hours\nAccount enquiries\nAccount enquiries\n8 hours\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 233,
            "text": "When the results have been verified by the interview subjects, the\nentire tabulation should be presented to the BIA sponsor, who will be\ninvited to review the results in light of his or her knowledge of the\nbusiness carried out by the departments analyzed. It is not uncommon\nfor this review to result in a revisitation of some parts of the interview\nprocess, as the sponsor may be able to lend a better perspective to the\nrelative importance of the various business processes involved and the\nresources estimated in the BIA.\nWhen the results have been reviewed, revisited if necessary, and then\nretabulated, they can be presented to the sponsor once again and used\nas input to the next step of the BCP process — the strategy selection.\nOnce again, there are many excellent works discussing strategy selection\nand therefore that detail of BCP will not be discussed here.\nTo revisit, when the interviews have been concluded and the results\ntabulated and presented, the entire BIA process can be represented by\nthe graphic shown in Figure 9.2.\n9.4 Preventive Controls\nAnother fundamental part of business continuity planning is preventive\ncontrols. Every organization should do some kind of business continuity\nFIGURE 9.2\nThe BIA Process\nIdentify BIA Sponsors\nDefine Scope of BIA\nConduct Information Meeting\nInformation Gathering\nQuestionnaire Design\nSchedule Interviews\nConduct Interviews\nTabulate Information\nPresent Results\nIdentify BIA Sponsors\nDefine Scope of BIA\nConduct Information Meeting\nInformation Gathering\nQuestionnaire Design\nSchedule Interviews\nConduct Interviews\nTabulate Information\nPresent Results\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 234,
            "text": "planning; but for some, that will take no other form of examining their\npreventive controls and, having deemed them to be sufficient, do nothing\nelse. \nHaving performed a business impact analysis (BIA), the next major step\nin business continuity planning (BCP) is to use the information from the\nBIA as input to our selection of a strategy for recovering critical business\nprocesses. Along the way, and before we select our strategy, it is necessary\nto recognize what preventive controls exist in our organization — controls\nthat might save us money and effort when we pursue our BCP strategy.\nThe types of preventive controls we are looking for include:\n\u0001\nInformation security controls\n\u0001\nEnvironmental security\n\u0001\nPhysical security\n\u0001\nDisaster recovery plans (i.e., existing plans to recovery IT capabilities)\n\u0001\nInformation security awareness programs\nIt should be noted here that some works list insurance as a preventive\ncontrol. Strictly speaking, insurance is not a preventive control but a\ncompensatory control, as having insurance does not reduce the risk of\nanything happening; it simply reduces the financial impact after an event.\nIn examining preventive controls, we will have to gather evidence of\nthe existence and nature of the controls and to do that we will be looking\nfor documents and talking to key people. Table 9.4 sets out the kind of\ndata we are looking for and the key people to whom we should be talking.\nInformation about preventive controls (and, indeed, the compensatory\ncontrol insurance), like the information from the BIA, must be presented\nto the interview subjects and used as input to the next step in the planning\nprocess — strategy selection.\n9.5 Recovery Strategies\nDevelopment of a recovery strategy is the last stage before developing\nthe recovery plan itself. Developing a recovery strategy lends itself well\nto the workshop format because it requires a very effective, real-time\nsharing of information and views. The purpose of the workshop is to\ndetermine which recovery strategy is most appropriate for our organization\nand document that (and the path to our decision) so that the strategy can\nbe approved by senior management (if they are not present at the\nworkshop) and our recovery planners can begin to construct the BCP.\nAttendance at the workshop should be mandatory for every department\nfor which a recovery plan is to be built. It is also desirable that the senior\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 235,
            "text": "management member(s) who will approve the selected recovery strategy\nalso attend the workshop but we recognize the real-word difficulty in\nmaking this happen.\n9.5.1\nHot Site, Cold Site, Warm Site, Mobile Site\nAs the purpose of the recovery strategy workshop is to determine the\nmost appropriate recovery strategy for our organization, before discussing\nthe process for selecting that strategy we should discuss some key terms.\nPart of selecting the recovery strategy will be to determine what type\nof facility we will need to use while executing our recovery plan. Some\nof that determination will be based on our need to recover IT facilities,\nand that need will be dictated by the results of our BIA. Where the BIA\nindicates that certain IT facilities must be available within four hours of\na business interruption, for example, we may be looking at a need for a\nhot site. By the same token, if the first IT system is not needed until 24\nhours after a business interruption, then a warm site may suffice.\nTo explain the differences in these terms and the terms in the heading\nto this section, we will have to look at three aspects of the terms: (1) what\nTABLE 9.4\nPreventive Control Information\nPreventive \nControl\nData Sought\nInterview Subjects\nInformation \nsecurity\nInformation security \npolicies, standards, and \nprocedures\nInformation security \nmanagement, internal audit, \nIT management, selected \nbusiness unit management\nEnvironmental \nsecurity\nFacilities plans and \nenvironmental \ncontrols diagrams\nFacilities management, risk \nmanagement, physical security \nmanagement, data center \nmanagement, internal audit\nPhysical \nsecurity\nFacilities diagrams, \nphysical security \npolicies\nFacilities management, physical \nsecurity management (if \ndifferent than facilities \nmanagement), internal audit\nDisaster \nrecovery plans\nExisting recovery plans, \nplan test reports\nRecovery plan management, \ndata center management, \ninternal audit\nInformation \nsecurity \nawareness\nInformation security \nawareness plans and \nstatus reports, \nawareness materials\nInformation security \nmanagement, internal audit, IT \nmanagement, selected \nbusiness unit management\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 236,
            "text": "the terms mean in relation to the services provided by each; (2) what each\ntype of site costs; and (3) what BIA requirements might demand each type\nof site. For the purposes of these figures, two recovery-site terms are\ncombined into the terms listed. A “mirror” site is an example of a hot site\nwhere data and transactions processed at the original site are also pro-\ncessed, in real-time, at the recovery site. A “mobile” site can be an example\nof any one of the three sites — depending on how the mobile facility is\nequipped — and thus will also not be listed separately.\nTable 9.5 shows characteristics of the three types of sites being con-\nsidered in our recovery strategy selection workshop.\nIn terms of cost — as might be expected — hot site recovery facilities\nare much more expensive than cold site facilities. The ability to walk into\na recovery facility and immediately begin exercising the recovery plan\nrequires an investment in equipment and time that will be recouped by\nthe fees charged to users of the site.\nThe cost of recovery facilities can vary, depending on the type of\nagreement used to secure the site. A purely commercial agreement, in\nwhich our organization (the client) agrees to pay for a recovery site\noperated by a vendor of recovery services, will generally require an up-\nfront fee plus a monthly “subscription” fee, and, in many cases, a fee to\naccess the site when necessary. (Some vendors of recovery site services\nallow a fixed number of “free” accesses for testing recovery plans.)\nAnother type of agreement is a reciprocal agreement: one in which\nour company and a company with similar requirements and facilities agree\nTABLE 9.5\nRecovery Site Characteristics\nRecovery \nSite Type\nCharacteristics\nHot site\nA site equipped with everything necessary to “walk in and resume\nbusiness immediately.” Typically has all the equipment needed\nfor the enterprise to continue operation, including office space\nand furniture, telephones, and computer equipment. In the case\nof a data center hot site, generally equipped with computer\nequipment in a specialized environment, system software, and\napplications. Data may be “mirrored” to the hot site or brought\nin from a backup storage area.\nWarm site\nA site equipped with basic necessities such as office space, fur-\nniture, and telephone jacks. In the case of a data center warm\nsite, generally equipped with computer equipment but not sys-\ntem software, applications, or data.\nCold site\nA site that is a bare workspace, generally providing heat, light,\nand power — but little or nothing else.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 237,
