State: Colorado
Volume: 200
Term: 1980-1980
Jurisdiction(s): Colorado
Source: https://static.case.law/colo/200.pdf

No. 79SA457

The People of the State of Colorado v. Sammy Naranjo
(612 P.2d 1099)

Decided May 19, 1980. Rehearing denied July 14, 1980.

1

ee 3

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Lynne Ford, Assistant Attorney
General, Litigation Section for plaintiff-appellee.

R. B. Fickel, for defendant-appellant.

En Bane.

JUSTICE DUBOFSKY delivered the opinion of the Court.

The defendant Sammy Naranjo appeals his conviction for first-degree
kidnapping and first-degree sexual assault. We reverse the defendant’s
conviction for first-degree kidnapping and affirm his conviction for first-
degree sexual assault. :

Between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. on September 25, 1976, the victim, who
was spending the week-end with friends near Estes Park, and another
woman went for a walk along Highway U.S. 34 toward the point where
the highway was closed because of damage from the Big Thompson flood.
As they returned, a car approaching them stopped and the occupants
asked if they wanted a ride. They declined. The car made a U-turn, and
again stopped beside them. Again the women declined the offered ride.
This time a man in the back seat got out of the car and grabbed the vic-
tim’s friend. The victim attempted to free her friend, and a second man,
the defendant, got out of the front passenger seat, and hit the victim in the
head. Meanwhile, the first woman freed herself and ran down into the Big
Thompson River. She looked back to see the two men shove the victim into
the car and leave at a high rate of speed. The woman who escaped contin-
ued across the river to a lighted house and called the police.

The car headed into Estes Park and then toward Lyons on U.S. 36. In
the back seat, the victim was subjected to involuntary sexual intercourse
with each of the three men. The car stopped only long enough for the men
to exchange places. The victim testified that she was hit continually and
that the defendant was the most brutal of her three captors.

4 ee

After about twenty minutes, the car turned up a dirt road and two
miles further, stopped. The defendant and his companions forced the vic-
tim to lie on the floor of the back seat and then shoved her head first out
of the car. They dragged her to a nearby grassy area, and, while continu-
ing to hit her, forced her to have oral, anal, and vaginal sexual relations
with all three of them. The assault was interrupted by the arrival of a
State Patrol car, and the defendant and his two companions fled. The
sheriff found the defendant nearby later that evening.

The victim, who sustained a number of cuts and bruises, ran to the
patrol car. She testified that, had the patrolman not arrived, she did not
know what the men would have done with her. Although the defendant
and his companions spoke to her in English, they conversed among them-
selves in Spanish. At no time did they suggest that she would be released if
she complied with their demands.

The trial court severed the cases against the defendant and his com-
panions. A jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree kidnapping and
first-degree sexual assault. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for kid-
napping and forty-five and one-half to fifty years in the penitentiary for
sexual assault, the sentences to be served concurrently.

The defendant contends on appeal that there was insufficient evi-
dence to support a first-degree kidnapping conviction. He challenges the
constitutionality of the first-degree sexual assault statute because it does
not include a mens rea element, and he questions the trial court’s refusal
to accept an instruction on second-degree sexual assault. In addition, the
defendant seeks review of his sentence for sexual assault.

The defendant questions the sufficiency of the evidence of first-
degree kidnapping because there was no proof that the seizure and move-
ment was done with
“the intent thereby to force the victim or any other person to make any
concession or give up anything of value in order to secure a release of a
person under the offender’s actual or apparent control . . . .”

Section 18-3-301(1), C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

In People v. Bridges, 199 Colo. 520, 612 P.2d 1110 (1980),
we determined that the language “to make any concession” in the first-
degree kidnapping statute does not include submission of a victim to ac-
tual application of physical force or physical violence as set forth in the
first-degree sexual assault statute, section 18-3-402(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973
(1976) Supp.; current version in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8).? The facts here fall within

' See also People v. Naranjo, 200 Colo. 11, 612 P.2d 1106 (1980).

2 Section 18-3-402(1)(a), C.R-S. 1973 (1976 Supp.; current version in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8), provides: “Any
actor who inflicts sexual penetration on a victim commits a sexual assault in the first-degree if . . . [Whe
actor causes submission of the victim through the actual application of physical force or physical violence.”

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subsection (1)(a) of the statute. The assault by the defendant was a crime of
physical force or violence. The victim had no choice in the matter, and the
assault ended when the police arrived. Such evidence is insufficient to support
first-degree kidnapping under the statute as construed in Bridges.

As a matter of law, the evidence here is sufficient only to sustain a
conviction for second-degree kidnapping. Because the trial court in-
structed the jury on second-degree kidnapping and there is sufficient evi-
dence to support a conviction for second-degree kidnapping, we remand
the case to the trial court to enter judgment and sentence for the lesser in-
cluded offense of second-degree kidnapping. See People v. Horrocks,
190 Colo. 501, 549 P.2d 400 (1976).

Il.

The defendant was convicted of first-degree sexual assault under sec-
tion 18-3-402, C.R.S. 1973 (1976 Supp.; current version in 1978 Repl.
Vol. 8),* He contends that the omission of language specifically referring
to mental culpability, a mens rea element, makes the statute unconstitu-
tional.

HM Legislative silence on the element of intent in a criminal stat-
ute is generally not construed as an indication that no culpable mental
state is required. In fact, the United States Supreme Court in construing
federal legislation has held that the basic definition of a crime usually re-
quires the conjunction of an act and a culpable mental state. United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57
L.Ed.2d 854 (1978); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct.
240, 96 L.Ed.288 (1952). This required mental state may be implied from
the statute. Cf. United States Gypsum, supra; Morissette, supra;
State v. Berry, 101 Ariz. 310, 419 P.2d 337 (1966). Cf. People v.
Washburn, 197 Colo. 419, 593 P.2d 962 (1979) (where the court con-
strued the words “intentionally” and “knowingly” to determine legislative
intent with regard to mental state). Moreover, as the United States Su-
preme Court held in Morissette, the mental state is a question of fact
which must be presented to the jury. See also People v. Washburn,
supra.

I The trial court therefore correctly instructed the jury on the req-
uisite element of culpable mental state [Colorado Jury Instructions

Section 18-3-302, C.R.S. 1973 (current version in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8) provides:

“Any person who forcibly or otherwise seizes and carries any person from one place to another
without his consent and without lawful justification commits second-degree kidnapping . . . .”

4 See footnote 1. The later amendment added the term “knowingly.” Section 18-3-402, C.R.S.
1973 (1976 Supp.; current version in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

6 a a

(Criminal) 6:1] and that sexual penetration must be inflicted “unlawfully
and knowingly.” The existence of a culpable mental state was considered
by the jury as an essential element of the crime, and thus, the defendant
was not deprived of due process.
Til.

The defendant also questions the trial court’s refusal to instruct
the jury on second-degree sexual assault. However, an instruction on a
lesser offense is required only when there is “some evidence” to support
the charge as defendant’s theory of the case or when “there is a rational
basis for the jury to acquit the defendant of the greater offense but convict
him of the lesser offense.” People v. White, 191 Colo. 353, 356, 553 P.2d
68, 70 (1976).

Second-degree sexual assault is committed when
“{t]he actor causes submission of the victim to sexual penetration by any
means other than those set forth in section 18-3-402, but of sufficient
consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission against the vic-
tim’s will.” (Emphasis added.)
Section 18-3-403(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). One of the
means set forth in section 18-3-402 is “through the application of physical
force or physical violence.” There was uncontroverted evidence in this case
that the sexual penetration was obtained by means of physical force, and
therefore, it is not error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury on
the lesser offense of second-degree sexual assault.

IV.

Il Finally, the defendant seeks appellate review of the propriety of
his sentence and the propriety of the sentencing proceeding. On review of
the propriety of the sentence, we consider three factors: (1) the nature of
the offense, (2) the public interest, and (3) the character of the offender.
People v. Malacara, 199 Colo. 243, 606 P.2d 1300 (1980), = § =~

The trial court sentenced the defendant to forty-five and one-half
to fifty years in the penitentiary for the first-degree sexual assault convic-
tion. The minimum sentence for first-degree sexual assault is ten years,
and the maximum sentence is fifty years. Section 18-1-105(1), C.R.S.
1973 (1976 Supp.; current version in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8). When the maxi-
mum, or near-maximum sentence such as the one here, is imposed, it
“must be supported by sound reasons in the record.” People v. Strong,
190 Colo. 189, 192, 544 P.2d 966, 967 (1976). In imposing sentence, the
trial court stated that the decision was based on'the evidence presented at
the sentencing hearing, psychiatric reports from an evaluation under the
Sex Offenders Act, section 16-13-201, et seg., C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.
Vol. 8 and 1979 Supp.), the probation department’s report, the staff psy-
chologist’s report, the evidence presented at trial, the nature of the crimes,
the defendant’s character, the possibility of rehabilitation, the need to
protect the public from the defendant, the need to punish the defendant,

and the deterrent effect of such punishment.

The defendant challenges the sentence primarily because he
had no significant criminal history. The lack of a prior criminal record is
only one consideration. The trial court properly considered the depravity
of the crime, People v. Euresti, 187 Colo. 266, 529 P.2d 1319 (1975), the
need to protect the public safety, People v. Campbell, 188 Colo. 79, 532
P.2d 945 (1975), and the probability of the offender’s rehabilitation.
People v. Duran, 188 Colo. 207, 533 P.2d 1116 (1975). The sentence is
supported by substantial evidence, and we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in imposing a severe sentence.

The defendant also challenges the trial court’s comment, when impos-
ing a life sentence for the first-degree kidnapping conviction, that the de-
fendant not be considered eligible for parole “until he had served a mini-
mum. of twenty-two years rather than the usual ten years.”5 The defend-
ant maintains that taking parole eligibility into account is not a judicial
function and improperly infringes on executive authority in determining
parole. We need not reach this consideration because we have vacated the
conviction and sentence for first-degree kidnapping.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court on first-degree sexual as-
sault, and we reverse the judgment of the trial court on first-degree kid-
napping. The cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

JUSTICE LEE and ROVIRA concur in part and dissent in part.

JUSTICE LEE concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I respectfully dissent in part I.

I concurred in People-v. Bridges, supra, for the reason that there
was no evidence of asportation, an essential element of kidnapping as
charged under section 18-3-301(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973. By reason of this
Bridges became only a first-degree sexual assault case under section 18-3-
402, C.R.S. 1973.

In the present case, the evidence of asportation was overwhelming.

The jury was properly instructed as to the law of first-degree kidnap-
ping, including the element of “concession.” By its verdict of. guilty, the
jury found the element of concession to have been established beyond a
reasonable doubt. There is ample evidence in the record from which this
conclusion could be reached.

§ Section 17-1-207(3), C.R.S. 1973 [current version at section 17-2-207, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.
Vol. 8, 1979 Supp.)], which was in effect at the time the defendant was convicted, provided that
one serving a life sentence would not be eligible for parole consideration until he had served ten
years,

I would therefore affirm the judgment of conviction of first-degree
kidnapping.

JUSTICE ROVIRA concurring in part and dissenting in part:
In People v. Bridges, 199 Colo. 520, 612 P.2d 1110 (1980), the
court adopted a new rule to be applied in cases in which a defendant is
charged, on the basis of a single criminal episode, with both first-degree
sexual assault under section 18-3-402(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol.
8), and first-degree kidnapping under section 18-3-301(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973
(now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8). The Bridges majority stated that the first-
degree kidnapping statute could not be used in such cases to secure en-
hanced punishment for conduct which “amounts in substance” only to
first-degree sexual assault. The majority imposed a “restrictive scope” on
the extent to which a victim’s forced submission to first-degree sexual as-
sault, as defined in section 18-3-402(1)(a), could constitute a “concession”
within the meaning of section 18-3-301(1)(a).

In interpreting the holding in Bridges, the majority here has stated
that “the language ‘to make any concession’ in the first-degree kidnapping
statute does not include submission of a victim to actual application of
physical force or physical violence as set forth in the first-degree sexual as-
sault statute, section 18-3-402(1)(a).” As a result of this interpretation of
Bridges, 1 conclude that, as a practical matter, even when a first-degree
sexual assault is accompanied by substantial movement of the victim by
the assailant, conviction for first-degree kidnapping is not possible.

Through its analysis of the phrase “to make any concession,” the ma-
jority has in effect held that a defendant who commits a first-degree sex-
ual assault may also be found guilty of first-degree kidnapping only in
those cases in which he has used words such as “I will let you go if you do
what I tell you” or “I will kill you unless you do what I tell you.” In my
view, the specific intent to force the victim to make a concession in order
to secure her release, necessary for a conviction under section 18-3-
301(1)(a), need not be established solely by such direct evidence. It may
be circumstantially established by the acts of the defendant which the vic-
tim perceives as demanding a concession. Specific intent is ordinarily in-
ferable from the facts, and proof thereof is necessarily by circumstantial .
evidence. Johnson v. People, 174 Colo. 413, 417, 484 P.2d 110, 112
(1971); Peterson v. People, 133 Colo. 516, 297 P.2d 529 (1956).

In Bridges, the court gave great weight to the two-prong test set out
in People v. Daniels, 71 Cal.2d 1119, 459 P.2d 225, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897
(1969). That test raised the questions of whether the movement of the vic-
tim substantially increased the risk of harm over and above that necessar-
ily presenting the crime itself and of whether the movement was incidental
to the commission of the crime.

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Applying the California test to the case sub judice, there can be little
doubt that the movement of the victim substantially increased her risk of
harm and that it was more than incidental to the crime. The California
Supreme Court in People v. Thornton, 11 Cal.3d 738, 523 P.2d 267, 114
Cal. Rptr. 467 (1974), applied the Daniels test as follows:

“In the incident involving Eileen S. defendant forced his way into the vic-
tim’s car and, seizing her around the throat with his arm, informed her
that he wanted her money. Rather than carrying out the robbery at that
location, however, defendant started the car and drove the victim several
blocks — steering with one hand while keeping her pinioned to the seat
by means of his arm around her throat. After parking the car defendant
took the victim’s money and then proceed[ed] with a sexual assault upon
her.

“In the incident involving Ottilia J. defendant approached the victim from
the rear while she was standing outside a tavern, held a pistol at her back,
and ordered her to walk down the street with him. He walked her thus at
gunpoint approximately one block to a car parked behind a service station
and forced her to enter it. There he ordered her to disrobe and, when she
had done so, took money from her purse. Then defendant commences a
sexual assault which lasted several hours. .
“It is clear that the asportation of the victim in each of these cases was not
‘merely incidental to the commission of the robbery’ and that such move-
ment ‘substantially increase[d] the risk of harm over and above that neces-
sarily present in the crime of robbery itself.’ The fact that in each case de-
fendant chose to consummate the robbery at a location remote from the
place of initial contact does not render the subsequent asportation ‘merely
incidental’ to the crime, for it is the very fact that defendant utilized sub-
stantial asportation in the commission of the crime which renders him lia-
ble to the increased penalty of section 209 if that asportation was such
that the victim’s risk of harm was substantially increased thereby. Clearly,
any substantial asportation which involves forcible control of the robbery
victim such as that occurring in this case exposes her to grave risks of
harm to which she would not have been subject had the robbery occurred
at the point of initial contact.” Id., 11 Cal.3d at 767-768, 523 P.2d at 286-
287, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 486-487 (footnote omitted).

The majority in Bridges attempts to distinguish People v. Molina,
41 Colo. App. 128, 584 P.2d 634 (1978), on the grounds that in that case
“the defendant warranted, and the victim perceived, that her freedom was
dependent upon her submission to the sexual assault.” In my view, what
the defendant did in this case fully supports the conclusion that his acts,
without saying more, were of such a nature that the victim could perceive
that her freedom and safety were dependent on her submission to his de-
mands.

10 es

In People v. Hines, 194 Colo. 284, 572 P.2d 467 (1978), this court
upheld a first-degree sexual assault and a first-degree kidnapping convic-
tion on analoguous facts. In Hines the defendant hid in the victim’s car
and, when she got in, placed a knife to her throat and told her to drive
away. During the drive, he threatened and sexually assaulted her. This
court, in affirming the conviction for first-degree kidnapping, and in re-
sponse to the defendant’s argument that the words “any concession” or
“anything of value” are vague and overbroad and that the first-degree kid-
napping statute is indistinguishable from the second-degree kidnapping,
said:
“An essential element of due process is that a statute defining a crime
state its requirements with reasonable clarity. People v. Blue, 190 Colo.
95, 544 P.2d 385 (1975); People v. Cardwell, 181 Colo. 421, 510 P.2d
317 (1973). However, the appellant has failed to meet his burden of prov-
ing this statute unconstitutional. See People v. Blue, supra. The instant
statute is sufficiently definite to give reasonable notice of the proscribed
conduct to one who would avoid its penalties, to guide the trial judge in its
application, and to guide counsel in defending one charged with its viola-
tion. There is no requirement that every term used in a statute be defined,
especially when the words employed are in common usage and readily un-
derstood. People v. Blue, supra.

“The appellant further argues that the first-degree kidnapping statute,

supra, is indistinguishable from the second-degree kidnapping statute
(section 18-3-302, C.R.S. 1973) and therefore equal protection require-
ments are violated. However, it is only where the same criminal conduct is
proscribed by both statutes that such a constitutional infirmity exists.

People v. Hulse, 192 Colo. 302, 557 P.2d 1205 (1976); People v.
Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975). That situation does not
exist here. First-degree kidnapping occurs only if the kidnapper intends ‘to
force the victim or any other person to make any concession or give up
anything of value in order to secure a release . . . .” Section 18-3-301(1),
C.R.S. 1973. This element is not required for second-degree kidnapping;
therefore, the statutes are clearly distinguishable.” Id., 194 Colo. at 288,
572 P.2d at 470.

The only pertinent difference between the facts in Hines and those in
the case at bar is that, in Hines, the defendant articulated his threat that
the victim would have to comply with his demands in order to survive,
while, in this case, the defendant used force to impose his will on the vic-
tim and did not articulate his demand or threat in words similar to those
used by the defendant in Hines. I would follow the rationale of Hines,
and therefore affirm both the conviction for first-degree sexual assault and
for first-degree kidnapping.

1

No. 79SA494

The People of the State of Colorado v. Rojorlo Roy Naranjo
(612 P.2d 1106)

Decided May 19, 1980. Opinion modified and as modified rehearing denied July 14,

So
3S
S

2 es

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Lynne Ford, Assistant Attorney
General, Litigation Section, for plaintiff-appellee.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Steven H. Denman,
Deputy, for defendant-appellant.

En Banc.

JUSTICE DUBOFSKY delivered the opinion of the Court.

3

The defendant, Rojorlo Roy Naranjo, appeals his conviction for first-
degree kidnapping and first-degree sexual assault. We reverse the defend-
ant’s conviction for first-degree kidnapping and affirm his conviction for
first-degree sexual assault.

The defendant’s conviction arose from the same incidents as in the
companion case, People v. Sammy Naranjo, 200 Colo. 1, 612 P.2d
1099 (1980). The facts are set out in detail there. The morning after
the assault, the police found the defendant’s billfold near where the car
was parked on a remote mountain road, and arrested the defendant and
one of his companions at Pinewood Springs, a nearby mountain town. The
victim identified Rojorlo Roy Naranjo, the defendant in this case, as the
first man to get out of the car and attack the victim’s friend.

The trials of the three suspects were severed because of statements
made by two of them which implicated the others. A jury found the de-
fendant guilty of first-degree kidnapping and first-degree sexual assault.
He was sentenced to life imprisonment for kidnapping and forty-four to
fifty years in the penitentiary for sexual assault, the sentences to be served
concurrently.

On appeal, the defendant questions the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a first-degree kidnapping conviction. He contends that because the
commission of the sexual assault was an essential element of first-degree
kidnapping under the prosecution’s theory of the case, the merger doctrine
must be applied to prevent subjection of the defendant to double jeopardy
in violation of U.S. Const. amend. V arid XIV, and Colo. Const. Art. II,
Sec. 18. The defendant challenges the constitutionality of the first-degree
sexual assault statute because it does not include a mens rea element. He
also seeks consideration of various trial court orders and his sentence for
sexual assault.

Our opinions in People v. Bridges, 199 Colo. 520, 612.
P.2d 1110 (1980), and People v. Naranjo, supra, determine the issues
here. The evidence in support of the first-degree kidnapping charge was
identical to the evidence in Naranjo, and therefore, we reverse the de-
fendant’s conviction for first-degree kidnapping.! As a matter of law the
evidence presented in this case is sufficient to support a conviction for sec-
ond-degree kidnapping. Section 18-3-302, C.R.S. 1973 (current version in
1978 Repl. Vol. 8). Since there was sufficient evidence and the jury was

1 We discussed in People v. Bridges, supra, the application of the merger doctrine when the
prosecution charges sexual assault and first-degree kidnapping and the submission of the victim
through the application of physical force or physical violence is the concession used to establish
first-degree kidnapping. In Bridges, we declined to apply the merger doctrine; instead, we con-
strued the first-degree kidnapping statute’s concession requirement narrowly, excluding from that
definition a submission of the victim through the application of physical force or physical violence.

