State: Wyoming
Volume: 80
Term: 1959-1959
Jurisdiction(s): Wyoming
Source: https://static.case.law/wyo/80.pdf

STATE of Wyoming, on relation of the CITY OF
CASPER, Natrona County, Wyoming, a municipal

corporation, Appellant (Relator below),

vw

Charles B. MORGAN, State Treasurer,
Appellee (Defendant below).

No. 2859.
Supreme Court of Wyoming
March 24, 1959
336 Pac.2d 791

Robert R. Rose, Jr., Arthur F. Fisher, Richard A.
Tobin, Casper, for appellant.

Thomas O. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Ellen Crowley,
Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

OPINION

Mr. Chief Justice BLUME delivered the opinion
of the court.

This is an action brought by the City of Casper to
have the gasoline license tax apportioned to cities and
towns of this state apportioned to the City of Casper
according to a special census taken of that city in
1957 instead of having the tax apportioned according
to the population shown by the regular decennial
federal census.

Section 82-2402, W.C.S.1945, provides for the levy-
ing of a gasoline license tax of four cents per gallon
on all gasoline sold in the state. Part of this tax was

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to be distributed to cities and towns of the state in

accordance with § 32-2408, W.C.S.1945, which pro-
vided that:

«*« = * Fyrom all other gasoline tax revenues pro-
vided by this Act, the [state] treasurer shall:

“* * * Apportion two [2] per cent of revenues
secured from gasoline license tax between the
several cities and towns of the State having a
population of more than 1,500 in the ratio which
the population of such city or town bears to the
total population of all such cities and towns ac-
cording to the last available Federal census * * *.”
(Emphasis supplied.)

Section 32-2408 was amended by Ch. 229, S. L. of
Wyoming, 1957, but the provision with reference to
the distribution of two cents per gallon above men-
tioned remained the same.

Section 2, Ch. 118, S. L. of Wyoming, 1951, provid-
ed for a special and additional gasoline license tax of
one cent per gallon and § 3 of the Act provided:

“The revenue derived from the additional li-
cense tax provided for in this Act shall be dis-
tributed * * * twenty-five per cent (25%) to the
cities and towns. * * * The twenty-five per cent
(25%) due cities and towns under this Act shall
be divided among the incorporated cities and
towns of the State in ratio which the population
of each city or town bears to the total population
of all such cities and towns according to the last
available Federal census, to be used in their street
and alley program.” (Emphasis supplied.)

According to the census of 1950, the population of
the City of Casper was 23,678. A special census was
asked to be taken by the City of Casper in 1957 and,

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according to that census, the population of the City of
Casper was 35,459. The city thereupon brought an
action against the State Treasurer to compel him to
distribute the gasoline license tax heretofore men-
tioned in the ratio which the population shown by the
special census bore to the total population of cities
and towns in the state limited as above mentioned.
The trial court held against the contention of the City
of Casper and from its judgment denying the city any
relief it has taken appeal to this court.

In former days the State of Wyoming had enacted
legislation for taking a state census midway between
the decennial census taken by the federal government,
but we have not had any state census for many years
and the legislation on that subject was repealed by
Ch. 11, S. L. of Wyoming, Spec.Sess., 1933. Hence
we can readily agree with the statement of the Arizona
court in the case of City of Bisbee v. Williams, 83
Ariz, 141, 817 P.2d 567, 569, as follows:

«*« * * Population is usually determined as the
result of a census and it is true in the United
States when one speaks of ‘the census’ the term
has come to be understood as meaning the United
States decennial census.”

If that is true, and we think it is, then that fact would
seem to show reasonably clearly that the legislature,
when it enacted the acts hereinbefore mentioned, did
not have in mind any special censuses to be taken by
any cities or towns in the state. We must further
bear in mind that if it were permissible to take such
censuses piecemeal it is apparent that as a matter of
self-interest and self-protection each and every mu-
nicipality in the state would be required to cause a
federal count of its inhabitants to be made each time

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another municipality chose to have one made in order
to retain its just share of the gasoline license tax.
This argument was made in the Arizona case above
mentioned but was rejected by the court. However,
it is readily seen that it does have considerable, if not
controlling, effect in order to determine as to what
was the intention of the legislature in making the
provisions above mentioned.

Counsel for the appellant in this case cite us to
State ex rel. Brubaker v. Brown, 163 Ohio St. 241,
126 N.E.2d 439; In re Cleveland’s Claim, 72 Okl. 279,
180 P. 852; City of Compton v. Adams, 88 Cal. 2d
596, 203 P.2d 745, as sustaining the contention of the
city herein. These cases all relate to the internal af-
fairs of the respective cities or towns. In the Cali-
fornia case, for instance, the question was whether or
not a municipal court should be established after the
city had attained a certain population in accordance
with a special census. These cases have no bearing, or
at least no controlling effect, herein. The legislative
acts under consideration in this case have a statewide
effect and do not relate to the mere internal affairs
of a municipality.

The only case cited to us by the appellant that can
in any manner be said to sustain the city’s contention
is the case of City of Bisbee v. Williams, supra. In
that case the statutory provision was as follows:

“The state treasurer of the state of Arizona
shall pay ten percent (10%) of the privilege tax
collected under the Excise Revenue Act of 1935,
or any amendment or modification thereof to the
various municipalities of the state of Arizona in
proportion to their population, as shown by the
most recent United States census, to be used by

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said municipalities for any municipal purpose.”

§78-1822, A.C.A.1989, as amended, 1952 Cum.
Supp. [83 Ariz. 141, 317 P.2d 568]

In that case it was held that a special census taken
in 1956 was controlling in connection with the distri-
bution of the privilege tax mentioned above. It may
be noted that the legislative act provided that the cen-
sus that should control was one that could be used by
said municipality for any municipal purpose. In other
words, any census that could be used for any internal
purpose of a municipality would be the controlling
census in connection with the distribution of the privi-
lege tax. Hence, the legislative provision in Arizona
is quite different from the legislative provision in
this state. Furthermore, the court apparently was
influenced in its decision by the fact that the state
treasurer in distributing the tax had distributed part
of it to a number of cities that had been incorporated
in the state after the decennial census of 1950. We
have no such precedent as that in this state and we do
not think, accordingly, that we could follow the Ari-
zona case heretofore cited.

A conclusion contrary to that in the Arizona case
was reached in the case of Sproul v. State ex rel.
Smith, 153 Fla. 892, 16 So.2d 109, which involved
a provision applicable to the state as a whole. In the
case of Harp v. Abrahamson, 248 Iowa 222, 80 N.W.
2d 505, 506, syllabus 2 is as follows:

“Under statute requiring treasurer to apportion
among municipalities the 8 per cent road use tax
fund in ratio which population of municipalities
as shown by ‘latest available federal census’ bears
to the total population of municipalities, quoted
phrase means the general federal census taken in
1950 and not a special federal census taken in the
city in 1954. * * *”

The court stated in part as follows at 80 N.W.2d 507,
508:

“The legislature, in enacting Chapter 312, cre-
ated a general fund to be administered among the
various cities and towns of the state on an equit-
able basis, i. e., the population of the various cit-
ies and towns. By Section 312.8 (2) [I.C.A.] it
provided, ‘in the ratio which the population of
each city or town, as shown by the latest avail-
able federal census, bears to the total population
of all such cities and towns in the state.’ Ratio, as
defined by Webster’s International Dictionary,
means ‘the quotient of one magnitude divided by
another of the same kind.’ Under appellants’
theory one magnitude would be the population of
the City of Newton, as established by the special
federal census of 1954, divided by another magni-
tude which must be the population of all the cities
and towns as established by the last certified
census, i. e. that of 1950. This last certified cen-
sus would also be the ‘latest available federal cen-
sus’ so far as the total population of all cities and
towns is concerned. Clearly such magnitudes are
not of the same class. Under the same definition
of ratio, using the last certified census as the mag-
nitudes, there is an equality between the cities and
towns based upon the same classification. * * *”

The case of City of St. Louis Park v. King, 246 Minn.
422, 75 N.W.2d 487, involved the question of the dis-
tribution of cigarette and liquor taxes and the ques-
tion was whether or not the distribution should be
made according to the last preceding census of the
United States or a special federal census in 1954, The
case contains an able discussion of the question in-
volved in this case. The court said in part at 75
N.W.2d 493 as follows:

«* * * The function of the census is to determine
the appropriate ratio, and it can only be useful

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under these statutes when it provides the popula-
tions of each political subdivision determined at
the same time and for the same purpose, which
ean be added together to determine the total popu-
lation of the state. And unless the population of
each political division is determined at the same
time as the whole state population, a fair appor-
tionment will not be made in accordance with the
language of the statute. * * *” (Emphasis sup-
plied.)

Again the court stated at 75 N.W.2d 495 as follows:

“We cannot assume that the population of other
state units of government, nor that the total popu-
lation of the state of Minnesota, would remain
constant from April 1, 1950, to the present. Ob-
viously, this assumption would be necessary to.
sustain plaintiff's contention. The increase in
the share which the plaintiff would receive un-
der the increased population shown by its special
federal census would bring about a decrease in
the proportional share of other state recipient
units. If such an exception is now to be made,
that is more properly a function of the legislature
than of the courts. If there is in fact any inequity
in the distribution of these taxes to the plaintiff
by reason of its increased population and its re-
sulting increased governmental responsibility, that
is also a matter that the legislature, and not the
courts, must rectify.”

We see no objection to the census of 1957 having a

controlling effect as to any internal affairs of the City

of

Casper, but we also think, particularly in accord-

ance with the decisions in the Iowa and Minnesota cases
above mentioned, that it can have no effect on the
distribution of the gasoline taxes involved in the case

at
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bar. We cannot encourage competition among the
mmunities in this state in having a special census

taken for the purpose of increasing their income from

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the gasoline license tax to the detriment of other com-
munities. The term “ratio” as used in the statute
applies, we think, to the same denominator, namely,
that the same census shall apply throughout. The
judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

_ —_

Dorothy BROWN, one and the same person
as Sheila Brownley, Appellant.

(Defendant below),
v.

STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff
below).

No. 2864.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
March 24, 1959.
336 Pac.2d 794

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Walter A. Muir, Rock Springs, C. L. Bates, Rawlins,
for appellant.

Thomas O. Miller, Atty. Gen., Glenn A. Williams,
Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

OPINION.

Mr. Chief Justice BLUME delivered the opinion of
the court.

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In this case the County and Prosecuting Attorney
of Carbon County, Wyoming, filed an information on
September 16, 1957, charging that Sheila Brownley on
August 26, 1957, did “unlawfully, maliciously and in
a rude, insolent and angry manner, unlawfully touch,
shoot, and wound a human being, to wit: Evan Aug-
ustine Sanchez, with a .45 caliber automatic pistol
with intent then and there to commit a felony, to wit:
to kill said Evan Augustine Sanchez, with purpose and
maliciousness, but without premeditation.” The de-
fendant, Sheila Brownley, whose true name was stipu-
lated to be Dorothy Brown, pleaded not guilty to the
charge. The case was tried to a jury commencing on
April 14, 1958. The jury found the defendant guilty
of aggravated assault and battery. She was sentenced
to six months in jail. From the verdict and judgment
of the court an appeal has been taken to this court.

It is admitted herein that the prosecuting witness,
Evan Augustine Sanchez, hereafter referred to as
Sanchez, was shot in the lower abdomen by the pistol
mentioned in the information while it was in the hands
of the defendant. He was seriously wounded, was in
the hospital for 244 to 3 months and had two operations
performed upon him, in the second of which the bullet
which entered his body was extracted. The shooting
occurred in what is called the Paris Rooms situated
in the city of Rawlins in this state.

A number of exhibits were introduced in evidence,
including a map of the Paris Rooms. None of these
exhibits are in the record before us so that the jury
must have had a somewhat better understanding of
some of the evidence than this court could have in the
absence of such exhibits.

The evidence in the case was extremely conflicting.

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It is hardly necessary to set out anything more than
the main facts testified to by Sanchez and by the de-
fendant. Sanchez testified that he was informed that
the Paris Rooms were open. He went there on August
26, 1957, at about 8:00 p.m. He rang the doorbell.
The defendant came out and asked what he wanted and
the witness told her that he wanted a “woman”. She
asked the witness if he had ten dollars and the witness
stated that he did. The witness then asked her if
there was a woman there and the defendant told him
she was the only one. The witness gave her ten dol-
lars and he and the defendant went into the bedroom
where, as may be inferentially gathered, the defend-
ant and the witness had sexual intercourse. During
that time, apparently, the witness talked to her about.
the illegality of prostitution, inferring or stating di-
rectly that defendant was a prostitute, After the par-
ties had sexual intercourse, the defendant got the gun
mentioned in the information from a drawer in a closet
which led off from the kitchen in the building. Be-
cause of that gun, seen by the witness, he attempted to
lock her up in the closet, but since it had no lock which
would hold he let her out. “I decided I couldn’t lock
her in there and if she wanted to shoot she could shoot
me anyhow.” Defendant told him to get out and he
said that he would. He walked down the hall in the
building, scared, with his back to the defendant, toward
the outside door with his hands raised high. When he
got to the door he let his arms fall, perhaps for the
purpose of opening the door, and the defendant shot
him. He fell down or sat down and while so down the
defendant “nudged” him, toid him to get out, and
shortly thereafter he got up, opened the door, got in
his car and drove to what he thought was a hospital
but went to the nurses’ home where he became uncon-
scious and where he was found by police officers later.

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He stated that he never touched the defendant in any
way except when they were in bed together.

The defendant denied having asked for or received
any money. She testified that she leased the Paris
Rooms which had five bedrooms, two sitting rooms and
a bathroom, kitchen and pantry. On the evening of
August 26, 1957, she went to the door when the door-
bell rang. The prosecuting witness stated that he was
looking for a “girl”. The defendant said that there
were no girls there but the prosecuting witness stated
that she would do. She told him that she was menstru-
ating at the time and could have no intercourse with
a man in any event at that time. Sanchez, however,
said he did not care about that, grabbed her and pushed
her into the bedroom. The defendant stated that he
pushed her over to the foot of the bed, fell on top of her,
put his arm across her throat so that she couldn’t
breathe and that they wrestled on the bed. She stated
that the prosecuting witness hit her and kicked her,
that she was half-unconscious during the affray, that
the prosecuting witness either raped her or attempted
to rape her, that she finally got loose, got hold of the
gun in question and told him to get out. When near
the door leading to the outside, the prosecuting witness
grabbed her and the gun went off accidentally.

Counsel for defendant have epitomized the main
part of defendant’s testimony as to what took place
subsequent to the time when she and Sanchez got out
of bed as follows:

«ex % * T glanced over in this drawer which was
open and I saw a gun laying there so I picked it up.
I though maybe I could scare him or something
into leaving. I had locked myself in the bedroom
from the inside. I heard my dog crying and I

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opened the door and the dog ran into my bedroom,
and Sanchez saw the gun and I told him you bet-
ter leave now and I closed the bedroom door again.
And then I stood there for a couple of minutes or
I don’t know just exactly how long I stood there
exactly and I heard a door slam so I thought he had
gone out but when I got out and I wanted to go in
the kitchen and get to the telephone because the
phone was in the kitchen, it was a pay phone and I
had to go in the kitchen to get to the phone for
help. When I opened up the bedroom door I didn’t
see anybody. The kitchen door was closed but I
thought he had gone on out so I walked on out in-
to the kitchen and when I got past the door out of
the corner of my eye I seen him hiding in the pan-
try so I jumped out in the center of the kitchen as
far as I could and told him to come out of there and
get on out of the house. No door on pantry in
kitchen, Door of bedroom opens into kitchen. No
door on pantry. He was behind the door inside the
pantry. There is a little wall there but the wall
does not have a door in it. He was behind this
wall and behind the door that—the bedroom door.
Then I told him to get out and so he came out of
there and he started up to the front and I fol-
lowed him and I had the gun in my hand. I never
laid it down and I got up to the front door and I
don’t know why but instead of telling him to open
the door I reached over with my left hand to open
the door. When I reached to open outside door at
staircase he lunged at me like he was going to
take the, gun away from me and the gun went
off, * *

It is obvious from this brief statement of facts that
e evidence was totally conflicting. It is not for this
urt to resolve that conflict. That was the duty of
e jury. We cannot interfere with their verdict,

even if we might think that the conflict was resolved
wrongly. There is no merit in the contention of coun~
sel for the defendant that the defendant’s testimony
must be taken as true in view of the fact that Sanchez

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was not called to rebut it. If the version of Sanchez
as to what took place is true, then it follows that the

testimony of defendant cannot be true, except insofar
as it agrees with that of Sanchez.

The record fails to disclose the relative physical
strength of the prosecuting witness and the defendant,
a matter of some importance in view of the defense
herein. The jury saw them both on the witness stand.
For aught we know, Sanchez was small and puny
while the defendant was physically strong, thus caus-
ing the jury to disbelieve her testimony for that rea-
son alone.

We might incidentally mention that the prosecuting
witness was 21 years of age, had been in the Basin In-
dustrial School at Worland, Wyoming, and also in the
reformatory at El Reno, Oklahoma, and had been in
jail a number of times in Rawlins. It was probably
this fact, among others, which induced the jury to
find a verdict merely of aggravated assault and bat-
tery.

1. It is contended by counsel for the defendant
that the court erred in overruling the motion for a di-
rected verdict in favor of the defendant and that the
evidence was insufficient to convict her, particularly
in that there was no showing of any malice or intent
on the part of the defendant to shoot or injure San-
chez. We cannot agree with counsel for the defendant.
They refer in the main to the testimony of the defend-
ant and ignore the testimony of Sanchez. In consider-
ing the point here urged, we must, in accordance with
a well-known rule, disregard the testimony of the de-
fendant insofar as inconsistent with the testimony of
Sanchez and consider only the testimony which tends

_

to show the guilt of the defendant. When the defend-
ant got the pistol mentioned in the information herein,
she was almost if not quite, according to her own testi-
mony, out of danger, if ever she was in any. According
to Sanchez, he was scared. He held up his hands.
When told to get out of the house he agreed. He
started down the hall of the building which was some
40 feet in length with his back to the defendant in
order to go out of the front door of the building. De-
fendant followed with the gun in hand just as a hunter
stalks his prey. When they got to the front door and
Sanchez lowered his hands, perhaps to open the door,
she shot him, inflicting a wound which doubtless would
have been fatal had it not been for the timely operation
upon Sancliez by Dr. Paul. Sanchez fell or sank down
on the floor. Instead of helping the boy, who was al-
most mortally wounded, she nudged him to get out,
which he did shortly thereafter. This testimony was,
we think, more than ample to justify the jury in find-
ing that the defendant in inflicting the injury upon
Sanchez acted maliciously and with intent to injure
him. See 41 C.J.S. Homicide § 316, p. 27. It is true that
Sanchez testified that when he let his hands fall down
when they reached the outer door he “guessed” she got
excited. But the jury were not compelled to accept
that interpretation.

We do not, and the jury evidently did not, judging
from their verdict of a comparatively minor offense,
overlook the fact that any woman, even one who is
“plying her trade”, would resent the crude, insolent
manner in which Sanchez referred to her, whose favors
he sought, as a prostitute. The jury doubtless would
have overlooked a moderate punishment inflicted upon
him, but for the defendant to carry her resentment to

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the extent indicated by the testimony cannot be con-
doned. The contention above mentioned is overruled.

2. Counsel for defendant and appellant contend that
it was error for the court to give Instruction 17 which
reads as follows:

“The Court instructs the jury that in weighing
the evidence in a case of this kind, it is within
the province of the jury to take into consideration
your own knowledge and experience in arriving
at your conclusions.”

Counsel contend that the jury can only consider know-
ledge and experience which they possess in common
with mankind in general and that contention is well
taken. See Annotations on the subject in 144 A.L.R.
932 and 104 A.L.R. 1017. See also Casper Lodge No,
22, 1.0.0.F., etc. v. Corbridge, 74 Wyo. 244, 286 P.2d
1047, 1056. There can be no doubt that jurors may
not act upon knowledge of a particular fact known
only to themselves. 58 Am.Jur. Trial § 819, p. 602.
How far a court may go in connection with an instruc-
tion on this subject without committing reversible er-
ror is not altogether clear. The expressions used by
the courts and authorities generally are not altogether
uniform. Thus it is said in 58 AmJur. Trial § 918,
p. 656, that jurors “may give effect to such inferences
as common knowledge or their personal observation
and experience may reasonably draw from the facts
directly proved.” In Rosenbaum v. State, 38 Ala. 354,
it is said that an instruction is not erroneous which
tells the jury that they may consult their general
knowledge and their own experience in life in a crimi-
nal case. In Heal v. Stoll, 176 Wis. 187, 185 N.W. 242,
246, it is said that a jury is not bound “to ignore en-
tirely their own knowledge and experience with re-

_

spect to the elements which combine to constitute the
value of the land.” In State ex rel. State Highway
Commission v. Stoddard Gin Co., Mo.App., 62 S. W.2d
940, the court said that it was not error to tell the jury
that they might take into consideration their own ex-
perience and observation in the common affairs of life.

It would have been better if the instruction com-
plained of in this case had directed the jury that they
might consider their knowledge and experience in com-
mon with mankind in general and the instruction given
herein, we think, should be avoided in the future. Still
we must determine as to whether or not the giving of
the instruction as it reads was reversible error and
whether it affected the substantial rights of the de-
fendant. We must in this connection consider Instruc-
tion 25 which reads as follows:

“Tt is your duty as jurors to decide this case
upon the law and on the evidence as you have
heard it here in Court, and when you retire to the
jury room you should not refer to, discuss or con-
sider anything in connection with the case except
the evidence received upon the trial and the in-
structions of the Court. All extraneous matters,
statements and suggestions should be carefully
disregarded by you, and you should base your ver-
dict solely upon the evidence, and guided by these
instructions alone.”

If the jury had received the impression from Instruc-
tion 17 that they could act upon their own personal
knowledge of a particular fact known only to them-
selves, it would have been reversible error, but the
instruction does not go that far. It specifically states
that the knowledge and experience which the jurors
have is limited to weighing the evidence in this case.
Instruction 25 specifically states that they cannot re-

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fer to, discuss or consider anything except the evidence
received in the trial of the case. Thus that instruction
substantially specifically instructs the jury that they
cannot act upon knowledge of a particular fact known
only to themselves. Taking the two instructions to-
gether, we do not think that we can say that the giv-
ing of Instruction 17 is reversible error or affected
the substantial rights of the defendant.

8. Perhaps the most troublesome question in the
case is as to whether or not the court should have given
Instruction A asked by defendant reading as follows:

“You are instructed that a person may lawfully
arm herself in reasonable anticipation of a danger-
ous attack and the mere fact of arming does not
justify an inference that it was done for the pur-
pose of attacking Evan Augustine Sanchez.

“Therefore if you find that the defendant,
Dorothy Brown, armed herself in reasonable anti-
cipation of a dangerous attack by Evan Augustine
Sanchez, this fact does not deprive the defendant
of the right of self-defense nor may you infer
from this fact alone that she held the gun for any
other purpose than to defend herself.”

The court refused to give it and this is claimed to be
reversible error. Instead the court gave Instructions
18 and 19 reading as follows:

“Tnstruction No. 18. The Court instructs the
jury that the right to defend one’s self against
danger, not of his own seeking, is a right which
the law not only concedes but guarantees to all
men. The defendant may, therefore, have shot
her assailant, either accidentally or intentionally,
and still be innocent of any offense against the
law. If, at the time she shot the prosecuting wit-

ness, you find from the evidence that she had
reasonable cause to apprehend on the part of the
prosecuting witness a design to do her serious per-
sonal injury, and there was reasonable cause for
her to apprehend immediate danger of such design
being accomplished, and to avert such apprehend-
ed danger, she shot, and at the time she did so,

she had reasonable cause to believe, and did be-
lieve, it necessary for her to shoot in the way she
did to protect herself from such apprehended
danger, then, and in that case, the assault was not
felonious, but was justifiable, and you ought to
acquit her upon the ground of necessary self-de-
fense. It is not necessary to this defense that the
danger should have been in fact actual or real, or
that the danger should have been impending and
immediately about to fall. All that is necessary is
that defendant had reasonable cause to believe,
and did believe, these facts. But, before you ac-
quit on the ground of self-defense, you ought to
believe that the defendant’s cause of fear and ap-
prehension appeared, at the time, reasonable to
er.”

“Instruction No. 19. The Court instructs the
jury that if you believe, from the evidence, that
the defendant, Sheila Brownley, was acting in self-
fense, believing that she was in imminent danger
of serious bodily harm or injury, as elsewhere ex-
plained in these Instructions, and that she con-
tinued to act in self-defense, at the time she fired
the shot in question, then defendant would be en-
titled to an acquittal. Under the law of self-de-
fense, a person has the right to defend herself,
and to fire a shot at her assailant, so long as the
danger of serious bodily harm or injury to her
person, real or apparent, considered from the de-
fendant’s standpoint, continues to exist. If the
defendant fired the shot in question in self-de-
fense, as explained in these Instructions, or if the
gun was accidentally discharged, at the time the
prosecuting witness, Evan Augustine Sanchez, was
shot, you should find the defendant not guilty.”

ee ”

The asked instruction was probably taken from what
we said in State v. Bristol, 58 Wyo. 304, 84 P.2d 757,
761, 762, reading as follows:

“Tt has been held that one may lawfully arm
himself in reasonable anticipation of a dangerous
attack. * * * To do so may, of course, have a tend-
ency to show the state of mind of the defendant,
although it has been held that the mere fact of
arming does not justify the inference that this
was done for the purpose of attacking the de-
ceased. * * *”

The Bristol case did not involve any instruction on the
subject. What was said was in connection with the
question as to whether or not Bristol] was the aggres-
sor. If any instruction similar to that asked is given
it should probably characterize the “dangerous attack”
more particularly, as, for example, the instruction
which was held should have been given in State v.
Burkett, 30 N.M. 382, 234 P. 681, 685, where the in-
struction asked reads as follows:

“You are instructed that one who has reason-
able grounds to believe that another will unlaw-
fully attack him, and that the anticipated attack
will be of such a character as to endanger his life
or limb, or to cause him serious bodily harm, has
aright to arm himself for the purpose of resisting
such attack.’ ”

The law relating to the duty of the court to give an
instruction on the right of the accused to arm himself
is stated in 41 C.J.S. Homicide § 878 ¢ (4), pp. 177, 178,
as follows:

“Where the court restricts the issue of self-de-
fense by submitting the issue of provoking the
difficulty, as considered supra subdivision b of this

—

section, it should also instruct the jury as to ac-
cused’s right to arm himself in anticipation of dan-
ger, and, where such an instruction is warranted
by the evidence, a refusal to give it constitutes er-
ror. Such an instruction, however, is neither ne-
cessary nor proper where such an issue is not
raised by the evidence in the case, as where the
evidence shows that, although accused was car-
rying a weapon at the time, he was doing so mere-
ly as was his usual custom, and not in anticipation
of danger from deceased; nor is such an instruc-
tion required where the court instructs as to self-
defense without any limitation as to provoking the
difficulty.”

This statement is contained under the subject of homi-
cide but we think it would be also applicable here. The
court in State v, Burkett, supra, in referring to this
statement, states as follows at 234 P. 685:

“Examining the numerous Texas decisions cited
to this section, we find the distinction very clearly
drawn between cases wherein the instructions
gave the defendant the perfect right of self-de-
fense, and those in which such right was abridged
or limited by the instructions by submitting the
issue of provoking the difficulty. In the former
class of cases it is not necessary to instruct as to
the right of the defendant to arm himself in an-
ticipation of attack. Smith v. State, 81 Tex.Cr.
868, 195 S.W. 595. But otherwise in the latter
class of cases. Brown v. State, 85 Tex.Cr. 493,
213 S.W. 658.”

Special circumstances might require the court to give
an instruction on the right of one to arm himself. See,
for instance, Bevley v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 210, 38
SE.2d. 331. We know of no special circumstance in
this case.

= °

It is at least doubtful that the asked instruction
fitted the facts appearing herein. The attack by
Sanchez to which the defendant testified was over.
Sanchez had apparently gratified the purpose for
which he had come. The defendant testified that af-
ter she got the gun the defendant was in the pantry.
She did not claim that she then apprehended a second
attack. According to her, she ordered Sanchez to
Jeave which he proceeded to do. She followed him at
a distance of six feet with the gun in her hand. She
did not remember whether or not he held his hands
up, so that we may accept the testimony of Sanchez
that in fact he did so. When they arrived at the front
door defendant stated that she reached to open the
door but that Sanchez lunged “like he was going to
take the gun away from me”. This hardly shows or
indicates that, as stated in asked Instruction A, there
was any reasonable anticipation on her part of a second
dangerous attack upon her.

Furthermore, the instructions given by the court
on self-defense stated that under the facts mentioned
therein the defendant had a right to shoot and kill if
necessary. That right necessarily included the right
to arm herself. That is doubtless the reason why it
is stated in 41 C.J.S. Homicide § 878 ¢ (4), p. 178, that
it is not necessary to give an instruction on the right
to arm one’s self where the court instructs as to self-
defense without any limitation as to provoking the
difficulty. No instruction on the subject of provoking
the difficulty was given in the case at bar, and we,
accordingly, see no reason why we should not accept
the rule as stated above, and so we cannot hold that
the refusal to give Instruction A was reversible error,

_

4, Counsel for defendant complain of the giving of
Instructions 6 and 7. These instructions relate to as-
sault with intent to commit murder or manslaughter.
All that need be said as to these instructions is that
in view of the fact that the defendant was not con-
victed of either of these offenses they were not pre-
judicial.

Counsel for defendant also complain of the giving
of Instruction 10 which reads in part as follows:

“You are further instructed that the intent to
kill is not an element of either aggravated assault
and battery or simple assault and battery, and the
defendant may be found guilty of either of these
two crimes even though you should find from the
evidence that she did not intend to kill Evan
Augustine Sanchez, provided, of course, that you
find from all the evidence, beyond a reasonable
doubt, the presence of all the other facts which
are necessary to constitute these crimes.” (Em-
phasis supplied.)

Counsel say that this instruction should not have left
the jury to speculate or guess what the court meant
by “the presence of all the other facts which are ne-
cessary to constitute these crimes.” We think, how-
ever, that the court’s instruction in that respect is
sufficient and was covered by two instructions of
the court.

In view of what we have said, it follows that the
conviction and judgment of the court herein must be
and are affirmed.

Affirmed,

—

Lela Irene MAFFEI and Lela Trene Maffei, Guardian
Ad-Litem of Charles Albert Maffei, Carol Irene Maf-
fei and John Jay Maffei, Minors, Appellants (Plain-
tiffs below),

v.

INCORPORATED TOWN OF KEMMERER,
Wyoming, Appellee (Defendant below).
No. 2843,

Supreme Court of Wyoming.
April 21, 1959.

388 Pac.2d 808

ry
o

Lee S. Nebeker, Green River, and Richard L. Bird,
Jv., and C. J. Frost, Salt Lake City, Utah, for appel-
lants.

Edgar J. Herschler, Kemmerer, for appellee.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

OPINION.

Mr. Justice HARNSBERGER delivered the opin-
ion of the court.

Plaintiffs alleged the town brought about the death
of their husband and father through negligence of its
police officer in directing deceased to assist him in the
pursuit of a felon without warning deceased of the
dangerous nature of the pursuit and that defendant’s
procuring liability insurance which required the insur-
er not to deny liability on account of municipal im-
munity except upon written request of the town (which
was not made) waived the town’s municipal immunity.
When defendant’s demurrer was sustained plaintiffs
elected to stand upon their pleading. The case was
dismissed and plaintiffs appeal.

By claiming there was a waiver of municipal im-
munity, the plaintiffs tacitly conceded the town did
possess an immunity. Notwithstanding, we will dis-
cuss that matter at some length. In addition appel-
lants ask us to decide: (1) If the insurance company
was estopped to plead immunity; (2) if plaintiffs have
an action as third-party beneficiaries under the insur-
ance contract; (8) if the immunity question could be
raised by demurrer.

o

The appellee says a cause of action was not stated
because: (1) There was a failure to plead whether the
town was acting in governmental or proprietary ca-
pacity; (2) in the absence of statute, the town is im-
mune from liability when exercising its governmental
function; and (8) the town cannot waive its immunity
by procurement of insurance.

As many of these various contentions will be dis-
cussed as are deemed best suited to disposition of the
case.

Although our decision in Savage v. Town of Lander,
77 Wyo. 157, 164, 165, 309 P.2d 152, 153, 154, indi-
cated that good pleading requires alleging the capacity
in which the town acted, the facts set forth in the in-
stant case sufficiently disclosed the town had acted in

a purely governmental capacity and appellants do not
assert otherwise. This being so, the further statement
in the Savage case has bearing:

“Any analysis of an action for personal injury
against a town must be considered in the true
legal perspective governing the tort liability of a
municipality—as distinguished from a private cor-
poration or an individual, The law on this subject
is too well settled to admit of serious controversy.
A municipal corporation has a dual nature or ca~
pacity, one public, and the other private, and ex-
ercises twofold functions and duties. The rule is
generally recognized that in the absence of sta-
tutory provision there can be no recovery against
a municipal corporation for injuries occasioned by
its negligence or nonfeasance in the exercise of a
function which is essentially governmental in
character, * * *”

This last sentence, which merely voiced a well-recog-
nized rule of law, undoubtedly committed us to accept-

a

ance of the doctrine of municipal immunity, absent
a statutory provision to the contrary. Now, this ap-
peal directly challenges us to renounce this generally
recognized doctrine of municipal immunity and to ju-
dicially declare that what is said to be a modern and
better public policy is the law of this State. This we
may not do.

In the first place, appellants cite us no authorities
directly in point to support their contention. The only
case in point we have discovered to support the theory
that a court is privileged to repudiate the general rule
giving immunity to towns from liablity for tort is Har-
grove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 1957, Fla., 96 So.2d
130, 60 A.L.R.2d 1193. There it was claimed that any
recession from the court’s prior decisions holding mu-
nicipal corporations immune from liability for torts
of police officers and making towns liable for such
torts under the doctrine of respondeat superior must
come from legislative rather than from judicial action.
The court was of divided opinion but the majority in
direct and forceful language rejected the thought. The
majority decision, however, would be much more per-
suasive were it not that we believe the learned court
proceeded upon an unfirm premise. The opinion writer
at page 182 in 96 So. 2d and at page 1196 in 60 A.L.R.
2d said:

“Tracing the rule [doctrine of municipal im-
munity] to its ultimate progenitor we are led to
the English case of Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.
R. 667, 100 Eng.Rep.R. 359 (1788). * * *”

The court then stated:

“Assuming that the immunity rule had its in-
ception in the Men of Devon case, and most legal

eT

historians agree that it did, it should be noted that
this case was decided in 1788, some twelve years
after our Declaration of Independence. Be that
as it may, our own feeling is that the courts should
be alive to the demands of justice. We can see
no necessity for insisting on legislative action in
a matter which the courts themselves originated.”
(Emphasis supplied.) Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa
Beach, Fla., 96 So.2d 180, 132, 60 A.L.R.2d 1193,
1196.

We interpret these expressions as meaning the Flori-
da court considered the doctrine of municipal immunity
originated by virtue of pronouncement made in Russell
v. The Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep.R. 359.
We believe that assumption is not justified because of
what was said inthe opinion in the Devon case, which
was an action in which an individual sought recovery
against the inhabitants of a county for injuries sus-
tained because of alleged negligence of the county. In
the major opinion at 2 T.R. 673, 100 Eng.Rep.R. 362
it was said:

«et + * there is no law or reason for supporting
the action; and there is a precedent against it in
Brooke: though even without that authority I
should be of opinion that this action cannot be
maintained.” (Emphasis supplied.)

To the same effect the concurring opinion said at
2 T.R. 673, 100 Eng.Rep.R. 363:

«oe + * However there is no foundation on which
this action can be supported; and if it had been
intended, the Legislature would have interfered
and given a remedy, as they did the case of hue
and cry. Thus this case stands on principle: but
I think the case cited from Brooke’s Abridgment
is a direct authority to shew that no such action
could be maintained; and the reason of that case

a

is a good one, namely because the action must be
brought against the public.’ (Emphasis sup-
plied.)

While we have been unable to find the full report
of the case abridged by Brooke, the language used by
the opinion writers in the Devon case clearly indicates
that antecedent to Russell v. The Men of Devon, supra,
a previous judicial pronouncement had recognized the
doctrine of municipal immunity. We do find, however,
in II Holdsworth’s History of English Law, 8d ed., p.
545, a reference stating the author of Brooke’s Abridg-
ments died in 1558. So it is clear the early decision
Brooke abridged was made before that year.

We have also procured from the Lawyers Co-opera-
tive Publishing Company a photographic reproduction
of the digest of the case as it appears in the editor’s
1586 edition of Brooke’s “La Graunde Abridgment”,
as well as a photographic reproduction of the report
itself as it appears in the 1680 edition of Year Book,
Easter 5 Edward IV 2, pl. 24. Both of these seem to
be written in medieval French. A careful and studied
translation of these documents coincides substantially
with the meaning ascribed to them by one of counsel
in the Devon case, 2 T.R. 669, 100 Eng.Rep.R. 360,
who represented it to be as follows:

«e & © if an highway be out of repair by which
my horse is mired, no action lies, ‘car est populus
et surra reforme per presentment ;’ which must be
understood to mean, that, as the road ought to be
repaired by the public, no individual can maintain
an action against them for any injury arising
from their neglect.”

Section 16-301, W.C.S.1945, says the Common Law
of England prior to the fourth year of James I (1607)

“shall be the rule of decision in this state.” Thus by
statute the doctrine of municipal immunity became the
rule of decision in our State and it is only by statute
that the doctrine should be abrogated.

Under these circumstances we are not free to ac-
cept the Florida court’s theory as stated in Hargrove
v. Town of Cocoa Beach, supra, and abolish the doc-
trine by judicial decree. Nor are we prepared to go
along with the Florida court’s assumption that the
1788 judicial recognition of the common law of Eng-
land amounted to a court-originated doctrine. It seems
more logical to conclude the doctrine was already a
part of the common law, engrafted therein through
long usage and custom.

In 88 Am.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 573, p. 265,
it is said:

“Following the decision in Russell v. Devon
County, it became a settled principle of the com-
mon law that an individual could not maintain an
action against a political subdivision of the state
for injury resulting from negligence in the per-
formance of any governmental function. * * *”

We cannot say the statement is inaccurate, although
it might well be noted that the opinions in the Devon
case only gave recognition to a principle which had
been applied in an earlier decision rendered at least
prior to 1558 in which the same doctrine was an-
nounced.

In the same volume of 88 Am.Jur. Municipal Corpo-
rations, § 620, pp. 317-319, instances are given where
the doctrine of municipal immunity has been upheld.
These included saying at page 319:

=

« * * Likewise, a municipal corporation is not
liable for a personal injury incurred by a citizen
who was called upon by police officers to assist
them in making an arrest. * * *”

At page 320, it is said:

“The modern tendency is against the rule of
nonliability of municipal corporations for the acts
of their policemen, * * *

citing Evans v. Berry, 236 App.Div. 384, 258 N.Y.S.
473 ; 262 N.Y. 61, 186 N.E. 208, 89 A.L.R. 387, and in a
footnote says:

“The tendency to apply the rule of respondeat
superior has been noted with approval in articles
by Professor Borchard entitled ‘Governmental Re-
sponsibility in Tort’ (28 Columbia L.Rev. pp. 577,
735), and ‘Government Liability in Tort’ (34
Yale L.J. 229, 240), and in a note on ‘Municipal
Responsibility for the Torts of Policemen’ (42
Yale L.J. 241); an article by the late Attorney
General Hamilton Ward on ‘Municipal Liability’
(Vol. 2, No. 7 [Sept. 1930] N. Y. State Bar Asso.
Bulletin, p. 402) ; a note in 16 Cornell Law Quar-
terly, 359; and ‘The Extension of Municipal Lia-
bility in Tort’? by Charles W. Tooke (19 Virginia
L.Rev. 97).” (Emphasis supplied.)

Assuming that the “modern tendency” referred to
means that courts are disposed to apply the rule of
respondeat superior in actions against municipalities,
we examine the authorities cited.

In Evans v. Berry, supra, the State of New York
had conferred “home rule” upon the city, granting it
legislative powers. Exercising this legislative power
the city expressly waived its municipal immunity. In
consequence, the decision rested solely upon the legis-

aT

lative action taken rather than in judicial decree dis-
carding the doctrine of municipal immunity. The case
does not, therefore, support the conclusion that mod-
ern judicial tendency is away from the immunity.

Borchard’s writing in 28 Colum.L.Rev. 577, 603,
dwells at length upon the desirability of abrogating
the doctrine of municipal immunity, but says:

«* * * In England and the United States, statute
alone can abolish the anachronisms of Kings that
do no wrong and States that are above the law
and cannot even be sued. * * *”

Nowhere does the author claim it is modern tendency
of courts to abolish the rule of nonliability of munici-
pal corporations. The same writer in 34 Yale L.J. 229,
240, says flatly:

“With respect to the torts of police officers,
there is an unusual degree of unanimity against
municipal liability. * * *”

The article in 42 Yale L.J. 241 contains nothing to
support the statement.

The article of the New York State Attorney General
in Vol. 2, No. 7, N.Y.S.B.A. Bull, 402, Sept. 1930, only
advocates legislative action to remove governmental
immunity, and similarly the article in 16 Cornell L.Q.
359 deals only with legislative action. Neither article
indicates any modern tendency of courts.

The writing of Charles W. Tooke in 19 Va.L.Rev.
97, 106, says:

«ct * * as many activities, now classed as govern-
mental, are put upon a self-liquidating basis, the

a

courts may reclassify these enterprises as pro-
prietary in order to subject their conduct to the
ordinary rules of civil liability. But beyond these
limits even the more progressive courts do not
feel justified in going. * * *’ (Emphasis sup-
plied.)

The author notes the Supreme Court of Ohio aban-
doned governmental and proprietary classification, in
the case of Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 1919, 100
Ohio St. 158, 126 N.E. 72, 9 A.L.R. 181, and this was
followed in Kaufman v. City of Tallahassee, 1922, 84
Fla. 684, 94 So. 697, 30 A.L.R. 471. But Ohio in 1922
in Aldrich v. City of Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342,
140 N.E. 164, 27 A.L.R. 1497, repudiated the Fowler
decision although Florida in City of Tallahassee v.
Kaufman, 87 Fla. 119, 100 So. 150 in 1924 persisted
in its former opinion.

Following this recount, the writer says:

“With the exception of these jurisdictions, the
courts of no state have felt at liberty to abandon
the prevailing doctrine of the immunity of muni-
cipal corporations for the negligence of their of-
ficers and agents in performing governmental
functions. The courts fully recognize the diffi-
culty of adjusting the doctrine to the now prevail-
ing principle of the complete subordination of mu-
nicipal corporations to the legislative will in all
matters that are of general state concern. * * *”
19 Va.L.Rev. 97, 107.

* * * * * *

“x * * While they [the courts] may admit the
glaring defects in the present law, they feel that
any changes that should be made must be left to
the wisdom of the legislature. As expressed by

a

the Supreme Court of Kansas [McGraw v. Rural
High School Dist. No. 1, Linn County, 120 Kan.
418, 414, 243 P. 1038, 1039]:

“ Tf the doctrine of state immunity in tort sur-
vives by virtue of antiquity alone, is an historical
anachronism, manifests an inefficient public poli-
cy and works injustice to everybody concerned,
* * * the Legislature should abrogate it. But the
Legislature must make the change in policy, not
the courts.” ” (Emphasis supplied.) 19 Va.L.Rev.
97, 108.

The very writings which are advanced as authority
are in essence in disagreement with the statement
that the modern tendency is against the rule of non-
liability of municipal corporations.

Appellants, like some courts, seem to feel that de-
cisions holding certain charitable institutions are
stripped of their immunity by purchase of insurance
are determinative of the liability of municipalities
which have bought insurance.

Appellants also place great reliance upon Thomas
v. Broadlands Community Consolidated School Dist.,
348 Tl App. 567, 109 N.H.2d 636 (Nov.1952), where
it is said the reasoning in Moore v. Moyle, 1950, 405
Tl. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81, a suit against a charitable in-
stitution which carried insurance, applied with equal
force to the case then before the court. It might be
well to look into the development of Illinois law re-
garding these immunities. In the early case (1905)
of Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 381, 75
N.E, 991, 993, 2 L.R.A.,N.S., 556, 4 Ann.Cas. 103, lia~
bility was sought to be imposed upon the University, a
private charitable corporation, for negligent acts of
its professor which resulted in injury to a student.

———— °

The court there gave recognition to the doctrine that
counties and towns, in performance of governmental
functions, are not subject to the doctrine of respondeat
superior respecting delinquencies of their agents or
officers for the reason those municipalities are arms
of the state and the nonliability of sovereignty covered
them. The opinion then said:

«* * * But the exemption according to charitable
institutions does not rest alone on the doctrine
that the state or the sovereign is not liable for
the acts of its servants. The doctrine of re-
spondeat superior does not extend to charitable
institutions for the reasons, ‘first, that if this lia-
bility were admitted the trust fund might be whol-
ly destroyed and diverted from the purpose for
which it was given, thus thwarting the donor’s
intent, as the result of negligence for which he
was in no wise responsible; second, that since the
trustees cannot divert the funds by their direct
act, from the purposes for which they were do-
nated, such funds cannot be indirectly diverted by
the tortious or negligent acts of the managers of
the funds or their agents or employees.’ 5 Am.
& Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Hd.) 928. * * *” Parks
v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 881, 75 N.E.
991, 993, 2 L.R.A.,N.S., 556, 4 Ann.Cas. 103.

This amounts to saying a charitable institution is not
exempt from liability for tort but its trust funds are.

In Moore v. Moyle, 405 Il. 555, 92 N.E. 2d 81,
where recovery was sought against a Polytechnic In-
stitute, a charitable institution, on whose equipment
plaintiff had been injured, after noting the Parks
decision had been followed in other decisions of that
state, a divided court held that while generally trust
funds of a charitable institution are exempt from lia-
bility for torts of its agents and employees, such im-

a

munity did not impose a disability to be sued in tort
and mentioned that in Vanderbilt University v. Hen-
derson, 23 Tenn.App. 135, 127 S.W.2d 284, 287, the
court gave approval to the idea that the exemption
and protection afforded was not an immunity from
suit or of nonliability for tort, but protection for
trust funds. The majority also held that beyond giv-
ing protective immunity to trust funds of a charitable
corporation, the rule of respondeat superior obtained
and tort action would lie against a charitable institu-
tion when, by reason of insurance, liability would not
impair or deplete trust funds. But the Moore case,
supra [405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 86], also says the car-
rying of insurance by a charitable institution “in no
way affects its liability” and that the presence of in-
surance was only of importance when effort was made
to collect a judgment from nontrust property or as-
sets, i.e., as from an insurer. This presents something
of a puzzle. If insurance is of importance only when
effort is made to collect from an insurer— not a party
to the action and hence not subject to the judgment
or execution thereon—the test of a court’s jurisdiction
to entertain a suit against the charitable institution
not only comes after a judgment is rendered against
it but comes in a proceeding to collect from a stranger
to the suit. This is something entirely new in juris-
prudence.

The final conclusion of the majority in the Moore
case, supra, was that it is the law of Illinois:

«*« * * that the trust funds of charitable corpo-
rations are immune from liablity for the torts of
the corporation’s employees and agents. Beyond
that, the rule of respondeat superior is in effect.”
Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81, 87.

a

The opinion of one of the two justices who dissented
points out clearly that the Parks decision, supra, was:

“« * * not merely that the assets of the uni-
versity were exempt from execution on the judg-
ment but that plaintiff was barred from recover-
ing * * *, If, therefore, this court is now holding
that the presence of unprotected assets does not
affect liability—in other words, that judgment
must be rendered on the merits regardless of the
charitable nature of the defendant institution—it
is difficult to see how the present holding can pos-
sibly be reconciled with that of the Parks case.
Moreover, the question presumably of controlling
importance, namely the manner in which a judg-
ment can be collected or enforced, is not before the
court in the present state of the yecord. The issue
to be determined is whether defendant is immune
from liability, not whether a liability reduced to
judgment can be subsequently satisfied from as-
sets held by the institution.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.H.2d 81, 87.

In Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consolidated
School Dist., 348 Ill App. 567, 109 N.E.2d 636, dam-
ages had been claimed against a school district, said
to be a quasi-municipality, for injuries caused by its
alleged negligence. There, as in the instant case, it
was contended the carrying of liability insurance re-
moved whatever immunity the district might possess
as a quasi-municipal corporation. Without discussion
it was held that absent insurance the district was not
liable for injuries resulting from tort. ‘But the court
said that the decision in the Moore case, supra, applied
with equal force and, therefore, the trial court’s dis-
missal of the action on defendant’s motion was re-
versed. The analogy relied upon was that the policy
of protecting against diversion of public funds from
the purpose for which they were intended in the Broad-

a

lands case, supra, corresponded to the policy of pro-
tecting the trust funds of a charitable institution in
the Moore case, supra, for the court said:

«* * * The only justifiable reason for the im-
munity of quasi-municipal corporations from suit
for tort is the sound and unobjectionable one that
it is the public policy to protect public funds and
public property, to prevent the diversion of tax
moneys in this case school funds to the payment of
damage claims. There is no justification or reason
for absolute immunity if the public funds are pro-
tected. * * *” (Emphasis supplied.) Thomas v.
Broadlands Community Consolidated School Dist.,
348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N.H.2d 636, 640.

The court attempted to bolster its decision with the
following quotation in Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47
N.M. 85, 186 P.2d 480, 482, taken from the annota-
tor’s statement in 75 A.L.R. 1196:

“<The whole doctrine of governmental immuni-
ty from liability for tort rests upon a rotten foun-
dation. It is almost incredible that in this modern
age of comparative sociological enlightenment,
and in a republic, the medieval absolutism sup-
posed to be implicit in the maxim, “the King can
do no wrong”, should exempt the various branches
of government from liability for their torts,
* * #7 See Broadlands case, supra, 109 N.E.
2d 686, 640.

and quotation from 54 Harv.LRev. 437, 439:

“TE seems, however, a prostitution of the con-
cept of sovereign immunity to extend its scope in
this way, for no one could seriously contend that
local governmental units possess sovereign pow-
ers themselves.’” See Broadlands case, supra,
109 N.B.2d 636, 640.

a

The harsh language thus used adds nothing of per-
suasiveness. It rather serves to emphasize the im-
propriety of courts of law assuming to base their de-
cisions on their own concept of “sociological enlight-
ment” rather than await legislative reaction to such
claimed modern advancement. It is important to
know that a later decision of the New Mexico court
in Livingston v. Regents of New Mexico College of
Agriculture & Mechanic Arts, 64 N.M. 306, 828 P.2d
78, 82 (July, 1958), resolves the New Mexico position
on the subject, saying:

“We admit that the logic of appellants’ argu-
ment might very well justify a change in the pub-
lie policy of this jurisdiction. We feel, however,
that the appellants’ argument should be addressed
to the legislature and not to this court. In Dough-
erty v. Vidal, 37 N.M. 256, 21 P.2d 90, 93, this
court said:

«oe %* * We are warned, however, that one
branch of government may not safely or wisely
carry its zeal for the rights of the citizen so far
as to encroach upon the functions of a co-ordinate
branch. * * * The Legislature is no doubt as sensi-
tive to injustice as the courts. By unsound or spe-
cious reasoning we might arrive at rough justice
in a particular case. More often we could do
nothing. It is better that all understand that the
legislative responsibility is undivided’ ” (Empha-
sis is that of the New Mexico court.)

The New Mexico Court then inquires:

“Are we to say that the legislature should have
expanded the provisions of the 1941 Act so as to
have permitted recovery in an action such as this;
and that the legislature having failed to do so, we
will declare such to be the policy of this state?”

a
And the court then gives its own answer:

“To do this, we think, would usurp the functions
of the legislative branch of our government.
Dougherty v. Vidal, supra; Vigil v. State, 56 N.M.
411, 244 P.2d 1110.”

Relieved of the excess verbiage which clothes the
Broadlands’ repudiation of the basic doctrine of sover-
eign immunity, the Illinois case amounts to no more
than a judicial change in that which was the law be-
fore the court spoke. The court indicated approval
of the premise that the nonliability of public quasi-
corporation is usually placed upon grounds that the
corporators are made such nolens volens; that their
powers are limited and specific and that no corporate
funds are provided which can, without express pro-
vision of law, be appropriated to private indemnifi-
cation. The court then says that as quasi-municipal
corporations and municipal corporations both function
as arms of the state, the reasons of their immunity
are the same. But the court challenges the contention
that neither the state nor a subdivision thereof can be
sued without consent as being a statement of the rule
without giving its reason, that rule being one of public
policy to protect public funds and public property. It
further says the rule of immunity stems from the
Devon case, supra, and that one of the principal rea-
sons there relied upon was the lack of corporate funds.
The court, however, is silent as to the other matters
hereinabove mentioned to which the Devon court gave
important consideration and as to the unmistakable
conclusion of the Devon court that the lowering of
the bar of municipal immunity was a matter for leg-
islative rather than for judicial action.

a

We can agree that a rule of law which is merely the
product of judicial decision, born of the necessities of
particular circumstance, is subject to judicial repudi-
ation when the reasons which gave rise to its judicial
adoption have failed or no longer exist. We do not,
however, agree that an ancient doctrine firmly im-
bedded in that great body of Anglo-Saxon law which
we inclusively refer to as the “Common Law”, and
which became that law through early usage and cus-
tom, can be judicially abrogated any more than courts
are authorized to abolish statutory law because in
their opinion the reason for the legislative enactment
no longer justified the continuance of the law. That
which is considered to be the merit of a law is not the
criterion upon which courts base their decisions as
to a law’s continued existence. This in no wise affects
the rules of law announced in Johnston v. Laird, 48
Wyo. 582, 52 P.2d 1219 or in Naab v. Smith, 55 Wyo.
181, 97 P.2d 677.

Even should some merit be conceded to the idea that
if moneys provided by taxation for governmental pur-
poses were saved harmless, the only remaining sound
reason for municipal immunity would be removed,
the pleading we are considering would still fall short
of stating a cause of action. This is because the ac-
tion is not limited to recovery from funds received
from such insurance, notwithstanding appellants as-
sert in their brief “* * * the prayer of the complaint is
limited to the insurance coverage in amount * * *”,
Aside from the fact that it is only in appellant’s brief
that the suggestion appears that the “complaint is
limited to insurance coverage”, there is a wide range
of difference between asking judgment in a sum which
merely corresponds in amount to the face value of the
insurance policy, as is true in the instant case, and an

a

action which seeks judgment to be satisfied exclus-
ively from moneys when actually made available from
insurance sources. Under these circumstances no as-
surance is given that tax moneys will not be required
to pay any judgment which might be recovered against
the town. It cannot be assumed that the town will at
all events be reimbursed by the insurance company
for the amounts the town would be compelled to pay
to satisfy a judgment rendered against it. Nor may
it be assumed that the town would even recover a
judgment against the insurance company if and when
the town brought action against the company under
the contract of insurance. Furthermore, if judgment
is obtained by the town against the insurance company
in such an action, it might not be collectible as the
company might become insolvent and unable to make
the required payment. The most the town obtains
by its purchase of insurance is a possible cause of
action against the insurer. On the other hand, the
town’s judgment creditor can always and at all events
make collection from the town whether it has funds
immediately available or must later obtain them by
taxation. See § 32-208, W.C.S.1945.

On the question of alleged waiver of municipal im-
munity by purchase of insurance, appellants first
maintain that § 29-430, W.C.S.1945, authorizing in-
corporated towns “To require from all officers and
servants elected or appointed, bonds and security for
the faithful performance of their duties”, is an implied
statutory waiver of immunity. They submit as their
sole authority for that contention Rogers v. Butler,
170 Tenn. 125, 92 S.W.2d 414. This was a suit against
a county school board of education, where it was held
that such a faithful performance bond is but a mode
of insuring against the consequences of a servant’s

a

negligence and that it was immaterial that the obli-
gation taken was in the form of a liability insurance
policy. However, we find the brief opinion in that
ease to be without citation of any supporting authority.
The conclusion was that either a bond or an insurance
policy served the purpose of the statute and that ob-
taining of either was within the authority granted
the board by statute. Under such a decision, it is
plain that our § 29-480, W.C.S.1945, would be legisla-
tive authority to the town of Kemmerer to purchase
the type of liability insurance present in this case.
From this, appellants reason our § 29-480, W.C.S.1945,
requiring faithful performance by officers of their
duties, is a blanket authority for the purchase of lia-
bility insurance by all governmental instrumentalities
as an incident to the performance of their functions.
While it may be true that an officer’s faithful per-
formance bond and a liability insurance policy are
both intended to give protection to the town, to say
that the giving of legislative authority to provide or
to require the giving of a faithful performance bond
necessarily implies that legislative authority has been
given to either require or permit the town’s obtaining
liability insurance, goes farther than what we believe
was the legislative intention when it enacted § 29-480,
W.C.S.1945. We must, therefore, hold that the section
referred to does not authorize a municipality to pur-
chase liability insurance.

Our understanding of appellants’ next suggestion is
that because the legislative acts of 1947 and 1958, §§
67-647 to 67-652, 1957 Cum.Pocket Supp., W.C.S. 1945,
[see Laws 1947, ch. 108, § 1; Laws 1958, ch. 141, § 1;
Laws 1958, ch. 141, § 2; Laws 1958, ch. 141, § 8; Laws
1955, ch. 61, §§ 1, 2] authorize school districts to ob-
tain insurance policies, the legislature has given re-

—

cognition of the nonimmunity of governmental bodies,
notwithstanding these acts expressly limited the
school districts’ liability to the amount of insurance
coverage. But appellants say “These statutes do not
create any liability and are specifically not a waiver
of immunity from suit”. We cannot dispute this state-
ment. However, by giving this express authority to
obtain insurance, the strongest implication arises that
the means of realizing the benefits of such policies
were also intended to be granted. To this end the
legislative waiver of the districts’ immunity was im-
plied in order that the entitlement of all concerned,
whether in benefit or protection, might be determined.
The logical conclusion, therefore, is not that the acts
mentioned give recognition that governmental ele-
ments are not possessed of immunity from tort action,
but rather that they do have an immunity which the

legislature has seen fit to waive to the extent of sub-
jecting them to a liability limited to moneys made
available from insurance. We do not have any stat-
ute which by implication or otherwise authorizes or
permits a town to obtain liability insurance of the
kind pleaded in this action, nor has any decision of
this court to that effect been called to our attention.

There are many decisions from other jurisdictions
which hold there can be no waiver of a municipality’s
immunity unless by specific legislative authority, and
they are persuasive. Among them are Stephenson v.
City of Raleigh, 232 N.C. 42, 59 S.H.2d 195; Pohland
v. City of Sheboygan, 251 Wis. 20, 27 N.W.2d 736;
Hummer v. School City of Hartford City, 124 Ind.
App. 30, 112 N.EH.2d 891; Wallace v. Laurel County
Board of Education, 287 Ky. 454, 153 S.W.2d 915;
Rittmiller v. School Dist. No. 84, D.C.Minn., 104
F.Supp. 187; Jones v. Scofield Bros. D.C.Md., 73

—————

F.Supp. 395; Marmor v. Port of New York Authority,
203 Misc. 568, 116 N.Y.S.2d 177. We, therefore, hold
it is beyond the power of a municipality to waive an
immunity which it possesses by virtue of its being an
arm of the state’s government and that any waiver
of such an immunity must come by direct action of
the legislature or through the clear and unmistakable
implication of its legislative acts,

We are asked to decide if the insurance company
is estopped to plead immunity, and appellants say:

“To permit an insurance company to take prem-
iums out of public funds for the represented pur-
pose of protecting the public against acts of negli-
gence, and then to hide behind a claim of munici-
pal immunity which was specifically waived by
the policy would be a fraud on the town and on
the residents who supplied the premium funds.”

The insurance company is not a party to this action,
and so there can be no question of its estoppel. If
there was misrepresentation on the part of the insur-
ance company in securing premium payments for an
insurance policy, which under the law of this State it
was not authorized to give, that question of fraud is
likewise not before us in this litigation. As we pres-
ently view the matter, even though the purchase of
insurance should be authorized by statute, the desired
protection cannot be assured, unless the insurance
company is joined in the action as a co-defendant and
made solely responsible to answer to any judgment
rendered, or in the absence of such joinder, any judg-
ment authorized to be rendered is limited to be re-
covered only from moneys made available by the in-
surance company and not otherwise.

a

Appellants also inquire, “Do plaintiffs have an ac-
tion as third party beneficiaries under the insurance
contract?” and say the insurance company is the true
defendant in this action. We do not accept that state-
ment. The town is the only defendant, the true de-
fendant and the real party in interest in the action.
Whether by reason of the insurance policy the plain-
tiff has a cause of action against the town, independ-
ent of any question respecting waiver of immunity—
about which we have already expressed ourselves—is
another matter not within the issues upon this appeal
and will not be considered.

The final answer sought is whether the question of
immunity which we have now answered can be raised
by demurrer. To be explicit, it can.

Although we must hold that in the present state of

the law of this State, the town of Kemmerer is immune
from liability to the family of the deceased, we are
not insensible that this may be inequitable. The de-
ceased may have naturally joined in aid of the local
policeman and suffered death as a consequence. In
this view, Mr. Maffei was acting in a commendable
manner and as might be desired of all good citizens.
In not dissimilar circumstances our legislature has
seen fit to take notice of some shortcomings in our
law and have enacted separate laws for the relief of
bereaved families. It is our misfortune in a case such
as this that we are not privileged to respond to the dic-
tate of our sympathies, but must stay with the law as
we find it.

The order and judgment of the district court sus-
taining defendant’s demurrer and dismissing plain-
tiffs’ action is affirmed.

Affirmed.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.
June 23, 1959.

340 P.2d 759

Lee S. Nebeker, Green River, Richard L. Bird, Jr.,
and C, J. Frost, Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellants.

a

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

OPINION ON REHEARING.

Mr. Justice HARNSBERGER delivered the opinion
of the court.

A petition for rehearing has been filed, explaining
that because of the town’s contract:of insurance the
appellants could not have joined the insurance com-
pany. This is not a ground for rehearing.

The reargument respecting estoppel, waiver, whether
the complaint was limited to recovery against the in-
surance company, and whether there was a miscar-

viage of justice because the insurance company sold
the town a policy of insurance which did not give the
town the purported protection, were all disposed of by
the opinion.

Rehearing denied.

— °
OLIVER W. STEADMAN, Appellant
(Defendant below),
v.
Art T. TOPHAM, Appellee
(Plaintiff below).
No. 2858.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.

April 28, 1959.

888 Pac.2d 820

—

1

a
o

et

Q
a

Meyer Rankin, Cody, and Edward E. Murane, Cas-
per, for appellant.