            "text": "to provide each other with space and facilities in which to recover business\nor data processing operations in the event that one company’s facilities\nbecome inaccessible. Of course, this type of agreement is much less\nexpensive than the previous example offered, but consideration must be\ngiven to the practicalities of the recovery situation and testing of recovery\nplans. Many companies enter reciprocal agreements and then find that\nmaintaining their site to accommodate their agreement partners’ recovery\nrequirements is costly and inconvenient. Another inconvenience to con-\nsider is the agreement partner’s need to access our site to test their recovery\nplans (and what disruption that might cause to our “normal” operations\nof the time).\nWhatever the prices of the various options available for recovery\nfacilities, the choice will largely be driven by the results of the BIA. For\nexample, there is little point in choosing the least expensive option for\nrecovery sites (cold site) if the BIA indicates that business operations or data\ncenter operations must be resumed within four hours of interruption —\nfour hours is clearly not long enough to equip a cold site with the furniture,\nequipment, and systems necessary to resume operations for even a small\ncompany. Table 9.6 gives an indication of the thresholds of time that can\nbe met by each type of recovery site. For each entry in the table, we are\nassuming that the recovery requirement is to recover data center operations\n(because these are generally more complex and time consuming than\nother business operations) and that a good standard of backup has been\noperated so that up-to-date applications and data are available for recovery.\n9.5.2\nKey Considerations\nThe objective of the recovery strategy selection workshop is to translate\nthe results of the BIA into requirements for recovery strategy. Whether\nthese are requirements for recovering computing resources or for recov-\nering other business processes, the purpose is to determine the technical\nand human requirements for recovering the ability to carry out the process.\nIn general, there are four areas to consider when choosing a recovery\nstrategy.\nTABLE 9.6\nRecovery Timescales\nRecovery Site\nMust Recover \nCritical Systems In\nHot site\n2–12 hours\nWarm site\n12–24 hours\nCold site\n24 hours or more\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 238,
            "text": "9.5.2.1\nPeople\nFor each critical business process identified in the BIA, we should also\nidentify the number of people necessary to restore that business function,\nthe skill sets that these people should have, and, by default, what people\nor skill sets might not be necessary in a recovery situation. Not all\ndepartments or staff will be necessary to recover most business processes.\n9.5.2.2\nCommunications\n\u0001\nVoice. Phone service is very often a critical resource needed to\nrestore normal business operations. We must know (from the BIA)\nwhat provisions we have to make to not only set up voice com-\nmunications at the recovery site, but also to divert our normal\nphone services from the affected site to the recovery site (so that\ncustomers calling our normal phone numbers are automatically\ndiverted to the phones at the recovery site).\n\u0001\nData. As with phone service, the BIA should provide us with an\nestimate of what is needed — at a recovery site — in terms of\ndata communications. When we determine our recovery strategy\nand select a recovery site, this information will provide specifica-\ntions for the data network that must exist at the recovery site.\n9.5.2.3\nComputing Equipment\n\u0001\nMainframe hardware resources (also includes midrange)\n\u0001\nMainframe data storage requirements, usually expressed in gigabytes\n\u0001\nUnique (i.e., nonstandard) hardware resources\n\u0001\nDepartmental computing needs (e.g., PCs, LANs, WANs)\n\u0001\nDistributed systems\n\u0001\nIT systems supporting E-commerce activities\n9.5.2.4\nFacilities\nOnce the above — and the physical furniture and equipment require-\nments — from the BIA have been calculated, we can use them to define\nthe physical facility requirements.\nThe availability of all these resources must be considered when choos-\ning a recovery strategy. If we are choosing a vendor for a recovery site\n(as opposed to a reciprocal agreement), we must communicate our\nrequirements to selected vendors in a Request for Proposal (RFP) to allow\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 239,
            "text": "the vendors to compete for the business of providing a recovery facility.\nIn the event that we opt for a reciprocal agreement, we will use the\nrequirements we have defined in our recovery strategy selection workshop\nto define the facilities our agreement partner must make available.\n9.6. Plan Construction, Testing, and Maintenance\n9.6.1\nPlan Construction\nWhen a recovery strategy has been selected, work can begin on creating\nthe recovery plan itself. To be more accurate, work will begin on creating\nall the individual recovery plans that go into making up the complete\nrecovery plan.\nThe overall recovery plan for our organization — or the part of the\norganization that was within the scope of the BIA — is a shell or template\nin which we fit the recovery plans of component parts of the organization.\nThe overall recovery plan is managed by the plan manager, who trains\nindividuals in business units to contribute recovery plans for their business\nunits and those recovery plans are in a format that fits the overall recovery\nplan.\nEach business unit’s recovery plan will contain the procedures and\ndocumentation needed for that business unit to resume operations in a\nrecovery facility. With the exception of Facilities Management and IT, each\nbusiness unit’s plans will assume that the recovery facility will be available\nwhen needed and that IT services will be available when needed. It is\nFacilities Management’s and IT’s recovery plans that will ensure that those\nfacilities and services will be available.\nEach recovery plan will be based on elements of information gathered\nduring the BIA:\n\u0001\nInformation about the availability of the recovery facility\n\u0001\nList of critical processes and the maximum tolerable downtime for\neach\n\u0001\nResources (equipment, IT applications, people, supplies, etc.)\nneeded to recover each process\nWe should note here that creating the recovery plan is an activity that\nhas had a high failure rate in the past. This is a staff-intensive, time-\nconsuming process and one that causes some organizations to “lose their\nnerve” before a tested plan has been produced. The best way to prevent\nthis from happening is through successful management that guides the\nprocess and separates it into small, measurable pieces so that progress is\nclearly visible at frequent points.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 240,