We found the evidence in Bridges insufficient to support a charge of first-degree kidnapping under
section 18-3-301, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

4 ee

instructed on second-degree kidnapping, we remand the case to the trial
court to enter judgment and sentence for second-degree kidnapping.

People v. Naranjo, supra. The jury instructions on first-degree sexual
assault in this case were identical in relevant parts to those given in

People v. Naranjo, supra, and our determination that the instructions
supplied the necessary mens rea element controls.

I) The defendant argues that the in-court identification of him by
the victim and her friend should have been suppressed by the trial court on
three grounds. First, he contends that a photo identification presented to
the witnesses a few days before trial was impermissibly suggestive. Al-
though the prosecutors made no comment while showing photographs of
the defendant and one of his companions to the witnesses, there were only
two photographs and both were mugshots. We assume for the purpose of
this opinion that the photographic showing was impermissibly suggestive.
Second, the defendant maintains that the showing of an independent
source for the identification made by each witness was insufficient. An in-
dependent source is tested by applying the following criteria: The opportu-
nity at the time of the crime to view the perpetrator, the degree of atten-
tion of the witness, the extent to which the prior description fits the
defendant, the level of certainty indicated by the witness at the pre-trial
identification, and the length of time between the crime and the trial.
People v. Jones, 191 Colo. 385, 553 P.2d 770 (1976). Finally, the defend-
ant argues that the pre-trial identification was done without notifying de-
fense counsel as had been agreed earlier between counsel and ordered by
the court.

HN The standard for determining when a suggestive pre-trial iden-
tification procedure prevents in-court identification of the defendant is if
the pre-trial identification “was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise
to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 971, 19
L.Ed.2d 1247, 1253. The People have the burden of establishing by clear
and convincing evidence that the in-court identification arises from an in-
dependent source and is not the direct product of the suggestive pre-trial
identification procedure. Huguley v. People, 195 Colo. 259, 577 P.2d 746
(1978).

IB Here, the trial court ruled that both witnesses’ in-court identifi-
cations of the defendant were independent and made specific findings on
the factors which determine independence. Huguley, supra.

The trial court found that both witnesses had face-to-face encounters
with the defendant under conditions with enough light to see him clearly.
Although the victim had not identified the defendant from photographs
shown to her shortly after the incident, the court found that the failure to
identify was ambiguous and that it did not give rise to misidentification of
the defendant at trial. The court concluded that the testimony of the

es 15
witnesses was based on independent recollection of the incident and not on
the photographic identification. All these findings were supported by sub-
stantial evidence.

The record does not support the defendant’s claim that the photo-
graphs shown to the witnesses before trial without prior notification to de-
fense counsel violated a court order. No such order appears in the record
or in the transcript of the suppression hearing. The trial court properly
permitted the in-court identification of the defendant by both witnesses.

The defendant’s trial was severed from those of his co-
defendants to avoid prejudicial evidence admissible only against the other
defendants.? The trial court also ruled that reference to the other defend-
ants by last name should be avoided as confusing and prejudicial since the
last names of all three were the same. The defendant here argues that the
severance was nullified by three references to the other defendants during
his trial. The first two references were use of the last name. Both times the
defendant objected and the objection was sustained by the trial court.

The third reference was in testimony by a Colorado Bureau of Inves-
tigation employee about pubic hair from one of the other defendants
which was found on the victim. The trial court denied the defendant’s re-
quest for a mistrial because the pubic hair evidence was relevant to the
crime charged under section 18-3-402(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol.
8). This subsection provides that first-degree sexual assault will be a class
2 felony if “(a) in the commission of the sexual assault the actor is physi-
cally aided or abetted by one or more other persons.” Testimony that an-
other individual participated in the sexual assault tends to establish that
the given defendant was aided and abetted in the commission of his crime.
Thus, the only valid objection by the defendant was that the witness used
the name “Naranjo” forbidden by the trial court. The reference to the
name, only the third in a long trial, was not sufficiently prejudicial to
make the denial of a mistrial a gross abuse of discretion. See People v.
Sexton, 192 Colo. 81, 555 P.2d 1151 (1976).

The defendant further contends that the trial court erred by instruct-
ing on complicity and on sexual assault when the defendant was aided or
abetted by others because the instructions given together could lead to
an inconsistent verdict. We disagree.

The two instructions provided accurate guidance to the jury.
The defendant was charged with first-degree sexual assault, a class 2 fel-
ony if the defendant is assisted by others. Section 18-3-402(2), C.R.S.
1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). The evidence supported the court’s instruction

2 The other defendants had confessed to most of the acts which were the basis for the criminal
charges.
3 Section 18-3-402(2)(a), C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

16 P|

on aggravated sexual assualt.* Based on the evidence, the jury also might have
found that the defendant assisted others in the commission of the crime whether
or not he himself committed sexual assault. Under the complicity instruction,
the jury could convict the defendant of first-degree sexual assault if it deter-
mined that he met the requirements in section 18-1-603, C.R.S. 1973 (now in
1978 Repl. Vol. 8).° An instruction on complicity may be given when two or
more people engage jointly in a crime. See McGregor v. People, 176 Colo.
309, 490 P.2d 287 (1971). The complicity instruction provided an alternative
ground for conviciton.

Finally defendant challenges the trial court’s comment, when impos-
ing a life sentence for the first-degree kidnapping conviction, that the de-
fendant not be considered eligible for parole “until he has served a
minimum of twenty years rather than the usual ten years.”® The defend-
ant maintains that taking parole eligibility into account is not a judicial
function and improperly infringes on executive authority in determining
parole. We need not reach this consideration because we have vacated the
conviction and sentence for first-degree kidnapping.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court on first-degree sexual as-
sault, and we reverse the judgment of the trial court on first-degree kid-
napping. The cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

JUSTICES LEE and ROVIRA concur in part and dissent in part.

JUSTICE LEE concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I respectfully dissent to that portion of the majority opinion which re-
verses the judgment of conviction of first-degree kidnapping. My reasons
therefor are set forth in People v. Naranjo, 200 Colo. 1, 612 P.2d
1099 (1980).

JUSTICE ROVIRA concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in part and dissent in part for the reasons set forth in People
v. Naranjo, 200 Colo. 1, 612 P.2d 1099 (1980).

4 The trial court treated the aggravating factor as an essential clement of the offense of first-
degree sexual assault.

5 Section 18-1-603, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8):

“A. person is legally accountable as principal for the behavior of another constituting a criminal of-
fense if, with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense, he aids, abets, or
advises the other person in planning or committing the offense.”

8 Section 17-1-207(3), C.R.S. 1973 [ourrent version at section 17-2-207, CRS. 1973 (1978 Repl.
Vol. 8, 1979 Supp.)}, which was in effect at the time the defendant was convicted, provided that
one serving a life sentence would not be eligible for parole consideration until he had served ten
years.

17

No. 79SA77

William Whittington, Jr. y. Harold Bray, Sheriff of Jefferson County,
Colorado

No. 79SA130
Stephen Edwin Ebelt a/k/a Stephen Vance Parker y. Robert Farris,
Sheriff of Summit County, Colorado

(612 P.2d 72)

Decided May 19, 1980. Rehearings denied June 9, 1980 on 79SA77 and June 23,
1980 on 79SA130.

18
|

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Michael Heher, Deputy,
for petitioners-appellants.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Anthony Marquez, Assistant
Attorney General, Litigation Section, for respondents-appellees.

En Banc.
JUSTICE DUBOFSKY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellants William Whittington, Jr. and Stephen Edwin Ebelt con-
test their extraditions to Maryland and Michigan, respectively, on the ba-
sis that.the Governor of Colorado did not review personally the requisition
documents before issuing Governor’s Warrants for extradition. In addi-
tion, each appellant raises individual issues. These appeals, which have
been consolidated, are from orders of the district courts discharging the
writs of habeas corpus. We affirm the orders in both cases.

HE Whittington challenges the sufficiency of the requisition docu-
ments as well as the Governor’s review of the documents. Neither alleged
insufficiency was brought before the trial court. Generally, an appellant
must raise the insufficiency of the warrant in the trial court where an op-
portunity for correction is available. Fox v. People, 161 Colo. 163, 420
P.2d 412 (1966); Self v. People, 133 Colo. 524, 297 P.2d 887 (1956). In

es 19

any event, a review of Whittington’s extradition documents establishes
compliance with section 16-19-104, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol.
8). Miller v. Cronin, 197 Colo. 391, 593 P.2d 706 (1979).

In the district court proceedings, Ebelt challenged his identification
and questioned the court’s jurisdiction, but he did not challenge the ade-
quacy of the Governor’s personal involvement in the issuance of the Gov-
ernor’s Warrant. Both appellants requested that we remand their cases to
the district court to take evidence about the procedures for issuing a war-
rant. We denied their requests.

The appellants maintain that they had no reason to question the Gov-
ernor’s procedures until the Attorney General’s answer brief was filed in
Massey v. Wilson, 199 Colo. 121, 605 P.2d 469 (1980), on May 14,.
1979, admitting that the Governor has delegated the authority to review
extradition papers and to issue warrants to an extradition secretary and
assistant attorneys general who aid the Governor’s office in extradition
matters. The date of Whittington’s habeas corpus hearing was January 16,
1979, and Ebelt’s, February 21, 1979. Therefore, we have no indication in
the records here whether the Governor personally reviewed the requisition
papers or personally signed the warrants. Had this matter been raised be-
fore the trial court, such testimony could have been supplied and any nec-
essary corrections made. Fox v. People, supra; Self v. People, supra.

We note that the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act defines
“Governor” to include “any person performing the functions of governor
by authority of the law of this state.” Sections 16-19-102(2), C.R.S. 1973
(now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8). Federal Law refers only to the “executive au-
thority” of the asylum state. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1976). Neither the state
nor federal law forbids delegation of the Governor’s executive authority to
employees in his office and assistant attorneys general.

In addition, it would not be proper for the judiciary to tell the
Governor how to delegate his authority in extradition matters. The general
tule is that “district courts do not have jurisdiction to interfere with the
executive branch of the government in the performance of its statutory
duties.” Moore v. District Court, 184 Colo. 63, 68, 518 P.2d 948, 951
(1974).

Appellant Eblet alleged that the requisition papers from Michi-
gan failed to establish his identity in the trial court. He maintains that his
name is not Stephen Edward Ebelt, but Stephen Vance Parker, and that
he signed Stephen Edward Ebelt at the insistence of law enforcement offi-
cials. He also challenges the fingerprint comparison and description of
Ebelt sent by the Michigan State Prison. The trial court heard Ebelt’s tes-
timony and evidence that when arrested, Ebelt listed his address as “17
Mile Road in Cedar Springs, Michigan.” The same address was listed in
the Michigan State Escape Notice for Stephen Ebelt. The trial court
found the evidence sufficient to establish Ebelt’s identity, and we see no

20 |

reason to disturb that ruling. Ramos v. Bower, 198 Colo. 473, 602 P.2d 4
(1979); Lomax v. Cronin, 194 Colo. 523, 575 P.2d 1285 (1978).

Ebelt also challenges the jurisdiction of the trial court because he was

held in the Summit County Jail longer than thirty days waiting issuance of
the Governor’s Warrant. Section 16-19-116, C.RS. 1973 (now in 1978
Repl. Vol. 8), provides: .
“If from the examination before the judge it appears that the person held
is the person charged with having committed the crime alleged and, except
in cases arising under section 16-19-107 [extradition of persons not pres-
ent where crime committed], that he has fled from justice, the judge shall,
by a warrant reciting the accusation, commit him to the county jail for
such a time not exceeding thirty days and as specified in the warrant as
will enable the arrest of the accused to be made under a warrant of the
governor on a requisition of the executive authority of the state having ju-
risdiction of the offense, unless the accused gives bail as provided in sec-
tion 16-19-117, or until he is legally discharged.”

Ebelt was arrested in Summit County on December 28, 1978. On
February 5, 1979, the district attorney moved the court for a thirty-day
extension in which to file the Governor’s Warrant. The court granted the
extension, and the Governor’s Warrant issued on February 8, 1979. On
February 13, 1979, the trial court granted the appellant leave to file a pe-
tition for writ of habeas corpus; the petition was filed on February 15,
1979.

HB Although the appellant was held in jail thirty-nine days before a
continuance was requested, the court did have the authority to grant the
continuance under section 16-19-118, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl.
Vol. 8), which provides:

“If the accused is not arrested under warrant of the governor by the expi-
ration of the time specified in the warrant or bond, a judge of a district
court may discharge him or may recommit him for a further period not to
exceed sixty days... .”

The extension granted was within the court’s discretion, and the appellant
was not prejudiced by the detention. Norrod v. Bower, 187 Colo. 421,
532 P.2d 330 (1975).

HB Moreover, the question of unlawful detention is moot. The Gov-
ernor’s Warrant issued on February 9, 1979. Appellant did not seek per-
mission to file his writ of habeas corpus until February 13, 1979. Once a
valid Governor’s Warrant is issued, illegalities and irregularities relating
to the detention of the fugitive are moot. Renton v. Cronin, 196 Colo.
109, 582 P.2d 677 (1978); Reese v. Warden and Keeper of the County
Jail, Jefferson County, 193 Colo. 7, 561 P.2d 339 (1977); Crumrine v.
Erickson, 186 Colo. 139, 526 P.2d 148 (1974).

The judgments are affirmed.

21

JUSTICE LOHR specially concurs.

JUSTICE LOHR concurring:

I concur in affirming the judgments of the trial courts. However, the
question of the nature and extent of the duties imposed upon the Governor
of the State of Colorado to participate in the review of requisition docu-
ments and in the issuance of Governor’s warrants was not raised in the
trial courts. I would not reach that question. See Morse v.People, 168
Colo. 494, 452 P.2d 3 (1969).

No. 79SA275

In the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of James E. Bubb and
Richard E. Yeager and James E. Bubb and Richard E. Yeager v. Vernon
C. Christensen and Estella D. Christensen

(610 P.2d 1343)

Decided May 19, 1980.

Vance E. Halvorson for appellees.

Robert H. Gleason for appellants.

Se 23
En Banc.

JUSTICE LOHR delivered the opinion of the Court.

James E. Bubb (Bubb) and Richard E. Yeager (Yeager) filed an ap-
plication in the water court’ for Water Division No. 6 to make absolute
their conditional water right for Yeager & Bubb Spring No. 1. The point
of diversion of that conditional water right is on a lot owned by Vernon C.
Christensen and Estella D, Christensen (Christensens). Bubb and Yeager
later filed a complaint in the district court for Routt County, seeking a
declaration that they own an easement for water diversion and transporta-
tion facilities across the Christensens’ lot for the purpose of developing
and utilizing Yeager & Bubb Spring No. 1, and other relief. The two
cases were consolidated for trial before the water judge, who granted the
application to make the conditional water right absolute and recognized a
right in Bubb and Yeager to proceed in eminent domain to condemn the
easement. The Christensens appealed,? and we affirm.

The cases were submitted and decided on stipulated facts.

James E, Bubb and Doria Bubb own Lot 12, Elk River Estates, Filing
No. 3, in Routt County. Richard E. Yeager and Eliza Yeager own Lot 11
in that subdivision. There is a residence on each of those lots. The Bubbs
and the Yeagers were unsuccessful in efforts to obtain an adequate supply
of water for résidential use by wells drilled on their own lots.? There are
no known water,sources on those lots.

On October 5, 1973, Bubb and Yeager filed an application in the
water court for a conditional water right for domestic, irrigation, and
stock watering purposes in the amount of .01 cubic feet per second (cfs)
from unnamed springs. The point of diversion was described by reference
to a United States government survey corner. The description placed the
point of diversion within Lot 5, Elk River Estates, Filing No. 3, although
no reference to that lot or subdivision was contained in the description.
Lot 5 is owned by the Christensens. A summary of the application was

1 We use “water court” as a convenient way to describe the district courts of all counties situated
entirely or partly within the water division, collectively acting through the water judge. See section
37-92-203(1), C.R.S. 1973.

2 Bubb and Yeager cross-appealed, contending that the water judge should have held that they
have an easement over the Christensens’ property by operation of law. However, Bubb and Yeager
have requested that their cross-appeal be considered only if the order of the water judge is reversed
in whole or in part based upon the Christensens’ appeal. As we are affirming the order of the
water judge, it is unnecessary to consider the cross-appeal.

3 James E. Bubb caused two wells and three test holes to be dug on the Bubb lot. The Yeagers’
predecessor in ownership caused one well to be dug on their lot. The sum of $27,000 was spent in
these unsuccessful efforts to obtain water for domestic use.

24 ee

duly published as part of the resume of water applications, as required by
law.4 The Christensens filed no statement of opposition. On February
28, 1974, the water referee granted a conditional water right for “Yeager
& Bubb Spring No. 1” in the amount of .01 cfs with a priority date of
September 12, 1973. On April 16, 1974, the water judge for Water Divi-
sion No. 6 approved and adopted that ruling and made it a decree of the
water court. The springs are tributary to the Yampa River.

About October 1975, Bubb and Yeager installed necessary drain tile,
pipe, and other improvements on Lot 5 to develop Yeager & Bubb Spring
No. 1 and to transport water therefrom to their own property. .01 cfs was
first applied to beneficial use on Lots 11 and 12 on or about November 6,
1975. Bubb and Yeager neither requested nor received permission from
the Christensens to enter Lot 5. The lot was not posted against trespass
and was not fenced or enclosed. On April 9, 1976, Bubb and Yeager filed
an application in the water court to have the conditional water right de-
clared absolute.

The Christensens resided outside the state of Colorado and had no ac-
tual knowledge of the entry of Bubb and Yeager upon Lot 5 or the con-
struction of the water diversion and transportation facilities until
approximately June 1976. Upon learning of the activity on their property,
the Christensens promptly filed a statement of opposition to the applica-
tion of Bubb and Yeager to have the conditional right made absolute, and
threatened to cut off the water supply by destroying or dismantling the
improvements.

In response to that threat, Bubb and Yeager commenced an action in
Routt County District Court in which they requested temporary and per-
manent injunctions to prevent the Christensens from interfering with the
water supply facilities, and in which they sought a declaration that Bubb
and Yeager owned an easement across Lot 5 for their water diversion and
transportation facilities. In the alternative, Bubb and Yeager sought a
right to condemn such easement through eminent domain proceedings.
The district court entered a temporary restraining order against the Chris-
tensens on August 18, 1977, and that order has been continued in effect by
agreement pending determination of the legal issues on the merits of both
cases.

The application to have the conditional water right declared absolute
and the application for injunctive relief were consolidated for trial before
the water judge.‘ An order resolving the matters in dispute was issued February

4 Section 37-92-302(3)(b), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).

5 See section 37-92-302(1)(b), C:R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).

© The water judge specifically ruled that it was appropriate to consolidate the proceedings in the
district court with the application in the water court, because the former proceedings involved
findings ultimately affecting water matters. This ruling has not been challenged on appeal and
appears proper.

eS 25

15, 1979. The water judge held that a water right can be initiated by trepass’ and
that, in any event, the Christensens cannot attack the conditional decree
because they failed to appear and object in the proceedings in which the
conditional decree was issued. The water judge also held that trespass is not a
proper issue in a proceeding to make absolute a conditional water right. The
following relief was granted: (1) the conditional water right for Yeager & Bubb
Spring No. 1 was made absolute; (2) a preliminary injunction was issued
against the Christensens, prohibiting interference with use of the easement by
Bubb and Yeager, and prohibiting removal or destruction of the water diversion
and transportation facilities; (3) Bubb and Yeager were permitted to proceed in
eminent domain to condemn an easement for water diversion and transportation
facilities; (4) Bubb and Yeager were granted a right of immediate possession
incident to the condemnation;* and (5) the order was made final with respect to
the relief described in (1) and (3) above, pursuant to C.R.C.P 54(b). This
appeal followed. :

The Christensens assert that the water court’s order should be re-
versed on two grounds: (1) a water right cannot be initiated or perfected
by trespass against the persons upon whose land the trespass was commit-
ted, and (2) the facility constructed by Bubb and Yeager is a well, not a
spring, and no power of condemnation exists in Bubb and Yeager to ac-
quire an easement for water diversion and transportation facilities relating
to a well.