_ —_—

Goppert & Fitzstephens, J. D. Fitzstephens, Cody,
for appellee.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

OPINION.

Mr. Chief Justice BLUME delivered the opinion of
the court.

This is an action for malicious prosecution brought
by Art T. Topham, hereafter referred to as plaintiff
or by his name, against the Shoshone National Bank
of Cody and Oliver W. Steadman, an attorney at law
of Cody, Wyoming. The Shoshone Bank will here-
after be referred to as the bank and Mr. Steadman will
be referred to either by name or as the defendant.
The petition alleged that the defendants maliciously
and without probable cause filed a criminal complaint
in the justice court at Cody signed and sworn to on
December 19, 1955, by Oliver W. Steadman, reading
as follows:

“T, Oliver W. Steadman, do solemnly swear that
on or about the 9th [8th] day of January, 1955,
in the County of Park and State of Wyoming, the
said Art T. Topham did unlawfully know that a

— °

statement in writing to the Shoshone National
Bank, Cody, Wyoming, a Corporation had been
made respecting the financial condition of the A
& N Surplus, Inc., a Corporation, the said Art T.
Topham being then and there an officer and hav-
ing interest in said Corporation, and did procure
a loan upon the face thereof, from said Shoshone
National Bank, Cody, Wyoming, a Corporation,
for the benefit of said A “ N Surplus, Inc., a Cor-
poration,

“Contrary to the form of the statute in such
case made and provided and against the peace and
dignity of the State of Wyoming.”

The defendants answered, denying that they instituted
criminal proceedings against the plaintiff maliciously
or without probable cause. Steadman admitted that
he executed and filed the foregoing criminal complaint
and alleged that he, believing that a criminal offense
had been committed by Art T. Topham, reported the
matter of the alleged criminal offense on the part of
Topham to the County and Prosecuting Attorney of
Park County, Wyoming, who thereupon caused to be
prepared and filed the criminal complaint mentioned
by Topham in his petition. An arrest of Topham was
made pursuant to the criminal complaint on December
24. He furnished bail in the sum of $200 and was never
imprisoned.

The case was tried to a jury. At the end of the evi-
dence produced on the part of Topham and again after
all the evidence was in, the defendants in the case made
motions to have judgment entered in their favor which
were overruled, But before the case was submitted to
the jury the case against the Shoshone National Bank
was dismissed and the case was submitted to the jury
only as to Steadman. The jury returned a verdict

—

against Steadman for the sum of $10,000 damages in
favor of Topham. Thereafter Steadman filed a mo-
tion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or,
as an alternative, for new trial. The court directed
that Topham should file a remittitur of all damages
in excess of $4,000 or that a new trial would be granted.
The remittitur was filed and thereafter a judgment
was entered against the defendant for the sum of
$4,000 in favor of Topham and against Steadman.
Thereafter supplemental motions for a new trial were
filed by Steadman in the case. Attached, among
other things, were affidavits by N. G. Catellier and
E. M. Casey to show that, as a matter of fact, Top-
ham knew of the financial statement mentioned in the
complaint filed herein and to show that plaintiff Top-
ham testified falsely in the case. Catellier stated in
his affidavit that Topham was familiar with the fi-
nancial statement and had seen it and helped to pre-
pare it, and that Topham was specifically asked in the
bank at the time the loan for $800 was obtained as to
whether or not the financial statement was correct
and that Topham answered in the affirmative. The
affidavit of E. M. Casey stated that Topham and
Catellier attempted to get him to help them get a loan
in January 1955 and that at that time:

“Topham and Catellier had with them a financial
statement showing the financial condition of the
A & N Surplus, Inc., and this financial statement
was discussed briefly with Mr. Topham and Mr.
Catellier ;

% * % * % *

“I do know of my own personal knowledge that
Art T. Topham was familiar with the financial
statement of the company in January, 1956
[1955] because he and Mr, Catellier were present

— °

in my office in Powell and they had the financial
statement with them and if Mr. Topham wanted
to he had full opportunity to study the financial
statement at that time.”

But these supplemental motions were overruled, and
the case is now before us on appeal taken by Oliver
W. Steadman.

The facts leading up to the filing of the criminal com-
plaint above mentioned are briefly as follows: Top-
ham and Catellier were the holders or main holders of
the stock of the A & N Surplus, Inc., a corporation.
They wanted to procure a loan from E. M. Casey above
mentioned. Not having procured that loan, they want-
ed to procure one from the Shoshone National Bank.
A financial statement was executed on January 8,
1955, sworn to on January 9, 1955, showing on hand
merchandise valued at $18,723.42 and but little in-
debtedness. It did not include any indebtedness of
$5,000 mentioned hereafter. The financial statement
was signed by Catellier but not by Topham. On Janu-
ary 22, 1955, the corporation passed a resolution to
permit the borrowing of $3,500 from the foregoing
bank. The signatures attached were those of Topham
and Catellier. The financial statement was given to
the bank, the exact date of which does not appear in
the record. Both Topham and Catellier went to the
bank on January 27, 1955, after the financial state-
ment had been given to the bank and procured a loan
of $800, the note being signed by both on behalf of the
corporation. The note fell due in three months, and
the president of the bank then attempted to procure
a renewal on the note, but Catellier by that time had
apparently severed his connection with the A & N Sur-
plus, Inc., and the renewal note was only signed by
Topham. The old note was retained and together with

the financial statement was placed in the hands of the
defendant Steadman for collection, and a judgment was
obtained thereon on November 30, 1955. On December
16, 1955, while Steadman was trying to discover as to
whether or not Topham had any property on which to
make a levy, he discovered that Topham and Catellier
had executed a mortgage, mortgaging all of the prop-
erty of the A & N Surplus, Inc., the mortgage being
dated December 20, 1954, and acknowledged January
20, 1955, and filed of record in Park County on Janu-
ary 21, 1955. Steadman at that time, namely, on
December 16, 1955, called at the office of the County
and Prosecuting Attorney of Park County, Wyoming,
and laid the matter before him, including the mort-
gage above mentioned, the financial statement, the
note given the bank, and the judgment secured on the
note. The county and prosecuting attorney did not at
that time act upon the information given him by Stead-
man but took the matter under advisement for three
days, in the meantime discussing the matter with his
deputy, and on December 19, 1955, he called Steadman
and advised him that in his judgment a crime had been
committed and that he had prepared a criminal com-
plaint ready for Steadman’s signature. The complaint
was then signed by Steadman as above mentioned. An
amended complaint was filed at the request of the
county and prosecuting attorney on January 9, 1956,
but no arrest was made under that complaint, so that
it is immaterial in the case and need not be mentioned
again. Baird v. Aluminum Seal Company, Inc., 8 Cir.,
250 F.2d 595; Perry v. Arsham, 101 Ohio App. 285, 136
N.E.2d 141.

We might state at this place that in the trial of the
case Topham proved actual damages in approximately
the sum of $400 by reason of making two or three

— °

trips to Cody in connection with the criminal complaint
and paying the sum of $100 to his attorney, and he al-
so testified that he was humiliated and shunned by
some of his friends.

The case under the criminal complaint before the
justice of the peace was continued several times, and
on January 27, 1956, the case was dismissed by the
county and prosecuting attorney,

1. The plaintiff Topham was required to prove in
this case not only that the case was dismissed against
him but also that Steadman acted with malice and
without probable cause in filing the criminal complaint
heretofore mentioned. Henning v. Miller, 44 Wyo. 114,
8 P.2d 825, 14 P.2d 487. We shall hereafter discuss
the case mainly in connection with the question as to
whether or not there was probable cause for Steadman
to file his complaint against plaintiff Topham. The
trial court in that connection in Instruction 5 told the
jury in part as follows:

“You are instructed that the Court has found in
this case that there was want of probable cause,
as a matter of law; and you may infer from this
that there was malice on the part of the defendant
Steadman.”

Counsel for Steadman contend that this instruction
was erroneous.

2. We held in the case of McIntosh v. Wales, 21
Wyo. 397, 184 P. 274, Ann.Cas.1916C, 278, that a dis-
missal of the proceedings at the request of the prose-
euting attorney constitutes no evidence of want of
probable cause since he acts in his official capacity and
not as a representative of the defendant. It is argued

—

by counsel for the plaintiff Topham that this case
should be distinguished from the foregoing case by
reason of the fact that the dismissal herein was en-
tered after the justice of the peace found that no
probable cause existed for arresting Catellier, against
whom also an information had been filed. We do not
think this fact makes any difference, We do not
know what evidence was introduced in the Catellier
case. At least Steadman, who should have been the
main witness, was never summoned or asked to testify
in the case, nor was he asked to testify in the case
filed against the plaintiff Topham. The testimony
shows that there were negotiations between Stead-
man and the attorney for the plaintiff to settle the
judgment against the plaintiff. The judgment was in
fact settled by the plaintiff paying to the bank one-
half of the judgment against him. This was about
nine o’clock in the morning on January 27, 1956.
Thereafter, at about ten o’clock or a little later, the
criminal complaint was dismissed by the county and
prosecuting attorney without the presence of Stead-
man.

8. We shall then proceed to consider the facts and
incidents in connection with the making of the loan of
$800 by the bank. As may be noted below, the evi-
dence of the plaintiff in this connection was mainly
to the effect that the charge against him was not
true, apparently on the theory that this would show
want of probable cause. All the testimony was ad-
mitted without objection so that we need not inquire
as to its relevancy. See on that matter 54 C.J.S. Ma-
licious Prosecution § 89g, pp. 1068-1069, The ques-
tion of probable cause is not dependent on the guilt or
innocence of the plaintiff. These are two different
questions. 54(C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 27, p. 986.

Le «

Hence, we shall first examine the evidence which coun-
sel for plaintiff believe shows the innocence of the
plaintiff and thereafter proceed to discuss the evi-
dence as to probable cause.

a. The uncontroverted evidence in the case is that
at the time the loan was made the officials of the bank
had before them the financial statement of January
8, 1955, above mentioned, and the only reasonable in-
ference to be drawn is that as a matter of fact the
bank in making the loan relied upon that financial
statement. So the only question left before us is as
to whether or not Topham had knowledge of it. The
plaintiff testified that he had no knowledge whatever
of the financial statement which was prepared by Ca-
tellier or whether it was handed over to the bank.
Perhaps the court finding as it did that there was lack

of probable cause as a matter of law credited the testi-
mony of the plaintiff. Ordinarily, of course, a judg-
ment or verdict will not be disturbed where the evi-
dence is conflicting. However, the rule has its limita-
tions. In the case of Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Arbo-
gast, 58 Wyo, 275, 81 P.2d 885, 892, we approved the
following rule:

“This rule [the one relating to conflicting evi-
dence], however, does not relieve an appellate
court of its duty of analyzing the evidence in the
light of reason and human experience and giving
consideration to the motives and propensities
which tend to influence or prompt human action,
in an effort to solve the question as to whether
the judgment is reasonably and substantially sus-
tained by the evidence. * * **

““There must be more than a conflict of mere
words to constitute a conflict of evidence. The
contrary evidence must be of a substantial char-

—

acter, such as reasonably supports the judgment
as applied to the peculiar facts of the case.’ [Her-
bert v. Lankershim, 9 Cal.2d 409, 71 P.2d 220,
251.]”

So we must analyze the facts shown in the record be-
fore us, particularly in view of the fact that actions
for malicious prosecution are not favored. Penton v.
Canning, 57 Wyo. 390, 118 P.2d 1002, 188 A.L.R. 300.

Plaintiff, in order to explain the mortgage in evi-
dence in this case, testified that the mortgage indebt-
edness was that of Catellier, that Catellier borrowed
$5,000 from Krantz which went into the business of
A & N Surplus, Inc., that he and Catellier both signed
a note for that amount on December 20, 1954, and
that the mortgage was not signed or acknowledged
until January 20, 1955. However, the fact that it was
not acknowledged until the later date is not very im-
portant. It is not at all unusual that an instrument is
actually executed on one date and acknowledged later.
When actually executed it is good between the parties
thought not acknowledged. Reynolds v. Morton, 22
Wyo. 174, 186 P. 795. Counsel for plaintiff say that
the $5,000 was not a corporation indebtedness and
therefore would not appear on the financial statement
given to the bank, but if it was not a corporation in-
debtedness, why and how did the plaintiff and Ca-
tellier undertake individually to mortgage property
belonging to a corporation? That fact has not been
explained and seems to throw a dark shadow across
the case.

The evidence shows that the plaintiff owned 80 to
85 percent of the corporation and that he was president
thereof. It would perhaps be not unreasonable, under
these facts, to presume that he had full knowledge

ti ’
of the financial statement above mentioned until the
contrary were satisfactorily proven. Topham’s testi-
mony was that Catellier told him that he had prepared

a financial statement but that he did not know that it
was presented to the bank. He testified further in

relation to the resolution of the corporation as to bor-
rowing money from the bank and his testimony was
as follows:

“Q. And at that time was the board advised
that a financial statement had previously been
given to the bank by the secretary of the corpo-
vation? A. No. ,

“Q. You weren’t advised of that? A. I wasn’t
advised ; I am on the board.

* * Ea * * a

“Q. Iam asking you whether or not the Board
authorized the secretary to give a financial state-
ment to the bank? A.He had that. It was agreed
upon long before that there was,

“Q. That is normal procedure? A. Normal pro-
cedure as far as I was concerned. I’m not fa-
miliar with corporate laws.

“Q. Irrespective of the meeting, isn’t it custom-
ary in your own business experience, if you were
getting a loan from a loaning institution or bank,
you give a financial statement; hasn’t that been
your experience? A. Any business loan; yes.

“Q. This was in business; you were getting a
business loan? A. Understand this was Mr. Ca-
tellier. He was supposed to handle the note. He
pad authorization to make arrangements for a
loan.

“Q. Were those authorizations Mr. Catellier
(sic), if the bank requested a financial statement,
it would have been in line with the authority he
had? A. Yes, it would be his duty.”

And yet in spite of this fact he attempted to make the
court believe the improbable fact that he knew nothing
of a financial statement. He further testified:

“Q. At the time of signing this document [the
note to the bank], did you have any conversation
with either—any of the officials of the bank?
A. I believe we passed the pleasantries of the day,
that is about all.

Ea ES * Es * *

“Q, And you are positive, on your oath, that
there was no discussion, about a financial state-
ment, on the 27th of January, 1955? A. Iam posi-
tive sir. All I done was sign the note.”

It would seem that in view of the fact that nothing
was said in the bank about security for the loan,
something must have been done or said in reference
thereto prior to that time. To say that plaintiff,
though the main owner of the A & N Surplus, Inc.,
did not bother to find out does not appear to be credi-
ble. That was the impression of the county and prose-
euting attorney, a disinterested party, who, after ex-
amining the documents given him by Steadman, stated,
“it was certainly reasonable to believe that Mr. Top-
ham knew of that statement [the financial state-
ment].” As heretofore stated, a few days before the
loan from the bank was made, plaintiff and Catellier
transferred the property of the corporation to Kranz
by mortgage which was foreclosed shortly afterwards
and, accordingly, little or nothing was left in the

—z °

hands of the plaintiff and Catellier with which to pay
the bank. The financial statement did not mention
the mortgage or any indebtedness of $5,000. Topham
stated several times in his testimony that he did not
mention the mortgage when the loan of $800 was ob-
tained, and at one time stated that he was not asked.
Yet it would seem to be clear that common decency
and ordinary honesty on his part would have required
him to inform the bank that all the property of the
corporation was mortgaged to Kranz. It was his duty
to speak, and the failure to do so was a fraud upon the
bank, and for this court to say that under the facts of
this case plaintiff was nevertheless entitled to recover
damages would, we think, be putting a premium on dis-
honesty. Fraud may be perpetrated by silence as well
as by representations and the former is at times the
equivalent of the latter. 387 C.J.S. Fraud §§ 15 and 16,
pp. 242-245. Topham’s evidence under the circum-
stances herein, that he knew nothing about the finan-
cial statement, was, in the words of Montgomery Ward
& Co. v. Arbogast, supra, merely a matter of words
and not of substance. The person who knew all about
it was Catellier. He could not be expected to be sub-
poenaed as a witness by the defendant because pre-
sumably he was a hostile witness, but we can see no
reason why the plaintiff could not have subpoenaed
him and confirmed his statement in connection with
his ignorance in regard to the financial statement,
if actually true. But he did not do so.

In closing this phase of the case, we think that there
are distinct indications in the record that the plaintiff
was actually guilty of the knowledge of the financial
statement and the falsity thereof. There are some
cases that hold that the plaintiff must prove his in-
nocence. The majority of the cases, however, hold

—

the contrary. 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 84b(4),
p. 1056. So we shall not base our decision herein on
the guilt of plaintiff, though we might incidentally
mention the fact that if we should send the case back
for a new trial, plaintiff might find himself in a strait
jacket in view of the statements of Catellier and Casey
heretofore mentioned,

b. We must proceed then to discuss as to whether
or not Steadman, as a reasonably prudent man, had
cause to believe that under the evidence before him
the plaintiff Topham was guilty as charged. That
evidence consisted of the financial statement, the note,
the mortgage and the fact that these documents were
handed to him by the bank. Counsel for the plaintiff
say that among the undisputed evidence “The most
important fact is, of course, that Topham made ab-
solutely no representations whatsoever to the Bank in
connection with the loan and therefore committed no
fraud.” Reference is made to the plaintiff’s testimony
in the case. The so-called “most important fact” is of
no importance at all. Topham was not charged with
making representations but with knowing that repre-
sentations had been made and that he received a loan
on the strength thereof. The note and financial state-
ment were handed to Steadman by the bank, which,
it would seem, gave rise to a reasonable inference that
the bank had relied on that statement when making
the loan. There were no facts giving the impression
that the indebtedness of $5,000 was that of Catellier
or that the property mortgaged was not in fact the
property of the party who signed the financial state-
ment. Steadman found a mortgage before him stating
the following:

“The undersigned, Norbert G. Catellier and Art
T. Topham, of Park County, Wyoming, for the

purpose of securing the payment of Five Thousand
and 00/100 Dollars, and interest according to the
conditions of one promissory note of even date
‘herewith, payable Dec. 20, 1955 for $5,000.00, do
hereby sell and mortgage unto Richard Kranz
and his assigns, the following described property,
now in their possession, to-wit: All inventory,
stock in trade, merchandise, furniture and fix-
tures located in our two stores, known as A & N
Surplus, one store located at 1284 Sheridan Ave.,
Cody, Wyo. and the other store located at 166
Main St., Lander, Wyoming, owned entirely by
me and without any encumbrances and are located
at as stated above.

Ea Ea Ea EY Ea ES

“Witness our hands and seal the 20th day of
December, 1954.

“(signed) Norbert G, Catellier
“(signed) Art T. Topham (Seal)
“(signed) W. F. Messenger Witness”

Thus he found an instrument purportedly executed on
December 20, 1954. It was signed by Topham and
Catellier, mortgaging the property of A & N Surplus,
Inc. The mortgage itself gave the clear impression
that the mortgagors represented the corporation and
that the indebtedness mentioned therein was the in-
debtedness of the corporation which was in existence
on December 20, 1954, giving clear reason to believe
that the financial statement of January 8, 1955, was
false, regardless of the fact that the mortgage was in
fact not acknowledged at that time. If Steadman was
misled as to any of the facts, he was misled by the
action of the plaintiff and Catellier in giving the mort-
gage in the manner above mentioned for which he could

not be held responsible. He had, we think, ample
cause to believe that the financial statement in ques-
tion in this case was false. So the only remaining
question is as to whether or not Steadman had cause
to believe that Topham knew of the making of the fi-
nancial statement. He knew that Topham was the
president of the A & N Surplus corporation, and that he
and Catellier were the sole owners. That, if by noth-
ing else, is shown by the mortgage. We have already
seen the reaction on this point on the part of the coun-
ty and prosecuting attorney, and the same is true, as
hereafter mentioned, on the part of his deputy. We
do not think that we can say that all these men acted
unreasonably or imprudently in believing that Topham
knew of the financial statement. Taking; all the fore-
going facts into consideration, and the inferences rea-
sonably drawn therefrom, we are inclined to believe
that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that
there was a want of probable cause.

4, But to err is human. Lest we be mistaken in ar-
riving at the above conclusion, we shall proceed to ex~
amine the defense of consultation of counsel. It was
said in Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., v. Pherson,
129 Colo. 502, 272 P.2d 643, 647:

“The rule that advice of counsel, properly taken
and relied upon in good faith, is a defense to a
suit for malicious prosecution applies with greater
yeason when the proceeding complained of was in-
stituted by and with the approval of the prosecut-
ing officer * * *.”

To the same effect see Crim v. Crim, Ala. App., 101
So.2d 845, 849; Newell on Malicious Prosecution, 1892,
p. 819. Most of the cases on the subject hold that
this defense, if properly shown, at least establishes

— °

the presence of probable cause. Annotation, 10 A.L.R.
2d 1215, 1246 et seq.

Steadman testified that in an attempt to locate as-
sets of the defendant he, on December 16, 1955, went
to the courthouse and examined the records in the
clerk’s office and accidentally discovered that the
mortgage in evidence in the case covered the same
property which was in the financial statement and
that he examined the latter statement for the purpose
of determining that fact, He testified that he then
went up to the county and prosecuting attorney’s of-
fice, got him to go down with him to the county clerk’s
office to look at the chattel mortgage which was on
file; that he showed him the financial statement and
also the judgment obtained pursuant to suit upon the
note; that he also furnished the county and prosecut-
ing attorney with a copy of the mortgage; that he had
a further conference with him on December 19, 1955;
that he made full disclosure to the county and prose-
cuting attorney of all the facts in his possession; that
the county and prosecuting attorney told him that he
had examined the papers which he had shown him and
had examined the criminal statutes in Wyoming and
that in his opinion a criminal offense had been commit-
ted in that the financial statement which was given to
the bank was false; and that the first time that he,
Steadman, thought of any criminal prosecution was
after he discovered the mortgage on December 16, 1955.

Mr. Jack F. Lewis, County and Prosecuting Attorney
of Park County, Wyoming, testified that he conferred
with Steadman on December 16, 1955, and was shown
the documents, namely, the chattel mortgage, the fi-
nancial statement, the note above mentioned and the
judgment which had been obtained against Topham,

a

and that he advised Steadman that in his judgment a
crime had been committed. Some of the testimony in
detail is as follows:

“Q. Did you have a further conference with
Mr. Steadman [after December 16] with reference
to this matter; and if so, when and where? A.
It was on Monday the 19th, I believe, I called him
and told him that I had gone over the papers and
looked up the criminal statutes and conferred
with my deputy, and that we felt that there was
a criminal offense, and that I had prepared a
criminal complaint, if he wished to sign it.

* % % * * *

“Q. Will you state to the Court and Jury what,
if anything you did say to him relative to this
matter. A. I don’t recall the exact words, but I
most certainly said that I felt there was an of-
fense committed or I wouldn’t have issued the
complaint.

Ea Ok * * * *

“Q. [on cross-examination] He told you facts
that led you to believe that on the 8th day of Janu-
ary, Mr. Topham procured a loan on the face of
this financial statement? A. The facts were pri-
marily the documentary facts.

* Ea ¥* * * *

“Q. Mr. Steadman told you Mr, Topham knew
about this statement? A. I think in the course of
telling me the circumstances, and from the docu-
mentary evidence, that he presented me, that since
the note was signed by both Mr. Topham and Mr.
Catellier, and that the statement was presented
to the bank, that from that evidence it was cer-
tainly reasonable to believe that Mr. Topham
knew of that statement.

Le *

“Q. Mr. Steadman told you that? <A. I wouldn’t
say he told me all of that in so many words, but
from the documentary evidence before me, I cer-
tainly assumed that.

* * Ea Ea % tk

“Q. You don’t remember what he told you; is
that right?. A. Yes, I remember he brought these
documents to me, and he says, I think an offense
has been committed; will you look them over and
see what you think about it.

“Q. Is that all he said? A. Just about; yes.”

Counsel for plaintiff contend that Steadman did not
tell the county and prosecuting attorney all the ma-
terial facts in the case, They say that Steadman did
not advise the county and prosecuting attorney that
no representations were made by Topham and there-
fore no fraud was committed by him. We have already
mentioned that matter heretofore and need not repeat
what we have said. Again they say that Steadman did
not advise the county and prosecuting attorney about
the renewal note given by the bank. That matter is
wholly immaterial. The president of the bank ex-
plained that after the note of $800 given on January
27, 1955, became due he wanted a renewal of the note
so that the bank examiner would not complain of hav-
ing on hand notes which were overdue. The $800 note
dated January 27, 1955, was not in fact paid, what-
ever some of the records of the bank may have shown.
It was retained in the hands of the bank and given to
Steadman and judgment was obtained for the amount
due thereon. Furthermore, we are unable to see that
whatever fraud may have been committed in connection
with the note dated January 27, 1955, was wiped out
by reason of any renewal or attempted renewal of the

_—

note. Again it is contended that Steadman did not
inform Lewis of the fact that the mortgage was not
acknowledged until January 20, 1955. But Lewis saw
the mortgage and obtained a copy of it. It spoke for
itself. Steadman could not give any more information
jn that connection than the mortgage itself conveyed.
Again counsel say that Steadman did not inform the
county and prosecuting attorney of a letter dated De-
cember 6, 1955, directed to Catellier, in which Stead-
man wrote:

“I further wish to inform you that we intend
to take every possible legal recourse to collect this
judgment you people owe, and if you continue to
ignore the situation with respect to this obliga-
tion Iam sure that it is going to be not only un-
pleasant but expensive.”

That letter, if it had any bearing in the case at all, and
we do not think it did, went only at most to the ques-
tion of malice and had nothing to do with the question
of probable cause. Want of probable cause cannot be
inferred from malice. Boyer v. Bugher, 19 Wyo. 463,
120 P. 171, 176; Verdier v, Verdier, 152 Cal.App.2d
3848, 818 P.2d 123; Safeway Stores, Incorporated v.
Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 122 A.2d 457. Moreover, the let-
ter was dated December 6, 1955. Steadman did not dis-
cover the mortgage until December 16, ten days later.
So it is difficult to see that the letter has any bearing
herein,

We think that Steadman informed the county and
prosecuting attorney of all the material facts in this
case which by reasonable diligence he was able to as-
certain. He was not required to seek out the plaintiff
Topham and inquire of him as to the truth of the facts

a .

which he gathered. Haines v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.
Co., 108 Kan. 360, 195 P, 592; Id., 108 Kan. 738, 196
P. 1079.

Counsel say that the jury did not believe that an
attorney of the “vast experience” of the defendant
relied upon the advice of the county and prosecuting
attorney in this case and that the credibility of the de-
fendant was for the jury alone to determine. We have
no doubt that an argument similar to that was made to
the jury in this case and that it had a large influence
in causing the jury to bring in the verdict which they
did. But it has been held that an attorney stands, in
this connection, upon the same footing as any other
person, so that the jury had no right to find otherwise.
In the case of Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Mason, 148
Ind. 578, 46 N.E. 332, 336, the court said:

“= * * Tt seems to be contended, or at least sug-
gested, that advice of counsel is for laymen, and
that John G. Williams, the general manager, who
supervised and directed the prosecution, being him-
self a lawyer of well-known ability, was not en-
titled to be protected in his action by the advice of
counsel. The rule of law is applicable to all persons
in the like circumstances; and one who, for him-
self, or as agent for another, is personally con-
cerned in the bringing or defending of an action,
is always in need of ‘the advice of one who can view
the facts calmly and dispassionately [Cooley on
Torts, 2d Ed., 2121,’ no matter whether he be him-
self an attorney at law or. not. * * *”

Counsel for plaintiff Topham argue that in order
that anyone may rely on the advice of counsel it must
be shown that he sought the advice in good faith and
relied on it in good faith. The point is of considerable
importance so that it deserves thorough investigation.

_

Counsel for the defendant say that Steadman actually
acted in good faith, but they shed little light on the
question. Steadman’s case might have been strength-
ened somewhat if he had testified that he acted in good
faith, but there is no such testimony, except that it
appears from the testimony of the county and prose-
cuting attorney that Steadman believed that an of-
fense had been committed. Counsel for plaintiff say
that the jury were the judges of the credibility of
Steadman and they apparently contend that in view of
that fact the jury were entitled to conclude arbitrarily
that he did not act in good faith. But that contention
is, of course, not true.

54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 51b, p. 1017, lays
down the rule that a defendant is required to (1) seek
the advice of counsel in good faith; (2) to act on the
advice in good faith; and (8) to believe that the charge
is true. And at 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 100,
pp. 1098-1094, it is said that the question of good faith
is ordinarily a question for the jury. The text is sup-
ported by many cases, See also Annotation, 10 A.L.R.
2d 1215, 1246-1252. Judge Tidball in an able opinion
in Henning v. Miller, 44 Wyo. 114, 8 P.2d 825, 14 P.2d
487, discussed to some extent the question of good
faith and belief in the facts, though not in connection
with advice of counsel. The case throws at least some
light on the question before us.

Many cases are silent on the question of good faith
and lay down the absolute rule that one who discloses
all the facts to counsel and only thereafter signs a com-
plaint is fully protected against an action for malicious
prosecution, Thus 34 Am.Jur. Malicious Prosecution
§ 163, p. 797, lays down the rule as follows:

Le "

“® * * On the other hand, if it appears without
dispute that the statements to the attorneys were
truthful, full and complete, giving all material
facts and circumstances within the knowledge or
information of the defendant, then the existence
or nonexistence of probable cause becomes a ques-
tion of law for the court, which should not be
submitted to the jury.”

In the case of Huf v. Hague, 171 Wash. 302, 17 P.2d
844, 846, the court stated:

«* * * In the case of Eberhart v. Murphy, 113
Wash. 449, 194 P. 415, 417, this court said: ‘We
have consistently held that an undisputed showing
that the prosecuting witness had acted upon the
advice of the prosecuting attorney, or other reput-
able counsel, after making a full and truthful state-
ment of all the known facts, made it the duty of
the court to find probable cause as a matter of
law? .

In Kennedy v. Crouch, 191 Md. 580, 62 A. 2d 582, 586,
the court stated:

<e * * TF a person who is contemplating the insti-
tution of a criminal proceeding obtains the advice
of counsel learned in the law and acts thereon, he
is protected not only because the adviser can view
the facts calmly and dispassionately, but also be-
cause he has the ability to judge the facts in their
legal bearings. Proof that he placed the facts fully
and fairly before his counsel and acted upon his ad-
vice is a good defense to the charge of want of
probable cause. * * *” .

In Smith v. Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., 72 Ohio
App. 289, 51 N.E.2d 208, 210, it was said:

«* * * The law provides that if a defendant in an
action for malicious prosecution makes a fair and

—

full disclosure of all the facts, covering the entire
period involved, such disclosure shall constitute
a valid defense to such action. * * *”

In Butler v. Lewis, 818 Il.App. 225, 47 N.H.2d 512,
syllabus 4 is as follows:

“When prosecuting witness fully and fairly
states all facts relative to proposed prosecution
to reputable counsel and receives advice from such
counsel that there is probable cause for a criminal
prosecution, and prosecuting witness acts on that
advice, he has a complete legal defense to an action
for malicious prosecution.”

A case very similar to the case at bar is Jones v. Zim-
merman, 180 Kan, 701, 308 P. 2d 96, 97. In that. case
Zimmerman informed the deputy county attorney in
reference to the facts in the case. He had nothing to
do with the writing of the complaint and did not tell
the deputy county attorney what to put in it, but he
signed the complaint prepared by the deputy county
attorney. The court in that case stated as follows:

“The record shows that the defendant made full
and true disclosure to the deputy county attorney
of all facts within his knowledge * * *. Under the
decisions of this court this is a defense to the
plaintiff’s action. Where a complaining witness
has truthfully laid before the county attorney all
the facts of which he has knowledge and the coun-
ty attorney directs that a prosecution be instituted,
the complaining witness will not be liable in dam-
ages * # ¥?

Numerous authorities to the same effect might be
cited.

We find, accordingly, at least a disharmony in the
cases, although we are not prepared to say that there

Le "

is a real conflict. Perhaps harmony is found in the
fact that the cases which do not mention the question
of good faith sub silentio considered that a prima facie
ease for good faith was made when full disclosure of
the facts was made to an attorney and the advice was
given that probable cause for prosecution existed. We
cannot interpret the decisions of the Washington court,
for instance, any other way. See Simmons v. Gardner,
46 Wash. 282, 89 P. 887, L.R.A.1915D, 16; Borg v.
Bringhurst, 105 Wash. 521, 178 P. 450. In the case of
Lacey v, Porter, 103 Cal. 597, 87 P. 635, 687, we read
that “Taking the advice of counsel, however, tends to
show good faith and honest motives and the absence
of malice.” In the case of Dunlap v. New Zealand
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 109 Cal. 365, 42 P. 29, 30, the
court said:

«& * * Tf, in addition to his own belief he [the
one signing the complaint] seeks the advice of one
learned in the law, and, after a full and fair state-
ment of the facts within his knowledge, is advised
by him that they constitute a crime, his good faith
in prosecuting the offender is corroborated. If, in
addition to this, the person whose advice he seeks
is the officer selected by the people to prosecute
offenders against the laws, and he gives to that
officer all the information that he possesses, and
is then advised by him that a crime has been com-
mitted, and the prosecution is made upon a com-
plaint prepared by that officer, his good faith is
established. Accordingly, it is held that if the
prosecuting witness seeks the advice of such of-
ficer, and lays before him all the facts within his
knowledge relating to the alleged offense, and is
advised by him that they constitute a crime, he is
protected in prosecuting the same, * * *”

Good faith is a state of the mind. No man can read the
mental workings of another except by and through

_

some outward manifestations. Without them no jury
can or is entitled to attribute bad faith to a man’s ac-
tions. Though advice of council in actions like this is a
defense, still, so far as we have been able to discover,
courts will not assume that a man’s actions have been
in bad faith but will assume the contrary unless evi-
dence of bad faith appears. Thus it is said in the case
of McConnel v. Street, 17 Ill. 258, 254, that good faith
is the opposite of fraud and bad faith and its nonexist-
ence, that is to say the nonexistence of good faith, as
in all other cases where fraud is imputed, must be es-
tablished by proof. It is said in 31 C.J.S. Evidence §
126, pp. 745-746, that in the absence of proof to the
contrary it is proper to indulge a presumption that per-
sons act honestly, properly and in good faith. Num-
erous cases are cited. In the case of Wright v. As-
cheim, 5 Utah 480, 17 P. 125, 181, the court referred
to a case where all the undisputed facts known to the
defendant, taken together, would justify in a reasonable
person the honest belief that the facts charged in the
criminal complaint were probably true. The court
then said:

«es + * In such case the defense would be abso-
lute as matter of law, and the jury would have no
right, under the pretense of saying the defend-
ant did not believe, to find against him. If it were
otherwise, the rule that what facts constitute
probable cause in an action for malicious prosecu-
tion is a question of law for the court would have
no meaning or force whatever. The jury might
in every case, no matter what the facts might be
under the pretense of unbelief on the part of the
defendant, find against him. * * *”

In the case of McKenzie v. Canning, 42 Utah 529, 181
P. 1172, 1178, the court stated as follows:

Se »

« * * We think the evidence, without conflict,
shows that the defendant substantially stated to
counsel all the material facts known to him; that
upon them they advised him; that he, on such ad-
vice, instituted the criminal prosecution; and that
in doing so he acted in good faith and upon a well-
grounded belief of the plaintiff’s guilt. It, how-
ever, in effect, is urged that before advice of
counsel may be a defense it must appear, not only
that the defendant fairly stated all the facts to
counsel, and upon them was advised, but also
that the defendant in good faith believed the plain-
tiff guilty of the charge, and that as to such fact
the plaintiff was entitled to the judgment of the
jury. That in some cases, dependent upon the
nature of the evidence, may be true. But before
the jury is justified in rejecting or disregarding
evidence of the defendant’s belief of the plaintiff’s
guilt, there must be some evidence, either from
the nature of the evidence calculated not to justi-
fy such a belief, or tending to show the defend-
ant’s disbelief, or other facts or circumstances to
justify a fair inference of the defendant’s disbe-
lief. In other words, the jury may not arbitrarily
reject the defendant’s evidence showing a well-
grounded belief by him of the plaintiff’s guilt.

The court in Sweatman v. Linton, 66 Utah 208, 241
P. 309, confirmed the two foregoing cases. These
cases relate to the matter of belief in the guilt of the
person who was prosecuted but there is no reason why
the same rule should not apply to all other phases of
good faith heretofore mentioned. In fact, it has so
been held. In the case of Harris v. Woodford, 98 Mich.
147, 57 N.W. 96, the court held that in an action for
malicious prosecution an instruction that probable
cause cannot exist when good faith is lacking is er-
roneous if there is no evidence showing that defendant
acted in bad faith. That case was confirmed in the

—

case of Pawlowski v. Jenks, 115 Mich. 275, 73 N.W. 238.
In that case the court stated as follows:

“The evidence on the trial showed that all the
facts were stated by defendant to his counsel be-
fore the chancery suit was instituted, and that he
was advised that the complainants in that suit had
a meritorious suit. This testimony is uncontra-
dicted, and there are no circumstances which au-
thorize an inference that defendant did not act
in good faith. Under such circumstances, the ad-
vice of counsel made out a case of probable cause.
Le Clear v. Perkins, 108 Mich. 181, 61 N.W. 357
[26 L.R.A. 627]; Poupard v. Dumas, 105 Mich.
826, 63 N.W. 301. Plaintiff’s counsel contends
that probable cause cannot exist where good
faith is lacking, and cites Harris v. Woodford, 98
Mich. 147, 57 N.W. 96. In that case it was said,
‘An instruction that probable cause cannot exist
where good faith is lacking may be proper in a
ease which admits of the question.” This may be
so stated in this case, but, before the force of the
testimony showing probable cause—as by advice
of counsel after a full statement—can be broken,
there must be some testimony impugning the
good faith of the defendant, as was distinctly held
in Harris v. Woodford. There is no such testimony
in this case.”

Similar in effect is the case of Krause v, Bishop, 18
8.D. 298, 100 N.W. 484. In the case of National Surety
Co, v. Page, 4 Cir., 58 F.2d 145, 150, 59 F.2d 370, a
case of malicious prosecution, the court stated:

«ok * * There is no evidence that the advice was
not sought and acted upon honestly and in good
faith upon a full and fair disclosure; and in such
case the rule is well settled that such advice is

conclusive on the question of probable cause.
ce tee

—z °
The foregoing statement was cited with approval and
applied in the case of Thomas v. Hinton, 76 Idaho 337,
281 P.2d 1050. In the case of Bradshaw v. Waterlow
and Sons, Ltd., L.R. (1915) 3 K.B. 527, a case cited and
quoted from by Judge Tidball in the Henning case,
supra, the syllabus is as follows:

“In an action for malicious prosecution the
question whether the defendant took reasonable
-care to inform himself of the facts before he insti-
tuted the prosecution ought not to be left to the
jury unless there is some evidence of his not hav-
ing made proper inquiries; and the question whe-
ther the defendant honestly believed in the
charge which he made ought not to be left to the
, Jury unless there is some evidence of the absence

of that belief.

“There cannot be an absence of reasonable and
probable cause when the Attorney-General has
granted his fiat for the prosecution and it is not
shown that the facts were put before him unfair-
iy.”

In the case at bar, the undisputed evidence is that
Steadman acted upon the advice of the county and
prosecuting attorney. There are no facts in this case
which in any way indicate that he did not act in good
faith. After Steadman conferred with the county and
prosecuting attorney on December i6, 1955, and
showed him the documents relating to the matter, the
county and prosecuting attorney took three days in
which to consider the matter. During that time he
talked it over with his deputy and they both concluded
that a crime had been committed and that Steadman
was justified in signing a criminal complaint. The
county and prosecuting attorney drafted the complaint
and he called Steadman on December 19, 1955, and

_

told him that he had prepared it and that it was ready
for Steadman’s signature. Not until then did Stead-
man sign the criminal complaint involved in this case.

Finally we should call attention to the case of An-

derson v. Friend, 85 Ill. 185, 187, where the court
stated.

«# * * Tf the advice of the attorney selected to
institute and prosecute for crimes and offenses
against the penal code will not protect the prose-
eutor, on the facts fairly stated, we should be at a
loss to know what would protect him short of a
conviction ; but it does protect and shield him from
a suit for malicious prosecution.”

And it seems to us that the case of Laughlin v. Claw-
son, 27 Pa. 328, 330, quoted with approval in-Van
Meter v. Bass, 40 Colo. 78, 90 P. 637, 18 L.R.A.,N.S. 49,
and also again approved in Montgomery Ward & Co.,
Inc., v. Pherson, 129 Colo. 502, 272 P.2d 648, fits the
case at bar. In that case the court stated, among other
things, as follows:

«cs & TF the officers of the state, who are ap-
pointed on account of their legal learning, consider
that a given state of facts is sufficient evidence of
probable cause, how can the private citizen be said
to be in fault in acting upon such facts, and how
can the state condemn him to damages for so do-
ing? To decide so is to use the machinery of gov-
ernment as a trap to ensnare those who trust in
government for such matters, and who ought to
trust in it. If such officers make a mistake, it is
an error of government itself, and government
cannot allow the citizen to suffer for his trust in
its proper functionaries. * * *”

— °

Steadman, though an attorney, is, as heretofore stated,
entitled to the benefit of the rule relating to advice
of counsel the same as anybody else.

In view of what we have heretofore said, we do not
see how we can escape the conclusion that the advice
given to Steadman is a complete defense herein, insofar
as probable cause is concerned, and that, accordingly,
the court erred in not entering judgment in favor of
Steadman notwithstanding the verdict. In view of
what we have said it is not necessary to consider the
question of malice. Lipowicz v. Jervis, 209 Pa. 315, 58
A. 619; Smith v. Patton, 12 Pa.Dist. & Co.R. 398, 395.

In conclusion we should not omit to mention the fact
that Steadman acted very ill-advisedly. The function
of a lawyer is to protect, counsel and advise his clients
and to protect and defend them in court. Howsoever
important it is that the criminal laws of the state be
enforced, yet a lawyer, unless he is the officiating
prosecuting attorney or his assistant, should not en-
gage in filing criminal complaints in connection with
any matter that he handles for a client. That should
be left to the client or to the county and prosecuting
attorney. When a member of the legal profession,
with the exceptions named, files such criminal com-
plaint, he distinctly lowers the dignity of his profes-
sion. What the public thinks as to whether or not he
should file such complaints is clearly shown by the
drastic verdict of the jury rendered in the case at bar.
It should be a warning to every member of the legal
profession.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed with di-
rection to enter judgment in favor of Steadman.

Reversed with direction.

Lloyd E. TWING and Ethel B. Twing,
Husband and Wife, Appellants
(Plaintiffs below) ,

v.

William E. SCHOTT and Helen Schott,
Husband and Wife, Appellees
(Defendants below).

No. 2857.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

April 29, 1959.

338 Pac.2d 839

|

o
a

Lonabaugh & Lonabaugh, R. H. Bennett and E. E.
Lonabaugh, Sheridan, for appellants. .

Harry E. Leimback and Robert Jerry Hand, Casper,
for appellees.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

OPINION.

Mr. Justice PARKER delivered the opinion of the
court.

Lloyd E. and Ethel B. Twing, husband and wife,
brought an action against William E. and Helen Schott,
husband and wife, seeking on the grounds of fraud
and concealment to rescind a Standard Purchase Offer,
Acceptance and Receipt for the purchase of real prop-
erty occupied as a trailer court and to recover a $6,000
down payment.?

In summary the facts show that the Twings, whose
attention had been attracted through a newspaper ad-
vertisement, contacted the Schotts at the trailer court,
discussed the matter of purchase, signed the instru-

1 Merrill D. Jenkins, realtor, and W. W. Gruenig, sales-
man, were originally joined as defendants, but the
action against them was later dismissed.

ment, made the down payment, and took possession of
the property. They later complained that neither the
sewage system nor the water for the premises was as
represented and ultimately brought the suit comprising
two causes of action, the first seeking relief because
of misrepresentation as to the sewage system and the
second because of concealment as to the water for the
place. The court found that plaintiffs had failed to
sustain the allegations of their’ petition and entered
judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs have appealed, as-
serting as error the finding that they failed to sustain
the allegations of their petition, the general finding
against them, and the court’s rulings on various evi-
dentiary matters.

Basically, plaintiffs’ appeal contends that defendants
represented the property to have a good and adequate
sewage system with two 1,000 gallon septic tanks and
one 5,000 gallon drainage tank, all workable and satis-
factory; that said representations were false and
known to be so by defendants, and were material fac-
tors in influencing plaintiffs to buy; that plaintiffs
were ignorant of the falsity of the representations,
had a right to rely and did rely on them, and were
damaged in consequence; that as to the water supply
defendants’ superior knowledge of the facts imposed
on them a duty to disclose all material facts but that
nevertheless certain material facts were undisclosed
and plaintiffs were damaged as a result of the conceal-
ment.

As in all appealed cases, we must assume that evi-
dence in favor of the successful party is true, must
not consider evidence of the unsuccessful party in con-
flict therewith, and must give to the evidence of the
successful party every favorable inference which may
reasonably and fairly be drawn therefrom. Schaffer v.

a m

Standard Timber Co., Wyo., 831 P.2d 611; Parkinson
v. Roberts, Wyo., 329 P.2d 823; and Strom v. Felton,
76 Wyo. 870, 302 P.2d 917.

The foregoing rule becomes somewhat stricter in its
application in cases wherein fraud is charged, and we
have repeatedly held that one who alleges fraud must
prove the same clearly and distinctly enough to satisfy
the mind and conscience that the fraud exists. More-
over, fraud will not be imputed to any party when the
facts and circumstances out of which it is supposed to
arise are consistent with honesty and purity of inten-
tion. Havens v. Irvine, 61 Wyo. 309, 157 P.2d 570, 574,
159 P.2d 366. See also First Nat. Bank of Green River
v. Barrett, 54 Wyo. 394, 93 P.2d 510; Williams v. Yo-
cum, 87 Wyo. 482, 268 P, 607; 283 Am.Jur. Fraud and
Deceit § 22.

One other rule is particularly significant in the
consideration of a case of this nature: This court may
not substitute its conclusions for the findings made by
the lower court. Lucksinger v. Salisbury, 72 Wyo. 164,
262 P.2d 396, 264 P.2d 1007.

In the light of these rules we look to the evidence
upon which plaintiffs rely to prove the misrepresenta-
tions and concealment which they allege. Such reli-
ance is placed primarily upon the conversation taking
place prior to the execution of the purchase agreement
and the evidence of what the circumstances actually
were at the time. Plaintiffs’ witnesses give their ver-
sion of what was said, and this does not agree entirely
with the testimony adduced by defendants. The con-
dition of the property, especially that of the sewage
system and the water supply, was discussed by various
witnesses but particularly by defendant Schott and by
Homer Troutt, a master plumber. We think there is

no oceasion to set forth all of the testimony in detail.
That adduced by plaintiffs tended to show that defend-
ants represented to them that the sewage system was
good and the water was furnished by the City of Sher-
idan, whereas in fact the sewage system was unwork-
able and the water, furnished by a private company,
was subject to additional charges. Defendant Schott
testified that he, with two other persons, had installed
the sewage system without previous experience, ac-
cording to “data that he [the owner of the Sheridan
Concrete Block and Pottery Works] had from the Port-
land Cement Company out of Denver, Colorado, on
septic tanks,” that the tanks were of the size repre-
sented, and that he had explained to the buyers diffi-
culties regarding the excessive use of water by the
tenants and the dropping of rocks in the sewage system
by children. He maintained, however, that the system
was satisfactory. As to the water supply, he said he
had shown his receipts to plaintiffs, thereby indicating
that the water was furnished by a private company
rather than the City of Sheridan and that in any event
the plaintiff Twing, following the execution of the con-
tract, attended a meeting of the water company and
agreed to cooperate.

The portions of the evidence which were conflict-
ing can receive no consideration here, but testimony
which stands uncontradicted and unimpeached cannot
be ignored by a trial court. Beck v, Givens, 77 Wyo.
176, 309 P.2d 715, 717, 818 P.2d 977. We refer then
to such portions of the record as seem to be germane.

Schott’s statements on cross-examination are signifi-
cant as to the sewage system:
“Q. And do you recall telling him [Twing] that

you had a good sewage system at that time? A.
es.

“Q, And do you recall telling him that the tanks
drained properly? A. They did.

“Q. Do you recall telling him that you had no
trouble with the sewage system? A. No. I told
him I had trouble with the sewage system but it
wasn’t no trouble related to the sewage system
alone. It was trouble that children would do, such
as drop rocks into the sewers and stuff and we'd
have to have it rodded.

* * * * * *

“Q. And you did stress * * * that this thing
{sewage system] worked good? A, Yes, to my
knowledge, it did.

* * * Ea * *

“Q. Was the word ‘adequate’ the only descrip-
tion used of your system? A. I don’t truthfully
remember whether it was ‘adequate’ or ‘sufficient’.

“Q. Did you say that all the neighbors were
having trouble with their systems but you didn’t
because it was new? A. Up to that point I had no
trouble with my system, as far as my system was
concerned. To my knowledge, I had no trouble
with my system.

“Q. Just answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Did you make
that statement? A. I don’t remember.

“Q. How many times previous to this meeting
on the evening of February 23rd had you pumped
your cesspool out? A. I had pumped the cesspool
three times from the date I bought it until the
day I sold it. And my son had pumped it once.

* * * % * *

“Q. Isn’t it true, Mr. Schott, that you were
pumping out this main tank about once a week or
more for some time before you sold this property
to the Twings? A, I pumped the main tank, yes.”

As to the water for the property, Schott testified:

“Q. What was said concerning the water bills?
A. Well, he asked me what kind of water I had.
Now, I thought he was asking whether I was get-
ting well water or what water and I told him,
‘City water.’

“Q. Well, were you getting city water? A.
From the Suburban Water Company. The Subur-
ban Water Company buys water from the city and
resells it out of the city.

* Ea * * * *

“Q. You didn’t tell him that you had a lawsuit
against Mr. and Mrs. Foss [the persons from
whom the Schotts had purchased the real proper-
ty] concerning some shares of stock [in the Sub-
prban Water Company]? A. No, I didn’t tell him

at.

“Q. Did you tell your agent anything about this
lawsuit or the water situation with the company?
A. No, not that I can recall.”

Homer Troutt testified that he was a master plumb-
er; that he looked over the place and made an investiga-
tion. He was the only witness who purported to be an
expert on the subject of sewage disposal. The follow-
ing portions of his testimony, although somewhat dis-
connected and occasionally lacking in meaning, were
not contradicted directly.

“Q. Now, between the first time in March that
you went down and late in April or May, did you
go down at any time to look over some septic tanks
or some supposed septic tanks and cesspool? A.
Well, they [the Twings] was having sewer trouble
and I went down and I explained to them that

a m

there wasn’t adequate drainage in the leaching
pit * * * in other words, it would be the cesspool.

* % * * * *

“Q. Based upon your experience, what was
wrong with the leaching pit or ‘cesspool’ as you
call it? A. Well, my experience in that end of the
town, you have to go between 14 and 15 feet to get
into the flow of sheet water that comes off the
hill and from the south part of the town. There’s
a stratus of gravel down there about 121% or 13
feet but it’s not a thick vein; and you get a little
surface water, but very little. And when you
break through that, why, then you get into your
drainage. In other words, —

“Q. In other words, it was your opinion that this
wasn’t draining because it wasn’t far enough
down? A. That’s right.

“Q. Now, was there anything else wrong with it,
with reference to its location? A. Well, the loca-
tion was just vice versa of where it should have
been located.

“Q. Why do you say that? A. Well, the water
comes down and water will seek its own course;
and it’s going towards the river, all of that water
for drainage. And they run it against the hill
level is what they run against.

“Q. In other words, it would be better to have it
on the other end, the west end of the lot, where
it was lower? A. That’s right.

“Q. Did you give an estimate at that time as to
what would be necessary to make the thing work
properly? A. Well, I told Mr. Twing that I would
have to dig out back of the little log garage, I be-

lieve it is, there. And I also told him that I’d have
to go down possibly 15 feet to hit what I wanted
for a leaching pit.

“Q. And what would the cost of this be to con-
nect up with pipes, and so forth and so on? A.
Well, to replace all that and turn it all around—
which the stuff that’s in the ground would cost
you more to dig it up than it would to replace it
with new—I told him it would cost in the neigh-
borhood of $2500.00 to get him drainage.

* * * * * *

“Q. Can you have a septic tank without having
baffles? A. No, sir.

“Q. And did you find any baffles in these two
[septic] tanks? A. Not that I could find. The
water was deep. If there was any in there, they
was very small.

& * * * * %

“Q. Were you able to determine whether or not
the tank would hold 5,000 gallons? A. It definite-
ly would not.

“Q. And with reference to the working area,
what relationship would it have to the size of the
tank? A. Well, the upper part of the tank was
useless to put in. It wasn’t doing nobody no good.
Anything above the sewer lines is useless at all.
It’s just absolutely no good. It’s from the sewer
line down to the bottom of your tank is your
working capacity.

“Q. What was the construction of this tank? A.
Cement blocks,

“Q. Were there spaces between the blocks that
you could find? A. No, they was laid up solid.

“Q. What do you ordinarily do with these
blocks? A. Turn them sideways to give them wat-
erway.

“Q. In other words, allow water to seep out?
A. That’s right, through the holes.

Ea * % * Ea %

“Q. Now, after looking at all of this sewage
system under the houses and out where the trail-
ers were—and excluding the tanks, to fix the
tanks up, that you already said would probably
cost around $2500.00—how much money in your
opinion would it take to put the sewage system on
this place in proper order? A, Between 5,000
and $5500.00,.and then I would be very skeptical
about it.

“Q. Now does that include these tanks here?
(indicating) or does it not include them? A. That
would include them.”

It has often been held that a false representation
in order to be actionable must relate to a matter of
fact rather than of opinion and the distinction be-
tween fact and opinion is not always definite and de-
pends upon the factors of each case, See generally
23 Am.Jur Fraud and Deceit § 27 f; 87 C.J.S. Fraud
§ 10; 5 Williston on Contracts, 1937, § 1491 ff. The
words of defendant Schott that the sewage system
was “good” and either “adequate” or “sufficient” could
not have been other than a fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion. We think his words constituted more than a
puffing statement and more than any opinion. It was
wholly inconsistent with the fact that he had repeat-
edly, according to his own admission, pumped out the
cesspool. In that connection, it does not appear by
testimony or otherwise that the purported dropping

of rocks in the line would cause the cesspool to fill. It
is true that the cesspool might have filled by reason
of the use of excessive water by the tenants but if
this were the fact then there would seem to be no ex-
cuse for failing to tell the prospective purchasers of
the pumpings of the cesspool. It is said in 5 Williston
on Contracts, 1987, § 1498, p. 4185, “It is certainly true
that any active conduct or words which tend to pro-
duce an erroneous impression may amount to fraud,
and half the truth may be a lie in effect.”

Even when a party is under no duty to speak re-
garding a matter, if he does speak, he must speak the
truth and make a full and fair disclosure. Gillespie v.
Ormsby, 126 Cal.App.2d 518, 272 P.2d 949; Wice v.
Schilling, 124 Cal.App.2d 735, 269 P.2d 231; Bank of
America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass’n v. Greenbach, 98
Cal.App.2d 220, 219 P.2d 814; Deardorf v. Rosenbusch,
201 Okl. 420, 206 P.2d 996; Esau v. Briggs, 89 Cal.App.
2d 427, 201 P.2d 25; In re Dryden’s Estate, 155 Neb.
552, 52 N.W.2d 737; Ehrlich v. Real Estate Commis-
sion, D.C.Mun.App., 118 A.2d 801; and Parker v. Title
& Trust Company, 9 Cir., 283 F.2d 505.

To the same effect is A.L.I. Restatement, 1938, Torts
§ 589:

“(1) A statement of opinion in a business trans-
action upon facts not disclosed or otherwise known
to the recipient may reasonably be interpreted as
an implied statement that the maker knows of no
fact incompatible with his opinion.”

The discussion in 3 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence,
5 ed., § 901a, is significant:

“Tf in addition to the party’s silence there is any
statement, even any word or act on his own part,

Le .

which tends affirmatively to a suppression of the
truth, to a covering up or disguising the truth, or
to a withdrawal or distraction of the other party’s
attention or observation from the real facts, then
the line is overstepped, and the concealment be-
comes fraudulent. The maxim is, Aliud est ce-
lare, aliud tacere. Although a party may keep ab-
solute silence and violate no rule of law or equity,
yet if he volunteers to speak and to convey inform-
ation which may influence the conduct of the oth-
er party, he is bound to discover the whole truth.
A partial statement then becomes a fraudulent
concealment, and even amounts to a false and
fraudulent misrepresentation.”

Perhaps the obligation of a party to make a full and
fair disclosure if he discloses at all is also applicable
to the words of defendant Schott regarding the water
which was to be used on the premises. True, his state-
ment was somewhat equivocal; and when he said that
it was “city water” he may have in a manner of speak-
ing been giving it a proper designation since the water
was originally brought through the city lines, but the
fact of there having been at that time some trouble
and misunderstanding about the water would seem to
have placed upon him in all fairness an obligation to
disclose all facts.

While we are always reluctant to reverse a judgment
unless it is clearly against the weight of the evidence,”
neither this nor any appellate court ought ever to hesi-
tate about a reversal whenever it is apparent that the .
judgment is contrary to the law and contrary to the

evidence. McNamara v. O’Brien, 2 Wyo. 447.

2 Globe Mining Company v. Anderson, Wyo., 318 P.2d
873; Columbia Copper Min. Co. v. Duchess Mining,
Milling & Smelting Co., 18 Wyo. 244, 79 P. 885.

The judgment of the trial court, being contrary to
the uncontradicted and unimpeached evidenée, is re-
versed, and the case is remanded for further proceed-~
ings not inconsistent with the views herein expressed.

Reversed and remanded.

In the Matter of the Workmen’s Compensation CLAIM
of Mrs. Albert P. MAFFEI (Adriani), Widow of Al-
bert P. Maffei, Deceased, filed under the Wyoming
Workmen’s Compensation Law.

Lela Irene Maffei ADRIANI, and Lela Irene Maffei
Adriani, as Guardian, Appellants
(Claimants below),
v.
WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION DEPARTMENT
of Wyoming, Appellee.
No. 2889.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
May 5, 1959.

338 Pac.2d 818

Lee S. Nebeker, Green River, and Richard L. Bird,
Jr., of Richards, Bird & Hart, Salt Lake City, Utah,
for appellant,

Thomas O. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Sterling A. Case,
Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

OPINION.

Mr. Justice HARNSBERGER delivered the opinion
of the court.

This is an appeal from denial of the claim of a widow
under the Workmen’s Compensation law of this State,
W.C.S. 1945, § 72-101 et seq., arising from the death
of her husband.

It appears deceased had been notified by telephone,
at the direction of the marshal of the town of Kem-
merer, that his place of business had been broken into.
The marshal and another person were following tracks,
which they assumed were those of a suspect made in
new snow, when they met deceased coming from his
home presumably in answer to the phone call. The three
men continued following the tracks which led to where
it seemed the suspect had entered an automobile. From

there the automobile tracks were followed going outside
the town limits and to another town where the car was
found. The marshal directed the third man to remove
the keys from the car, which he did. The three con-
tinued their search when a man suddenly appeared
with two guns, made them get in the car with him, and
drive to a secluded area where the suspect shot and
killed the deceased. Because of these circumstances
the widow claimed her husband lost his life while en-
gaged in performance of his duties as an employee of
the town.

At the hearing before the district court, the third
man was called as a witness for claimant and testified
generally to the above facts which do not seem to be
disputed. In addition, he. stated he could not recall
what was said when the deceased joined the marshal
and the witness, except that

ce * ® it was on the matter of the fact that
somebody had broken into his place of business
and whoever it was, we figured out made these
tracks leaving that area and the tracks were real
fresh and probably we might be able to catch who-
ever it might be.”;

that later in the search the marshal said he would
get the “Paddy Wagon” and then he “picked me up
and we went down and picked Albert (the deceased)
up and followed the tracks * * *”. On cross-exami-
nation the witness testified he was not hired or depu-
tized by the marshal, but that he volunteered to go
with the marshal and accompanied him of his own free
will and was never told to accompany the marshal.

The marshal, who was claimant’s only other witness
beside herself, testified that when deceased joined him
and the third man, he, the marshal, said to deceased,

“Do you want to go to the garage and wait for me un—
til I get back * * * ”, to which deceased replied, “No,
I will go with you”; that deceased could have gone
home if he wanted to; that he “would much rather not
have either one with me—in fact—”; that he had in-
structed the third man to “call one of the Maffei boys
and tell them the place is broken into”; that in the
course of the search after he got the patrol car he “in-
vited them into the patrol car”.

In a letter from the court instructing counsel to
prepare and submit an appropriate order denying the
claim for compensation, the court commented:

“Tt does not appear from the evidence that Mr.
Maffei was required, summoned, impressed, com-
manded, or otherwise to accompany the policeman.
Nor was he deputized by implication or otherwise.
He was asked if he wanted to ‘go with us or go to
the garage.’ He elected to accompany the officer
and one other person and thereby became a volun-
teer and proceeded at his peril.”

It is evident to us from this statement and from an
examination of the entire transcript of the testimony,
the substantial portion of which is set forth herein and
which was all the evidence submitted, that the court
had a clear understanding of the applicable law and
that its determination that the evidence had failed to
meet claimants’ burden of proof to show the deceased
was acting either as an employee of the town or was
impressed in the town’s service as a member of a posse
comitatus was correct.

The judgment of the court being fully justified by
the lack of evidence necessary to support the claim the
same was properly denied.

Affirmed.

Wayne L. FEUSNER, also known as Wayne Feusner,
Roy H. Feusner, also known as Roy Feusner, Roy D.
Feusner, Roy H. Feusner and Sons, a Partnership,
Appellants (Defendants below),

v.
C. R. FARLEY, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

Wayne L. FEUSNER, also known as Wayne Feusner,
Roy H. Feusner, also known as Roy Feusner, Roy D.
Feusner, Roy H. Feusner and Sons, a Partnership,
Appellants (Defendants below),

v.

Shelby GIBLER, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
Nos. 2861, 2862.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.
May 12, 1959.

838 Pac.2d 835

Thomas M. McKinney, Basin, Robert B. Bowman
(of Bowman & Bowman), Lovell, for appellants.

J. D. Fitzstephens and E. J. Goppert (of Goppert &
Fitzstephens), Cody, for appellees.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

OPINION.

Mr. Justice HARNSBERGER delivered the opinion
of the court.