            "text": "The plan manager should begin the process by holding workshops to\nintroduce all business unit planners to each other, to the planning process\nand to the help available. Table 9.7 shows a summary of activities\nnecessary to begin to build recovery plans (and Crisis Management Plans,\ndiscussed later).\nThe components of each plan should include the following, where\nappropriate:\n\u0001\nPlan overview and assumptions\n\u0001\nResponsibilities for development, testing, and maintaining the plans\n\u0001\nContinuity team structure and reporting requirements\n\u0001\nDetailed procedures for recovery of time-critical business processes,\ncomputer applications, networks, systems, facilities, etc.\n\u0001\nRecovery locations and emergency operations centers\n\u0001\nEmergency operations communications procedures\n\u0001\nRecovery timeframes\n\u0001\nSupporting inventory information:\n\u0001\nHardware\n\u0001\nSoftware\n\u0001\nNetworks\n\u0001\nData\n\u0001\nPeople\n\u0001\nSpace\n\u0001\nFurniture\n\u0001\nSupplies\n\u0001\nTransportation\n\u0001\nExternal agents\n\u0001\nDocumentation\n\u0001\nData\nIn the workshop, the recovery plan manager should explain what is\nrequired as content for each section of the plan from each business unit\nplanner.\n9.6.1.1\nCrisis Management Plan\nA special subset of the recovery plan is called the Crisis Management plan\nand this refers to the management activity that must be performed when\na recovery is required. In an emergency or recovery situation, the orga-\nnization’s management becomes the crisis management team and is\nresponsible for the following:\n\u0001\nContact emergency services and liaise with them\n\u0001\nSet up communications center\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 241,
            "text": "TABLE 9.7\nSummary Planning Activities\nBusiness Processes\nIT Systems\nCrisis Management\nWorkshop: Business unit \nmanagement develops \ncontinuity team \nstructures for each BU \ninvolved in the effort. \nDevelops activities and \ntasks to recover time-\ncritical BU processes, \nincluding resources \n(workstations, facilities, \nspace, vital records, \npeople, telephones, etc.).\nAssigns activities and \ntasks to BU recovery \nplanning team \nmembers.\nWorkshop: IT \nmanagement develops \ncontinuity team \nstructures and \nactivities and tasks to \nrecover time-critical IT \nresources (apps, nets, \nsystems, etc.).\nAssigns activities and \ntasks to IT recovery \nplanning team \nmembers.\nMeet with senior \nmanagement and \nfacilitate development \nof Crisis Management \nteam structures.\nBU recovery planning \nteam establishes \ncommunications \nprocesses and reporting \ntimeframes.\nIT recovery planning \nteam establishes \ncommunications \nprocesses and \nreporting timeframes.\nAssist senior manage-\nment in development \nof activities and tasks to \nfacilitate management \nof the organization \nthrough an emergen-\ncy/crisis event.\nBU recovery planning \nteam gathers and docu-\nments all inventory \ninformation for those \nresources that support \ntime-critical resources.\nIT recovery planning \nteam gathers and \ndocuments all \ninventory information \nfor those resources \nthat support time-\ncritical resources.\nIdentify and establish \nCrisis Management \nEmergency Operations \nCenter location(s).\nBU recovery planning \nteam develops recovery \nplan as described in \nworkshop.\nIT recovery planning \nteam develops \nrecovery plan as \ndescribed in \nworkshop.\nEstablish communica-\ntions processes and re-\nporting timeframes \nwith IT and business \nunit recovery planning \nteams, as well as with \nexternal communities \n(i.e., shareholders, civil \nauthorities, customers/ \nclients, employee fami-\nlies, press, etc.).\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 242,
            "text": "\u0001\nDamage limitation at the original site\n\u0001\nDamage assessment when the original site is accessible\n\u0001\nOriginal site forensics\n\u0001\nRecovery activity management\n\u0001\nSite restoration plans\n\u0001\nPlans to return processing to original site\n9.6.1.2\nPlan Distribution\nWhen the initial draft of the business unit and IT recovery plans and the\ncrisis management plan have been developed, the drafts should be assem-\nbled into one plan and then distributed to all members of the recovery\nteams.\nThere is a school of thought that says that only the relevant parts of\neach plan should be distributed to teams (crisis management plan to senior\nmanagement, IT plan to IT, etc.), but more good can be created if all\nmembers of all recovery planning teams can see the plans made by others.\nThis is especially important in the early stages of testing, as we shall see\nlater.\nCopies of recovery plans should be kept in three places. Each member\nof each recovery team should have two copies: one to keep at the normal\nplace of work and one to be kept off site (usually at home). A third,\ncomplete copy of the entire recovery plan should be stored at an off-site\nfacility — usually the same facility used to store backup copies of data.\n9.6.2\nPlan Testing\nWhen draft plans have been prepared, each must be tested. This is another\npart of the recovery planning process that is resource-intensive and time\nconsuming but is entirely necessary because no recovery plan was ever\nprepared right the first time. (Indeed, given the changing nature of the\nprocesses to be recovered, it might be said that no recovery plan is ever\nTABLE 9.7 (continued)\nSummary Planning Activities\nBusiness Processes\nIT Systems\nCrisis Management\nDevelop procedures for \nsite management \n(damage limitation, \nforensics, damage \nassessment, return \nplanning, etc.).\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 243,
            "text": "“right” in the sense that it perfectly reflects everything needed to recover\na process at the time recovery is needed. Therefore, repeated testing is\nneeded to keep plans up-to-date and as close to complete as possible.)\n9.6.2.1\nLine Testing\nLine testing is performed when business unit and IT recovery plans and\ncrisis management plans are first drafted. Line testing is nothing more\nthan a review of the draft plans — line by line — by members of the\nrecovery planning teams.\nEach draft plan is read by every member of each recovery planning\nteam and notes are made on inconsistencies and omissions. It makes\nsense, after the first read-through, for all members of the recovery teams\nto gather in a workshop setting to review the notes they have made.\nIn the workshop, whiteboards and flipcharts are used to note the\ncomments made by each team member. The workshop process is that\neach member, in turn, reads aloud their remarks and a scribe — appointed\nby the recovery plan manager — tabulates the comments on whiteboards\nand flipcharts. The scribe takes responsibility for eliminating duplication\nand takes note of the comments of the person who drafted the plan. For\neach remark offered by a plan reviewer (recovery team member), the\nauthor is required to add an action (such as “amend plan accordingly”).\nTable 9.8 provides an example of how the workshop notes might look.\nAt the end of the line testing workshop (or series of workshops if it\nis found necessary to split them up due to time constraints), each recovery\nplan team amends its plan to incorporate the remarks made in the\nworkshop. The second level of testing will be performed on the next draft\nversion of the plans.\n9.6.2.2\nWalk-Through Testing\nWhen an initial draft of the plan has been reviewed and amended, a\nsecond type of test — walk-through testing — can be performed.\nLike line testing, walk-through testing is conducted in a workshop\nsetting and will most likely require a series of workshops because this\ntype of testing is time consuming. Each business unit’s (or IT or crisis\nmanagement) recovery plan is “acted out” around a workshop. The\npurpose of this type of testing is to locate and resolve timing issues in\nplans and requires each recovery planning team to simultaneously review\ntheir plans’ timing requirements. For example, it may be found that a\nbusiness process’ recovery depends on the availability of IT systems that\nhave not had time to be recovered by the time they are required by the\nbusiness process.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 244,