We first consider whether the conditional water right can be attacked

at this time on the basis that it was initiated by trespass.
An application for a conditional water right involves a “water
matter” over which the water court has exclusive jurisdiction. Section 37-
92-203(1), C.R.S. 1973; section 37-92-302, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp,).
The stipulated facts establish that the conditional water right decreed to
Yeager & Bubb Spring No. 1 was obtained in full compliance with the
procedures prescribed by section 37-92-302, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).
The Christensens had notice of the application by reason of publication of
the summary in the resume. See section 37-92-302(3)(a), C.R.S. 1973.
The Christensens did not file a statement of opposition to the application,

7 The specific activities which occurred on the land to initiate the conditional water right are not
identified by the stipulated facts. It is assumed that Bubb and Yeager actually went upon the
Christensens’ land before applying for the conditional water right, because of the necessity of activ-
ity on the land to satisfy the “first step” requirement to initiate a conditional water right. See Elk
-Rifle Water Co. v Templeton, 173 Colo. 438, 484 P.2d 1211 (1971).

® Moneys representing the value of the property taken plus damage to the residue had been depos-
ited into the registry of the court. See section 38-1-105(6), C.R.S. 1973.

PR
26 ee

section 37-92-302(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.); did not file a protest
to the ruling of the referee, section 37-92-304(2), C.R.S. 1973; and did not
seek correction of any substantive errors in the judgment and decree of the
water court within three years after it was entered, section 37-92-304(10),
C.R.S. 1973. Instead, they took no action until the water had been applied
to beneficial use and an application had been filed to make the conditional
decree absolute. They then filed a statement of opposition.

We do not reach the question whether trespass is.a defense to an ap-
plication for a conditional water right? No such defense was raised, and
the time for challenging the conditional decree has expired. The Christen-
sens are bound by the conditional decree for Yeager & Bubb Spring No.
1.

I.

The Christensens also contend that a water right cannot be perfected
by trespass against the person upon whose land the trespass was commit-
ted,

In the instant case the improvements which permitted the water
to be diverted and applied to beneficial use were constructed after entry of
the conditional decree and without permission of the Christensens. As will
be seen in Part III of this opinion, the owner of a conditional water right
may condemn rights-of-way over the lands of others for the purpose of
transporting water for beneficial use. See section 37-86-102, C.R.S. 1973.
Bubb and Yeager did not do this. Instead, they entered on the Christen-
sens’ land peacefully but without permission, constructed the facilities
without interference or complaint by the Christensens, and applied the
water to beneficial use.

HB Any damages resulting from the taking of the Christensen’s
property and damage to the residue can be compensated in the pending
eminent domain proceeding. See sections 38-1-101 to -120, C.R.S. 1973
(1979 Supp.). This is the only relief to which the Christensens would have
been entitled had the eminent domain proceedings been conducted in ad-
vance of entry on Lot 5 by Bubb and Yeager. Any other damages resulting
from Bubb and Yeager’s unpermitted entry on Lot 5 could be recovered in
an action based on trespass.19

HB No useful purpose would be served by holding that the condi-
tional water right cannot be decreed to be absolute until the easement has
been obtained by condemnation. In other cases in which a person having a
right of eminent domain entered upon land without authorization prior to

® For convenience, we adopt the “trespass” characterization used by the parties, By so doing we do
not intend to foreclose the possibility that entry upon the land of another to take the first step to
initiate a water right might be deemed permitted by operation of law in some circumstances. We
need not reach that issue in this case and express no opinion with respect to it.

© But see footnote 9.

| 21

exercise of such right, the landowner has been denied permanent injunc-
tive relief. Twin Lakes Co. v. Sill, 104 Colo. 215, 89 P.2d 1012 (1939)
(injunction denied on‘condition that eminent domain proceedings be insti-
tuted and diligently prosecuted); see Stuart v. Colorado Easter
Railroad Co., 61 Colo. 58, 156 P. 152 (1916) (relief will be limited to
monetary recovery for the value of the land taken and the damages caused
by the taking); Larimer County Canal No. 2 Irrigating Co. v. Larimer
and Weld Reservoir Co., 26 Colo. App. 380, 143 P. 270 (1914) (injunc-
tion may be conditionally granted until compensation is paid or condem-
nation proceedings instituted). Under the circumstances of this case we
conclude that trespass is not a defense to the application to make the con-
ditional water right absolute. .
il.

The Christensens urge that the structure constructed on their land by
Bubb and Yeager is a well, not a spring, and that the law does not permit
condemnation of an easement to construct a well upon the land of another
and to transport water from the well to apply it to beneficial use on other
lands.

Hl The record reflects that the source of the water was stated in the
original application to be “unnamed springs.” The water referee found the
statement to be true in issuing his ruling, and the ruling was confirmed
and made a judgment and decree of court. This establishes the source of
the water to be springs.

HH Even more importantly, the right of condemnation is not depend-
ent upon whether the source of supply is characterized as a well or a
spring. The statutory basis for the right is section 37-86-102, C.R.S. 1973,
which provides:

“Any person owning a water right or conditional water right shall be enti-
tled to a right-of-way through the land which lies between the point of div-
ersion and point of use or proposed use for the purpose of transporting
water for beneficial use in accordance with said water right or conditional
water right.”
The extent of the right-of-way is defined by section 37-86-103, C.R.S.
1973, and the right of condemnation to acquire the right-of-way is granted
by section 37-86-104, C.R.S. 1973.11 :
When a facility for transportation of water is constructed or uti-
lized by one having the right of eminent domain, without prior acquisition
of an easement, the remedy of the landowner is limited to temporary relief
pending conduct of the eminent domain proceedings by owners of the
water right. Twin Lakes Co. v. Sill, supra; see Stewart v. Stevens, 10°

"| The ultimate sources of the right of condemnation are Colo. Const. art. II, § 14, and Colo.
Const. art. XVI, § 7.

28 P|

Colo. 440, 15 P. 786 (1887); Larimer County Canal No. 2 Irrigating
Co. v. Larimer and Weld Reservoir Co., supra.

The order of the water judge from which appeal has been taken is
fully consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. We affirm that
order.

No. 79SC68

William R. James, Judith Ryan Horton, Janet Bendixen, as
representatives of the Arrowhead Redevelopment Citizens Council y.
Board of Commissioners of The Denver Urban Renewal Authority

(611 P.2d 976)

Decided May 27, 1980.

Davies and St. Veltri, Robert Justin Driscoll, William R. James, for
petitioners.

Opperman, Kokish & Vranesic, P.C., John Kokish, for respondent.

En Banc.

es 29

CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue before the court is whether the Denver Urban Renewal Au-
thority (DURA) is a “state agency or authority,” and therefore subject to
the Colorado Open Meetings Law. Section 24-6-402, C.R.S. 1973. We
granted certiorari to review the decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals
in James v. Board of Commissioners, 42 Colo. App. 27, 595 P.2d 262
(1978), which held that DURA was neither a state agency nor a state au-
thority. We affirm.

The petitioners are members of an association of citizens who own
property in an area proposed for purchase and development by DURA.
They were denied access to DURA meetings and therefore sought injunc-
tive relief in the trial court to require DURA to comply with the Open
Meetings Law. The trial court, finding DURA to be both a state agency
and a state authority, granted the relief sought.

The Open Meetings Law, which was initiated by vote of the people at
the General Election in 1972, fails to define the scope of the term “state
agency or authority.” It is conceded that this law was modeled after the
“Florida Government and Sunshine Law,” which applies to “any state
agency or authority or . . . any agency or authority of any county, mu-
nicipal corporation or any political subdivision.” Fla. Stat. §286.011
(1975). Our statute, on the other hand, only applies to “any state agency
or authority.” Section 24-6-402, C.R.S. 1973. Therefore, it appears obvi-
ous that the drafters intended a more narrow application of the Open
Meetings Law in this state.

It is the petitioner’s primary position that DURA is a state agency or
authority because its existence was provided for by the General Assembly.
While DURA was organized pursuant to the state Urban Renewal Law,
section 31-25-101 et seq., C.R.S. 1973, it was statutorily defined as a
“body corporate and politic” established to carry out urban renewal pro-
jects for a municipality. Section 31-25-104(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973. Nowhere
in the statute is an urban renewal authority described as a “state agency
or authority.”

The mere enactment of legislation which permits the formation of a
commission, board, agency, or authority does not per se make that body a
state agency or authority. If this were the case, it would lead to the con-
clusion that school district boards (section 22-32-101 et seq., C.R.S.
1973) are state agencies or authorities, having been authorized by state
legislation. Such a proposition was specifically rejected by this court in
Bagby v. School District No. 1, 186 Colo. 428, 528 P.2d 1299 (1974).
We held that school boards were merely “political subdivisions of the
state” and therefore not subject to the Open Meetings Law. Id. 528 P.2d

30 es

at 1302.

HB We hold that DURA is not a “state agency ‘or authority” under
the Open Meetings Law.

Judgment affirmed.

No, 79SC152

James Jackson Nailor v. The People of the State of Colorado
(612 P.2d 79)

Decided June 2, 1980.

31
es

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Thomas M. Van Cleave,
III, Deputy, for petitioner.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, for respondent.

En Banc.

CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES delivered the opinion of the Court.

The court of appeals in People v. Nailor, 44 Colo. App. 364.
612 P.2d 1138 (1979) affirmed the petitioner-defendant’s conviction for
first-degree criminal trespass and possession of burglary tools. We granted
certiorari and now hold that the trial court committed reversible error.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

The charges against the defendant were based upon an attempt to
break into an automobile. The juror in question had her car burglarized
only the week before and stated to the court:

“TJ don’t think I should sit on the jury. A week ago I had my car broken
into and burglarized. And it was a bad experience and I don’t think it
would be fair. I have been thinking about it all night and I don’t think I
could be fair.”

An extensive voir dire of the prospective juror was conducted by defense
counsel, the district attorney, and the trial judge, and although the juror
stated that she believed that she could distinguish her experience from the
charges against the defendant, her final position was that there was a seri-
ous doubt in her own mind about her ability to be fair and impartial. The
trial court denied defense counsel’s challenge for cause because the juror’s
impartiality was merely in doubt and this was not sufficient to render the
juror biased. Defense counsel was then forced to use one of his peremptory
challenges and he later exhausted all his peremptory challenges. The trial
court refused to grant him an additional peremptory challenge, which de-
fense counsel stated would have been used if granted.

32 ee

Ht is fundamental to the right to a fair trial that a defendant be
provided with an impartial jury. Maes v. District Court, 180 Colo. 169,
503 P.2d 621 (1972). To insure that this right is protected, the trial court
must excuse prejudiced or biased persons from the jury. The test to be ap-
plied is provided in section 16-10-103(1)(j), C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978
Repl. Vol. 8), and Crim. P. 24(b)(1)(X). The trial court need not grant a
challenge for cause if it “is satisfied, from an examination of the juror or
from other evidence, that he will render an impartial verdict according to
the law and the evidence submitted to the jury at the trial.” However, if
there is sufficient reason to question the impartiality of the juror, the trial
court should grant a challenge for cause and dismiss the juror. Cf. Jones
y. People, 23 Colo. 276, 47 P. 275 (1896) (A trial court should excuse a
juror “if it appears doubtful” that the juror will not follow the court’s final
instructions on the law.). This standard protects the interests of justice and
promotes judicial efficiency.

Of course, the ultimate decision is one for the trial court’s sound
discretion, since the factors of credibility and appearance which are deter-
minative of bias are best observed at the trial court level. See Beeman v.
People, 193 Colo. 337, 565 P.2d 1340 (1977).

If The trial court here abused its discretion by failing to excuse this
potential juror. There was no dispute here about the fact that the juror
doubted she could be fair because of her recent “bad experience.” From
this clear expression of bias, it would be difficult for a trial court to as-
sume that such a juror could render an impartial verdict. Justice would
have been served by excusing this potential juror.

The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause is re-
turned to that court for entry of a judgment reversing the trial court’s con-
victions and remanding for a new trial.

33

No. 80SA126

Jose Ricardo Sanchez v. The District Court in and for the County of
Pueblo, State of Colorado, and the Honorable Jack Seavy, District Judge

(612 P.2d 519)

Decided June 2, 1980. Rehearing denied June 23, 1980.

Dale P. Tursi, for petitioner.

J. E. Losavio, Jr., District Attorney, Amy S. Isaminger, Deputy, for
respondent.

En Banc.
CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this original proceeding, the petitioner argues that the six-month
speedy trial period imposed by section 18-1-405, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.
Vol. 8) has expired and the charge against him should be dismissed. We
issued a rule to show cause why the relief requested by the petitioner
should not be granted and now make the rule absolute.

The petitioner pled not guilty on January 11, 1979 to two counts of
vehicular homicide, and trial was set for May 22, 1979. At the petitioner’s
request the trial was reset for July 31, 1979. On July 16, 1979, the peti-
tioner again moved to vacate the trial date and also moved to enter a plea
of not guilty by reason of insanity. The district court granted these mo-
tions and ordered the petitioner to be examined at the Colorado State
Hospital. Thirty-five days later, the district court received the psychiatric
report. A November 26, 1979 hearing for purposes of setting the sanity
trial date was continued seven days until December 3, 1979, at the request
of the petitioner. At the December 3, 1979 hearing, the petitioner with-
drew his insanity plea, but continued his not guilty plea. Trial was finally
set for March 4, 1980. Immediately prior to trial, petitioner moved to dis-
miss for failure to comply with the speedy trial statute. The district court
denied the motion, and petitioner instituted this action.

The People in answer to the rule to show cause argue that a new
six-month period commenced as of December 3, 1979, the date the peti-
tioner withdrew his insanity plea. The People cite People v. Haines, 37
Colo. App. 302, 549 P.2d 786 (1976) for the proposition that once a de-
fendant has entered an insanity plea, the prosecution is provided six
months to commence trial of the insanity issue, and after the defendant
has been found sane, then has an additional six-month period to com-
mence the trial of the merits of the case. The People argue that the first
six-month period for trial of the sanity issue had not yet run by December
3, 1979, and therefore withdrawal of the insanity plea, in resolving the
question of the petitioner’s sanity, simply commenced the running of the
second six-month period for trial of the case in chief. We disagree.*

+ We are cognizant of the People’s concern that a defendant might strategically wait until the
speedy trial period had nearly expired and then withdraw his insanity plea. Section 18-1-
405(6)(g)(I1) is an adequate safeguard, however. This section provides that a continuance may be
granted to allow the prosecuting attorney in felony cases to prepare the state’s case if such addi-
tional time is justified because of the exceptional circumstances of the case. The court. must make
specific findings with respect to.the justification. In this event, a period of delay not exceeding six
months is excluded from the computation of the speedy trial period. In the present case, the People
did not request such a continuance.

es 35

HB Section 18-1-405(1) provides:

“Except as otherwise provided in this section, if a defendant is not brought
to trial on the issues raised by the complaint, information, or indictment
within six months from the date of the entry of a plea of not guilty, he
shall be discharged from custody if he has not been admitted to bail, and,
whether in custody or on bail, the pending charges shall be dis-
missed... .”

This provision is clear. A defendant must be brought to trial within six
months from the date of the entry of a plea of not guilty, except as other-
wise provided by section 18-1-405(6)(a).? This rule equally applies where
a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity. People v. Renfrow,
193 Colo. 131, 564 P.2d 411 (1977).

Hi We now turn to the question of the appropriate date from which
to compute the six-month period, as well as the manner of calculating the
six-month period in this case. On January 11, 1979, the petitioner pled not
guilty to the offenses charged. It is from this date that the six-month pe-
riod must initially be computed. Section 18-1-405(1). On May 15, 1979,
the petitioner moved to vacate the May 22, 1979 trial date, and the case
was reset for trial July 31, 1979. On July 16, 1979, the petitioner moved to
vacate the trial date and requested a continuance. Consequently, a new
six-month period began to run. Section 18-1-405(3). This six-month pe-
riod expired on January 16, 1980, The 35-day period during which the
psychiatric examination was conducted and report was prepared must be
excluded from the six-month period. Section 18-1-405(6)(a). Petitioner
concedes that seven additional days must also be added to this period as
the petitioner requested the continuance of the trial setting scheduled for
November 26, 1979. Section 18-1-405(6)(f). The final date before which
the petitioner could be brought to trial was therefore February 27, 1980.
The petitioner’s motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the speedy
trial statute filed immediately prior to the trial to have been commenced
March 4, 1980, should therefore have been granted.

The rule to show cause is accordingly made absolute.

2 “In computing the time within which a defendant shall be brought to trial as provided in subsec-
tion (1) of this section, the following periods of time shall be excluded:

(a) Any period during which the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, or is unable to appear by
reason of illness or physical disability, or is under observation or examination pursuant to a plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity... .”

3A plea of not guilty by reason of insanity includes a not guilty plea: Crim. P. 11(¢)(1).

we
a

No. C-1696

Gerald E. Welsh y. Robert J. Levy
(612 P.2d 80)

Decided June 2, 1980. Rehearing denied June 23, 1980.

Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Felicity Hannay, John M. Sayre, for
petitioner.

Wesley A. Miller, Edward Miller, for respondent.

En Banc.

JUSTICE LEE delivered the opinion of the Court.

Certiorari was granted to review the decision of the court of appeals
in Levy v. Welsh, 44 Colo. App. 360, 612 P.2d 1135, (1978). We
affirm the court of appeals.

37

Respondent, Robert J. Levy, acquired title by purchase of a tract of
land on January 31, 1958. He paid taxes on the property that year, but
failed to pay any taxes from 1959 until the time that this action was initi-
ated in 1971. Levy claimed that he thought his father had been paying the
taxes during those years.

The property was sold at a tax sale on December 5, 1960. The certifi-
cate of sale was assigned to petitioner, Gerald E. Welsh, on June 6, 1962.
On March 2, 1965, a treasurer’s deed was executed, recorded, and deliv-
ered to Welsh by the Treasurer of Adams County. Welsh paid taxes on
the property from 1962 until 1975.

For a period of approximately twenty-four to thirty months during
the years following the tax sale of the property to Welsh, Levy leased the
property to two separate tenants for grazing purposes. The second tenant
was in possession of the property when Welsh became aware of the ten-
ancy. Welsh notified the tenant that he was the owner of the property and
that all future rent payments should be made to him. The tenant began
paying rent to Welsh in March 1971.

In May 1971, Levy commenced an action in district court under
C.R.C.P. 105 “for the purpose of obtaining a complete adjudication of the
tights of the parties hereto with respect to such real property and for dam- °
ages for the withholding of possession.”

Welsh moved to dismiss, asserting that more than five years had
elapsed since the execution and delivery of the treasurer’s deed, and thus
the action was barred by section 39-12-101, C.R.S. 1973. The district
court granted the motion to dismiss.

Levy then filed a motion for new trial. The district court vacated its
judgment, holding that the treasurer’s deed was void on its face because of
an insufficient description of the property.

Welsh appealed and the court of appeals reversed in an opinion not
selected for publication. The court concluded, as a matter of law, that the
property description at issue was sufficient and that the deed was not in-
valid on its face. The case was remanded “for further proceedings not in-
consistent with this opinion.”

On February 23, 1977, following remand of the case, Welsh filed a
motion for summary judgment in the district court. He once again argued
that the five-year statute of limitations in section 39-12-101 barred Levy’s
action.

Levy then filed a motion for leave to amend his original complaint in
order to clear up the “ambiguities” in the language of the complaint. Spe-
cifically, he sought to delete language which referred to Welsh’s posses-
sion of the property, i.e., Levy’s claim for “damages for the withholding of
possession.” The court denied the motion, finding that the complaint was
“unambiguous with regard to the issue of possession.”

38 rs

The court then heard oral argument on Welsh’s motion for summary
judgment. The motion was granted on the basis that the five-year statute
of limitations in section 39-12-101 operated to bar Levy’s action.

Levy then appealed and the court of appeals reversed. The court of
appeals held that Levy’s allegations relating to possession could not be
construed as a judicial admission for the purpose of invoking section 39-
12-101; that the undisputed facts contained in affidavits in the’ record
could lead only to the conclusion that Levy was in possession of the prop-
erty at the time of the commencement of this action and therefore, as a
matter of law, Welsh was not in possession at the time of the commence-
ment of this action; and finally that, since Welsh was not in possession, he
was not entitled to rely on section 39-12-101, C.R.S. 1973.

The court of appeals remanded the cause for trial on the issue of
whether Levy was given notice of Welsh’s application for the issuance of a
treasurer’s deed, as required by section 39-11-128, C.R.S. 1973, in order
to determine the validity of the deed.

Welsh here argues that the court of appeals erred in reversing the
summary judgment entered by the district court. We do not agree.