C. R. Farley and Shelby Gibler each brought their
separate actions against defendants. As their claims
were identical against the same defendants and would
be determined upon the same evidence, the cases were
consolidated for trial and will similarly be disposed of
in this court.

Plaintiffs claimed defendants Roy H. Feusner and
Wayne L. Feusner, his son, orally agreed with Farley
and Gibler to engage with them in a joint prospecting
and mining venture. The Feusners were to pay Gibler
$350 per month and Farley $10 per day and all ex-
penses. Farley was to furnish his jeep and certain
instruments; Farley, Gibler and Wayne were to pros-
pect for and locate uranium claims; and Roy, Wayne,
Farley and Gibler would own equal shares in any min-
ing claims located.

Defendants claimed that both plaintiffs were merely
employees of a dairy business owned wholly, or at least
principally, by the Feusner family.

Upon trial to the court, judgment was rendered ad-
judging each plaintiff to be the owner of a one-fourth
interest in the disputed claims subject, however, to a
lease of the property held by Lisbon-Uranium Corpo-

ration and to a royalty interest held by one Morris
Avery. From that judgment the defendants and each
of them appeal.

Defendants contend that the alleged oral agreement
was voided because of our Statute of Frauds, the ap-
plicable portion of which reads:

“$n the following cases every agreement shall
be void unless such agreement, or some note or
memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed
by the party to be charged therewith:

% % * Ea * *

“Fifth—Every agreement or contract for the
sale of real estate, or the lease thereof, for more
than one year;” § 5-101, W.C.S.1945.

However, in their brief appellants say, “Appellees
rely upon the rule that where two or more parties agree
to locate mines upon the public domain through their
joint efforts or expense and each is to acquire, by the
act of location, an agreed interest in the mine, that
the agreement is not within the Statute of Frauds” and
that they “have no dispute with this rule of law’. Ap-
pellants also acknowledge that by its judgment the
trial court found the parties had entered into a joint
adventure. These concessions sum up to mean that if
the court’s finding that there was a joint adventure
was correct, the Statute of Frauds would not apply.

Notwithstanding, we think it proper to explain how
Mecum v. Metz, 30 Wyo. 495, 222 P. 574, rehearing de-
nied 82 Wyo. 79, 229 P. 1105, cited by appellants as
supporting their contention, is distinguished from this
case and, consequently, is not in point. In the Mecum
case the alleged agreement concerned real estate, the

title to which was in Metz at the time the purported
contract was made and, therefore, the agreement was
clearly within the purview of the statute. In this case,
at the time the agreement was made, there was no title
to the disputed claims in either of the contracting par-
ties. The same situation obtained in Crosby v. Stra-
han’s Estate, Wyo., 324 P. 2d 492, as that in the Mecum
case, so it also fails to sustain appellants’ claim.

The oral agreement relied upon by plaintiffs in the
cases now before us was nothing more nor less than
what is generally referred to as a “grubstake” con-
tract. Such contracts have repeatedly been held not to
be within Statutes of Fraud.

In Cascaden v. Dunbar, 2 Alaska 408, 412; Id., 9 Cir.,
157 F. 62, 84 C.C.A. 566 (certiorari denied 212 U.S.
572, 29 S.Ct. 682, 58 L.Ed. 656) ; 8 Alaska 671; 9 Cir.,
191 F. 471, 112 C.C.A. 115, the court stated:

“A grubstake contract is an agreement between
two or more persons to thereafter locate mines
upon the public domain by their joint aid, effort,
labor, or expense, whereby each is to acquire, by
virtue of the act of location, such an interest in
the mine as is agreed on in the contract. * * *
The title accrues to each as an original locator,
though the location be made in the name of one
or more of the parties only. Lindley on Mines
(2d Ed.) § 831; Book v. Justice Min. Co. (C.C.)
58 F. 106. Each party to the grubstake contract
not named in the location notice becomes, neverthe-
less, an equitable owner and tenant in common
with those named. Murley v. Ennis, 2 Colo. 300.
A grubstake contract, though oral, is not within
the statute of frauds. * * *” Cascaden v. Dunbar,
2 Alaska 408, 412.

In Book v. Justice Mining Co., C.C., 58 F. 106, 119,
827, it was said:

““* * * An oral agreement to locate a mining
claim for the benefit of another need not be in
writing. If a party, in pursuance of such an under-
standing, at the expense of another, locates the
claim in his own name, he holds the legal title to
the ground in trust for the benefit of the party
for whom the location was made; and such party
could, upon making the necessary proofs, compel
the locator of the mining claim to convey the title
thereof to him, although the agreement so to do
was not in writing. This familiar principle has
been often applied in cases where a party has en-
tered into an oral agreement to locate mining
ground for the joint benefit of himself and others,
and makes a location in his own name. It has al-
ways been held that such oral agreements are not
within the statute of frauds. Gore v. McBrayer,
18 Cal. 582; Moritz v. Lavelle, 77 Cal. 10, 18 Pac.
Rep. 803; Hirbour v. Reeding, 3 Mont. 15; Wel-
land v. Huber, 8 Nev. 208.” Book v. Justice Min-
ing Co., C.C., 58 F. 106, 119.

In Dayvault v. Baruch Oil Corp., 10 Cir., 211 F.2d
335, 340, this language was used:

“The pleadings and the evidence in this posture
of the case establish a rather typical joint adven-
ture to acquire, explore and develop oil and gas
leases. It is a familiar arrangement in the oil
country for those having knowledge and access to
oil and gas leases to match their know-how with
those who have access to risk capital for the de-
velopment of oi] properties. While not good busi-
ness practice, it is not uncommon for the joint
adventurers to orally agree that one of them shall
hold title to the leases in order to expedite the
promotion of the joint enterprise. See Blackner
v. McDermott, supra [10 Cir., 176 F.2d 498]; Mul-
roy v. Sessions, supra [Sup., 88 N.Y.S.2d 853];

Hifler v. Calmac Oil & Gas Corp., supra [Sup., 258
App.Div. 78, 10 N.Y.S. 2d 531, 16 N.Y.S.2d 104].

eR RD
The court also stated at 211 F.2d 339:

“Tf title to partnership property is placed in the
name of one of the partners, a fiducial relation
is thereby created, as to which he owes the high-
est degree of honor and good faith. Mattikow v.
Sudarsky, supra [248 N.Y. 404, 162 N.E. 296];
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545,
62 A.L.R. 1; Wyoming-Indiana Oil & Gas Co. v.
Weston, 48 Wyo. 526, 7 P.2d 206, 80 A.L.R. 1037;
Blackner v. McDermott, 10 Cir., 176 F.2d 498. The
partnership property is regarded as personal prop-
erty for the purpose of adjusting the equities of
the parties * * *; or equity may impress a trust
upon the property for the benefit of the joint ad-
venturer. Meinhard v. Salmon, supra. Or, equi-
ty may impress a constructive trust upon the real
property for the benefit of the joint adventurers
to prevent unjust enrichment and to enforce resti-
tution. * * *”

We entertain the same views as those expressed in
the above quoted cases.

Appellants are insistent that the record is devoid of
any evidence which entitled the court to find there was
an oral joint adventure agreement between Roy H.
Feusner, Wayne L. Feusner, Shelby Gibler and C. R.
Farley and say this is especially true with respect to
Roy H. Feusner’s being a party to any such agreement.

Insofar as the evidence being sufficient to sustain
the court’s finding that there was such an agreement
between the two plaintiffs and Wayne L. Feusner, the
transcript of evidence is replete with testimony sup-

P| “

porting that conclusion and we deem it unnecessary to
recount it at any length. Gibler testified that in his
presence Wayne Feusner told Farley, “With your
know-how and experience and your Jeep and instru-
ments, and you and Shelby together, I think we’ll find
it. I'll grubstake you to the rate of $10.00 a day and
give you 25%. That would be an equal share with the
four of us.” He further testified to statements
Wayne made in his presence to other persons saying
that claims were to be staked half in his and half in
his father’s (Roy’s) names, and when arrangements
were being made to secure the services of an aviator
to help discover suitable areas, Wayne told the aviator
he was dealing with Gibler, Farley, Roy Feusner and
Wayne Feusner; and under similar circumstances,
Wayne told.a surveyor he, Wayne, had an equal inter-
est in the claims with his father, Gibler and Farley.
Farley testified to talks he had with Wayne after the
agreement was made in which Wayne acknowledged
and referred to the claimed agreement and promised
to “get the paper drawed up” on their interest. These
testimonies were largely corroborated by other wit-
nesses. Such evidence was more than ample to justify
the court’s finding there was an agreement of joint
adventure at least as between the plaintiffs and Wayne
Feusner.

With regard to any agreement between plaintiffs
and Roy Feusner, the situation is somewhat different.
Gibler testified that in a conversation with Roy Feus-
ner, Roy told him practically the same thing that
Wayne had told him; that when Gibler said he did not
have any money to go ahead and prospect, Roy said
Gibler had been with him a long time and he wanted
to see him make a success and said, “I think that we
can do it.”. Gibler further testified that in May of

1956, after the claims had been located and mining
operations had begun, Roy asked him to let Dale Feus-
ner, another of Roy’s sons, run the mine and at the
game time told Gibler, “Give us a chance to recover
part of our money back before we give you any papers
on it”. Later about the first of June, Roy told Gibler
they had taken out about 200 tons of ore that didn’t
pay expenses and they were going to get a mining
company to mine the claims for 90 days on a 50 per-
cent profit, but they were not selling the claims; that
he did not have any money and couldn’t give plaintiffs
any papers to show any money when they didn’t have
any. In September following, Roy told Gibler the com-
pany was in there for all time and he would see that
Gibler had more money than Gibler ever had in his life.

While the above is somewhat meager evidence, it is
nonetheless substantial to show that Roy had know-
ledge of and acquiesced in the arrangement which
Wayne made with plaintiffs for the joint adventure.
It certainly showed that Roy gave subsequent recog-
nition that plaintiffs had an interest in the fruits of
that joint adventure and that he, himself, was accept-
ing benefits and proceeds.

Conceding there was slight evidence of Roy’s par-
ticipation in consummation of the agreement, still the
court was entitled to believe Gibler when he said that
Roy had told him practically the same thing that
Wayne had told him. That testimony incorporated all
the representations, proposals and agreements made by
Wayne in his dealings with plaintiffs respecting a joint
adventure to be undertaken by the four parties. Roy
later acknowledged that the plaintiffs as his co-adven-
turers had an interest in the claims, even though they
had been located part in his own name and part in his

son Wayne’s name, and this gave further evidence that
he was aware of and approved the arrangement made
in his behalf by his son Wayne. Furthermore, his ex-
euse for not putting on paper the recognition that
plaintiffs had an interest in the claims was an equally
tacit acknowledgment that plaintiffs did possess an
interest in the mining claims, Under such circum-
stances, to hold the trial court was without right to
include Roy Feusner as a party to the oral agreement
of joint adventure would be to ignore the evidence re-
ferred to above and to consider that it was not sub-
stantial. The trial judge had the best opportunity to
see and observe the witnesses whose testimony appears
in the record and his obvious reaction was to accept as
wholly true what plaintiffs and their witnesses had
said under oath.

While the evidence in this case is sufficient to show
Roy’s participation in the negotiations which resulted
in the grubstake contract, we call attention to the Ap-
pellate decision by the Federal Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, Ninth Circuit, upon its review of the Cascaden
case, supra at 157 F. 62, 65, for there the Court of
Appeals based its decision on a grubstake mining con-
tract which had been entered into by one partner on
behalf of himself and the other partners.

In such a case, this court will not interfere. The
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

WHEATLAND IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Appellant (Petitioner below),

ve

Lester SHORT, Melvin Short, Charles Clack, A. M.
Downey, Hillary Bartlett, Vincent Utter, Emerson
Utter, Guy M. Holmes, the Ayres Partnership, G. W.
Goodrich, Ella Day, J. C. Hall, Andrew Roskie and
Margaret Roskie, A. E. Barrett, Everett Prichard,
Roy Starr, et al., Appellees (Objectors below).

No. 2884.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.
May 12, 1959.

339 Pac.2d 403

oO
rt

De
|
Jones & Jones, Wheatland, for appellant.

W. J. Wehrli, Casper, for appellees.

Heard before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and
HARNSBERGER, JJ.

OPINION.

Mr. Justice PARKER delivered the opinion of the
court.

This is an appeal from an order of the district court
which struck from the budget of The Wheatland Irri-
gation District an item designated as “Land Loan Re-
payment-Ringsby—$87,500.00.”

ee *

The Wheatland Irrigation District was created on
August 15, 1947, by decree of court under the authority
of c. 71, art. 8, W.C.S.1945, as the successor of two
companies, the Wyoming Development Company and
The Wheatland Industrial Company, which had for
many years prior thereto maintained the principal ir-
rigation system in Platte County.

The district being in existence by reason of statute
and its activities controlled thereby, the original irri-
gation district legislation and its subsequent history
are of importance. The legislature passed c. 72, S.L.
of Wyoming, 1907, providing generally for the organi-
zation of irrigation districts and the construction of
irrigation works. This law was amended in 1911 and
almost completely revamped by c. 2, S.L. of Wyoming,
Spec. Sess., 1920, “Providing for the formation and
organization of Irrigation Districts and conferring
certain powers thereon.” This 1920 Act with some
later amendments now constitutes art. 8. It set up
the procedure for the organization of an irrigation
district, delineated the powers, and provided among
other things for the assessments, preparation of as-
sessment rolls, collection of assessments, and enforce-
ment of payments.

To ascertain whether or not the steps taken in the
instant case have been in accordance with art. 8, we
review the record on appeal, which apparently pur-
ports to contain all of the official acts since the organi-
zation of the district.

1 The project was started in the early eighties by a
group of men who formed a corporation for develop-
ment purposes and was known as the Wyoming De-
- velopment Company; later an additional company,
The Wheatland Industrial Company, was formed.

First there is the petition of the freeholders of the
area setting forth various relevant facts and praying
for organization. This was accompanied by a signed
“Preliminary Engineering Report to Accompany Pe-
tition * * *,’ outlining in general the history of the
Wyoming Development and Wheatland Industrial com-
panies, referring to the water rights, tunnels, canals,
water supply, and costs, which report was approved
by the state engineer. Certain objections to the pro-
posals were allowed and some disallowed, but the court
approved and confirmed the organization and subse-
quently granted the district commissioners authority
to execute an agreement with the former companies
by which the new district would undertake to assume
the obligations and succeed to the interests of its pre-
decessors in maintaining the irrigation system. Some
eighteen months later the commissioners filed with
the court an application for authority to borrow $125,-
000 from the Wyoming Farm Loan Board, which
amount was to be evidenced by bonds of the district.
According to the allegations, the borrowed money was
to be used as follows:

“Construction and repairs
New equipment and repairs..
Payment of fixed expenses.

$49,000.00
64,014.31
11,985.69”

The commissioners concurrently filed a report and
budget of the district for the ensuing year, setting
forth certain estimated future expenses including an
item of interest and principal on the $125,000 loan.
After notice this report and budget came on for hear-
ing and was approved.

On May 7, 1957, the commissioners of the district
filed with the court a petition for authority to borrow

from the Wyoming Farm Loan Board a sum of money
not to exceed $2,400,000 to be used for the purchase
of ranch lands in Carbon and Albany counties to ac-
quire certain water rights used in conjunction there-
with; to construct new irrigation canals and other fa-
cilities; and to repair, enlarge, and renovate existing
facilities—$1,500,000 to be used in the purchase of the
ranch lands and the construction of water conduction
facilities therefrom and the remainder for enlarge-
ment of storage facilities of the district and other con-
templated improvement and renovation.”

The petition alleged that the facts regarding this
matter had been explained at a public-meeting in April
1957 at which a regularly conducted election had been
held, 178 landowners voting 31,248 acres in favor and
20 landowners, 4,524 acres against. (There was no
filing of a preliminary engineering report.) The court
thereupon issued an order to show cause. A resistance
to the petition, filed by A. M. Downey, was overruled
by the court on May 29, 1957, after hearing. The
court on the same day issued an order granting au-
thority to the district to borrow the said $2,400,000
from the Wyoming Farm Loan Board.

Thereafter on June 4, 1957, the commissioners filed
a petition for adjudication of the budget for the ensu-
ing year in the amount of $88,000, calling attention to
certain amounts they had on hand and noting that they
would pay the installments on the $125,000 bonded in-

2 Although the record is not entirely clear, it appears
that the transaction for the expenditure of $1,500,000
has been concluded while the remaining $900,000 has
never been expended or budgeted by item.

debtedness to the Wyoming Farm Loan Board from
the proceeds of the loan authorized on May 29, 1957.
The commissioners stated that a levy of $1.25 per acre
should be made on 55,948.63 acres of land in the dis-
trict, asked the court to fix a time for hearing of objec-
tions and for the approval of the budget and the auth-
orization of an assessment for the current year in the
sum of $1.25 per acre on all lands in the district. The
court thereafter fixed a time for hearing, and on July
12, 1957, adjudicated and approved the budget of $88,-
000.

On May 27, 1958, LeGrande T. Page, Commissioner
of District No. 1; Woodrow May, Commissioner of
District No. 2; Harlem McLeod, Commissioner of Dis-
trict No. 3; G. E. Graefe, Commissioner of District No.
4; and Oscar B. Gudahl, Commissioner of District No.
5, each filed with the court an identical paper, purport-
ing to be an “Assessment for Benefits” and stating,
inter alia:

“I * * * do hereby make and assess benefits for
lands situate within said District * * * in compli-
ance with the laws of the State of Wyoming and
for the purpose of determining how the payment
of the District’s indebtedness shall be apportioned
among said lands.

“T have heretofore regularly called a meeting of
the land owners within my District and have open-
ly discussed with them at said meeting the various
elements and factors to be considered in arriving
at this assessment. * * *

* Ea % * * *

“After giving due consideration to all of the
facts, circumstances and elements involved, I do

hereby assess equal benefits to all lands situate
within my District.”

Neither the amount of benefits to be caused by the
proposed work nor a total itemization of the cost was
mentioned in the papers.

On June 2, 1958, the commissioners filed a petition
for adjudication of the budget for the ensuing year,
listing estimate of money needed as $139,083 (includ-
ing the item, “Land Loan Repayment-Ringsby—$37,-
500.00”) and praying for an authorization of assess-
ment in the sum of $2.50 per acre for all acreage in the
district. The court thereupon entered an order fixing
a time and place for hearing on the budget. On June
17, 1958, Florence L. Kindom filed a letter objecting
to an increase in the water tax. On June 21, 1958,
Mrs. Hilary Glen Bartlett by Albert B. Bartlett filed a
paper stating her objections, and Mr. Bartlett filed a
similar paper on his own behalf. On the same day the
persons herein listed as appellees filed a joint objection
pointing out among other things that no petition or
application for benefits had been filed by the district
and praying that the $37,500 item be stricken.

The court on June 28, 1958, entered an order recit~
ing motion of objectors “that no assessment for bene-
fits’ be determined by the Court at this time because
of the lack of jurisdiction due to there not being on
file or on record a petition or application of the Board
* * * requesting such assessment for benefits and set-
ting out the facts to support the same,” decreeing that

$C. 71, art. 8, uses the terms “assessment of benefits”
and “assessment for construction.”

the $37,500 item be removed from the budget, and re-
ducing the per-acre levy accordingly, from which or-
der this appeal has been taken.*

The commissioners now contend that they have com-
plied with all of the irrigation district statutes and
that the item of $37,500 for the improvement of the
existing water supply and the extension of the irriga-
tion works was improperly stricken by the court. In
order to determine the correctness of this contention,
we look to art. 8 and, in particular, to the two sections
which require information to be supplied to the court
as a condition to the improvement and extension
sought.

Section 71-801, W.C.S.1945, provides that:

“Whenever a majority of the freeholders * * *
in any district * * * desire to provide for the irri~
gation of the same; or to improve the existing
water supply for said lands; or to purchase, ex-
tend, operate or maintain constructed irrigation
works * * * they may file in the district court of
the county which embraces the largest acreage of
the district, a petition, hereinafter referred to
as the ‘petition,’ which shall include:”

thereafter listing various essentials including a pre-
liminary engineering report.

Section 71-814, W.C.S.1945, provides that:

«x * * said commissioners shall * * * report in
writing to the court.

4 On the same day the court entered an order approv-
ing the remainder of the budget and reciting that the
$37,500 item had been stricken.

ee

“1. The extent and character of the proposed
work and the sufficiency of the water supply.

“2. If it be found necessary to change the
boundaries of said proposed district, previously
fixed, they shall report said proposed change * * *,

“3. What lands within the district, as by them
reported will be injured by the proposed work
*

“4, All lands within the district as by them re-
ported will be benefited by the proposed work and
they shall assess against such lands by whomso-
ever held the amount of benefits which they de-
termine will be caused.to the same by the pro-
posed work, and in case of lands have [sic] appur-
tenant thereto a partial water right or partial
rights in a system of irrigation the assessment
shall be according to benefits making due allow-
ance for existing rights. The benefits so assessed
are herein referred to as ‘The assessment roll.’

“5. They shall also determine and report to the
court the total itemized amount as near as they can
determine, that said proposed work will cost, in-
cluding organization expenses and the unit cost
upon which the assessments are based, which shall
be designated as ‘cost of construction.’

“6. If the cost of construction of any particular
part of the work so proposed to be done shall be
assessed upon any particular tract or tracts, lot
or lots of land, the commissioners shall so specify,
and in their report they shall fix and determine
the sums which should be assessed against said
tracts and lots, and assess such sum against said
tracts and lots.

“7, They shall apportion and assess the part of
this ‘cost of construction’ not’ assessed as above,
against the several benefited tracts and lots in

said irrigation district, in proportion to the benefits
which they have assessed against the same, by set-
ting down opposite each tract or lot the sum which
they assess against the same for construction. The
assessments which together make up the cost of
construction, as above defined, are herein referred
to as ‘assessments for construction.’

“8. They shall set forth in their report the
amount of water by them apportioned to each
separate tract or lot of land in said district, to be
assessed.

“9. The commissioners shall further report to
the court the probable cost of keeping said pro-
posed work in repair after it is completed.

“10. They shall include in their said report, said
map, plans and other specifications, and file the
same with their report.”

The commissioners concede that neither they nor
their predecessors filed any report under the provisions
of § 71-814. In admitting noncompliance with the
statute, counsel say they do not know whether the
commissioners “neglected to make a ‘Report’ and as-
sess the benefits therein because of their failure to be
advised that it was their legal duty to do so, or wheth-
er the ‘Report’ was intentionally not made because the
Commissioners determined the same to be unneces-
sary.” They insist that the irrigation works, canals,
reservoirs, etc., had been in existence for many years,
that it would have been a worthless and needless thing
for the commissioners to make a report providing the
information because no works were proposed, and
they urge that the law will not require the doing of a
useless thing. They go on to say that when the present
commissioners discovered that “there had never been
an assessment of benefits confirmed by the court as

required by law” they immediately followed the course
open to them as provided under § 71-830, W.C.S.1945,
each commissioner calling a meeting of his district,
giving notice of the date of meeting, holding respective
meetings, and making the assessments heretofore men-
tioned. Counsel argue that such an assessment of bene-
fits applied equally to all land; and on the authority
of May v. City of Laramie, 58 Wyo. 240, 131 P.2d 300,
and Kimbel v. Osborn, 61 Wyo. 89, 156 P.2d 279, 158
ALR. 1079, they say:

« * * There are 55,633.36 acres, approximately,
of land in the District and the indebtedness which
was incurred for the benefit of the entire District
was in the sum of one million five hundred thous-
and dollars ($1,500,000.00) ; therefore by the
process of simple computation, the benefits were
assessed in the sum of approximately twenty-six
dollars and ninety-six cents ($26.96) per acre.”
(Emphasis supplied.)

and maintain that the equal sharing of the expendi-
tures on a proportional basis by all the lands in the
district is justified in law. They attack the statement
of the trial court that it lacked jurisdiction because
no assessment for benefits had been made, arguing
that the court would have jurisdiction under § 71-830,
relating to.“Omission to assess benefits * * * against
any land or person which should have been assessed.”
They also insist that the acts of the commissioners
must be presumed to be valid and say that the irriga-
tion district law should be liberally construed to pro-
mote the public welfare.

Let us examine then the views of the objectors.
Counsel urges that there has been no assessment of
benefits and therefore no levy could be made against
the lands of the district. He says, “there apparently

was no contemplated construction at the time the dis-
trict was formed, and consequently there was not at-
tached to the petition for organization of the district
such preliminary engineering report on the feasibility
of the project, including a report on the sufficiency
of its water supply and an estimate of the cost of con-
struction.” This is not urged as a fatal defect, but it is
insisted that when the plan for new construction and
expenditures for water rights and property developed,
it was incumbent upon the commissioners to make
either the report required by § 71-814 or the supple-
mental report mentioned in § 71-821 * for the purpose
of having benefits assessed and confirmed. He con-
tends that in the absence of assessment the commis-
sioners are without authority to borrow any money
or make any levy against the lands in the district,
quoting § 71-831, W.C.S.1945:

“The commissioners may borrow money, not ex-
ceeding the amount of ‘assessment for construc-
tion’ as herein provided, unpaid at the time of bor-
rowing for such purposes, or for the payment of
any indebtedness they may have lawfully incurred,
and may secure the same by notes or bonds * * *.”

With the above arguments in mind, we advert to the
record of what has been done in this case to ascertain
whether or not the judgment of the trial court is cor-
rect,

The preliminary engineering report which was at-
tached to the original petition in 1947 was sketchy and

5 Obviously the filing of a supplemental report per-
mitted by this section is dependent upon their being
an original report.

general; admittedly no report of the commissioners
was filed under the provisions of § 71-814 either im-
mediately after the formation of the district or since
that time. The “Assessment for Benefits” which each
of the commissioners filed on May 27, 1958, assumed
to divide the proposed expenses, without stating them,
equally among the landowners. It is doubtful that a
certain sum can be taken as a basis for any assessment
unless the amount thereof has been determined in the
manner designated by law. However, it is unnecessary
for us to discuss these purported assessments at any
length. They are clearly ineffective since whatever
their other shortcomings they have never been con-
firmed by the court. Although the commissioners ar-
gue at some length that the benefits have been prop-
erly assessed, they do not contend that there has been
any report upon which an assessment could be based.

The commissioners have relied upon § 71-830 as
authority for calling of meetings by the respective
commissioners and the subsequent assessment of bene-
fits. Primarily, this section provides that the omission
to make irrigation district assessments “against any
land or person which should have been assessed,” shall
not “affect the jurisdiction of the court to confirm the
report” or to make the assessments as soon as the
omission is discovered and shall not render the assess-
ments against other lands voidable. Since it is not
here contended that any report was ever made under
the provisions of § 71-814, § 71-830 is inapplicable. It
seems clear that § 71-830 purports to deal with inad-
vertent omissions of certain areas rather than failure
to file an assessment of benefits on all the lands in the
district.

The trial court’s reference in the findings to “the
lack of jurisdiction” is somewhat confusing. It is our

view that the trial court had jurisdiction to pass upon
the budget and accept or reject the various items, and
this was true notwithstanding the fact that some pre-
requisite to a certain item had not been met. Per-
haps the reference to lack of jurisdiction was inad-
vertent. In any event, it does not vitiate the judgment
if the court arrived at the correct result. See 5B C.J.S.
Appeal & Error § 1787, citing Cook v. McDonald, 60
Wyo. 215. 148 P.2d 594; 5B C.J.S. Appeal & Error §
1849, citing State v. Alexander, Wyo., 324 P.2d 831;
and see Peterson v. Johnson, 46 Wyo. 478, 28 P.2d 487,
91 A.L.R. 723.

From what we have said, it is clear that the $37,500
item requested by the commissioners in their petition
for adjudication of June 2, 1958, was one falling with-
in the provisions of § 71-801. The officers of the
district having ignored the clear prerequisites of the
irrigation district statutes, the trial court had no al-
ternative but to strike the item. The judgment must
therefore be affirmed. This is not to say that the
failure to comply with the requirements of the statues
cannot be cured by the commissioners hereafter taking
the required steps. Although a general interpretation
of the irrigation district law is beyond our obligation,
it may be desirable that we discuss the matter brief-
ly in order that these parties may be the better en-
abled to follow the directions of the legislature as we
interpret them.

The first section of the article, 71-801, permits the
majority of the owners of the land in the district to
file a petition whenever they desire to (a) provide for
the irrigation of the lands; (b) to improve the existing
water supply for the lands; (c) to purchase, extend,
operate, or maintain constructed irrigation works; or

(d) to cooperate with the United States in certain
respects under federal reclamation laws.

It seems to us that under a reasonable interpreta-
tion the legislature meant the succeeding sections to
govern any of these circumstances. It would be un-
reasonable to choose one of the above-mentioned func-
tions to the exclusion of the others. As this court said
in one of our first reported cases, Ivinson v. Hance, 1
Wyo. 270, 275, “Statutes are to be construed in a rea-
sonable manner.” And see 2 Sutherland Statutory
Construction, 3 Ed., § 4508.

Any confusion as to the proper steps for a district or
its officers to take in a certain situation would seem
to grow out of the fact that the legislature has recited
multiple objectives and subsequently outlined proced-
ures, some of which are obviously inapplicable to the
accomplishment of certain of the objectives. We think
that insofar as possible effect must be given to every
part of the statute. Coady v. Batchelder, Wyo., 335
P.2d 448; Radalj v. Union Savings & Loan Ass’n, 59
Wyo. 140, 188 P.2d 984, 141 P.2d 856; Cuthbertson
v. Union Pac. Coal Co., 50 Wyo. 441, 62 P.2d 8311. This
means that if a procedure is applicable to a stated ob-
jective there must be compliance. Accordingly, the
district or its officers should fulfill every requirement
of the statutes which reasonably can apply to that
which is expected to be accomplished under § 71-801.
In our view, it would be absurd to say that the report
required by §71-814 must be furnished at the time of
the organization of a district but is not required at any
later time even though the district then seeks “to im-
prove the existing water supply for said lands; or to
purchase, [and] extend” constructed irrigation works
in an amount which equals or exceeds the cost of the

original works. We have often held that a statute if
susceptible of other interpretation will not be con-
strued so as to produce absurd results. Texas Co. v.
Siefried, 60 Wyo. 142, 147 P.2d 887, 150 P.2d 99; Hu-
ber v. Thomas, 45 Wyo. 440, 19 P.2d 1042; Houghton
Bros. v. Yocum, 40 Wyo. 57, 274 P. 10. And see 8
Sutherland Statutory Construction, 3 Ed., § 5505.

Originally, even the cost of maintenance was within
the provisions of § 71-801 so as to require the filing of
the report under § 71-814. In 1928 the legislature re-
vised § 978, C.S.1920 (now § 71-828), and added the
section which is now 71-824, providing for the filing
with the court of an “itemized estimate of the money
to be raised by assessment within the district for the
purpose of constructing new work, maintenance and
to meet the yearly current expenses of the district.”
Such additional provision in effect eliminated the “ex-
penses of any current year” from the requirements of
§§ 71-801, 71-814. The words “new work” used in the
statute are to be read in connection with the words
“expenses of any current year” and when so construed
mean work which may in one sense be considered new,
as distinguished from strict maintenance, but is never-
theless work which would tend to continue the district
in as good condition as in the past rather than an ex-
tension of the irrigation works or improvement of the
existing water supply. Any question on such classi-
fication of proposed work is subject to determination
by the district court to which the budget is submitted.
To state it another way, § 71-824, providing for the
submission of an itemized estimate of yearly current
expenses and hearing thereon after notice, sufficiently
protects the freeholders as interested parties and in-
forms the court so that an intelligent determination
may be made as to the assessments for such purposes.

Any other assessments can be effective only after due
hearings based on preliminary engineering report (§
71-801) and commissioners’ report (§ 71-814). This
will inform landowners as to the proposed expendi-
tures, the measure of the prospective benefits, and their
assumption of the increased expenses and will simul-
taneously enable the court to make intelligent decisions
thereon.

In the light of this last discussion perhaps some
general statement should be made about the proced-
ures of The Wheatland Irrigation District during the
past dozen years of its existence. The preliminary
engineering report attached to the 1947 petition was
general and undoubtedly was vulnerable to attack ex-
cept that long previous existence of the works and
public knowledge of the project’s operations tended to
make this requirement as well as some other prescribed
procedures mere formalities. The commissioners at
that time failed to file a report under the provisions
of § 71-814. Technically this was a violation of the
statute, which, though conceivably excusable during
the first few years requiring current expenses only,
could not be overlooked at the time that the commis-
sioners contemplated both improvement of the existing
water supply and extension of the irrigation works.
If the district intends to proceed legally with the con-
templated substantial improvements of water supply
and extension of the irrigation works, the filing of
both of these reports is essential.

Affirmed.

R. D. DAME, Appellant (Defendant below),

Bruce Anderson et al., Defendants,
v.
E. T. MILESKI, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 2848,

Supreme Court of Wyoming.
May 18, 1959.
840 Pac.2d 205

$$ $$$ |

1D
aad

D. W. Ogilbee and Jack D. Emery, Casper, for ap-
pellant.

Elmer J. Scott, Worland, for appellee.

Heard before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and
HARNSBERGER, JJ.

OPINION.

Mr. Justice PARKER delivered the opinion of the
court.

This is a suit to quiet title and to adjudicate the
rights of the parties in a 1 percent overriding royalty
interest in the oil and gas in certain Big Horn County
lands. According to the uncontradicted evidence, D. L.
McDonald and Stanley T, Wallbank were owners of a
United States oil and gas lease on the lands. They as-
signed it to others, reserving a 1 percent overriding
royalty in each McDonald and Wallbank; McDonald
thereafter conveyed his 1 percent overriding royalty
interest in the same lands three different times as fol-
lows:

(1) To R. D. Dame on February 11, 1952, which in-
strument was filed for record in the Land Office,* Bu-
reau of Land Management, Department of Interior,
Cheyenne, Wyoming, February 21, 1952, and was re-
corded in the Office of the County Clerk of Big Horn
County on November 22, 1954.

(2) To Bruce Anderson on February 14, 1952, which
instrument was recorded in the Office of the County
Clerk of Big Horn County on June 17, 1953.

1 Sometimes referred to by counsel as Land and Survey
Office.

(8) To E. T. Mileski on November 6, 1952, which in-
strument was filed for record in the Land Office No-
vember 21, 1952, and was recorded in the Office of the
County Clerk of Big Horn County on November 6, 1952.

Mileski, the last to purchase the said interest from
McDonald but the first to record it in the county where
the lands were situated, brought suit against Dame,
Anderson, and Anderson’s assignees, alleging purchase
of the royalty interest for valuable consideration and
in good faith. Dame filed an answer, counterclaim,
and cross-petition, apparently relying upon the fact
that the filing of his assignment in the Land Office
constituted constructive notice to plaintiff. The other
defendants defaulted.

Prior to the presentation of any evidence, defendant
interposed what he later termed a speaking demurrer
“in accordance with Sec. 8-1308(5),” W-.C.S.1945, as-
serting that McDonald, grantor, was a necessary party
to the action. This demurrer was overruled, and the
case proceeded to trial. The court rendered judgment
for plaintiff, specifically finding, inter alia, that the
allegations of plaintiff’s petition were true, that plain-
tiff had purchased in good faith the 1 percent overrid-
ing royalty from McDonald on November 6, 1952, and
that plaintiff had no actual or constructive notice of
adverse claims of defendant Dame at the time of pur-
chase.

Basically the errors charged against the trial court
in the rendering of judgment for plaintiff on his peti-
tion rather than for defendant on his cross-petition
are: (1) The finding that plaintiff purchased in good
faith for a valuable consideration and without notice
of adverse claim of defendant Dame. (2) The failing

to find that (a) plaintiff was on notice of the prior
assignment of defendant; (b) the interest in contro-
versy was personal property rather than real proper-
ty; (c) the instrument on which plaintiff relies is not
one in a record chain of title giving him rights as a
good-faith purchaser; and (d) plaintiff gave no valid
consideration for the assignment.

Defendant first argues that there was a substantial
defect of parties defendant, complaining because the
court overruled his speaking demurrer. He does not
undertake to define a speaking demurrer or to justify
its employment, entirely overlooking the fact that a
speaking demurrer has usually been held to be bad
pleading. See 19 AmJur. Equity § 310; 41 AmJur.
Pleading § 209; 71 C.J.S. Pleading § 256; and many ex-
cerpts from cases in 839A Words and Phrases, Speaking
Demurrer, p. 74 ff. Instead, he cites cases from other
jurisdictions tending to hold that where conflicting in-
terest of plaintiff and defendant in their respective
claimed holdings are acquired from the same person
such person becomes an indispensable or necessary
party. The cited cases are not sufficiently analogous
in circumstances to be persuasive. Moreover, § 3-1805,
W.C.S.1945, provided:

“When any of the defects enumerated in section
one hundred and thirteen [§ 3-1303] do not appear
upon the face of the petition, the objection may
be taken by answer; and if no objection be taken
either by demurrer or answer, the defendant shall
be deemed to have waived the same * * *.”

In the present case the defendant made no attempt to
immediately demur but answered instead and at that
time raised no question regarding defect of parties de-
fendant. Accordingly, even if there were a defect of

parties defendant the matter would have been waived
prior to the time the case came to trial.

Defendant argues that the filing of his assignment
with the Land Office constituted constructive notice
and justifies his position on several different grounds.
He points out that the Department of the Interior has
the obligation of leasing public lands and is, according-
ly, authorized to promulgate regulations therefor. He
then calls attention to 48 C.F.R. § 192.141 (1954),
which provides:

«ce * * all instruments of transfer of a lease or
of an interest therein, including assignments of
working or royalty interests, and operating agree-
ments, and subleases, must be filed for approval
within 90 days from the date of final execution
and must contain all of the terms and conditions
agreed upon by the parties thereto * * *.”

He goes on to say that the trial court and incidentally
the parties to the action are bound to take judicial
notice of the provisions of the regulations, citing South
v. Wishard, 146 Cal.App.2d 276, 303 P.2d 805; Arnold
v. Universal Oil Land Co., 45 Cal. App.2d 522, 114
P.2d 408; and Livermore v. Beal, 18 Cal.App.2d 535,
64 P.2d 987. Inasmuch as all of these cases emanate
from the jurisdiction of California, the first matter of
importance is to ascertain the statutory provisions as
to judicial notice in that State. We find that § 1875,
West’s Annotated California Codes, Civil Procedure,
states:

“Courts take judicial notice of the following
facts:

* * * * * *

“3, Public and private official acts of the legis-
lative, executive and judicial departments of this
state and of the United States, and the laws of the
several states of the United States and the inter-
pretation thereof by the highest courts of appel-
late jurisdiction of such states ;”

The California eases cited by defendant are based upon
this statute, Arnold v. Universal Oil Land Co., supra,
having held, largely on the authority of Livermore v.
Beal, supra, that the persons interested in the subject
matter of the records and orders of executive depart-
ments of the United States are also charged with no-
tice.

The Wyoming statute on judicial notice is as fol-
lows:

“Every court of this state shall take judicial
notice of the common law and statutes of every
state, territory and other jurisdiction of the
United States.” § 3-3109, W.C.S.1945.

Comparison of these statutes discloses that the scope
of judicial notice as to public records is, therefore,
much more limited in Wyoming than in California.

The wisdom of various statutory provisions as to
judicial notice may well be debatable. Persons favor-
ing an enlarged area of administrative matters which
a court can notice, without the necessity of taking evi-
dence, point out the resulting facility in the trial of
lawsuits. Those favoring more restricted assumption
of facts by the courts insist that in these days of tre-
mendously increased activities by executive and ad-
ministrative bodies a litigant would, under broader
statutes, be charged with knowledge of scores of ac-
tivities of which he actually knew nothing. Be that

a .”

as it may, the wisdom of the procedure is not one for
the courts but for the people through legislation. We
are guided, as are the California courts, by the statute
applicable to the jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Cali-
fornia cases cannot be precedent on this phase of the
question.

Defendant also quotes Schnee v. Schnee, 23 Wis. 377,
99 Am.Dec. 183, 185:

«#* * * The last purchaser in such case may be,
and no doubt is, chargeable with knowledge of
any facts appearing by the records of the land-
office at which he purchases, or of the general
land-office, going to show the claim or title of the
first purchaser. * * *”

It is significant to note the next sentence of the court’s
opinion:

“And the doctrine may, under some circum-
stances, perhaps, be carried somewhat farther;
but it clearly does not apply to a case like this;
and the authorities cited by counsel do not sustain
his position. * * *”

Clearly, the pronouncement is dictum only and of such
a general nature as to be of no help.

No other state cases are cited on this point, but de-
fendant contents himself with reference to Interior
decisions in which constructive notice of Federal rec-
ords is discussed. Obviously, these cases dealing with
Federal agency matters can have no bearing on this
problem.

Defendant quotes a general reference to construc-
tive notice in 39 AmJur. Notice and Notices § 7,
wherein it is stated:

“Constructive notice is the law’s substitute for
actual notice, intended to protect innocent per-
sons who are about to engage in lawful trans-
actions. It is a legal inference from established
facts and, like other legal presumptions, does not
admit of dispute. * * *” (Emphasis supplied.)

The statement hardly supports defendant’s thesis.
Where the law is as in California, the constructive
notice does not admit of dispute. Where the law is as
in Wyoming, there is, of course, the most serious dis-
pute. The effect of the recording of an instrument
as charging a subsequent purchaser with notice there-
of is solely by reason of the statute to that effect and
is necessarily confined. 5 Tiffany Real Property, 3
ed., p. 15; see also 5 Thompson on Real Property, 1924,
p. 3 ff.

As his next point, defendant contends that plaintiff's
overriding royalty is an interest in personalty and is
therefore not subject to a suit to quiet title, citing 3
Summers Oil and Gas, perm. ed. 1938, p. 391:

“In some oil and gas producing states the courts
have not had the occasion to consider the nature of
the oil and gas royalty interest. In a Wyoming
case the court of that state said that unaccrued
royalties reserved in an assignment of a permit
to drill for oil and gas on public lands were per-
sonal property.”

Defendant admits that Rue v. Merrill, 42 Wyo. 497,
297 P. 875, cited by Summers in support of his state-
ment is not in point. He assumes that the author must
have intended Oregon Basin Oil & Gas Co. v. Ohio Oil
Co., 70 Wyo. 268, 248 P.2d 198—a violent assumption
because the volume of Summers cited was written some
fourteen years before the Oregon Basin case was de-

a ”

cided. In any event that case related to the gas-pro-
ducts tax on oil which this court specifically held to be
a tax upon the severed product. Defendant in order
to bring the instant case within the Oregon Basin doc-
trine insists that the assignment to Mileski granted
only a right in the oil and gas which might be pro-
duced and saved and no right whatever in oil in place
in the ground. This question was decided in Denver
Joint Stock Land Bank of Denver v. Dixon, 57 Wyo.
528, 122 P.2d 842, 845, 849, 140 A.L.R. 1270, when in
holding that a mortgage of land containing no reserva-
tion of oil and gas embraced a landowner’s royalty, we
considered the matter at length and said:

“Tt is true, of course, that when oil and gas have
been brought to the surface, they become personal
property. State v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 163, 197, 212
P. 758. And if the right under the deed to Eades
consisted only of the right to receive a certain
amount of oil, without reference to its source, then
it might well be said that the right is one merely
to personal property. But it consists of a right to
receive the oil and gas from particular pieces of
land.

* * * * Ea *

“Since the law on this subject is said to be still
in the formative stage it may not be amiss to re-
peat and amplify some of the statements made in
the earlier part of this opinion, indicating, per-
haps, an independent or additional reason why
interests such as herein involved should be con-
sidered real and not personal property * * *.”

The royalty interests in the issue here relate to the
certain land from: which the oil or gas is to be taken,
and under the Denver Joint Stock Land Bank of Den-
ver case must be held to be real property and subject
to the law relating thereto.

Defendant also urges that, according to the records
of Big Horn County, there was a break in chain of
title in Mileski’s grantor at the time of the conveyance
to him and for that reason plaintiff could not succeed.
These contentions do not seem to be in accord with
the pleadings since the petition specifically alleges Mc-
Donald and Wallbank to have been the owners of the
United States oil and gas lease, Buffalo 037331, dated
September 1, 1945; that McDonald and Wallbank as-
signed to Zigler, reserving 1 percent overriding royal-
ty in each McDonald and Wallbank; and that Zigler
thereafter obtained a preferential extension or renewal
of said lease which preferential extension (Wyoming
02827) was subject to the same overriding royalty
in favor of McDonald. Defendant in his answer and
affirmative pleadings not only admitted these allega-
tions but alleged them as his own, proceeding there-
after to assert the Dame assignment from McDonald
in the lease, Wyoming 02827. Having stated his posi-
tion in the pleadings, he cannot alter it at this time.
See Casper Lodge No. 22, I.0.0.F., of Casper Wyoming
v. Corbridge, 74 Wyo. 244, 286 P.2d 1047. From the
pleadings, there seems to be no question that both
parties trace their titles to a common grantor, McDon-
ald. As we said in York v. James, 62 Wyo. 184, 165
P.2d 109, 162 A. L.R. 780, where parties in an action
to quiet title each assert opposing claims to the proper-
ty, the title need not be shown beyond the common
grantor, and the rule requiring plaintiff to recover on
the strength of his own title is inapplicable.

Defendant relies upon Rue v. Merrill, 42 Wyo. 497,
297 P. 875, 877, that “to enable one to claim the rights
of a bona fide purchaser without notice, the title pur-
chased must be apparently perfect and good at law.”
‘This rule is correct but it has no application here since

a ”

both parties by their pleadings concede that their pre-
decessor in interest had good title.

Defendant argues that plaintiff paid no present
valuable consideration for his assignment and was
therefore not a bona fide purchaser for value. Plain-
tiff concedes that normally the cancellation of a pre-
existing indebtedness is not a valuable consideration
but contends such cancellation coupled with the sur-
render of the evidence of the indebtedness and the
payment before notice of substantial additional
amounts is valuable consideration, citing 92 C.J.S.
Vendor & Purchaser § 828b, p. 227, and 55 Am.Jur.
Vendor & Purchaser § 748, for the proposition that a
purchaser will be protected where part of the consider-
ation was antecedent debt and the remainder a con-
temporaneous payment if said payment constitutes a
substantial part of the entire amount to. be paid. Whe-
ther one who takes property in satisfaction of a pre-
existing debt is entitled to protection as a bona fide
purchaser for value is a question on which there has
not been unanimity of view. See 55 Am.Jur. Vendor
and Purchaser § 742 ff.; 92 C.J.S. Vendor & Pur-
chaser § 323, pp. 227, 228; 8 Pomeroy’s Equity Juris-
prudence, 5 ed., § 748 ff.; and see 5 Tiffany Real Prop-
erty, 3 ed., § 1802. Similarly, courts have experienced
considerable difficulty regarding the protection which
should be accorded a purchaser where a part only of
the purchase price has been made before the pur-
chaser receives notice of a prior claim against the
property. See 3 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, 5
ed., § 750; 55 Am.Jur. Vendor and Purchaser § 750;
and Annotations, 87 A.L.R. 1505, 1516, 1519; 109 A.
LR. 168, 167; 124 A.L.R, 1259, 1261; 21 Ann.Cas, 4638.

Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the consideration
which was paid is of interest:

“Q. So you then took the whole assignment for
what? A. Well, I took the whole one percent then
for what he already owed me, which was $2,365.-
00, plus $1,600.00, that I was to pay him on top of
that one percent.

“Q. And how were you to pay the $1,600.00?
A. Well, I told Dan I couldn’t afford it. There
wasn’t any way I could give him any big sums of
cash. He told me to pay it out as I could. Any-
time he needed a little money, or any time I could
spare it, I would pay that on account of that roy-
alty.

“Q. Now, did you make payments on that
$1,600? A. Yes I did.

“Q. Did you keep a record of those payments?
A. Yes I did, keep a record.

“Q. What kind of a record was it? A. Well, I
had a little book in the safe. Every time I gave
him any money or anything, why I put it down in
that little book.

“Q. In addition to money did you give him any-
thing else? A. Yes, he received on his own request,
he received merchandise in the way of guns and
fishing tackle, and little horse statuettes merchan-
dise that he could sell to get a little money to go
on.

“Q. How soon after the assignment did you
start paying him? A. Immediately.”

Plaintiff continued with the discussion of the amounts
which he had paid and later the following ensued:

“Q. Now, can you look at that record down at
the bottom of the page. There appears a notation
‘balance due $397.10 9/2/54 to McDonald” Can
you tell me what that means? A. Yes, that is the

a "

balance of $1600 cash I was supposed to pay Dan
for the one percent royalty. That is the balance
that was still left for me to pay on this particular
date.

_ “Q. On the date of September 2, 1954? A. That
is right.

“Q. Now can you look at the record and tell me
when it was you completed paying the $1600? A.
Yes, the balance; in fact, it was not only paid but
overpaid actually on November 24th, 1954.

“Q. How was it paid? A. Well, there was $274
for merchandise, fishing tackle, guns etc., Mc-
Donald requested me to bring to Billings, and
there was $187.70 in cash, and then there was a
$25.00 check as well that was paid to him at that |
time. If you will notice on here it is overpaid to
him to the extent of $111.00.”

This testimony was flatly contradicted by McDonald,
and it therefore became necessary for the trial court
to determine which of the witnesses was worthy of
belief. We must consider the evidence most favorable
to the prevailing party here under the rule which we
have often announced. Holbrook v. Continental Oil
Co., 73 Wyo. 821, 278 P.2d 798; Lasich v. Wimpenney,
73 Wyo. 345, 278 P.2d 807; Tompkins v. Byrtus, 72
Wyo. 587, 267 P.2d 753; Jacoby v. Town of City of
Gillette, 62 Wyo. 487, 174 P.2d 505, 177 P.2d 204, 169
A.L.R. 502. So considering we have no alternative
but to conclude that if the trial court believed Mileski
there was ample evidence upon which the finding and
judgment of the court could be predicated. The de-
tached sheets of the book, plaintiff’s Exhibits 4a and
4b, which purported to show the amounts of money
paid by Mileski to McDonald were received in evidence.
Defendant objected on the ground that they were not

proper business records and that no proper foundation
had been laid for their admission, but his objection
was overruled. These exhibits are somewhat irregu-
lar, but we think a proper foundation was laid when
it was said that these sheets were the original record of
payments and that the record was true and correct and
that “Every time I gave him any money or anything,
why I put it down in that little book.” If defendant
desired to challenge the statements, he should have
done so. The proper weight to be given to such evi-
dence was a matter within the discretion of the trial
court. According to Exhibits 4a and 4b, there was
still due on November 22, 1954, the date of the record-
ing of the Dame assignment, a balance of $187.70 still
unpaid on the $1,600 amount which Mileski claimed to
be the cash consideration he had promised McDonald.
However, Mileski stated that he learned of the previ-
ous sale of the royalty to Dame “about two or three
weeks before Christmas, 1954.” If the trial court be-
lieved this testimony to the exclusion of all conflicting
statements, it might properly have concluded that Mi-
Jeski had paid all of the promised $1,600 cash consider-
ation for the assignment from McDonald before becom-
ing aware that the previous assignment to Dame was
in existence. Assuming this to be true, we need not
determine whether or not a pre-existing indebtedness
is such consideration as will protect a bona fide pur-
chaser without notice.

The parties do not discuss the fact of there being a
balance of $187.70 due from Mileski to McDonald at
the time the assignment to Dame was recorded, but
perhaps the case should not be concluded without refer-
ence thereto. It is stated in 3 Pomeroy’s Equity Jur-
isprudence, 5 ed., § 759b:

“Where the subsequent grantee or mortgagee
whose deed or mortgage is first recorded has, at
the time of payment of part or all of the consider-
ation, constructive notice of the prior interest,
arising from the intermediate recording of the
prior deed or mortgage, the question has arisen
as to which title or right is superior, and on this
question different conclusions have been reached.
It will be observed that differences in the record-
ing laws may conceivably affect the result. On the
one hand it has been held that the subsequent
purchaser, to obtain priority, must show that the
purchase money was actually paid. before the re-
cording of the prior conveyance or equities. On
the other hand it has been held that payment of
the purchase price before actual notice of the
prior purchase is sufficient to protect a subsequent
purchaser who has first recorded his deed, since
the record of the prior purchase is not in itself
sufficient to give notice to one who has recorded
his deed.”

And see 55 Am.Jur. Vendor and Purchaser § 750. In
considering this matter as relates to the law of this
State, we bear in mind the provisions of § 66-116, W.
C.S.1945:

“Hach and every such deed, mortgage, instru-
ment or conveyance touching any interest in lands,
made and recorded, according to the provisions of
this chapter [article], shall be notice to and take
precedence of any subsequent purchaser or pur-
chasers from the time of the delivery of any such
instrument as [sic] the office of the register of
deeds, for record. * * *”

and § 66-119, W.C.S.1945:

“Every conveyance of real estate within this
state, hereafter made, which shall not be recorded
as required by law, shall be void, as against any
subsequent purchaser or purchasers in good faith

and for a valuable consideration of the same real
estate or any portion thereof, whose conveyance
shall be first duly recorded.”

In the light of the general law on the subject, the cases
cited in support thereof, subsequent cases which have
referred to such citations, and the above-mentioned
Wyoming statutes, we conclude that plaintiff under
the facts here was not bound by the notice of defend-
ant’s recording of assignment on November 22, 1954.

Affirmed.

Melvin GOICH, Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 2872.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
May 18, 1959.
839 Pac.2d 119

180

W. A. Muir, Rock Springs, Lawrence A. Marty, Green
River, for appellant.

Thomas O. Miller, Atty. Gen., Glenn A. Williams,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Joe R. Wilmetti, County and Pros.
Atty. of Sweetwater Co., Rock Springs, for appellee.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

OPINION.

Mr. Justice PARKER delivered the opinion of the
court.

The defendant, Melvin Goich, was charged with
manslaughter in that he did unlawfully and felonious-
ly kill Jimmie Whisler, without malice or premedita-
tion, but in the commission of an unlawful act, to wit:
driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor to such an extent as to be incapable
of safely operating said vehicle and driving upon the
left side of the highway.1 The matter was tried before
a jury which rendered a verdict of guilty, and defend-
ant was sentenced from 18 to 24 months in the peni-
tentiary.

The facts out of which the prosecution arose were
as follows: On the morning of May 30, 1957, at about
four-thirty, the deceased in company with his father
was driving a Chevrolet sedan westerly on Highway 30
about 500 yards west of Rock Springs. Mr. Telck, a
member of their party, had preceded them a few min-

1 The section of the statute under which this is drawn
is not stated in the information, but § 9-205, W.C.S.
1945, is quoted as one of the instructions and counsel
present argument on this section.

utes in another automobile. The defendant, alone in a
pickup truck, going easterly from Green River to Rock
Springs, turned suddenly to the left and struck the
Whisler car on its left side while it was to the extreme
right of the highway, causing a severe wreck in which
defendant was injured and Jimmie Whisler killed.

The evidence of the State purported to show that de-
fendant Goich had been in Green River at a bar immedi-
ately prior to his departure for Rock Springs, had
drunk some beer, possibly some other intoxicating li-
quor, had driven on the wrong side of the road prior to
the crash, and had turned abruptly, causing the acci-
dent,

Defendant specifies some sixteen different errors
which can for practical purposes be classified as insuf-
ficiency of the evidence to show commission. of the of-
fense, improper instruction of the jury, and incorrect
rulings on the admission of evidence.

It is uncontroverted that defendant turned sharply
to his left, crossed into the wrong lane of traffic, hit
deceased’s car on the side, and was in violation of the
traffic code at the time of the crash, but he explained
his actions by saying that he was momentarily blinded
by the sun. The main point of contention is as to the
sobriety of defendant at the time. The court properly
instructed that the phrase “under the influence of in-
toxicating liquor” means that a person has taken into
his stomach a sufficient quantity of intoxicating li-
quor so as to deprive him of the normal control of his
bodily or mental faculties. State v. Dobbs, 70 Wyo. 26,
244 P.2d 280, 284.

It is not necessary at this point that we analyze the
evidence to ascertain whether or not it showed that de-

fendant had drunk intoxicating liquor so that he was
under the influence thereof or was prior to the crash
wandering in his driving as the witness Telck asserted.
We turn instead to a consideration of instructions. sev-
en, eight, and nine to which defendant objected.

Instruction seven reads:

««e * * (drivers of vehicles proceeding in opposite
directions shall pass each other to the right, and
upon roadways having width for not more than one
line of traffic in each direction each driver shall
give to the other at least one-half of the main-
traveled portion of the roadway as nearly as possi-
ble.’ and the violation of that statute by any per-
son is and was declared to be a misdemeanor; and,
therefore, an unlawful act.”

The first part of the instruction is an exact quotation
of § 60-644, W.C.S.1945, and the latter part a con-
densation of § 60-603, W.C.S.1945, which makes a vio-
lation of the previously quoted section a misdemeanor.
Defendant insists that this instruction led the jury to
believe that if defendant was at the time of the crash .
on the left-hand side of the highway he was guilty of
an unlawful act and thereby guilty of the crime
charged, regardless of whether or not he was at the
time under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The
State maintains that the instruction did not tell the
jury “it need find no other evidence to support their
verdict” and goes on to urge that instruction twenty-
three admonished the jury to consider all of the in-
structions and not to, single out any particular one.

Instructions eight and nine discuss the definition of
involuntary manslaughter, particularly with reference
to an unintentional killing effected in the commission
of some unlawful act and say that the violation of the

statute or statutes must be accompanied by criminal
carelessness or culpable neglect which was the proxi-
mate cause of the death of deceased. The defendant
argues that since the words “culpable neglect” or
“criminal carelessness” are not contained in the in-
formation the jury should not have been instructed on
that subject and thereby led to believe that a finding
of negligence would support a conviction. The State
answers that the charge of manslaughter embodies the
elements of culpable neglect and criminal carelessness
by the provisions of the statute which were submitted
in instruction four without objection.

The defendant apparently in an effort to counteract
the effect of the statements in instructions seven, eight,
and nine, to which he objected, sought to have the court
give instruction “A” which recited an excerpt from
the criminal complaint and continued:

“Before you can convict defendant, you must be
satisfied, from the evidence, beyond all reasonable
doubt, that defendant, at the time and place
charged, was under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, as charged in the Information, and as de-
fined by the Court. If the State has not proven, by
competent evidence, the charge of intoxication, as
alleged in the Information, beyond all reasonable
doubt, you should return a verdict of not guilty.”

Although no claim of error relates to other instruc-
tions, two of them require consideration. Instruction
five recites the first portion of § 60-414, W.C.S.1945
(1957 Cum.Pocket Supp.)—commonly referred to as
the drunken driving statute:

“It is unlawful and punishable as provided in
subdivision (d) of this section for any person who
is under the influence of intoxicating liquor, to

a degree which renders him incapable of safely
driving a motor vehicle, to drive any motor vehicle
within this State.”

Thus the jury was advised on that point.

At the oral argument, defendant’s counsel insisted,
and the State conceded, that under the information in
this case in order to justify a verdict of guilty the State
was obligated to prove both defendant’s intoxication
and his driving on the wrong side of the highway. With
this we agree, and it was necessary for the court to
instruct the jury accordingly. When we review the
record, we find no instruction to this effect. What is
more serious, instruction four, referring to the com-
mission of an unlawful act, coupled with instruction
seven, defining the duties of the drivers in passing
and stating that a violation of such statute was a mis-
demeanor and therefore an unlawful act, certainly im-
plies—if it does not say so in as many words—that the
verdict of manslaughter was justified in this case if
the jury found that defendant was guilty of either
drunkenness or driving on the wrong side of the high-
way.

Instructions eight and nine are not objectionable on
the grounds urged by defendant that they discussed
criminal carelessness and culpable neglect. We think
these terms which are a part of the statutory defini-
tion of manslaughter may properly be used in instruc-
tions relating to this crime even though some words of
the statute have been omitted from the charge. Never-
theless, instructions eight and nine would seem to fur-
ther the impression left by instruction seven that the
court was discussing a sole unlawful act, i. e., improper
driving rather than the two improper acts, i. e., drunk-
en driving and driving on the wrong side of the road.

It is of course possible that the jury believed defendant
to have been guilty of both unlawful acts although we
are inclined to think that the evidence of drunkenness
was quite weak. Nevertheless, under the well settled
law, the jury in a criminal case must be instructed as
to all of the unlawful acts which are requisite to a con-
viction on any charge, and the failure to so state must
be assumed to have been prejudicial to a defendant who
is convicted. It is stated in Annotation, 169 A.L.R.
815, that “a complete omission from the instructions
of any definition or explanation of the offense charged
is generally regarded as reversible error, even where
the question has not been properly presented or pre-
served at the trial.” At 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law begin-
ning at § 1198, it is said, “Proper instructions as to the
nature and elements of the offense charged must be
given”; and the text goes on with an elaboration at §
1194, which we discussed in State v. Woodward, 69
Wyo. 262, 240 P.2d 1157, 1164, there indicating that it
was generally proper and sufficient to give the defini-
tion in the language of the statute. Where the inform-
ation alludes to two different statutes, violation of both
being essential to the conviction, we think the mere
recitation of the statutory definition of each could
scarcely fail to leave the jury in a state of confusion.
People v. MacPherson, 823 Mich. 438, 35 N.W.2d 376,
382, states: “it is the duty of the trial court in a crimi-
nal case to indicate to the jury with reasonable certain-
ty the offense with which the defendant is charged.”

In State v. Wilson, 76 Wyo. 297, 301 P.2d 1056, we
repeated the axiom that in all criminal prosecutions
the defendant has a right to be informed of the accus-
ation against him, applying it to the manslaughter
statute in Wyoming where death occurs from an auto-
mobile accident. We held there that a defendant in

| "

such a case was entitled to a bill of particulars indicat-
ing the type of act out of which it was claimed that the
death occurred. As a corollary to this view it is the
right of the jury to know the illegal act upon which the
crime is based.

From what we have said, the verdict in the case can-
not stand. The conviction must be reversed and the
case remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

Clara K. SHOTWELL, Appellant,
(Plaintiff below),
v.
Earl C. SHOTWELL, Appellee,
(Defendant below).
No. 2870.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.

May 19, 1959.

389 Pac.2d. 410

Brooke Wunnicke, Cheyenne, for appellant,
James A. Greenwood, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

|
OPINION.

Mr. Justice HARNSBERGER delivered the opinion
of the court,

Appellant seeks reversal of an order of the district
court refusing to modify the provision for support and

maintenance of a minor child which was made in a de-
eree divorcing the parties to this proceeding.