            "text": "Like the line testing workshop, the walk-through testing workshop\nshould produce a table of remarks and actions that can be used by planners\nto refine and improve their draft plans.\n9.6.2.3\nSingle Process Testing\nThe next step in the testing process is testing the ability to recover a\nsingle process (or in an IT test to test the recovery of the operating system\nor single application). Some organizations forego this step and, instead,\ngo to multiple process testing — perhaps testing the recovery of a small\nnumber of processes or applications.\nThis test is an actual test of relocating to a recovery site. The test\nshould be scheduled with care and should involve the actual execution\nof the test plans.\nIn this, as in more complex tests of the recovery plans, audit is\ninvaluable. In every test of the plans from this point on, people should\nTABLE 9.8\nLine Testing Review Table\nBack-Office Process Recovery Plan\nPlan Section\nRemark\nAuthor’s \nComment\nAuthor’s Action\nRecovery \ntimeframes\nProcess #3 does not \nreflect the recovery \ntimeframe listed in \nthe BIA\nRecovery \ntimeframe has \nbeen \nreviewed \nsince the BIA\nAmend original \nBIA data\nPeople\nProcess #5 requires \nthe participation of \nmembers of staff \nwho will be required \nat that time to \nrecover process #3\nLack of \nadequate \nskills\nReview recovery \ntimeframe or \ninitiate training \nfor additional \nmember of staff\nTransportation\nNo plan has been \nmade to transport \nstaff from original \nsite to recovery site\nOmission\nAdd to second \ndraft of plan\nExternal \nagents\nProcess #5 requires \nthe participation of \ncheck stock \nsuppliers\nIntention is to \nrely on \ncurrent stocks\nReview current \nstock levels and \nlikely recovery \ntimes and amend \nplan if necessary\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 245,
            "text": "be available for no other purpose than to audit the test (Internal Audit\noften fulfills this duty) and to provide notes and observations at a meeting\nafter the test is over (often referred to as the post-mortem). The notes\nand observations are used in the same way that the Line Testing Review\nTable (Table 9.8) is used — to provide the input for correcting errors and\nomissions in the recovery plans that have been tested.\n9.6.2.4\nFull Testing\nWhen a number of single process tests have been conducted and confi-\ndence has grown about the ability to test, then the organization is ready\nto schedule and carry out a test of the entire recovery plan. In practice,\norganizations that have large, complex recovery plans tend to test groups\nof processes or applications recovery as testing the complete recovery\nplan can be extremely disruptive to normal operations. However, it is\nnecessary to test the complete plan at least once a year.\nFull tests, like single process testing, are carried out at the recovery\nfacility and try as far as possible to replicate the conditions that will be\nfound in an actual recovery situation.\n9.6.2.5\nPlan Testing Summary\nTable 9.9 shows a summary of the considerations and actions that must\nbe taken to plan and conduct single process and full recovery tests.\n9.6.3\nPlan Maintenance\nRecovery plans should be tested in some form twice each year. Whether\nthat form is a walk-through test or a full test depends on the resources\navailable to the organization, but a full test (once the plan is fully\ndeveloped and has gone through the line, walk-through, and single\nprocess tests) should be performed once per year because testing is the\nmost effective way to perform plan maintenance.\nHowever, business processes and IT configurations change more fre-\nquently than once or twice per year, and each change makes the recovery\nplan out of date. Therefore, a method must be found to update plans\nbetween tests.\nThe plan manager, each month, should poll every recovery planner\nfor updates to their individual plans and incorporate those updates in the\noverall recovery plan. Once per month, the plan manager should send\nout a notice to each recovery planner and ask for updates. Generally, the\nupdates will contain the following sections:\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 246,
            "text": "\u0001\nDetailed procedures for recovery of time-critical business processes,\ncomputer applications, networks, systems, facilities, etc.\n\u0001\nRecovery timeframes\n\u0001\nSupporting inventory information:\n\u0001\nHardware\n\u0001\nSoftware\n\u0001\nNetworks\n\u0001\nData\n\u0001\nPeople\nIt should be noted that the plan manager should not allow non-\nresponse to the request for updates. Nonresponse may mean that the\nrequest was not received or that the recovery planner has simply been\ntoo busy to prepare the response. Each recovery planner must be required\nto send a response — even if the response is “No update.”\nWhen all responses have been received, the plan manager updates\nthe master copy of the plan and the copy kept at the off-site location,\nand sends the updated pages to each recovery planner (two copies: one\nfor the workplace and one for their off-site facility).\nThe recovery planner then produces a report for management that\nshows the updates made.\nTABLE 9.9\nTest Considerations and Actions\nTesting Process \nComponent\nConsiderations and Actions\nTest plan \npreparation\nMeeting of recovery planners scope the test and prepare \ntest schedule, objectives, timing, resources required, \npersonnel involved, follow-up, and reporting requirements\nTest logistics \npreparation\nNotify off-site workspace locations, transportation, off-site \nstorage, and other internal and external participants as \nappropriate and brief them on test plan schedules and \nactivities\nTest execution\nActivate Emergency Operations Center (EOC) location and \nexecute Test Plan\nPost-test debrief\nMeeting of recovery planners and recovery teams to review \ntest objectives met and document test results\nContinuity plan \nupdate\nUpdate recovery plans with lessons learned from test\nTest scheduling\nPrepare follow-on and long-term recovery plan test \nschedules\nManagement \nupdate\nPrepare and escalate written results of recovery plan test \nfor management review and approval\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 247,
            "text": "9.7 Sample Business Continuity Plan Policy\nSee Table 9.10 for a sample business continuity plan policy.\n9.8 Summary \nBusiness continuity planning is the process of ensuring that your organi-\nzation can continue doing business even when its normal facilities or\nplace of business is unavailable. In earlier years, many companies undertook\nTABLE 9.10\nSample Business Continuity Plan Policy\nBusiness Continuity Planning\nPolicy\nThe continued operations of COMPANY business activities in the event of\nan emergency must be addressed by each business unit in a Business Con-\ntinuity Plan (BCP). The business unit BCPs must be coordinated with the\nCOMPANY BCP and the COMPANY Emergency Response Plan.\nStandards\n\u0001\nEvery business unit will have a documented and tested BCP.\n\u0001\nEach business unit will conduct a Business Impact Analysis (BIA) to\ndetermine their critical business processes, applications, systems, and\nplatforms. The BIA results are to be presented to the Management\nCommittee for review and approval.\n\u0001\nThe BIA results are to be reviewed by the business unit annually to\nensure results are still appropriate.\n\u0001\nThe business unit BCPs must be coordinated with the COMPANY-wide\nBCP.\nResponsibilities\n\u0001\nThe Management Committee of COMPANY is required to review and\napprove business unit BCPs as well as the COMPANY BCP.\n\u0001\nAdditionally, it is the responsibility of COMPANY managers to ensure\nthat the business unit BCP is current.\nCompliance\n\u0001\nCOMPANY Management is responsible for conducting periodic tests\nof the BCP to ensure the continued processing requirements of the\nCompany are met.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 248,