The primary issue here before us is whether Welsh can rely on the
provisions of section 39-12-101, C.R.S. 1973. That section states in perti-
nent part:

- “. .. No action for the recovery of land sold for taxes shall lie unless the

i ing.

same is brought within five years after the execution and delivery of the
deed therefor by the treasurer, any laws to the contrary notwithstand- -

i Many cases have considered the effect of the so-called “short”

five-year statute of limitations. Whether brought as actions to quiet title,

to remove a cloud on title, or in ejectment,’ the rule is clearly established:
the five-year statute of limitations may not be relied upon as a defense un-
less the holder of the treasurer’s deed is in actual possession of the prop-

- erty at the time the action is commenced. Compare Fastenau v. Asher,
“124 Colo. 161, 235 P.2d 587 (1951); Fuschino v. Lutin, 124 Colo. 42,

234 P.2d 906 (1951); Vogt v. Hansen, 123 Colo. 105, 225 P.2d 1040
(1950); Realty Co. v. Brady, 77 Colo. 56, 234 P. 1054 (1925); Lambert
v. Murray, 52 Colo. 156, 120 P. 415 (1911); Litch v. Bryant, 46 Colo.
160, 103 P. 289 (1909); Wood v. McCombe, 37 Colo. 174, 86 P. 319
(1906); and Williams y. Conroy, 35 Colo. 117, 83 P. 959 (1905) (holder
of tax deed in actual possession has a right to rely on the five-year statute
of limitations) with Central Co. v. Frost, 76 Colo. 413, 232 P. 1111
(1924); Bennett v. Rohan, 73 Colo. 551, 216 P. 1052 (1923); Gibson v.
Interior Realty Co., 70 Colo. 5, 201 P. 680 (1921); Munson v. Keim, 53

* 1 Now we have but one form of action, C.R.C.P. 105.

es 39

Colo. 576, 127 P. 1026 (1912); Munson v. Marks, 52 Colo. 553, 124 P.
187 (1912); Keener v. Wilkinson, 33 Colo. 445, 80 P. 1043 (1905);
Mitchell v. Titus, 33 Colo. 385, 80 P. 1042 (1905); Eagan v. Mahoney,
24 Colo. App. 285, 174 P. 1119 (1913); Foster v. Gray, 24 Colo. App.
247, 133 P. 146 (1913); and Empire Co. v. Mason, 22 Colo. App. 612,
126 P. 1129 (1912) (property at issue was vacant and tax deed holder
could not rely on the five-year statute of limitations).

As noted previously in this opinion, twice during the years following
the tax sale, Levy leased the property to tenants who used it for grazing.
While the second tenant was in possession of the property, Welsh became
aware of the tentants’ possession and notified him to make all future rent
payments to him. The tenant complied with this demand. Welsh argues
that by this action the tenant thus became his tenant, and Welsh, there-
fore, was in possession of the property at the time this action was initiated.
We do not agree.

HI This court has held that occupancy by a lessee under a lease con-
stitutes possession by the lessor. Cleveland v. Dow Chemical, 168 Colo.
388, 451 P.2d 741 (1969); American Bond Co. v. Hopkins, 46 Colo.
460, 104 P. 1040 (1909); and Merchants’ State Bank v. Porter, 20 Colo.
216, 37 P. 960 (1894). However, the actions of Welsh in inducing Levy’s
tenant to pay the rent to him could not effectively terminate the tenancy
established by Levy and divest Levy of possession. American Bond Co. v.
Hopkins, supra; Merchants’ State Bank v. Porter, supra.

We therefore agree with the court of appeals that, since the record
shows that Levy, and not Welsh, was in possession of the property at the
time this action was brought, Welsh cannot rely on the five-year statute of
limitations, section 39-12-101, C.R.S. 1973, to bar Levy’s claim.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

JUSTICE ERICKSON does not participate.

No. 80SA178

In the Matter of the Proposed Initiative on Transfer of Real Estate to
Amend the Colorado Constitution by Adding a Section 9 to Article XVIII

(611 P.2d 981)

Decided June 2, 1980.

41

Holland & Hart, Richard M. Koon, for petitioner Don A. Childears.

Calkins, Kramer, Grimshaw & Harring, Victor L. Wallace, II, for
petitioner, Charles W. Henning.

Joseph A. Davies, P.C., Curtis W. Shortridge, for proponents.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Stephen H. Kaplan, First Assistant
Attorney General, General Legal Services Section, for Initiative Title
Setting Board.

42 ee

En Banc.

JUSTICE LEE delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an original proceeding pursuant to section 1-40-102(3), C.R.S.
1973 (1979 Supp.). Petitioners! challenge the denial of their motion for
rehearing by the Initiative Title Setting Review Board (board) regarding
the titles, summary, and submission clause fixed by the board for the pro-
posed initiative on transfer of real estate.

Petitioners contend that the titles, summary, and submission clause
fixed by the board are unfair and fail to clearly express the true meaning
and intent of the proposed constitutional amendment; that the titles, sum-
mary, and submission clause contain language which is likely to create
prejudice in favor of the amendment; and that the board’s statement con-
cerning the fiscal impact of the amendment is misleading and prejudicial.
We do not agree.

The test to be applied by the court in this case has been well-
established: “(1) [W]e must not in any way concern ourselves with the
merit or lack of merit of the proposed amendment since, under our system
of government, that resolution rests with the electorate; (2) all legitimate
presumptions must be indulged in favor of the propriety of the board’s ac-
tion; and (3) only in a clear case should a title prepared by the board be
held invalid.” Bauch v. Anderson, 178 Colo. 308, 497 P.2d 698 (1972);
IN RE: An Initiated Constitutional Amendment Respecting Rights of

“the Public to Uninterruped Services by Public Employees, 199
Colo. 409, 609 P.2d 631 (1980). This court is limited to determining
whether the titles, summary, and submission clause are “unfair” or fail to
“clearly express the true meaning and intent” of the proposed constitu-
tional amendment. Section 1-40-102(3), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).

The proposed constitutional amendment provides:

“In order that all persons shall have the right to freely sell or transfer their
real estate or any interest therein subject to existing financing, no person
or lending institution with a security interest in real estate shall directly or
indirectly accelerate or mature the indebtedness secured by such real es-
tate or alter the terms and conditions of the indebtedness or security inter-
est on account of the sale or transfer of such real estate or any interest
therein, so long as the original debtor remains directly responsible for the
indebtedness and the security for the indebtedness is not substantially im-
paired by the sale or transfer.

+ Petitioners are qualified electors who are dissatisfied with the titles, summary, and submission
clause of the proposed constitutional amendment. Section 1-40-102(3), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).

ee 43

“This section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.”
IL

Petitioners first contend that the titles, summary, and submission
clause prepared by the board are unfair and do not express the true mean-
ing and intent of the proposed amendment. Petitioners present four bases
for this contention: (1) the titles, summary, and submission clause fail to
state that the rights and prohibition stated in the amendment are not ap-
plicable to federally chartered savings and loan associations; (2) they fail
to state that the amendment will not have retroactive application; (3) they
fail to mention that there is an existing statute, section 38-30-165, C.R.S.
1973 (1979 Supp.), relating to the same subject; and (4) they fail to dis-
tinguish: between sales “subject to” existing financing and “assumptions”
of existing financing.

(1) The record indicates that the proponents of the amend-
ment intend that it apply to all lending institutions in Colorado, including
federally chartered savings and loan institutions. As the board points out
in its brief to this court, “Whether this goal or intention is realistic, feasi-
ble, desirable or possible is not for the board to determine or adjudicate.”
That same reasoning applies to the standard of review in this court. We
can only consider whether the titles, summary, and submission clause re-
flect the intent of the amendment, not whether they reflect all possible
problems that may arise in the future in applying the language of the pro-
posed amendment. It is not the function of this court to rephrase the titles,
summary, and submission clause so that the language used is the best pos-
sible to express the meaning and intent of the proposed amendment. See
Say v. Baker, 137 Colo. 155, 322 P.2d 317 (1958).

HH (2) Whether the proposed amendment will have retroactive ap-
plication is a matter to be adjudicated in the future. If a controversy arises
in a specific factual context, then judicial determination of retroactive ap-
plication may be appropriate, but it is not relevant to the determination of
the accuracy of the language of the titles, summary, and submission
clause.

(3) We do not consider that the failure to mention the existence
of a statute addressing the same or similar subject as that of the proposed
amendment has any effect on the acceptability of the titles, summary, and
submission clause. As we have said, that language need only express the
intent and meaning of the proposed constitutional amendment.

HI (4) The failure of the board to include language distinguishing
sales “subject to” existing financing from “assumptions” of existing fi-
nancing does not in our view affect the accuracy of the language of the ti-
tles, summary, and submission clause so as to cause that language to fail
to state clearly the meaning and intent of the proposed amendment. The
Janguage formulated by the board directly parallels the language of the
proposed amendment, and thus reflects its meaning and intent.

44 es

Il.

II Petitioners’ second major contention is that the titles, summary,
and submission clause contain language which is likely to create prejudice
in favor of the amendment. The language which petitioners argue is “pre-
judicial” is taken verbatim from the proposed amendment. The board was
within the guidelines for formulating the titles, summary, and submission
clause when it adopted the language of the proposed amendment.

I

The board stated in the summary that the proposed amendment
“would have no direct fiscal impact on state government.” We have re-
viewed the record on appeal, and find that the record supports the state-
ment of the board.
Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the Initiative Title Setting Re-
view Board.

No. 80SA143

The People of the State of Colorado y. Bailey Allan Belfor
(611 P.2d 979)

Decided June 2, 1980.

| 45

Robert B. Kane, for complainant.

Paul G. West, for attorney-respondent.

En Banc.

JUSTICE ERICKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

I The respondent, Bailey Allan Belfor, has been disciplined on two
previous occasions. On May 25, 1978, he was given a letter of admonition
for failing to pay a treating physician’s statement out of the proceeds of a
settlement made in a personal injury action after he had given the doctor
his personal assurance that his statement would be paid. Thereafter, the
respondent’s further violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility
resulted in a one year suspension which commenced on March 5, 1979.
People v. Belfor, 197 Colo. 223, 591 P.2d 585 (1979). Shortly after the
one year suspension ended, the respondent failed to comply with the condi-
tions which were prerequisites to his reinstatement. These conditions re-
quired that he demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence: “(1) that he
has been rehabilitated; (2) that he has complied with and will continue to
comply with applicable disciplinary orders and rules; and (3) that he is
competent and fit to practice law.” People v. Belfor, supra. He nonethe-
less paid his registration fee so that he could again practice law.

As a result of the respondent’s further misconduct, the Supreme
Court Grievance Committee now recommends that the respondent be sus-
pended for an additional period of one year. We approve the recommenda-
tion and order the respondent suspended for a period of one year from the
announcement of this opinion and until such time as he complies with the
conditions set forth above which were part and parcel of his initial

46 |

suspension.

Three complaints were made against the respondent which
caused the Supreme Court Grievance Committee, after a full hearing, to
recommend further suspension. Two complaints related to the respondent
practicing law during the period of his suspension. The Grievance Com-
mittee concluded that the respondent had not practiced law when he ap-
peared in a divorce action with the permission of the trial judge and dis-
missed the complaint. We point out that granting a person permission to
practice law is the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court of Colorado. In
re Petition of Colorado Bar Association, 137 Colo. 357, 325 P.2d 932
(1958).

Il As to the second complaint, the respondent took part in a com-
plex real estate transaction and engaged in the practice of law by repre-
senting, counseling, advising, and assisting a former client. Cf. Denver
Bar Association v. Public Utilities Commission, 154 Colo. 273, 391
P.2d 467 (1964). In practicing law the respondent violated the provisions
of DR 3-101(B) of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the provi-
sions of Rules 228 and 241(B), C.R.C.P.

I In addition, the third complaint requires a severe sanction. In
dealing with a former client the respondent collected fees in excess of
those set forth in a contingency fee agreement and released a judgment
lien of his client’s debtor without notice to his client. Thereafter, he with-
drew as counsel and refused to account to his client. Only after a com-
plaint was made to the Grievance Committee did the respondent pay his
client the funds that he was entitled to and which were not properly ac-
counted for to the client. His conduct is contrary to the provisions of DR
1-102(A)(1), (4) and (6), DR 2-110(A)(2) and (3), DR 7-101(A)(2) and
(3), DR 9-102(B) and Rule 241(B), C.R.C.P.

Accordingly, the respondent is suspended for a period of one year
after the announcement of this opinion. Costs in the amount of $540.99
are assessed against the respondent and shall be paid within ninety days to
the Clerk of the Supreme Court. The respondent shall not be reinstated
unless and until he demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that (1)
he has been rehabilitated; (2) he has complied with and will continue to
comply with all applicable disciplinary orders and rules; and (3) he is com-
petent and fit to practice law. People v. Belfor, 197 Colo. 223, 591 P.2d

585 (1979).

47

No. 80SA182

The People of the State of Colorado y. James C. Schultz
(611 P.2d 977)

Decided June 2, 1980.

Stuart A. Van Meveren, District Attorney, Loren B. Schall,
Assistant, for plaintiff-appellant.

Dean, Martin, Mitchell & Schwartz, Allen R. Schwartz, for
defendant-appellee.

48 ee

En Bane.

JUSTICE ERICKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

The prosecution has taken this interlocutory appeal from an order de-
claring an arrest to be unlawful and from an order suppressing all evi-
dence seized incident to the arrest of James C. Schultz. C.A.R. 4.1. We
reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

As a result of an investigation of a series of church burglaries occur-
ring in Loveland, Colorado, officers of the Larimer County Sheriff's office
prepared an affidavit asserting that the defendant and his confederates,
Michael Corbin and Tony Orth, committed the offense of second-degree
burglary. See section 18-4-203, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8).
After determining that the affidavit established probable cause, a Larimer
County judge issued an arrest warrant and commanded that the warrant
be executed by any lawfully authorized person.

Upon securing the warrant for the defendant’s arrest, the officers pro-
ceeded to Michael Corbin’s residence, located in Greeley, Colorado, to ar-
rest Corbin and the defendant, who was known to be temporarily residing
at that address. Prior to making their arrest, however, the officers re-
quested and received assistance from members of the Weld County Sher-
iff’s office and the Greeley Police department. When the officers of the
three departments arrived at the Corbin residence, they were given per-
mission to enter and, shortly thereafter, they arrested the defendant.

Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress all evidence derived
from the defendant’s arrest, alleging that the Larimer County officers had
no authority to execute an arrest warrant in Greeley, which is situated in
Weld County. In granting the motion, the trial judge relied upon section
16-3-106, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8), which provides:

“When any peace officer is in fresh pursuit of any alleged offender, having
a warrant for his arrest or having knowledge that such warrant has been
issued, or, in the absence of an arrest warrant, when the offense was com-
mitted in the officer’s presence or the officer has reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that the alleged offender has committed a criminal offense, and the
alleged offender crosses a boundary line marking the territorial limit of his
authority, such peace officer may pursue him beyond such boundary line
and make the arrest, issue a summons and complaint, or issue a notice of
penalty assessment.”

We reverse the order declaring the arrest to be illegal and suppressing evi-
dence seized incident to the arrest.

HB Section 16-3-108, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8) states
that an arrest warrant based on an affidavit establishing probable cause is

| 8

valid throughout the state of Colorado and may direct any peace officer to
arrest the individual named in the warrant. See Crim. P. 4.2. Although
the Larimer County Sheriff's officers who arrested the defendant are
“peace officers,” see section 18-1-901(3)(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.),
the defendant argued that they had no authority under section 16-3-106,
C.R.S. 1973, and the common law to effect an arrest outside of Larimer
county. Cf. Crim. P. 4(b)(1) and 4(c)(1). Thereafter, the trial judge
found, and the prosecution admitted, that the Larimer County Sheriff's
officers were not engaged in fresh pursuit, but did have both Greeley and
Weld County officers with them at the time the arrest was made. The sup-
pression order was entered because the trial judge concluded that the Lar-
imer County Sheriffs officers had no arrest powers in Weld County unless
they effected the arrest in Weld County while in hot pursuit. Section 16-3-
106, C.R.S. 1973.

In People v. Lott, 197 Colo. 78, 589 P.2d 945 (1979), we affirmed a
trial court’s suppression of evidence seized as the result of a warrantless
arrest made in Denver by officers of the Wheat Ridge Police department.
There the officers were not in fresh pursuit and we held that they should
have obtained an arrest warrant for the defendant and enlisted the aid of
Denver police before making the arrest.

In this case, the arresting officers obtained a warrant and en-
listed the aid of both the Greeley police and the Weld County Sheriff's of-
fice, both of whom were authorized to execute arrest warrants in Weld
County. Since officers with authority to arrest in Weld County were pres-
ent during the defendant’s arrest, we can perceive no reason to hold the ar-
rest invalid. See section 16-3-202, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol.
8). To hold the arrest warrant invalid simply because the Larimer County
Sheriff's officers did not formally request that the Weld County Sheriff's
officers or Greeley police perform the steps required to effect the defend-
ant’s arrest would be to exalt form over substance. Cf. Kirby v. Beto, 426
F.2d 258 (Sth Cir. 1970); State v. Wise, 90 N.M. 659, 567 P.2d 970
(1977). In our view, it is immaterial who executes the arrest warrant pro-
vided that individuals with lawful authority to make an arrest are actually
present at the scene of the arrest and participate in the arrest process. See
People v. Bloom, 195 Colo. 246, 577 P.2d 288 (1978).

Accordingly, the order declaring the arrest to be invalid and suppress-
ing the evidence seized incident to the arrest is reversed and the case is re-
manded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion.

Donald K. Smith, Terry E. Turner, for petitioner.

Eugene L. Farish, District Attorney, for respondents.

En Banc.

JUSTICE ROVIRA delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner brought this original proceeding pursuant to C.A.R.
21, alleging that his statutory right to a speedy trial’ has been denied, and
seeking relief in the nature of prohibition. We issued a rule to show cause
and now make the rule absolute.

The petitioner was arrested on charges of class 4 felony fraud by
check. See sections 18-5-205(2) and (3)(c), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol.
8). A preliminary hearing was held in the county court on February 8,
1979, and the petitioner was bound over as charged to the respondent dis-

. trict court. Arraignment in the respondent court was set for March 23,
1979.

Subsequently, however, counsel for the petitioner moved to continue
the arraignment. The petitioner’s written motion for a continuance stated
that “the Defendant waives his right to a speedy trial.” The arraignment
was rescheduled for April 20, 1979.

+ See section 18-1-405, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8 & 1979 Supp.); Crim. P. 48(b). The peti-
tioner does not base his speedy trial claim on the federal and state constitutional provisions guaran-
teeing the right to a speedy trial, and in view of our disposition of this case, we find it unnecessary
to consider the constitutional rights to a speedy trial (see U.S. Const. amend. VI; Colo. Const.
Art. IL, Sec. 16).

a

At the arraignment held on April 20, the petitioner entered a plea of
not guilty and demanded a trial to a jury. The respondent court suggested
May 9, 1979, as a possible trial date. In response, counsel for the peti-
tioner stated, “We will waive speedy trial if that is the concern. There is
no problem there.” The court set a trial date of July 30, 1979.

On July 10, 1979, the district attorney filed a written motion in the
* respondent court, requesting a continuance of the scheduled trial date on
the grounds that “[a] material and necessary witness will not be available”
on July 30. On July 16, 1979, the court entered a written order reschedul-
ing the trial for November 1, 1979, on the grounds that “there has been
cause for vacating” the July 30 trial date. Neither the district attorney nor
defense counsel was present when the respondent court granted the contin-
uance, and it appears from the record before us that, in granting the con-
tinuance, the court relied entirely on the district attorney’s written motion.

At a pretrial conference held on October 22, 1979, the petitioner
moved to dismiss on the grounds that he had not been brought to trial
within six months of the entry of his plea of not guilty on April 20, 1979.
The court granted the petitioner’s motion.?, On February 6, 1980, how-
ever, the court reconsidered its ruling on the speedy trial question and re-
versed the prior order of dismissal. Trial was set for April 7, 1980, and the
petitioner brought this action under C.A.R. 21.

1.

The petitioner’s speedy trial claim is based on section 18-1-405(1),
C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), which provides as follows:

“Except as otherwise provided in this section, if a defendant is not brought
to trial on the issues raised by the complaint, information, or indictment
within six months from the date of the entry of a plea of not guilty, he
shall be discharged from custody if he has not been admitted to bail, and,
whether in custody or on bail, the pending charges shall be dismissed, and
the defendant shall not again be indicted, informed against, or committed
for the same offense, or for another offense based upon the same act or
series of acts arising out of the same criminal episode.”

The petitioner pled not guilty to the charges against him on April 20,
1979. He was not brought to trial during the subsequent six-month period
ending on October 20, 1979. Therefore, under section 18-1-405(1), he was
entitled to a dismissal of the charges unless the statutory speedy trial pe-
riod was extended or tolled, pursuant to another provision of the speedy
trial statute.