No transcript of the evidence appears in the record
and the appeal is submitted upon an agreed statement
consisting of a statement of the case, statement of
points on appeal and copies of pleadings. A summary
of the situation thus presented discloses that on May
9, 1955, plaintiff sought modification of that portion of
the decree which related to support of the minor in or-
der to require defendant to make monthly cash pay-
ments in such amount as the court should deem fair
and reasonable. The detail of defendant’s answer,
which resisted the petition for modification, need not
be recounted here as the parties agree the sole question
to be decided on this appeal is whether under the di-
vorce decree requiring the father to convey to the child
an undivided one-half interest in the home relieved the
father from further contribution for the support of the
child so long as the child retains the one-half interest
in the real estate conveyed to it in fulfillment of the
decree.

In submitting the appeal to this court, appellant’s
counsel has filed an exhaustive brief dealing with the
appealability of the order denying the petition for modi-
fication; the jurisdiction of the district court to modi-
fy; the equitable jurisdiction of the district court to
deal with matters relating to support of a minor; the
construction of a decree to uphold the court’s intention;
the chargeability of the minor’s support expenses
against the minor’s estate, coupled with the contention
that such estate has now been consumed, thus leaving
defendant now liable for the minor’s further support;
and that Wyoming law is agreeable to modification of
the decree in the manner sought.

Without resort to authority, we may say there is no
doubt but that the order denying modification is an
appealable order; that the district court did have juris-
diction to modify the initial support decree; that it was
within the equitable jurisdiction of the court to deal
with matters relating to the support of the minor and
that such a construction of the court’s decree should
be given as will uphold its intention. These matters
are almost if not altogether elementary. We may also
agree that under some circumstances the expenses in-
curred in supporting a minor may be chargeable against
the minor’s estate in a proper proceeding to accomplish
that purpose, but that question is not before us nor
may we now pass upon appellant’s claim that the estate
of the minor has been consumed. In the first place,
there is no transcript of the evidence concerning that
matter and, in any event, it is a matter between the
person claiming the charge and the minor.

As indicated above, the real question we are called
upon to decide under the agreed statement is: Did the
court err in interpreting the divorce decree which re-
quired defendant to convey unto the minor an undivid-
ed one-half interest in the home property “in lieu of
support and until the further order of this court” to
mean that such one-half interest of the minor in that
real estate should be used for the minor’s support be-
fore additional cash payments were to be required of
the defendant?

The evidence produced to the trial court not being
before us, we are unable to consider any factual mat-
ter that may have affected the trial court’s decision.
The issue here, therefore, resolves itself to be whether
as a matter of law the one-half interest in the real es-

state presently owned by the minor is to be exhausted
before the court should require the defendant to make
further monetary provision for the child’s support.

The authorities offered by appellant to the effect that
a minor’s estate should not be used to provide for the
child’s support during minority, when either of the par-
ents is able to provide for that support, are of no value
to us when the sole estate in question was created for
the express purpose of providing that support. Neither
is it necessary to decide whether the child is entitled
to first look to the male parent before calling upon the
mother for support, and we have already indicated that
the one-half interest of the child is still intact, not-
withstanding appellant suggests it has been consumed.

We feel the intendment of the initial decree for child
support is plain and free from doubt. When the de-
cree was made, it was the right, privilege and duty of
the court to make such provision for the custody, care,
maintenance and support of the minor as seemed to be
in the child’s best interest. Rather than requiring the
father to pay a lump sum which may have been un-
availing, due to the financial condition of defendant at
that time, or make periodic future payments, the de-
cision ensured to the child physical property which was
within the power of the court to immediately command.
We are entitled to assume that to the court in its wis-
dom this was the best provision that could be made
rather than to have the child’s support depend upon
the uncertainty that lay in the father’s future ability
to provide. If the court had so decided and the father
then had the present ability to pay, the decision might
have required the father to pay a lump sum. In sucha
case there would be no reason to require further sup-
port until that sum was exhausted. We see no defeat-

ing difference between having a lump sum intact at
this time to provide for the minor’s support and having
intact at this time an interest in property that may be
liquidated to provide that support. Until that which
the decree provided for support is expended, there is
no need to call upon the father for further support.

While appellant’s counsel tells us of the basis of an
asserted claim by plaintiff against the property of the
minor, that is a matter not within the record any more
than matters which defendant’s pleading mentions
which might well be valid offsets against plaintiff’s
claims, such as the use, occupancy and enjoyment of
the premises by: the plaintiff and her new husband, or
the question of whether the divorce decree necessarily
absolved the plaintiff of all obligation to assist in the
support of the child even though the court required a
certain contribution from the father.

The same counsel also informs us, outside the record,
that the minor, now some seventeen years of age, is an
inmate of the Wyoming State Training School, owing
to certain deficiencies. While this fact may not be tak-
en into account in deciding the law of the case, it serves
to emphasize that at present, and perhaps in the fu-
ture, the provision for the welfare, health, education,
comfort and happiness of the minor will be assumed by
the State, with its right to such reimbursement as is
provided by law. At present there is no reason to be-
Hieve that the property set over to the child for its sup-
port will not be sufficient and under proper proceed-
ings it may be applied to that purpose, either from its
renting income or its sale as may become necessary.

The order of the district court denying plaintiff’s pe-

tition for modification of the original provision for the
support of the minor child of the parties must be af-
firmed.

Affirmed.

Charles L. BUCKMAN, Lorraine C. Pendleton, Landon
C. Reed, Bernard J. Thompson, Lee Burt and Roy S.
Harkins, doing business under the name and style of
Hanna-Basin Construction & Coal Co., a co-partner-
ship, Appellants (Plaintiffs below),

v.
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Local 7247

of United Mine Workers of America, J. E. Brinley
and Milo Picarelli, Appellees (Defendants below).

No. 2908.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
May 19, 1959.

339 Pac.2d 3898

eS
x

201

J. Reuel Armstrong, Rawlins, and Harold B, Wag-
ner, of Wagner & Wyers, Denver, Colo., for appel-
Jants.

Robert S. Lowe, Rawlins for appellee.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

OPINION.

Mr. Chief Justice BLUME delivered the opinion of
the court.

The parties to this case will be mentioned as plain-
tiffs and defendants or by name as in the court below.
On December 20, 1958, plaintiffs herein commenced an
action against the defendants alleging as follows:

1. Plaintiffs are the sole partners and owners of the
Hanna-Basin Construction & Coal Company. They are
now and at all times hereinafter mentioned have been
engaged in the strip coal mining business near Elmo,
Carbon County, Wyoming.

2. The United Mine Workers of America is an in-
ternational unincorporated labor organization. Its Lo-
cal 7247 has its headquarters in Hanna, Carbon County,
Wyoming, J. E. Brinley and Milo Picarelli are the busi-
ness agents of United Mine Workers of America and
of the said local organization.

8. Plaintiffs are the vendees under the terms of a
conditional sales contract wherein the Nuggett Coal
Company is the vendor. Plaintiffs are in possession of
the leases, equipment, land, mines, real property and
personal property formerly held by the Nuggett Coal
Company, all of the property being located near Elmo,
Wyoming, and plaintiffs are operating the property for
themselves. All six of the plaintiffs are actively en-
gaged in the coal mining business. They have invest-

Ci

ed their capital in the property and are entirely de-
pendent on their business for their support and the
support of their families. Plaintiffs have two em-
ployees, namely, an office worker and a truck driver,
All the remainder of the work done in and around the
mine is performed by the plaintiffs themselves.

4, Defendants and their representatives and agents
made illegal, unlawful and wrongful demands upon
plaintiffs as follows, to wit: (a) That all of the plain-
tiffs, except Roy S. Harkins, who is the secretary and
manager of the co-partnership, immediately become
members of Local 7247 of the United Mine Workers of
America; (b) That the Local be designated as bar-
gaining agent by the plaintiffs; (c) That the plaintiffs
immediately unionize the mine and other operations by
compelling their employees to join the Local of the
United Mine Workers of America.

5. The demands are impossible demands and plain-
tiffs refused to accede to them. These demands violate
plaintiffs’ rights of free choice and of life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness. Plaintiffs do not choose to
join the union or to have the Local designated as their
bargaining agent, nor can they lawfully coerce their
employees to join the union.

6. When plaintiffs refused to comply with the de-
mands of the defendants, and each of them, the de-
fendants in menacing terms and threatening language
told the plaintiffs that they would not permit them
to operate the mine. On December 15, 1958, defend-
ants caused a great number of pickets to walk up and
down the public access roads to plaintiffs’ mine, some
of them carrying placards and signs reading “Unfair
to organized labor”. These pickets continued to patrol

the access roads to the plaintiffs’ mine, and the de-
fendants have threatened to place on the picket line
as many as 250 pickets to patrol in front of the plain-
tiffs’ premises carrying said signs.

7, Plaintiffs’ customers, patrons and their employees
have been threatened by the defendants and their rep-
resentatives and pickets by the use of such signs and
by standing in the middle of such roads, preventing
access to the plaintiffs’ premises. Plaintiffs have been
threatened by the defendants, their representatives
and pickets by being called obscene names in menacing
and threatening language such as “we will run you out
of business you * * *”, Ingress and egress to and from
the plaintiffs’ place of business was obstructed and in-
terfered with by said defendants and many of the
plaintiffs’ customers have been intimidated, molested
and prevented from doing business with the plaintiffs
by said acts, threats and conduct of the defendants.

8. Plaintiffs have protested against these acts,
threats and conduct and have requested defendants
to desist therefrom, but defendants continue the same
conduct as above alleged.

9. On December 15, 1958, only two customers of the
plaintiffs entered the plaintiffs’ premises, and one of
those arrived before the establishment of the picket
line. Ordinarily a great number of customers would
have come to the plaintiffs’ mine and purchased coal
therefrom. By reason of the defendants’ conduct as
above mentioned, plaintiffs have been irreparably dam-
aged in a great amount of money, the amount of which
cannot be ascertained by the plaintiffs. If said acts
continue as set out herein and as defendants threaten
to continue them, plaintiffs will be irreparably dam-

i

aged and their business greatly injured and destroyed,
and the plaintiffs are without adequate legal remedy at
Jaw to seek a compensation of aforesaid grievous
wrongs so practiced upon them by the defendants.

Plaintiffs accordingly pray a restraining order
against the defendants, their officers, members, ag-
ents, pickets and representatives from molesting, inter-
fering with, threatening or intimidating plaintiffs and
their employees and customers. The plaintiffs also
ask damages in the sum of $10,000.

On December 23, 1958, the defendants appeared in
this action by their attorney, Robert S. Lowe, and filed
a resistance to the motion for temporary restraining
order, alleging as follows:

“Come Now Defendants by and through Robert
8. Lowe, their Attorney, and respectfully resist
the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order made
herein by Plaintiff, and Motion for Dismissal of
the same on the grounds, and for the reason that:

“(a) Same is prohibited by Article 5, Chapter
54 of the Wyoming Compiled Statutes, 1945.

“{b) That the business involved in this subject
litigation is engaged in and affects interstate com-
merce as Defendants offer to show by evidence to
be presented at hearing to be held by this Court
December 28, 1958, and therefore, this Court is
without jurisdiction to award the relief prayed
for by Plaintiffs herein.

“(¢) That the within controversy is one of those
within the scope and effect of Section 8(b) of the
Labor Management Relations Act as amended
[29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)], and that therefore the
Congress of the United States has pre-empted the
field, thereby depriving the State of Wyoming and
its Courts from jurisdiction herein.

“(d) That the picketing, the subject of these
proceedings, is peaceful and is thereby protected
by Amendment 1 of the Constitution of the United
States of America, and also Sections 20, 21, 22 and
87 of [article 1 of] the Constitution of Wyoming.”

A hearing was had upon the complaint and the re-
sistance above mentioned on December 23, 1958, before
the Honorable Vernon G. Bentley, Judge, presiding. At
the end of the hearing the judge presiding stated as
follows: “This Court will rule that it has no jurisdic-
tion in this matter.” An order was accordingly entered
denying the injunction asked by the plaintiffs. Plain-
tiffs have appealed.

There is but a single question before us in this case
and that is whether or not the court erred in holding
that it had no jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the
court of the subject matter was invoked by the com-
plaint of the plaintiffs herein. If that complaint stated
a cause of action, then and in that event the court ac-
quired jurisdiction and the power and the duty to de-
cide the case. 1 Freeman on Judgments, 5 Ed., § 338;
21 C.J.S. Courts § 33; New River, H. & W. R. Co. v.
Honaker, 119 Va. 641, 89 S. E. 960, Ann.Cas.1917C,
182; Belles v. Miller, 10 Wash. 259, 38 P. 1050, citing
United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, 31 U.S. 691, 8
L.Ed. 547; Goodman v. Winter, 64 Ala. 410, 38 Am.Rep.
18; Grignon’s Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. 319, 48 U.S. 319,
11 L.Ed. 283; United States v. Maney, C.C.D.Minn., 61
F. 140. There can hardly be any doubt in this case, as
shown by a cursory examination of the complaint here-
inbefore set out, that the court had full power and
authority to decide this case, notwithstanding the fact
that the case involved interstate commerce. Thus it
is said in Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Help-
ers Local Union No. 776 (A.F.L.), 346 U.S. 485, 74 8.
Ct. 161, 164, 98 L.Ed. 228:

“k  * We have held that the state still may ex-
ercise ‘its historic powers over such traditionally
local matters as public safety and order and the
use of streets and highways.’ Allen-Bradley Local
No. 1111, United Electrical Radio and Machine
Workers of America v. Wisconsin Employment Re-
lations Board, 315 U.S. 740, 749, 62 S.Ct. 820, 825,
86 L.Ed. 1154, * * *”

In Annotation, 2 L.Hd.2d 1680, 1686, it is said:

“Tt is well established that the federal labor re-
lations statutes do not deprive a state of power to
enjoin mass picketing or picketing involving vio-
lence, notwithstanding that interstate commerce
is affected * * *.”

That the state has jurisdiction in case of picketing by

* violence, threats or mass picketing is stated in the
Annotation, 32 A.L.R.2d 1026, 1029. Counsel for the
defendants refer us to this annotation at page 1036
where it is said:

“While it was held by the Supreme Court of the
United States that the National Labor Relations
Act, in its original form, did not deprive a state
court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit for injunc-
tive relief against a labor union or employees to re-
strain them from picketing in an illegal manner,
such as mass picketing or picketing by way of vio-
lence and force, the Supreme Court has never
squarely decided that a state court’s jurisdiction
to enjoin violence in picketing and mass picketing
affecting interstate commerce has survived the
Labor Management Relations Act. * * *”

But that volume was published in 1958. In 1956 the
Supreme Court of the United States decided the case
of United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America v. Wisconsin Employment

Se

Relations Board, 351 U.S. 266, 76 S.Ct. 794, 799, 100
L.Ed. 1162, and in that case Mr. Justice Reed stated

as follows:

«« * * But our post-Taft-Hartley opinions have
made it clear that this general rule does not take
from the States power to prevent mass picketing,
violence, and overt threats of violence. The domi-
nant interest of the State in preventing violence
and property damage cannot be questioned. It is a
matter of genuine local concern. Nor should the
fact that a union commits a federal unfair labor
practice while engaging in violent conduct pre-
yent States from taking steps to stop the violence.

“The States are the natural guardians of the
public against violence. It is the local communities
that suffer most from the fear and loss oceasioned
by coercion and destruction. We would not in-
terpret an act of Congress to leave them powerless
to avert such emergencies without compelling di-
rections to that effect.”

In short, the defendant union and its members had
no right to engage in mass picketing and, in picketing,
make threats, use abusive language, prohibit entrance
to the premises to customers of plaintiffs, inflict prop-
erty damage or obstruct the highways. In addition to
the cases already cited, see Allen-Bradley Local No.
1111, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers
of America, v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
315 U.S. 740, 62 S.Ct. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154; Youngdahl
vy. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 181, 78 S.Ct. 206, 2 L.Ed.2d
151; Ellingsen v. Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union of Chi-
cago, Local 758, 877 Ill. 76, 85 N.E.2d 349; Asphalt
Paving, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of America,
181 Kan. 775, 317 P.2d 349; Annotation, 32 A.L.R.2d

1026, 1036, et seq. The trial court must decide whether
or not the defendants and the members of the union
have committed the prohibited acts, as alleged in the
complaint, and make proper orders in that connection.

Counsel for defendants contends that the trial court
actually took jurisdiction of the case. He argues that
the ruling of the trial court is tantamount to a general
finding which is a finding of every special thing ne-
cessary to be found to sustain the order. He cites, for
instance, the case of Lucksinger v. Salisbury, 72 Wyo.
164, 262 P.2d 396, 264 P.2d 1007 and also mentions the
rule that where no special findings are made the pre-
sumptions are in favor and support of the trial court’s
judgment. We have no fault to find with these rules,
but we do not think they have any application in the
case at bar. A holding that the court has no jurisdiction
is not the same thing as a holding that the evidence
shows a want of jurisdiction, but means, we think, un-
less qualified, that the court lacks the power to decide
the case or any part of it. We might add that it is quite
obvious, after examining the record before us, that the
court gave no consideration to the evidence before it ex-
cept that part which relates to the question of inter-
state commerce.

The court must, accordingly, assume jurisdiction in
this case. This court is primarily a court of review,
except in cases in which this court has original juris-
diction or where a constitutional question is legally
certified to this court. It is not its function to deter-
mine the facts and the law in a case in the first in-
stance. That must be done by the trial court. See
4A C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 699, p. 528; 14 AmJur.
Courts § 48, p. 277; Art. 5, § 2, Constitution of Wyom-
ing; State v. Kelley, 17 Wyo. 335, 98 P.886.

Counsel for defendants contends that the National
Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction in this
ease, That would depend it seems upon the following
factors: First, the picketing must be peaceful; Second,
the plaintiffs must be engaged in interstate commerce;
Third, being engaged in interstate commerce is not
enough. There is a so-called “no-man’s land” which is
not occupied by the federal legislation regarding labor
relations. If the case falls within this so-called “no-
man’s land”, state courts have jurisdiction in the case
to enjoin even peaceful picketing if contrary to the law
or the public policy of the state. If, however, the fed-
eral legislation covers a case such as the present one,
then and in that event state courts have no jurisdiction
to enjoin peaceful picketing and the National Labor
Relations Board alone has jurisdiction in the matter.
Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local
Union No. 776 (A.F.L.), 846 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161, 98
L.Ed. 228; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S.
468, 75 S.Ct. 480, 99 L.Ed. 546; Stoddard-Wendle Mo-
tor Co. v. Automotive Machinists Lodge 942, Interna-
tional Association of Machinists, 48 Wash.2d 519, 295
P.2d 805; Asphalt Paving, Inc., v. International Bro-
therhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and
Helpers of America, 181 Kan. 775, 317 P.2d 349; Fries-
en v. General Team and Truck Drivers Local Union
No. 54, 181 Kan. 769, 317 P.2d 366.

Counsel in the case should point out to the trial court
the presence or absence of provisions in the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. showing
that this case falls within its provisions, or falls within
the field of “no man’s land’. In other words, they
should for the benefit of the trial court critically
analyze the provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act which might have a bearing in the case at bar.

The judgment of the court refusing to assume juris-
diction is reversed with direction to assume jurisdic-
tion, make a finding of facts and of law and decide the
case and make such orders as may be proper. The court
may direct that additional testimony be taken, if avail-
able, and make such other orders as may be proper
or necessary to carry into effect the foregoing opin-
ion.

Reversed with directions.

216

Charles L, BUCKMAN, Lorraine C. Pendleton, Landon
C. Reed, Bernard J. Thompson, Lee Burt and Roy S.
Harkins, doing business under the name and style
of Hanna-Basin Construction & Coal Co., a co-part-
nership, Appellants (Plaintiffs below),

v.

UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Local 7247
of United Mine Workers of America, J. E. Brinley
and Milo Picarelli, Appellees (Defendants below).

No. 2903.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
July 14, 1959.

342 Pac.2d. 236

UL :
|
|
Robert S. Lowe, Rawlins, for appellees, in support of
petition for rehearing.

OPINION.

Mr. Chief Justice BLUME delivered the opinion of
the court.

A petition for rehearing has been filed herein. Coun-
sel for defendants takes exception to our comments on
the so-called “no man’s land’”—an indeterminate area
not pre-empted by the National Labor Relations legis-
lation but open for action by the states. That there is
such an area is well attested. Thus in Garner v. Team-
sters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776
(A.F.L.), 846 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161, 164, 98 L.Ed. 228,
Mr. Justice Jackson stated: “The National Labor Man-
agement Relations Act [61 Stat. 186, 29 U.S.C. § 141
et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq.J, as we have before
pointed out, leaves much to the states, though Con-
gress has refrained from telling us how much.” In
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S, 468, 75 S.Ct.
480, 488, 99 L.Ed. 546, Mr, Justice Frankfurter stated
as follows:

“By the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress did not ex-
haust the full sweep of legislative power over in-
dustrial relations given by the Commerce Clause.
Congress formulated a code whereby it outlawed
some aspects of labor activities and left others free
for the operation of economic forces. As to both
categories, the areas that have been pre-empted
by federal authority and thereby withdrawn from
state power are not susceptible of delimitation by
fixed metes and bounds. Obvious conflict, actual
or potential, leads to easy judicial exclusion of
state action. Such was the situation in Garner v.
Teamsters Union, supra [846 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct.
161, 98 L.Ed. 228]. But as the opinion in that case
recalled, the Labor Management Relations Act
‘leaves much to the states, though Congress has re-
frained from telling us how much.’ 346 US. at
page 488, 74 S.Ct. at page 164. This penumbral
area can be rendered progressively clear only by
the course of litigation. * * *”

In case of Stoddard-Wendle Motor Co. v. Automotive
Machinists Lodge 942, International Association of Ma-
chinists, 48 Wash.2d 519, 295 P.2d 805, 307, the court
stated:

“Difficulty arises when it must be determined
whether specific facts are covered by the subject
matter of the act. Has Congress so far pre-empted
the field that, even in its silence, state action is ex-
cluded; or, is state action preserved? The diffi-
culty is compounded when this question must be
resolved by a state court. The problem is further
complicated by the absence of specific standards
in the act itself. It “* * * leaves much to the states,
though Congress has refrained from telling us how
much.’ Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and
Helpers Local Union No. 776 (A.F.L.), 1958, 346
US. 485, 488, 74 S.Ct. 161, 164, 98 L.Ed. 228.

““This penumbral area can be rendered pro-
gressively clear only by the course of litigation.’

Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 1955, 348 U.S.
468, 480, 75 S.Ct. 480, 488, 99 L.Tdd, 546.”

Counsel contends that the so-called “no man’s land”
cases are covered by the federal law and that the only
. Jurisdiction which a state has is when the National
Labor Relations Board cedes power to a state agency
in connection with a case before it. We think counsel
is clearly mistaken. He relies upon the case of Guss
v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 598,
600, 1 L.Ed.2d 601. Chief Justice Warren in that case
cites the National Labor Relations Act, § 10(a), 49
Stat. 449, as amended 61 Stat. 186, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et
seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., wherein it is stated:
“The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor
practice (listed in Section 8) affecting commerce.”
(Emphasis supplied.) Thus as to what constitutes an
unfair practice and is entrusted to the board we must
examine § 8 which is limited in its scope just as men-
tioned in the cases heretofore cited. Chief Justice
Warren continues at 77 S.Ct. 602:

“We hold that the proviso to § 10(a) is the ex-
clusive means whereby States may be enabled to
act concerning the matters which Congress has en-
trusted to the National Labor Relations Board.
* * *? (Emphasis supplied.)

So again we must refer back to § 8 of the National
Labor Relations legislation to find out what matters
have been entrusted to the board. These cannot con-
sist of the matters embraced in the area of “no man’s
land” because these are left to the states according to
the decisions first above mentioned. These cases and
the Guss case are not in conflict.

Counsel for the defendants further contends that
the question as to whether or no specific facts come
under the protection of the National Labor Relations
Act must be determined by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board and state courts are precluded from in-
terpreting the federal Act. Counsel cites as authority
for that contention the case of San Diego Building
Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. Gar-
mon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 778, 779, 3 L.Ed.2d 775,
decided on April 15, 1959, and written by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter who, in that case, made the following
statement:

“At times it has not been clear whether the par-
ticular activity regulated by the States was gov-
erned by §7 or § 8 [Taft-Hartley Act] or was, per-
haps, outside both these sections. But courts are
not primary tribunals to adjudicate such issues.
It is essential to the administration of the Act that
these determinations be left in the first instance
to the National Labor Relations Board. What is
outside the scope of this Court’s authority cannot
remain within a State’s power and state jurisdic-
tion too much yield to the exclusive primary com-
petence of the Board. * * *”

Mr. Justice Harlan, with whom Mr. Justice Clark,
Mr. Justice Whittaker and Mr. Justice Stewart con-
curred, in commenting on the foregoing statement of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, stated as follows at 79 S.Ct.
784, 785:

“T am, further, at loss to understand, and can
find no basis on principle or in past decisions for,
the Court’s intimation that the States may even be
powerless to act when the underlying activities
are clearly ‘neither protected nor prohibited’ by
the federal Act. Surely that suggestion is fore-
closed by International Union, United Automobile
Workers, etc. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations

SC“ Cid

Board, 336 U.S. 245, 69 S.Ct. 516, 93 L.Ed. 651,
supra, as well as by the approach taken to federal
pre-emption in such cases as Allen-Bradley Local
[No. 1111, United Electrical Radio and Machine
Workers of America] v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board, supra [815 U.S. 740, 62 S.Ct. 820,
86 L.Ed. 1154]; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York
State Labor Relations Board, 830 U.S. 767, 778,
67 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 91 L.Ed. 1234, and Algoma
Plywood & Veneer Co. vy. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board, 336 U.S. 301, 69 S.Ct. 584, 93
L.Ed. 691, not to mention Laburnum and Russell
[United Const. Workers [Affiliated with United
Mine Workers of America] v. Laburnum Construc-
tion Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 74 S.Ct. 883, 98 L.Ed.
1025; International Union, United Automobile,
Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America (UAW-CIO) v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634,
78 S.Ct. 932, 2 L.Ed.2d 1030] and the primary
jurisdiction doctrine itself. Should what the
Court now intimates ever come to pass, then in-
deed state power to redress wrongful acts in the
labor field will be reduced to the vanishing point.”

It would seem that the foregoing case has injected

another factor of uncertainty into the subject before

us.

Mr. Justice Harlan continues his opinion by say-

ing as follows at 79 S.Ct. 785:

“Tn determining pre-emption in any given labor
case, I would adhere to the Laburnum and Russell
distinction between damages and injunctions and
to the principle that state power is not precluded
where the challenged conduct is neither protected
nor prohibited under the federal Act. Solely be-
cause it is fairly debatable whether the conduct
here involved is federally protected. I concur in
the result of today’s decision.”

Thus it would seem that all the members of the Court
agree, at least to the extent that if the matter is fairly

debatable then the National Labor Relations Board has

exclusive jurisdiction. So our reference to this matter
in the original opinion was possibly too broad or not
sufficiently limited. We must leave this point open
for future consideration, and in that respect our form-
er opinion is modified. It would seem, as we stated in
the original opinion, that the National Labor Relations
legislation needs critical examination.

Other exceptions taken to our original opinion are
not well taken and so the petition for rehearing is de-
nied.

TRUCK TERMINAL, INC., d/b/a Husky Chief
Terminal, Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
Paul NIELSEN, d/b/a Nielsen Trucking
Company, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 2901

Supreme Court of Wyoming.
May 19, 1959.
339 Pac.2d 413

a
a

19
aq

Henderson and Godfrey, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Walter C. Urbigkit, Jr., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

I

OPINION.

Mr, Chief Justice BLUME delivered the opinion of
the court.

This is an action by plaintiff, Paul Nielsen, doing
business as Nielsen Trucking Company, appellee here-
in, against the defendant, Truck Terminal, Inc., doing
business as Husky Chief Terminal, appellant herein,
for damages to a truck under circumstances hereafter
mentioned. The case was tried to a jury which re-
turned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Judgment
was rendered upon the verdict and the defendant has
appealed. The parties will be named herein as plain-
tiff and defendant as in the court below.

The complaint in this case alleges as follows:
I

For good and valuable consideration arising from past
business and future prospect of business, defendant
on March 5 and 6, 1957, undertook to store plaintiff's
truck No. N70 by agreement with agents of plaintiff.
Defendant failed to furnish proper storage and in fact
removed the vehicle from heated storage during the
night of March 5 to 6, 1957, and as a result the vehicle
suffered damage from freezing resulting in the follow-
ing direct and proximate damage to plaintiff:

(a) Cost of new turbo $1,001.64
(b) Repairs in Cheyenne 226.81
(c) Repairs in Salt Lake City 75.00
(d) Driver breakdown time 160.00
(e) Loss of use 180.00
(£) Telephone calls incident to repair 21.89

$1,664.84

I

On March 5, 1957, plaintiff’s truck was delivered to
defendant for storage in a heated garage. Defendant’s

agents were advised that the vehicle contained water
and not antifreeze. Sometime during the night of
March 5 to 6, 1957, the vehicle was removed from the
heated building and parked outside without the know-
ledge or consent of plaintiff or plaintiff’s agents.
Neither was the water drained from said vehicle nor
other action taken by defendant or defendant’s agents
to prevent freezing. The vehicle was placed in storage
by plaintiff’s agents to prevent freezing, and in reli-
ance upon the heated storage furnished by defendant,
plaintiff's agents had not drained the water from the
vehicle or taken other action to prevent freezing. As
a result of the negligence, carelessness and misconduct
of defendant and defendant’s agents, the vehicle froze,
proximately resulting in damage to plaintiff in the
amount heretofore itemized in I above. Wherefore
plaintiff demands judgment against defendant in the
amount of $1,664.84 and costs of this action.

Defendant answered, denying each and every allega-
tion contained in plaintiff’s complaint. It alleged af-
firmatively that it is not and was not in the business of
storing vehicles of any description in the month of
March 1957; that it is solely in the business of selling
petroleum products and servicing vehicles and has no
facilities for storage; that plaintiff’s truck No. N70
was never delivered to defendant nor accepted by de-
fendant for storage or bailment; that a contract for
storage or bailment was never executed between plain-
tiff and defendant; that the defendant never acquired
a possessory interest sufficient for bailment nor re-
ceived any consideration sufficient for a contract or
bailment. Defendant asserts the following affirmative
defenses:

(a) Assumption of Risk—The plaintiff as-

sumed the risk of any alleged damage that oc-
curred.

(b) Contributory Negligence—The plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence which con-
tributed directly to any alleged damage.

(c) Estoppel—Plaintiff is estopped to recover
because of its actions and representations upon
which defendant relied.

(d) Fraud—Plaintiff’s claim is based in fraud.

Defendant also filed a counterclaim but this was
subsequently dismissed and need not be mentioned
further. Counsel for defendant and appellant herein
have made a statement of facts in their brief which we
shall, with some additions, follow herein:

There is no dispute that plaintiff’s diesel truck de-
parted from Salt Lake City, Utah, on March 5, 1957,
and proceeded across southern Wyoming on U. 8. High-
way 30. The drivers of the truck were George
Bruhns, an employee of Nielsen Trucking Company,
and Dean K. Christensen, an employee of Ringsby
Truck Lines. The truck arrived in Cheyenne, Wyom-
ing, sometime before midnight that evening after hav-
ing proceeded through snow and cold weather all day.
The truck was equipped with a sleeper cab so that one
driver could sleep while the other driver operated the
truck.

George Bruhns testified for the plaintiff that he ar-
rived in Cheyenne about 9 or 10 p.m. on March 5,
1957. He stopped at the Husky Chief Terminal to
purchase diesel fue] and have the truck serviced. The
chains were repaired and the air breather was cleaned.
He contacted the Wyoming Highway Department and

learned that the roads were closed. He discussed stor-
age with Willoughby, an employee of defendant, and
asked to leave his truck in a covered station. Willough-
by stated that he would store the truck since no other
trucks would be coming in during the night. Bruhns
offered to pay for the storage but Willoughby said
that it wasn’t necessary. Bruhns then left for his sis-
ter’s house in Cheyenne but before leaving defendant’s
station he expressly called attention to the fact that
the truck did not have any antifreeze but only water.
He returned the next morning and found that the tur-
bo of the truck and the compressor were frozen. Tem-
porary repairs were made in Cheyenne and other re-
pairs were made in Salt Lake City, Utah.

Dean K. Christensen testified for the plaintiff that
he arrived in Cheyenne, Wyoming, about 10 p.m. The
diesel truck was placed in the grease pit at Husky
Chief Terminal. The roads were closed out of Chey-
enne. Willoughby agreed to store the truck. The truck
turbo was frozen when he returned the next day. The
supercharger was the damaged part and it was dis-
connected for the return trip to Salt Lake City. A load
was taken back to Salt Lake City by the damaged
truck. He was paid breakdown time while in Chey-
enne.

Myron Holley testified for the plaintiff that he is a
mechanic in Cheyenne, Wyoming. He performed tem-
porary repairs on the plaintiff’s truck in the sum of
$226.81.

Paul W. Nielsen testified that he is the owner of the
plaintiff company. The truck in question was hauling
a load of sugar to Chicago, Illinois. He was unable to
obtain a turbo-charger for the truck for two days. He

wanted to fly a turbo to Cheyenne but was unable to
find one until two days later. He talked with Gus
Fleischli over the phone on March 6, 1957, and Fleis-
chli told him that everything would be taken care of.

Robert Willoughby testified for the defendant. He
is presently a member of the Wyoming Highway Pa-
trol. He was employed by Husky Chief Terminal on
March 5, 1957. Plaintiff’s truck pulled into the station
about 9:30 p.m. The truck was placed in the grease
pit to repair the tire chains. The driver of the truck
said they were going downtown for a while. He re-
fused to store the truck because other trucks would be
coming in and out all.night and he could not tie up a
grease pit for storage. Grease pits are not designed
for storage. There was no conversation about anti-
freeze in the truck radiator. The drivers did not tell
him there was water in the truck. They had never
stored trucks before and there were no facilities to
store trucks at the station. Drivers sometimes store
trucks at Land Air during storms. The snow during
that night was light and trucks were passing through
all night.

Kenneth Farrens testified for the defendant that he
was assistant manager of Husky Chief Terminal on
March 5, 1957. He was present when the plaintiff's
drivers were talking to Willoughby. The drivers stated
they were going to town for a while. There was no
conversation about storing the truck in his presence
and nothing was said about water in the radiator. De-
fendant never stored trucks because there were no fa-
cilities.

Gus Fleischli testified that he is the manager of
Husky Chief Terminal. He tried to help the plaintiff

obtain repairs for the truck. Plaintiff was a fair cus-
tomer. There were no facilities for storing trucks at
Husky Chief Terminal. The average truck remains on
the grease pit about 80 minutes to an hour as there are
often about 26 grease jobs a day.

A few additional facts will be mentioned hereafter.

1. Counsel for defendant contend that the court
submitted the case to the jury upon a wrong theory.
They mean that the court assumed that there was in
fact a bailment when that fact was actually in dispute.
The court instructed the jury by Instruction No. 5 as
follows:

“The Court instructs you that a ‘bailment’ may
be defined as a delivery of personalty for some
particular purpose, or on mere deposit, under a
contract, express or implied, that after the pur-
pose has been fulfilled it shall be redelivered to the
person who delivered it, or otherwise dealt with
according to his directions, or kept until he re-
claims it, as the case may be.”

There is no particular fault to find with that instruc-
tion. The defendant offered an instruction to the fol-
lowing effect:

“You are instructed that a bailment may not be
forced upon a party and it is based upon contrac-
tual principles. In other words, there must be an
offer by one party, for a sufficient consideration,
to do a particular thing, and there must be an ac-
ceptance by the other party. Before there can be
a contract between two parties, the minds of the
two parties must come together upon all the terms
and conditions of the contract, or, as it is some-
times said, the minds of the contracting parties
must meet.”

The offered instruction is not entirely correct. It states
that there must be a consideration. In 8 C.J.S. Bail-
ments § 16, p. 250, it is said that “The bailment of
personal property needs no consideration other than
the transaction itself to support it.” But the offered
instruction was correct insofar as stating that a bail-
ment may not be forced upon a party and that there
must be an acceptance on the part of the bailee, or of
the person who is to be a bailee, and that the minds of
the parties must meet. In Annotation, 1 A.L.R. 394,
897, 898, it is stated:

“In order to establish a bailment, there must be
an acceptance of the article bailed, it being neces-
sary to show either an express contract to take
the article and later redeliver it, or circumstances
from which such a contract can be implied, it being
sufficient to prove acceptance either directly or
by circumstances showing a constructive accept-
ance. In other words, since the relation is founded
upon contract, either express or implied, the duty
and liability springing therefrom ordinarily cannot
be thrust upon one without his knowledge or con-
sent, but must be voluntarily assumed by the par-
ty himself or some authorized agent. And no legal
responsibility rests on one who declines to become
a bailee * * *.”

The court might well have embodied this principle in
its instruction in view of the contentions of the defend-
ant herein. However, we do not think that this was
fatal. The court instructed the jury as follows:

“The issues of this case in brief are:

“The plaintiff contends that he, by his truck
driver agents, left the truck in question at the de-
fendant’s station under a bailment with the con-
sent and agreement of defendant’s employees, the
truck to remain there overnight; that plaintiff’s

ee *

employees told defendant’s employees that the
truck had no antifreeze and must be kept in a
warm place to protect it from damage by freezing ;
that the defendant wrongfully and negligently
placed the truck outside, as a result of which the
turbo-charger and air compressor were frozen and
had to be replaced, and that plaintiff suffered dam-
ages as follows:

a) Cost of new turbo $1,001.64
b) Repairs in Cheyenne 226.81
c) Repairs in Salt Lake City 75.00
a) Driver breakdown time 160.00
e) Loss of use 180.00
f) Telephone calls incident to repair 21.89

$1,664.84

and that he is entitled to recover that amount from
defendant.

“The defendant, on the contrary, contends that
plaintiff’s truck was left at defendant’s station to
have the tire chains repaired ; that storage for the
night was refused: that nothing was said as to the
lack of antifreeze in the truck, and that the plain-
tiff’s drivers left to be gone for a short time and
did not return until morning; that there was no
bailment or agreement for storage and defendant
is not responsible for any damage which may have
occurred to the truck.”

In the next instruction the court instructed the jury
that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff. Thus
the contentions of the parties were set forth very clear-
ly and, if the contentions of the plaintiff were true, as
the jury found, there was clearly a bailment. Since
the court instructed the jury that the burden of proof
of his contentions was on the plaintiff, the question as
to whether or not there was a bailment was left to the
jury and was not assumed by the court to exist as
counsel contend,

2. Defendant asked for an instruction as follows:

“You are instructed that it is the duty of the
bailor to reveal any hidden characteristics or char-
acteristics that cannot be ascertained upon reason-
able examination of the bailed article to the bailee
and the bailee is not responsible for any damage
that may occur as a result of hidden or unascer-
tained characteristics.”

In the first place, we are not at all certain that the ab-
sence of antifreeze in the truck was a hidden charac-
teristic. That fact could have been easily ascertained
by a cursory examination. In the second place, the
matter was directly in issue. The evidence for the
plaintiff showed that special attention was called to
the want of antifreeze in the truck. The testimony in
favor of the defendant showed the contrary. The mat-
ter was for the jury to determine and the refusal to
give the instruction asked was not, we think, prejudi-
cial.

8. Counsel offered an instruction on estoppel. We
fail to find any elements of estoppel in this case. Coun-
sel state in their brief that “there was ample evidence
of misrepresentation and reliance.” We do not know
what counsel mean. We find no misrepresentations in
the record unless counsel mean that the testimony of
the witnesses for plaintiff was false, but that was a
matter for the jury to determine, and they determined
evidently that no misrepresentations were made.

4, Counsel for defendant’ also asked that an instruc-
tion on assumption of risk be given. We do not sup-
pose that counsel refer to the well-known doctrine of
assumption of. risk which is only applicable in cases
arising between master and servant. 4 Words and

A ~*~

Phrases, Assumption of Risk, pp. 607, 612. It is that
rule which is doubtless intended to be referred to in
Rule 8(c) of our Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure
when it refers to “assumption of risk”. We presume
that counsel refer to a more general and wider sense
of assumption of risk. For instance, when a man in
freezing weather leaves a warm house and goes outside
he runs—assumes—the risk of getting cold. If the
agents of plaintiff had deliberately left the truck in
question standing outside of any shelter in freezing
weather, they would have run—assumed—the risk of
freezing parts of the truck. But there was no need of
a special instruction on this subject. The matter was
involved in the question as to whether or not there was
a bailment and whether or not the defendant exercised
the care necessary under the circumstances. The mat-
ter was resolved in favor of the plaintiff. There is no
merit in the contention that the verdict was not sus-
tained by sufficient evidence. We held in Willis v.
Willis, 48 Wyo. 408, 49 P.2d 670, 678, Id., 49 Wyo. 296,
54 P.2d 814, and in many cases decided since then, that
the appellate court must assume that the evidence in
favor of the successful party is true, leaving out of con-
sideration entirely the evidence of the unsuccessful
party in conflict therewith, and give to the evidence of
the successful party every favorable inference which
may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it.

5. The court refused to permit the witness Fleischli
to testify that it was his custom not to store any trucks
at his filling station. This is assigned as error. Coun-
sel for defendant have not cited us to any case holding
that the holding of the court was error. The point is
not clear. It is said in 81 C.J.S. Evidence § 180, p. 881:

«ex * * the custom of a party or his employees, or
the course of conducting his business, may become

relevant and material in an action involying some
claim or liability arising out of such business; and
evidence of a habit of doing a thing in the course
of business is, if clearly shown as a definite course
of action, admissible as indicating that, on a par-
ticular occasion, the thing was done as usual.”

So perhaps the custom sought to be shown would indi-
cate that defendant in this particular case did what
was usually done and would corroborate Willoughby’s
testimony. The witness Willoughby testified in part
as follows:

“Q. During the time you worked for Husky
Terminal did you ever store trucks for Nielsen be-
fore? A. No, sir.

“Q. Did you ever store trucks? A. No, we never
did because we didn’t have facilities. If someone
wanted a truck stored, we would call Land Air or
somebody [who] had facilities for storing trucks.”

The witness Farrens testified in part as follows:

“Q. In your experience as assistant general
manager out there have you ever stored Nielsen’s
truck? A. No, I wouldn’t store anybody’s truck,

“Q. What is the reason for that? A. Because
we run twenty-four hour service and we done only
service work, they didn’t have storage facilities.”

The witness Gus Fleischli testified without objection
that he had no facilities for storing trucks at his sta-
tion,

We are inclined to believe that the testimony of these
witnesses substantially conveyed to the jury the idea
contained in the fact that the custom of the defendant

was not to store any trucks, and if the excluded evi-
dence was error we do not think the error is sufficient-
ly prejudicial to warrant a reversal of the judgment
herein.

6. Damages. The turbo and the compressor were
frozen. Two days were lost before the truck was able
to move again, and then instead of proceeding to Chi-
cago as had been contemplated, it was returned to Salt
Lake City in order that a new turbo might be installed.
A new turbo was necessary to be acquired. Repairs
had to be made, The men had to be paid for time lost
and the profits from the trip to Chicago were lost. The
items are set out in plaintiff’s complaint. At the pre-
trial conference, it was agreed that the cost of the new
turbo was reasonable and that the charges for repairs
at Cheyenne and Salt Lake City were reasonable. Coun-
sel for the defendant, however, contend that at least
some of the damages should have been mitigated, and
we understand them to contend that the burden in con-
nection with that was upon the plaintiff. However,
they are mistaken in that connection. It is stated in
25 C.J.S. Damages § 144e, p. 791, as follows:

“The party who commits a wrong has the burden
of establishing matters asserted by him in mitiga-
tion or reduction of the amount of damages. So
the burden is on him to show that some of the con-
sequences of the injury might have been avoided
by proper efforts or acts of the injured party

The cost of the new turbo could not have been mini-
mized nor that of the compressor. The repair of the
latter was the main charge made at Cheyenne, namely,
in the amount of $184.86. It was necessary to repair
the compressor because it furnished the air for the

brakes. But the remainder of that item and the cost
of the repairs at Salt Lake City, the loss of time for the
men and the loss of profits could have been minimized
to some extent at least if a new turbo had been avail-
able sooner. It was not obtained until several days af-
ter the breakdown at Cheyenne. Counsel for defendant
claim that they were not permitted to cross-examine
the witness Holley as to being able to obtain a turbo in
Denver. The witness was asked, ‘Could you have ob-
tained a turbocharger in Denver?” The court sustained
an objection made by counsel for the plaintiff. We
think the ruling was erroneous. However, counsel for
defendant made no offer to show what the witness
would testify so they cannot complain of the ruling.
Moreover, at a previous question, the same witness was
asked, “Q. Could you usually buy a turbo of this type
in Denver? A. Yes.” The plaintiff Nielsen in this
case testified that he made every effort to obtain a
turbo as soon as possible and that it had been his in-
tention to fly a new turbo to Cheyenne if it could be
obtained, but he was not able to obtain one at that time.
The defendant made no effort to show that a turbo was
obtainable in Denver at that time and previous to the
time that one was obtained in Salt Lake City. Since
the burden to show that the damages might be miti-
gated was upon the defendant and he made no effort
in connection with the matter already mentioned, there
is no reason why the testimony of the plaintiff Nielsen
should not be accepted by this court,

The plaintiff was employed by the Ringsby System
to haul its goods and received as compensation the sum
of sixteen cents per mile, the Ringsby System paying
the drivers in addition, On the occasion in question
here, plaintiff was able to haul the goods only from
Salt Lake City to Cheyenne, Wyoming, a distance of

A = *

471 miles, making the total received for the round trip
$150.72. The drivers were laid off two days on account
of the damages to the truck of plaintiff. Their com-
pensation for breakdown.time was $1.15 an hour, and
inasmuch as they were paid by the Ringsby System,
the amount due to them was deducted from the pay-
ment which the plaintiff received for the haul to Chey-
enne. The plaintiff, of course, had personal know-
ledge of the facts except, perhaps, as to the exact
amounts of money involved. In that connection, coun-
sel for plaintiff attempted to introduce a letter dated
April 4, 1957, from the Ringsby System. An objection
was made to the letter as being hearsay evidence, which
it was. The record is not very clear as to whether or
not it was actually introduced in evidence. However,
it appears from the record that in the main the letter
was used merely for refreshing the testimony of the
witness Nielsen. He was asked, “From your own recol-
lection and refreshing your recollection from this de-
seription [in the letter] you received, * * * what was
your gross from, that was paid to you by Ringsby for
the trip from Salt Lake to Cheyenne and back to Salt
Lake?” He stated that he received $150.72 at the rate
of sixteen cents per mile but the deductions for break-
down time for George Bruhns and Dean Christensen
were made in the sums of $66.70 and $80.50. On the
whole, we see no prejudice resulting from the recol-
lection of the witness being refreshed from the letter
in question. He also testified that if he had been per-
mitted to make the trip to Chicago he would have made
a net profit of six cents per mile which, for the round
trip from Salt Lake City to Chicago of three thousand
miles, would be $180.00. Counsel for the defendant
argue that the books of the plaintiff should have been
introduced to show this profit, but we see no particular

reason why the independent knowledge of the witness
could not be accepted as evidence,

The witness Nielsen also testified as to the telephone
bill mentioned in the complaint consisting of the sum
of $21.39. The witness testified that he received four
calls from George Bruhns, his driver, and that the
charges were in the sum of $21.39. Counsel object
that that was not the best evidence and that the re-
cefpts for these telephone calls should have been intro-
duced in evidence. However, we think that while the
witness did not directly testify that he paid these
charges, that is substantially the effect. It is stated
in 82 CJ.S. Evidence § 802, p. 729:

“The payment of money * * * may be proved by
parol without accounting for the absence of a re-
ceipt evidencing such fact, where the witness
can testify to the fact positively and from his own
independent knowledge, not founded on his having
seen the receipt * * *, While bills representing
payments by a person have been held admissible,
receipts have sometimes been held inadmissible as

being inferior to the testimony of living witness-
es, * * #”

We think that the objection in this connection must be
overruled.

We have examined the record before us with con-
siderable care and we do not find any error sufficient
to justify the reversal of the judgment in this case and
it is, accordingly, affirmed.

Affirmed.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK AT CODY, Cody, Wyoming,
and Ruth Clare Yonkee, Trustees, Appellants (Plain-
tiffs below),

ve
F, Allyn FAY and Mary Ann Fay, Appellees
(Defendants below).
No. 2877.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.

June 23, 1959.

341 Pac.2d 79

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Ernest J. Goppert of Goppert & Fitzstephens, Cody,
for appellants.

Elmer J. Scott, Worland, for appellees.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

=

S
pred
a

OPINION.

Mr. Justice HARNSBERGER delivered the opinion
of the court.

On August 4, 1952, Otto Menger, now deceased, be-
came the owner and holder of a $5,000 cashier’s check
of The Farmers State Bank, Worland, Wyoming. When
introduced in evidence this check bore on its reverse
side a typewritten notation “Pay to the order of F.
Allyn Fay and Maryann Fay, of Worland, Wyo. Loan
on Contract Note of even date, Aug. 11th 1952”, under-
neath which appears in ink “O. A. Menger” with a
typewritten underscoring and then in ink “F. Allyn Fay
& Maryann Fay”. One August 12, 1952, this check was
deposited to the account of “The Men’s Shop F. Allyn
Fay”. “The Men’s Shop” was a trade name used by
F. Allyn Fay.

In the probate of Mr. Menger’s estate, the following
entry appears upon the inventory and appraisement,
“F, Allyn Fay—Loan in the sum of $5,000.00”. On
distribution of the estate of the deceased this inven-
toried item was decreed in trust to Ruth Clare Yonkee
and the First National Bank at Cody, Cody, Wyoming,
by virtue of a residuary clause. As the asserted loan
was not repaid, the trustees brought this action against
the defendants who claimed the $5,000 was a gift to
them from the deceased.

Plaintiffs’ position seemed to be that the typewrit-
ing appearing above the signature of the deceased on
the reverse side of the check was sufficient evidence
that a loan had been made to defendants and conse-
quently they rested their case after introducing the
check and a deposit slip showing the check’s proceeds
were credited to the account of defendant F. Allyn Fay.

At the conclusion of the trial, the court requested
counsel to file briefs. This was done, and within a
month thereafter, the trial judge addressed a letter
jointly to respective counsel informing them that plain-

eC te

tiffs had failed to prove the allegations of their peti-
tion; that the record showed “that on August 11, 1952,
Otto Menger delivered a cashier’s check to the defend-
ants, bearing the endorsement in question”; that it
was deposited in the defendant’s account; that this
was “not sufficient upon which to base a finding for
the plaintiffs”. The letter also noted that the court
had said at the close of the case that it could not find
that the transaction constituted a gift, and that the
court was unable to say what the transaction was. The
letter closed with instruction to defense counsel to pre-
pare a judgment, “saving exceptions to the plaintiffs”

Defense evidence showed the endorsement signatures
“F, Allyn Fay & Maryann Fay” were the first writings
on the reverse side of the check and that both these
names had been written by F. Allyn Fay; that the
name “O. A. Menger” was written thereafter and the
typing including the underscoring line was imposed
after “O. A. Menger” was written.

The judgment recited that plaintiffs had asked for
special findings at the beginning of their argument,
but set forth that the only findings the court could
make were: that plaintiffs had failed to prove their al-
legations by a preponderance of the evidence and that
the court was unable to determine from the evidence
what the transaction was between Otto Menger and
the defendants. The court then found generally for
the defendants and decreed plaintiffs recover nothing
from defendants and defendants have their costs for
witness fees. This general finding in favor of defend-
ants and against plaintiffs imported a finding that
there was insufficient evidence to prove that the $5,000
had been loaned to defendants.

Plaintiffs moved to amend this judgment, claiming
the court had orally stated at the close of the argument
and before submission of briefs that defendants had
received the sum of $5,000 in the form of a cashier’s
check issued by The Farmers State Bank of Worland,
to the deceased, Otto Menger; that defendants had
failed to prove that the $5,000 had been paid them as
a gift and that the court’s letter to counsel was a memo-
randum opinion making special findings slightly dif-
ferent than those announced at the close of the oral
argument. The motion also stated that before judg-
ment was entered, plaintiffs again had verbally re-
quested the court for special findings of fact and con-
clusions of law to be made in accordance with the
court’s letter of March 25, 1958, and alleged that there-
upon the court advised plaintiffs the judgment would
contain the findings as orally announced by the court
and as set forth in the letter above referred to, but
that notwithstanding this promise the judgment en-
tered omitted such findings.

Tt was also claimed in this motion that inasmuch as
plaintiffs had admitted during the trial that defend-
ants had never made nor executed a contract note dated
August 11, 1952, with Otto Menger, as plaintiffs had
originally pleaded, they should be permitted to amend
their pleadings accordingly. The court denied the mo-
tion in its entirety.

In this appeal, plaintiffs say the court committed
reversible error (1) in failing to find defendants had
received from Menger the sum of $5,000; (2) in failing
to find the transaction did not constitute a gift; (3) in
failing to find the transaction was an unjust enrich-
ment of defendants; (4) in refusing the amendment of
plaintiffs’ pleading; (5) in denying plaintiffs’ motion

to have the judgment amended; (6) in finding general-
ly for defendants; and (7) in entering the judgment
rendered.

There was no error in the court’s failure to find de-
fendants had received $5,000 from Menger. Such a
finding standing alone would have availed plaintiffs
nothing. In order to have benefited plaintiffs, the
necessary finding would have been that defendants
had received $5,000 from Menger as a loan. The ef-
fect of the court’s finding that there was a failure to
prove the allegations of the petition was a holding that
the alleged loan had not been made. That was suf-
ficient to adversely dispose of plaintiffs’ claim, provid-
ing only that the evidence justified such a finding.

Nor was there error in failing to find the transac-

tion did not constitute a gift.

Plaintiffs’ action was commenced on the theory
there was an express contract evidenced by a promis-
sory note which obligated defendants to repay the
$5,000. Upon this theory plaintiffs were required to
prove not only that there was such a note but that the
same remained unsatisfied. After entry of the judg-
ment containing the finding that plaintiffs had failed
to sustain their cause of action, plaintiffs in effect be-
latedly admitted this was true by filing their motion
to amend. This implied they wanted to abandon their
note theory and switch to a claim upon an implied con-
tract to repay the money. But their proof was not
amplified and remained only that the $5,000 had been
paid by Menger to defendants. This was as insufficient
to establish an implied contract to repay the money as
it was to prove the money had been paid as a loan. In
either view, the appellants’ position is tantamount to

saying that an unexplained payment by one person to
another presupposed that such payment is a loan un-
less the payee is able to prove to the contrary.

This would indeed be a strange rule of law if we
must be put to proof that all moneys coming into our
possession were not paid to us as a loan.

In this case we have an admitted failure of plaintiffs
to prove defendants made and executed the purported
note. There was also a failure of plaintiffs to prove
that the money was given as a loan or was paid under
circumstances where in equity or good conscience it
ought to have been repaid.

This is not a case where the evidence shows defend-
ants had moneys belonging to another which in good
conscience, equity and justice they should be called up-
on to account. The cases cited by appellants, to sup-
port their theory that the burden of proof shifted from
plaintiffs to defendants because defendants had an-
swered that the money paid them was a gift, fall far
short of meeting the facts proven in this case. We
do not disagree that if proof shows one holds proper-
ty of another, and sufficient reason is shown why in
good conscience, equity and justice it should be re-
turned, the onus of defending against an action to en-
force its return or repayment falls upon him who as-
serts such a defense. But here, plaintiffs completely
failed to show anything except that Menger had paid
defendants $5,000. When they proved that, they mere-
ly proved the $5,000 belonged to the defendants. To
recover the money back it was necessary they prove a
reason, valid in law or in equity and justice, why it
should be repaid. This they did not do and the court
so correctly found.

The burden was upon plaintiffs to establish that the
transaction was such that in law or equity they were
entitled to repayment of the amount involved. Until
sufficient evidence was produced to prove this vital
element of plaintiffs’ claim, nothing was required of
the defendants. They were entitled to sit idly by, tak-
ing the position there was nothing which required any
defense. However, when the typewritten notation
and underscoring presented a circumstance bearing
upon the existence of a note which evidenced a loan,
it then became incumbent upon defendants to act. This
they did by challenging the verity of the typewriting
being upon the instrument at the time it was negotiat-
ed. To do this the testimony of an expert whose quali-
fications were admitted by plaintiffs was offered.
This evidence showed the chronology of the various
writings which appear on the reverse side of the check.
In addition, the court itself was privileged to make
its own visual examination of the exhibit. Further-
more, defendants produced testimony of two credible
witnesses as to statements made by deceased just a few
days after the check was cashed which definitely indi-
cated the deceased had lately made a large cash gift to
the defendants. Under these circumstances, the find-
ing that plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient to con-
vince the court as to just what the transaction was
speaks strongly that the court was either unconvinced
that the typewriting was on the check at the time it
was presented and paid, or if it was on the check at
that time, that this fact of itself did not sufficiently
indicate the money was given by deceased to the de-
fendants as a loan. Viewing this finding in a light
most favorable to plaintiffs, it can mean no more than
that the court did not believe the evidence as a whole
warranted the conclusion that the transaction was a
loan, even if the notation had been upon the check

when it was cashed. In any event, the finding was
justified under the evidence most favorable to the de-

fendants.

In oral argument, appellants’ counsel, for the first
time, insisted the expert’s testimony was discredited
upon cross-examination. With this we do not agree.
The expert’s direct testimony was positive and con-
vincing. He called attention to certain overlappings
of the different colors of ink and typewriting imprints,
as well as the running of the inks or blotchings, and
clearly explained how this signified that one writing
or imprint was placed on the document after or before

others.

The alleged discrediting cross-examination was as
follows:

“Q. And it also can be observed that there is
a different colored ink there, the typewriter has
one color, and that goes from the printing on
down through the line, does it not? A. Yes, sir.

“Q. Looks like that was all put on there at one
time by a typewriter? A. Yes, sir.

“Q. And the ink that Mr. Menger used to sign
his name with is a dark blue ink, is it not? A.
Yes, I called it purple.

“Q. It is either purple or dark blue? A. Yes,
sir, I will agree with you.

“Q. It shows very clearly the dark blue clear
over this light blue color? A. Yes, sir.

“Q. That Mr. Fay used to sign the document
with; it also shows, does it not that that, especially
on the G here that that obliterated and covered

that typewritten line entirely, didn’t it? A. Not
covered completely, but almost, sir.

“Q. You can see there is no line visible from
the ‘g’ to the end of it? A. It could be seen on the
enlarged portion over there,

“Q. Inside the loop? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Inside of the loop of the G? A. Yes, sir.

“Q. That is the only place it could be seen? A.
Yes, sir.

“Q. The way you observe, it is covered by this
purple blue ink right after the ‘m’, between the
‘m’ and the ‘e’? A. Yes, sir.

“Q. You observe it is covered between the ‘t’
and ‘0’? A. Yes, sir.”

A fair summary of what these questions and an-
swers show is that while the exhibit itself may not
have as clearly shown which writing was over the
other, the enlargement of the exhibit, which was also
in evidence, did show these facts.

This cross-examination taken alone is somewhat
confusing but it certainly does not contradict the other
direct testimony of the witness. The trial court had
the best opportunity to gauge the effect of the cross-
examination and the true meaning to be gleaned, from
the whole of the witness’ testimony. Therefore, the
court’s obvious reaction to the evidence will not be
disturbed.

Before leaving this subject, we are disposed to add
that our own careful examination of the exhibit leaves

no doubt in our minds but that the typewriting was
placed on the check after the signatures had been writ-
ten.

The premise of appellants’ claim that defendants
will be unjustly enriched if permitted to retain the
money assumes that whenever money has been received
the recipient is not entitled to retain it unless he is able
to affirmatively prove his right to do so. This is en-
tirely unsound and its unwisdom becomes apparent if
the same idea is expressed in a somewhat different
fashion. For instance, it would mean that whenever
a person receives money, he must thereafter be pre-
pared to assume the burden of proving that he should
not be legally or equitably called upon to repay it. En-
visioning the impossible situations which would arise
under such a rule, would cause us to discard any such
rash philosphy. That is simply not the law. The
burden to prove a right remains upon him who asserts
that right. Appellants’ quotation from 58 C.J.S. Mon-
ey Received § 4 p. 918, offered in support of this claim
says plainly:

«x * ® ATI plaintiff need show is that defendant
holds money which in equity and good conscience
belongs to him; * * *” (Emphasis supplied.)

Appellants, however, completely ignore or overlook
the applicable balance of the statement which says:

«« * * but if he fails to show such superior right,
that is, that defendant does hold money which so
belongs to plaintiff, he cannot recover, * * *.”

It was required that plaintiffs prove why or where “in
equity and good conscience” the $5,000 received by de-
fendants should be repaid. This case is devoid of any

substantial evidence showing defendants were under
duty or obligation to repay the money or that defend-
ants either expressly or impliedly ever promised to re-
pay it. No fact or circumstance appears in the record
to indicate in the slightest that in good conscience,
equity or justice the money ought to be repaid. With
the rule of law that where good conscience, equity or
justice demand, a person should not be permitted to be
unjustly enriched, for which appellants cite numerous
authorities, we heartily agree, but with appellants’
attempt to fit the rule to the facts of this case, we dis-
agree. No unjust enrichment has been shown.

We find no error in the court’s refusing plaintiffs
the right to amend their reply. Appellants say they
had that right because during the trial they admitted
defendants had not made or executed the note as plain-
tiffs had pleaded. The record does not show that any
such admission was made during the trial. The first
reference to any such admission appears in plaintiffs’
motion to amend the court’s findings and judgment,
which was made, of course, after judgment was ren-
dered. However, even had the admission been made
during the trial we fail to see how that would have
aided plaintiffs. We assume, although neither the
appellants’ brief nor their arguments make it at all
clear, that appellants have some idea that by confessing
there was no note, thus repudiating their own pleading
in that respect, they should be privileged to depart
from their original action upon an express contract
and allowed to succeed upon some theory of implied
contract. If that was their thinking, plaintiffs would
still fail of recovery because, as heretofore pointed
out, their evidence failed to show a loan was made to
defendants and thus they fell far short of proving there

was an implied promise, or imposed duty, to repay the
amount in question to the person to whom the check
was originally issued or to his successors in interest.

In any event, if the evidence in this case warranted
an amendment, a further answer to plaintiffs’ claim
that there was reversible error in denying the amend-
ment is found in Rule 15(b) of our Rules of Civil
Procedure which says:

«« * ® Such amendment of the pleadings as may
be necessary to cause them to conform to the evi-
dence and to raise these issues may be made up-
on motion of any party at any time, even after
judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect
the result of the trial of these issues. * * *? (Em-
phasis supplied.)