            "text": "what they called “disaster recovery planning” — which was nothing more\nthan making sure that their computer operations could be resumed as\nquickly as necessary when the data center was unavailable. When com-\npanies tested their “disaster recovery plans,” some of them realized that\nbeing able to recover data center operations was all very well but pointless\nif the organization’s offices and other places of business — where the\nfunctions provided by the data center were used — were also unavailable.\nBusiness continuity plans are notoriously difficult to sell to senior man-\nagement, and that is a cause for frustration among information security\nprofessionals. Creating and testing a business continuity plan is a very\nsignificant commitment of resources and many executives take a wait-\nand-see approach to dealing with the risk of business interruption. An\napproach to convincing reluctant organization managers to undertake\nbusiness continuity planning is to break the process into components and\n“sell” each component on its own values. This chapter examined the\ncomponents of a business continuity plan.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 249,
            "text": "Glossary\n802.11 — Family of IEEE standards for wireless LANs first introduced in\n1997. The first standard to be implemented, 802.11b, specifies from\n1 to 11 Mbps in the unlicensed band using DSSS (direct sequence\nspread spectrum) technology. The Wireless Ethernet Compatibility\nAssociation (WECA) brands it as Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi).\n802.1X — An IEEE standard for port-based layer two authentications in\n802 standard networks. Wireless LANs often use 802.1X for authenti-\ncation of a user before the user has the ability to access the network.\nAbend — Acronym for abnormal end of a task. It generally means a\nsoftware crash.\nAcceptable use policy — A policy that a user must agree to follow to\ngain access to a network or to the Internet.\nAccess controls — The management of permission for logging on to a\ncomputer or network.\nAccess path —  The logical route that an end user takes to access comput-\nerized information. Typically, it includes a route through the operating\nsystem, telecommunications software, selected application software,\nand the access control system.\nAccess rights — Also called permissions or privileges, these are the rights\ngranted to users by the administrator or supervisor. These permissions\ncan be read, write, execute, create, delete, etc.\nAccountability — The ability to map a given activity or event back to\nthe responsible party.\nAdministrative controls  The actions/controls dealing with operational\neffectiveness, efficiency, and adherence to regulations and manage-\nment policies.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 250,
            "text": "Anonymous File Transfer Protocol (FTP) — A method for download-\ning public files using the File Transfer Protocol. Anonymous FTP is\ncalled anonymous because users do not provide credentials before\naccessing files from a particular server. In general, users enter the\nword “anonymous” when the host prompts for a username; anything\ncan be entered for the password, such as the user’s e-mail address or\nsimply the word “guest.” In many cases, an anonymous FTP site will\nnot even prompt for a name and password.\nAntivirus software — Applications that detect, prevent, and possibly\nremove all known viruses from files located in a microcomputer hard\ndrive.\nApplication controls — The transaction and data relating to each com-\nputer-based application system. Therefore, they are specific to each\nsuch application, which may be manual or programmed, are to endure\nthe completeness and accuracy of the records and the validity of the\nentries made therein resulting from both manual and programmed\nprocessing. Examples of application controls include data input valida-\ntion, agreement of batch controls, and encryption of data transmitted.\nApplication layers — They refer to the transactions and data relating to\neach computer-based application system and are therefore specific to\neach such application controls, which may be manual or programmed\nprocessing. Examples include data validation controls.\nASP/MSP — A third-party provider that delivers and manages applications\nand computer services, including security services, to multiple users\nvia the Internet or virtual private network (VPN).\nAsymmetric key (public key) — A cipher technique whereby different\ncryptographic keys are used to encrypt and decrypt a message.\nAsynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) — A high-bandwidth, low-delay\nswitching and multiplexing technology. It is a data-link layer protocol.\nThis means that it is a protocol-independent transport mechanism.\nATM allows very high-speed data transfer rates at up to 155 Mbps.\nAudit trail — A visible trail of evidence enabling one to trace information\ncontained in statements or reports back to the original input source.\nAuthentication — The act of verifying the identity of a system entity\n(user, system, network node) and the entity’s eligibility to access\ncomputerized information. Designed to protect against fraudulent log-\non activity. Authentication also can refer to the verification of the\ncorrectness of a piece of data.\nAvailability — Relates to information being available when required by\nthe business process now and in the future. It also concerns the\nsafeguarding of necessary resources and associated capabilities.\nBaseband — A form of modulation in which data signals are pulsed\ndirectly on the transmission medium without frequency division and\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 251,
            "text": "usually utilize a transceiver. In baseband, the entire bandwidth of the\ntransmission medium (cable) is utilized for a single channel.\nBiometrics — A security technique that verifies an individual’s identity\nby analyzing a unique physical attribute, such as a handprint.\nBit-stream image — Bit-stream backups (also referred to as mirror image\nbackups) involve all areas of a computer hard disk drive or another type\nof storage media. Such backups exactly replicate all sectors on a given\nstorage device. Thus, all files and ambient data storage areas are copied.\nBrute force — The name given to a class of algorithms that repeatedly\ntries all possible combinations until a solution is found.\nBusiness impact analysis (BIA) — An exercise that determines the\nimpact of losing the support of any resource to an organization,\nestablishes the escalation of that loss over time, identifies the minimum\nresources needed to recover, and prioritizes the recovery of processes\nand supporting systems.\nCertificate authority (CA) — A trusted third party that serves authenti-\ncation infrastructures or organizations and registers entities and issues\nthem certificates.\nChain of custody — The control over evidence. Lack of control over\nevidence can lead to it being discredited completely. Chain of custody\ndepends on being able to verify that evidence could not have been\ntampered with. This is accomplished by sealing off the evidence so\nthat it cannot in any way be changed and by providing a documentary\nrecord of custody to prove that the evidence was at all times under\nstrict control and not subject to tampering.\nCleartext — Data that is not encrypted; plaintext.\nCold site — An IS backup facility that has the necessary electrical and\nphysical components of a computer facility, but does not have the\ncomputer equipment in place. The site is ready to receive the necessary\nreplacement computer equipment in the event the users have to move\nfrom their main computing location to the alternative computer facility.\nConfidentiality — Confidentiality concerns the protection of sensitive\ninformation from unauthorized disclosure.\nCriticality analysis — An analysis or assessment of a business function\nor security vulnerability based on its criticality to the organization’s\nbusiness objectives. A variety of criticality may be used to illustrate\nthe criticality. \nCyber-cop — A criminal investigator of online fraud or harassment.\nData classification — Data classification is assigning a level of sensitivity\nto data as they are being created, amended, enhanced, stored, or\ntransmitted. The classification of the data should then determine the\nextent to which the data needs to be controlled or secured and is\nalso indicative of its value in terms of its importance to the organization.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 252,