2 We note that on October 29, 1979, the district attorney filed a notice of appeal with respect to
the October 22, 1979, order dismissing the case against the petitioner. The appeal, however, was
dismissed by order of this court on January 7, 1980, on the motion of the district attorney.
3 Crim. P. 48(b)(1) is of like effect.

fn
33

The district attorney argues* that the speedy trial period
should be extended pursuant to section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I), C.R.S. 1973
(1978 Repl. Vol. 8), which provides as follows:
“In computing the time within which a defendant shall be brought to trial
as provided in subsection (1) of this section, the following periods of time
shall be excluded:

“(g) The period of delay not exceeding six months resulting from a con-
tinuance granted at the request of the prosecuting attorney, without the
consent of the defendant, if:

“(1) The continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence
material to the state’s case, when the prosecuting attorney has exercised
due diligence to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to
believe that this evidence will be available at the later date. . . .”5

It is true that if the district attorney’s motion to continue the trial date
from July 30, 1979, to November 1, 1979, comes within the scope of sec-
tion 18-1-405(6)(g)(I), the resulting period of delay cannot be computed
for purposes of section 18-1-405(1). Under section 18-1-405(6)(g)(1),
however, it must be demonstrated that, in continuing a trial date beyond
the otherwise applicable speedy trial period, the trial court specifically
found that: (a) the continuance was necessary because of the unavailabil-
ity of material evidence intended to be presented by the People; (b) the
People exercised due diligence in attempting to make the evidence avail-
able on the scheduled trial date; and (c) reasonable grounds exist to be-
lieve that the evidence will be available on the date to which the trial is
sought to be continued. There must be support for the findings in the re-
cord before the court. Tasset v. Yeager, 195 Colo. 190, 576 P.2d 558
(1978); Murphy v. District Court, 195 Colo. 149, 576 P.2d 163 (1978);

People v. Baker, 38 Colo. App. 101, 556 P.2d 90 (1976).® In this case,
the record before us indicates that the respondent court granted the dis-
trict attorney’s motion to continue the July 30, 1979, trial date solely on
the basis of the district attorney’s written motion. That motion contained
only the unsupported allegation that a material witness would be unavaila-
ble for trial on July 30, 1979. There was no showing of due diligence or
that the witness would be available at a later trial date. In these circum-
stances, we hold that the delay between July 30, 1979, and November 1,
1979, is not properly excludable from the statutory speedy trial period

4 Because the petitioner makes no claim based on the constitutional rights to a speedy trial, see fn.

1, supra, we will not address the district attorney’s arguments with respect to the applicability of
the constitutional speedy trial guarantees to the facts of this case.

5 Crim, P. 48(b)(6)(VII)(A) is of like effect.

© For the purposes of this case, we assume without deciding, as did the Colorado Court of Appeals

in People vy. Baker, supra, that an ex parte continuance may be granted on the grounds stated in
section 18-1-405(6)(g)(1) and Crim. P. 48(b)(6)(VII)(A).

54 |

under section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I), and that the petitioner was entitled to a
dismissal of the charges against him under section 18-1-405(1).
. Il.

Hl The district attorney argues that the petitioner, on two occasions,
waived his speedy trial rights under section 18-1-405, C.R.S. 1973 (1978
Repl. Vol. 8). The district attorney relies on: (a) a statement included in
the petitioner’s March 23, 1979, motion to continue the arraignment date;
and (b) a statement made to the respondent court by defense counsel at
the April 20, 1979, arraignment. For the reasons stated below, we con-
clude that the statements of defense counsel, in the particular circum-
stances of this case, do not constitute a waiver by the petitioner of the
tight to challenge the statutory speedy trial violation which occurred when
the respondent court continued the trial date beyond October 20, 1979.

Section 18-1-405 and Crim. P. 48(b) were designed to render
the federal and state constitutional rights to a speedy trial more effective.
P.V. v. District Court, 199 Colo. 357, 609 P.2d 110 (1986);.,
Simakis v. District Court, 194 Colo. 436, 577 P.2d 3 (1978). Every rea-
sonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights
must be indulged. We must therefore examine the asserted statements of
waiver carefully, giving particular attention to the context in which each
was made.

On March 23, 1979, when the petitioner moved to continue the ar-
raignment date, his written motion contained a statement to the effect that
“the Defendant waives his right to a speedy trial.” We consider this state-
ment to have been intended only as a waiver of the right to challenge any
speedy trial violation caused by the request for a continuance of the arr-
aignment date. However, the statutory speedy trial period did not begin to
tun under section 18-1-405(1) until the defendant entered his plea of not
guilty at the arraignment on April 20, 1979. No statutory speedy trial vio-
lation occurred when the arraignment was continued to April 20, and de-
fense counsel’s statement of waiver ceased to be effective when the contin-
uance was granted by the respondent court.

We are of the view that the statement of waiver made by defense
counsel at the April 20, 1979, arraignment hearing was limited by the cir-
cumstances in which it was made. The petitioner’s counsel offered to
waive the protections of the speedy trial statute only “if that is the con-
cern,” i.e., only to the extent that the speedy trial statute interfered with
the setting of a date for trial. When the respondent court set the trial date
for July 30, 1979, well within the six-month statutory period, defense
counsel’s statement of waiver ceased to be effective.

We reject the district attorney’s argument that each of the asserted
statements of waiver was effective with respect to any subsequently occur-
ring statutory speedy trial violation. Through neither statement, in our
opinion, did the petitioner waive his right to challenge the speedy trial

55

violation outlined in Part I of this opinion, supra. The respondent court
therefore erred when it denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss the
charges against him on statutory speedy trial grounds.

Rule made absolute.

No. 80SA114

Robert Louis Marquez y. The District Court in and for the Tenth Judicial
District and State of Colorado, and The Honorable Thomas F. Phelps,
one of the judges thereof

(613 P.2d 1302)

Decided June 2, 1980. Opinion modified and as modified rehearing denied July 14,
1980.

Alex J. Martinez, Deputy State Public Defender, for petitioner.

J. E. Losavio, Jr., District Attorney, Amy S. Isaminger, Deputy, for
respondents.

En Banc.
JUSTICE DUBOFSKY delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner, Robert L. Marquez, brought this original proceeding
for relief in the nature of prohibition pursuant to C.A.R. 21, contending
that his right to a speedy trial had been denied. We issued a rule to show
cause to the Pueblo County District Court, the respondent. We now make
the rule absolute.

On January 31, 1979, the petitioner entered pleas of not guilty to
charges of second-degree burglary and conspiracy, and trial was scheduled
to begin June 25, 1979. On May 31, 1979, the district attorney requested
a continuance of the trial date. The petitioner consented to the continu-
ance, and trial was rescheduled for August 28, 1979. Because the peti-
tioner agreed to the continuance, the time for him to be brought to trial
was extended from July 31, 1979 to October 28, 1979. Section 18-1-
405(4), C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8) and Crim. P. 48(b)(4).1

A jury was empaneled on August 28, 1979, but before the jury was
sworn, the district attorney requested a continuance because the chief wit-
ness in the case could not be located. The petitioner objected to the

1 Section 18-1-405(4) provides:

“If a trial date has been fixed by the court, and thereafter the prosecuting attorney requests and is
granted a continuance, the time is not thereby extended within which the trial shall be had, as is
provided in subsection (I) of this section, unless the defendant in person or by his counsel in open
court of record expressly agrees to the continuance. The time for trial, in the event of such agree-
ment, is then extended by the number of days intervening between the granting of such continu-
ance and the date to which trial is continued.”

See also Crim. P. 48(b)(4).

51

continuance. The court allowed the district attorney until the next day to
find the witness. On August 29, the witness still was missing, and the
court dismissed the jury panel unsworn. The district attorney presented
testimony about efforts to find the missing witness. The court reset trial
for September 6, 1979, or, if the witness could not be found by then, for
December 26, 1979.

The next court docket entry is February 11, 1980. The witness had
been located on February 4, 1980, and the court set trial for February 26,
1980. On February 20, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss for viola-
tion of the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. The court denied the motion,
vacated the trial date of February 26, and reset the matter for trial on
March 6, 1980. On March 4, the trial court denied the petitioner’s second
motion to dismiss for violation of speedy trial rights. Also on March 4, the
court granted the petitioner’s request for a stay of the March 6 trial date
while the petitioner brought this original proceeding to challenge denial of
his motion to dismiss.

Section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I), C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8),
and Crim. P. 48(b)(6)(VID(A) allow a continuance not to exceed six
months, at the request of the prosecuting attorney, without the consent of
the defendant, to be excluded from the computation of the speedy trial
time if:

“The continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence ma-
terial to the state’s case, when the prosecuting attorney has exercised due
dilligence to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that this evidence will be available at the later date; . . .”

Section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I), C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

The missing witness was located on February 4, 1980.2 Sixty days re-
mained of the petitioner’s six months, which allowed until April 4, 1980
for trial.?

Il Petitioner maintains that the continuance should not be excluded
from the computation of his speedy trial time because the district attorney
failed to establish as required by statute the materiality of the witness’ tes-
timony, the diligence of the prosecuting attorney, and a reasonable basis to
believe the witness would be found, and the trial court failed to make cor-
responding findings. We agree.

Initially we note that the burden of compliance with the speedy
trial statute is on the district attorney and the trial court. See, e.g.,
Harrington v. District Court, 192 Colo. 351, 559 P.2d 225 (1977). The

2 The record does not indicate what happened when the witness was not found by the scheduled
December 26th trial date. Because the statute permits a continuance not to exceed six months until
the evidence is available, and the record here is unclear, we chose the date of February 4th, when
the evidence became available, as the last day for the continuance.

3 This date is determined under section 18-1-405(4). See footnote 1, supra.

58 eS

burden includes making a record sufficient for an appellate court to deter-
mine statutory compliance. People v. Baker, 38 Colo. App. 101, 556 P.2d
90 (1976).

The record relevant to the continuance includes only minute en-
tries for August 28 and 29 and an investigator’s affidavit, dated a week
after the court granted the continuance, about attempts to locate the wit-
ness. The minute entries indicate the district attorney stated that the miss-
ing witness was the prosecution’s chief witness, but the record does not in-
clude a showing of materiality. The minute entries also reflect that the
sheriff testified about efforts to locate the witness, but the record does not
include his testimony. There is no showing of reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that the witness would be available at a later date. Nor did the trial
court make specific findings establishing the statutory elements for our re-
view. Cf. People v. Abeyta, 195 Colo. 338, 578 P.2d 645 (1978). Because
the record is insufficient, the August 29th continuance cannot be excluded
from the speedy trial computation, and the petitioner should have been
tried by October 28, 1979. A trial date of March 6, 1980 was beyond the
time for a speedy trial, and the court should have dismissed the charges
against the petitioner. See Sweet v. Myers, 200 Colo. 50, 612 P.2d
75 (1980).

Il Relief in the nature of prohibition under C.A.R. 21 is an appro-
priate remedy when a district court is proceeding without jurisdiction to
try a defendant in violation of his right to a speedy trial. Hampton v.
District Court, 199 Colo. 104, 605 P.2d 54 (1980).

Accordingly, the rule to show cause is made absolute, and the trial
court is directed to grant the petitioner’s motion to dismiss for failure to
comply with the speedy trial statute and rule.

59

No. 79SA393

The People of the State of Colorado y. Randy Layton
(612 P.2d 83)

Decided June 9, 1980.

6o

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Kathleen M. Bowers, Assistant At-
torney General, for plaintiff-appellee.

Reynard & Booms, P.C., Robert Tabor Booms, for defendant-
appellant.

En Bane.

CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES delivered the opinion of the Court.

Defendant-appellant, Randy Layton, was found guilty by a jury of
aggravated robbery. Section 18-4-302, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).
On appeal, the defendant challenges the constitutionality of the statute al-
lowing proof of a prior felony conviction when an accused person testifies.
He also urges reversal on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence
to sustain his conviction and that he was coerced by his counsel not to tes-
tify on his own behalf. We affirm the defendant’s conviction.

IL

I The defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress any evidence regarding his prior felony convictions if
he testified. The defendant did not take the stand at trial. He now asserts
that section 13-90-101, C.R.S. 1973 is unconstitutional. This section pro-
vides that the credibility of any witness, including the defendant in a crim-
inal case, may be drawn into question by proof of a prior felony conviction.

The defendant contends that he was denied due process of law be-
cause there is no reasonable nexus between a person’s prior felony convic-
tion and his propensity to lie on the witness stand. See State v. Santiago,
53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 675 (1971). We have rejected this contention in
prior decisions which are dispositive in this case. People v. Griffith, 197
Colo. 544, 595 P.2d 231 (1979); People v. Thompson, 197 Colo. 299,
592 P.2d 803 (1979); People v. Taylor, 197 Colo. 161, 591 P.2d 1017
(1979); People v. Montez, 197 Colo. 126, 589 P.2d 1368 (1979); People
y. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 585 P.2d 275 (1978); People v. Henry, 195
Colo. 309, 578 P.2d 1041 (1978); Velarde v. People, 179 Colo. 207, 500
P.2d 125 (1972).

The defendant also argues that he was denied equal protection of the
law because section 13-90-101 penalized defendants who testify on their
own behalf. Defendant argues there is an arbitrary distinction between ad-
mitting evidence of prior felony convictions when a defendant chooses to
testify, and excluding such evidence when the defendant has chosen not to

es 61

take the witness stand. We do not agree with the defendant’s contention in
this respect.

Hl The equal protection clauses of the United States and Colorado
Constitutions require that persons similarly situated be treated equally.
Section 13-90-101 does treat those defendants who chose to testify on
their behalf differently than those defendants who do not take the witness
stand. These two classes of defendants are not similarly situated however.
When a defendant takes the witness stand, his credibility is in issue, and
evidence of prior felony convictions then becomes relevant. Such unequal
treatment does not violate equal protection guarantees. Furthermore, to
require a defendant to make such a choice in trial strategy does not render
the statute constitutionally infirm. See People v. Henry, supra; People
v. Yeager, 182 Colo. 397, 513 P.2d 1057 (1973).

I.

HMM The defendant next argues that there was insufficient evidence
to sustain his conviction. Specifically, he states that certain testimony was
insufficient as a matter of law to establish his identity as the perpetrator of
the offense.

The robber wore a stocking mask. A witness to the robbery recog-
nized the voice of the robber as a personal acquaintance. The robber’s
build, clothing, and other features also were similar to the defendant’s
build, manner of dress and general appearance. Another witness also rec-
ognized the robber’s voice as that of the defendant. Additionally, other
testimony circumstantially pointed to the defendant as the person who
committed the robbery.

Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecu-
tion, there was sufficient evidence to establish that defendant committed
the offense for which he was charged. It is within the province of the jury
to determine what weight will be given the evidence. People v. Rivas, 197
Colo. 131, 591 P.2d 83 (1979).

il.

HE The defendant asserts that his counsel coerced him to waive his
right to testify on his own behalf. Whether a defendant testifies is a deci-
sion which ultimately rests with the defendant, after full consultation with
his counsel. Steward v. People, 179 Colo. 31, 498 P.2d 933 (1972);
Martinez v. People, 173 Colo. 515, 480 P.2d 843 (1971).

In the present case, there is no evidence that defense counsel pre-
vented defendant from testifying on his own behalf. Rather, the record
shows that at a hearing regarding defendant’s motion for a new trial the
defendant testified that his counsel had explained to him that he had a
right to testify, and that he had to make the final decision. Defense coun-
sel discouraged defendant from taking the witness stand because of the ad-
missibility of his prior felony convictions, and defendant heeded this
advice. Defendant also suggests that he was denied effective assistance of

62 Ce)

counsel by being persuaded not to testify on his own behalf. This advice
does not illustrate incompetence or ineffective assistance.

The judgment is affirmed.

JUSTICE LEE and JUSTICE QUINN do not participate.

No. 79SC237

Esmerejildo Garcia Garza a/k/a Jesus Valdez v.
The People of the State of Colorado

(612 P.2d 85)

Decided June 9, 1980.

6

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Craig Truman, Chief Dep-
uty, Bryan D. Shaha, Special Deputy, for petitioner.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Kathleen M. Bowers, Assistant At-
torney General, Appellate Section, for respondent.

En Banc,

JUSTICE ERICKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

. We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals decision in
People v. Garza, 44 Colo. App. 393, 612 P.2d 1139 (1979), which
affirmed the trial court’s refusal to permit the defendant to change his
plea from not guilty to not guilty by reason of insanity five days prior to
the date scheduled for his trial. We affirm.

The defendant, Esmerejildo Garcia Garza, was arrested on January
8, 1978. At the time of the arrest, Garza told the police that his name was
Jesus Valdez. On February 8, 1978, Garza waived a preliminary hearing
and pled not guilty to a charge of second-degree assault. Trial was set for
March 22, 1978. On March 11, 1978, Garza escaped from the Weld
County jail where he was being held pending trial. Following his appre-
hension, he revealed that his true name was Esmerejildo Garcia Garza. A
police check revealed that Garza had a long criminal record and was
wanted by Texas authorities on various felony charges. Garza had also
hidden his identity and his past criminal record from his attorney. Subse-
quent to his escape, Garza told his attorney he felt he had “some mental
problems.” On March 17, 1978, Garza moved to change his plea to not
guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the alleged commission of the
offense. The trial judge, in our opinion, correctly ruled that good cause to
change the plea had not been established and he denied the defense mo-
tion.
Where a defendant seeks to enter a plea of not guilty by reason
of insanity, section 16-8-103(1), C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8)
provides, in part: “The defense of insanity may only be raised by a specific
plea entered at the time of arraignment; except that the court for good
cause shown may permit the plea to be entered at any time prior to trial.”
See Crim. P. 11(e)(1).

64 ee

HB ln Ellis v. District Court, 189 Colo. 123, 538 P.2d 107 (1975),
we held that “good cause is shown when it is demonstrated that fairness
and justice are best subserved by permitting the additional plea.” The
standard is satisfied upon petitioner’s showing that, at the time of arraign-
ment, the plea was entered due to “mistake, ignorance, or inadvertence.”
Ellis, supra, Ultimately, however, the question of good cause is one ad-
dressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and, absent a clear abuse
of discretion, the trial judge’s ruling will not be disturbed on appeal.
Taylor v. District Court, 182 Colo. 406, 514 P.2d 309 (1973); Martinez
vy. People, 179 Colo. 197, 499 P.2d 611 (1972); Gallegos v. People, 166
Colo. 409, 444 P.2d 267 (1968).

The record does not show an abuse of discretion by the trial
court. Although defense counsel forcefully argues that he has demon-
strated good cause through his showing that Garza lied to him about his
real identity and his past criminal record, and said that he has some men-
tal problems, he did not establish good cause. Martinez, supra. In our
view, a more compelling case was presented in Ellis where the defense
counsel learned after the defendant’s arraignment that his client had been
adjudicated criminally insane in previous proceedings.’

Accordingly, the court of appeals decision is affirmed.

JUSTICE LEE does not participate.

+ In the instant case the defendant refused the trial court’s offer to appoint a psychiatrist to con-
duct a psychiatric examination of the defendant. Although we note that a defendant is not entitled
to a psychiatric examination as a matter of right, Gallegos, supra, the trial court is not without
discretion and in some cases the results obtained from such an examination may be helpful to the
court in determining whether the petitioner has established good cause for the entry of a plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity.

65
No. 80SA117

The People of the State of Colorado y. The District Court of the
Seventeenth Judicial District, and Jean J. Jacobucci, Chief Judge
Thereof

(612 P.2d 87)

Decided June 9, 1980. Rehearing denied June 30, 1980.

Paul Q. Beacom, District Attorney, Marc P. Mishkin, Deputy, for
petitioner.

Robert T. Burns, for respondents.

En Bane.

JUSTICE ROVIRA delivered the opinion of the Court.

The People brought this original proceeding pursuant to C.A.R. 21,
seeking relief in the nature of prohibition. We issued a rule to show cause
and now make the rule absolute, granting relief as explained more fully
below.

A full exposition of the proceedings before the respondent court,
which have extended over a period of nearly four years, is necessary. On

| 67

May 18, 1976, the driver’s license of Victor Ralph Binkley (“Binkley”)
was revoked by the Department of Revenue (“department”) pursuant to
the “implied consent” statute. The revocation occurred after a hearing at
which testimonial and documentary evidence was received by the depart-
ment’s hearing officer. See section 42-4-1202(3)(e), C.R.S. 19731 Imme-
diately thereafter, Binkley filed a petition in the respondent court pursuant
to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), challenging the revocation of his license on proce-
dural and substantive grounds and alleging that the revocation would re-
sult in irreparable injury to him because of impending loss of employment.

On May 19, 1976, the respondent court specifically found that irre-
parable injury would result to Binkley if his license were not restored, and
stayed the revocation pending resolution of the issues raised in Binkley’s
petition. The court issued a citation directing the department to show
cause why the revocation should not be permanently stayed. The depart-
ment was also ordered to submit to the court, on or before June 21, 1976,
“the complete records of the proceedings, including a transcript of all the
testimony, files, records, exhibits and affidavits, in possession of the [de-
partment]”.