We find no merit in the contention that the court
erred in denying and overruling plaintiffs’ motion to
amend findings, make additional findings and to amend
the judgment. The basis for this claim seems to be
that the findings contained in the judgment do not
contain various statements made orally by the court
at the close of the arguments but before final sub-
mission upon briefs of the parties, and also that the
court omitted various statements, contained in the
court’s letter to the attorneys dated March 25, 1958,
which appellants say are “findings”. Kardon v. Na-
tional Gypsum Co., D.C.Pa., 83 F.Supp. 613; Id., D.C.,
69 F.Supp. 512; Id., D.C., 73 F.Supp. 798; Alden-
Rochelle, Inc. v. American Society of Composers, Au-
thors and Publishers, D.C.N.Y., 80 F.Supp. 900; Id.,
D.C., 8 F.R.D. 157; Id., D.C., 80 F.Supp. 888, and
Wilkins v. Couch, D.C.Ok1., 10 F.R.D. 582, cited by ap-
pellants in support of this claim of error, are not at
all in point on the real question presented, which is

whether the denial of a motion to amend findings is
reversible. The Wilkins case, however, is adverse to
counsel’s theory that the oral statements of the court
made at the close of the arguments but before submis-
sion of briefs, or the recitals contained in the court’s
letter to both counsel but before judgment entered,
were binding upon the court, for in that case it was
held the court did not err in subsequently amending
its original fact findings and conclusions of law and
rendering judgment accordingly on its own initiative.

Finally, appellants launch a blanket claim of error
in finding generally for defendants and entering judg-
ment in favor of defendants and against plaintiffs.
We discover nothing new added to what had been
previously advanced by appellants in support of the
other claims already considered, so it is unnecessary
to say anything more about them.

During oral argument, appellants’ counsel had much
to say about the defendant Fay making false state-
ments to their representative prior to the commence-
ment of this action. The trial court evidently did not
feel that these admittedly false statements reflected

“ adversely upon Fay’s credibility under all the circum-
stances present. We are inclined to agree that at the
time these statements were made this defendant was
not under duty to tell the truth and while it was wrong
and unnecessary for him to make untrue statements,
his reasons for doing so are at least understandable.

In conclusion, we hold that there was sufficient evi-
dence before the court to justify its findings that plain-
tiffs had failed to produce the preponderance of evi-

dence necessary to sustain their cause of action. The
judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiffs
is, therefore, affirmed.

Affirmed.

In the Matter of the Appeal of Virgil SANDERS, an
Elector and Taxpayer of Byron High School, State
of Wyoming, from a Decision of the District Bound-
ary Board of Big Horn County, Wyoming, Dated
February 17, 1958.

Virgil SANDERS, Appellant (Plaintiff and
Appellant below),

v.

Frank H. BROWN, Dan B. Cropsey, Bliss Bayne, Patra
Keele and May D. Shoemaker, as members of The
District Boundary Board of Big Horn County, Wy-
oming, Appellees (Defendants and Appellees below).

No, 2885.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

June 28, 1959.

341 Pac.2d 85

rad
a

ee
J. D. Fitzstephens, Cody (Goppert & Fitzstephens,
Cody, on the brief), for appellant.

John O. Callahan, Basin, for appellees.

Robert A. Meyer, Casper, amicus curiae for Ohio
Oil Co.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

OPINION.

Mr. Chief Justice BLUME delivered the opinion of
the court.

On February 17, 1958, the school District Boundary
Board of Big Horn County, Wyoming, consisting of
the Board of County Commissioners, the County Treas-
urer and the County Superintendent, by a vote of
three to two undertook to consolidate the Lovell, Cow-
ley and Byron school districts and the Byron High
School District, establishing a new district numbered
58. Virgil Sanders, plaintiff and appellant herein, a
resident and taxpayer of Byron High School District,
appealed from the order of the boundary board, al-
leging that the action was illegal and without juris-
diction. The district court held the action of the board
to be legal and with jurisdiction.

a

The only question argued and submitted to this court
is as to whether or not the district boundary board had
jurisdiction to consolidate the Byron High School Dis-
trict with the other districts. We agree with the con-
tention of the plaintiff and appellant Sanders for the
reasons hereafter stated.

The boundary board claims to have jurisdiction in-
so far as the Byron High School District is concerned
under § 67-701, W.C.S. 1945, as amended by § 15, Ch.
119, S.L. of Wyoming, 1955, which, insofar as material
herein, reads as follows:

“The County Superintendent of Schools, the
County Treasurer, and the Board of County Com-
missioners shall constitute a board for laying off
their county into convenient school districts, such
board to be styled ‘the district boundary board.’
Said board by a majority vote may divide the
county into school districts, may alter and change
the boundaries of the districts so formed from time
to time and may at any time consolidate entire dis-
tricts, or portions of districts, when, in the opin-
ion of such board such changes, alterations or
consolidations may be justified by existing circum-
ey and conditions * * *.” (Emphasis sup-
plied.

It may be noted that under this provision the board
forms the school districts in a county and may change
the boundaries of the districts, including consolidation
thereof, when so formed. In other words, the power
of the board here mentioned is limited and applies only
to the districts which are formed by it. So we must
inquire as to whether or not the board may establish
and form a high school district in a county. In that
connection we should bear in mind the rule stated in
78 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 99, pp. 846,
847, as follows:

a =

“A county board of education or of school trus-
tees, or a like body, may exercise any powers au-
thorized by law. It has, in general, only such
powers as are expressly or directly conferred on
it by constitutional or statutory provision or pow-
ers which are necessarily incidental to those ex-
pressly conferred, or only those powers which are
expressly or impliedly given by statute, and it can
exercise its powers only in the manner authorized
by statute. The powers of such a board are not
to be extended by construction, and, where the
right of the board to exercise authority is doubt-
ful, such authority should not be exercised by it.”

See also School Dist. No. 14 in Fremont County v.
School Dist. No. 21 in Fremont County, 51 Wyo. 370,
67 P.2d 192, 195, 71 P.2d 187. No express power is
given by § 67-701 to form a high school district and
we do not think that the power to do so is implied in
view of the fact that we have an express statutory pro-
vision in connection with the formation of high school
districts.

Provisions for the organization of high school dis-
tricts are contained in §§ 67-901 through 67-936, W.C.
8.1945 (1957 Cum.Pocket Supp.) and §§ 67-1101
through 67-1104, W.C.S.1945, containing some 40 sec-
tions in all. Section 67-901 provides as follows:

“For the purpose of affording better education-
al facilities for pupils more advanced than the
studies provided in the district schools existing in
the several counties in this State, and in addition
to such school districts as are now organized, or
which may hereafter be formed under the laws
for the creation and formation of the same, there
may be organized and established a high school
district and a free high school therein, on condi-
tions and in the manner hereinafter prescribed,
the territorial extent of which may embrace any

number of present organized and constituted school
districts, the qualified electors of which may vote
to become a part of such high school district and
participate in the maintenance and benefits of
such high school organization.”

It may be noted that these high school districts are
established in addition to other school districts and
these other school districts are probably those to which
reference is made in § 67-701. The Act relating to
high school districts provides for the organization by
petition and vote by ballot. Its name is High

School District instead of School District as is
true in connection with other districts. Full provision
is made for the conduct of the election. The number
of trustees is six instead of three as in other school
districts. The statutes provide for the location of the
high school, for tax levies, for the issuance of bonds
and payment thereof, for the collection of taxes, for
the erection of suitable high school buildings, for the
employment of a faculty, for annexation of territory
to the high school district already created, and for the
withdrawal of territory therefrom. In other words,
the statutes relating to high school districts are com-
plete in themselves and provide for all proper and
necessary matters in connection therewith. Hence,
we must adopt herein the ordinary rules of construc-
tion of statutes. In the case of State ex rel. Mellinger
yv. Throckmorton, 169 Kan. 481, 219 P.2d 413, 417, the
court stated:

“It is clear that the legislature intended by the
mentioned acts to provide separate methods for
the formation and alteration of school districts
lying wholly within a county and joint school dis-
tricts lying in two or more counties. It is a cardi-
nal rule of law that statutes complete in them-
selves, relating to a specific thing, take precedence

over general statutes or over other statutes which
deal only incidentally with the same question, or
which might be construed to relate to it, Where
there is a conflict between a statute dealing gen-
erally with a subject, and another dealing specific-
ally with a certain phase of it, the specific legis-
lation controls in a proper cage. This rule is ap-
plicable here, * * *”

In 50 Am.Jur. Statutes, § 867, p. 371, it is stated:

“Tt is an old and familiar principle, closely re-
lated to the rule that where an act contains special
provisions they must be read as exceptions to a
general provision in a separate earlier or subse-
quent act, that where there is in the same statute
a specific provision, and also a general one which in
its most comprehensive sense would include mat-
ters embraced in the former, the particular pro-
vision must control, and the general provision
must be taken to affect only such cases within its
general language as are not within the provisions
of the particular provision. * * *”

In the case of Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. Park-
inson, 193 Okl. 112, 141 P.2d 586, 590, certiorari de-
nied 820 U.S. 776, 64 S.Ct. 90, 88 L.Ed. 465, it is held
that when a statute provides for a separate independ-
ent school district, that fact argues strongly against
the theory that such a district can be disorganized un-
der the subsequent section by annexation to another in-
dependent district.

We think these rules are controlling herein. It may
be noted that the creation of a high school district and
annexation thereto or separation of territory there-
from are all made by the vote of the people interested,
and we hardly think that the legislature intended that
the voice of the people expressed in an election should
be nullified by the actions of a few individuals consti-

tuting the boundary board. If the contention of the
boundary board were correct, it is very clear that the
people might vote to create a high school district in
one day and the boundary board could consolidate it
or divide it, changing the boundaries, the very next
day. That is so unusual a situation that we cannot be-
lieve that such was the intention of the legislature. In
1947 the legislature by Ch. 168 of the Session Laws of
that year provided for the reorganization of school
districts. It may be noted that by § 10 of that Act it
is provided that whatever reorganization is made must
be approved by the vote of the people. We need not
determine the applicability of that legislation in the
case at bar, but the fact that the legislation provided
for approval by the electors would emphasize the fact
that the legislature has generally preferred to have
the electors determine their own destiny in school mat-
ters rather than to have the members of the boundary
board do so for them.

Counsel for the appellees cites us to § 67-915 which
states, among other things, that a high school district
“shall be recognized as one of the regular constituted
school districts of the county, and shall be entitled to
and shall receive all the rights and benefits as such.”
Counsel contends that this provision shows that the
boundary board has jurisdiction in this matter under
§ 67-701. A high school district is of course a school
district, but that does not mean that it is subject to
the same provisions as other districts. Section 67-915
apparently was enacted for the specific purpose that
a high school district should receive all the rights and
benefits of other school districts as, for instance, a
portion of the funds distributed by the state to the
various school districts. Counsel for appellees also
cites us to Ericksen v. School District No. 2 of Na-

trona County, 67 Wyo. 216, 217 P.2d 887. That case
refers to the limitation of bonded indebtedness of a
high school district and has no bearing in the case at
bar. .

We might mention the fact that the identical ques-
tion now before the court came before the Honorable
Louis J. O’Marr, Attorney General, on July 18, 1944.
In that case he was requested to answer the question
“Does the County Boundary Board have the authority
to change the boundary of an organized High School
District?” His answer was as follows:

“My answer to the first question must be in
the negative, for High School Districts are organ-
ized by petition by freeholders of districts to be
included in the high school district followed by an
election. Annexation of school districts to high
school districts and the withdrawal of school dis-
tricts from high school districts are also provided
for but, as in the original formation, annexations
and withdrawals must be by petition and a vote of
the electors. (Article 5 of Chapter 99, Wyoming
Revised Statutes, 1981, as amended). It will be
seen from the above that high school districts are
governed by special laws and, therefore, district
boundary boards have no jurisdiction over the
boundaries of such districts.” Opinions of the At-
torney General of the State of Wyoming, 1941-
1947, p. 516.

The legislature did not change the law in any respect
material here after the foregoing opinion was ren-
dered, so that it apparently acquiesced in the opinion,
which deserves some consideration on the part of this
court in considering the intention of that body. We
think that Attorney General O’Marr was correct.

The judgment of the district court is reversed.

Reversed.

In the Matter of the ESTATE of Mrs. Mary
MERRILL, Deceased.

Georgia K. MERRILL, Proponent and Appel-
lant, Alberta A. Webber, Landis Webber
and Florence M. Bannon, Proponents,

v.

Mary Kay VAN ETTEN, Contestant, and
Ellis Merrill and Beverly Merrill Carpenter,
Contestants and Respondents.

No. 2808.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.

June 30, 1959.

841 Pac.2d 506

&
S

Moran, Murphy & Hettinger, Riverton, for appel-
lant.

Don D. Bowman, Denver, Colo., and Chester Ingle,
Thermopolis, A. Joseph Williams, Cheyenne, for re-
spondents.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

OPINION.

PARKER, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment rejecting probate
of the July 7, 1953, will of Mary Merrill after a jury
had rendered a special verdict finding that at the time
of executing the instrument she was not of sound and
disposing mind and memory and was acting as a result
of undue influence.

Mary Merrill and her husband, George Merrill, were
pioneer Wyoming ranchers possessed of numerous
holdings. Mr. Merrill died in 1984. They were the
parents of seven children, two of whom predeceased
Mrs. Merrill, one died subsequent to the trial below,
and four are still living. The three who are deceased
left children surviving them.

Prior to July 7, 1958, Mrs. Merrill had made at least
two other wills and had caused certain transfers to be
effected for tax reasons. None of these facts appear
to us to have more than a passing interest in the trial.
Mrs. Merrill, past eighty-four at the time of her death
and past eighty-three at the time she made the 1953
will, was quite deaf, almost blind, and intermittently
in bad and improved states of health.

The specifications of error recite insufficiency of
the evidence to support the verdict and judgment, er-
roneous instruction of the jury, some seventy-seven
improper rulings on evidence, and the denial of at-
torney fees to the proponents.

We first consider whether or not the evidence as to
testamentary capacity was sufficient to support the
verdict, and in so doing ascertain upon whom fell the
burden of proof. Respondents say that the guardian-
ship of the estate of Mary Merrill, instituted in 1952
and undissolved on July 7, 1953, together with testi-
mony regarding decedent’s condition, places the in-
stant case under the exception mentioned in our opin-
ion, In re Lane’s Estate, 50 Wyo. 119, 58 P.2d 415, 419,
60 P.2d 360, where we said:

“In our examination of contestant’s claims, it is
proper to recall in this connection that it was
pointed out in Wood v. Wood, 25 Wyo. 26, 164 P.
844, 852, that the burden of showing an alleged
incompetency of the party making the will rests
upon the contestant ‘unless the case should be
brought within the exception where previous in-
competency is admitted or sufficiently shown to
change the burden.’ * * *”

We cannot agree with respondents for two reasons.
First, even assuming that the guardianship proceed-
ings were proper evidence, which we do not need to
determine at this time, we note that the petition in
the guardianship proceedings was quite explicit that
the reason Mrs. Merrill was unable to manage and ad-
minister her property was because of her physical
condition. Nothing was said about mental incompe-
tency in the petition. Therefore, any reference to “an
incompetent” in the subsequent papers in the guardian-

ship file could not be taken to refer to a mental condi-
tion of the ward. Second, under the mentioned pro-
nouncement in the Lane case, the exception which
would change the burden of proof does not stem from
the nature of the evidence on incompetency adduced
at the trial but rather from a previously proven or
admitted mental incompetency. Accordingly, the bur-
den of proof in this case rested upon the contestants.
This being true, we look to the evidence on which they
relied to show that Mary Merrill was not of sound and
disposing mind and memory at the time of the execu-
tion of the will.

In the main, those witnesses who stated or intimated
that Mary Merrill was not of sound and disposing
mind and memory on July 7, 1958, based their apprais-
al that she lacked testamentary capacity upon strange
reasons such as (1) she would not have made the kind
of will she did if she had been of sound mind, (2) she
(almost totally blind and deaf) would occasionally
ask questions as to the whereabouts of persons with
whom she had just been speaking, and (8) she didn’t
understand the will because the witness himself
couldn’t understand it.

As in any other appeal, this court must assume the
truth of the evidence in favor of the successful party,
ignore that of the unsuccessful party in conflict there-
with, and give that of the successful party every favor-
able inference which may be reasonably drawn there-
from. In re Johnston’s Estate, 63 Wyo. 332, 181 P.2d
611; In re Anderson’s Estate, 71 Wyo. 238, 255 P.2d
983,

Contestants on several occasions asked of different
lay witnesses whether or not they thought Mary Mer-

2 lé(Y

rill was of sound and disposing mind and memory,
and whether they thought she was incompetent. Ap-
pellant objected to such questions on two grounds:
First, that there was not background to show the wit-
nesses’ observation of the decedent at the time of the
execution of the will, and second, that an opinion was
improper. As to the first, we are aware that observa-
tions as to a testator’s condition are often limited to
the precise time of the execution of the will. However,
there is nothing in the record indicating any sharp
change in Mrs. Merrill’s mental condition over a period
of several years, and we are therefore unconvinced
that the objection on this ground had merit. As to
the second cause for objection, we are inclined to agree.
In the cases which we have examined, the attempt to
secure opinion evidence from lay witnesses concerning
testamentary capacity has employed many different
words and phrases, including: mental unsoundness,
competency, incompetency, mental capacity, capacity
to make a will, capable of making a will, a mind sound
enough to make a will, etc. The exact form of the
question is not of great importance.

Although nonexpert opinions as to mental capacity
have been received by courts on occasion in the past,*
most courts have been conscious of the inherent dan-
ger of invading the province of the trier of fact by so
doing and have tended to limit the lay witness to a
statement of the actual things that were seen, heard,
or experienced by him without permitting him to voice
his opinion or conclusion. Judge Blume’s statement
in In re Johnston’s Estate, supra, at 181 P.2d 618,
“Laymen, too, are competent witnesses when they re-

120 Am.Jur.Evidence § 856; 7 Wigmore on Evidence,
3 ed., § 1933.

late the facts on which their observations are based,
and the weight to be attached to the testimony of ex-
pert as well as nonexpert witnesses is for the trier of
facts,” did not quite say this but implied it. We think
the voicing of opinion as to testamentary capacity by
a person who is not especially trained tends to invade
the province of the jury and should not be permitted.
See 7 Wigmore on Evidence, 8 ed., § 1958; 57 Am.Jur.
Wills § 129; Annotation, 155 A.L.R. 281, 284.

Even courts which have accepted opinions of lay
witnesses on mental unsoundness of a testator have
restricted the effect of the testimony to the reasons
given for the opinion. In re Dupont’s Estate, 60 Cal.
App.2d 276, 140 P.2d 866, 871. Important as is the
proper limitation of nonexpert opinion evidence, it is
not determinative in the present situation since the
facts upon which the witnesses here based their views
fell far short of meeting contestant’s burden of show-
ing that Mary Merrill lacked the capacity to make a

- will.

We pass then to the sufficiency of the evidence as
to contestants’ claim of undue influence. It is not de-
nied that the burden of proof was upon them, and we
think it was. Wood v. Wood, 25 Wyo. 26, 164 P. 844.
The testimony on which reliance is placed is quite dif-
ficult to follow. In its aspect most favorable to the
contestants it could be interpreted to show that the
proponents of the will were with deceased most of
the time prior to her death; that one of them, Alberta
Webber, arranged with the lawyer, R. L. Moran, to
come to the Red Creek Ranch on the day that the will
was drawn, that prior to that time she had said she
did not want the children of her deceased sister, Mar-
garet Brown, to inherit from her mother and that af-

RS l*

ter the will had been drawn she was alleged to have
said that she had arranged it so that her sister, Mary
C. Merrill, would never mismanage her mother’s prop-
erty again; that certain of the children and grandchil-
dren received amounts less than others; and that they
received amounts less than they would have had under
other wills and less than they would have received if a
prior transfer had remained effective. It is difficult
for us to agree that this type of testimony could rea-
sonably be found either by a court or jury to consti-
tute undue influence, and respondents’ arguments are
unconvincing. After relating the facts about Mrs. Mer-
rill’s infirmities, they merely say that they do not rely
upon these facts to prove the undue influence but
rather upon these together with a disparity between
the shares given to the natural objects of her affection
—inconsistent with prior dispositions of her property
and inconsistent with her previously expressed inten-
tion to treat all of her grandchildren and children
equally. They cite only one case, In re Conroy’s Es-
tate, 29 Wyo. 62, 211 P. 96, 99, to substantiate their
position:

“Tt is not necessary to cite authorities to sustain
the proposition that undue influence, seldom sus-
ceptible of direct proof, may be established by
proof of facts from which it may be fairly and
reasonably inferred.”

This statement correct as it is has little persuasion in
the present situation. The rules governing the burden
of proof and the necessity of showing of alleged undue
influence of testator have often been discussed by this
court. In Cook v. Bolduc, 24 Wyo. 281, 157 P. 580, 581,
582, 158 P. 266, it was said:

«* * * Wills deliberately made by persons of
sound mind are not to be lightly set aside, and the

undue influence which will warrant doing so must
be proven to be such as destroys the free agency
and thereby substitutes the will of another for
that of the testator. * * *”

We referred to this holding in In re Anderson’s Es-
tate, 71 Wyo. 238, 255 P.2d 988, 986, and again in In
re Nelson’s Estate, 72 Wyo. 444, 266 P.2d 238, 250. We
held in the Nelson case that the mere showing of sus-
ceptibility to undue influence is not sufficient to in-
validate a will, but such susceptibility must be con-
nected with evidence of actual undue influence exer-
cised upon the testatrix. We also held in that case
that the testatrix has no duty to make an equal division
of her property among her relatives and failure to do
so does not make dispositions unnatural.

As to the alleged undue influence, the trial court in-
structed the jury that the contestants must prove by
the preponderance of the evidence: a confidential re-
lationship between proponents and decedent; that de-
cedent’s condition was such as to permit a subversion
of her freedom of will; that there was activity con-
trolling the testamentary act on proponents’ part; that
the will appeared to be the result of such influence;
and that the free agency of the testatrix was destroyed
and the will of others substituted in its place. On the
pasis of these criteria, we think the contestants’ evi-
dence falls short of sustaining the burden of proof.

A consideration of all of the evidence in the record
fails to show that Mrs. Merrill was of unsound mind
and memory at the time she executed the will on July
7, 1953, and likewise fails to show that she was under
undue influence. To the contrary, it shows that she
was of sound mind, was cognizant of her family situ-
ation, of the extent of her property, of her physical

disabilities, and of the probable short duration of her
life. The verdict of the jury that the will signed by
Mrs. Merrill July 7, 1958, was the result of undue in-
fluence being exerted over her and that she was not
of sound and disposing mind and memory at that time
was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence
and had no substantial evidence to support it. It may
be that the jury was unduly influenced by the repeated
reference to the guardianship matter and the denomi-
nation of deceased as “an incompetent.” Although the
record of a guardianship has been held to be compe-
tent evidence in a proceeding to determine the validity
of a will, a showing of the appointment of a guardian
does not make out a prima facie case of incompetency,
raises no presumptions of insanity, and has often been
held to be entitled to little or no weight. See 2 Page
on Wills, 8 ed., § 805; Thompson on Wills, 3 ed., § 70;
and generally see 94 C.J.S. Wills §§ 46, 64; 57 Am.Jur.
Wills §§ 110, 185.

«* # * An order having a guardian appointed
would not necessarily be inconsistent with testa-
mentary capacity because guardianship may only
indicate an inability to manage property or busi-
ness affairs. * * *” 36 Tex.L.Rev. 18.

Most of the cases to which reference is made in these
authorities are limited in the assistance they provide
since they relate to cases dealing with wards who ad-
mittedly have had mental difficulties, sometimes hav-
ing been found to be insane. Even in such cases, courts
have been very careful to say that the adjudication in
a guardianship or insanity matter is not one which can
be carried over into the finding as to the validity of
a will. In this case, it is abundantly clear that there
was no intimation in the guardianship of mental in-
competency of Mary Merrill.

Without speculating on whether or not the jury in
this case was misled into giving undue weight to the
guardianship proceeding, we feel obligated to say that
the refusal of the court to instruct as to the limited
effect of the guardianship was error which was pre-
judicial to the proponents. One of the instructions re-
quested and refused, 5A, stated:

“You are instructed that the fact that a person
was or might be under guardianship at the time
when he or she executes a will does not, of itself,
in any manner prevent that person from making
a valid will. A person under guardianship may
execute a will as freely as any other person.”

Another such instruction was 6A:

“You are instructed that the Guardianship, con-
cerning which testimony in this case has been giv-
en, and the file of which is in evidence as Contest-
ants’ or Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1, constitutes no ad-
judication of incompetency or determination of
mental incompetency. The Guardianship here
concerned is a guardianship of the estate or prop-
erty and was instituted without legal hearing or
judicial determination. It may be considered by
you, along without [apparently intended to be
with] evidence in the case as bearing on the ques-
tion of whether or not, on July 7, 1953, Mrs. Mary
Merrill possessed testamentary capacity. It is
not, and is not to be construed as being determina-
tive of that question.”

Perhaps these instructions could have been better
worded, but in any event the jury should have been
instructed on the subject if they were to have reason-
able latitude in evaluating the guardianship proceed-
ings.

Perhaps the views of Chief Justice Blume in In re
Hartt’s Estate, 75 Wyo. 305, 295 P.2d 985, 1002, might
properly receive further consideration in a case such
as the one before us.

«ce * * He [the testator] accumulated it; he could
have given it away in his lifetime * * *; he could
have disposed of it in his will as he desired, if not
contrary to law ***. It is, and for many centur-
jes has been, a common thought in our economic
system, that to execute a last will and testament is
the most solemn and sacred act of a man’s life.
* * * Tt would not be becoming of us to give men
and women to understand that as soon as they are
lowered in the grave, those upon whom they have
bestowed their bounty may engage in a scramble
over the property at will. To say that would, we
think, be poor public policy, contrary to the inter-
ests of society and should not be encouraged.”

The cause is reversed with direction to admit the
will to probate.

We should not end the discussion of this case with-
out mentioning several matters which have been ar-
gued.

A. Appellant has filed a motion to strike appear-
ance and enter default against respondents on the
ground that they did not file their papers in time. We
have made no attempt to dispose of the case on this
basis: First, because we preferred that it should be
resolved upon its merits; and second, because exten-
sions, repeatedly granted with mutual consent of pro-
ponents and certain contestants, seemed reasonably
to include all parties. Moreover, the contestants now
remaining could scarcely have proceeded with any ef-
fective presentation of the case until the other exten-
sions had been concluded.

B. Appellant moved for a new trial on the ground
that the transcript of evidence disclosed numerous
errors and the undue delay in the preparation of the
transcript prevented any proper correction except by
a new hearing. This motion was overruled. In view
of the disposition of the case, we do not pass upon the
propriety of the court’s ruling on this point. Suffice
to say that the charge is a serious one, that the activi-
ties of a court reporter are within the jurisdiction of
the trial court, subject to the constitutional provision
which places superintending control in the supreme
court. Any complaint regarding delay or incorrect-
ness of transcripts should be most carefully investi-
gated by the trial court of jurisdiction so that its find-
ings may here be reviewed to insure justice to all.

C. The trial court disallowed proponents attorney
fees. Appellant’s counsel concede that this matter is
within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we
agree. That court’s decision on the point should not be
reversed unless there was an abuse of the discretion
accorded to it. However, it is our view that in the
light of the above-quoted pronouncement in the Hartt
case the wishes of a testator should be given consider-
ation, and this is not practically possible unless an at-
torney is provided to present the matter properly. Ac-
cordingly, attorney fees should be allowed to the pro-
ponents of a will unless it should appear to the court
from the evidence that the contentions of the propon-
ents are without merit. In the instant situation, di-
rection is made that the trial court allow the actual
expenses and a proper fee to proponents’ counsel for
services in presenting this matter below. Since we
think that the appeal to this court had merit, attorney
fees should be granted therefor, and we fix the amount

at $1,000 which should be considered by the trial court
as a proper charge against the estate.

Reversed with directions.

ANTLERS HOTEL, INC., a corporation,
Appellant (Defendant below),

v.

TOWN OF CITY OF NEWCASTLE, a municipal
corporation, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

Ira BALDWIN, Appellant (Defendant below),

v.

TOWN OF CITY OF NEWCASTLE, a municipal
corporation, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

Nos. 2865, 2866.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.
July 14, 1959.

841 Pac.2d. 951

19
road
a

ro
Re}
a

Ellery, Gray & Hickey, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Thomas L. Whitley, City Atty., Newcastle, for ap-
pellee.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

OPINION.

Mr. Chief Justice BLUME delivered the opinion of
the court.

The Town of the City of Newcastle, a municipal
corporation, brought an action against the Antlers
Hotel, Inc., defendant below and appellant here, and
also an action against one Ira Baldwin who conducted
a laundry in the Town of Newcastle and was defendant
below and is appellant here. The two actions were
consolidated in the court below and have been con-

solidated on this appeal, involving as they do similar
facts and identical rules of law and claims in con-
nection therewith. The town asked judgment against
the Antlers Hotel for the sum of $493.14 due for the
use of the sewer system of the town from September
28, 1955, to November 29, 1957, and also asked judg-
ment against Ira Baldwin for $269.96 for the period
between 1953 and 1957, alleging that the amounts due
have been unpaid. The town further asked judgment
for penalty and attorneys’ fees. After answer was
filed and the pre-trial conference held and answers to
interrogatories submitted, the court entered judgment
in favor of the town against the respective defendants
and appellants here for the amounts claimed in the
complaints, except that it refused to give judgment
for any penalty or counsel fees. From that judgment
the defendants below and appellants here have ap-
pealed to this court.

If we understand the contentions of the appellants
herein, they are as follows: First: the service charges
for sewer made against them are excessive and in
violation of § 29-2706, W.C.S.1945; Second, the rates,
that is to say, service charges, established by the town
are arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory and not uni-
form. We shall consider these contentions in the or-
der above mentioned.

1. Before stating what appears to be the contention
of appellants in greater detail, we should perhaps first
refer to the fact that it is stipulated that the sewer or,
rather, part of the sewer used by the Antlers Hotel
was constructed in 1920 and that part of the sewer
used by Baldwin was constructed in 1932. The parts
of the sewer so constructed were paid for by bonds con-
stituting a general obligation of the town and they

SC CO

have been fully paid. Subsequently in 1949, revenue
bonds were issued by the town in the sums of $64,000
and $200,000. In 1954 further revenue bonds were
issued in the sum of $120,000. These last bonds were
issued for a sewer disposal plant as shown by the fol-
lowing agreement between the parties:

“Tt is agreed that the plaintiff town constructed
a sewer disposal unit in the form of a sewer la-
goon and constructed a main sewer line from the
city limits of the town to the sewer lagoon which
is located outside of the town and that this con-
struction took place during the year 1954. That
all of the sewage of the town, including the sew-
age of both defendants, passes through the main
line and into the sewer lagoon which was construct-
ed in the year 1954. That the construction in 1954,
above referred to, was financed by a water and
sewer revenue bond issue, which was issued by
the town council in that year in the amount of
$120,000 pursuant to statute.”

It appears to be the contention of appellants that in
view of the fact that their sewer was originally con-
structed for them in 1920 and 1932 and the con-
struction cost was paid for by general obligation
bonds which have been paid, they are not responsible
in any way for charges arising by reason of any reve-
nue bonds issued subsequently, and that as the service
charges against the appellants contain a sum levied
by reason of the revenue bonds, these charges are ex-
cessive and illegal. In other words, counsel seem to
think that the only just service charge which may be
made against appellants is that arising out of the op-
eration and maintenance plus the depreciation charge
for that part of the town’s sewer system which existed
at the time the sewer system was established in 1920
and 1932 respectively. They claim that they are not
benefited by anything else and that the town cannot

consider the system as a whole insofar as appellants
are concerned and levy a service charge or rate accord-
ingly on all the users of the system. We think counsel
are mistaken. It would be impractical for a city or
town to fix one rate based on the construction of part
of the sewer system at one time and fix another rate
for another part of the sewer constructed at another
time and still another rate for the part of the sewer
constructed subsequently. It is very clear that the
sewage disposal plant was of benefit to appellants as
well as to every other user of the sewer system. As
already shown, the sewage of both appellants passes
through the main line and into the sewer lagoon which
was constructed in 1954. Hence, it was of benefit to
the appellants to the same extent as to any other users
of the sewer system. The record does not show for
what purpose the bonds of 1949 above mentioned were
issued. Assuming that they were issued for the pur-
pose of extending the sewer system to other parts of
the town, it by no means follows that the appellants
were not benefited, for every owner of property in a
city or town is interested for sanitary purposes that
a sewer system should be established throughout the
community, and a distinct benefit accures to every
property owner if that is done.

A case very closely in point herein is the case of
Morse v. Wise, 37 Wash.2d 806, 226 P.2d 214. The
difference in that case is that the appellants had paid
for their sewer by special assessments, while in the
ease at bar it is claimed that their sewer was paid for
by general obligation bonds as already mentioned. The
appellants in the Washington case claimed that they
should not be compelled to pay any service charges by
reason of the extension of the system because they
were in no way benefited thereby, just as is claimed

in the case at bar. In that case the city was authorized
to create a special fund or funds for the sole purpose
of defraying the cost of the public utility or additions,
betterments. or extensions, just as is true here. The
court stated, among other things, that when the city.
provided for the issuance of revenue bonds and made
service charges to pay the cost and operation thereof
it acted pursuant to the police power so as to protect
the health of its inhabitants. It continued as follows
at 226 P.2d 217, 218:

«* * * The act does not exclude sewer systems
constructed pursuant to local improvement sta-
tutes, but it contemplates the raising of revenue by
fixing rates and charges for the furnishing of
service to all of those served by the system of
sewerage as a whole. * * *

* * * cd * *

“It was not necessary that the city council give
consideration to the fact that appellants have been
assessed for the cost of construction of the part of
the sewer system serving them and their proper-
ties when fixing sewer service charges. The prop-
erty owners did not ‘acquire’ the mains and later-
als when they paid the cost of construction. * * *

* * * * * *

«« * * The legislature has supplied cities and
towns with an additional method of raising reve-
nue to defray the expense connected with sewage
disposal facilities and to fix rates and charges for
the use thereof. The sewer system serving appel-
lants and those similarly situated was constructed
by the city of Chelan, and although the greater
part of the cost was paid by the property owners
served, the city had control over it and had the
duty to maintain it. The act gave the city the
authority to integrate it into the later constructed
sewer system and make a service charge to all
qrhose property is served by the entire sewer sys-

m. a

We agree with the reasoning in this case.

As already stated, counsel for appellants refer to
§ 29-2706, W.C.S.1945, and think that the second por-
tion thereof, in conjunction with the last sentence
which is italicized by them and in this opinion, lends
support to their contention. We do not think so. The
section reads as follows:

“Any municipality borrowing money and im-
proving or constructing or acquiring and improy-
ing a sewerage system under the provisions of this
Act [§§ 29-2701—29-2711], is authorized and di-
rected to charge and collect from the users of such
system at a rate which shall be sufficient at all
times to pay the cost of operating and maintaining
such system, provide an adequate depreciation
fund and pay the principal and interest on the
bonds issued by the municipality under the pro-
visions of this Act.

“Any municipality that owns and operates or
that may hereafter own and operate a sewerage
system constructed or acquired under the provis-
ions of any law of this state may, by ordinance,
provide that the users of such system shall pay a
service rate sufficient to defray the cost of oper-
ating and maintaining such system, and of provid-
ing an adequate depreciation fund thereof and
thereafter such municipality is authorized to
charge and collect such service rate for such pur-
pose but no tax or other charge shall thereafter
be assessed against the users of such sewerage
system for such purpose.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The second portion of the section authorizes a service
charge for (1) operation and maintenance and (2)
for a depreciation fund. It fails to refer to the pay-
ment of principal and interest and states that no other
tax or charge. may be made. Counsel for appellants
contend that under this provision they are not liable

for any service charge for the purpose of paying prin-
cipal and interest. Now it is clear that the second part
of the section applies to all users of the sewer system
alike, not merely to users situated as are appellants.
So if the contention of appellants were correct, there
would be no one chargeable with the payment of the
principal and interest of bonds. That, of course, can-
not be true. What was meant by the italicized por-
tion, namely, “but no tax or other charge shall there-
after be assessed against the users of such sewerage
system for such purpose” is difficult to say, and coun-
sel for appellants have not been able to enlighten us.
One thing-is certain, namely, that we must construe
the whole section together. We cannot construe it to
mean that the first portion authorizes a service charge
for the payment of the principal and interest of the
bonds and that the second portion denies the right to
do so. The section as a whole authorizes service
charges to be imposed for three purposes, namely,
(1) to pay for the operation and maintenance of the
system, (2) to provide an adequate depreciation fund
and (8) to pay the principal and interest on the bonds.
It is probable that the italicized portion above men-
tioned has reference only to the first two purposes
above mentioned, without having any reference to the
third purpose and without meaning to affect the right
to levy a service charge for that purpose.

2. It is further claimed that the charges against the
appellants are excessive by reason of the fact that the
town accumulated a sum of money in excess of some
$73,000. The record is somewhat confusing in that
matter. Pages 53 and 54 of the record show that the
accumulation amounts to $31,712.45, which we think
is not excessive. Furthermore, we could not say that
even the amount of $78,000 would be excessive. It

could always be used for the purpose of paying the
principal and interest on the bonds so that we cannot
say in what respect the appellants would be prejudiced.

8. As heretofore stated, appellants claim that the
rates established were arbitrary, capricious, discrimi-
natory and not uniform. The burden of proof in that
connection was upon the appellants. 78 C.J.S. Public
Utilities § 26, p. 1048. Not every discrimination is
condemned but only a discrimination which is arbi-
trary, in view of the fact that it is impossible to meas-
sure the justness of a rate upon a mathematical basis.
See Caldwell v. City of Abilene, Tex. Civ.App., 260
S.W.2d 712. Section 29-2707, W.C.S.1945, provides
that a rate shall be fixed which shall equitably dis-
tribute the cost of service between the users, and the
question here is whether or not appellant has shown
that this provision has been violated.

The Town of Newcastle operates its water and sewer
system as one system, pursuant to the authority of §
29-2702, W.C.S. 1945 (1957 Cum.Pocket Supp.). It
enacted an ordinance in 1949 fixing water rates and
sewer service rates. It enacted in that connection §
15 of the ordinance reading as follows:

“Section 15: The owner or occupant of any com-
mercial premises who by reason of special circum-
stances finds that the foregoing rates are unjust
or inequitable as applied to his premises shall make
written application to the governing body stating
the circumstances and requesting a different basis
of charges for water and sewer services to his
premises. If such application be approved, the
governing body may by resolution fix and estab-
lish fair and equitable rates for such premises to
be effective as of the date of such application and
continuing during the period of such special cir-

cumstances. Whenever by reason of special cir-
cumstances the governing body finds that the fore-
going rates are unjust and inequitable as applied
to the premises it may by resolution fix and es-
tablish fair and equitable rates for such premises
during the period of such special circumstances or
any part thereof.”

The sewer rates are fixed as follows:

“Class 1. Creameries, packing houses, poultry
houses, and goods-processing plants, and all con-
tributors of relatively strong sewage.

First 2000 gal. of water used, Minimum $2.00
per month

All over 2000 gal. at 15¢ per 1000 gallons per
month

“Class 2. Includes laundries, dry cleaners, gas and
oil stations, car washing stations, ice cream par-
lors, hotels, drug stores, and manufacturing plants.

First 2000 gal. of water used, minimum at $2.00
per month

All over 2000 gal. at 12¢ per 1000 gal. per
month

“Class 8. Includes all other users of sanitary fa-
cilities ;
First 2000 gal. used, minimum at $2.00 per
month

All over 2000 gal. used at 10¢ per 1000 gal. per
month”

It may be noted that the sewer rates are fixed upon
a basis of the amount of water that is used. The or-
dinance establishes three different classes. No ob-

jection is made by appellants as to these classes. In
each case the minimum charge is $2 per month. Inso-
far as the ordinance is concerned, all parties using the
sanitary facilities pay a meter rate. No flat rate is
provided for in the ordinance. It appears, however,
that there are twelve business firms on flat rates but
that these rates have been determined in each case
by the town council according to the provisions of §
15 of the ordinance, the rates varying from $2 to $12
per month. It has not been shown that the action of
the town council was without justification in making
these provisions in these special cases. Aside from
those, it appears that there are 404 users on flat rates
as against 699 users on meter rates. We may take it
for granted, we think, that these 404 users on flat
rates are owners of residential properties and who are
hardly in the same situation as are commercial users.
A flat rate in some cases where others pay by meters
is not per se illegal or arbitrary or discriminatory
and is not per se an unjust rate. Thus it is said in the
case of Jarrett v. City of Boston, 209 Ga. 530, 74 S.E.
2d 549, 551, 40 A.L.R.2d 1327, which states the rules
generally applicable in cases such as that before us,
as follows:

“8, Where a municipality, as here, owns and
operates a waterworks system, it is fundamental
that its rates for water must be uniform, in the
sense that they must not be unreasonably or un-
justly discriminatory as between consumers; but
it ig not of itself unreasonable or unjust discrimi-
nation to furnish water to some consumers at flat
rates and to others of the same class at meter
rates, even though the rate by the gallon actually
used is ordinarily lower to the former than to the
latter. 43 Am.Jur. 691, § 180; 67 C.J. (Waters)
1257, § 811; 4 McQuillin on Mun. Corp., p. 3591;
Consolidated Ice Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 274 Pa.

Ce

558, 118 A. 544; Richardson v. City of Greensboro,
174 N.C. 540, 94 S.E. 8; Parker v. City of Boston,
1 Allen, Mass., 361. As was held by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in the Consolidated Ice Co.
case, Supra, the fact that flat rate consumers pay
Jess per gallon for water than meter consumers
does not show discrimination, A difference in
conditions of service justifies a difference in
charge; but when a difference in charge is based
on a difference in service, it must have some rea-
sonable relation to the amount of difference, and
cannot be so great as to produce an unjust dis-
crimination. Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Call Pub. Co., 181 U.S. 92, 21 8.Ct. 561, 45 L.Ed.
765. And in cases involving the rates of a city-
owned-and-operated waterworks system, it will be
presumed, in the absence of a clear showing to the
contrary, that the city’s governing body properly
performed its official duty, and did not exceed its
authority, in fixing the city’s water rates, adjust-
ing them between consumers upon a difference in
conditions of service. * * *”

See also the case of Consolidated Ice Co. v. City of
Pittsburgh, 274 Pa. 558, 118 A. 544; and Gericke v.
City of Philadelphia, 353 Pa. 60, 44 A.2d 283.

As already stated, there can hardly be any doubt
that the use of the sewer in residential property stands
upon a different footing from the use in connection
with commercially-used properties. For instance, in
these western states lawns are irrigated during the
summer season. The use of water during that season
is hardly a proper criterion as to the rate that should
be paid during that season for the use of a sewer. That
might be remedied perhaps by applying to residences
an average rate used during the winter months, or
some other method might be devised by which an
equitable rate could be fixed. We have no evidence
before us which shows that, as a matter of fact, the

flat rates for residential property are unjust or dis-
criminatory. For aught that appears in the record,
residential properties overpay rather than underpay
for the use of the sewer. As stated before, the burden
of proof in connection with the contention here men-
tioned is upon the appellants. We think they have
failed in that burden and the judgment of the trial
court must, accordingly, be affirmed. It is so ordered.

Affirmed.

SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 32, IN COUNTY OF FRE-
MONT and State of Wyoming; William Wall, Chair-
man of the Board; Joe Chernick, Clerk; Albert
panse, Superintendent, Appellants (Defendants

elow),

v.
LaVeta WEMPEN, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 2844,
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
duly 14, 1959.
342 Pac.2d 232

312

Moran, Hettinger & Leedy, R. Lauren Moran, River-
ton, for appellants.

Spence & Hill, G. L. Spence, Riverton, for appellee.

SC“ Ci

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

OPINION.

Mr. Justice HARNSBERGER delivered the opinion
of the court.

In this case a lady who had been employed as a cook
by the Board of Trustees of School District No. 32, in
Fremont County, Wyoming, was discharged and she
sued the board to recover her salary for the remaining
period of the school year. The case was tried to a jury
and upon its verdict the court gave her judgment
amounting to $453.33, The school board appeals.

The evidence in the record seems clear and for the
most part undisputed. The board’s minutes show it
decided to employ plaintiff as a cook for the 1956-1957
school term at a salary increase of $11.11 per month
above her previous salary. This made her per month
salary $151.11, or $1,360 for the term. The action of
the board was communicated in writing to plaintiff by
the board’s school superintendent, a somewhat usual
procedure, and the employee’s acceptance of the offer
of employment was indicated on that writing, signed
by plaintiff and returned to the superintendent. The
instrument as completed and as shown by an exhibit
is as follows, with the exception that the lost original
used the words “First Cook” instead of the words
“Chief Cook”.

“Pavillion Public Schools
“Election Notice

“You have been elected as Chief Cook for the
1956-1957 school term at a salary of 1860.00.
Please check and sign as per your wishes below
and return to the office on or before April 1, 1956.
Thank you.

“ X= I accept.

“«

I reject.

“7/s/ Mrs. LaVeta Wempen
“Signature”

Plaintiff entered upon her duties as cook and per-
formed the required services in a highly satisfactory
manner. However, her son became involved in minor
misconduct and was disciplined by the school super-
intendant. His punishment included the repayment
of the cost of small items of school property that had
been destroyed. Shortly afterwards on February 19,
1957, when the superintendent was in the school lunch-
room, an occurrence growing out of the son’s trouble
took place between the employee and the superintend-
ent. There is dispute as to the exact nature of this
difficulty. On the one hand the superintendent con-
tended the employee had used profane language, was
loud, abusive, defiant and disrespectful. The plaintiff,
however, maintained that all she did was to shove a
silver dollar across the table indicating it was to pay
for the damage her son had done, and that the dollar
was returned by the superintendent. Undoubtedly
angry words were exchanged and the dollar passed
back and forth between the parties several times. Af-
ter the superintendent left the scene of the altercation,
he returned to the lunchroom and requested plaintiff
to come to his office to discuss the matter. The em-

ployee admitted she refused to do this. The episode
came to the attention of the board and the superin-
tendent reported his version of the affair at a special
meeting of the board called and held February 22, 1957.
Although plaintiff was not notified of the meeting,
was not present, and was given no opportunity to of-
fer her version of the affair, the board decided to dis-
charge her and directed the superintendent to notify
plaintiff of its action. This he did by sending her the
following:

“February 22, 1957
“Mrs. LaVeta Wempen
“Pavillion, Wyoming

“Dear Mrs. Wempen:

“The Board of Education of School District No. 32
met in special session on February 22 and consid-
ered your recent unethical conduct in the lunch
room. The matter was discussed at length and
the board voted unanimously to dismiss you im-
mediately as cook not only because of the scene
which you created but because you refused to dis-
cuss the matter with me under proper conditions.

“Very cordially yours,
“A. S. Hansen, Superintendent”

From this letter we may assume the board felt, that
notwithstanding the contract of employment, it was
entitled to summarily discharge the cook for her al-
leged misconduct and insubordination. With this we
cannot agree. Before the board was entitled to take
that drastic action, it was necessary that the employee
be apprised of charges preferred against her; that no-
tice of hearing upon those charges be given her; and
that at such hearing she be permitted full opportunity

to offer such explanation, excuse, justification or re-
futation as might be available to her. While the board,
at least in the first instance, was clothed with authori-
ty to decide whether its employee had been guilty of
such misconduct or insubordination as warranted term-
ination of her employment, it was not entitled to act
arbitrarily in an ex parte proceeding, solely upon rep-
resentations of the superintendent which, in the nature
of things, were possible to be colored from his inter-
ested position.

Baird v. School Dist. No. 25, Fremont County, 41
Wyo. 451, 287 P. 808, cited by both parties, discusses
the right of a teacher to have charges filed, to have
notice of hearing, and a hearing when discharge is
sought by the county superintendent of schools under
authority of what is now our § 27-1108, W.C.S.1945.
It also deals with the right of a jury to substitute its
determination as to whether there is just cause for
discharge for the decision reached by the school board
after it had given notice and held a hearing for that
purpose. The case also incidentally deals with the
question presented here, which is whether the school
district board may summarily and without hearing and
notice discharge a term-contract employee and termi-
nate the employment without compensation for the
unexpired portion of the term in cases where cause for
such discharge is the basis for such action. The con-
clusion reached in the Baird case, supra, makes it un-
mistakable that in order to justify the school board in
discharging the plaintiff in this case, it was necessary
that the plaintiff be given notice and hearing. The
court said at page 460 in 41 Wyo. and at page 310 in
287 P.:

«& * * And we shall assume, for the purposes of
this case, that, in order to make the decision of the

school board of any effect, a hearing, upon notice,
was necessary, * * *.””

Again at page 467 in 41 Wyo. and at page 313 in 287
P., it was said:

«<* * * According to the Durst Case, removal of
a teacher may be only for cause, and we may as-
sume, as heretofore stated, that it should be only
upon notice and a hearing. ag

See Durst v. School Dist. No. 2 of Niobrara County,
39 Wyo. 442, 273 P. 675.

While both the Durst case, supra, and the Baird
case, supra, concerned the employment and discharge
of teachers, we do not think the principle involved de-
pends upon the character of the employment or the
professional or non-professional status of the employee,
but rather upon whether there is a contract of employ-
ment for a definite term and whether a proper pro-
ceeding was had to abrogate that contract for a just
cause.

Section 67-1038, W.C.S.1945, provides: “Educational
matters affecting the school district shall be under
the care of the district board of school trustees”, and
§ 67-625, W.C.S.1945, says: “The district board shall
employ all teachers necessary for the schools of the
district, and pay them by draft on the treasurer”.
These statutes obviously fall short of expressly saying
that power is given to a board of school district trus-
tees to employ the personnel necessary to perform
other school functions, although § 67-616, W.C.S.1945,
seems to give a board rather general authority to make
contracts in performance of duties delegated to it by
district meeting or to carry out the vote of the district

meeting. Similarly these statutes fail to expressly
authorize a board to discharge personnel it has em-
ployed even in proper cases and under proper circum-
stances. However, it seems logical and a fair conclus-
ion that a schoo] board must be possessed of such ad-
ministrative authority. In Durst v. School Dist. No. 2
of Niobrara County, 39 Wyo. 442, 448, 449, 273 P. 675,
677, this court gave recognition to the principle that
the right to hire implies the right to dismiss, and ap-
proval of this rule was reiterated in Baird v. School
Dist. No. 25, Fremont County, 41 Wyo. 451, 466, 287
P. 308, 312, the court saying, “* * * the power to em-
ploy implies the power to discharge.”

In the absence of special findings, we must consider
the verdict and judgment for plaintiff carried with
them every necessary finding of fact which is sup-
ported by evidence. In 89 C.J.S. Trial § 650, p. 494, it
is said:

“In the absence of special findings in irrecon-
cilable conflict therewith, a general finding im-
ports a finding of all subsidiary facts necessary to
render it sufficient and support it as well as the

judgment which is rendered in the proceedings.
eae a?

Authorities are cited which include Wallis v. Nauman,
61 Wyo. 281, 238, 157 P.2d 285, 286, wherein the court
gave tacit approval to the rule announced in Hinton
v. Saul, 87 Wyo. 78, 96, 259 P. 185, 191, where it was
said:

«x * * And in causes tried to a court, a general
finding is one of every special thing necessary to
be found to sustain the judgment. * * *”

Reiteration of this rule occurs in Holbrook v. Con-
tinental Oil Co., 738 Wyo. 321, 278 P.2d 798; Lucksinger
y. Salisbury, 72 Wyo. 164, 262 P.2d 396, 264 P.2d 1007;
Jacoby v. Town of City of Gillette, 62 Wyo. 487, 174
P.2d 505, 177 P.2d 204; and Tyler v. Tyler, Wyo., 832
P.2d 489.

While some of the authorities cited are cases which
were tried to the court rather than to the jury, we see
no good reason why the rule is not as appropriate
where there is a general verdict of a jury as in cases
which are tried directly to the court.

Among findings necessary to support the verdict
and judgment in this case is that there was a contract
of employment between the board and plaintiff for her
services for the 1956-1957 school term rather than a
month-to-month hiring, terminable at will, and that
plaintiff was not guilty of such insubordination as
justified her discharge.

Whether or not plaintiff was employed for a term
or from month to month was a matter properly within
the determination of the jury in this case. Without
detailing, we feel the summary herein contained shows
there was sufficient substantial evidence upon which
the finding there was a term contract could be made.

While standing alone, the admission of plaintiff that
she refused to comply with the superintendent’s re-
quest to come to his office might indicate she had been
guilty of an insubordination which justified her dis-
charge without remuneration for the remaining period
of the term, it might be that her refusal could have
been satisfactorily explained or justified if opportunity
had been given her. The crucial question then was
whether the vital facts of misconduct and insubordi-

nation were established in a proper manner. The
board assumed to determine there had been misconduct
and insubordination without giving the cook any op-
portunity to appear before it and offer such explana-
tion, excuse, justification or refutation as she may have
been able to furnish. The record does inform us that
when she was asked to come to the superintendent’s
office, she coupled her refusal by calling attention to
contrary instructions she had received. We are not
suggesting that this necessarily excused her from com-
plying with the superintendent’s request, but we men-
tion it merely to illustrate that her side of the story
was entitled to be heard and considered. Similarly,
the question of her understanding of the nature of the
superintendent’s request was entitled to be placed be-
fore the board and by it taken into account. This is
to say, opportunity should have been accorded her to
show whether she understood that an order had been
given or that she was merely being invited to iron out
a disagreement. It is even left unclear whether the
direction to come to the office was one which properly
grew out of her employment and in the line of her
duties which she was required to obey, or if it was
only the superintendent’s offer of an opportunity to
adjust disrupted personal relationships resulting from
her son’s difficulties. In any view, the ex parte action
of the board in accepting the one-sided report of the
superintendent presents the question whether, as a
matter of law, the plaintiff was entitled to be advised
of charges made against her, to notice, and to an op-
portunity to be present at any hearing held to consider
those charges before she could be dismissed without
remuneration. Only under such circumstances could
the board have given fair consideration to whatever
she might have been able to offer in her defense, in
explanation or in refutation of the charges.

We do not question the right of a school district
board to dismiss at will, and without hearing, other
than term-contract employees or even to dismiss a
term-contract employee for just cause. But, to dis-
charge a term employee without according her an op-
portunity to know the misconduct or insubordination
with which she is being charged; to be denied notice
of any hearing that is to be held upon such charges;
and to be given no opportunity to be present at, par-
ticipate in, and offer whatever she may have available
in her defense, excuse or justification, is an arbitrary
act and an abuse of the discretionary authority of the
school district board. Any such action taken by the
board is of no force or effect whatsoever and the jury
was entitled to disregard such action and to make its
own determination as to whether plaintiff’s discharge
without payment to her of the full agreed term com-
pensation was justified by her conduct.

We, therefore, hold plaintiff was entitled to be paid
the full amount of contract salary for her services for
the entire term. In consequence, the verdict of the
jury and the judgment of the court in this case must be
upheld.

Affirmed.

Joe Cruz MARTINEZ, Appellant (Defendant below),

Uv.
STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 2881.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
July 21, 1959.

342 Pac.2d 227.

©
oO

327

L. A. Crofts and W. A. Smith, Lander, for appellant.

Thomas O. Miller, former Atty. Gen., Maxwell E.
Osborn, former Deputy Atty. Gen., Norman B. Gray,

Atty. Gen., W. M. Haight, Asst. Atty. Gen., and G. L.
Spence, County and Pros. Atty., of Fremont County,
Lander, for appellee.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

OPINION.

Mr. Justice PARKER delivered the opinion of the
court.

Joe Cruz Martinez, charged with first degree mur-
der, was tried by a Fremont County jury, found guilty
without qualification, was sentenced to die in the gas
chamber, and has now appealed to this court.

The pertinent facts of the homicide were as follows:

On the morning of January 1, 1957, sometime after
eight o’clock, the defendant, who was employed on the
Barquin ranch, came to Mike Barquin and reported
that Ramon Gonzales, another employee of the ranch,
had been shot, Barquin in company with Martinez
went to the bunk house, found Gonzales lying on his
bed with a bullet hole in his skull but still breathing.
Barquin immediately went for the authorities who up-
on their arrival found Gonzales dead. Subsequent
autopsy disclosed the head wound to be the cause of
death.

Martinez’ story to Barquin and later to the sheriff
was that on the night before, New Year’s Eve, he and
Gonzales had been in various places in the town of
Lander and thereabouts, drinking and carousing, had
a fight with some Indians who had later followed them
out of town and had run them off the road with the
car; Martinez and Gonzales had speeded up and re-
turned to the bunk house of the Barquin ranch; after-
ward the Indians drove up in the car whereupon Mar-
tinez crawled under his bed; the Indiaus came into the
bunk house, started an argument with Gonzales, and
shot him.

The sheriff and other officers made an examination
at the scene of the death, took pictures, and then pro-
ceeded to make an investigation in an effort to determ-
ine the actual occurrences. In so doing they found
that Gonzales had been shot through the head with a
small caliber rifle (later determined to be a .22) and
also found that a .22 caliber rifle was missing from the
ranch.

The sheriff almost immediately suspected Martinez
of the crime and after completing preliminary check at

the ranch asked defendant if he would go to Lander to
assist with the investigation to discover the persons
who had committed the crime. Martinez readily agreed
and remained with the sheriff through that day ond
the next, staying the night at the jail. The State makes
a point of the fact that he was not then under formal
arrest.

The following day the missing rifle was discovered
hidden under a granary at the ranch. This was later
proved to be the weapon which fired the fatal shot. On
the night of January 2 about 9:15 Martinez, having
been told that the rifle had been found and that it bore
his fingerprints, made a signed confession which was
admitted in evidence at the trial over defendant’s ob-
jections. This confession, the basis for the conviction
of first degree murder, related the activities in the
early part of the evening of December 31 as being
substantially the same as those previously recounted.
From the point that the two started back to the Bar-
quin ranch, defendant’s story was entirely changed.
He said that on the return trip he and Gonzales fell to
quarreling about their evening’s lack of success with
women, whereupon deceased criticized Martinez, call-
ing him a foul name, opening the car door, and sug-
gesting that they fight. Defendant said he did not
get out of the car because he was half asleep and sick
with all the drinking he had done. Instead he finally
convinced Gonzales to get back in the car and they
went on home. Defendant lay down on the bed and
Gonzales, after acting undecided, finally lay down.
Martinez then turned off the light and wished Gonzales
happy dreams, whereupon Gonzales called him the foul
name he had previously used, thereby indicating that
he was still angry. Defendant said he thought Gon-
zales would get up and cut his throat off; that he (de-

a ”

fendant) wouldn’t take any chances; and that he got
up, slipped on his shoes and trousers, walked out and
got the gun from the porch of a nearby house, checked
it to see if it was loaded, returned, and shot deceased.

In their argument for reversal, defendant’s counsel
insist that there was error on the part of the court and
of the prosecuting official in certain aspects of the
trial, They also contend that, although they made no
objection at the trial regarding the instructions given
or refused, the court instructed improperly. Their
principal contention, however, seems to be that there
was insufficient evidence to support the verdict and
judgment of first degree murder, the confession being
both inadmissible and insufficient, even if admitted,
to show premeditated malice—there being no other
evidence on which the jury’s finding could be legally
based. We shall consider these arguments in the order
named.

I. Errors in the Conduct of the Trial

One error charged by defendant’s counsel was the
refusal of the trial court to exclude witnesses from
the courtroom until after they had been sworn, the
swearing having taken place immediately following
the prosecution’s opening statement. No authorities
are cited to substantiate the claim of error which seems
to be founded in the fact that the witnesses, by hearing
the opening statement, would know the prosecution’s
theory of the case prior to the time they were called
upon to testify. They point to the evidence regarding
defendant’s sobriety and say that the testimony was
just “too pat” to have been spontaneous and uninflu-
enced. Counsel admit that the exclusion of witnesses
is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and
they do not insist that such discretion was abused. We

m a

think that whenever exclusion of witnesses is indicated,
the better practice is to make the exclusion at the be-
ginning of the trial. However, defendant’s arguments
fail to convince us either that the court’s discretion
was abused or that defendant was prejudiced.

It is argued that the court erred in permitting Mike
Barquin to testify “He [defendant] was not drunk”
in response to the question, “Do you have an opinion
whether he was drunk or not?” Although a lay wit-
ness may be allowed to testify as to his opinion on the
sobriety of an individual if he states the facts upon
which the opinion is based,! the witness’ answer in the
instant situation was unresponsive and therefore
should have been stricken upon the request of defend-
ant’s counsel. Nevertheless, the facts regarding de-
fendant’s behavior had been recited previously by Bar-
quin; and even without the expression of his opinion,
the jury was informed of his reaction as to defendant’s
behavior. Accordingly, there would seem to have been
no prejudicial error.

It is insisted that the court erred in overruling an
objection to a question asked defendant in which there
was an allusion to a discrepancy between his testimony
at the trial and at the preliminary hearing. The con-
tention that the ruling was improper is not supported
by a reason. A witness may properly be cross-exam-
imed regarding both judicial and extrajudicial state-
ments which he has made on material matters. State
v. McCarroll, 128 Or. 178, 261 P. 411; McCann v. State,
20 Ariz. 489, 182 P.96; People v. Walker, 140 Cal. 153,
73 P. 881; People v. Pete, 128 Cal. 878, 55 P. 998;

1 State v. Cantrell, 64 Wyo. 132, 186 P.2d 589.

a ”

People v. Popovich, 295 Ill. 491, 129 N.E. 161; People v.
Biloche, 414 Ill. 504, 112 N.E.2d 162, certiorari denied
346 U.S. 878, 74 S.Ct. 131, 98 L.Ed. 385; 348 U.S. 846,
75 S.Ct. 69, 99 L.Ed. 667; Morris v. State, 100 Fla. 850,
130 So. 582; Shaw v. State, 186 Miss. 1, 100 So. 519; 3
Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, 12 ed., §§ 891, 948.

Error is charged because the prosecuting official in
cross-examination undertook to show inconsistencies
between defendant’s testimony and his prior conversa-
tions in the jail cell, tape recorded without his know-
ledge. The jury did not hear the recording which was
played to defendant in the presence of the court; how-
ever, defendant before the jury was repeatedly con-
fronted with quotations purporting to come from his
recorded conversations. Defendant’s counsel to sub-
stantiate the charge of error say that the hiding of a
microphone anywhere is not looked upon with favor,
citing two law review articles,? neither of which is pri-
mary authority. Although we too look with disfavor
upon surreptitious listening, the lack of argument
showing it to be error in this case makes discussion
of the point unwarranted.

Defendant also complains of certain other statements
by court and prosecuting counsel, especially questions
on voir dire concerning the views of the chief executive
on punishment, urging that such views might have had
some effect upon the jurors. No cogent argument and
no authorities are presented in substantiation of the
claimed improprieties, and we do not think they merit
discussion here.