            "text": "Data diddling — Changing data with malicious intent before or during\ninput to the system.\nData Encryption Standard (DES) — A private key cryptosystem pub-\nlished by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).\nDES has been used commonly for data encryption in the forms of\nsoftware and hardware implementation.\nData normalization — In data processing, a process applied to all data\nin a set that produces a specific statistical property. It is also the\nprocess of eliminating duplicate keys within a database. Useful because\norganizations use databases to evaluate various security data.\nData warehouse — A generic term for a system that stores, retrieves,\nand manages large amounts of data. Data warehouse software often\nincludes sophisticated comparison and hashing techniques for fast\nsearches as well as advanced filtering.\nDDoS attacks — Distributed denial-of-service attacks. These are denial-\nof-service assaults from multiple sources.\nDecryption key — A piece of information, in a digitized form, used to\nrecover the plaintext from the corresponding ciphertext by decryption.\nDefense-in-depth — The practice of layering defenses to provide added\nprotection. Security is increased by raising the cost to mount the attack.\nThis system places multiple barriers between an attacker and an\norganization’s business-critical information resources. This strategy also\nprovides natural areas for the implementation of intrusion-detection\ntechnologies.\nDegauss — To have a device generate electric current (AC or DC) to\nproduce magnetic fields for the purpose of reducing the magnetic flux\ndensity to zero. A more secure means of destroying data on magnetic\nmedia.\nDigital certificates — A certificate identifying a public key to its sub-\nscriber, corresponding to a private key held by that subscriber. It is\na unique code that typically is used to allow the authenticity and\nintegrity of communications to be verified.\nDigital code signing — The process of digitally signing computer code\nso that its integrity remains intact and it cannot be tampered with.\nDigital signatures — A piece of information, a digitized form of signa-\nture, that provides sender authenticity, message integrity, and non-\nrepudiation. A digital signature is generated using the sender’s private\nkey or applying a one-way hash function.\nDisaster notification fees — The fee a recovery site vendor usually\ncharges when the customer notifies the vendor that a disaster has\noccurred and the recovery site is required. The fee is implemented to\ndiscourage false disaster notifications.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 253,
            "text": "Discretionary Access Control (DAC) — A means of restricting access\nto objects based on the identity of subjects and groups to which they\nbelong. The controls are discretionary in the sense that a subject with\ncertain access permission is capable of passing that permission on to\nanother subject.\nDisc mirroring — This is the practice of duplicating data in separate\nvolumes on two hard disks to make storage more fault tolerant.\nMirroring provides data protection in the case of disk failure, because\ndata is constantly updated to both disks.\nDMZ — Commonly, it is the network segment between the Internet and a\nprivate network. It allows access to services from the Internet and the\ninternal private network, while denying access from the Internet\ndirectly to the private network.\nDNS (Domain Name Service) — A hierarchical database that is distrib-\nuted across the Internet and allows names to be resolved to IP\naddresses and vice versa to locate services such as Web and e-mail.\nDual control — A procedure that uses two or more entities (usually\npersons) operating in concert to protect a system’s resources, such\nthat no single entity acting alone can access that resource.\nDynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) — DHCP is an industry\nstandard protocol used to dynamically assign IP addresses to network\ndevices.\nElectronic signature — Any technique designed to provide the elec-\ntronic equivalent of a handwritten signature to demonstrate the origin\nand integrity of specific data. Digital signatures are an example of\nelectronic signatures.\nEnterprise root — A certificate authority (CA) that grants itself a certif-\nicate and creates a subordinate CAs. The root CA gives the subordinate\nCAs their certificates, but the subordinate CAs can grant certificates to\nusers.\nExposure — The potential loss to an area due to the occurrence of an\nadverse event.\nExtensible Markup Language (XML) — A Web-based application\ndevelopment technique that allows designers to create their own\ncustomized tags enabling the transmission, validation, and interpreta-\ntion of data between application and organizations.\nFall-through logic — Predicting which way a program will branch when\nan option is presented. It is an optimized code based on a branch\nprediction.\nFirewall — A device that forms a barrier between a secure and an open\nenvironment. Usually the open environment is considered hostile. The\nmost notable open system is the Internet.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 254,
            "text": "Forensic examination — After a security breach, the process of assess-\ning, classifying, and collecting digital evidence to assist in prosecution.\nStandard crime-scene standards are used.\nGuidelines — Documented suggestions for regular and consistent imple-\nmentation of accepted practices. They usually have less enforcement\npowers.\nHoneypots — A specifically configured server designed to attract intrud-\ners so their actions do not affect production systems; also known as\na decoy server.\nHot site — A fully operational off-site data processing facility equipped\nwith both hardware and system software to be used in the event of\ndisaster.\nHTTP — A communication protocol used to connect two servers on the\nWorld Wide Web. Its primary function is to establish a connection\nwith a Web server and transmit HTML pages to the client browser.\nIDS (intrusion detection system) — An IDS inspects network traffic to\nidentify suspicious patterns that may indicate a network or system\nattack from someone attempting to break into or compromise a system.\nInformation security governance — The management structure, orga-\nnization, responsibility, and reporting processes surrounding a success-\nful information security program.\nInformation security program — The overall process of preserving\nconfidentiality, integrity, and availability of information.\nIntegrity — The accuracy, completeness, and validity of information in\naccordance with business values and expectations.\nInternet Engineering Task Force (IETF) — The Internet standards set-\nting organization with affiliates internationally from network industry\nrepresentatives. This includes all network industry developers and\nresearchers concerned with evolution and planned growth on the\nInternet.\nIntrusion detection — The process of monitoring the events occurring\nin a computer system or network, detecting signs of security problems.\nIP Security Protocol (IPSec) — A protocol in development by the IETF\nto support secure data exchange. Once completed, IPSec is expected\nto be widely deployed to implement virtual private networks (VPNs).\nIPSec supports two encryption modes: Transport and Tunnel. Trans-\nport mode encrypts the data portion (payload) of each packet but\nleaves the header untouched. Tunnel mode is more secure because\nit encrypts both the header and the payload. On the receiving side,\nan IPSec-compliant device decrypts each packet.\nISO 17799 — An international standard that defines information confi-\ndentiality, integrity, and availability controls.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 255,