The department responded by motion on June 12, 1976, alleging that
Binkley’s petition under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) had “fail[ed] to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” The record before us indicates that the
department submitted the “records” pertaining to the revocation of Bink-
ley’s driver’s license, but that a transcript of the May 18, 1976, hearing
was not included in the materials submitted to the court. The department
requested that, “pursuant to... 24-4-106, C.R.S. 1973, as amended,
this court limit its review to the record pertaining to the subject matter of
this action.”

On December 8, 1977, after a delay of nearly eighteen months, Bink-
ley filed a motion in the respondent court, seeking a default judgment on
the grounds that the department had failed to submit a transcript of the
May 18, 1976, hearing. In response, the department moved to vacate the
May 19, 1976, citation to show cause, asserting that the availability of ju-
dicial review under the “State Administrative Procedure Act” (see section
24-4-106, C.R.S. 1973 (Vol. 10 & 1979 Supp.)) precluded Binkley’s chal-
lenge pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4).

On December 22, 1977, the respondent court accepted the depart-
ment’s arguments and dismissed the case. The court held that “[t]he ex-
clusive remedy for judicial review of a license [revocation] . . . lies under
C.R.S. 1973, 24-4-106, which provides a plain, speedy and adequate rem-
edy at law.”

1 Section 42-4-1202(3)(e) was amended subsequent to the date on which Binkley’s license was re-
voked. See section 42-4-1202(3)(e), CRS. 1973 (1979 Supp.).

68 es

Binkley then sought to amend his petition in order to come within
section 24-4-106. On March 13, 1978, however, the respondent court re-
versed its previous ruling concerning the relationship between C.R.C.P.
106(a)(4) and section 24-4-106. The court held that Binkley: .

“properly brought [his] . . . appeal in the instant action under Rule
106(a)(4) and . . . furthermore, C.R.S. § 24-4-106 is not the exclusive
remedy relative to appeal to the District Court of decisions by the Depart-
ment of [Revenue] ....

“Because of this finding, the question of whether [Binkley] . . . can
amend his complaint is moot.”

The court reinstated the May 19, 1976, citation to show cause but did not
set a return date for submission of the record by the department.

No further action was taken for a period of more than twenty-two
months. On January 29, 1980, the respondent court, on its own motion, set
a return date for submission of the record by the department. That date
was subsequently continued to March 11, 1980, and the People instituted
this action under C.A.R. 21, seeking an order prohibiting the respondent
court from proceeding further in this case.

I

The department contends that the “State Administrative Proce-
dure Act” and, specifically, section 24-4-106, C.R.S. 1973 (Vol. 10 &
1979 Supp.), constitute the exclusive means through which Binkley may
seek judicial review of the revocation of his driver’s license. We agree.

Binkley’s license was revoked pursuant to the “implied consent” stat-
ute, which provides (in section 42-4-1202(3)(f), C.R.S. 1973) that “the
person whose license has been revoked . . . shall have the right to file a
petition for judicial review in the appropriate court in accordance with sec-
tion 42-2-127.” Section 42-2-127, C.R.S. 1973, in turn, provides for “judi-
cial review in accordance with section 24-4-106, C.R.S. 1973.” Binkley
was only authorized to seek judicial review pursuant to section 24- 4-106 of
the “State Administrative Procedure Act.”

Had Binkley proceeded under section 24-4-106, the temporary relief
provided by the respondent court (i.e., the stay of revocation pending reso-
lution of the issues raised in Binkley’s petition) would have been available
under section 24-4-106(5), C.R.S. 1973. That statute provides as follows:
“Upon a finding that irreparable injury would otherwise result, the
agency, upon application therefor, shall postpone the effective date of the
agency action pending judicial review, or the reviewing court, upon appli-
cation therefor and regardless of whether such an application previously
has been made to or denied by any agency, and upon such terms and upon
such security, if any, as the court shall find necessary and order, shall is-
sue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of
the agency action or to preserve the rights of the parties pending
conclusion of the review proceedings.”

eS 69

Hin contrast, district court review under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) is
limited to those situations in which: (a) an inferior tribunal has exceeded
its jurisdiction or abused its discretion when acting in a judicial or quasi-
judicial capacity; and (b) “there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy”
otherwise available to the party challenging the action of the inferior tri-
bunal. In this case, Binkley did not demonstrate to the respondent court
that judicial review under section 24-4-106 did not constitute such a
“plain, speedy and adequate remedy.”

The respondent court, therefore, acted correctly on December 22,
1977, when it dismissed Binkley’s petition for failure to proceed under sec-
tion 24-4-106. Correspondingly, the court erred on March 13, 1978, when
it reinstated the petition brought under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4). Cf. Vigil v.
Industrial Commission, 160 Colo. 23, 413 P.2d 904 (1966) (statutorily-
prescribed judicial review of final action of Industrial Commission held
not inadequate for purposes of C.R.C.P 106(a)(4), and, therefore, statu-
tory review constituted the “sole remedy for this claimant’s cause of ac-
tion”); Theobald v. District Court, 148 Colo. 466, 366 P.2d 563 (1961)
(temporary relief, pending judicial review, from a final order revoking a
driver’s license must be granted according to the criterion set forth in the
predecessor to section 24-4-106(5), C.R.S. 1973).

Il.

The second issue presented in this original proceeding is
whether Binkley should have been allowed to amend his original petition
in such a manner as to come within the provisions of the “State Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.” A review of the allegations contained in that peti-
tion indicates that the sole amendment required to bring Binkley’s cause
of action within the Act would have been deletion of the mistaken refer-
ence to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) as the basis for the respondent court’s jurisdic-
tion, and substitution of a reference to section 24-4-106, C.R.S. 1973 (Vol.
10 & 1979 Supp.). In all other respects, the petition stated a cause of ac-
tion under section 24-4-106.

The propriety of amendments to pleadings in actions for judicial re-
view under section 24-4-106 is governed by the rules of civil procedure’
(See section 24-4-106(4), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.)), and in our view, the
above-described amendment to Binkley’s petition should have been al-
lowed pursuant to C.R.C.P. 15(a). See Tihonovich v. Williams, 196
Colo, 144, 582 P.2d 1051 (1978); Regennitter v. Fowler, 132 Colo. 489,
290 P.2d 223 (1955).

Ill.

Hl The third question presented for our review is whether the
amendment discussed in Part II of this opinion, supra, “relates back” to
May 19, 1976, the date on which Binkley lodged his original petition un-
der C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) in the respondent court. The resolution of this
question is crucial for purposes of section 24-4-106(4), C.R.S. 1973, which

70 es

placed a limitation of sixty days on the period within which Binkley may
seek judicial review of the department’s final order revoking his license.?
Binkley’s original petition under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) was lodged one day
after the entry of the order of revocation, well within this sixty-day limita-
tions period. However, Binkley did not seek to amend the petition to come
within the “State Administrative Procedure Act’ until at least nineteen
months after the final agency action, i.e., until after December 22, 1977,
when the respondent court dismissed his original petition.

This issue is governed by the rules of civil procedure. See section 24-
4-106(4), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.). C.R‘C.P. 15(c) provides that an
amended pleading “relates back” to the date of the original pleading
“[w]henever the claim . . . asserted in the amended pleading arose out of
the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set
forth in the original pleading.” Since the sole amendment required to
bring Binkley’s original petition within the “State Administrative Proce-
dure Act” is the substitution of a reference to section 24-4-106, C.R.S.
1973 (Vol. 10 & 1979 Supp.) for the mistaken reference to C.R.C.P.
106(a)(4), the pleading, if so amended, would state a claim for judicial re-
view identical in all substantive respects to that stated in Binkley’s original
petition. In these circumstances, the amendment “relates back” to May
19, 1976, and is therefore within the applicable limitations period. This re-
sult has been reached in similar cases dealing with the federal counterpart
to C.R.C.P. 15(c). Glover y. City of New York, 446 F.Supp. 110
(E.D.N.Y. 1978); Tankrederiet Gefion A/S v. United States, 241
F.Supp. 83 (E.D. Mich. 1964). Accord, 6 C.A. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure s ver (1971).3

HB An appellant is required o Neder and pay for a transcript of an
administrative hearing in order to make it part of the record for purposes
of judicial review under section 24-4-106. See section 24-4-105(13),
C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.); Loesch v. State, 194 Colo. 169, 570 P.2d 530
(1977). However, in their brief filed with this court, the People have indi-
cated that it will be impossible for Binkley to fulfill this requirement if
further proceedings are ordered on remand. Pursuant to what the People
characterize as routine administrative practice, the department destroyed
the tape recording of the May 18, 1976, hearing when sixty days had
passed after that hearing and no action for judicial review had been

2 Bffective May 24, 1976, after Binkley’s right to seck judicial review of the revocation of his
driver’s license had accrued, section 24-4-106(4) was amended to reduce the applicable limitations
period from sixty to thirty days. See section 24-4-106(4), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).

3 We specifically disapprove Frankmore v. Board of Education, 41 Colo. App. 416, 589 P.2d
1375 (1978), to the extent that it implies that an amendment to a pleading which serves only to
correct an incorrect reference to the basis for a reviewing court’s jurisdiction cannot “relate back”
under C.R.CP. 15(c).

es 71

instituted under section 24-4-106.

In further proceedings on remand, Binkley may request that
the respondent court make specific findings as to the circumstances in
which the recording was destroyed. If the court finds, as alleged by the
People, that the recording was destroyed pursuant to routine administra-
tive practice, it must limit its review under section 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.
1973, to the materials which were submitted to the court by the depart-
ment on June 12, 1976. Alternately, the evidence before the respondent
court may show that spoliation of the recording has occurred, i.e., that:
(a) the tape recording in question was in existence and in the control of
the department; (b) the recording would have been admissible, after tran-
scription, as part of the record in an action for judicial review under sec-
tion 24-4-106; and (c) the department destroyed the recording intention-
ally, for the purpose of preventing its transcription and production on
judicial review. If the respondent court determines that spoliation has oc-
curred, it must entertain a rebuttable presumption that, had the recording
been properly transcribed and submitted for review, it would have sup-
ported the factual allegations concerning the May 18, 1976, hearing made
by Binkley in his original pleading. See Richardson v. Richardson, 124
Colo. 240, 236 P.2d 121 (1951); In re Holmes’ Estate, 98 Colo. 360, 56
P.2d 1333 (1936); Vick v. Texas Employment Commission, 514 F.2d
734 (Sth Cir. 1975); State v. Langlet, 283 N.W.2d 330 (Iowa 1979);
McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 283 (2d ed. E.
Cleary 1972).

V.

The rule is made absolute, and this cause is remanded to the respon-
dent court with directions: (1) to permit Binkley to amend his original
pleading as described in Part II of this opinion, supra; and (2) to review
the revocation of Binkley’s driver’s license pursuant to section 24-4-106,
CRS. 1973 (Vol. 10 & 1979 Supp.), consistent with this opinion.

Rule made absolute.

JUSTICE LEE does not participate.

x
i

No. 79SC24

Cordillera Corporation, a Utah Corporation y. John W. Heard
(612 P.2d 92)

Decided June 9, 1980.

Mason, Reuler and Peek, P.C., Maurice Reuler, Roseanne M. Hall,
for petitioner.

Robert M. Bearman, for respondent.

En Banc.

| 73

JUSTICE DUBOFSKY delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals
(Cordillera Corporation v. Heard, 41 Colo. App. 537, 592 P.2d 12
(1978)] holding that by commencing litigation a landlord and tenant
waived the mandatory arbitration provision in their lease agreement. We
affirm.

. The landlord, petitioner Cordillera Corporation, filed a complaint in
Denver District Court on November 24, 1976 for damages from breach of
a lease agreement between Cordillera and the tenant, respondent John W.
Heard. The lease agreement was incorporated into the complaint. On De-
cember 15, 1976, the respondent entered a general denial which included
affirmative defenses."

During the course of the litigation, the petitioner filed a motion for
summary judgment. Both parties filed extensive briefs, and following a
hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Both parties then amended
their pleadings, and the respondent requested a jury trial. On March 13,
1978, more than one year after commencement of the litigation, the peti-
tioner retained new counsel and filed a Motion for Determination of Juris-
diction and Availability of Arbitration. The motion was based on the
lease’s arbitration clause which the petitioner claimed only then to have
discovered. The trial court held that the lease’s mandatory arbitration pro-
visions controlled, and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
case.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that an arbitration clause could
be waived:

“A valid and unwaived arbitration clause deprives the court of jurisdiction
until the dispute has been submitted to arbitration. See Guthrie v.
Barda, 188 Colo. 124, 533 P.2d 487 (1975); Zahn v. District Court, 169
Colo. 405, 457 P.2d 387 (1969). Here, however, the issue is whether, as
contended by defendant, the arbitration clause has been waived. See
Thomas Wells & Associates v. Cardinal Properties, Inc., 192 Colo.
197, 557 P.2d 396 (1976).

“Although the public policy of this state favors arbitration and, con-
versely, waivers of arbitration are disfavored, Dominion Insurance Co. v.
Hart, 178 Colo. 451, 498 P.2d 1138 (1972), the right to arbitrate ‘may be
waived like any other contractual right.’ School District No. Six v.
Alfred Watts Grant & Associates, 156 Colo. 328, 399 P.2d 101 (1965).
To be valid, the waiver must be a voluntary relinquishment of a known
right. People ex rel. Metzger v. Watrous, 121 Colo. 282, 215 P.2d 344

1 None of the defenses related to the arbitration provision in the lease agreement.

74 |

(1950); French v. Patriotic Insurance Co., 107 Colo. 275, 111 P.2d 893
(1941).” Cordillera Corporation v. Heard, 41 Colo. App. at 539, 592
P.2d at 13.

In order to hold that the facts here establish waiver, the Court of Ap-
peals reasoned that the petitioner’s complaint was an offer to modify the
contract, which the respondent accepted by filing an answer. Thus, the ar-
bitration provision of the contract was waived, and the district court could
assert jurisdiction.

One of the cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals, Titan
Enterprises, Inc. v. Armo Construction, Inc., 32 Cal. App. 3d 828, 108
Cal. Rptr. 456 (1973), has been overruled recently by the California Su-
preme Court [Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and
Transportation District, 23 Cal. 3d 180, 588 P.2d 1261, 151 Cal. Rptr.
837 (1979)]. In Titan, the California Court of Appeals said that by filing
suit on a contract without first seeking arbitration, the plaintiff waived his
right to arbitration under the contract. In Doers, the California Supreme
Court found that more than filing a lawsuit is necessary if a party is to be
deemed to have waived an arbitration right. Relying on a series of federal
cases, the court in Doers held that a waiver is implied when litigation of
the dispute prejudices the other party.

The federal cases cited in Doers suggest that the federal courts follow
a slightly different analysis to determine when an arbitration clause has
been waived by the parties. See, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith v. Lecopulos, 553 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1977); Demsey &
Associates v. S.S. Sea Star, 461 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1972); Carcich v.
Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1968); and Chatham
Shipping Co. v. Fertex Steamship Corp., 352 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1965).
Under federal law, a clear expression of waiver is necessary before a court
may find the original agreement to arbitrate abandoned. However, instead
of relying on a contract analysis such as that used by the Colorado Court
of Appeals to find a waiver of the arbitration clause, the federal courts
look for actions inconsistent with the arbitration clause. Inconsistent ac-
tion manifests the intent to waive the arbitration clause. See United
Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 93 N.M. 105, 597 P.2d 290
(1979).

The federal cases have developed two tests for determining waiver of
an arbitration clause. The difference between them depends on the party
raising the issue and the stage of the litigation. When the plaintiff in a
lawsuit requests invocation of an arbitration clause, such as here, there is
no waiver if the only litigious act is the filing of a complaint. Merrill
Lynch, supra; Doers, supra, But once an answer has been filed on the
merits, both parties have acted in a manner not consistent with the arbi-

eS 15

tration clause and may have waived it. Merrill Lynch, supra; Chatham,
supra.? :

The second test is used to determine if there has been a waiver of an
arbitration clause by a defendant who originally asserted the right to arbi-
tration as an affirmative defense in his answer. Because the defendant
does not have the choice of forum, his exercise. of the arbitration right may
be delayed somewhat so long as his delay and the proceeding on the merits
do not prejudice other parties. Demsey & Associates, supra, and
Carcich, supra.

We look to the federal precedent for the rationale of requiring
a trial court to make a factual determination that inconsistent actions of
the parties when they pursue litigation manifest the intent of the parties to
waive an arbitration clause. An arbitration clause may be waived by ac-
tions taken in litigation which are not consistent with an arbitration
clause.3 Here, actions of the petitioner and the respondent were sufficient
to waive the mandatory arbitration clause.

Judgment affirmed.

JUSTICE LEE does not participate.

2 Some federal cases use prejudice to other parties to determine whether the plaintiff's actions are
inconsistent with the arbitration clause. See Carolina Throwing Co. v. S & E Novelty Corp.,
442 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1971); Vespe Contracting Co. v. Anvan Corp., 399 F.Supp. 519 (E.D.
Pa. 1975); Commercial Metals Co. v. International Union Marine Corp., 294 F.Supp. 570
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). Because we find that petitioner’s pursuit of litigation for more than a year was
action inconsistent with the arbitration clause, we do not consider whether such a test is appropri-
ate here.

3 Our opinion in Thomas Wells and Associates v. Cardinal Properties, Inc., 192 Colo. 197,
557 P.2d 396 (1976), is not inconsistent with this approach. In that case the plaintiff argued that
there were facts in addition to the conduct of the litigation which indicated waiver. This Court re-
manded the case to the trial court for a determination of those facts. Here, the only issue is
whether the undisputed facts as set out supra are sufficient to support waiver.

No. 79SA569

The People of the State of Colorado, ex rel. Eldon E. Silverman, Special
Prosecutor v. Richard A. Anderson

(612 P.2d 94)

Decided June 9, 1980.

Eldon E. Silverman, for complainant.

Paul G. West, for respondent.

En Banc.
JUSTICE DUBOFSKY delivered the opinion of the Court.
A formal complaint was lodged with the Supreme Court Grievance

Committee against respondent, Richard A. Anderson, who was admitted
to the practice of law in Colorado on September 20, 1960. Based upon

A 7

stipulated facts presented to the grievance committee, we suspend the re-
spondent from the practice of law for six months.

[i The formal complaint evolved from respondent’s acceptance of
representation of Jack E. Lake and others to prosecute an action for
breach of contract. Mr. Lake contacted the respondent in October, 1976
about a cause of action against a California company. Two months later,
at a meeting with Mr. Lake and two other claimants against the Califor-
nia company, the respondent accepted employment to prosecute a lawsuit
in federal court in Colorado against the company, agreed that the repre-
sentation would be on a contingent fee basis, and accepted a deposit of
$150.00 for costs. The respondent failed to deposit the money in a trust
account. Between the Fall of 1976 and February, 1978, the respondent
told Mr. Lake in the course of many conversations that suit had been filed
and that a California law firm had been retained to take depositions in
California. In fact, suit had not been filed and the respondent had not con-
tacted potential California counsel.

The respondent answered the formal complaint, admitting most of the
allegations. Subsequently, the respondent, his attorney, and the special
prosecutor filed with the hearing committee a joint stipulation of facts and
recommendation for discipline. The grievance committee recommended
that the respondent be suspended for twelve months and be assessed the
costs of the proceeding.

We have reviewed the stipulation and the record, and note that the
respondent has been disciplined three times previously, once by private
censure and twice by letters of admonition. Two of the matters involved
delay and the respondent’s failure to inform his clients of the status of
their cases. Therefore, we conclude that the respondent’s license to prac-
tice law should be suspended for six months.

The joint stipulation of facts, accepted by the grievance committee,
states that the respondent’s conduct violated C.R.C.P. 241 and the follow-
ing disciplinary rules: DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting a lawyer from engag-
ing in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation);
DR 6-101(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from neglecting a legal matter en-
trusted to him); DR 7-101(A)(2) (prohibiting a lawyer from intentionally
failing to carry out a contract of employment entered into with a client for
professional services); and DR 9-102(A) (requiring that all funds of
clients be deposited in a trust account). We accept the stipulation of facts
as a basis for our action.

A license to practice law assures the public that the lawyer
who holds the license will perform basic legal tasks honestly and without
undue delay, in accordance with the highest standards of professional con-
duct. In addition, the public has a right to expect that one who engages in
professional misconduct shall be disciplined appropriately.

fn

78

Accordingly, it is ordered that respondent, Richard A. Anderson, be
suspended from the practice of law for six months from June 16, 1980.
Respondent shall pay the costs of $200.12 incurred in the disciplinary pro-
ceedings to the clerk of this Court within 60 days.

JUSTICE LEE does not participate.

No. 79SA255

The People of the State of Colorado vy. Joe Manuel Estorga
(612 P.2d 520)

Decided June 9, 1980. Opinion modified and as modified rehearing denied June 23,
1980.

|||

a
i

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Maureen Phelan, Assistant
Attorney General, for plaintiff-appellee.