27 Wyo.LJ. pp. 44, 91.

I. Instructions

Although it is admitted in argument that no objec-
tions were registered at the time of the trial, defend-
ant now contends that certain improper instructions
were given to the jury. It is conceded that the in-
structions are all standard and commonly given by trial
courts in homicide cases, but it is said that the use of
abstract words and unusual phraseology fails to dis-
close to the jury inthis case their specific duties in
deliberations and gives unwarranted emphasis and per-
spective on points of importance. The instructions
thus under fire are ones which advise the jury that
they may disregard any part of the witness’ testimony
if he has sworn falsely to material facts, that the law
presumes a person to intend the results or conse-
quences of an act intentionally committed, and that the
defendant’s confession should not be considered for any
purpose unless the jury believed it to have been volun-
tarily made. We were provided with no valid argu-
ment and no authorities bearing on the alleged impro-
priety of the instructions, and we perceive nothing
wrong in what was sent to the jury. After most care-
ful consideration, we think that the instructions enun-
ciate rules of law which have long been recognized as
correct in Anglo-Saxon courts and propound philoso-
phies which are essential for the jury to consider in
arriving at a fair verdict.

III. Confession

We proceed then to what appears to be the most
serious charge of error raised by the defendant: That
the confession was inadmissible and, even should this
court hold the confession admissible, it was ineffec-
tive to show premeditated malice.

A consideration of the statements in the confession
itself, the evidence of the officers in charge of defend-
ant at that time, and defendant’s own testimony at the
trial taken in conjunction with other matters in the
record disclose the confession of Martinez to have been
voluntary. Other than defendant’s own words, evi-
dence which pointed to his being guilty of the homi-
cide was entirely circumstantial; his association with
deceased immediately prior to the shooting, his know-
ledge of the whereabouts of the rifle, and his attempt
to explain the shooting and the physical facts at the
death scene, Such circumstances disclose nothing to
indicate whether or not the person who fired the fatal
shot acted purposely and with premeditated malice.
Thus, the sole basis for defendant’s conviction of first
degree murder was his extrajudicial confession; and
this, if considered in its entirety, failed to show pre-
meditated malice.

Defendant’s story, as recounted in the January 2
typed confession to the county and prosecuting at-
torney, contained some statements which were signfi-
cant:

«# * * T didn’t get off the car [to fight deceased,
who on the way back to the ranch had urged, “let’s
go to blows’]. I was about half asleep and sick
with all that drinking we had done. * * * I said
[after the two had gone back to the bunkhouse
and defendant had lain down on the bed], ‘Well,
happy Dreams, boy,’ ‘Sure you old son of a bitch,
happy dreams, same to you’ * * * so I figured,
‘Dog gone this has gone too far. I’ll bet this old
boy will get up and cut my throat off’ So I
thought ‘No, I’m not taking any chances.’ I
got up then and slipped my shoes on and my trous-
ers. I already had my shirt on, and I walked out
and went and got the gun.”

These and similar statements which he made nullify
the element of premeditated malice so far as the con-
fession is concerned. If he was half asleep and sick
from drinking, this was evidence which should have
been considered as tending to show that he had not
planned beforehand to kill the deceased; and if he
acted from fear, he could not have been following a
preconceived plan when he fired the fatal shot.

We are fully cognizant ofj the rule that the exculpa-
tory part of a confession need not be believed. Morti-
more v. State, 24 Wyo. 452, 161 P. 766; 7 Wigmore on
Evidence, 3 ed., § 2100, p. 495; 2 Wharton’s Criminal
Evidence, 12 ed., § 396, p. 148; 2 Underhill’s Criminal
Evidence, 5 ed., § 407. However, we think that if any
essential element of the crime is negatived by the con-
fession, then that essential element must be supported
by other evidence before there can be a valid conviction.
In Eagan v. State, 58 Wyo. 167, 128 P.2d 215, 225, ap-
proved in State v. Helton, 73 Wyo. 92, 276 P.2d 434,
we said, “the admission of homicide must be considered
in connection with any mitigating or exculpatory
statements made in connection therewith.” Applying
that rule to the present case, the jury was bound to
have considered Martinez’ statement that he was half
asleep and sick from the drinking, that he was fearful
of what Gonzales would do to him, and further that the
two had been carousing for several hours, during
which time deceased had called defendant names and
had wanted to fight him. There was no evidence pro-
duced by the State which contradicted these state-
ments of defendant. The opinion evidence that Marti-
nez was not drunk between eight and nine o’clock, New
Year’s morning might at first be thought to contradict
any claim of drunkenness, but when it is remembered
that this was some one and a half hours or more after

a ”

the shooting and after a most sobering crisis, the ap-
parent contradiction is without much force.

Evidence of premeditation, other than the confes-
sion, was entirely lacking; and the confession intro-
duced uncontradicted factors which negatived pre-
meditated malice. In the instant case there was clear
evidence of a homicide committed by defendant, and
we think from a consideration of all of the evidence in
the record that the killing was so reckless as to war-
rant the jury in finding that it was done purposely and
maliciously so as to constitute second degree murder.
See Dickinson v. State, 222 Ind. 551, 55 N.H.2d 825.

The judgment and sentence herein is set aside and
the district court is ordered to resentence the defend-
ant for second degree murder.

Affirmed as modified.

William E. BARBER and Edna Barber,
Appellants (Defendants below),
ve

STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION of
Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 2846.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
July 28, 1959.

342 Pac.2d. 7238

rt
xt
oo

a
bl
oD

343

Brown, Healy, Drew, Apostolos & Barton and Will-
iam H. Brown, Jr., Casper, for appellants.

Thomas O. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Robert L. Duncan,
Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

OPINION.

Mr. Justice PARKER delivered the opinion of the
court.

The State Highway Commission of Wyoming, plain-
tiff, in accordance with its resolution directing action
to be taken under § 48-105, W.C.S.1945, as amended,
filed a petition in the District Court of Converse Coun-
ty seeking to acquire by condemnation 158.5 acres of
ranch land belonging to William E. Barber and Edna
Barber. The purpose for which the property was
sought was the establishing of an access facility high-
way to be a portion of U. S. Highway 87. Defendants
Barber answered, denying most of the allegations of
the petition for want of knowledge; alleged damage in
excess of $92,000 which would accrue to them if the
property were taken; and prayed judgment. They also
asserted that plaintiff had not exhibited a good-faith
effort toward agreement on damages but had offered
only $5,800 for the land. The court issued an order
appointing commissioners to assess and determine the

Ms *

compensation to be paid to defendants and shortly
thereafter entered an order granting the plaintiff im-
mediate possession of the land sought to be condemned.
The commissioners appraised the value of land being
condemned at $38,982.50, which amount covered num-
erous items: $14,162.50 for the land; $4,500 for reloca-
tion and construction of certain ranch facilities ; $3,000
for loss of trees; $3,000 for exposure of the ranch to
the public; $2,020 for aggregate taken from the con-
demned land; $1,000 for loss of adequate means of in-
gress and egress during the period of the highway
construction; and $11,300 for damage to the ranch op-
erating unit due to the highway’s cutting directly
through the ranch. Both plaintiff and defendants ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the award and demand
was made for a jury trial to determine the compensa-
tion which defendants were to receive for the taking of
their property.

Upon the trial of the cause, the jury rendered a ver-
dict awarding the defendants the sum of $15,000, item-
ized as $3,992.50 for the property actually taken and
$11,007.50 for the damage to the property not actual-
ly taken but injuriously affected. The trial court
thereafter overruled a motion for new trial and en-
tered an order confirming the verdict of the jury in
the amount of $15,693.1

In their appeal the defendants have urged various
errors which they believe warrant a reversal.

+The difference between the order and the verdict ap-
parently resulted from an inadvertent transposition
of the jury’s figures, and the order should stand cor-
rected to conform to the verdict,

I

Defendants say that the order is contrary to the law
and to the evidence, for one reason because plaintiff
had no authority or right to condemn the land and con-
sequently the court had no justification to hear the
controversy. They point out that the right of eminent
domain is wholly within the power of the legislature
and cannot be exercised by any other agency except
by a proper delegation through statute. Plaintiff pur-
ported to act under the provisions of § 48-105, W.C.S.
1945, amended by c. 163, S. L. of Wyoming, 1953, which
directed that the State Highway Commission acquire
rights of way “by condemnation proceedings in the
same manner as is provided by law for the condemna-
tion of rights of way for railroad purposes as set forth
in Article 65, Chapter 2, Wyoming Complied Statutes,
1945.” Plaintiff’s counsel admit that the statutory
reference in this portion of the session law was er-
roneous, there being no such article and chapter, but
argue that the reference intended was c. 8 art. 61,
W.C.S.1945, the portion of the Wyoming statutes
which deals with eminent domain by railroads; and
they say the court should give effect to the intention
of the legislature. On the other hand, defendants in-
sist that plaintiff had no authority to proceed under
§ 48-105, as amended by ec, 163, S. L. of Wyoming,
1958, because this session law referred to a part of the
statutes which was nonexistent. Many authorities are
cited by them purporting to say that courts are not
the arbiters of statutes and may not make corrections
to declare what the courts think that the legislature in-
tended. This is another way of saying that the er-
roneous designation of the chapter governing condem-
nation proceedings for railroads leaves the session law
ineffective to provide a method of condemnation for

eC

the land here in issue. We think this contention is
without merit. It is true that courts will not usurp
the power of the legislature by deciding what should
have been said,? but no such decision is necessary in a
situation so plain as this. The session law clearly re-
ferred to the chapter and article in the statutes which
dealt with “condemnation of rights of way for rail-
road purposes.” Nothing could be clearer, and the
mere fact that there was an incorrect designation by
numbers should mislead no one. State ex rel. Board
of Com’rs of Laramie County v. Wright, 62 Wyo. 112,
163 P.2d 190; Hollibaugh v. Hehn, 18 Wyo. 269, 79
P. 1044.

I

Defendants insist that the court erred in refusing
to give their instructions A, B, C, and D, which related
respectively to the formula for determining damages,
the obligation of plaintiff to perform work not listed
in the plans and specifications, the meaning of just
compensation, and the steps in determining the dam-
age. Without setting the instructions forth at length,
suffice to say that the subjects mentioned in A, C, and
D were adequately treated by the court in instructions
8, 4, and 5 which were given. As to B, we are doubt-
ful that the trial court would have been within its
province to instruct the jury on plaintiff’s obligations
to perform acts other than the ones mentioned in the
plans and specifications; and the authorities cited by
the defendants on this point are unconvincing.

* State v. Hungary, 75 Wyo. 423, 296 P. 2d 506; State
ex rel. Board of Com’rs of Laramie County v. Wright,
62 Wyo. 112, 168 P.2d 190.

Tir

Defendants argue that they should have been al-
lowed to adduce testimony tending to show that the
Federal Government rather than the State of Wyom-
ing was paying the bill. This we think was, or at least
should have been, wholly immaterial to the issues. Ap-
parently the idea underlying the request was that juries
regard Federal projects as pork barrels which may be
tapped without pain to the conscience or injury to the
residents of the State. Our experience is that the
citizens who serve on juries are fully cognizant of the
harm to State taxpayers which results from unwar-
ranted Federal spending. In any event, the argument
is without merit, and no authorities are cited to war-
rant consideration of the point.

Iv

Defendants contend that the court erred in granting
plaintiff’s motion to have the jury view a part only
of the appellants’ property and cite some cases which
tend to hold that the basis of a jury’s verdict must be
the testimony and evidence adduced at the trial rather
than the jury’s view of the premises. Apparently
plaintiff’s counsel concede the propriety of these au-
thorities for they do not argue the point, and the trial
court must have agreed for it gave an instruction say~
ing that the purpose of the jury’s visit was to better
enable them to understand the testimony and apply it,
not to make the jurors silent witnesses. Perhaps it is
not possible that a group of persons see a portion of
the premises under litigation to the exclusion of other
portions thereof without giving some weight to what
they have seen—even if the court has instructed them
not to do so. If the jury were to be shown any of the
ranch perhaps it would have been fairer to allow them

to see all of it. However, there is no showing that the
limited view in this case prejudiced the defendants.
Moreover, even under the common law a trial court has
wide discretion in permitting a jury to view premises,*
and the rule is applicable in eminent domain cases.*

Vv

Defendants urge that the court improperly overruled
objections to plaintiff’s cross-examining one of the
three former commissioners concerning the amounts
previously placed on the property, saying that the dam-
ages set by the commissioners who had an obligation
to evaluate the property were not proper evidence to
be placed before the jury in this case. We are in agree-
ment with the authorities cited by counsel to that ef-
fect. However, in this instance the inconsistent state-
ments of the witness are in issue rather than the form-
er action of the commissioners, and such inconsistent
statements if material may be the subject of cross-
examination or impeachment, not as of substantive or
independent testimonial value but merely in order that
the two mouthings of the person who purports to in-
form the court and jury may be placed side by side so
that the relative value of one or the other could be de-
termined by the fact-finding body. 8 Wigmore on Evi-
dence, 3 ed., § 1017 et seq.; 4 Jones on Evidence, 5 ed.,
§ 982, et seq.; McCormick on Evidence, 1954, § 37 et
seq.; 58 Am.Jur. Witnesses, § 688; 98 C.J.S. Witnesses

258 AmJur. Trial § 441; Annotation, 42 L.R.A. 368;
§ 38-2409, W.C.S.1945.

*5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3 ed., § 18.3; Jahr, Emi-
nent Domain, 1953, pp. 871, 372; 1 Orgel on Valuation
under Eminent Domain, 2 ed., pp. 547, 548.

§ 573 et seq. See Annotations at 183 A.L.R. 1454 and
66 A.L.R. 289. In eminent domain cases where a com-
missioner is examined as a witness, he may be cross-
examined as to his report. Munkwitz v. Chicago, M &
St. P. Ry. Co., 64 Wis. 408, 25 N.W. 438; 2 Lewis, Emi-
nent Domain, 8 ed, pp. 1149, 1150.

Vi

It is maintained that the court erred in refusing to
admit certain rebuttal testimony of witness Reno. This
testimony related to values, benefits, and detriment,
which were said to be properly a part of the case in
chief. As counsel urge, if there be no trickery, ma-
terial evidence should not be rejected merely because
it is in improper order. However, under the Wyoming
Rules of Civil Procedure, the bar and bench of this
State are dedicated to a full and fair disclosure of all
the facts in a case at or prior to the time of trial, with
no withholding of certain matters to be used as secret
weapons. It is our view that rebuttal testimony should
ordinarily be limited to that which will relieve a lita~
gant who, having been free from deception in the
pleadings and pretrial stages, has at the trial been sur-
prised and placed at an unfair disadvantage. To ef-
fectuate this, the trial court must have considerable
latitude in demarcating rebuttal testimony. We think
there was no abuse of discretion here.

VII

What we have said regarding the rebuttal testimony
of witness Reno is equally applicable to the exception
which defendants registered to the trial court’s inter-
posing its own objection to certain testimony. Since
the primary interest of the bar and bench is the dis-

closure of the true facts in a given litigation, we think
a presiding judge is within his rights and is discharg-
ing his duty by controlling the testimony offered even
if he is obligated to act on his own motion in accomp-
lishing this. See Chapman v. Rose, 185 Wash. 248, 237
P. 708, 710, quoting State v. Frost, 184 Wash. 48 234
P. 1021, wherein it was said that the function of a trial
judge is to see that the litigation is conducted accord-
ing to the rules of law and if he believes improper ques-
tions are being asked he is entirely within his right in
directing that they be not answered even though no
objection is made, for the trial judge is more than a
mere referee.

Vill

Defendants also argue that the order is erroneous
because the verdict is contrary to the weight of the
evidence, An attack of this nature often poses a dif-
ficult and delicate question. A reviewing court, lack-
ing the advantages of observation at the trial, is re-
luctant either to set up its judgment as superior to the
finder of fact or to indulge in an exercise of seman-
tics, Nevertheless, findings and judgment which are
unsupported by the evidence, contrary to the evidence,
or obviously against the great weight of the evidence,
may not stand. 4 C.J. 880; 5A C.J.S. Appeal & Error
§ 1658; 83 Am.Jur. Appeal and Error §§ 887, 890. The
criterion is the substantiality of the evidence to support
the court’s decision. Kaleb v. Modern Woodmen of
America, 51 Wyo. 116, 64 P.2d 605; Peterson v. John-
son, 46 Wyo. 473, 28 P.2d 487, 91 A.L.R. 728.

In the present case, the matter in issue is the value
of the land actually taken and the damages to other
portions of defendants’ property not actually taken but

injuriously affected. Defendants point out the con-
stitutional provision against the taking of property
without just compensation,® and quote Chief Justice
Blume in Hirt v. City of Casper, 56 Wyo. 57, 103 P.2d
394, 398, where in discussing the meaning of what is
now ¢. 3, art. 61 W.C.S.1945, he said:

«= * * The term ‘damaged’ used in the constitu-
tion, and the term ‘injuriously affected’ used in
the various sections of the statute, are synony-
mous. * * * In other words, the statutes of this
state recognized the fact, prior to the adoption of
the constitution, that in a proceeding of eminent
domain compensation should be made not only for
property actually and physically taken, but also
for damages which would be sustained by reason
of the exercise of the power. The constitution
merely confirmed a rule which had already previ-
ously been adopted by the legislature. * * *”

Apparently the trial court recognized this rule since
various instructions discussed the damages to defend-
ants’ property not actually taken and the market value
of the property before and after the taking. We there-
fore look to the record in order that we may ascertain
what is the evidence upon which the verdict could be
based. Without delineating the evidence which de-
fendants adduced on this subject, we find that the
testimony of defendant Barber and some seven other
witnesses, who purported to be familiar with defend-
ants’ property as a ranching unit, listed the damages
caused by the highway, by taking the value of the
ranch before and afterward, as ranging from $65,000
to $102,000, the majority placing them in the neigh-
borhood of $80,000, This method, of course, included
the loss of the land as well as other items.

5 Art. 1, § 32, Constitution of Wyoming.

SC

The only evidence of damages presented by the plain-
tiff was that of Paul Goodman, G. Gordon Sanford, and
B. L. Scherck.

Goodman said he was a real estate broker and had
been for some sixteen years, had bought, sold, or listed
ranches in Wyoming and in Converse County. When
asked whether or not he was familiar with the Barber
ranch, he answered, “Only as I have been out there
twice recently and, of course, have gone through the
old highway many, many times.” There was nothing
to show that he had made a careful examination of
the ranch, its operation as a unit, or its value. Never-
theless, he gave an opinion that “it is worth a little
more now than before * * * I believe it would sell eas-
jer now after the new highway is in than before for
the same amount of money.” Defendants repeatedly
objected to his testimony as having insufficient foun-
dation. His being in the real estate business and hav-
ing listed for sale certain properties in the State and
the area undoubtedly qualified him to some extent to
give a figure as to the value of the land actually tak-
en, but it is equally clear from his own statements that
he made no examination of the entire ranch or its oper-
ation. He was therefore without foundation to testify
on the damages to the ranch unit.

Sanford said that he was a resident of Casper, had
been born and reared on a ranch in Natrona County,
had acted as appraiser of Wyoming land for life insur-
ance companies and other agencies interested in
ranches, and knew of land valuations in that vicinity.
However, he also when asked if he was familiar with
the Barber property said, “I should qualify this, that
I am familiar with the Barber property only so much
as the new highway right-of-way goes by and that land

north of the present highway right-of-way. I have
not had occasion to visit with Mr. Barber or go over
the other lands south of the highway right-of-way.”
In fact his statements are unmistakable that he had
not even seen portions of the ranch. Thus, the wit-
ness’s testimony as to valuation could not reasonably
have been taken to deal with any damages which were
incurred by the defendants other than the actual tak-
ing of the acreage,

Scherck, in the real estate business in Casper for
some forty-five years, said that he was familiar with
ranch property in Converse County, but he likewise
when asked if he had examined the Barber ranch said,
“No sir. Let me put you straight. I was sent down
here to get the value of the land inside of this new
right-of-way. I was not sent down to appraise the
Barber ranch or anybody else’s ranch, just the right-
of-way. That is all I am going to tell you about.” He
thereby clearly disqualified himself from giving an ac-
ceptable opinion on the value of the ranch before and
afterward or the damage which had been incurred to
the defendants for injury to the business unit. De-
fendants objected to his testimony because of insuf-
ficient foundation. We think the court correctly ruled
that the testimony could stand since the witness was
qualified to give some limited opinions on the values
of Wyoming ranch properties, but he like the others
having disclaimed specific knowledge of the value of
the Barber ranch left his evidence unsubstantial to es-
tablish the total damages sustained.

The verdict recited two elements of damages: (1)
the value of the land actually taken, and (2) the dam-
ages to the portions of defendants’ property not actu-
ally taken but injuriously affected after deducting

therefrom the value of the real benefits or advantages,
if any, which might accrue from the construction of
the highway. This was in accordance with instruc-
tions which the trial court properly gave. We look
then to each of the stated elements to see what evi-
dence there was to support the jury’s verdict.

As to the first, the testimony was conflicting, but
we think that without question there was substantial
evidence to support the verdict. As to the second
there was strictly speaking, no evidence at all. No
testimony was presented by plaintiff. The statements
of Goodman, Sanford, and Scherck, not purporting to
have been based upon an evaluation of the ranch as an
entity, could not validly refer to damages or benefits
thereto. No evidence was presented by defendants
relating to either benefits or damages to the unit as
distinguished from the land taken, their unchallenged
testimony addressing itself only to the lump-sum dif-
ference in the value of the property before and after
the taking of the highway area.® It follows that there
is no source in the evidence from which the figure in
the second part of the verdict could have been taken.
Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed and the
cause remanded for further proceedings consistent
with the views herein expressed.

Reversed and remanded for new trial,

6It is unnecessary to determine whether or not the
jury would have been acting properly had it allocated
a portion of the difference in value as testified by de-
fendants’ witnesses to the second element of the
verdict.

Lee O. HINTON and Atlantic Refining Company,
a Corporation, Appellants (Defendants below),

v.
Harold B. WILMES, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 2881.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Aug. 18, 1959.

848 Pac.2d 201

361

Murane & Bostwick, R. R. Bostwick, Casper, for ap-
pellant.

Clarence G. Cypreansen and R. N. Ogden, Casper,
for appellee.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

OPINION.

Mr. Chief Justice BLUME delivered the opinion of
the court.

This is an action for damages brought by the plain-
tiff, Harold D. Wilmes, against Lee O. Hinton and the
Atlantic Refining Company by reason of injuries sus-
tained by the plaintiff in being thrown out of a Dodge
truck driven by Lee O. Hinton, an employee of the At-
lantic Refining Company, on November 1, 1956. The
court gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the
sum of $8,719 and costs of the action, From that
judgment the defendants have appealed herein. Plain-
tiff will be mentioned herein as such or by name or as
appellee and the defendants as such or by name or as
appellants.

The appellee herein alleged in his complaint, stated
briefly, that appellee—plaintiff—was an employee of
Robin and Thatcher of Natrona County, Wyoming, as
a field worker but that his employers loaned out and
required his services as such worker under the control,
direction and actual employment of and by the defend-
ant, Atlantic Refining Company, though his wages
were paid by Robin and Thatcher; that Lee O. Hinton,
an employee of the Atlantic Refining Company, drove
the plaintiff in a 1956 Dodge truck owned by the At-

lantic Refining Company to the oil field on the Burke
Ranch; and that in so driving the truck he was grossly
negligent, overturning the truck and injuring the plain-
tiff. Damages were sought in the sum of $53,086.60.
The defendants, appellants herein, filed their answer,
admitting that Lee O. Hinton was an employee of the
Atlantic Refining Company, a corporation, but denying
the complaint in other respects.

The facts herein are substantially undisputed. The
appellee was employed by Robin and Thatcher who un-
dertook to furnish workmen for the Atlantic Refining
Company and entered into a contract with that com-
pany agreeing in the contract to transport its employ-
ees to the place designated by the Atlantic Refining
Company. Robin and Thatcher accordingly employed
the appellee herein to go to work for the Atlantic Re-
fining Company at the so-called Burke lease which was
located about 27 miles north and a little east of the city
of Casper. While at work the appellee was under the
direction of the Atlantic Refining Company or its em-
ployees. Appellee was what was called a roustabout.
Such a person was employed in the oil field to do vari-
ous work which was found to be necessary in the field.
However, appellee was in the first place employed to
act as a pumper in order to take the place of Hinton, a
pumper for the Atlantic Refining Company, while Hin-
ton was on vacation. After Hinton returned from
vacation, however, the appellee was retained for work
in the field and continued to work until he was injured
as above mentioned on November 1, 1956. Hinton put
the appellee to work when he arrived at the field and
apparently was the party who put him to general work
as a roustabout after Hinton returned from his vaca-
tion. Appellee lived some 10 miles out of Casper. A few
times he drove his own car to work on the Burke lease

and when he did so he was paid 714¢ per mile by Robin
and Thatcher, Practically all the time, however, he
was driven to work on the Burke lease in a conveyance
owned and controlled by the Atlantic Refining Com-
pany, at first in a Jeep station wagon and later in a
Dodge pickup truck, the latter being used on November
1, 1956, when the appellee was injured. During the
time Hinton was on vacation appellee drove himself to
and from work in the jeep station wagon owned by the
Atlantic Refining Company. There was no specific
agreement about appellee’s being taken to work in a
conveyance owned by the Atlantic Refining Company.
As Hinton testified, it was in a manner taken for grant-
ed that appellee would ride with Hinton to go to work.
Appellee met Hinton generally at a gasoline station of
the Standard Oil Company in Casper and from there
they drove to the Burke lease. The injury occurred
some distance from Casper while Hinton was negotiat-
ing a curve and the Dodge truck went off the road in-
to a borrow pit on the left side of the curve. The ap-
pellee herein alleged in the petition that Hinton was
guilty of gross negligence. The trial court, however,
found that there was not gross negligence but that the
negligence of Hinton was merely ordinary negligence.

1. It is contended by counsel for the appellants here-
in that the proof must be in accordance with the allega-
tions of the complaint. That, of course, is ordinarily
true. But counsel seem to contend further that inas-
much as the plaintiff alleged that Hinton was grossly
negligent in driving the Dodge truck, it was incumbent
upon the plaintiff to prove that the negligence was
gross and that he failed to do so. It is not necessarily
true that a plaintiff must prove all of his allegations.
It is stated in 71 C.J.S. Pleading § 522, pp. 1078, 1079:

a “

“As a general rule no more need be proved, even
though more be alleged, than enough to sustain
the cause of action or defense relied on. In other
words, only those allegations necessary to a recov-
ery need be supported by proof. Surplusage ina
pleading need not be proved. * *

We think, as hereinafter shown, that plaintiff and ap-
pellee has proved a cause of action herein. We do not
think that it is true, as stated in the brief of counsel
for appellants, that since plaintiff alleged gross negli-
gence he in effect also alleged that he was a guest in
the Dodge truck at the time that he was injured.

2. It is the contention of appellants herein that ap-
pellee was a guest when he rode in the Dodge truck and
when he was injured on November 1, 1956, within the
meaning of § 60-1201, W.C.S.1945, relating to the lia-
bility of an owner to a guest, as follows:

“No person transported by the owner or oper-
ator of a motor vehicle as his guest without pay-
ment for such transportation shall have a cause of
action for damages against such owner or opera-
tor for injury, death or loss, in case of accident,
unless such accident shall have been caused by the
gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct
of the owner or operator of such motor vehicle
and unless such gross negligence or wilful and
wanton mis-conduct contributed to the injury,
death or loss for which the action is brought.”

Counsel for appellants claim that since appellee was a
guest he could not recover any damages unless the
negligence of Hinton was gross, and the court having
found that the negligence was not gross, but simple,
it follows as a matter of law that appellants are not
liable in this action.

When guest statutes were passed in various states
some 30 or more years ago, automobiles were not as
numerous as they are today. Many people at that time
who did not own such a vehicle were glad when they
received an invitation to ride in an automobile for their
pleasure. At that time also, as is partially true today,
there were many stragglers footing their way from
place to place known as hitchhikers, and generous au-
tomobile drivers frequently picked them up and drove
them to their destinations or at least a part of the way.
When the legislatures enacted the guest statutes, they
undoubtedly had in mind, primarily, situations such as
above mentioned—situations involving purely social
relations or purely relations of hospitality. As stated
in Lawson v. Cole, 124 Ind.App. 89, 115 N.E.2d 134,
187, “It is true that under the guest statute the word
‘guest’ has more of social than business significance.”
But generous drivers often found themselves in diffi-
eulty if an accident should happen. As mentioned in
Crawford v. Foster, 110 Cal.App. 81, 293 P. 841, 843:

“«* + * the proverbial ingratitude of the dog
that bites the hand that feeds him, found a count-
erpart in the many cases that arose, where gener-
ous drivers, having offered rides to guests, later
found themselves defendants in cases that often
turned upon close questions of negligence. Un-
doubtedly, the Legislature, in adopting this act,
reflected a certain natural feeling as to the injus-
tice of such a situation, * * *”

See also Knutson v. Lurie, 217 Iowa 192, 251 N.W. 147.
So in Sullivan v. Davis, 263 Ala. 685, 83 So.2d 434, 435,
59 A.L.R.2d 331, 383, it is stated:

«cx & ® The so-called ‘guest statute’ was designed
to provide relief for drivers of automobiles who
had extended their hospitality to passengers, and

were then subjected to suit, under the common
law, which held the driver responsible to his guests
for a breach of duty to exercise ordinary care.
* kw?

The time soon came, however, when courts were
called upon to interpret the word “guest” when there
was more than a purely social relationship existing be-
tween the driver and the person driven and injured,
It has not always been easy to determine the status
of the person driven, for, as stated in Sullivan v. Davis,
supra, at 83 So.2d 486, 59 A.L.R.2d 3384:

«« * * The commercial and social relationships
that can exist between the driver of an automobile
and his passenger are almost as numerous and
varied as human activity itself. At one extreme
we have the ‘hitchhiker’ guest who clearly falls
within the purview of the statute. At the other
extreme we have the passenger who pays the driv-
er to be transported to a particular place and who
is unquestionably beyond the scope of the statute.
Between these two extremes the dividing line may
at times become illusory and shadowy. * * *”

Hence, we find apparent discrepancies in the decisions
of the courts.

An extensive annotation dealing with the matter of
mutual business or commercial objects or benefits as
to the status of a rider under an automobile guest sta-
tute is contained in 59 A.L.R.2d 836 to 365, and it is
said at page 339:

“If the carriage of a person in a motor vehicle
tends to promote the mutual commercial or busi-
ness interests of the person carried and the driver,
the passenger is not a guest within the meaning
of guest statutes.”

To the same effect is 54 AmJur. Automobiles and
Highway Traffic § 514, pp. 552, 553; 4 Blashfield, Cy-
clopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Perm.Ed.,
p. 807; and 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 399(5)b, p. 1011
et seq. We recognized this rule in the case of Fox v.
Fox, 75 Wyo. 890, 296 P.2d 252. The Massachusetts
court appears to have stated the rule somewhat more
specifically and seems to cover a situation such as we
find in the case at bar. In the case of Hanlon v. White
Fuel Corp., 328 Mass. 455, 104 N.H.2d 424, 426, it was
said that:

«<* * * One is not ‘a gratuitous passenger if the
benefits accruing to the driver from the transpor-
tation are not of a pecuniary nature but are in the
form of some advantage other than that associat-
ed with mere companionship or social intercourse.’
Howes v, Kelman, 326 Mass. 696, 699, 96 N.E.2d
894, 396.”

See also 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 399 (5)a, p. 1009.
It can hardly be doubted that some advantage accrued
to the defendants herein for they were vitally inter-
ested in that the appellee should be at work on the
Burke Ranch and that he should be at work promptly.

Illustrating the question involved in this case to some
extent, we find it is held that a person riding in an au-
tomobile of another who wants the judgment of the
former in the matter of buying cattle is not a guest of
the latter within the meaning of the guest statute but
apassenger. Kleinhesselink v. Porterfield, 76 S.D. 577,
83 N.W.2d 191. If a broker wants his secretary to
familiarize herself for the broker’s benefit with the
land for sale by the broker, she is not a guest when
riding in the broker’s automobile but a passenger. Gil-
lespie v. Rawlings, 49 Cal.2d 359, 317 P.2d 601. Ifa

person wants assistance of another in connection with
domestic duties, the person whose assistance is sought
is not a guest but a passenger in riding in the automo-
bile of the person who seeks the assistance. Shapiro
vy. Bookspan, 155 Cal.App.2d 358, 318 P.2d 128. If a
person is asked by another to help the latter in unload-
ing watermelons, the former is not a guest when riding
in the latter’s automobile but a passenger. Christiana
v. Rattaro, 81 Cal.App.2d 597, 184 P.2d 682.

In Annotation, 59 A.L.R.2d 336, 389, it is stated:

“Tn a majority of the cases in which the question
has arisen it has been held that an employee being
conveyed to or from his work in his employer’s
motor vehicle was being transported as a passen-
ger rather than as a guest, such transportation in-
volving the mutual objects or benefits of the em-
ployment. For the same reason, an employee rid-
ing in his master’s vehicle in the performance of
his duties is not a guest within the meaning of the
guest statute.”

This note was adopted as stating the law in 5A Am.Jur.
Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 520, pp. 559, 560,
where it is said:

«« * * Persons transported as an incident of
their employment are usually not considered as
guests within the meaning of these statutes even
despite the fact that no payment is made.”

Appellee, as above noted, was not technically an em-
ployee of the Atlantic Refining Company for he was
paid by Robin and Thatcher who also paid into the
Workmen’s Compensation Fund of the state. Never-
theless, appellee’s situation was similar to that of an
employee. It was not essential that he should have
been hired directly by the Atlantic Refining Company

for him to recover damages on account of the simple
negligence of Hinton. That has been held in the case
of Russell v. Parlee, 115 Conn. 687, 163 A. 404, a case
which seems to control the decision of this case. The
facts in that case, stated simply, were that the defend-
ant, a woman, owned a farm which was worked for her
by one Grant under an arrangement by which the de-
fendant received a part of the produce grown on the
farm. Grant hired the plaintiff to help him on the
farm, The defendant drove them to her farm and her
negligence injured the plaintiff. In that case, as in
this, the plaintiff alleged gross negligence but the jury
found the negligence to be simple. In a well-considered
opinion the Connecticut court held the defendant liable
for the damages inflicted upon the plaintiff by reason
of her negligence and stated in part as follows at 163
A. 406:

«« * * Bearing in mind the objects which it may
be assumed were within the legislative purpose in
the enactment of this legislation, we are not pre-
pared to say that the Legislature intended to
deny a right of recovery for negligence to a
passenger in an automobile unless there was, by
bargain between the parties, a consideration for
the transportation moving to the owner or opera-
tor. The person transported is not a guest within
the meaning of the statute if the transportation is
for the mutual benefit of both parties, and in de-
terming whether it was for their mutual benefit
the relationship between the parties to which it
was an incident may be considered. Kruy v. Smith,
supra [108 Conn. 628, 144 A, 304]. The relation-
ship must be definite and the benefit tangible
(Leete v. Griswold Post No, 79, American Legion,
supra [114 Conn. 400, 158 A. 919]), but it is not
required that the relationship be such that the
benefit accruing is the consideration for the trans-
portation agreed upon by the parties. See Loftus v.

Pelletier, 223 Mass. 63, 111 N.E. 712; Lyttle v.
Monto, 248 Mass. 340, 142 N.E. 795.

“The arrangement between the defendant and
Grant created an identity of interest between them
in the cultivation of the garden, and the transpor-
tation of the plaintiff contemplated a benefit to
her by expediting the necessary work in her gard-
en, though the actual wages of the plaintiff were
to be paid by Grant instead of herself. * * *”

Counsel for appellants contend that the case at bar is
distinguished from others by reason of the fact that
there was a specific agreement between the Atlantic
Refining Company and Robin and Thatcher that the
latter should transport the plaintiff and appellee to his
work for and on behalf of the Atlantic Refining Com-
pany. The record does not show that appellee had any
knowledge of any such specific agreement, but aside
from that, it is difficult to see that the benefit in-
volved in the case at bar would in any manner what-
ever be diminished or changed by reason of any such
agreement. The corporation still was interested to
have the appellee at work and have him there prompt-
ly. We are inclined to believe that the trial court was
fully justified under the facts herein to find that ap-
pellee was a passenger rather than a guest at the time
he was injured. ,

The judgment of the trial court, accordingly, is af-
firmed.

Affirmed,

Margaret BOSCHETTO, Appellant
(Defendant below),

v.
Ben BOSCHETTO, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 2873.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Aug. 18, 1959,

343 Pac.2d. 503

19
is
co)

376

” Magagna, Galicich & Hamm, Rock Springs, for ap-
pellant.

Albert E. Nelson and William H. Jackson, Jv., Rock
Springs, and A. G. McClintock, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before BLUME, C.J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, J.J.

OPINION.

Mr. Chief Justice BLUME delivered the opinion of
the court.

This action, which is one for divorce, was instituted
by Ben Boschetto, appellee herein, on March 80, 1956,
asserting that Margaret Boschetto, his wife and ap-
pellant herein, had offered such indignities to the ap-
pellee as to render his condition as husband of defend-
ant intolerable. Margaret Boschetto answered, general-
ly denying the allegations of the petition, and filed a
cross-petition alleging that the plaintiff had been guil-

ty of extreme cruelty to the defendant and that the
plaintiff had offered such indignities to defendant as
to render her life with plaintiff intolerable and further
alleging that plaintiff and defendant had, by their joint
efforts and as joint adventurers and partners, acquired
property in excess of $200,000 in value. She asked that
she be divorced from the plaintiff. The case was tried
to the court without a jury and at the close of the trial
the court rendered judgment granting a divorce to the
plaintiff, Ben Boschetto, and dividing the property of
the parties as hereinafter mentioned. From that judg-
ment Margaret Boschetto has appealed. She will be
referred to hereafter as the appellant and Ben Bos-
chetto will be referred to as the appellee.

It appears herein that from 1941 to August, 1947,
the parties herein lived together as husband and wife
and held themselves out as such but were not in fact
married. They were married, however, in August,
1947, and lived together as husband and wife except
as hereinafter indicated until February, 1956, when
the appellee left the appellant, and the parties have not
lived together since that time. The appellee had been
married previously and by that marriage had three
children, namely, a son named Ben, born in 1927, Alfred,
a son born in 1980, and one daughter named Verlee
born in 1982. The appellant also had been previously
married and had one daughter who died in 1949.

1, As to the divorce. The record herein is volumi-
nous. Aside from exhibits, we have some 350 pages
of typewritten testimony before us. As we stated in
Steere v. Steere, 72 Wyo. 501, 267 P.2d 750, we see no
good reason to relate the testimony in great detail. It
will subserve no good purpose, That is particularly

true in view of the fact that both parties herein seek
a divorce. Appellee relied upon indignities heaped up-
on him. It appears that soon after the parties were
married the appellant commenced to take intoxicating
liquors to excess and did so frequently. One witness
testified that she became intoxicated practically every
holiday, every weekend and sometimes during the mid-
dle of the week. During such times appellant would
curse the appellee, calling him such names as “bastard”,
“dago”, “wop” and “s.o.b.” At one time she told the
appellee to go to hell, that she was tired of him and for
him not to come back. Three special incidents of that
nature were testified to in detail, commencing with
1954, after which the appellee left the appellant and
commenced an action for divorce. However, they be-
came reconciled. Another such incident occurred in
1955 at their summer home when appellee, as he stated,
became a wreck and drove home and again commenced
an action for divorce. They were then separated for
several months but became reconciled on Christmas
Eve of 1955. But this, unfortunately, lasted only six
weeks and in February, 1956, her conduct, as shown
by the testimony, was worse than ever and appellee
finally left her and the present action was commenced.
At one time, as stated by the appellee, appellant called
appellee’s daughter, Verlee, a “black bitch”. Appellant
herself testified that when she had some intoxicating
liquor her courage rose and then she would “tell him
off”. We think that there was sufficient testimony to
warrant the trial court in holding that the complaint
of appellee was well taken. It is said in 27A CJS,
Divorce § 44(2), p. 150, that indignities consist of vari-
ous acts varied in their nature. “Generally speaking,
such acts may consist of rudeness, vulgarity, unmerited
reproach, haughtiness, contumely, studied neglect, in-

tentional incivility, manifest disdain, abusive language,
malignant ridicule, and every other plain manifestation
of settled hate and estrangement.”

Counsel for appellant contend that appellee was
guilty of the same thing of which he accuses the ap-
pellant and that, therefore, under the rule of recrimi-
nation, he cannot obtain a divorce. Furthermore, they
say that he was guilty of cruelty to the appellant and,
hence, the appellant is entitled to a divorce. However,
we do not think that the rule of recrimination is ap-
plicable in this case, in view of the contradictory evi-
dence appearing in the record. Appellant testified that
the appellee called her vile names, but the appellee
testified that he never abused her and that he did
everything he could to make the marriage a success.
The trial court resolved the point in appellee’s favor
and this court cannot interfere. There was testimony
that appellee hit the appellant on Christmas Eve, 1952,
and once, perhaps twice, in the year 1955 at their sum-
mer home. Appellee denied that he hit the appellant
and stated that he merely pushed her, perhaps onto the
bed. He indicated how he pushed her. The trial judge
saw how it was done. We have no means of knowing
that, so this question too must be left to the judgment
of the trial court and we cannot interfere. This is true
also in regard to the charge that the appellee was fre-
quently guilty of becoming intoxicated. The appellee
denied that. Ted Peterson, a nephew of the appellant,
testified that he went to a so-called “cat house’—
whatever that may be—with the appellee, and that
they had a beer and left, It does not appear how often
that was true; perhaps that was the only near place
where appellee and Peterson could get a beer, and we
cannot regard the matter seriously. Counsel for appel-
lant intimate that appellee was guilty of infidelity with-

“ ia

out any evidence to support the charge. Counsel also
complain because he did not take her to Italy with him
in 1953 and to other places. He probably would have
done so if they had been more congenial. The failure to
do so did not justify her misconduct nor does the fact
that she suffered with neurosis, If she was unable to
control taking intoxicating liquor she could have gone
to bed and “slept it off”. She could have avoided, we
think, calling the appellee the abusive names which we
have heretofore mentioned. Counsel also contend that
appellee deliberately planned to get rid of the appellant
by taking liquor home—which he did to some extent—
and by other actions. We do not get that impression
from the record before us. Appellee married appel-
lant in 1947 after living with her in a meretricious re-
lationship. He took the trouble to take her to Albert
Nelson to get him to persuade her to refrain from using
intoxicating liquor to excess. He caused her to be taken
to a psychiatrist in Salt Lake City in the hope that
treatment by him would help her. He twice brought
an action for divorce and twice a reconciliation took
place. Such actions are inconsistent with the claim
that appellee tried to get rid of the appellant. Counsel
for appellant make an impassioned plea in their brief
on appellant’s behalf. That could very well have been
addressed to the trial court but is somewhat out of
place when addressed to an appellate court. The trial
court saw the witnesses on the witness stand. Appellee
testified for nearly a whole day. The court had ample
opportunity to judge as to whether or not he was tell-
ing the truth. We are not in the same position as the
trial court. It is probably true that appellee’s conduct
was not altogether above reproach. We seldom find
that to be true. As said in 1 Nelson, Divorce and An-
nulment, 2d Ed., § 10.08, p. 364, “Quite a number of
courts have pointed to the fact that the wrecking of a

2 «C*

marriage is almost always due to fault on both sides.”
However, it is not necessary for a complainant to be
entirely blameless in order to be entitled to a divorce.
27A C.I.S. Divorce § 56(8) b, p. 180, n. 738; 27A CIS.
Divorce § 67a, pp. 228-229, in 59.10, We do not think
that we would be justified in interfering with the find-
ing and judgment of the trial court awarding the ap-
pelle a divorce herein. We find no reversible error so
far as admission of testimony is concerned.

2, Division of the property. Section 3-5916, W.C.S.
1945, provides as follows:

“In granting a divorce, the court shall also
make such disposition of the property of the par-
ties, as shall appear just and equitable, having re-
gard to the respective merits of the parties and to
the condition in which they will be left by such di-
vorce, and to the party through whom the prop-
erty was acquired, and to the burdens imposed
upon it, for the benefit of the wife and children,
and the court may also decree to the wife reason-
able alimony out of the estate of the husband hav-
ing regard for his ability, and to effectuate the
purposes aforesaid, may order so much of his real
estate or the rents and profits thereof, as is ne-
cessary to be assigned and set out to the wife for
life, or may decree a specific sum to be paid by
him to her, and use all necessary legal and equit-
able processes to carry its decrees into effect.”

In Lovejoy v. Lovejoy, 836 Wyo. 879, 256 P. 76, 79, Id.,
388 Wyo. 358, 267 P. 91, this court stated:

“Tt is conceded that in making a division of
property under the statute the trial court exer-
cises a discretion. There are no hard and fast
rules to control its action. The statute does not
require an equal division. A just and equitable
division is as likely as not to be unequal. The de-
cision of the trial court should not be disturbed,
except on clear grounds, as that court is usually

in a better position than the appellate court to
judge of the respective merits and needs of the
parties, * * *”

Inasmuch as a trial court’s judgment cannot be dis-
turbed except on clear grounds, we have seldom inter-
fered with the action of the trial courts and whenever
we have done so we have interfered only to a very
limited extent. It is readily seen that unless we ad-
here to that course we should be apt to have before
this court a plethora of appeals in divorce cases in-
volving a division of property and asking us to vir-
tually constitute ourselves as a court of the first in-
stance to divide the property. We do not think that
that is the function of this court.

The court awarded to the appellant Lots 5 and 6,
Block 10, in the Clark Addition to Rock Springs,
Sweetwater County, Wyoming, valued at $23,000. This
property was the home of the parties and contained in
addition a number of apartments which were rented
out to other parties. The court further awarded to
the appellant the sum of $10,000 in cash, a 1955 Olds-
mobile sedan and attorneys’ fees of $2,500. It award-
ed all other property to the appellee. The net worth
of appellee, according to the stipulation of the parties,
was approximately $199,000, so that after deducting
what was awarded to the appellant and considering
the attorneys’ fees, the property left to the appellee
would be approximately in the sum of $160,000 as
against about $37,000 awarded to the appellant. Coun-
sel for the appellant claim that their client should
have half of the appellee’s property.

Appellant and appellee, as heretofore indicated,
started living together in a meretricious relationship
in July, 1941, holding themselves out, however, as hus-

band and wife. This relationship continued until they
were married on August 22, 1947. The evidence fair-
ly discloses, we think, that appellant was aware that
the relationship was meretricious. She was 25 years
of age in 1941, had been married before, and had a
child by that marriage. Hence, the case of Roberts v.
Roberts, 64 Wyo. 488, 196 P.2d 361, 197 P.2d 697, has
no application in the case at bar. We do not think
that on account of public policy we are justified in
overruling Willis v. Willis, 48 Wyo. 408, 49 P.2d 670,
681, Id., 49 Wyo. 296, 54 P.2d 814, where we stated:

“‘&A wife is not entitled to compensation for
services rendered her husband. And where a wo-
man lives with a man as his mistress or concubine,
she cannot recover for such services as are inci-
dental to the relationship in which they live, un-
less a contract for payment is shown.’” 40 Cyc.
2823.

In Annotation, 31 A.L.R. 1255, 1259, it is said:

“Where a woman cohabits with a man and has
actual knowledge of the unlawful nature of the
relationship, she does not by such cohabitation
alone acquire any rights in the accumulations of
the man during such relationship * * *. She may,
however, acquire certain rights where it is es-
tablished that there was an agreement to pool
earnings or an agreement of partnership or joint
adventure, or where there are circumstances ade-
quate to establish a constructive trust. * * *”

Counsel for appellant claim that there was an agree-
ment to pool earnings as partners or joint adventurers
and that there were circumstances adequate to estab-
lish a constructive trust.

It appears herein that the appellant had $500 which
she gave to the appellee about 1942 and which was

used to pay unpaid bills. The court appears to have
regarded that as a loan and we cannot say that we
disagree. The court took this loan into consideration
in making its award of property. Appellant also did
the housework for the parties and rented the apart-
ments connected with their home, occasionally cleaning
an apartment if it became vacant, and doing occasional
painting in that connection whenever it was necessary.
But the main stress of counsel for appellant is laid on
the fact that she signed notes with appellee aggregat-
ing some $75,000 during the period here in question.
Counsel for appellee dispute this and say that many of
the various notes were signed in order to pay off other
and previous notes. We need not, we think, go into the
matter. Counsel for appellant say and stress the fact
that she was just as much responsible for the payment
of these notes as appellee. Theoretically that is true.
Practically speaking, it is not. She had no visible prop-
erty of any kind. She was earning no money. She had
no financial standing whatever. Hence, she cannot be
said to have helped the appellee financially by signing
notes with him. The addition of her name to the notes
was substantially merely a formality. We find no
sufficient evidence in the record to justify us in hold-
ing that there was any agreement or pooling of prop-
erty as partners or joint adventurers or that there is
any basis for a constructive trust.

However, the appellant stands in this case before
the court not as a courtesan but as the lawful wife of
the appellee so that Willis v. Willis, supra, has only a
limited bearing in this case, and we must determine
whether or not this court can be justified in modifying
the awards made by the trial court in view of the fact
that the appellant was the wife of appellee for a period
of nine years before the commencement of this action.

The home and the apartment awarded to appellant had
been acquired by the appellee long before 1941. The
appellee started his grocery business in 1931, to which
a locker business was added in 1948 and 1949. Appel-
lee worked hard, as is admitted by the appellant herein,
often working late at night and on Sundays. He built
up his business until now it is a substantial, well-paying
one. Our statute provides that in dividing property
in the case of divorce the derivation of the property
is an item to be considered. Hence, what his children
helped him to acquire is relevant herein, The testi-
mony shows that his boys commenced to work for him
in the store at hours when not in school from the time
‘when they were about eight years of age, that they
worked hard and got only their spending money. The
daughter too, who was 15 years of age in 1947, helped
in the store and helped the appellant in taking care of
the housekeeping and the washing necessary for the
store. The appellant during the marriage continued
to take care of the renting of these apartments and
matters incidental thereto as she did before the maxr-
riage. In addition she worked about two weeks in the
store in 1948, possibly a little more, and ran a trailer
and hamburger and popcorn stand in conjunction with
her husband for about two months in 1949 during the
evenings. She kept house during this time but the
oldest boy, Ben, went into military service in 1945 to
1946 and was married in 1949. The second boy, Alfred,
went to military service in 1951 and was married dur-
ing that time. The girl, Verlee, was married in 1953.
None of the children lived with the appellant after be-
ing married and Verlee helped considerably in the
housework before 1953. So the burden of housekeeping
from and after 1951 could not have been very great. In
1951 the appellee and his two boys formed a partner-
ship the boys each receiving a 20 percent interest in the

store and locker business and the appellee retaining a
60 percent interest therein. The property which he
has left is, in the main, this 60 percent interest.

The apartments awarded to appellant herein would
bring an income, as far as we can judge, taking into
consideration necessary repairs from time to time, of
approximately $2,000 per annum. If she invests the
$10,000 awarded her by the court at 4 percent, that
would bring in an additional income of $400 per an-
num. The care of the renting of the apartments should
not take much of appellant’s time. She is now 48 years
of age, still a comparatively young woman. She should
not expect to be able to spend her life in idleness. If
she quits her excessive drinking of intoxicants, as she
should, she should be able for many years to increase
the above income by a considerable amount so as to
enable her to live in comparative comfort. She has
neither chick nor child dependent upon her. Appellee
has three children, We do not think that we should be
justified in depriving the latter of their expectancy to
inherit from their father the property to the acquisi-
tion of which they devoted much of their time.

The majority of the court is in doubt as to the wis-
dom of modifying the award herein. They do not be-
lieve that a clear case has been presented to justify
this court to do that. They believe that the trial court
had a better opportunity to judge as to how the prop-
erty of the parties should be divided and that its judg-
ment in that connection should stand. The whole of
the judgment of the trial court, accordingly, is af-
firmed.

Affirmed.

Matter of the ESTATE of Charles L. STRINGER,
Charles Limuel Stringer, also known as
_ Chas. L. Stringer, Deceased.

Bertie M. STRINGER, Appellant
(Defendant below),

v.

Wilhemine M. L. MILLER, Appellee
(Plaintiff below).

No. 2871.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Aug. 18, 1959.

343 Pac.2d. 508

a
oO

ad
Q

Henry A. Burgess and Bruce P. Badley, Sheridan,
for appellant.

G. R. McConnell and Walter Scott, Laramie, for ap-
pellee.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

OPINION.

Mr. Justice HARNSBERGER delivered the opinion
of the court.

Following the death of Charles L. Stringer, de-
ceased, his widow, Bertie M. Stringer, petitioned the
court on December 4, 1957, for the appointment of an
administrator of his estate alleging that he had died
intestate, The following day, one Wilhemine M. L.
Miller filed a petition containing two causes of action.
In the first cause, an instrument dated December 8,
1952, was offered for probate and in the second cause,
an instrument dated August 26, 1949, was offered,
the petition praying that one or the other of these in-
struments be admitted to probate as the last will and
testament of the deceased. Thereafter, on January 2,
1958, Bertie M. Stringer filed her petition for the pro-
bate of an instrument dated March 22, 1954.

During the hearing that followed, the parties stipu-
lated the 1952 instrument had been properly executed
as a last will and testament of the deceased. As it was
not available, a copy was received in evidence.

At the conclusion of the hearing which was held,
and following submission of briefs by counsel, the court
found that the petition of Wilhemine M. L. Miller, ask-
ing alternatively for the probate of either the 1949 in-
strument or the 1952 instrument, was contested by
Bertie M. Stringer and that the petition of Bertie M.
Stringer was contested by Wilhemine M. L. Miller. In-
asmuch as Bertie M. Stringer had originally filed her
petition that letters of administration be granted on
the theory that the deceased had died intestate and
later had filed another petition for the probate of the
alleged will of 1954 of the deceased, we must assume
from the court’s findings that this meant Wilhemine
M. L. Miller contested both of those petitions. The
court also found generally in favor of petitioner Wil-
hemine M. L, Miller and against petitioner Bertie M.
Stringer; that the 1954 instrument was a carbon copy;
that the unsigned original of such instrument had not
been signed by the deceased; that the subscribing wit-
nesses did not see the deceased execute the carbon copy
offered for probate; that the signature of the deceased
appearing on the carbon copy was not proved; that
there was no proof deceased had signed the 1954 car-
bon copy, either within or without the presence or
hearing of the subscribing witnesses or at all; that
the signatures on the 1949 and the 1954 instruments
were not identical; that the proponent of the 1954
instrument had failed to meet the burden of proof that
the document was the last will of the testator or was
valid and in full force and effect; and that the court
should deny the probate of the 1954 instrument.

As to the 1949 instrument, the court found the de-
ceased and his pre-deceased first wife, Emily K. String-
er, had executed identical wills except for the substi-
tution of names where the context so required, and one
of those wills was the 1949 instrument for which pro-
pate was sought; that there was a pre-will conference
and contract to make such joint and mutual wills be-
tween the parties; that there had been established a
contract to make the testamentary disposition in those
1949 wills; that the contract was supported by suf-
ficient consideration in that the deceased Charles L.
Stringer, the husband, promised to devise and bequeath
property in which he and his wife had an equal inter-
est, in a particular way, in consideration of a similar
promise on the part of Emily K. Stringer, the wife,
and that in reliance thereon each executed his and her
separate will dated the 26th day of August, 1949; that
Emily K. Stringer, the wife, died in December 1952,
and her will executed in pursuance of the contract was
thereafter probated by the deceased Charles L. String-
er, who accepted the benefits provided him under his
wife’s 1949 will.

The court then found there was a valid and existing
contract between the deceased Charles L. Stringer and
his first wife, Emily K. Stringer, deceased, to execute
the joint and mutual wills of August 26, 1949.

The court further found there was insufficient evi-
dence to establish the existence or validity of the De-
cember 8, 1952, will; that the August 26, 1949, will of
the deceased, Charles L. Stringer, was duly and validly
executed and in full force and effect on the date of his
death, and that the subsequent marriage of the de-
ceased to Bertie M. Stringer did not revoke the 1949
will nor was it revoked by any will or wills subsequent-

si‘ ’

ly made; that the 1949 will of the deceased should be
admitted to probate and the costs should be assessed
against Bertie M. Stringer.

Upon these findings the court adjudged and decreed
that the petition for probate of the 1954 instrument
be denied and that the petition for issuance to Bertie
M. Stringer of letters of administration with the will
annexed be denied; that the petition of Wilhemine M.
L. Miller for letters of administration with the will an-
nexed and for probate of the 1949 instrument be grant-
ed and that the 1949 instrument be admitted to pro-
bate as the last will and testament of the deceased;
that the petition of Wilhemine M, L. Miller so far as it
pertains to the 1952 instrument be denied and that the
1952 instrument be denied admission to probate; that
there was a valid and existing contract between
Charles L. Stringer, deceased, and Emily K. Stringer,
deceased, for the execution of joint and mutual wills;
that the deceased Emily K. Stringer had performed
her part of that contract and that the deceased Charles
L. Stringer had accepted the benefits of that contract
by and through the probate of the estate of the de-
ceased Emily K. Stringer; that the 1949 will of the de-
ceased Charles L. Stringer which was being admitted
to probate was the performance of the contract on the
part of Charles L. Stringer, deceased, and the costs of
the contest were assessed to Bertie M. Stringer.

From these findings and order and judgment of the
court, Bertie M. Stringer appeals.

It may not be amiss to comment that, in strict pro-
priety, the 1949 wills should not be referred to as joint
wills, inasmuch as they were not contained in a single
instrument. As is pointed out in 97 C.J.8. Wills § 1364,

@, pp. 286-287, “the terms ‘joint wills’ and ‘mutual wills’
are sometimes inaptly used interchangeably.” There
seems, however, to be no question but that the two
wills executed in 1949 were mutual wills and were re-
ciprocal in their provisions.

Appellant insists there was error in considering for
probate at the same hearing all the instruments of-
fered, Appellant contends that the court erred in re-
ceiving evidence regarding the 1949 and 1952 instru-
ments at the same hearing had on the 1954 instrument.
This, appellant says, is because the 1949 and 1952 in-
struments contained petitioner’s affirmative allega-
tions that there was an oral agreement to make the
1949 will and that the hearing upon the 1949 and 1952
instruments had been set immediately following that
upon the 1954 instrument. Appellant also asserts that
the court had expressly said the hearing was to be
upon the 1954 instrument and indicates this meant the
hearing would be only regarding that instrument, and
that it was after both sides had rested that the court
changed its mind and decided the hearing was upon
all probate files relative to the estate of the deceased
Charles L. Stringer.

Our examination of the record shows that all the
court said at the commencement of the hearing was in
answer to appellant’s counsel’s inquiry. “Do you want
me to make an opening statement at this time?” To
this the court replied, “Call your witnesses merely for
the purpose of proving the due execution of the will.”
This statement falls short of expressly saying the hear-
ing would be solely upon proof of the 1954 instrument.
It merely advised counsel to proceed with the proof of
his case.

Appellant says this change afforded appellant no op-
portunity to object to evidence relating to the pur-
ported 1949 oral agreement to make a will and afforded
appellant no opportunity to call witnesses, and, there-
fore, it constituted a denial of due process of law and
gave appellant no opportunity to be heard. And ap-
pellant further contends it was error for the court to
consider the issue of the oral agreement, at the time
of hearing proof for the admission to probate of the
1954 instrument. Again we must disagree with appel-
Jant. An examination of the record shows that after
the appellee-contestant had rested, the court stated
that it desired to have briefs, and appellant’s counsel
then inquired if the three cases, which we understand
referred to the probate of the 1949, 1952 and 1954 in-
struments, were consolidated for the hearing. To this
the court replied in the affirmative. Appellant’s coun-
sel then attempted to obtain a stipulation from oppos-
ing counsel respecting the 1952 instrument, and when
he did not succeed, requested the appellee to elect be-
tween the causes of action for probate of the 1949 or
1952 instruments. This resulted in appellant’s counsel
agreeing that by her pleading, appellant had admitted
the validity of the execution of both the 1949 and the
1952 instruments. Thereupon, appellant’s counsel re-
quested the right to continue to call witnesses about
the 1952 instrument, and then appellant’s counsel, with-
out any objection from either opposing counsel or the
court, proceeded to and did call Bertie M. Stringer for
further examination.

Under these circumstances, it is clear the appellant
was not prejudiced by the consolidation of the hearing
upon the several petitions for letters of administration
or probating of instruments.

fo

We find nothing in Rule 42(a) of our Rules of Civil
Procedure, which is referred to by appellant, to sup-
port her position that consolidation must be made be-
fore hearing, Of course, such a consolidation should
not be had if it results in prejudice to any party liti-
gant. We do not, however, find any such prejudice
resulted in this instance.

In order to pass upon the correctness of the court’s
decision admitting the 1949 document as the last will
and testament of the deceased, we must not only ex-
amine the evidence relating to the validity of the execu-
tion of the 1949 instrument, but we must ascertain
whether the instrument subsisted as the last will and
testament of the deceased at the date of his death.
With respect to the first question, there seems to have
been no dispute that the 1949 instrument was signed
by the testator in the presence of the required number
of witnesses and in that respect it was sufficiently au-
thenticated. As to its subsisting as the last will and
testament of the deceased as of the date of his death,
the record seems clear that it did not. In the first
place, the parties stipulated that the 1952 will of the
deceased was validly executed and hence, as of the date
of its execution, that instrument was the last will and
testament of the deceased, and it contained a clause ex-
pressly saying:

“I, Charles Limuel Stringer, also known as
Charles L. Stringer and C. L. Stringer, of Gillette,
Wyoming, hereby make my last will, revoking all
previous wills and codicils.”

This express revocation in the 1952 will sufficiently
fulfills our statutory requirement regarding revocation
of wills as set forth in § 6-306, W.C.S.1945, as follows:

ltl’

“No will or any part thereof shall be revoked
unless by burning, tearing, cancelling or obliter-
ating the same with the intention of revoking it,
by the testator or by some person in his presence
and by his direction, or by some other will or codi-
cil in writing, signed, attested and subscribed in
the manner provided by law for the execution of
a will, excepting only that nothing contained in
this section shall prevent the revocation implied
by law from subsequent changes in the condition
or circumstances of the testator. The power to
make a will implies the power to revoke the same.”
(Emphasis supplied.)

The 1949 will of the deceased Charles L. Stringer,
being thus expressly revoked by the later 1952 will,
may not correctly be said to be the last will and testa-
ment of the deceased. Hence, the lower court was in
error in admitting the 1949 will to probate as the last
will and testament of the deceased. The court was not
privileged to ignore the stipulation of the parties which
established the 1952 instrument as the valid last will
and testament of the testator as of the date of its execu-
tion.