            "text": "Internet service provider — A third party that provides organizations\nwith a variety of Internet and Internet-related services.\nMail relay server — An e-mail server that relays messages where neither\nthe sender nor the receiver is a local user. A risk exists that an\nunauthorized user could hijack these open relays and use them to\nspoof their own identity.\nMandatory access control (MAC) — MAC is a means of restricting\naccess to data based on varying degrees of security requirements for\ninformation contained in the objects.\nMasqueraders — Attackers that penetrate systems by using user identi-\nfiers and passwords taken legitimate users.\nMessage Authentication Code — Message Authentication Code refers to\nan ANSI standard for a checksum that is computed with keyed hash\nthat is based on DES.\nMirrored site — An alternate site that contains the same information as\nthe original. Mirrored sites are set up for backup and disaster recovery\nas well to balance the traffic load for numerous download requests.\nSuch “download mirrors” are often placed in different locations\nthroughout the Internet.\nMobile site — The use of a mobile/temporary facility to serve as a\nbusiness resumption location. They usually can be delivered to any\nsite and can house information technology and staff.\nMonitoring policy — The rules outlining the way in which information\nis captured and interpreted.\nNonrepudiation — The assurance that a party cannot later deny origi-\nnating data, that it is the provision of a proof of the integrity and\norigin of the data which can be verified by a third party. A digital\nsignature can provide nonrepudiation.\nNonintrusive monitoring —  The use of nonintrusive probes or traces\nto assemble information and track traffic and identity vulnerabilities.\nOSI 7-layer model — The Open System Interconnection seven-layer\nmodel is an ISO standard for worldwide communications that defines\na framework for implementing protocols in seven layers. Control is\npassed from one layer to the next, starting at the application layer in\none station, and proceeding to the bottom layer, over the channel to\nthe next station and back up the hierarchy.\nOff-site storage — A storage facility located away from the building,\nhousing the primary information processing facility (IPF), and used\nfor storage of computer media such as offline backup data storage files.\nPacket filtering — Controlling access to a network analyzing the\nattributes of the incoming and outgoing packets and either letting\nthem pass or denying them based on a list of rules.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 256,
            "text": "Passive response — A response option in intrusion detection in which\nthe system simply reports and records the problem detected, relying\non the user to take subsequent action.\nPassword cracker — Specialized securities checker that tests user’s pass-\nwords, searching for passwords that are easy to guess by repeatedly\ntrying words from specially crafted dictionaries. Failing that, many\npassword crackers can brute force all possible combinations in a\nrelatively short period of time with current desktop computer hardware.\nPenetration testing — A live test of the effectiveness of security defenses\nthrough mimicking the actions if real-life attackers.\nPort — An interface point between the CPU and a peripheral device.\nPrivacy — Freedom from unauthorized intrusion.\nProcedures — The portion of a security policy that states the general\nprocess that will be performed to accomplish a security goal.\nProxy server — A server that acts on behalf of a user. Typical proxies\naccept a connection from a user, make a decision as to whether or\nnot the client IP address is permitted to use the proxy, perhaps perform\nadditional authentication, and complete a connection to a remote\ndestination on behalf of the user.\nPublic key — In an asymmetric cryptography scheme, the key that may\nbe widely published to enable the operation of the scheme.\nRADIUS — Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service. A protocol used\nto authenticate remote users and wireless connections.\nReciprocal agreement — Emergency processing agreements between\ntwo or more organizations with similar equipment or applications.\nTypically, participants promise to provide processing time to each\nother when an emergency arises.\nRecovery point objective (RPO) — A measurement of the point prior\nto an outage to which data is to be restored.\nRecovery time objective (RTO) — The amount of time allowed for the\nrecovery of a business function or resource after a disaster occurs.\nRedundant site — A recovery strategy involving the duplication of key\ninformation technology components, including data, or other key\nbusiness processes, whereby fast recovery can take place. The redun-\ndant site usually is located away from the original site.\nResidual risks — The risk associated with an event when the control is\nin place to reduce the effect or likelihood of that event being taken\ninto account.\nRisk assessment — A process used to identify and evaluate risks and\ntheir potential effects.\nRisk avoidance — The process for systematically avoiding risk. Security\nawareness can lead to a better educated staff, which can lead to certain\nrisks being avoided.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 257,
            "text": "Risk mitigation — While some risks cannot be avoided, they can be\nminimized or mitigated by putting controls into place to mitigate the\nrisk once an incident occurs.\nRisk transfer — The process of transferring risk. An example can include\ntransferring the risk of a building fire to an insurance company.\nRSA — A public key cryptosystem developed by Rivest, Shamir, and\nAdleman. RSA has two different keys: the public encryption key and\nthe secret decryption key. The strength of RSA depends on the difficulty\nof the prime number factorization. For applications with high-level\nsecurity, the number of the decryption key bits should be greater than\n512 bits. RSA is used for both encryption and digital signatures.\nSecure Socket Layer (SSL) — A protocol developed by Netscape for\ntransmitting private documents via the Internet. SSL works by using\na public key to encrypt data that is transferred over the SSL connection.\nSecurity metrics — A standard of measurement used to measure and\nmonitor information security-related information security activity.\nSniffing — An attack capturing sensitive pieces of information, such as\na password, passing through the network.\nSocial engineer — A person who illegally enters computer systems by\npersuading an authorized person to reveal IDs, passwords, and other\nconfidential information.\nSplit knowledge — A security technique in which two or more entities\nseparately hold data items that individually convey no knowledge of\nthe information that results from combining the items. A condition\nunder which two or more entities separately have key components\nthat individually convey no knowledge of the plaintext key that will\nbe produced when the key components are combined in the crypto-\ngraphic module.\nSpoofing — Faking the sending address of a transmission to gain illegal\nentry into a secure system.\nStand-alone root — A certificate authority that signs its own certificates\nand does not rely on a directory service to authenticate users.\nStandard — A set of rules or specifications that, when taken together,\ndefine a software or hardware device. A standard is also an acknowl-\nedged basis for comparing or measuring something. Standards are\nimportant because new technology will only take root once a group\nof specifications is agreed upon.\nSteering committee — A management committee assembled to sponsor\nand manage various projects, such as an information security program.\nSteganography — A technology used to embed information in audio\nand graphical material. The audio and graphical materials appear\nunaltered until a steganography tool is used to reveal the hidden\nmessage.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 258,