Frey & Huisjen, John P. Frey, for defendant-appellant.

En Banc.
JUSTICE LOHR delivered the opinion of the Court. |

The defendant, Joe Estorga, was convicted of sexual assault on a
child (section 18-3-405, C.R.S. 1973) following a jury trial. The defendant
appealed, and the case was subsequently transferred from the court of ap-
peals to this court pursuant to section 13-4-110(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973. We
reverse and remand for a new trial.

The victim of the sexual assault was a ten-year-old girl who was men-
tally retarded to some degree. In March 1976 her family moved into an
apartment building which was managed by the defendant. The defendant
and his family resided in that building. The victim became friendly with
the defendant’s wife and children and visited them frequently. In early
February 1977 the defendant and his family moved to a house and the de-
fendant no longer managed the apartment building.

After the defendant moved, the victim visited with the defendant’s
family on four or five occasions. The majority of the visits occurred at the
suggestion of the defendant, although the victim’s mother, at the request
of the victim, initiated at least one of the visits. On July 11, 1977, the de-
fendant attempted to persuade the victim to visit him. Her mother told her
she could go with the defendant, but the victim appeared frightened and
said she did not want to go with him. She remained at home and on the
next morning indicated to her mother that the defendant had sexually
molested her on previous visits. Her mother then had her examined by a
doctor. The doctor’s examination indicated that she had sustained penetra-
tion to the vagina. The victim’s mother then informed the police of the al-
leged crime. Thereafter, the district attorney filed an information charging
the defendant with sexual assault on a child “between January 1, A.D.,
1977; {6 [sic] July 12, A.D., 1977.7!

+ The pertinent portion of the information reads “[tJhat between January 1, A.D., 1977, to [sic]
July 12, A.D., 1977, in the County of Larimer and State of Colorado, JOE MANUEL
ESTORGA, not the spouse of the victim, . . . did unlawfully and feloniously subject said victim
to a sexual contact when said victim was less than 15 years old and said defendant was at least 4
years older than said victim... .”

es 81

Defendant has advanced several grounds for reversal. We will first
consider the issue which we find necessitates reversal and will then address
defendant’s other arguments to guide the trial court on remand.

IL

I During the People’s case, three witnesses testified concerning the
alleged sexual assaults. The victim testified in a very general manner that
the defendant had subjected her to several different types of sexual con-
tact, but at no time indicated what had transpired on any particular occa-
sion. There was also testimony by the mother that the child had been with
the defendant on four or five occasions and that the child later indicated
that she had been sexually molested by the defendant. There was no testi-
mony by the mother that a specific act had occurred during any particular
visit. In addition, a police officer testified that, after he had described vari-
ous acts of sexual contact to the defendant in general terms, the defendant
admitted that he had engaged in such acts with the victim. However, the
officer further testified that the defendant refused to explain any details of
any particular transaction. At the close of the People’s case, the defendant
moved that the court order the People to elect a specific instance of sexual
assault and to rely on that instance for conviction. The court denied the
defendant’s motion. We hold that this denial constituted reversible error.

This court held in Laycock y. People, 66 Colo. 441, 182 P. 880
(1919), that where there is evidence of many acts, any one of which would
constitute the offense charged, the People may be compelled to select the
transaction on which they rely for a conviction. The People are not re-
quired to identify the exact date of the offense, but they must individualize
and select a specific act. The Laycock rule requiring a selection of a cer-
tain act has been affirmed on several occasions. Shier v. People, 116
Colo. 353, 181 P.2d 366 (1947); Wills v. People, 100 Colo. 127, 66 P.2d
329 (1937); Schreiner v. People, 95 Colo. 392, 36 P.2d 764 (1934).

IJ The important reasons for requiring election of a specific act
were succinctly stated in Burlison v. State, 501 S.W.2d 801 (Tenn.
1973). The Tennessee Supreme Court stated that such an election enables
the defendant to prepare and make his defense to a specific charge, and
assures that some jurors do not convict on one offense and others on a sep-
arate offense.? We adopt this rationale.

Il The error in not requiring the People to select a specific act was
compounded when the court instructed the jury that they could find the

2 The Tennessee Supreme Court also mentions that the election protects the defendant from dou-
ble jeopardy. That reason is not applicable under the facts of the instant case.

82 es

defendant guilty if they found that the evidence showed that the crime had
occurred at any time within three years prior to the filing of the informa-
tion. Such an instruction is proper if evidence of only one transaction is
admitted and there is some question as to the date of the incident. In such
a situation, the jury may find the defendant guilty if it finds that the spe-
cific incident occurred within three years of the filing of the information.?
Albritton v. People, 157 Colo. 518, 403 P.2d 772 (1965); see Laycock v.
People, supra. This court held in Eby v. People, 63 Colo. 276, 165 P.
765 (1917), that it was reversible error to give such an instruction if there
was evidence of more than one transaction and there could be some doubt
as to which transaction the jury relied upon for conviction. Under the cir-
cumstances of this case, it was reversible error to give such an instruction.
Il.

HE (Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible
error by denying the defendant’s motion for psychological evaluation of
the victim. We disagree. In People v. King, 41 Colo. App. 177, 581 P.2d
739 (1978), the court of appeals held that such an examination should be
ordered only when there is a compelling reason for it and that the ordering
of such an examination is within the discretion of the trial court. It further
stated that the court must “balance the possible emotional trauma, embar-
rassment or intimidation to the complainant against the likelihood of the
examination producing material, as distinguished from speculative, evi-
dence.” 41 Colo. App. at 179, 581 P.2d at 741. In the instant case, the
only evidence presented with respect to the defendant’s motion for psycho-
logical evaluation was the testimony of the victim’s mother. The mother
testified that the victim was ten years of age, had no trouble talking with
people, was mentally retarded to a certain degree, had attended special ed-
ucation classes since entering kindergarten, and was in the highest part of
her special education class. Based upon this record we find that the court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for psychological evalua-
tion.4

Il. .

I Defendant next argues that the court improperly denied his mo-
tion to suppress inculpatory statements which were made at or about the
time of his detention and arrest. We disagree. It is undisputed that the de-
fendant voluntarily came to the police department at the request of a po-

3 Section 16-5-401, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8) requires that an action based on sexual as-
sault on a child be instituted within three years after the commission of the offense.

“If the motion for psychological examination is renewed in preparation for a new trial, the trial
judge must exercise his discretion, applying the standards discussed herein to the facts developed in
any hearing on that motion. We cannot and do not indicate any opinion as to how the trial court
should rule on such a motion.

83

: lice officer and that, upon arrival at the police department, the Miranda’ rights
“were read to him. He then signed a waiver of those rights and proceeded to

make inculpatory statements. The defendant alleges that the statements he

» made following his waiver should not have been admitted as the waiver was not
* voluntarily made, because he was extremely frightened and confused. He
” testified that he requested an opportunity to consult with counsel but was
. advised by a police officer that counsel would be appointed for him when he

appeared in court. The police officer testified that the waiver was voluntary and
that there was no request for counsel. The trial court resolved the conflict in the

. evidence against the defendant. The motion to suppress was properly denied.

IV.

HMM The defendant urges that the trial court committed reversible
error in finding the child victim competent to testify; allowing the child to
testify; and then refusing an instruction tendered by the defendant advis-
ing the jury to weigh the testimony of the child with caution. We do not
agree with these assertions. Following a competency examination in which
the child was questioned by the trial judge and counsel for both parties,
the court found that the child was competent to testify. We have previ-
ously held that, if the court can determine that the witness is able to ob-
serve and relate facts accurately and understands the moral obligation to
tell the truth, she is competent to testify. Marn v. People, 175 Colo. 242,
486 P.2d 424 (1971).® The trial court made findings with respect to these
standards in determining that the child was competent to testify. These
findings are supported by the record. The determination of competency is
addressed to the discretion of the trial court and, absent an abuse of dis-
cretion, the court’s ruling will not be disturbed on review. Id.; Wesner v.
People, 126 Colo. 400, 250 P.2d 124 (1952) (involving a seven-year-old
witness). We find no such abuse.”

We also conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing defendant’s tendered instruction to weigh the evidence of the
victim carefully. A general instruction on witness credibility was given
which sufficiently listed factors for the jury to consider in weighing all evi-
dence. It was within the trial court’s discretion to refuse a specific instruc-
tion which might have unnecessarily emphasized particular evidence.

8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

© In Marn v. People, supra, the witnesses were of the ages of nine and ten, The court made no
distinction between them in discussing the applicability of C.R.S. 1963, 154-1-6, which provides in
pertinent part:

“(1) the following persons shall not be witnesses:

“(b) Children under ten years of age who appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the
facts respecting which they are examined or of relating.them truly.”

CRS. 1963, 154-1-6, is currently codified at section 13-90-106, C.R.S. 1973.

7 On retrial, competency of the victim should be determined in light of the record there developed.

84 es

People v. Cunningham, 194 Colo. 198, 570 P.2d 1086 (1977). Again, we
find no abuse of discretion.

Vv.

The defendant next challenges the constitutionality of section

18-3-408, C.R.S. 1973, which forbids the giving of a jury instruction that
a charge such as the one in this case is easy to make but hard to defend
against (the traditional “Lord Hale” instruction). The defendant contends
that section 18-3-408, C.R.S. 1973, violates the constitutional requirement
of separation of powers (Colo. Const. art. III) by interfering with the rule-
making power of the court established in Colo. Const. art. VI, § 21. This
court specifically upheld the constitutionality of the statute against a simi-
lar attack in People v. Fierro, 199 Colo. 215, 606 P.2d 1291 (1980).

VI.

Defendant’s final ground for reversal involves the court’s refusal to
permit defendant to introduce testimony which would have allegedly im-
peached the victim’s prior statements, on the basis that the defendant had
not followed procedures prescribed in section 18-3-407, C.R.S. 1973 (now
in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8). Because a new trial is necessary and the issue may
not arise on retrial, we choose not to consider whether the trial court’s rul-
ing on that matter was correct.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded for a new trial.

JUSTICE LEE does not participate.

85
No. 80SA203
In The Matter of the Title, Ballot Title, Submission Clause and Summary

Pertaining to the Branch Banking Initiative Adopted on March 19, 1980,
and Amended on April 8, 1980

(612 P.2d 96)

Decided June 9, 1980.

Frank L. Hays, Robert W. Hutchinson, for petitioner.

Vanatta and Spelts, P.C., Richard J. Spelts, Dean R. Vanatta, Scott
F. Sullan, for proponents.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,

Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Stephen H. Kaplan, First Assistant
Attorney General, for Initiative Title Setting Board.

En Banc.

ee 87

JUSTICE LOHR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an original proceeding pursuant to section 1-40-102(3), C.R.S.
1973 (1979 Supp.). The petitioner, James P. Thomas, challenges the ac-
tion of the Initiative Title Setting Review Board! (Board) denying his
motion for rehearing regarding the titles, summary, and submission clause
fixed by the Board for the proposed initiative on branch banking. Standing
to assert this challenge is conferred upon the petitioner, as a “qualified
elector” other than one who submitted the initiative petition, by the stat-
ute pursuant to which this proceeding has been brought.

Petitioner contends that certain language in the titles, summary, and
submission clause? misstates federal law; that the use of the word “con-
venience” is unfair; and that the language fails to disclose that authoriza-
tion for existing detached banking facilities will be abolished. As a result,
the petitioner asserts that the titles, summary, and submission clause are
unfair and do not clearly express the true meaning and intent of the pro-
posed law. See section 1-40-102(3), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.). We have
reviewed each of the petitioner’s contentions and conclude that the Board’s
action in denying the motion for rehearing should be affirmed.

= This court has previously stated the principles by which it is
guided in its review of a case such as the one now before us:

“(1) [W]e must not in any way concern ourselves with the merit or lack
of merit of the proposed amendment since, under our system of govern-
ment, that resolution rests with the electorate; (2) all legitimate presump-
tions must be indulged in favor of the propriety of the board’s action; and
(3) only in a clear case should a title prepared by the board be held in-
valid.”

Bauch v. Anderson, 178 Colo. 308, 310, 497 P.2d 698, 699 (1972); In
the Matter of the Proposed Initiative on Transfer of Real Estate to
Amend the Colorado Constitution by Adding a Section 9 to Article
18, 200 Colo: 40, 611, P.2d 981 (1980); In-re; Thitiated:.
Constitutional Amendment Respecting Rights of ‘the Public to
Uninterrupted Services by Public Employees, 199 Colo. 409, 609 P.2d
631 (1980). This court is limited in its review to determining if the titles,
summary, and submission clause are “unfair” or do not “clearly express

1 The secretary of state, the attorney general, and the director of the legislative drafting office
constitute an ad hoc board to designate and fix a proper fair title, together with a ballot title and
submission clause, and to prepare a clear, concise summary of each law to be proposed by initia-
tive. Section 1-40-101(2), C.R.S. 1973. We refer to that board as the Initiative Title Setting Re-
view Board.

2 The titles, summary, and submission clause fixed by the Board are set forth in Appendix A. The
proposed initiative itself is set forth in full later in this opinion,

88 ee)

the true meaning and intent of the proposed law.” Section 1-40-102(3),
C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).
“Be It Enacted By The People of the State of Colorado:
“SECTION 1. 11-6-101, Colorado Revised Statutes 1973, as amended, is
amended, BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW SUBSECTION, to read:
“11-6-101.
“(1.1) Effective July 1, 1981, any bank, with the approval of the banking
board, may establish one or more branches anywhere in this state. Such
approval shall be given if the banking board determines that the proposed
branch will serve the public need and convenience in the community or
area to be served. The procedure for processing any application for a
branch shall be established under rules and regulations prescribed by the
banking board. For the purpose of this subsection *branch“ means a bank-
ing facility separate from the principal office of the bank, at which cus-
tomer services and other banking activities are conducted. All administra-
tive costs of filing and processing any application for a branch, as
determined by the banking board, shall be paid by the applicant bank.
Any conflicting provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall not apply
on and after July 1, 1981.”

1

The petitioner’s first group of contentions relates to the accuracy and
adequacy of the titles, summary, and submission clause to express the in-
terrelation of the proposed initiated law and the federal laws governing na-
tional banking associations. “Bank” as used in the proposed initiated law
includes national banking associations. Sections 11-1-101, -102(2), and
-102(16), C.R.S. 1973.

Hl Petitioner first contends that the summary incorrectly states that
national banking associations may establish branches provided only that
they meet the restrictions as to location imposed on state banks. The sum-
mary provides in part: “Current federal law permits national banking
associations to establish branches when state banks are authorized to do
so, subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by the state statute on
state banks.” This language is a fair summary of the pertinent portion of
the McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1976),? which provides for the es-
tablishment of branches by national banking associations. Petitioner’s

3 That portion of the McFadden Act which is relevant to the instant matter states:
“(c) A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency,
establish and operate new branches:

“(2) at any point within the State in which said association is situated, if such establishment and
operation are at the time authorized to State banks by the statute law of the state in question by
language specifically granting such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recog-
nition, and subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by the law of the State on State
banks.”

| 89

complaint appears to be that the Board’s summary fails to explain the full
impact the initiated law might have as a result of the McFadden Act. Peti-
tioner contends that case law has held that the establishment of branches
by national banking associations is also subject to state standards relating
to matters other than location. Even if the petitioner’s interpretation of
federal case law is correct,* the language “when state banks are author-
ized to do so” adequately suggests that location is not necessarily the only
relevant state criterion for evaluating a branch banking application by a
national banking association. The legislature has mandated that the sum-
mary be at once clear and concise. Section 1-40-101(2), C.R.S. 1973
(1979 Supp.). It also must be a true and impartial statement of the intent
of the proposed law and must not be an argument, nor likely to create
prejudice either for or against the measure. Id. The treatment of the
McFadden Act matter by the Board in preparing the summary is faithful
to those criteria.

HHI Petitioner next alleges that the language of the ballot title and
submission clause contradicts federal law in that it states that the state
banking board would have to authorize a branch of a national banking
association whereas such authorization is the responsibility of the United
States comptroller of the currency. The language of the proposed law
clearly purports to apply to national banking associations as well as state
banks. However, the parties seem to agree that federal law would not per-
mit the state banking board to act with respect to applications of national
banking associations for approval of branches. The Board struggled with
this problem in establishing the language of the ballot title and submission
clause. The transcript of the hearing before the Board on the petitioner’s
motion for rehearing reflects proposals by individual members of the
Board to revise the language to make it more accurate and complete. Each
proposal was discovered to have problems of its own and could not com-
mand approval of a majority of the members of the Board. The Board,
after extensive consideration, elected to utilize the language now before
this court. This language describes the true meaning and intent of the pro-
posed law as derived from the language of that law and leaves the possible
effects of federal law to be brought to the attention of the voters by public
debate. See In the Matter of the Proposed Initiative on Transfer of
Real Estate to Amend the Colorado Constitution by Adding a Section
9 to Article 18, supra. Being mindful of our duty to indulge all legiti-
mate presumptions in favor of the Board’s action, Bauch v. Anderson,
supra, we conclude that the action taken by the Board should not be dis-
turbed by this court.

4 "We express no opinion as to the petitioner’s interpretation of case law with respect to the impact
the proposed statute might have on the establishment of branches by national banking associations.

90 ee

| | Petitioner next contends that the titles, summary, and submis-
sion clause incorrectly state that the state banking board can grant ap-
proval for a branch to “any” bank upon determination that the branch will
serve the public need and convenience when in fact the state banking
board cannot bind the federal comptroller with its interpretation of public
need and convenience. Here again the Board has elected to describe the
purported effect of the proposed law without attempting to explain the ex-
tent to which the law might not be able to be applied to national banks
consistent with federal law. For the same reasons discussed in the immedi-
ately preceding paragraph, we will not disturb the action taken by the
board.

IL.

II Petitioner’s next contention is that the use of the word “conven-
ience” in the titles, summary, and submission clause is prejudicial. In the
proposed statute “convenience” is part of a standard, i.e., public need and
convenience, that must be satisfied to obtain approval to establish a
branch bank. The use of the word in the titles, summary, and submission
clause is alleged to be prejudicial because that word is likely to be the ba-
sis of the campaign for branch banking. This court has held that “catch
phrases” which are not a part of the text of a proposed amendment should
be excised from the ballot title and submission clause. Henry v. Baker,
143 Colo. 461, 354 P.2d 490 (1960); Say v. Baker, 137 Colo. 155, 322
P.2d 317 (1958). However, Henry v. Baker, supra, and Say v. Baker,
supra, are not applicable to the instant case because the term “conven-
ience” is part of the proposed statute and is used in the titles, summary,
and submission clause in the same manner in which it appears in the pro-
posed statute.

Petitioner also argues that the titles, summary, and submission clause
are misleading in failing to disclose that the comptroller of the currency
might interpret public need and convenience differently than does the
state banking board, with the result that branch banking applications for
national banking associations might be subject to different standards than
branch banking applications for state banks. Again, for reasons previously
explained, we will not disturb the Board’s decision to summarize the pur-
ported effect of the proposed law, leaving for public debate the question of
the impact of federal law on implementation of the proposed law.

Ti.

Petitioner’s final argument is that the titles, summary, and sub-

mission clause fail to express the true meaning and intent of the proposed
law by failing to disclose that the proposed law would abolish authoriza-
tion for presently existing detached facilities. This argument is based on
an interpretation by petitioner of the effect the proposed statute will have
on the present law. Such effect is by no means certain and the proponents
have stated it is not their intent that authorization for detached facilities

rs a1
be abolished. If the proposed law is adopted and a conflict arises in the fu-
ture with respect to the abolishment of authorization for detached facili-
ties, a judicial determination of the effect of the proposed statute on cur-
rent law may be made at that time. Under these circumstances the effect
of the proposed law as to authorization for existing detached facilities
need not be treated in the titles, summary, and submission clause in order
to prevent unfairness or to express clearly the true meaning and intent of
the proposed law. See section 1-40-102(3), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).

We affirm the ruling of the Initiative Title Setting Review Board de-
nying the petitioner’s motion for rehearing.

JUSTICE LEE does not participate.

APPENDIX A

The title to the proposed initiated amendment to the Statutes, as des-
ignated and fixed by the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and
Director of the Legislative Drafting Office, is as follows:

“An Act to provide that beginning July 1, 1981, any bank may establish
one or more branch banking facilities separate from the principal office of
the bank anywhere in the state if the banking board determines that the
proposed branch will serve the public need and convenience in the commu-
nity or area to be served; and providing that all administrative costs of fil-
ing

“The term ‘branch’ is defined as a banking facility separate from the prin-
cipal office of the bank, at which customer services and other banking
activities are carried on.

“The proposed amendment would take effect July 1, 1981, and any provi-
sions elsewhere in the amended section in conflict with the proposed

92 es

amendment would not be applicable after that date.”