However, notwithstanding the testator’s 1949 will
did not subsist as his last will at the date of his death,
it still retained its character as evidence bearing upon
the existence of a contract between the first wife, Em-
ily K. Stringer, and the deceased.

There is no dispute between the parties that the
wills of Emily K. Stringer and Charles L. Stringer
executed in 1949 were identical except where the con-
text required the substitution of different names. Each
will, in the first instance, left all the property of the
person making that will to the spouse, and then pro-
vided that in the event the spouse did not survive the

maker, that one-half of the property should go to the
relatives of the deceased spouse. True, there is noth-
ing said in either of these identical wills as to there
being any contract or agreement between the parties
for the making of the same. However, the court re-
ceived testimony to the effect there was such an agree-
ment and understanding, and in that connection the
record shows the following in the testimony of Wil-
hemine M. L. Miller regarding statements of the de-
ceased prior to making the 1949 will:

“Q. What did they discuss, Charles and Emily?
A. Oh, making a Will, and they wanted to make a
Will so that when they both passed on it would—
what they had would be divided equally between
their brothers and sisters, half and half on each
side.

“Q. And did you hear both of them agree to
that? A. Oh, yes, that was what they wanted in
their Will.

“Q. And then what happened there, Mrs. Mil-
ler? A. Well, they took my dad out to the country
with them, because he spent part of his time with
us and part of his time with them during the sum-
mers, and the next time they came in they stopped.
at our house and said, ‘Well, we made our Wills.’

“Q. And how long after that was that? Do
you recall? A. Well, it wasn’t very long after
that * * * I couldn’t say exactly * * * but it was
during that summer before they made their Wills.

“Q. Did they say anything further about what
kind of Wills? A. Yes, they said they made that
kind of Will as you have just explained, that they
would give it to each other and, when both were
dead, half went to the Kurllrusses [The Kurllrus-
ses were the relatives of Emily K. Stringer] and
half to the Stringers.”

The fact that this testimony referred to statements
made by the deceased prior to the execution of the
1949 will does not legislate against its relevancy.

As is said in Van Houten v. Whitaker, Cal.App.,
337 P.2d 900, 903:

“* * ® a subsequently executed will may relate
back to the making of any oral agreement which
it embodies so as to validate the latter under the
statute of frauds * * *.”

Later on, the same witness testified that when
Charles L. Stringer was considering marrying Bertie
M. Stringer he said to the witness:

“‘Mimm [Wilhemine], no matter what happens,
what I do, everything will be the same between
the Kurllrusses and me, and it will be just like
Emily and I planned it” (Emphasis supplied.)

Ada Boyet, another witness, testified that deceased
Charles L. Stringer told her in 1953 or 1954:

“Em’s half was to go to the Kurlrusses and his
half to the Stringers.”

In recross-examination, Glenn Stringer testified:

“Well, they [The Stringers] said that they want-
ed it to be divided between the two families. * * *
When they was both gone.”

The record shows this statement was made in 1950.

In addition, there is no dispute but that Charles L.
Stringer did receive the benefits and properties be-
longing to his first wife following her decease by vir-

tue of and in accordance with the provisions of her
1949 will which was identical with the 1949 will of the
deceased in dispute here.

In Van Houten v. Whitaker, Cal.App., 337 P.2d 900,
9038, supra, which action although not a parallel to the
instant case, inasmuch as it was one in which it was
sought to impose a trust upon a devisee who had re-
ceived distribution of property under a joint will with
her husband, nonetheless bears directly upon the ques-
tion of the survivor’s right to escape the obligation to
carry out the contractual provision of such a joint will
by revoking it. The court there approved what was
said in Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal.2d 559, 564,
212 P.2d 878, 881:

“Where two parties agreed to make mutual
wills, each promising. to dispose of his property
to the other or, if the other be dead, to certain
third persons, and one of the parties performs by
leaving his property to the other, the intended
devisees and legatees are entitled to enforce their
rights as beneficiaries under the agreement. The
contracting party who survives becomes estopped
from making any other or different disposition of
the property, and his obligations under the agree-
ment becomes absolutely irrevocable and enforce-
able against him, at least where he avails himself
of the provisions of decedent’s will in his favor
and accepts substantial benefits thereunder.’ ”

See also 97 C.J.S. Wills § 1866c, p. 298, and cited au-

thorities. And to the same effect is 57 Am.Jur., Wills,
§ 174, p. 154.

In Schomp v. Brown, Or., 835 P.2d 847, 850, it is
clearly stated:

«# * * Such a reciprocal or mutual will, even
though revoked, still stands as evidence of the con-
tract, * * *”

As far as we have discovered, this court has not as
yet considered the effect of mutual and reciprocal wills
between married couples where the survivor has re-
voked after the death of the spouse and received bene-
fits under the will of the deceased, but in Canada v.
Ihmsen, 38 Wyo. 489, 456, 457, 240 P. 927, 982, 43
A.L.B. 1010, 1019, where such wills had been executed
by unrelated persons, the court refused to accept the
contention that such mutual and reciprocal wills cre-
ated a contractual obligation because there was a lack
of consideration. However, the court said:

“It may, however, be that certain arrangements
of property, like that made among members of a
family, should be put upon a somewhat different
footing from those made between strangers in
blood. In Lewis v. Lewis, 104 Kan. 269, 178
P. 421, the court says that such arrangements be-
tween husband and wife should be favored. That
view is not dissimilar to the view adopted by the
civil law. Alexander on Wills, § 70. Generally
speaking, persons who made such contracts were,
under the Roman law, considered as legacy hunt-
ers. Gaius, a noted jurist of the second century of
our era, applied that term to persons who were
given an undivided portion of an inheritance as
well as to those who received a legacy, and held
such gifts to be void. Digest, Justinian, 30, 64.
Paul, another noted jurist, states that, when a
man appoints another as his heir upon condition
that such other should in turn appoint a third per-
son as heir, such appointment is void. Digest,
Justinian, 28, 5,72. On the other hand, the fam-
ous Papinian wrote that the rule against the va-
lidity of reciprocal appointments does not apply
where they are induced by mutual affection. Di-
gest, Justinian, 28, 5, 71. * * *”

While the testimony quoted above, evidencing the
nature of the agreement between the first wife and
Charles L. Stringer, is not voluminous, it is not con-
tradicted and when considered in the light of the
identical nature of the provisions of the wills of both
parties concerned, it cannot be said to be unsubstantial
evidence.

The lower court in the instant case quite possibly
considered that in examining a testamentary document,
it was entitled to do so with a view to discovering the
dominant testamentary scheme, and if so, we are in
agreement. In any event, it was the finding of the
court that there was sufficient evidence to establish
there was a contract between the deceased and his first
wife, Emily, to make the testamentary dispositions
which were contained in the 1949 wills. We are not
disposed to disagree with that finding, although as
previously indicated, we disagree with the lower court
in finding that the 1949 document was the last will
and testament of the deceased at the date of his death.

The appellee suggests that if we assume the will of
1952 had been revoked, the 1949 will of the deceased
was revived, and quotes at length from diverse au-
thorities—the sum total of which merely illustrates
that there is a wide difference of opinion in different
jurisdictions as to the reviving effect of the revocation
of a subsequent will which is relied upon as having
revoked a former will.

In the Annotation in 28 A.L.R. 911, it is said:

“There are five possible theories as to the ef-
fect, as a revival of a former will, of the destruc-
tion of a later will revoking the earlier, viz: (1)
‘That the earlier will is revived as a matter of law;

—Eli( ’

(2) that the earlier will is revived unless an in-
tention to the contrary appears; (3) that the ear-
lier will is not revived; (4) that the earlier will is
not revived unless an intention to revive it ap-
pears; and (5) that the question is one of inten-
Hon without any presumption for or against re-
vival.’

In the Annotation’s summary, it is pointed out that
the view that the earlier will is revived ipso facto, is
supported by the rule at common law, citing a few
English cases, the earliest of which was in 1754, as
well as some American cases which followed that rule.
It is stated the general theory of cases accepting this
view is that as a will is ambulatory until death, a will
which is itself revoked can have no effect as a revok-
ing instrument.

The doctrine that the earlier will is revived unless
an intention to the contrary appears, proceeds on the
theory that the destruction or revocation of a will
which revoked or superseded a previous one, leaves
the first as if the second had not existed, unless it be
clearly proved that the second was destroyed with the
intention of dying intestate. This, in theory, is simi-
lar to the view just discussed—in other words, be-
cause neither is a complete will until the death of the
testator.

The view that the destruction or revocation of a
subsequent will does not revive a prior will, but that
such prior will can only be revived by a republication,
is clearly illustrated in Lively y. Harwell, 1850, 29 Ga.
509, 515, 516, quoted with approval on a subsequent
appeal in Harwell v. Lively, 830 Ga. 315, 320, 321, 76
Am.Dec. 649, 651, where the court said:

“Here are two wills of different dates and in-
consistent provisions, and the last one, in point

of date, is confessedly revoked. Which of these
papers, or does either, show the final testamentary
mind of the testator? I say neither does. The
last one does not, as is admitted by everybody, for
it is expressly revoked. How is it with the first?
That contains what was once his mind, but we
know that he changed that mind when he made
the last one. How do we know that he ever re-
verted to it? It is said that he changed again
when he revoked the last. This is true, but to
what did he change? The case is this: he had a
scheme and abandoned it for another, and then
abandoned the second. All so far is clear and
satisfactory, but can you go further and say that,
when he abandoned the last, he returned to the
first? If these two schemes comprehended ALL
the possible dispositions of his property, then the
conclusion would be a logical one, that when he
abandoned the one he returned to the other. But
when the number of possible schemes in every
case is legion, you can not say that because he has
departed from any one, you know his mind has
settled upon any other particular one out of that
infinite number. The whole fallacy lies in assum-
ing that the two papers exhaust the subject. It
seems to me that the abandonment of any one
scheme does not of itself afford the least indica-
tion in favor of any other particular one out of an
infinite number. * * *” (Emphasis is that of the
Georgia court.)

It may be that in the instant case the failure of the
testator to destroy the 1949 will should be considered
as bearing upon the testator’s intention to revive it, if,
in fact, he had destroyed the 1952 will. However, the
only thing approaching evidence of any such destruc-
tion of the 1952 will is found in the testimony of Ber-
tie M. Stringer. This was to the effect that she saw
the deceased tear up some instrument. But, the de-
stroyed instrument was not shown to be the 1952 will,
so this testimony can hardly be regarded as sufficient

ee

sl’

to raise a presumption that the 1952 will was in fact
destroyed by the testator with the purpose of reestab-
lishing or reviving his 1949 will.

Courts which have accepted the theory that an ear-
lier will is not revived unless an intention to revive
appears seem content to merely say the better opinion
seems to be that in the absence of statute, the subse-
quent destruction of the revoking will does not have
the effect of reviving the former will unless there
is evidence that it was the intention of the testator
to revive the former will. Where there is an express
revoking clause, it is said that this is especially true.

The position taken by certain English courts and
the courts of at least three of our states, that the ques-
tion of revival is one of pure intention without there
being any presumption either for or against revival
arising by virtue of the destruction of the revocatory
will, is of little help to us here as no such intention ap-
pears from the record.

We have no statute providing that a will revoked by
a subsequent will is revived by the destruction of
the subsequent will when the former will has not been
destroyed. We do have § 6-306, W.C.S.1945, previous-
ly mentioned, expressly providing the different ways
by which a will may be revoked. The legislative si-
lence relative to the question of revival does not incline
us to believe a presumption is created that a will re-
voked in one or the other of the ways authorized by
express statute, is brought back into life. If any pre-
sumption at all is indicated, it seems more reasonable
to us that it should be that the presence in our laws of
an express statute prescribing ways in which a will
may be revoked, without there being a further statute

providing for revival of such a revoked will, mani-
fests that the legislature has intentionally spoken its
last word concerning the existence of such a revoked
testament.

We, therefore, conclude that the 1949 will of the
deceased Charles L. Stringer was revoked by the 1952
will which contained an express revocation of all form-
er wills, and that the 1949 will has not been revived.
Nevertheless, as previously stated, the 1949 will still
remains as evidence of a contractual obligation as-
sumed by the deceased Charles L. Stringer, and it was
beyond his power to escape that commitment by exer-
cising his undoubted right to revoke the 1949 will as
his last will and testament. As to whether or not there
was a revocation of the 1949 will, independent of the
1952 revocation, occurring by virtue of the 1954 in-
strument, will receive our attention in our discussion
of the validity and subsistence of the 1954 document
as the last will and testament of the deceased at the
time of his death.

The contention of the appellee that the instrument
was not the last will and testament of the deceased be-
cause the 1954 instrument offered was imprinted by
the use of carbon paper is entirely without merit. There
is no special virtue in typing made by imprint through
a ribbon rather than through a piece of carbon paper.
The typing was all done at the same time and in a
single operation. The important thing is to discover
whether the typewritten instrument offered was adop-
ted by the testator as his last will and testament by the
affixing to it of his signature and his having two wit-
nesses to that signature affix their own signatures
thereon.

Ce

No one questions the signatures of the witnesses,
but appellant claimed that the other signature purport-
ing to be that of the deceased on the instrument was
not his signature, and the trial court found it was not
identical with the signature on the 1949 will, and that
appellant had failed in her burden to prove it was the
signature of the deceased. When we closely examine
the transcript of the evidence, we find that a reputable
banker of the community testified without equivoca-
tion that he knew the signature of the deceased and he
positively identified the signature upon the offered
instrument as being that of the testator. Similarly,
the lawyer, who had represented the deceased during
his lifetime, testified positively that he too knew the
signature of the deceased and that the signature ap-
pearing on the instrument was that of the deceased.
No attack of any kind was made upon the credibility
of either of these witnesses, nor was any showing made
of their lack of qualification. No witness appeared
and testified in contradiction to the positive statements
of these two disinterested witnesses. We do not over-
look that the brother of the deceased, who was an in-
terested witness, inasmuch as he stood to receive dis-
tribution of a portion of the estate of the deceased un-
der the terms of the 1949 will, testified concerning th~
signature appearing upon the 1954 instrument. His
testimony, however, was not positive, but when aske?
if the questioned signature was that of the deceased
testator replied, “Well, I don’t think it’s his.” On
cross-examination, this witness’ attempt to justify his
doubt about the signature was anything but convinc-
ing. In fact, his effort to explain his doubt by giving
as his reason the difference in the form of certain let-
ters from the form in which he said the deceased usu-
ally wrote them, was in itself contradictory. At no
time did he state directly and positively that it was

not the signature of his deceased brother. Under these
circumstances we cannot say the evidence of this bro-
ther was sufficiently substantial to present that con-
flict in evidence which requires us to accept the court’s
finding that the signature of the deceased on the 1954
instrument had not been sufficiently established.

The circumstances surrounding the execution of the
1954 instrument all fortify this conclusion. The un-
contradicted testimony is that the deceased and his
widow went to the office of their attorney for the
express purpose of making their wills; that they in-
formed the lawyer of their wishes and he prepared
wills which he thought carried out the instructions
given him; that thereafter the deceased and his widow
returned to the office of that attorney and the de-
ceased called attention to certain changes which he de-
sired to have made; that thereafter the attorney made
the desired changes, but when the deceased and his
widow returned a second time to execute their wills,
the lawyer was not there, and the secretary in that of-
fice gave the deceased and his widow the reformed and
completed instruments.

The further uncontradicted evidence shows that
thereupon the deceased and his widow drove some 40
miles to the ranch home of the friends, who signed the
questioned document ag witnesses; that upon arrival
the deceased stated to those friends that he and his
wife were there to execute their wills and to get their
friends to assist them by witnessing their wills; that
then they all sat around a common table with the in-
struments the deceased and his wife had brought from
the lawyer’s office on that table before them and they
proceeded to affix their signatures; that in doing this
the ribbon-typed copy of the document—the carbon-

lil’

typed copy of which was presented for probate—was
left unsigned by the deceased. But the carbon-typed
instrument was executed by deceased and witnessed by
their two friends. The offered instrument, thus exe-
cuted and witnessed, was not a copy. It was an origi-
nal, Hence, this is not a case where there was execut-
ed an original will, as well as a copy of that original,
and the authorities offered to the effect that in such a
case all executed copies must be produced or accounted
for are inapplicable. It is inconceivable that a person
who had gone to his attorney, directed the manner in
which his will was to be prepared, corrected the first
draft, secured the final draft, drove 40 miles in order
to get his friends to witness the instrument he had had
prepared by his lawyer, and informed his friends the
purpose for his visit there, should have changed hi-
mind and not executed the document to be his last will
and testament, without some person then present
knowing about the change of purpose and so testifying
to that effect at the hearing. The whole affair cor-
roborates the verity of the signature upon the offered
instrument. .

In considering the trial court’s findings and its
judgment refusing to admit the 1954 instrument to
probate as the last will and testament of the deceased,
it is, of course, important that we keep in mind the
firmly entrenched rule of this court, that in the face of
a finding of fact by the lower court, we will not sub-
stitute our judgment for that of the trial court when
there is conflict in substantial evidence regarding that
fact. And we are mindful that in the face of conflict-
ing evidence that we must regard only the evidence
most favorable to the successful party, together with
all fair inferences which may reasonably be given it.

However, where there is no substantial evidence that
gives rise to a conflict, we have the right and in fact
the duty to examine the record and reach our own
independent conclusion from the substantial evidence
therein contained.

In 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1564(6), p. 1288, it is
said:

“Where there is no substantial conflict in the
evidence it has been held that the presumption in
favor of the trial court’s conclusion does not ap-
ply, oe “7

And in 8 Am.Jur., Appeal and Error, § 954, p. 518,
it is said:

«« * © However, the presumption in favor of
judicially found facts does not exist where such
findings are the result of misconception of law,
or when there is no conflict in the evidence, * * *.”

We cannot say that there is a wealth of authority
in the form of decisions respecting this seeming ex-
ception to the general rule regarding findings of fact
made by a trial court, but this does not detract from
the soundness of the exception. Perhaps one of the
clearest statements made by a court in applying the
exception to the general rule is to be found in Steven-
son v. Sherman, Tex. Civ.App., 231 S.W.2d 506, 512,
where it was said:

«* * * The items derive from testimony which
we regard as undisputed; hence whether or not
they constitute a necessary expense will be with-
out reference to the trial court’s conclusions, since
the presumption in favor of a finding of fact on
disputed testimony does not attach to a conclusion
drawn from undisputed evidence. Funk v. Walk-

er, Tex.Civ.App., 241 S.W. 720; Gulf, C. & S. F.
Ry. Co. v. Gaddis, Tex. Com.App., 208 S.W. 895.

OR I?

An earlier case from Alabama, Barnes v. Clark, 227
Ala. 651, 151 So. 586, 588, 90 A.L.R. 687, 641, states
the matter as follows:

“In reaching this conclusion we have not lost
sight of the rule obtaining here that a presumption
should be indulged in favor of the correctness of
the conclusion of the trial judge, who sees and
hears the witnesses, when there is conflict in the
evidence, but in this case there is no conflict, and
therefore nothing upon which to base this general
presumption, Wright v. Price, 226 Ala. 591, 147
So. a

The Alabama courts have been consistent in follow-
ing the rule in the Barnes case, supra. See Haden v.
Boykin, 259 Ala. 504, 66 So.2d 708; Liberty Nat. Life
Ins. Co. v. Trammell, 83 Ala.App. 275, 883 So.2d 479,
certiorari denied 250 Ala. 159, 38 So.2d 483; Id., 35
Ala.App. 800, 51 So.2d 167, reversed 255 Ala. 1, 51
So.2d 174, certiorari denied 255 Ala. 236, 51 So.2d 176;
Department of Industrial Relations v. Savage, 38 Ala.
App. 277, 82 So.2d 485.

But we need not go so far afield, because this court
in Washakie Livestock Loan Co. v. Meigh, 47 Wyo. 161,
33 P.2d 922; 50 Wyo. 480, 491, 492, 62 P.2d 528, 526,
107 A.L.R. 1063, in reversing the finding and judg-
ment of the trial court, considered the evidence which
was available to that court in making its decision, and
in doing so said:

“It is urged that this evidence establishes a con-
tract of bailment of the sheep in question entered
into during the spring of 1931, between Meigh on

the one hand and the lien claimants on the other.
We are utterly unable to see that this is so. We
think the only fair inference that can reasonably
be drawn from this record is that these men who
were working with the sheep were at all times
merely employees of Meigh and the Meigh Live-
stock Company, and that the sheep were always
after the spring of 1931, as they had been before
that time, under the control and in the possession
of Bob Meigh. In saying this we do not overlook
the general finding of the trial court in favor of
the lien claimants. We are constrained to say that,
in view of the statements made by Meigh in the
mortgage he signed and his sworn property state-
ment quoted from above, no weight can be attached
to his testimony that there was an oral contract of
bailment entered into between him and the men
who looked after the sheep. The testimony of Go-
mez, the only one of those who were the other al-
leged contracting parties to appear on the witness
stand, falls far short of establishing such a con-
tract. He unequivocally said that he was an em-
ployee of Bob Meigh, and his statement is borne
out when the record is viewed in its entirety. In
our judgment, the general finding of the district
court is not supported by the evidence in the case
if such finding should be construed as determining
that there was such a contract.”

The parallel between the position taken by Judge
Riner in the Washakie Livestock Loan Company case,
supra, and the instant case seems clear to us. In the
former case, the court had before it the testimony of
both Meigh and Gomez in conflict with other testimony
given to the contrary. Yet, when from an examina-
tion of the entire record, it became obvious to the re-
viewing court that the positive testimony of those wit-
nesses was of doubtful character because of other evi-
dence in the record, such testimony was said to be
without weight. This simply meant that because of
its doubtful quality, the court did not consider it pre-

sented a conflict in the evidence which justified ac-
cepting the lower court’s finding. This court, there-
fore, refused to follow the general rule and uphold the
lower court’s decision, although on its face there ap-
peared to be a conflict in evidence. This resulted be-
cause the court considered the evidence purporting to
raise such a conflict as unsubstantial.

Another earlier Wyoming case, Carter Oil Co. v.
Pacific Wyoming Oil Co., 87 Wyo. 448, 467, 263 P. 960,
966; 38 Wyo. 361, 267 P. 85, at least touched upon the
question where it is said:

«es * * That testimony is all to the effect that
the lands of homesteaders in this case are all on
the same geologic structure with other lands, on
part of which producing oil wells are located. If
that is true, and we must accept it as true for the
purposes of this decision, the defendant never had
an opportunity to get more than one lease there-
on. * * *”? (Kimphasis supplied.)

The point in the Carter case was that if the only testi-
mony in the record was to the same effect, this court
must accept it as true. So in the case now before us,
if as we do, we disregard as unsubstantial the testi-
mony given by the brother of the deceased when he
said he did not think it was his brother’s signature,
the only other testimony is that of the banker and the
lawyer, and it must be accepted as true by us. We
must conclude, therefore, that the court erred in ig-
noring the only substantial evidence given which bore
on the authenticity of the deceased’s signature, and we
find that the disputed signature on the 1954 instru-
ment was proved to be the signature of the deceased.
No one questions the authenticity of the signatures of
those who signed as witnesses and those witnesses

themselves appeared and testified to their own signa-
tures. The fact that they were unable to recall the
details concerning the signing of the offered document
is of no probative value respecting the verity of the
deceased’s signature. The following reasoning and
logic of a relatively old California case, In re Tyler’s
Estate, 5 Cal.Unrep.Cas. 851, 50 P. 927; 121 Cal. 405,
53 P. 928, 929, 930, is applicable here and is quite per-
suasive and warrants its quotation here:

«“* %* * While the Code provides that certain
things are necessary to the making of a valid will,
it does not prescribe how those things shall be
proved. It leaves that to the general rules of evi-
dence. There is provision, it is true, that if the
attesting witnesses are alive, and present in the
county, they must, in the event of a contest, be
ealled. This is a very natural and just provision,
for in such case the failure of the proponent of a
will to call his attesting witnesses would be a very
suspicious circumstance. But there is no statutory
declaration, and no principle of law, to the effect
that a will executed in due form shall go for
naught unless an attesting witness, after the lapse
of many years, shall continue to recollect every-
thing material that occurred at the time he sub-
scribed his name to it. Such a rule would make
the validity of the will dependent, not upon the
disposing mind of the testator, nor his freedom
from duress, undue influence, or fraud, nor upon
his clear expression of his intention in the body of
the instrument, nor upon its execution in conform-
ity to the form and ceremony prescribed by the
statute, but upon the fullness, accuracy, and per-
sistency of the recollection of one of the persons
who signed it as a witness. Such a rule cannot
be maintained either upon principle or precedent.
What constitutes a sufficient execution of a will
is prescribed by statute. What constitutes suf-
ficient proof of such execution is not so pre-
scribed, and is a different question,—a question

Sli‘ ’

to be solved by the general principles of evidence.
* * * Where an attesting witness has no recollec-
tion as to certain matters connected with the mak-
ing of the will, the case is, upon principle, in the
same condition as where he is dead, insane, or
absent; * * *,

“Authorities supporting the above conclusion
are numerous. We will refer to some of them:
In 1 Greenl. Ev. par. 38a, we find the following:
‘Execution of Instruments—Regularity of Acts.
Of a similar character is the presumption in favor
of the due execution of solemn instruments. Thus,
if the subscribing witnesses to a will are dead, or
if, being present, they are forgetful of all the
facts, or of any fact material to its due execution,
the law will in such cases supply the defect of
proof by presuming that the requisites of the sta-
tute were duly observed.’ Authorities are cited
sustaining the text. In Beach on the Law of Wills
the author, in paragraph 89, says: ‘On the death
of the witnesses, or on the failure of their mem-
ory, the proof of the fact of execution begets the
presumption that all the details of the statutory
requirements were complied with, whether so
stated in the attestation clause or not, unless the
contrary be proven.’ In 1 Jones, Ev. § 44, it is
said as follows: ‘If a will purports to have been
duly signed, attested, and witnessed, on proof of
execution the court will presume, in the case of
the death of the witnesses, or in case they do not
remember the facts connected with its execution,
that the law was complied with; and the details
of the statutory requirements will be presumed,
whether it is so stated in the attestation clause or
not, unless the contrary is proven.’ * * *

«* * * In Burgoyne v. Showler [1 Rob.Ece. 10]
it is said: ‘I think I should be establishing a very
dangerous precedent if I were to pronounce
against this will. I think the principle on which
Sir H. J. Fust has acted in these cases is this:
That, in the absence of the recollection of the wit-

nesses, he will presume the will to be duly execut-
ed.’ In Re Leach [12 Jur. 881] each of the wit-
nesses ‘remembered that he signed his name as
a witness to the will in the testator’s presence,
put neither of them could recollect whether the
testator signed his name in their presence, nor
whether his signature was already set to the will
when they signed, or whether the other witness
was present’; and upon this testimony it was held
that ‘the presumption is in favor of the due exe-
cution, according to the principle laid down by
the learned judge who sat for me in the case of
Burgoyne v. Showler, and I therefore decree pro-
bate to pass as prayed.’ In Kirk v. Carr [54 Pa.
285] the court says: ‘Want of memory will no
more destroy the attestation than insanity, ab-
sence, or death.’ In Clarke v. Dunnavant [10 Leigh
13], Tucker, J., in his concurring opinion, says,
having alluded to a case where the attesting wit-
ness to a will had sworn affirmatively that the sta~
tute had not been complied with in making it:
‘How is it where, as in this case, they do not nega-
tive a compliance with the statute, but merely have
forgotten the circumstances? It seems to me that,
upon fair analogy, the question should be decided
as it would be if the witness were dead, and his
handwriting proved. And so, accordingly, I think,
are the authorities to be understood.’ After re-
ferring to the case of Jackson v. Le Grange, 19
Johns. 386, approvingly, he says: ‘Where the mem-
ory of the witness fails, the proof of his signature
will justify an inference that all the requisites of
the law have been complied with.’ Further on he
says: ‘From the whole of these cases, then, I de-
duce that on a question of probate the defect of
memory of the witnesses will not be permitted to
defeat the will, but that the court may, from cir-
cumstances, presume that the requisitions of the
statute have been observed, and that they ought
so to presume from the fact of attestation, unless
the inferences from the fact are rebutted by satis-
factory evidence.’ Having alluded to suggestions
of mischief which might follow the decision, he

ES li( ’

says: ‘Far greater mischiefs would arise from a
contrary decision, which should make the rights
of every devisee and legatee depend, not only up-
on the honesty, but also upon the slippery memory
of witnesses. Under such a decision no man could
be sure of dying testate, since the forgetfulness
of a witness would frustrate all his precaution;
and a question of title by will, which, in the
spirit of the statute of frauds, the legislature
designed to rest upon written evidence alone,
would, after all, depend upon the integrity and
the memory of those who were called on to attest
the instrument. The consequence would be that
I may have a good will by me to-day, but, if I live
five years, it may become a void instrument, be-
cause one of the witnesses to it cannot recall some
ceremony of its execution. Such a consequence
I would not aid in bringing about. It would tend,
I have no doubt, to multiply the attempts, already
too common, to set aside wills, since the chances
of success must be very much increased if the
frailty of human memory is to be called in to the
aid of the discontented heir.’ In the leading opin-
ion by Parker, J., the same views are expressed,
and he says: ‘Few persons witnessing a paper
would, after eight or nine years, be able to recall
every fact that might be necessary to give it legal
validity ; and if their defect of memory is, without
other impeachment, to prejudice the rights of par-
ties claiming under it, the mischief would be
greater than any that can result from this de-
cision.” * * *”

In consequence, we hold that the 1954 instrument
was executed with all the formality required by our
statute § 6-304, W.C.S.1945:

“All wills to be valid must be in writing, or
type-written, witnessed by two (2) competent wit-
nesses, and signed by the testator or by some per-

son in his presence and by his express direction,
Lee

It was signed by the testator and witnessed by two wit-
nesses at his request. That was sufficient.

We also hold the 1954 instrument, improperly re-
ferred to in these proceedings as a carbon copy, but
in fact an original instrument which bore the signa-
ture of the testator and the signatures of two subscrib-
ing witnesses, must be admitted to probate as the last
will and testament of the deceased.

Inasmuch as the 1954 instrument also contained an
express clause revoking all previous wills and we now
find that the 1954 instrument was the last will and
testament of the deceased, there is now left no ques-
tion but that the 1949 will of the deceased was re-
voked.

What we have previously said with respect to the
1949 instrument remaining as evidence of the contract
between the deceased and his first wife, Emily K.
Stringer, does not mean that the property of the de-
ceased should be distributed in accordance with the
provisions of the 1949 instrument because that will is
now revoked. It does, however, mean that the de-
ceased’s obligations under the contract evidenced by
the 1949 instrument must be discharged and satisfied
during the administration of the deceased’s estate, and
that the portion of that estate which would have passed.
to the family of the deceased’s first wife, Emily K.
Stringer, must be set over to them in fulfillment of
the deceased’s contractual obligation. Not until then
will the portion of the estate of the deceased remaining
after the satisfaction of the contractual obligation be
subject to disposition under the terms of the 1954 last
will and testament of the deceased.

ti‘ ’

It is, therefore, ordered that the judgment of the
trial court be reversed; that the judgment and order
admitting the 1949 instrument to probate as the last
will and testament of the deceased be vacated, set aside
and held for naught; that the court enter its judgment
admitting the 1954 instrument to probate as the last
will and testament of the deceased; that the contract-
ual obligations assumed by the testator under and by
virtue of the terms of the 1949 mutual and reciprocal
wills be fulfilled by setting over unto the parties named
in the 1949 mutual will of the deceased such properties
as are therein specified and which remained in the
possession and ownership of the deceased at the date
of his death; and that the district court make such
other and further order as may be necessary to carry
into full effect the conclusions reached in this opinion.

Reversed with directions.

In the Matter of the ESTATE of Charles L. STRING-
ER, Charles Limuel Stringer, also known as Chas.

L. Stringer, Deceased.

1 Bertie M. STRINGER, Appellant
(Defendant below),

ve

Wilhemine M. L. Miller, Appellee
(Plaintiff below).

No. 2871.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Nov. 8, 1959.
845 Pac.2d 786
ee

i

Le

Henry A. Burgess, Sheridan, for appellant.

Walter Scott and G. R. McConnell, Laramie, for ap-
pellee.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

OPINION

Mr. Justice HARNSBERGER delivered the opinion
of the court.

Both parties have petitioned for rehearing.

Appellee charges our opinion omitted material facts;
material facts were incorrectly stated; and important
points of law raised were not considered.

The omitted fact is said to be that appellant three
times denied there was a will. Such denial is not ma-
terial to the validity of the instrument. It could not
change the fact, established by competent evidence,
that there was such a will. Even had appellant known
there existed a last will and intended to conceal it—
which does not appear to be the case—the instrument
would still have been and remained the deceased’s last
will and testament.

Appellee intimates that when a witness, who at one
time was an attorney for the proponent of a will and
who is attorney for the special administrator, testifies
to the signature of the deceased upon that will, such
testimony must be presumed to be influenced by in-
terest. It is alsoimplied that similar testimony of the
special administrator would also be tinged with a like
interest, These assumptions are entirely unjustified.
The services of both the special administrator and the
attorney end the moment any will is admitted to pro-
bate. It is also true that the former employment of
the lawyer does not suggest any reflection on his credi-
bility.

What we have now said likewise negates the charge
that we incorrectly referred to these witnesses as being
disinterested. Appellee criticizes our reference to the
brother of the deceased as an interested witness be-
cause the brother’s share would amount to only 1/12 of
the estate. The recipient of any portion of the estate,
especially one of the size in this case, certainly has an
interest.

Appellee next insists we misstated the distance as
being 40 miles which deceased traveled in order to have
the 1954 will witnessed. Appellant testified she and
the deceased went from Gillette to the home of the
witnesses and one of those witnesses said that dis-
tance was 40 miles.

The remainder of appellee’s complaint merely con-
sists of reargument of matter which has previously
been considered.

The appellee’s petition for rehearing is, therefore,
denied.

Appellant says we erred in sustaining the trial
court’s consolidation of the causes for the probate of
the 1949, 1952 and 1954 instruments offered as the
last will and testament of the deceased. Counsel indi-
cates that statements of the trial judge made in cham-
bers and in open court misled him into believing that
the hearing would be upon the 1954 will and upon its
termination hearing would be had upon the 1949 and
1952 wills.

We find an order entered on January 16, 1958, set-
ting the hearing on the petition for probate of the
1954 instrument at 10:00 a.m., February 3, 1958, and
also setting the hearing on the petition for probate of
the 1949 and 1952 instruments at exactly the same day
and hour, but providing that the hearing on the latter
instruments would immediately follow the hearing on
the 1954 will. The verbal statements attributed to
the judge did not vary from that order which had ap-
prised appellant and her counsel that they should come
into court the morning of the hearing prepared with
all witnesses and evidence available to them which
would be relevant upon the probate of either of the
several documents about which proof was to be taken.
Furthermore, the record discloses that counsel was
given an unrestricted opportunity to call and examine
any witnesses he desired and to produce any other evi-
dence pertinent to the matters so set for hearing.

When the appellant rested, the appellee moved that
probate of the 1954 instrument be denied. No ruling
was made upon the motion, but the court said, “Well,
let’s hear some more testimony, then”, and appellee
called under the statute and cross-examined the pro-
ponent of the 1954 will. This was followed by appel-
lant’s examination of the same witness who was then

li‘ ’

re-examined by appellee. Seven more witnesses were
then called by appellee, cross-examined by appellant
and re-examined by appellee, after which appellee rest-
ed. At this point the court said it wanted briefs.

«* * * about the execution of the Will which is
now offered for probate. I want a brief on that
as to whether or not it has been duly executed.
And then, I want a brief on-mutual Wills and the
effect of mutual Wills on a subsequent marriage
and the making of another Will.”

Appellant then inquired, “* * * are all these three
eases consolidated for this hearing?”; to which the
court replied, “Yes, they are.” To this appellant
made no objection, although her counsel remarked he
thought there should be an order of consolidation en-
tered, but did not pursue the matter.

A discussion about stipulations then took place, dur-
ing which the court inquired if appellant wished to
offer anything further, and on receiving an affirmative
response, the court granted its permission and appel-
lant’s counsel said he wanted to continue to call witness-
es, which he did by calling the proponent of the 1954
will and then called and cross-examined opposing coun-
sel under the statute, after which appellant rested,

Under these circumstances it remains in doubt at
what stage of the proceeding the hearing on the 1954
will ended and just when the hearing on the 1949 and
1952 wills began, if it began at all.

At this point we might comment that an order en-
tered April 17, 1958, the same day the court entered
its order admitting the 1949 will to probate, did not
pretend to consolidate retroactively the hearings upon

the several petitions for probate. The order merely
provided that the files in these causes be consolidated
into one file. However, without quibbling over wheth-
er the three causes were improperly consolidated for
hearing or merely considered together by the court in
reaching its decision as to which of the three instru-
ments offered was the last will of the deceased, the
appellant now has little cause for complaint regarding
the probate of the 1954 instrument, inasmuch as we
found the evidence in the record required that will to
be admitted to probate.

We think, however, that it is fair to conclude that a
just complaint may be that our direction to the trial
court should have been confined to the vacation and
setting aside of the order admitting the 1949 instru-
ment and ordering the admission of the 1954 will to
probate in its stead. With such a contention we could
agree, notwithstanding we remain convinced the trial
court was correct in finding the 1949 will evidenced a
contract from which the estate cannot escape. Among
the authorities which seem to represent majority opin-
ion on the question of how such contractual rights
should be asserted are those cited in 57 Am.Jur., Wills,
§ 716, p. 485, where it is said:

“* * * Generally speaking, the remedy of a
person injured by the violation of a contract for
the execution of wills containing reciprocal be-
quests and bequests to third persons effective upon
the death of the surviving testator is not to be had
in a contest of the probate of the will which con-
stitutes the violation of which complaint is made,
since, in the absence of statute, the only issue on
a contested probate is whether the paper pro-
pounded is ‘the last will of the decedent.’ Similar-
ly, a contract jointly to execute a single will which
is reciprocal in the bequests made cannot be assert-

ed as a ground for contesting the probate of a
later revoking will. It is not a ground of contest
to the probate of a will that it violates an agree-
ment to make wills containing reciprocal pro-
visions or revokes a former will made in pursu-
ance of such agreements, and the probate court
cannot refuse to probate a will on the ground that
it was made in violation of such an agreement,
unless such court is, by statute, given equitable
jurisdiction, or the probate of the will has been
enjoined by a court of equity. Jurisdiction can-
not be conferred by the consent of the parties so
as to permit the probate court to hear a contest
based on the ground that the propounded instru-
ment violates a contract for the execution of
mutual and reciprocal wills. * * *”

We do not have the exact type of statute giving the
probate court the equitable jurisdiction to which ref-
erence is made in the above quotation. Nor has the
probate of a will in this case been enjoined by a court
of equity. However, § 2-8, W.S.1957, formerly § 6-101,
W.C.S.1945, gives exclusive jurisdiction to district
courts of the state in probate matters in the following
words:

“The district courts of the state shall have ex-
clusive original jurisdiction of all matters relat-
ing to the probate and contest of wills and testa-
ments, the granting of letters testamentary and
of administration, and the settlement and dis-
tribution of decedents’ estates. The court granting
the letters shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all
matters touching the settlement and distribution
of the estates whereon such letters have been
granted.”

But this statute does not, in our opinion, change
the fact that in proceedings for the probate of an in-
strument as the last will and testament of the deceased
only matters affecting the validity and subsistence of

the will should be considered, and any right or claim
against the estate arising through contract must be
asserted in an independent action against the admin-
istrator or the executor of the estate as the case may
be.

The view we now take was touched upon by this
court in Church v. Quiner, 81 Wyo. 222, 226, 227, 224
P, 1078, 1074, it was said.

“While in this state the district court is the
court of general jurisdiction, and the same court
has by the Constitution (section 10, art. 5) jur-
isdiction ‘of all matters of probate,’ yet, in the
exercise of its probate powers, its jurisdiction
is limited and special, and when its acts in probate
are without [beyond] the limits of the special ju-
risdiction conferred, they have no binding effect
‘even upon those who have invoked its authority.’
eed

This statement in the Quiner case was made in decid-
ing that conflicting claims as to who was entitled to
receive distribution of a portion of an estate, under
separate assignments of the same interest, could not be
determined in the probate proceeding but must be
litigated as a civil matter. So it is that if appellee, or
any others, have contractual rights arising from the
1949 wills, these claims and rights must be ascertained
and adjudicated in a proper suit, separate and apart
from this proceeding, which was and must remain
exclusively one to determine the validity and subsist-
ence of a last will and testament of the deceased. Any
such action must, of course, be brought against the
administrator or executor of deceased’s estate and any
right or claim established must be satisfied during
the administration of that estate.

With further reference to the proper procedure to
be followed, where a contractual right is claimed, in
97 C.J.S. Wills § 1366 c, p. 298, it is said.

«« * ® So, where a party to a contract or agree-
ment for mutual wills makes a later will, even
without notice to, or the knowledge of, the other
party, or after the latter’s death, the mutual will
cannot be admitted to probate, since it is not the
testator’s last will, and the later will may be admit-
ted, without regard to the fact that it does not
comply with the agreement; but it is subject to the
rights of interested persons to compel a distri-
bution of the estate under the contract on which
the mutual will was founded, their remedy being,
however, in equity, and not in the probate court,
which has no choice but to distribute the estate
under the last will.”

In In re Isacson’s Estate, 77 Idaho 12, 285 P.2d 1061,
1068, it is said:

“Although a joint will and acceptance of bene-
fits thereunder by the survivor may, under some
circumstances, constitute an irrevocable contract,
such facts do not make the joint will the irrevoc-
able will of the survivor; and his joint will may
be revoked by a later will. Furthermore, the
question of whether an irrevocable contract exists
is not an issue when the later will is tendered for
probate.

“The issues of whether such an irrevocable
contract exists and the enforcement thereof are
matters to be tried out in a court of equity, and
are beyond the equitable powers of the probate
court in probate matters. *

The statement as to the forum in which the con-
tractual right is to be litigated does not, of course,
apply in this state because of our statute quoted above.

Also in Annotation, 169 A.L.R. 9, 53, we find the
following:

“Generally speaking, the remedy of a person
injured by the violation of a contract for the ex-
ecution of wills containing reciprocal bequests
and bequests to third persons effective upon the
death of the surviving testator is not to be had ina
contest of the probate of the will which con-
stitutes the violation of which complaint is made,
since, in the absence of statute, the only issue on
a contested probate is whether the paper pro-
pounded is ‘the last will of the decedent.’ * * *”

Other authorities are Smith v. Davis, 200 Ga. 317, 37
8.H.2d 182; Id., 208 Ga. 175, 45 S.H.2d 609; In re
Kenny’s Estate, 2833 Iowa 600, 10 N.W.2d 73; In re
Cocklin’s Estate, 230 Iowa 415, 297 N.W. 864; Id., 232
Towa 266, 5 N.W.2d 577; 236 Iowa 98, 17 N.W.2d 129,
157 A.L.R. 584.

In consequence of what we now say here, the opinion
heretofore rendered and the order and direction con-
tained in the final paragraph thereof is modified and
the last paragraph made to read as follows:

“It is, therefore, ordered that the judgment of
the trial court be reversed; that the judgment and
order admitting the 1949 instrument to probate
as the last will and testament of the deceased
be vacated, set aside and held for naught; that
the court enter its judgment admitting the 1954
instrument to probate as the last will and testa-
ment of the deceased; and that the court make
such orders as may be necessary to carry into full
force and effect this direction.”

Because of the direction now given a rehearing on
appellant’s petition is unnecessary.

Rehearing denied and directions in original opinion
modified.

Elizabeth Lucille CULVER, Executrix of the Estate
of George L. Culver, Deceased,

Appellant (Defendant below),
v.

Constance S. SEKULICH, Administratrix of the
Estate of Stephen E. Sekulich, Deceased, Appellee

(Plaintiff below).
No. 2887.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Sept. 15, 1959.
344 Pac.2d 146

Ey
vt

Murane & Bostwick, Edward E. Murane, Casper,
for appellant.

Greenwood, Ferrall & Bloomfield, Cheyenne, Rogers,
Field, Gentry & Jackson, Clay C. Rogers, Kansas City,
Mo., and Burbridge & Burbridge, Omaha, Neb., for
appellee.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

OPINION

Mr. Justice PARKER delivered the opinion of the
court.

On October 29, 1956, Stephen E. Sekulich was a
passenger in a Beechcraft, twin engine, Bonanza air-
plane piloted by George L. Culver. That morning the
two went from Newcastle, Wyoming (their place of
residence), to Billings, Montana, and in the afternoon
left for the trip home sometime near two o’clock.
About 3:45 p. m. the plane crashed in a ranching
area of Niobrara County, killing both men.

The present action was brought by Constance S.
Sekulich, the widow of the passenger and admini-
stratrix of his estate, against Elizabeth Lucille Culver,
the widow of the pilot and executrix of his estate, the
petition alleging that the plane was under the exclusive
control of Culver and was negligently caused to crash

to the ground, killing Sekulich. The allegations of
negligence were numerous and included the pilot’s
starting the flight from Billings when he knew or
should have known that a snowstorm existed in his
route which would make the trip extremely dangerous;
his failure to use alternate available landing fields;
his failure to maintain a safe altitude or to operate
the plane in accordance with instrument flight rules;
his operation of the aircraft at low altitudes in clouds
and snow showers, particularly in the light of his
defective vision; and the violation of various Civil
Air Regulations. The answer, admitting the status of
the parties, denied other alleged matters and set up
two affirmative defenses: that the plane encountered
weather elements which caused it to crash to the
ground, such action of the elements being an act of
God and not due to the negligence of the pilot; and that
the pilot and passenger were on a joint venture so that
the negligence of the pilot, if any, must be imputed to
the passenger.?

On the trial of the cause before the court without a
jury, a judgment was entered for plaintiff in the sum
of $65,544.82. Defendant has appealed, urging error
of the trial court in (1) permitting various experts
to testify and give opinions based upon hypothetical
questions which were not supported by any evidence
in the record, (2) making findings of fact which were
definitely and specifically based upon the opinions of
the experts, which opinions were not supported by
any evidence in the record, and (8) in issuing con-

1The question of the joint venture was not raised in
the appeal.

a “

clusions of law which being without foundation in the
evidence and based upon improper findings of fact
were erroneous and incorrect.

I

The Hypothetical Questions

Counsel for defendant cite the case of Peterson yv.
McMicken, 72 Wyo. 444, 266 P.2d 288, for the principle
that the scope and conduct of hypothetical examina-
tion is a matter of judicial discretion; and they cite
Miracle v. Barker, 59 Wyo. 92, 186 P.2d 678, as hold-
ing that the ultimate weight to be given to the testi-
mony of experts is to be determined by the jury (or
court) and there is no rule which requires them to
surrender their judgment or give controlling influence
to the opinions of scientific witnesses. Thus, defend-
ant proceeds upon the theory that the scope and con-
duct of examination by means of hypothetical questions
in the trial of a cause is a matter within the discretion
of the court; that a hypothetical question may be
framed so as to put any theory which may be deduced
from the evidence; and that a question may assume
any facts within the limits of the evidence upon which
an opinion of an expert may be desired and may omit
any facts not deemed by the questioner to be material
to his inquiry, provided always that the question is
based upon evidence which has been presented to the
court. Plaintiff agrees with this view and cites John-
son v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 59 Wyo, 120, 187 P.2d
615, and Phifer v. Baker, 834 Wyo. 415, 244 P. 687.
The authorities of both litigants are within the rule
stated in 2 Jones on Evidence, 5 ed., § 415.

«* * * the [hypothetical] question should be
framed so that it fairly and clearly states the as-

sumed facts which, according to the claim of in-
terrogating counsel, have been proved, and for
which there is some support in the evidence, and
calls for an opinion of the witness which is based

thereon.”

Defendant contends that “in practically every hypo-
thetical question there was an improper assumption
of evidence and that the question was not based upon
the evidence in the record.”

The principle upon which the first point in the
appeal is to be resolved is then by mutual agreement
entirely clear, i. e., those hypothetical questions which
were grounded upon evidence were proper; those for
which there was no evidentiary foundation were im-
proper.2. Accordingly, we turn to defendant’s criti-
cisms of the hypothetical questions. She first com-
plains of a hypothetical question preparatory to the
requesting of the opinion of witness Nelson, Director
of Aeronautics of the State of Wyoming:

«« * * on the afternoon of October the 29th,
1956 at approximately 3:00 o’clock in the after-
noon or perhaps 3:10 or 3:15, that is the approxi-
mate time, the airplane in question was observed
—was heard flying in the Lance Creek Valley
going east and a little north near the Rumney
residence and in approximately 15 minutes later

2 Notwithstanding the apparent agreement of counsel
in the present case, jurists and legal writers have
long been plagued by the difficulties which the hypo-
thetical question presents, not the least of which is
the formulation of the bases for the interrogation.

See McCormick on Evidence, 1954, §§ 14, 16; 23 Tex.

L. Rev. 109, 122-126; 2 Wigmore on Evidence, 3 ed.,

§§ 682-686; Judge Learned Hand, New York Bar

Association Lectures on Legal Topics, 1921-1922.

it was seen going in—it was observed going in
the opposite direction. Assume that near that
time it was observed near the Spencer Ranch,
which is approximately 3 miles from the Rumney
Ranch and in the same valley and that. at the
Spencer Ranch it was observed twice. The first
occasion it was going in one direction and on the
next occasion it was going in the opposite direction
and at the time it was observed at the Spencer
Ranch it was approximately 2 yards above a bank,
which is approximately 40 feet high. And assume
that about one minute before the crash it was seen
at the Rumney Ranch at a height of about 75 feet
and traveling in the direction in which the crash
occurred. And assuming that during that time,
covering approximately 30 minutes before the
crash when the airplane was heard and observed
as stated, it was snowing heavily. * * *”

Defendant argues that there is no evidence to show
that the plane which was seen by the various witnesses
was the Culver plane.

Gladys Rumney said she saw a light colored plane
which made a good deal more noise than her husband’s
one-motor plane go over about three-thirty and about
fifteen minutes later she heard it again, walked to the
door, and heard the plane hit the ground. Her son,
Raymond Rumney, went to the wreck shortly there-
after; and his father, James E. Rumney, went there
about seven o’clock that evening and helped to carry
out the bodies of Culver and Sekulich. This evidence,
uncontradicted, establishes without question that the
plane which Mrs. Rumney last heard was the one pi-
Joted by Culver. It is not so clear that the plane ob-
served some fifteen minutes or more before the crash
was the same one. William Spencer said, “Whether
it was the same plane or not, it went over twice in the
course of the afternoon,” and later said, “it sounded

like a two motor plane,” implying that the sound was
the same in each instance. Sylvia Hammell was asked,
“On each and every time that you heard the plane,
did you hear any difference in the working or sound
of the motor?” and she answered, “No.” Although
this evidence was not specific, it was unrefuted, and we
think it was substantial in the light of the improb-
ability that two different twin-motor planes would be
traveling over a ranching area at a low altitude during
a snowstorm within such a short space of time.

Defendant contends that there was nothing in the
record showing the height of the bank over which the
plane flew immediately prior to the crash. The
testimony does not say, as does the hypothetical ques-
tion to Nelson, that the bank was forty feet high, at
least in so many words. Josephine Spencer said she
thought the bank was higher than her two-story house,
the height of which she did not estimate. Defendant
says the point is material because it tended to show the
prudence or imprudence of the pilot’s flying the plane
at a height of forty feet above the ground. Even if
this assumption is warranted, which we doubt, it is no
more detrimental to defendant on this point than the
unquestioned evidence of Sylvia Hammell who said that
she saw the plane flying “just barely above the tops
of the trees” which she said were probably twenty-
five to thirty feet high. Thus, the statement in the
question of the height of the bank does not seem to
have prejudiced defendant.

Defendant urges, and we think with merit, that
there is nothing in the record to substantiate the state-
ment that “about one minute before the crash, it [the
plane] was seen at the Rumney Ranch at a height of
about 75 feet.” No witness testified to this effect,
Gladys Rumney, the only person mentioning the height

of the plane as seventy-five feet, said that she had seen
it at that height some 600 feet away going east and a
little north, that fifteen minutes later she heard a plane
which sounded as if it were flying north and slightly
to the west, and that immediately thereafter she heard
the crash. Sylvia Hammell said she heard the plane,
then saw it, and some ten to fifteen minutes later
heard it immediately prior to learning of the crash.
As above mentioned, she said the height of the plane
was “just barely above the tops of the trees.” The
only other witness mentioning height was Bertha Ann
Potter, seven years old at the time of the crash and
nine years old at the time of the trial, who alluded
only to the plane’s being two yards above the bank as it
passed over. Bertha Ann’s mother, Josephine Spenc-
er, said she received word of the crash shortly after
her daughter had called attention to the plane. The
scene of the crash was approximately three miles from
the Spencer residence and considering the speed of the
aircraft, the crash, according to the evidence, could
have occurred approximately one minute following the
time Bertha Ann saw the plane. It is clear, therefore,
that the statement in the hypothetical question that the
plane was seventy-five feet high about one minute be-
fore the crash was not supported by the evidence, at
least not literally. Courts have not always been in
agreement as to the rejection or acceptance of a hy-
pothetical question where there has been a minor vari-
ance in the facts upon which it purports to be based.
See 23 Mich.L.Rev. 411. 2 Jones on Evidence, 5 ed.,
§ 416, p. 784, after stating this general principle, says:

“But a question is not necessarily to be rejected
by the court although * * * the question does not
state the facts as they actually exist. * * * it is
sufficient if the question fairly states such facts as
the proof of the examiner fairly tends to establish,
and fairly presents his claim or theory. * * *”

2 Wigmore on Evidence, 8 ed., § 680, states:

“If the Premises fail, the Conclusion must be
disregarded. * * * But the failure whitch justifies
rejection must be a failure in some one or more im-
portant data, not merely in a trifling respect.”
(Emphasis supplied.)

The force of the challenged statement in this part of
the question to Nelson seems to be that the plane was
flying at a low altitude a short time before the crash,
and the evidence clearly sustains this even though it
does not bear out the exact footage at that time.

It is complained that there is no evidence to support
the statement that the Culver plane was in the area for
approximately thirty minutes, and it is pointed out
that the maximum time given by any witness was
twenty-five minutes and that the difference of five
minutes is fatal when a plane is traveling at the rate
of 200 m. p. h. or 8344 m. p.m. The factual basis of
hypothetical questions must be accurately stated, but
we doubt if the variance mentioned here should vitiate
this question, especially when none of the witnesses
purported to be accurately accounting for time by the
aid of watches or clocks and when throughout the trial
and in the questioning the word “approximately” was
used,

From what we have said, we think we have made it
clear that in our view the hypothetical question here
set forth the theory of the plaintiff and in general
the facts which the evidence tended to prove, so that
any failure to adhere literally to the evidence is not
fatal.

Defendant challenges another hypothetical question
to witness Nelson:

“Q. Mr. Nelson, in your judgment and opin-
ion, would it be the exercise of prudence for a
pilot flying an airplane equipped to be flown ac-
cording to instrument flight rules to fly that air-
plane under visual flight rules in a snow storm
where the visibility was limited to a distance of
from one fourth to three fourths of a mile in the
valley of the Lance River, in the area of the crash,
for a period of time approximately 25 to 35 min-
utes at an altitude of from 40 to 75 feet in trying
to find a place to effect a landing?”

The objection here is twofold: that there was no evi-
dence in the record to show that the plane was being
flown about in that area for a period of twenty-five to
thirty-five minutes or, even if it was, that the height
during that time was from forty to seventy-five feet.
Although the evidence is susceptible of defendant’s
interpretation, it is not for a party to foreclose views
which differ from his own. The record is devoid of
any official statement of the Billings airport authori-
ties as to the time of the Culver plane’s take-off. If
the trial court was obligated to accept as the time of
take-off the testimony of witness Seeley who said that
he learned it had occurred at 2:17 p.m., Culver could
not have been in the area where the witnesses were for
a period of twenty-five to thirty-five minutes. On the
other hand, however, witness Hartwig said he saw the
two men depart before two o’clock, and he gave as his
reason for fixing the time the fact that he was back in
his office at two o’clock for an appointment, and the
further fact that at ten minutes after two that day
his daughter, Mrs. Sekulich called and he told her
the two men had been out twenty or twenty-five min-
utes. If Hartwig’s testimony was interpreted literally
as the time of departure and if the plane traveled at
the maximum ground speed of 200 m. p. h., the dis-
tance of approximately 260 to 270 air miles between

Billings and the scene of the wreck might have been
covered by approximately 3:10 p.m. We doubt if the
framer of a hypothetical question should be required
as a predicate to prove what was happening at every
instant of a period, and we think that it may be assum-
ed that what was proved as having occurred at cer-
tain times in the period covered by the question may
be taken as true for the entire period unless the con-
trary be shown. As we have previously indicated, one
witness said she saw the plane flying just above the
tree tops and another said she saw it at seventy-five
feet (basing the height of the plane on the fact that she
believed it to be twice as high as their thirty-five to
forty foot trees). The witness Potter said the plane
was about two yards above the bank when it went over,
the height of the bank not having been directly speci-
fied by anybody. The trial court was entitled to exer-
cise its discretion as to the hypothetical questions pro-
pounded, and in this instance there was no abuse of
the discretion.

Defendant objected to the hypothetical question to
witness Peck, U. S. Air Force pilot:

«ce ® ® assuming that the pilot of this plane did
not turn around and go back in the direction which
he had been flying to escape the storm but con-
tinued into it, then tell us, what in your opinion,
based upon your knowledge of Civil Aeronautics
Rules and the standard and practice and custom
of pilots, he should have done?”

The basis of this objection was that there was no evi-
dence to show that the pilot continued into the storm
or that he should have turned around, he being author-
ized to fly on instrument flight. It is not essential that
every possible fact relating to a circumstance be stated
in a hypothetical question. Crosby v. Portland Ry. Co.,

58 Or. 496, 511, 100 P. 300, 101 P. 204; 2 Wigmore on
Evidence, 3 ed., § 682. If the adverse party wishes ad-
ditional facts laid before the witness, he is free to do
so on cross-examination.? Cobb v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry.
Co., 150 Or. 226, 44 P.2d 731. Whether the pilot Cul-
ver was continuing into the storm or trying to fly
around it was a matter to be determined by the trier
of fact. We think that either party in his questioning
might have made such assumptions as he reasonably
believed to be warranted by the evidence. The same
rule applies to the pilot’s authorization (if it actually
existed) to proceed on instrument flight.

Defendant objects to several hypothetical questions
to witness Lynch, a pilot and flight instructor:

“Now, do you have an opinion as to whether or
not it would be prudent and would be in accord-
ance with Civil Aeronautics Rules and the stand-
ard of procedure followed by air pilots for the
pilot to continue into the snow storm with a visi-
bility of one fourth to three fourths of a mile for
a distance of 30 to 40 air miles before going onto
instrument flight?”

“Mr. Lynch, assuming that on October 29, 1956,
and at about and between 3:25 p. m. until about.
3:45 p. m., Mr. Culver’s airplane was seen flying
in the Lance Creek Valley * * * it was seen flying
in a northwesterly direction just immediately be-
fore 3:45 p.m. * * * It was flying at an altitude
of from 40 to 75 feet from the ground, Now, as-
suming those facts, will you please tell us whether
or not you have an opinion as to whether or not
that plane has been flown by the pilot in accord-
ance with standard practices and customs of air

8 This principle was the subject of comment by the
court during the course of the trial.

pilots and in accordance with Civil Aeronautic
Rules and Regulations and in the exercise of rea-
sonable prudence. * * *”

“Now Mr. Lynch, assuming that a pilot flies in-
to conditions such as I have described and is
flying at the altitude at from 40 to 75 feet in the
snow storm—the altitude of 40 to 75 feet from the
terrain there, and is flying in a snow storm where
the visibility is only one fourth to three fourths of
a mile, do you have an opinion as to what he should
do with the airplane?”

Here defendant again urges that there was no evi-
dence to identify the plane and no evidence that it was
flown about the area for the period of time mentioned
or at the height stated. Additionally, she says that
there was no evidence to show that the plane flew in-
to the snowstorm with a visibility of one-fourth to
three-fourths of a mile for a distance of thirty to forty
miles or that the plane went on instrumnet flight. We
have already discussed our views as to the identity of
the plane, the period during which the testimony show-
ed it to have been in the area, and the height of the
flight at various points. As to the effect of the storm
on the vision, both William and Josephine Spencer said
visibility was about 300 yards and later set it at a
quarter of a mile. Witness Hammell said that she
could see approximately a quarter of a mile. Gladys
Rumney said that she thought she could see through
the snowstorm between one-half and three-fourths of
a mile. Witness Seeley who outlined the area of the
storm as of five o’clock on the evening of October 29,
1956, said that the storm was moving from south-
east to northwest at the rate of about 15 m. p. h.; that
the visibility in Newcastle between 12:45 and 1 p. m.
was one to two miles; that he flew to Upton, taking
fifteen to seventeen minutes, stayed there approxi-

_ “

mately two minutes, attemped to return to Newcastle,
and after eighteen miles was forced down at Osage be-
cause of the limited visibility in Newcastle; and that
he returned by motor vehicle the remaining four miles
to the Newcastle airport where he found the visibility
from then until he departed at four o’clock to vary
from one-fourth to one and a half miles. Although the
record does not show that the limited visibility as-
sumed by the question and fully warranted by the testi-
mony extended for thirty or forty air miles, the uncon-
troverted statements of the limitation in vision in some
of the areas under consideration was certainly a strong
enough circumstance to justify the assumption that a
person could not see a greater distance over any of the
territory which the plane covered during that period.

Defendant says that there was no evidence in the
record to show that Culver went onto instrument
flight,* but she fails to argue the matter or attempt to
show that the lack of evidence would vitiate the ques-
tion. It is therefore unnecessary that we consider
this point more than to say that the unexplained phrase
“before going onto instrument flight” does not neces-
sarily connote the change in the type of flight which
defendant assumes.

Considering the hypothetical questions to Lynch in
the light of the record, we see no impropriety in the
trial court’s having allowed them to stand.

Defendant urges that it was error for plaintiff to
ask witness Seeley whether there was a standard prac-

4 Instrument flight is flight solely by reference to in-
struments within the airplane as opposed to visual
Fight, flight by reference to things outside the air-
plane.

tice as to the filling of the tanks of a plane with gaso-
line before departure. No argument is presented that
the asking of the question prejudiced the defendant,
but it is merely said that the question is outside the
pleadings and the issues. We think the objection well
taken and that the question could have had no bearing
on the issues presented, but the adverse ruling was not
prejudicial to the party appealing.