            "text": "Symmetric key encryption — In symmetric key encryption, two trading\npartners share one or more secrets, and no one else can read their\nmessages. A different key (or set of keys) is needed for each pair of\ntrading partners. The same key is used for encryption and decryption.\nTACACS+ — Terminal Access Controller Access Control System Plus is an\nauthentication protocol, often used by remote-access servers or single\n(reduced) sign-on implementations. TACACS and TACACS+ are pro-\nprietary protocols from CISCO®.\nTCP/IP — Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol is a set of\ncommunications protocols that encompasses media access, packet\ntransport, session communications, file transfer, electronic mail, termi-\nnal emulation, remote file access, and network management. TCP/IP\nprovides the basis for the Internet.\nThreat analysis — A project to identify the threats that exist over key\ninformation and information technology. The threat analysis usually\nalso defines the level of the threat and likelihood of that threat to\nmaterialize.\nTwo-factor authentication — The use of two independent mechanisms\nfor authentication; for example, requiring a smart card and a password.\nVirus signature files — A file of virus patterns that are compared with\nexisting files to determine if they are infected with a virus. The vendor\nof the antivirus software updates the signatures frequently and makes\nthem available to customers via the Web.\nVirtual private network (VPN) — A secure private network that uses\nthe public telecommunications infrastructure to transmit data. In con-\ntrast to a much more expensive system of owned or leased lines that\ncan only be used by one company, VPNs are used by enterprises for\nboth extranets and wide area intranets. Using encryption and authen-\ntication, a VPN encrypts all data that passes between two Internet\npoints, maintaining privacy and security.\nWarm site — A warm site is similar to a hot site; however, it is not fully\nequipped with all the necessary hardware needed for recovery.\nWeb hosting — The business of providing the equipment and services\nrequired to host and maintain files for one or more Web sites and to\nprovide fast Internet connections to those sites. Most hosting is\n“shared,” which means that the Web sites of multiple companies are\non the same server in order to share costs.\nWeb Server — Using the client/server model and the World Wide Web’s\nHyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Web Server is a software program\nthat serves Web page files to users.\nWorm — With respect to security, a special type of virus that does not\nattach itself to programs, but rather spreads via other methods such\nas e-mail.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 259,
            "text": "Bibliography\n1. International Standards Organization. Information Technology — Code of\nPractice for Information Security Management, ISO/IEC 17799:2000(E).\nGeneva, Switzerland: ISO, 2000.\n2. Ford, Warwick and Michael S. Baum, Secure Electronic Commerce. Upper\nSaddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997.\n3. King, Christopher M; Curtis E. Dalton; and T. Ertem Osmanoglu. Security\nArchitecture: Design, Deployment and Operations. New York:\nOsborn/McGraw-Hill, 2001.\n4. Summers, Rita C. Secure Computing: Threats and Safeguards. New York:\nMcGraw-Hill, 1997.\n5. Tudor, Jan Killmeyer, Information Security Architecture. New York: Auer-\nbach Publications, 2001.\n6. Hutt, Arthur E.; Seymour Bosworth; and Douglas B. Hoyt. Computer\nSecurity Handbook, Third Edition. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1995.\n7. National Institute of Standards and Technology. An Introduction to Com-\nputer Security: The NIST Handbook, Special Publication 800-12. Washington,\nD.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,\n8. Pfleeger, Charles P. Security in Computing, Second Edition. Upper Saddle\nRiver, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996.\n9. Summers, Rita C. Secure Computing: Threats and Safeguards. New York:\nMcGraw-Hill, 1997.\n10. Vallabhaneni, Rao S. CISSP Examination Textbooks. Schaumburg, IL: SRV\nProfessional Publications, 2000.\n11. Devlin, Ed and Cole Emerson. Business Resumption Planning, 1999 Edition.\nNew York: Auerbach Publications, 1999.\n12. Hare, Chris. CISSP Certified CBK Study Guide: Business Continuity Planning\nDomain. Posted at http://www.cccure.org, March 1999.\n13. Hutt, Arthur E.; Seymour Bosworth; and Douglas B. Hoyt. Computer\nSecurity Handbook, Third Edition. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1995.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
            "page_number": 260,
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        },
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            "text": "35. U.S. Department of Defense. Technical Rationale Behind CSC-STD-003-85.\nWashington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985.\n36. U.S. Department of Defense. Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria\nWashington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985.\n37. U.S. Department of Defense. Trusted Network Interpretation of the Trusted\nComputer System Evaluation Criteria. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government\nPrinting Office, 1987.\n38. Carroll, John M. Computer Security, Third Edition. Woburn, MA: Butter-\nworth-Heinemann Publishers, Ltd., 1996.\n39. International Standards Organization. Information Technology — Code of\nPractice for Information Security Management, ISO/IEC 17799:2000(E).\nGeneva, Switzerland: ISO, 2000.\n40. ______________. Common Criteria for information Technology Security\nEvaluation, Version 2.1. August 1999.\n41. King, Christopher M; Curtis E. Dalton; and T. Ertem Osmanoglu. Security\nArchitecture: Design, Deployment and Operations. California:\nOsborn/McGraw-Hill, 2001.\n42. Pfleeger, Charles P. Security in Computing, Second Edition. Upper Saddle\nRiver, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996.\n43. Tudor, Jan Killmeyer, Information Security Architecture. New York: Auer-\nbach Publications, 2001.\n44. Vallabhaneni, Rao S. CISSP Examination Textbooks, Volume 1. Schaumburg,\nIL: SRV Professional Publications, 2000.\n45. Bryson, Lisa C. “Protect Your Boss and Your Job: Due Care in Information\nSecurity,” Computer Security Alert, Number 146. San Francisco, May 1995.\n46. D’Agenais, Jean and John Carruthers, Creating Effective Manuals. Cincinnati,\nOH: South-Western Publishing Co., 1985.\n47. Glass, Robert L. Building Quality Software, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice\nHall, 1992.\n48. Icove, David; Karl Seger; and William VonStorch. Computer Crime: A\nCrimefighter’s Handbook. CA: O’Reilly & Associates, 1995.\n49. International Information Security Foundation. Generally Accepted Systems\nSecurity Principles (GASSP) Version 2.0. Gaithersburg, MD, June 1999.\n50. International Standards Organization. Information Technology — Code of\nPractice for Information Security Management, ISO/IEC 17799:2000(E).\nGeneva, Switzerland: ISO, 2000.\n51. Jackson, K.M. and J. Hruska. Computer Security Reference Book: Boca\nRaton, FL: CRC Press, 1992.\n52. National Institute of Standards and Technology. An Introduction to Com-\nputer Security: The NIST Handbook, Special Publication 800-12. Washing-\nton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.\n53. National Security Agency. Online Course: Overview and Risk Management\nTerminology. Posted at www.ncisse.org/Courseware/NSAcourse/lesson1/\nlesson.PPT. 1997.\n54. Parker, Donn. “Risk Reduction Out, Enablement and Due Care In,” Com-\nputer Security Institute Journal, Volume XVI, Number 4, Winter 2000.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        },
        {
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            "text": "55. Peltier, Tom. “How to Build a Comprehensive Security Awareness Program.”\nComputer Security Institute Journal, Volume XVI, Number 2, Spring 2000.\n56. Peltier, Thomas R. Information Security Policies, Standards, Procedures and\nGuidelines. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2001.\n57. Peltier, Thomas R. Information Security Risk Analysis. New York: Auerbach\nPublications, 2001.\n58. Russell, Deborah and G.T. Gangemi Sr. Computer Security Basics. CA:\nO’Reilly & Associates, 1991.\n59. Tipton, Harold F. and Micki Krause, Editors. Information Security Man-\nagement Handbook, 4th Edition. New York: Auerbach Publications, 2000.\n60. Anonymous. Maximum Security: A Hacker’s Guide to Protecting Your Inter-\nnet Site and Network, Second Edition. Indianapolis: Sams Publishing, 1998.\n61. Scambray, Joel; Stuart McClure; and George Kurtz. Hacking Exposed: Net-\nwork Security Secrets & Solutions, Second Edition. New York:\nOsborne/McGraw-Hill, 2001.\nCopyright 2005 by CRC Press, LLC. All Rights Reserved.\n"
        }
    ]
}