Defendant’s arguments against the propriety of the
questions submitted to the expert witnesses lose con-
siderable force when we perceive throughout the dis-
cussion the attitude which is stated in words at one
point, “All of the hypothetical questions propounded
to the various experts were based on false and exag-
gerated testimony.” Actually, defendant seems not to
be challenging the existence of evidence upon which
the hypothetical questions could be based but rather
the dependability of the testimony given.

From our analysis of the record, it appears to us
that there was some evidence to support every hypo-
thetical question to which objection was made. Such
evidence was not always complete, was sometimes hazy
as to time, distance, and other vital points but in gen-
eral furnished a fair climate for the consideration of
the views of the expert witnesses. Whatever omis-
sions there were might well have been cured by the
calling to the attention of the experts on cross-exami-
nation the situations which the defendant thought
were unspecified or unclear. In any event, the credi-
bility of the witnesses and the weight of the testimony
were matters within the exclusive province of the trial
court.

Ir
Findings of Fact

Most of the claimed errors in the trial court’s find-
ings emanate from the alleged impropriety of hypothet-
ical questions, and since we hold that such questions
were justified, it is unnecessary to discuss at length
the findings of fact.

It is said that there is no basis for the finding that
Sekulich at all times exercised ordinary and reason-
able care for his own safety. We agree with the de-
fendant that there was no proof of the passenger’s be-
ing careful, but neither was there any proof of his be-
ing negligent, and under such circumstances the legal
presumption is that he was alert to the preservation of
his own life and well-being. Wilhelm v. Cukr, 68 Wyo.
1, 227 P.2d 988, 230 P.2d 507.

Counsel urge the finding that the crash was 293
miles from the airport at Billings was without sup-
port in the testimony. It is true that uncontradicted
evidence showed the air miles direct from Billings to
the crash to be between 260 and 270 miles, but there
is other evidence to show the distance from the Billings
airport to the Newcastle airport as approximately 2538
miles and the distance from there to the crash as ap-
proximately 40 miles, totaling the 298 miles somewhat
ambiguously found by the court.

Defendant argues that there is lack of support in
the record for the finding that the flight commenced at
the Billings airport at approximately between 1:50
p. m. and 2:17 p. m. and terminated at 3:45 p. m., and
that the pilot was operating under visual flight con-

ditions and circumstances. We have heretofore suf-
ficiently discussed the evidence relating to the first
portion of this objection. As to the second portion
the record lacks direct evidence to show whether the
pilot was flying by instrument or visually and is si-
lent as to the filing of a flight plan before take-off as
would have been essential under instrument flight
rules.° Counsel present no argument as to the allow-
able presumption under such a situation, but we think
that the testimony tending to show flight back and
forth in the snow at extremely low altitudes warranted
the finding.

The court found that Culver could in the exercise of
reasonable prudence and ordinary care have flown the
airplane to the alternate Wyoming airports of Sheridan,
Douglas, Casper, Crazy Woman and Rock Springs, to
Billings, Montana, or Chadron, Nebraska. Defendant
says there is nothing in the record to show that Culver
could or should have flown to Crazy Woman, Rock
Springs, or Chadron. Although no witness gave speci-
fic reasons why the pilot could have availed himself of
one of these three places, these airports with the oth-
ers mentioned are shown on Exhibit 24a as airports
in Wyoming, western Nebraska, and southern Mon-
tana. The fact that they were recognized by aeronau-
tic authorities and the further fact that they were out-
side the territory testified by witness Seeley as being
the storm area undoubtedly warranted the court in
finding that the pilot could have in the exercise of rea-
sonable prudence and ordinary care utilized one of
them.

+ § 60.41, Civil Air Regulations, as amended to Sep-
tember 10, 1956.

Defendant objects to the findings:

“Said George L. Culver failed to exercise rea-
sonable and ordinary care in flying and piloting
said plane at and near the scene of the crash over
sparsely settled areas, near and about several live-
stock ranches, houses, barns, fields, and trees in
said snow storm at altitudes from 40 to 75 feet at
a speed of approximately 180 miles per hour; and
when and while in flight, visibility was less than
one mile, and when he knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable care, should have known that hills and
bluffs project from the ground and in the exercise
of ordinary care, he could have and should have,
elevated or increased the altitude of said plane so
as to fly it with reasonable safety above the ob-
structions and particularly the obstruction into
which he crashed.”

She says that there was no competent testimony to
support this finding, but that on the contrary the pilot
had two alternatives, (1) to effect a forced landing,
or (2), to go on instrument flight and gain altitude.
She urges further that the trial court overlooked testi-
mony of various witnesses of two different landing
strips in the area and of the fact that the pilot Culver
had flown along a pipeline in that valley on different
occasions. As we have previously indicated, we think
there was sufficient evidence to justify the court in
finding that the flight occurred from altitudes of from
forty to seventy-five feet at a speed approximating
180 m. p. h. when the visibility was less than one mile.
We come then to the question of whether or not the
court was justified in finding that the pilot did not
exercise reasonable care in failing to increase the al-
titude of the plane so as to fly with safety above the
obstructions. This was only one aspect of the pilot’s
behavior which the court was obligated to consider.
Elsewhere the court had found the pilot “should have

reversed the course of said airplane and avoided en-
tering said storm area,” and that he could have in the
exercise of reasonable care flown to various alternate
airports. The finding under instant consideration
deals with the last aspect of the care required of the
pilot, he having been found to have failed in the exer-
cise of reasonable care in two other decisions. There
is no indication in this finding that the court failed
to consider the feasibility of an emergency landing.
Evidence had been submitted on both the potential and
the danger of doing this, and we must assume that the
court rejected this possibility after due consideration.
We think it was within the trial court’s province and
warranted by the evidence.

There is also complaint that the court found the
plane not to have been iced over at the time of the
erash but to have been in good order and functioning
properly. Various witnesses who were at the scene
of the crash were interrogated as to ice and indicated
that they saw none. The evidence of the witnesses
who saw and heard the plane shortly before the crash
spoke of the noise as being that of a two-motor plane,
thereby indicating that the engines were not missing,
and witness Nelson said, “I am certain that the air-
craft flew into the ground with both engines opera-
ting.” Although the evidence on the lack of icing and
upon the plane’s functioning properly is not over-
whelming, it is substantial.

Defendant objects to the court’s finding that:

“George L. Culver did not intend to and did not
in the crash commit suicide or engage in a suicidal
act. His death was directly caused by his negli-
gence and lack of care as stated in these findings.”

The objection is twofold, protesting both the finding
of negligence as the cause of death and the finding of
the pilot’s lack of intention to commit suicide. The
challenge to the finding of negligence adverts to the
hypothetical questions which we have heretofore dis-
cussed. Although there was no direct evidence as to
the intention, a finding that the death resulted from
negligence is inconsistent with and negatives suicide.

There is complaint that the computation of the court
in the findings and judgment is not consistent with
the finding made in open court, but defendant does not
show herself to be prejudiced or cite authorities on
the point.

Tt is objected that the court has made no findings
upon the allegations contained in paragraph seven of
plaintiff’s amended petition which relates to various
portions of rules of Civil Air Regulations. Although
no reason for the objection is stated, it is notable that
the trial court in this case was warranted in making
and did make other findings sufficient to support the
judgment. Several of these were based upon violation
of common law rules rather than of statutes but it is
well recognized that the duty of exercising care to pro-
tect another person against injury may either have
existed at common law or be imposed by statute. 38
Am.Ju.Negligence § 14. Where a finding of a certain
fact necessarily controls the judgment, the omission
of the court to find on other issues does not constitute
reversible error. 538 Am.Jur. Trial § 1184,

Il
Conclusions of Law

The arguments that the trial court’s conclusions of
law are improper grow out of the claim that the find-

ings of fact were incorrect and lead us only into furth-
er arguments on matters already considered. In the
main, it is urged repeatedly under the authority of
Miracle v. Barker, 59 Wyo. 92, 186 P.2d 678, that the
trier of fact is not required to surrender its judgment
on the hypothetical question and give controlling in-
fluence to the opinion of a scientific witness.¢ In sup-
porting her theory, defendant highlights the discrep-
ancies and inconsistencies of testimony with the re-
peated statement that the witnesses were inexperienc-
ed, inaccurate, and incorrect. This we do not think is
within the province of counsel to determine nor is it
for us to review at this time. The evidence presented
to the trial court was as we view it susceptible of an in-
terpretation given it by the trier of fact. It is the
function of an appellate court to ascertain whether or
not there was substantial evidence upon which the trier
of fact could base its opinion if it believed the testi-
mony. It is not for us to evaluate the evidence that
was presented.

We find no error in the record which justifies rever-
sal, and the case is accordingly affirmed.

Affirmed.

° We do not consider that the Miracle case establishes
the limits within which the trier of fact is cireum-
scribed, but merely provides the governing philoso-
phy. :

R. J. STUDER, d/b/a Studer Construction Company,
and Studer Construction Company, a foreign cor-
poration, Appellants (Defendants below),

v.

Willard N. RASMUSSEN and Clifford E. Rasmussen,
d/b/a Rasmussen Brothers, a Co-partnership, Appel-
lees (Plaintiffs below).

No. 2853.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Oct. 20, 1959.

344 Pac. 2d. 990

©
oS
~~

i
a
a

Henry A. Burgess and Bruce P. Badley, Sheridan,
for appellants.

Holstedt & Schwartz, Sheridan, oral argument by
Robert E. Holstedt and Harry F. Schwartz, Sheridan,
for appellees.

Before BLUME, C. J., PARKER, J., and PEAR-
SON, D. J.

OPINION

Mr. Chief Justice BLUME delivered the opinion of
the court.

This is an action brought by Willard N. Rasmussen
and Clifford E. Rasmussen against R. J. Studer, doing
business as Studer Construction Company, to recover
an amount due on a subcontract and for damages for
delay in connection therewith. Subsequently the Stud-
er Construction Company was added as a defendant.

The defendants had a contract with the United
States Government for constructing water and sewer
systems, paved roads and electrical distributing system

at the Glasgow Air Force Base near Glasgow, Valley
County, Montana. Part of this work relating to the
construction of roads was subcontracted by the defen-
dants to the plaintiffs in this case. Under that con-
tract the subcontractors agreed to furnish all labor,
materials, equipment and supplies, and to perform all
work as described below. It was agreed that the
work, labor and materials to be done, performed or
furnished by the subcontractors were as follows:

“Item No. 7. 8,760 Cu. Yd. Leveling Course,
14% inch minus (in place)

“Item No. 8. 30,300 Cu. Yd. Base Course, 114
inch minus (in place)

“Item No. 10 (Part). 1,670 Ton Mineral Ag-

gregate, (produce and stockpile
only.)”

The contractor agreed to pay the subcontractors for
performance of the subcontract as follows:

Estimated

“Unit Price Amount

“Item No. 7. 8,760 C.Y. $140 $ 5,264.00
“Ttem No. 8. 80,800 C.Y. 1.00 30,300.00
“Item No. 10. 1,670 Ton 2.00 3,340.00”

It might be mentioned that many months after the
times hereinafter stated Item No. 10 was eliminated
from the work to be performed on behalf of the Gov-
ernment of the United States but the government
agreed to pay and did pay the defendants for 387 tons
of mineral aggregate under Item 10 already produced
at that time and the defendants herein used 194 tons
and 91 tons of this aggregate and agreed to pay the
plaintiffs for that at the rate of $8 per ton.

The contract provided that the subcontractors
should be bound by the general conditions of the con-
tract between the government and the contractor.

This action was brought on May 15, 1957, in the Dis-
trict Court of Sheridan County. In the first cause of
action the plaintiffs claimed judgment for $2,818.04
and interest. This included the sum of $1,000 still due
under items 7 and 8, the amount paid by the govern-
ment for the 387 tons of mineral aggregate, the
amount due for the mineral aggregate used by the de-
fendants themselves and also the sum of $389.04 for a
bond furnished by the plaintiffs in accordance with the
agreement between the parties.

In the second cause of action plaintiffs claimed dam-
ages for delaying the plaintiffs in the performance of

their contract for a period from July 15, 1955, to Sep-
tember 15, 1955, and also further damages by reason of
the fact that they had to perform the contract in cold
weather and were delayed in the work by reason there-
of.

The court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs on
the first cause of action as claimed by the plaintiffs
and on the second cause of action found the following
facts:

“8, That on July 5, 1955, the Defendant wrote
Plaintiffs a letter directing them to move on to the
job and commence work thereon by July 11, 1955
at the latest.

“9, That in response to said direction from the
Defendant, the Plaintiffs moved their equipment,
supplies and labormen from Sheridan, Wyoming,
to the jobsite at Glasgow Air Force Base, near
the town of Glasgow in. northern Montana, and

were ready, able and willing to begin performance
under said sub-contract between the parties hereto
on the 20th day of July, 1955.

“10. That the approximate value of Plaintiffs’
equipment allocated, moved to and used upon said
job was $200,000.00.

“11. That on the said 20th day of July, 1955, and
for a period thereafter, extending up until Sep-
tember 12, 1955, the Plaintiffs though ready, will-
ing and prepared to do so, were unable to com-
mence performance of the work to be done by
them under said contract between the parties
hereto because Defendant had failed to perform
preliminary work required of him under his prime
contract with the government for the installation
of water and sewer utility lines which had to be
placed under the streets and roads before the
Plaintiffs could commence performance under
their sub-contract to place the gravel thereon, a
circumstance of which the Defendant was advised
and knew.

“12, That by reason of the Defendant’s action
in directing the Plaintiffs to move in upon said
job, before the same was in a condition for them
to perform under their sub-contract, and by rea-
son of the Defendant’s failure to perform the pre-
liminary work on its part to be done under the
prime contract with the government before the
Plaintiffs could commence performance, until
September 12, 1955, the Plaintiffs were required
to, and did, expend in wages for its labormen at
the Glasgow Air Force Base, the amount of Three
Thousand One Hundred Eighty-Four Dollars and
Forty-Two Cents ($3,184.42) during said delay
period, commencing July 20, 1955, and ending
September 12, 1955, for which Plaintiffs received
no benefit; and, for the same reasons and for the
same period, were required to hold in readiness
upon said job their machinery and equipment
necessary to perform the work to be done by them

under said sub-contract for which they received
no benefit, and for which the reasonable rental
value, or return thereon, during said delay period
amounted to Twelve Thousand Fifty Seven Dol-
lars and Six Cents ($12,057.06).

“13. That the evidence fails to show that the
additional delay of approximately one and one-half
months alleged by the Plaintiffs in the completion
of the work done under said contract, after the
same had been commenced, was entirely due to the
Defendant’s action in delaying the commencement
of the work to be done under the Plaintiffs’ sub-
contract until September 12, 1955.”

Judgment for the plaintiffs accordingly was enter-
ed upon the first cause of action in the sum of $2,-
818.24 and judgment for $15,241.48 on the second
cause of action. The court disallowed any damages by
reason of the delay claimed by the plaintiffs due to cold
weather conditions.

From this judgment the defendants have appealed
to this court.

The letter mentioned by the court written by R. J.
Studer to the Rasmussens is as follows:
“Billings, 7-5-55
“Whitey Rasmussen,
“Rasmussen Brothers:
“Thanks for returning the signed contract. I
am enclosing your copy for your files.

“You can get going up there as soon as you wish
to, but don’t figure on later than this week if pos-
sible. Arnold is adding to his dirt equipment, and
is going good on the streets. The contractor on

a ."

the dormitories and on the fire station, mess hall
etc. has signified his acceptance of our sub prices,
so that will call for some more gravel and possibly
aggregate at better prices. It looks certain that
you can put out concrete aggregate if you will at
pretty good prices. Herb has been approached by
several contractors including NWEng., about
whether we would put out material for them. He
has a record of whats been let and who has it. The
pit looks OK for sand too as far as I can gather. No
concrete tests as yet, but the stuff is non-pl. and
plenty hard.

“Hope that you can make plans to move up by
the end of this week, or by the 1ith of July at the
latest.

“Studer Construction Co.
“by /s/ RB. J. Studer
“R. J. Studer”

The writing of this letter and the receipt thereof by
the Rasmussens is not disputed herein.

The work to be done by the plaintiffs and appellees,
as explained by the evidence herein, was to do some
stripping of the top soil, brush and timber of the gravel
strata in preparation for removal of gravel for pro-
cessing, to produce gravel and place it on the roads and
streets in accordance with the contract requirements
and also to level the streets. In order for the plaintiffs
to do this, it was necessary for the defendants to com-
plete the utility work under the contract with the
Government of the United States consisting of sewer
lines and water lines. The Glasgow Air Force Base
was laid out in blocks, with streets laid out at the sides.
The water and sewer lines were not to be placed under
but along the sides of the streets. But these lines cros-

sed the streets at various places, and until the lines
were so laid across, there were only short segments be-
tween the crossings which were too short for the op-
eration of the machinery used by plaintiffs in placing
the gravel on the streets and leveling them. In accord-
ance with the letter above set out, plaintiffs, appellees,
arrived at the Air Force base on July 13, 1955, but
found that the water and sewer lines had not been laid
by the defendants as required so as to enable them to
place any gravel on the lines laid out for roads and
streets. They did some stripping commencing about
July 21 and July 28, 1955, but according to the testi-
mony of Willard N. Rasmussen, this work was of no
benefit in connection with the performance of the con-
tract in that stripping should be done at the same time
when the gravel is produced, but he employed some of
his laborers in stripping so as to keep them away from
the saloons.

There is some testimony in the case with reference
to some gravel production being done in the month of
August 1955, and the testimony of Willard Rasmussen
and Mr. Skidmore, the resident engineer in charge, is
not quite in harmony. The court evidently found that
this work was of no value and that as a matter of fact
the actual production of gravel for putting on roads
and streets was begun on September 12, 1955.

According to the witness Skidmore the defendants
did not speed up their work as they should have under
the contract which they had with the United States
Government, and we think we must accept the finding
of the court that the plaintiffs and appellees herein
were delayed in their work from July 20 to September
12, 1955.

a i

Counsel for appellants state that they make “no ob-
jections to the findings of the trial court so far as the
amounts due and owing under the first cause of action
are concerned.” And we accordingly proceed to con-
sider the questions raised by appellants in connection
with the second cause of action, namely, the damages
claimed by reason of the delay above mentioned.

1. The contract with the United States Government
provided that “Samples shall be submitted to the Con-
tracting Officer not less than 30 days before the start
of placement operations.” Counsel for appellants
claim that by reason of this fact the trial court erred
in awarding damages during the period that the Ras-
mussens were barred from placing material upon the
job; that “the time delay was a condition precedent to
the further performance by them of the contract.” If
the contention of appellants is correct, the amount of
damages awarded is excessive. The point is a trouble-
some one. Counsel for appellees contend that con-
sidering the facts herein and the various provisions of
the prime contract the understanding of all the parties
was that the submission of samples was not necessary
and that whatever samples were submitted were for
the convenience of the Rasmussens. The provision
above mentioned could be waived and we think that
the evidence herein sufficiently shows that it was
waived. There is no evidence in the record that the
agents of the government made any demand for sam-
ples after the Rasmussens arrived at the base or that
they raised any objections in connection therewith.
There is no testimony in the record that the govern-
ment prevented the Rasmussens from putting gravel
on the roads on September 12, 1955, because samples
had not been submitted as provided in the prime con-
tract. That would have been the time for making ob-

jections if any were to be raised under the foregoing
provision as to samples. The government accepted 387
tons of mineral aggregate but there is no evidence that
samples thereof had been submitted under the above-
mentioned requirement, thus indicating that the pro-
vision had been waived. The reason for the waiver is
explained partially at least by the fact that the gravel
was to be taken from pits controlled by the govern-
ment so that samples doubtless had already been ap-
proved by government engineers. Willard Rasmussen
testified as follows:

“Q. You were questioned on the sampling of
your grave] and your product at this base. Where
was the material actually accepted for the job? A.
Final acceptance was in place on the road.

“Q. There was no question of acceptance in the
the gravel pit? .. . acceptance on the road, is that
right? A. Acceptance on the road was the only
provision.

“Q. And the acceptance could not be had until it
was placed on the road? A. Not final acceptance.
They had to accept areas or pits, and so on and so
forth. By that I mean had we used gravel from
another source it would have to be approved all
on up the line to all in all, and so forth. This area
that was designated as the borrow area for our
particular part of the job had been approved for
the project. And the testing that was done when
we took samples and brought them to their lab-
oratory was done for our convenience so that we
could know what it took on our part to meet their
specification. And they approved our samples as
we brought them in.

* * * * * ®

“Q. You have been asked on page TP 8-2 about
the 80 days sampling period before starting of

placement operations. When you appeared on the
Base were you told what areas had already been
accepted for gravel? A. Yes, sir.

* * * * * Ea

“Q. When you arrived on the job had an area in
which you were to get the gravel already been ap-
proved? A. Yes, sir.”

R. J. Studer went on the witness stand and did not
claim that he placed any reliance on the foregoing -pro-
vision as to samples so as to excuse him from sooner
performing the work he was to do, and he evidently put
the same construction on the contract as the Rasmus-
sens. He said nothing in his letter of July 5, 1955, as
to the submission of samples. We are inclined to be-
lieve that we should not be justified in reversing the
judgment herein on the ground of the contention made
as above mentioned.

2. Appellants contend that in order that the appel-
lees herein might recover damages for delay they must
show (1) that there was contractual requirement that
the Rasmussens were to be given the work site by a
time certain and (2) that there was a delay and a de-
fault as well and that the appellees were damaged by
the default. They quote from the case of United States
v. Howard P. Foley Co., Inc., 829 U.S. 64, 67 S.Ct. 154,
91 L.Ed. 44, and United States v. Rice, 317 U.S. 61, 68
S.Ct. 120, 87 L. Ed. 58. In the latter case, Rice con-
tracted to install plumbing, heating and electrical
equipment while another contractor constructed the
building. A change was necessary to be made as to the
ground on which the building was to be constructed by
reason of the soil originally selected proving to be in-
adequate for the erection of a building thereon. By
reason of the change, the building was not ready for

Rice for some months. The court held that the date
for the completion of the building was tentative, of
which Rice had to take notice, and that under the cir-
cumstances the government was held to be not liable
for the delay. The case at bar is distinguishable in two
points. There was no tentative date. The letter of
July 5, 1955, set a definite date when the Rasmussens
were to commence the work. Second, no question of
change in the original contract is involved herein. In
the first of these cases syllabus 1, 829 U.S. 64, is as fol-
lows:

“Under the government construction contract
here involved, for installation of lighting of the
runways of an airport, the Government was not
liable for damages for delay in making the runways
available to the contractor, though the delay pre-
vented completion within the specified time, since
the contract did not obligate the Government ex-
pressly or impliedly to make the runways avail-
able promptly, it contained provisions anticipating
delays caused by the Government and providing
remedies other than an award of damages to the
contractor, and no fault actually was chargeable to
the Government 329 U.S. at pages 66-67, 67 S.Ct.
at pages 154-155.”

The court followed the rule laid down in the Rice case
and the decisive statement of the case seems to be the
following at 329 U.S. 68, 67 S.Ct. 156,

«« © * But in this case there is ample indica-
tion both in the extrinsic facts and in the contract
terms that changes and delays were anticipated
and remedies therefor provided. * *”

We think that this case too cannot be said to be in point
in the case at bar. That also can be said as to the case
of H. E. Crook Co., Inc., v. United States, 270 U.S. 4,
46 S.Ct. 184, 70 L.Ed. 488.

The rule of law applicable in this case appears to be
that the appellants herein were required, before calling
the Rasmussens to the base, to perform the prelimi-
nary work which was necessary to be done by them in
order that the Rasmussens might go to work and per-
form their work under the subcontract. Thus the
court said in Edward E. Gillen Co. v. John H. Parker
Co., 170 Wis. 264, 171 N.W. 61, 67, 174 N.W. 546,:

“The general rule therefore applies that where
labor and material are to be furnished and render-
ed by the one party and to be paid for by the
other, and the one furnishing the work, labor or
material is dependent to some extent upon the
other party performing his part, or providing for
the prompt performance by others of a portion
of the work, there arises by implication an obliga-
tion on such person, situated as is the defendant
here, not only to refrain from doing that which
will interfere or impede the contractor in the per-
formance of his part, but that it will also do all
that which is reasonably necessary in order to en-
able the contracting party to so perform. For a
failure in either respect damages can properly be
awarded to the person so delayed or impeded.

In the case of Stehlin-Miller-Henes Co. v. City of
Bridgeport, 97 Conn. 657, 117 A. 811, 818, the court
stated:

“The plaintiff claimed that this implied con-
tract was that the defendant must provide a build-
ing in a proper state of forwardness so that the
plaintiff's work could be installed within the time
limited in its contracts with defendant. The de-
fendant disputed this claim and insisted upon the
argument in this court that there was no authority
to be found supporting it. The trial court in sus-
taining the demurrer erroneously held the rule to
be contrary to plaintiff’s position. The rule is

undoubted in circumstances such as were present
in this case that an implied contract arose on the
part of the defendant to keep the work on the
building, whether done by itself or other contrac-
tors, in such a state of forwardness as would en-
able the plaintiff to complete its contracts within
the time limited. * * *”

A number of cases are cited. 5 Williston on Contracts,
1987, § 1293A, pp. 3686, 3687, considers this as an

elementary principle and states as follows:

«se # * Where a party stipulates that another
shall do a certain thing, he thereby impliedly pro-
mises that he will himself do nothing which will
hinder or obstruct that other in doing that thing.’
{Gay & Co. v. Blanchard, 32 La.Ann. 497] Often
indeed, the situation is such that the cooperation
of one party is an essential prerequisite to perfor-
mance by the other, in which case there is not only
a condition implied in fact qualifying the promise
of the latter, but, as already stated, an implied
promise by the former to give the necessary co-
operation. * * *”

See also Haley v. Brady, 17 Wash.2d 775, 187 P.2d 505,
146 A.L.R. 859; Indianapolis Northern Traction Co.
v. Brennan, 174 Ind. 1, 87 N.E. 215, 90 N.E. 65, 68, 91
N.E. 503, 30 L.R.A.N.S., 85. An annotation on the
subject is contained in 115 A.L.R. 65 and subsequent
pages and numerous cases are cited to sustain the rule
above mentioned. Another annotation on the same
subject is contained in 91 L.Ed. 48-80 and, on page 57

of this annotation, it is said:

“Where a contractee fails to have the premises
in a state of readiness, so that the contractor can
proceed with the work within the time contem-
plated by the contract, and the contractor is dam-
aged thereby, the contractee is liable for the dam-
ages caused by such delay.”

As above stated, counsel for appellants further con-
tend that delay itself gives no ground for damages, but
in order that damages may be awarded there must in
addition thereto exist a default. They further con-
tend that the appellants were not in default. That
contention seems to be based on the theory that in or-
der to be in default it was necessary in this case for
the government to so declare and that since the de-
lay of the appellants was excused by the government
there was no default on the part of appellants and that
hence no basis for damages herein exists on account
of the delay. We think that counsel are in error. The
fact that the government excused appellants’ delay
would under no principle of law excuse the appellants
from performing their duty to the appellees. We may
concede that if the appellants had been hindered in
their work by the government or by circumstances be-
yond their control, then no damages should have been
awarded. But that is not the situation here. The
testimony shows that appellants commenced laying
pipe for sewer and water about the middle of June
1955—Mr. Skidmore said June 24, 1955. Appellants
knew or should have known that when they wrote the
letter of July 5, 1955, to the Rasmussens that the ap-
pellees could not do any effective work for some time
thereafter. As early as July 6, 1955, Mr. Skidmore re-
quested the appellants to “step up the progress”. We
think the trial court was justified in finding that the
appellants were negligent insosar as the appellees were
concerned and that they should respond in damages on
account thereof.

8. Counsel for appellants contend that if there was
any default on appellants’ part appellees waived their
rights to recover any damages by continuing with the
work. Counsel cite the case of Snowball v. Maney

Bros. & Co., 89 Wyo. 84, 270 P. 167, 271 P. 875, 61
A.L.R. 199. That case, though containing expressions
that might be construed as sustaining the contention
of appellants, is not in fact in point. In that case Snow-
ball undertook to construct a road along a certain line.
The line of the road was changed and Snowball con-
structed the road along that line. He then brought an
action claiming that he was entitled to the profits
which he would have made if the road had been con-
structed along the old line. It was held that he could
not recover on that theory. It appears in that case
that there was a delay caused by reason of the change
of the road and Snowball was paid approximately $1,000
by reason of that delay. So, if anything, the case would
seem to be contrary to the contention of the appellants
herein. Counsel for appellants also cite us to 25 C.J.S.
Damages § 48, p. 521, where it is stated: “Profits can-
not be recovered as a distinct element where plaintiff
sues upon a completed contract and recovers the con-
tract price.” The authority cites Wyant v. United
States, 46 Ct.Cl. 205, and Ryan v. Rodgers & Hagerty,
Inc., 197 App.Div. 662, 189 N.Y.S. 269. These cases
are not in point. The authority also cites Southern
Bitulithic Co. v. Hughston, 177 Ala. 559, 58 So. 450,
from which counsel for the appellants quote in their
brief. The case holds that when the plaintiff resumed
work he waived the breach so far as profits were con-
cerned. The contract having been performed became
the measure of profits to be earned thereunder. How-
ever, the court seems to have made a distinction be-
tween profits to be earned under the contract and dam-
ages sustained by reason of some default on the part
of the owners. The court said at 58 So. 453:

‘cs ® ® Whatever may have been the proper rule
under the circumstances for the admeasurement
of damages in the way of actual losses—a question

we do not find presented by the record and as-
signments of error—it seems clear that plaintiff

could not recover profits he might have earned.
me?

The case cites 3 Sutherland, Damages, 8d Ed., § 714.
As we shall note later, that author is not any authority
for the proposition that when a subcontractor con-
tinues to work he thereby waives any damages which
he may have sustained by reason of the owner’s de-
fault.

If there is an express contract in connection with
the damages, that contract, of course, must govern,
That was held true, for instance, in the case of Geiger
v. Western Maryland Railroad Co., 41 Md. 4. Nor is
the statement as to the damages to be recovered en-
tirely uniform in all of the cases on the subject. See,
for instance, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hollerbach, 105
Ind. 187, 5 N.E. 28, and Mansfield v. New York Cent.
& H.R. R. Co., 102 N.Y. 205, 6 N.E. 386. In 9 C.J. 791
it is said:

« * * Tn case of a delay caused by the owner, the
builder is not obliged to abandon the work and sue
for damages, but he may proceed to complete the
work and then claim damages. * * *”

In the same work on page 798 it is said:

“Where the builder is delayed by the failure of
the owner duly to perform the obligations assumed.
by him, the fact that the builder continues the
work is not a waiver of his claim for damages for
such delay. * * *”

In the same work on page 914 it is stated:

«* * * although a delay or suspension of the work
is made necessary by the conduct of the railroad

company, the contractor is not obliged to aban-
don the contract but may subsequently complete
the work and recover, in addition to the contract

price, the damages caused by the interruption.
Bee 97

This rule thus stated in three different places in C.J.
and also stated in 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 502b(8) (a), p.
1060, is, we think, sustained by the great weight of
authority. The rule generally applicable is stated very
clearly in the case of Selden Breck Construction Co.
v. Regents of University of Michigan, D.C.Mich., 274
F. 982, 985, in which it was stated as follows:

“2, It is further urged by defendant that the act
of plaintiff in proceeding with, and completing, its
work under the contract after the alleged breach
thereof by defendant, operated as a waiver of any
right to recover damages caused by such breach.
I cannot agree with this contention. Considera-
tion of the subject satisfies me that the correct
rule is that upon breach of a building contract by
the failure of the owner to perform his obligations
under such contract, which delays the contractor
in completing his work thereunder, the latter is not
obliged to abandon such work, but may elect to
continue therewith after such breach and, upon
performance of the contract on his part, is entitled
to recover the damages sustained by him as a re~
sult of the delay caused by such owner. * * *”

The rule as thus stated is, we think, fairly supported
by the following authorities: Tobey v. Price, 75 Ill.
645; Weeks v. Rector, ete., of Trinity Church in City
of New York, 56 App.Div. 195, 67 N.Y.S. 670; W. H,
Stubbings Co. v. World’s Columbian Exposition Co., 110
Tl. App. 210; Allamon v. Mayor, ete., of City of Albany,
43 Barb., N.Y. 88; Beskin v. State, 119 Misc. 209, 195
N.Y.S. 951, affirmed 206 App.Div. 784, 200 N.Y.S. 915;
Florence Oil & Refining Co. v. Reeves, 18 Colo.App. 95,

56 P. 674; Snare & Triest Co. v. United States, 43 Ct.
Cl. 864; Belmar Contracting Co., Inc. v. State, 110
Misc. 429, 180 N.Y.S. 494; Sheehan v. City of Pitts-
burg, 213 Pa. 188, 62 A. 642; Underground Const. Co.
v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 367 Ill. 360, 11 N.E. 2d
861, 115 A.L.R. 57; 3 Williston on Contracts, 1936, §
704; 8 Corbin on Contracts, 1951, § 755. The subject is
treated quite fully in 3 Sutherland, Damages, 4th Ed.,
§ 714, pp. 2708, 2709, where it is stated in part:

«ss * * While the contract is to be regarded as
furnishing the exclusive measure of compensation
for the work done, the actual damages which re-
sult from the default of the employer should not
fall on the contractor. * * * The right of the con-
tractor to recover damages caused by the failure
of the owner to perform on his part is not waived
by proceeding with the contract as soon as he is
permitted to do so and by recovering compensa-
tion under it. * * *”

While in Tobey v. Price, supra, there seems to have
been a contract that the owner on account of his de-
fault should be liable for damages, the equity of the
situation is stated so plainly that we cannot omit to
quote from the case, At 75 Ill. 647 it is stated:

“Appellant argues, if he was tardy, and failed
to furnish the iron and cut stone work seasonably,
the plaintiffs could have abandoned the job, and
brought their action for such damages as they in-
curred in not being able to complete it. But he ar-
gues, if instead of abandoning the job they elected
to proceed and complete it, they will be presumed
to have waived the lapse of time, and to have done
the work under contract, and they can, therefore,
claim only the contract price. In other words, ap-
pellant claims appellees are entitled to no damages
for his delay. We know of no authority for such
a position. Appellees could have abandoned the

work and brought their action for damages, but
their right to proceed with the work to completion,
and then claim damages, cannot be seriously ques-
tioned.

“The performance of the contract by appellees
was dependent on performance by appellant, and
if he neglected or failed to perform in due season
his part of the contract, by which appellees were
delayed in the completion of the work, to their
damage, common reason suggests they should be
compensated therefor. * * *”

We see no reason to disagree with all these authorities.
We do not hold that damages must be paid for every
delay, no matter how short the delay may be. In the
case of a construction contract of any magnitude, a
delay due to unforeseen circumstances is apt to arise
in connection with one part of the work which will
cause also a delay in another part, and that fact should
be considered in determining whether or not the rule
above mentioned should be applied. We merely hold
herein that the delay in the case at bar was unreason-
ably long and should have been prevented.

It remains to consider the measure of damages in
this case. Counsel for appellants, aside from the fact
that they contend that appellees are not entitled to
damages at all, further contend that the court erred
in awarding damages to the appellees based on the
rental value of the equipment of the appellees. In the
ease of Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hollerbach, 105 Ind.
187, 5 N.E. 28, the court allowed as damages for the
delay interest on the investment. The court herein,
in addition to allowing the wages paid to the men em-
ployed by appellees while they were idle, also allowed
the rental value on the equipment of appellees from
July 20, 1955, to September 12, 1955, at the rates men-

tioned in Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 7, Associated Equipment
Distributors’ Compilation of Rental Rates, 1955 edi-
tion, which gives the average rental rates in the United
States. It appears by the evidence herein that the
appellees might have engaged in work and used their
machinery on other property but that they could not
afford to let their men go or apply for other work
when they were given to understand by the appellants
from day to day that they would soon be required to
go to work and perform their part of the contract.
That the damages for delay may be awarded based on
rental value has been held to be proper in Town and
Country Engineering Corporation v. State, Ct.Cl., 46
N.Y.S.2d 792; Immick Co. v. State, 251 App.Div. 919,
297 N.Y.S. 623; Lowman Const. Corporation v. State,
Ct.Cl, 10 N.Y.S.2d 963.

The foregoing rule allowing damages for delay, based
on rental value, has its basis in the actualities of life
and presupposes, of course, that the equipment would
be actually let to another to be used, and when used
it would be subject to normal, ordinary’ wear and tear.
We may take judicial notice of such normal wear. The
rental testified to and considered by the court is based
upon items in Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 7 but that rental is
the gross and not the net rental. That exhibit states
as follows: “The equipment rented is to be delivered
to the lessee in good operating condition, and is to be
returned to the lessor in the same condition as deliv-
ered, less normal wear.” The normal wear and tear
while in operation, when expressed in money, must
accordingly be deducted from the gross rental men-
tioned in the exhibit. That was not done. The record
is entirely silent on the subject of normal, ordinary
wear. In other words, if the equipment of plaintiffs
had been let to another for use, plaintiffs would at the

end of the period of letting have, say, $12,000, but
would at the same time have on hand equipment which
by reason of the use would be depreciated to a certain
extent, and whatever the amount of that depreciation
expressed in money may be that would be a loss to the
plaintiffs themselves and the net amount which plain-
tiffs would receive would be $12,000 less such deprecia-
tion. Undoubtedly there ave available experience ta-
bles of depreciation by reason of use which together
with expert testimony would present a basis for the
determination of this phase of the damages. For in-
stance, we have before us a publication by the Cater-
pillar Tractor Company entitled “Performance Hand-
book” in which among other things, is given as of
January 1951 the method of estimating hourly owning
and operating costs of each tractor with wagon or scra-
per while the equipment is in operation. The depreci-
ation, which we take to mean normal wear and tear
plus obsolescence, is given separately. That publica-
tion, which seems to be of general use in the United
States, figures the depreciation of each of such pieces
of equipment under the most excellent conditions to
be from $0.963 to $1.90 per hour, It would, on account
of the difference in cost, be somewhat higher in 1955.
We have not found any of plaintiffs’ statistics for de-
preciation of other pieces of equipment but the ingenu-
ity of counsel will doubtless find them. From what
we have found, it would seem that the depreciation of
the equipment of plaintiffs, if in operation, would, when
expressed in money, represent a rather substantial
amount. In the original petition the damages estimated
by plaintiffs, aside from the amount paid to workmen,
were stated at $7,079.96, while at the time of the trial
they were estimated at $12,057.06. It seems that when
plaintiffs made the original estimate of $7,079.96 they

may have taken into consideration the normal, ordi-
nary wear and tear but that this item was entirely for-
gotten at the time of the trial.

Even though there probably is available standard
information upon which there could be based a determ-
ination regarding depreciation of the machinery by
use, it is not a matter of which we can take judicial
notice.

Moreover the adjudication of the depreciation as to
its relative component parts might depend upon factors
other than those in accepted compilations. This is
then a matter which must be resolved by a district
court upon the presentation of proper evidence. Ac-
cordingly, we must reverse the judgment as to the
amount of damages from delay, aside from the amount
paid to workmen, and remand the case to the district
court for the determination of the one item of deprecia-
tion, that is to say normal wear, directing a new judg-
ment to be entered when that item has been satisfac-
torily shown and deducted from the present judgment
herein. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.

In part affirmed.

In part modified.

” a

Joseph PETERS and Lila Peters, Appellants
(Defendants below),

v.
James CAMPBELL, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 2869.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Oct. 20, 1959.

345 Pac.2d. 234

oO
a

cor)
J

A95

Robert S. Lowe, Rawlins, for appellant.

Brimmer & Brimmer, Clarence A. Brimmer, Rawlins,
for appellee.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNS-
BERGER, JJ.

OPINION.

Mr. Chief Justice BLUME delivered the opinion of
the court.

On May 5, 1956, plaintiff, James Campbell, filed in
the District Court of Carbon County, Wyoming, his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he is

the father of an infant, Celeste Campbell, born to his
wife on December 29, 1955, in Rapid City, South Dako-
ta, and that the defendants, Joseph Peters and Lila
Peters, unlawfully retained the possession of that
child, On May 12, 1956, the court issued a writ of
habeas corpus directing that the child be produced in
court on May 25, 1956. On March 20, 1957, defendants
filed their answer to the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, denying that the plaintiff was the father of
the child in question and admitting that it is in their
custody at Rawlins, Wyoming. They alleged that
plaintiff and his wife abandoned the child and are not
proper persons to have the care and custody of it; that
defendants have paid out a considerable amount of
money for the care and maintenance of the child; and
that the writ of habeas corpus is sued out for the bene-
fit of both plaintiff and his wife and that the latter,
accordingly, should be made a party herein. Plaintiff,
in his reply, denied all affirmative allegations.

In the meantime the defendants asked that plaintiff
and his wife submit themselves to a blood test in order
that their blood might be compared with the blood of
the child Celeste. An order to that effect was made and
the blood test was taken by Dr. Donald L. Becker of
Casper, Wyoming, who also took a test of the blood
of the child Celeste. The result of that test was, ac-
cording to the testimony of Dr. Becker, that the plain-
tiff, James Campbell, was not excluded from being the
father of the child Celeste.

The trial of this matter was had commencing on
May 238, 1957. The trial court found that the plaintiff,
James Campbell, was the father of the child, Celeste
Campbell; that the plaintiff has never relinquished
or abandoned the child and did not intend to abandon

|

his parental duties; and that plaintiff and his wife,
Bette, are fit and proper persons to have the care and
custody of the child, and by an amendment of the judg-
ment found that it is to the best interest of the child
that plaintiff and his wife have such care and custody.
The court accordingly directed that the minor child be
immediately delivered to the custody and care of the
plaintiff, James Campbell. From that judgment the
defendants have appealed.

On March 27, 1958, the court made an order staying
execution of its judgment during the pendency of the
proceedings in this court.

It may be mentioned herein that on June 16, 1956,
the defendants herein filed in the District Court of
Carbon County, Wyoming, a petition for the adoption
of the minor child Celeste but no final order has been
made therein.

The parties will be mentioned herein as they were in
the court below,

The facts herein are as follows: The plaintiff, James
Campbell, and his wife, Bette Campbell, were married
on August 6, 1951. They had one child born in 1952
and another child born in 1954. Plaintiff is connected
with the Air Force of the United States and is a staff
sergeant and has been awarded a medal for distin-
guished service. Being connected with the Air Force
required him to be absent from his usual home a good
deal of the time and that fact caused some friction
between him and his wife. Bette, who also had pre-
viously been connected with the Air Force, wanted to
go to college while the plaintiff was away from home
and she went to college in Kansas City, Missouri, in

the months of March and April 1955. At that time she
met Ray Cardona, who was of Spanish descent, and,
according to her testimony, she was intimate with him
during the latter part of April and the early part of
May 1955. She definitely discovered that she was preg-
nant in the latter part of June 1955 and, having had
intercourse with Cardona later than the time that she
had cohabitated with her husband, she concluded that
any child that she would have would be the child of
Ray Cardona and that it would be best that any child
by Cardona should be adopted by some outside persons.
To accomplish that fact she called upon the Reverend
L. R. Buckman to find some suitable people who would
undertake the care and custody of the child. She
thought that the child would be born about February
1, the period of gestation being on the average 280 days.
The child was born on December 29, 1955. On Decem-
ber 30, 1955, Bette Campbell signed a written relin-
quishment to the child and consented to the adoption
of the child by others without any notice to her, The
following statement appears, dated December 31, 1955:

“To Whom It May Concern:

“Permission is hereby granted to release the
person of baby girl born to Mrs. James R. Camp-
bell on December 29, 1955, to the custody of Les-
ter Buckman.

“Signed: Bette H. Campbell
“Signed: Bette H. Campbell
“Csigned] James R. Campbell”
Mr. Buckman took charge of the child and delivered it

to the defendants herein on January 6, 1956. Accord-
ing to the testimony of plaintiff and his wife, they

a ”

figured that in view of the fact that the child was
born on December 29, 1955, it was born prematurely
if considered as the child of Ray Cardona, but they
discovered sometime in January 1956, through the
Welfare Department, that the child was not born pre-
maturely but weighed seven pounds and seven ounces
and that it was accordingly a normal child. They con-
cluded that the father of the child was James Camp-
bell, the plaintiff herein, who, according to their testi-
mony, was with his wife in Kansas City, Missouri, for
the period of four days during the latter part of March
1955, so that the child was born within the period of
gestation of approximately 280 days figured from the
time that plaintiff and his wife cohabited as above
mentioned. Plaintiff then called upon the Reverend
Buckman to deliver the child to him and when he did
not do so plaintiff brought an action against him in
the Circuit Court of South Dakota for a writ of habeas
corpus to obtain the custody and care of the child, A
hearing was had in that connection on March 28, 1956.
The court found that James Campbell was the father
of the child but inasmuch as the child had been deliv-
ered to the defendants in this case by the Reverend
Buckman, the write of habeas corpus was discharged.
After that, on May 5, 1956, the present action was
brought as already mentioned. During the trial Bette
Campbell revoked her relinquishment to the child and
her consent to its adoption.

Counsel for the defendants advances three proposi-
tions, namely, the following: Proposition 1: In the
best interests of subject child she should be left in the
home and custody of appellants; Proposition 2: Ap-
pellee has no interest in subject child by virtue of the
fact that it was fathered by another, namely, Ray Car-
dona, and no consent of the waiver must be obtained

from appellee even though the child was conceived
and born during wedlock, the evidence being sufficient-
ly clear that the child was in fact illegitimate; Proposi-
tion 3: If subject child be deemed a legitimate child
of appellee for any reason whatsoever, then appellee
has lost all rights with respect to and in this child by
virtue of abandonment.

1. In connection with Proposition 1 it is said that
the father of the child does not have an absolute right
to the care and custody of the child and that a court
may award such custody to another if it is for the best
interests of the child to do so. It is not necessary
herein to question that statement of the law. In the
case at bar the trial court found that is was for the
best interests of the child that the care and custody
of the child be returned to the plaintiff, James Camp-
bell, the father of the child. There are no particular
facts in the case which show that the judgment of the
trial court in connection with this matter should be
reversed.

2. We shall next consider Proposition 8 in which it is
contended that the plaintiff and his wife abandoned
the child and have therefore lost all rights to the care
and custody thereof. The trial court on this proposi-
tion made the following statement:

“Tn this connection the evidence shows that for
sometime before and after the birth of the minor
child in question, his wife gave him the impression
that he was not the father of the child. She con-
vinced him that it would be better for all con-
cerned to have someone adopt the child. He con-
tinued to feel that way until sometime in January
1956, when he found out from a Welfare Worker
that the child was a normal baby and weighed
over seven pounds. He immediately went to see

Rey, L. R. Buckman about the return of the child.
In February of the same year he consulted with a
Mr. Clapp, who was the attorney who represented
the Peters in obtaining the relinquishment and
consent to adoption from Mrs. Campbell. He was
informed by Mr. Clapp that he could do nothing
about getting the child back. He then consulted
another attorney by the name of Gunderson. Short-
ly afterwards a Habeas Corpus proceeding for the
return of said minor child was started by the
Plaintiff in the Circuit Court of the Seventh Ju-
dicial Circuit Court of South Dakota. After a
hearing on March 28rd, 1956, the South Dakota
Court found that James Campbell was the father
of said minor child; that the Rev. L. R. Buckman
had surrendered said child to Joseph Peters and
Lila Peters; that said child was in the State of
Wyoming and that the Rev. Buckman had no con-
trol over said child at the time of the hearing.
Accordingly, the Writ and the Rev. Buckman were
discharged.

“Then in May, 1956, the present Writ, was filed
and proceedings to obtain the custody of said
child have been in effect until this date.

“These facts, under the light of the present
Wyoming decisions, would indicate to me that the
Plaintiff did not abandon the said minor child. I
feel that a fair interpretation of the evidence
shows that the Plaintiff did not intend to aban-
don his parental duties and his parental claim to
Celeste Campbell.

“In this case there is no evidence to show that
Plaintiff is not a fit and proper person to have the
custody of said child—the same can be said of the
Defendants. I think it is fundamental that natural
parents have a right to their own children and in
order to deprive a parent of the custody of his
child there must be grave reasons shown, These
have not appeared in this case.”

In order to constitute an abandonment of a minor
child by a father, there must be an actual intent mani-
fested to sever the parental relations. In re Guardian-
ship of Bruegger, 94 Cal.App. 589, 271 P. 523. There
must be a settled purpose to forego all parental duties
and relinquish all parental claims to the child. In re
Adoption of Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862. The
plaintiff, according to his testimony, signed the paper
heretofore set out permitting the Reverend Buckman
to take the child out of the hospital under the mistak-
en belief that he was not the father of the child. As
soon as he discovered his mistake and found that he
was the father of the child in question here, he took
every step that he could in order to get control and
custody of the child. We cannot see that in view of
such a fact it can be said that he abandoned it. We
have not been cited to any authority that under the
state of facts here presented a parent can be said to
have abandoned his child. It may be that the court
might have drawn an inference, even in spite of what
we have said, that plaintiff actually abandoned the
child. He was not required to draw such a conclusion.
If two different inferences may be drawn from a state
of facts, as we may assume was true in the case at bar,
then the inference drawn by the trial court is control-
ling. Rienecker v. Lampman, 55 Wyo. 159, 96 P.2d
561, and see Johnston v. Vukelic, 67 Wyo. 1, 213 P.2d
925.

It is not necessary we think to discuss the relin-
quishment of the child on the part of the mother and
we need not disagree with the able opinion of the Su-
preme Court of Utah in In re Adoption of D-——, 122
Utah 525, 252 P.2d 223. The mother of the child could
not bind its father by her relinquishment. The paper
signed by the plaintiff in this case, as above men-

a ”

tioned, did not constitute a consent to the adoption of
the child and in order that adoption be permitted the
written consent of plaintiff, if he was the father, was
required. Sections 1-712 and 1-709, W.S.1957 (§§ 58-
204 and 58-206, W.C.S.1945). This consent was not
required if he had abandoned the child. Section 1-719,
W.S.1957 (§ 58-218, W.C.S.1945). Since the court has
found that plaintiff did not abandon the child, the only
question remaining in the case is as to whether or not
he was actually the father of the child, so that we
must turn to a discussion of that question.

8. The second proposition argued by counsel for the
defendants is that the record shows that plaintiff in
this case was not the father of the child Celeste. It is
admitted herein that the child was born during the
time that plaintiff and his wife Bette were married.
Hence, a presumption of legitimacy arises. It is stated
in 7 Am.Jur. Bastards § 14, p. 68, as follows:

“No principle of law is more firmly established
than the principle that every child born in wedlock
is presumed to be legitimate. It was a maxim of
the Roman law, and one which the common law
copied, that the presumption is that he is the fa-
ther whom the marriage indicates, and Montes-
quieu, alluding to it, observed that ‘the wicked-
ness of mankind makes it necessary for the laws
to suppose them better than they really are. Thus
we judge that every child conceived in wedlock is
legitimate, the law having a confidence in the
mother as if she were chastity itself.’ * * *”

In 10 C.J.S, Bastards § 3b, pp. 18-20, it is stated:

“The policy of the law is to confer legitimacy
upon children born in wedlock when access of the
husband at the time of conception was not impos-
sible, and there is a presumption that a child so

born is the child of the husband and is legitimate,
even though the wife was guilty of infidelity dur-
ing the possible period of conception. In general,
however, the presumption is not conclusive in the
first instance and is rebuttable.”

Referring to the fact that formerly the presumption
was conclusive but that under the modern rule it is
rebuttable, the text further states at pp. 21-22.

“x * &* Hyen under the modern rule, however,
the presumption is a strong one, one of the strong-
est and most persuasive known to the law, which
means that, in addition to performing its essential
function as a rule of evidence, the presumption,
like the presumption of innocence, is accompanied
by another rule fixing the required measure of
proof, and there is authority for the view that it
is well-nigh conclusive and that it becomes con-
elusive in the absence of any sufficient proof that
the husband could not have been the father. * * *”

In this connection it may be mentioned that Dr. Bray
testified that Bette Campbell told him that her last
menstrual period was on April 5, 1955, and he conclud~
ed therefore that the child was not the child of the
plaintiff herein but that of Ray Cardona, who was inti-
mate with Bette during the latter part of April and
the first part of May 1955. The court excluded the
communication made to Dr, Bray on the part of Bette
Campbell, and this is contended to be error. Section
1-189, W.S.1957 (§ 83-2602, W.C.S.1945) provides that:

“The following persons shall not testify in cer-
tain respects:

“1, * * * * a physician, concerning a communica-
tion made to him by his patient in that relation,
or his advice to his patient * * *.”

a u

In construing an identical statute, it was held by the
Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Howle, 68 Ohio St. 614, 68 N.E. 4, that
the statute means what it says and that a physician
cannot testify to a communication made to him by his
patient. It is said in 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 301a, p.
841, that:

“The rule of privilege applies, although the pa-
tient is not a party to the action in which a dis-

closure is sought, and is not present to object.

It is admitted herein that Bette Campbell never gave
permission to Dr. Bray to make any disclosure of what
she told him, so that the ruling of the court herein
was correct. We might, however, mention in that con-
nection that the court stated, “I might add, that even
if such testimony [of Dr. Bray] was allowed to stand
it would not be strong enough to change the Court’s
findings in this matter”, namely, in regard to the pa-
ternity of the plaintiff of the child Celeste.

The evidence herein, if believed, shows that the child
Celeste was born, as stated before, during lawful wed-
lock. The plaintiff and his wife cohabited during four
days in the latter part of March 1955. The child was
born on December 29, 1955, and the period from the
March cohabitation to the birth of the child on De-
cember 29, 1955, was the normal period of gestation,
while the period from the latter part of April 1955 to
December 29, 1955, was not, This evidence was amply
sufficient to justify the court in finding that the child
Celeste was legitimate, unless countervailing evidence
was shown in the record that the plaintiff could not
have been the father. Testimony to that effect was

sought to be introduced into the case, attempting to
show that the child resembled Ray Cardona, who was
supposedly Spanish. Objection was made to such testi-
mony by counsel for the plaintiff. They claimed that
such testimony was conjecture. We feel that they mis-
conceived the law. It would have been advisable if a
recess had been taken and, the Jaw on this matter had
been fully elucidated when it was first introduced. A
trial judge cannot be expected to know all the ramifi-
eations of the law, while counsel in the case look up
the law in preparing the case with more or less care.
The cases on the subject are innumerable. A full
treatment is found in 7 Am.Jur. 649 et seq. Elaborate
annotations are found in 40 A.L.R. 97 and 95 A.L.R.
814. The cases on the subject are hopelessly conflict-
ing. It is said in 7 Am.Jur. Bastards § 32, p. 649:

“Tf the expressions of opinion in various cases
are to be regarded as accurate, there is a decided
conflict of the authorities as to the admissibility
of evidence of resemblance as bearing on the
question of legitimacy, the holding ranging from
an unqualified admission of such evidence to a
total exclusion thereof. * * *”

The point was considered to a considerable extent in
the case of State v. Thomas, 38 Wyo. 72, 264 P. 1017,
in which the court indicated that it did not favor in-
troduction of such evidence, at least not in a criminal
case. That case involved a child eight months old.
The parents were of the same race so that the case
perhaps cannot be considered any authority herein. We
might mention in that connection that 1 Wigmore on
Evidence, 3d Ed., § 166, p. 627, states as follows:

«* %* * The sound rule is to admit the fact of
similarity of specific traits, however presented,
provided the child is in the opinion of the trial

Court old enough to possess settled features or
other corporal indications.”

The law appears to be somewhat different if color

or racial characteristics are involved. It is said in 7

Am.Jur. Bastards § 34, p. 649:

“Generally, evidence that a child born during
wedlock is of a different race or color than the
mother’s husband has been held to be admissible
on the issue of legitimacy. This is true both of
opinion evidence on the subject and of demonstra-
tive evidence by exhibition of the child. * * *”

In 7 Am.Jur. Bastards § 50, p. 659, it is said:

“Evidence that a child is of a different race
or color from that of its mother’s husband is
strong proof of illegitimacy unless it is explained
by the child’s resemblance in race or color to the
mother. * * *”

1 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., § 167, p. 628, states
on that point as follows:

“A physiological principle, similar to the pre-
ceding one, but attended usually with more clearly
marked results, tells us that the progeny of persons
of one race receive from the progenitors certain
corporal traits very different from the traits
transmitted from a progenitor of another race.
The presence of these peculiar traits of the race is
therefore evidential to show a progenitor of the
race bearing those traits. The admissibility of
this evidence has never been doubted by Courts;
though its use, since the abolition of slavery in
this country, is now very rare, because the issues
in which it is relevant can only be uncommon.”

It has been said that in such case the age of the child

makes no difference. 7 Am.Jur. Bastards § 35, p. 650.

Clark v. Bradstreet, 80 Me. 454, 15 A. 56, 6 Am.St.Rep.
221. This should, of course, be true in clear cases as
in cases involving a Negro child, mulatto child, a child

of oriental features, Indian features, or, perhaps, Mex-
ican. Whether that rule should apply in a case such
as before us seems to be rather doubtful. In the case
at bar the child involved was only seventeen months
old at the time of the trial in this case. Whether it
had fairly well-developed features is not shown in the
record so that the case before us presents a doubtful
question, especially in view of the strong presumption
of legitimacy.

Assuming that it could properly have been shown
that the racial characteristics of the child only seven-
teen months old were such as to prove that plaintiff
could not have been its father, let us examine what
the record herein shows. . The child was in the court-
room and so were the two legitimate children born in
1952 and in 1954 to plaintiff and his wife. At Ques-
tion 248 on the cross-examination of the plaintiff by
Mr. Lowe, plaintiff was asked, “You will consent, of
course, to the Court seeing the children and comparing
them with the baby in controversy?” The question
was objected to as speculative. At Question 249 the
plaintiff was asked, “Would you state for the benefit
of the record a brief summary of the description of
the two children that you have?” This too was objected
to and the court sustained the objection. The court
also stated, “I think the children were in the courtroom
long enough for anybody to observe them.’ The an-
swer to this question was doubtless intended to enable
the court by way of comparison to say that the ap-
pearance of Celeste was different from that of the
other children, but the question itself gave no indica-
tion that the latter’s appearance was such as to show

a ™

that she might have been the child of Ray Cardona.
The witness was merely asked to testify as to the ap-
pearance of the other two children, not as to the ap-
pearance of Celeste, so that if the question had been
permitted to be answered this court would not know
anything about the appearance of Celeste—only about
the appearance of the other two children. At Question
492, on cross-examination of Bette Campbell, she was
asked, “Would you please describe the appearance of
Ray Cardona, please?” That was objected to as
speculative and too remote. The court asked whether
or not counsel wanted to make an offer of proof. Mr.
Lowe therefore made the following statement:

“Well, the purpose, Your Honor, is again the
connection of the established law; the right of the
Court to take into consideration the appearance of
the child in determining the question of paternity,
or known paternity that relates directly, I submit,
to the appearance of this child which has very ob-
viously Spanish features, as did Mr. Cardona.”

Thereupon Mr. Brimmer made the following state-
ment:

“We won’t agree and can never agree that this
child obviously has Spanish features. I have no-
ticed the child, I observed her closely today and
my opinion is that she can fool many of us. Can
you definitely think the law refers only to an ob-
vious case, for instance; a white couple of a negro
child, something like that. In this instance we
submit that counsel’s line of interrogation calls for
evidence that certainly is not precise, it is indeed
speculative, entirely too remote, it leads only to
conjecture.”

The court sustained the objection made by Mr. Brim-
mer.

The appearance of Ray Cardona, standing by itself,
was immaterial. We surmise that counsel expected
that if the answer should be that his appearance was
Spanish, then the court seeing the child in the court-
room would conclude by way of comparison that Ce-
leste was his child, but that is based on counsel’s as-
sertion that the features of the child were Spanish.
That assertion was denied by counsel for the plaintiff
and there is nothing in the record to show us the truth.
So far as we can see, the foregoing question did not
shed any light on the case insofar as this court is con-
cerned. This case strongly shows the disadvantages
under which this court labors at times as compared to
the advantages which the trial court has.

At Question 682 on direct examination of Reverend
Buckman by Mr. Lowe he was asked, “Now, Reverend,
how does this child, Celeste Campbell, compare in ap-
pearance to their two other children?” An objection
was made that the question was speculative and the
court sustained the objection. The question probably
implied that the children were different in appearance
but that is all. Children of the same parents often are.
The question hardly implies that the appearance of Ce-
leste was such as to show Spanish features, let alone
features which would show that the plaintiff could not
have been the father of the child.

We think that all the foregoing questions should have
been more specific or counsel should have followed the
general rule and offered to show what he wanted to
show, namely, that the child’s features were such as
to prove that she was the daughter of Ray Cardona
and not the child of the plaintiff. In the absence
thereof we are unable to say as to whether or not the
trial court’s rulings were erroneous. Tauer v. Williams,

69 Wyo. 888, 242 P.2d 518; Cooley v. Frank, 68 Wyo.
436, 235 P.2d 446; Wyoming Investment Co, v. Wax,
45 Wyo. 321, 18 P.2d 918; Casper Motor Co. v. Marquis,
31 Wyo. 115, 223 P. 764.

Aside from what has been said, we find affirmative
evidence on the part of Dr. Becker that by reason of
the blood test plaintiff was not excluded from being
the father of the child Celeste. We further find that
Bette Campbell testified that she had Spanish and In-
dian blood. We do not know whether or not her ap-
pearance indicates that inasmuch as we have not seen
her and the record contains no evidence in that con-
nection.

Counsel for defendants says that the court erred in
not causing Bette Campbell to be made a party herein.
We are unable to see how that would have prejudiced
the defendants. She was probably a proper party but
we cannot say that she was a necessary party.

Counsel claims that defendants should be reimbursed
for the expenses which they incurred in connection with
the child Celeste, and Mrs. Peters testified that she
and her husband expended something over a thousand
dollars in the care and custody of Celeste. The trial
court considered that that question was not in the case
atall, It is stated in 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 41a,
p. 570:

“A proceeding in habeas corpus relating to the
custody of a child must be viewed in two aspects.
Tn one aspect, the writ purports to afford an in-
quiry into the question whether the child is unlaw-
fully restrained of its liberty. In the other, it is
ordinarily a means for investigating and determ-

ining which of two parties has the better right to,
and is better qualified to have the custody of, a
child. * * *”

We have not been cited to any cases where the conten-
tion of counsel for defendants has been held to be prop-
er. In any event, defendants were early advised of the
contention of the plaintiff and at least not later than
the time of the commencement of this action. There
is no testimony in the case as to what amount of money
had been expended on the child by the defendants up
to that time.

We do not find any reversible error in the record
and the judgment must accordingly be and it is hereby
affirmed.

Affirmed.