The ballot title and submission clause to the proposed initiated

amendment to the Statutes, as designated and fixed by the Secretary of
State, Attorney General, and Director of the Legislative Drafting Office,
is as follows:
“Shall any bank, beginning July 1, 1981, be permitted to establish one or
more branch banking facilities separate from the principal office of the
bank anywhere in the state if the banking board determines that the pro-
posed branch will serve the public need and convenience in the community
or area to be served, all administrative costs of filing and processing an ap-
plication for a branch to be paid by the applicant bank?”

No. 79SA183

William Whittington, Jr. v.
Harold Bray, Sheriff of Jefferson County, Colorado

(613 P.2d 633)

Decided June 16, 1980.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Michael Heher, Deputy,
for petitioner-appellant.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Anthony Marquez, Assistant

es 93

Attorney General, for respondent-appellee.

En Banc.

CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of a petition for writ of
habeas corpus filed pursuant to the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.
Section 16-19-101, et seg., C-_R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8). The
appellant raises three issues relating to the propriety of the extradition
proceedings. He first challenges the validity of the governor’s warrant due
to the alleged failure of the governor to personally review the requisition
documents. Secondly, he questions the sufficiency of the requisition docu-
ments from North Carolina used to support the warrant. Finally, he at-
tacks the sufficiency of the proof of his identification as the person sought
by the demanding state. We reject each of these arguments and affirm the
trial court’s denial of the petition.

HE The appellant’s first argument was not raised in the trial court;
however, it was recently rejected by this court in Wittington v. Bray,
200 Colo: 17, 612 P.2d 72 (1980). We find no reason to. dlabotatey,
further on the issue. Additionally, the remaining arguments have been
raised for the first time on appeal,’ and thus will not be considered.

Judgment affirmed.

1 The appellant did challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of his identity in the trial court on a
ground other than the primary thrust of his argument to this court. We note that this secondary
ground is without merit. See Allen v. Cronin, 189 Colo. 540, 543 P.2d 707 (1975).

)
a4

No. 79SA218

Alan N. Charnes, Executive Director,
Colorado Department of Revenue v.
Nick DiGiacomo

(612 P.2d 1117)

Decided June 16, 1980.

al
a

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,

Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Richard H. Forman, Assistant
Attorney General, General Legal Services Section, for plaintiff-appellee.

DiGiacomo & Braden, David R. DiGiacomo, for defendant-
appellant.

En Banc.

JUSTICE DUBOFSKY delivered the opinion of the Court.

The defendant-appellant taxpayer here appeals a, trial court order de-
nying his motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum issued under section
39-21-112(3), C.R.S. 1973 (see p. 11, infra).1 The Court of Appeals
transferred the case to us under section 13-4-102, C.R.S. 1973, because
the taxpayer challenges the constitutionality of the subpoena statute. We
affirm the trial court’s order.

1 This is a special statutory proceeding in a district court, and the court has made the final judg-
ment required by the statute. Therefore, the court’s rulings are appealable. C.A.R. 1(a)(1).

ee 97

On October 24, 1978, the Attorney General, on behalf of Alan
N. Charnes, the director of the Department of Revenue (plaintiff-
appellee), filed a motion for a subpoena duces tecum in Denver District
Court. The motion requested that a subpoena issue to the Citizen’s Bank
in Westminster because the director believed the bank had custody and
control of records necessary for him to investigate the liability of the tax-
payer Nick DiGiacomo, appellant here, for Colorado income, sales and
withholding taxes. The director filed exhibits with the motion showing
that the taxpayer, who had been served with an administrative subpoena,
refused to produce the requested records. Section 39-21-112(3), C.R.S.
1973, provides for a judicial subpoena to third parties when the Depart-
ment of Revenue is unable to obtain information directly from the tax-
payer.

When the motion was filed, the Attorney General issued a summons
to the bank requesting its presence at a hearing on November 3, 1978, at
which time the court would consider issuing the subpoena. The taxpayer
filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings to protect his expectation of
privacy in the records held by the bank and to challenge the statutory pro-
cedures as violative of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The trial
court granted the taxpayer leave to intervene. The bank did not appear at
the hearing, and over the taxpayer’s objection, the court issued the sub-
poena for the bank records. The taxpayer then filed a motion to quash the
subpoena. The court denied the motion on December 12. The issuance of
the subpoena has been stayed pending this appeal.

Both the taxpayer and the director challenge the trial court’s rulings.
The taxpayer claims an expectation of privacy in his bank records which
are inadequately protected from government access by the judicial sub-
poena in section 39-21-112(3), C.R.S. 1973. The statutory shortcomings
he alleges are lack of notice to the taxpayer of the motion for a subpoena
and no requirement before the subpoena issues that the director show
probable cause to believe that the taxpayer has violated the tax laws. He
also argues that the judicial subpoena statute compels him to testify
against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

On the other hand, the director contends that because the taxpayer
has no expectation of privacy in records held by the bank, the taxpayer has
neither standing to file a motion to quash nor sufficient interest in the ac-
tion to intervene under C.R.C.P. 24.

We agree with the taxpayer that he has an expectation of privacy in
his bank records and that the records are protected from unreasonable
search and seizure by the Department of Revenue. Therefore, we conclude
that the taxpayer here has sufficient interest in the statutory subpoena
proceeding to permit him to intervene in the action and to file a motion to
quash the subpoena duces tecum. We also conclude that the trial court
properly denied the taxpayer’s motion to quash the subpoena because the

98 ee

statutory process allowing governmental access to records is reasonable,
and the director sufficiently justified the need for the documents in the in-
stant case.

I. EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY

I The United States and Colorado constitutions protect an individ-
ual’s reasonable expectation of privacy from unreasonable governmental
intrusion. See U.S. Const., Amend. IV; Colo. Const., Art. II, Sec. 7.
The taxpayer here argues that the Department of Revenue’s seizure of his
records of financial transactions from his bank is a governmental intrusion
which violates the constitutional protection for expected privacy.

The taxpayer bases his argument on the Fourth Amendment test in
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576
(1967), providing protection for “people not places.” In determining
whether the interest asserted represents a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, the court looked not to the location of the act but to the expectation
of the individual. Thus, in Katz although the individual was in a public
telephone booth, he expected privacy, and government agents could not re-
cord his call without receiving prior judicial approval.

The Katz opinion represented a departure from property concepts
that had been used to determine the scope of Fourth Amendment protec-
tions. The United States Supreme Court has since considered the more
flexible “expectation of privacy” analysis in the context of governmental
seizure of bank records of an individual’s financial transactions in United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976).?
However, in Miller, the court held that any expectation of privacy which
a customer had in his records was forfeited when he disclosed the informa-
tion to the bank in the course of his bank transactions. Once he revealed
information to a third party, the bank, the customer could not limit gov-
ernmental access to that information.? Personal information, which was
once kept within an individual’s control, now may be readily accessible to
the government through financial statements and records of checks tied to
social security numbers.

Miller limits our application of the Fourth Amendment to the facts
before us, but it does not determine the scope of protection provided to in-
dividuals in Colorado by the constitution of this state. Denver v. Nielson,

2 In Miller, a federal grand jury subpoenaed from two banks “all records of accounts, i.e., savings,
checking, loan or otherwise,” in the name of defendant or his company. The defendant was
charged with illegal distilling, and the court refused to suppress the bank records because there
was no violation of the defendant’s interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.

3 Miller has been the subject of legal criticism, particularly because its reliance on a property
analysis ignores the observation in Katz that property concepts cannot be “talismanic solutions” to
Fourth Amendment problems. Thus, Miller fails to recognize the role of banks in our complex so-
ciety. See LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, §2.7 (1978);
Comment, 14 San Diego L. Rev. 414 (1977). Cf. Note, 83 Yale L. J. 1439 (1974).

99

194 Colo. 407, 572 P.2d 484 (1977). The Colorado constitutional protec-
tion from unreasonable searches is similar to the Fourth Amendment:
“The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects,
from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any
place or seize any person or things shall issue without describing the place
to be searched, or the person or thing to be seized, as near as may be, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writ-
ing.” Colo. Const., Art. I, Sec. 7.

The issue for our decision is whether the Katz expectation of privacy test
as a measure of unreasonable seizures under the Colorado Constitution
gives the taxpayer here the right to challenge a subpoena to the bank for
his records. We conclude that it does.

I] The Katz test has been applied in Colorado courts to reasonably
limit governmental searches and seizures. See, e.g., People v.
Weisenberger, 183 Colo. 353, 516 P.2d 1128 (1973); Zamora v. People,
175 Colo. 340, 487 P.2d 1116 (1971); and People v. Harfmann, 38 Colo.
App. 19, 555 P.2d 187 (1976). Since the decision in Katz, several states
have considered whether an expectation of privacy under the Katz analy-
sis exists in bank records.4 In Burrows v. Superior Court of San
Bernardino County, 13 Cal.3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166
(1974), the California Supreme Court held that a bank customer has an
expectation of privacy in the bank’s records of the customer’s financial
transactions.5 Noting that bank transactions are not completely voluntary
because bank accounts are necessary to modern commercial life, the court
found that the inadvertent disclosure of information about the substance
of financial transactions was incidental to the customer’s major purpose of
facilitating fund transfers. Contrary to the rationale in Miller, there was
not a true disclosure to a third party. Since the customer does not intend
to disclose the substance of the financial transaction, the California court
found that a bank customer retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the bank records.®

4 Compare the recent decisions in Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 403 A.2d 1283
(1979), cert. denied, 444 US. 1032, 100 S.Ct. 704, 62 L.Bd.2d 668 (1980) (finding an expecta-
tion of privacy in bank records) with Smith v. State, 283 Md. 156, 389 A.2d 858 (1978) (no ex-
pectation of privacy in bank records).

5 The Burrows decision has not been changed since Miller. In fact, the principle has been ex-
tended to credit cards, People v. Blair, 25 Cal.3d 640, 602 P.2d 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1979),
and telephone records, People v. Mejia, 95 Cal.App.3d 828, 157 Cal.Rptr. 233 (1979).

6 If the reason for the government’s interest in the bank account is that the customer has written a
“bad check”, the bank may reveal the existence and status of the customer’s account. See People
v. Johnson, 53 Cal.App.3d 394, 125 Cal.Rptr. 725 (1976); State v. McCray, 15 Wash. App. 810,
551 P.2d 1376 (1976). In these cases, the bank is an active party to the transaction, and the cus-
tomer loses his expectation of privacy in the account. For similar situations, see, e.g., Av.
District Court, 191 Colo. 10, 550 P.2d 315 (1976); Donaldson v. U.S., 400 U.S. 517, 91 S.Ct.
534, 27 L.Bd.2d $80 (1970).

100 |

The test we adopt to determine the taxpayer’s interest in his
bank records follows Katz and Burrows: whether the bank depositor has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the bank records of his financial
transactions. We conclude that the taxpayer here does.

HB This analysis does not bar government agents from obtaining
bank records. DeJohn, supra. Governmental access to the records is lim-
ited in that appropriate legal process must be used to obtain them (see
Part III, infra), and the bank customer has standing to assert his expecta-
tion of privacy in the records during the legal process (see Part Il, infra).

Il. INTERVENTION AND STANDING

The taxpayer asserted his claim for protection of his bank records
from unreasonable governmental intrusion in a motion to intervene in the
proceeding for the issuance of the subpoena [section 39-21-112(3), C.R.S.
1973] and in a motion to quash the subpoena to the bank.’ The director
of the Department of Revenue argues that the taxpayer has no expectation
of. privacy in his bank records and thus no interest to support intervention
in the subpoena proceeding and no standing to file the motion to quash.

The taxpayer’s motion to intervene is based on C.R.C.P. 24(a):8
“Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an ac-
tion

“(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his
ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately
represented by existing parties.”

Our declaration of an expectation of privacy in bank records satisfies the
rule requirement of an “interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action.” The taxpayer’s ability to protect that
interest may be impaired or impeded if he is not allowed to intervene. Al-
though he could challenge the propriety of the subpoena in tax deficiency
or criminal proceedings, by then the privacy of his records has been
breached, and the information contained in the records is possessed by the
government. Finally, the taxpayer’s privacy interest in his bank records
cannot be adequately represented when, as here, the bank, the custodian
of the records, chose not to appear at the subpoena hearing. The trial
court’s order allowing the taxpayer’s intervention was proper because the
taxpayer’s expectation of privacy is an interest sufficient to support

7 Although it was not error for the taxpayer to have used both procedures, either by itself would
have been sufficient to raise the issue. Section 39-21-112(3), CRS. 1973; CR.CP. 24, 45(b), 81.
® Because we conclude that the taxpayer is entitled to intervention of right under C.R.CP.
24(a)(2), we do not consider whether he was entitled to permissive intervention under C.R.CP.
24(b).

101

intervention of right. C-.R.C.P. 24(a)(2).°
Once the court allows intervention, it follows that a taxpayer
with an expectation of privacy in his bank records has standing to raise the
legitimacy of governmental access to the records in a motion to quash the
subpoena for the records. C.R.C.P. 45(b). The motion to quash requires
the director of the Department of Revenue to justify access to the the tax-
payer’s bank records under the standards of section 39-21-112(3), C.R.S.
1973, infra.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATUTE

The taxpayer argues that the statute providing for a judicial subpoena
to a third party in a proceeding against a taxpayer is unconstitutional be-
cause it does not protect his expectation of privacy in his bank records
from unreasonable searches. Particularly, he challenges the statute’s lack
of a probable cause standard for the issuance of a subpoena and lack of
notice to the taxpayer. He questions the propriety of the civil subpoena
when the documents may be used for a criminal investigation. He also ar-
gues that permitting government access to his bank records violates his
Fifth Amendment rights.
. We do not agree with the taxpayer’s contention that probable
cause is required to support an administrative subpoena. In Oklahoma
Press Publishing Company v. Walling, 327 US. 186, 66 S.Ct. 494, 90
L.Ed. 614 (1946), the United States Supreme Court held that an adminis-
trative agency’s seizure of records is a reasonable seizure if (1) the inves-
tigation is for a lawfully authorized purpose; (2) the information sought is
relevant to the inquiry; and (3) the subpoena is sufficiently specific to ob-
tain documents which are adequate but not excessive for the inquiry. See
also People ex el. MacFarlane v. American Banco, 194 Colo. 32, 570
P.2d 825 (1977). Thus, section 39-21-112(3), C.R.S. 1973, allowing the
judicial subpoena, and the documents submitted by the Department of
Revenue to support the subpoena, must meet the Walling standards.

Section 39-21-112(3), C.R.S. 1973, provides:

“If the executive director of the department of revenue is unable to secure
from the taxpayer information relating to the correctness of the taxpayer’s
return or the amount of the income of the taxpayer, the executive director
may apply to any judge of the district court of the state of Colorado for
the issuance of subpoenas to such other persons as the executive director
believes may have knowledge in the premises, and upon making a showing

° Compare Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 91 S.Ct. 534, 27 L-Ed.2d 580 (1971),
which held that a taxpayer was not entitled to intervention of right in a proceeding to enforce an
administrative summons of the Internal Revenue Service for papers possessed by a former employer
of the taxpayer. The court assumed that there was no expectation of privacy in the papers. Subse-
quently, Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code to allow taxpayer intervention in third
party summons. Tax Reform Act of 1976. 26 U.S.C. §7609 (1976).

102 ee

satisfactory to the court that the taxpayer cannot be found, or evades serv-
ice of subpoena, or fails or refuses to produce his records or give testi-
mony, or is unable to furnish such records or testimony, the judge has
power, after service of summons upon the persons named in the petition of
the executive director and after hearing, to cause the issuance of sub-
poenas under the seal of the court to the persons sought to be so sum-
moned requiring any of them to appear before said executive director and
give testimony relating to said taxpayer’s return or income. In case any of
said ‘persons so served with subpoena fail to respond thereto, the judge
may proceed against such persons as in cases of contempt.”

The statute clearly meets the Walling standard. The director of the De-
partment of Revenue is required by section 39-21-112(1), C.R.S. 1973
(1979 Supp.), to enforce the state tax laws. A subpoena seeking informa-
tion to enforce the tax laws is a “lawfully authorized purpose.” Informa-
tion relating to the correctness of the taxpayer’s return or the amount of
the taxpayer’s income is “relevant” to enforcement of the tax laws. The
statute refers to taxpayer records or testimony; the required specificity is
provided by the subpoena.

The documents supporting the subpoena stated that the Depart-
ment’s investigation was of the Colorado income, withholding and sales
tax liability of the taxpayer, a lawfully authorized purpose. The Depart-
ment’s subpoena sought from the bank:

“(1) Copies of all signature cards, statements, canceled checks written on
or deposited to any account, deposit slips and debit or credit notices, issued
within the period from January 1, 1974 through January 31, 1978 pertain-
ing to all checking accounts, savings accounts or any other bank accounts,
as well as all loan agreements, promissory notes, collateral agreements,
and any other financial records, maintained in the name of, or reflecting
agreements with Nick DiGiacomo.

(2) Copies of all invoices, billing statements, purchase or credit agree-
ments, leases, checks, money orders, promissory notes and any other busi-
ness or financial records pertaining to Nick DiGiacomo for the period
from January 1, 1974 through January 31, 1978.”

Because the Department was investigating personal and business tax lia-
bility and the subpoena limited the scope of the records by subject and
date, the documents sought were relevant and identified specifically
enough to meet the Walling standards.

The taxpayer also maintains that the civil subpoena here is im-
proper because the Department of Revenue intends to pursue a criminal
action against him and the records sought are for the criminal investiga-
tion. This contention has been considered most recently by the United
States Supreme Court in Donaldson v. United States, supra, and in
United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 98 S.Ct. 2357,
57 L.Ed.2d 221 (1978). Both cases involved the propriety of Internal

es 103

Revenue Service civil subpoenas when the underlying intent was to use the
subpoenaed documents for a criminal investigation. As the court noted,
civil and criminal aspects of tax investigation overlap. The investigation
may result in criminal prosecution’? and assessment of a civil penalty.
Tax investigations by the Department of Revenue also may result in crimi-
nal or civil sanctions.‘ Based on LaSalle, the use of a civil subpoena in
the department’s tax investigation was proper.

The taxpayer also questions the statute’s lack of a notice provision to
inform the taxpayer of the third party subpoena. Here, the taxpayer actu-
ally had notice of the subpoena proceeding, so we do not reach this issue. 1?

HI Finally, the taxpayer challenges the statutory subpoena process
as compelling him to be a witness against himself in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. The premise of his argument is that a court issued subpoena
to the bank for the records of his financial transactions in effect compels
the production of his personal papers. We disagree. The compulsion is on
the bank, not on the taxpayer directly. Fisher v. United States, 425 US.
391, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976); Andresen v. Maryland, 427
US. 463, 96 S.Ct. 2697, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976).

The statute and the subpoena documents submitted to the trial court
meet the minimum requirement for the Department of Revenue to obtain
the records of a taxpayer. Neither the statute on its face nor the applica-
tion of the statute in these circumstances violates in an unreasonable man-
ner the taxpayer’s expectation of privacy in his bank records.

IV. CONCLUSION

An individual has an expectation of privacy in records of his financial
transactions held by a bank in Colorado. This expectation of privacy will
prevent unreasonable governmental access to the records, but the access
sought by the Department of Revenue in this case is reasonable. Both the
statute and the showing made by the Department of Revenue adequately
protect the taxpayer’s expectation of privacy.

Judgment affirmed.

‘© The court separated the criminal and civil investigations when the Internal Revenue Service re-
commended the case to the Justice Department for prosecution. The briefs here indicate that the
instant case was recommended to the appropriate district attorney for prosecution but the district
attorney refused to prosecute. +

11 Cf. sections 39-22-621, 39-26-115, 120, 121, C.R.S. 1973 {ana 1979 Supp.).

12 To protect the taxpayer’s expectation of privacy in bank records, the taxpayer should have no-
tice of judicial subpoena proceedings under section 39-21-112(3), C.R.S. 1973.

104

No. 79SA433

In the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of Front Range Land
& Livestock Company: Rueben Michel y. Front Range Land & Livestock
Company

(612 P.2d 1128)

Decided June 16, 1980.

Reuben Michel, pro se.

Saunders, Snyder, Ross & Dickson, P.C., William J. Kirven III, for
appellee.

En Banc.
JUSTICE LOHR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Upon the application of Front Range Land & Livestock Co. (Front

Range), the water court for Water Division No. 1 awarded a water stor-
age right to Front Range Land & Livestock Reservoir. Reuben Michel

eS 105

(Michel) appealed, and we affirm.

Front Range Land & Livestock Reservoir consists of several ponds in
an area which long ago was in the main channel of the South Platte River.
The river changed its course, leaving a marshy oxbow area in which the
ponds are located. The capacity of the ponds was increased to 69.8 acre
feet by construction of three low dams.

On December 31, 1974, Front Range filed an application for a water
storage right for Front Range Land & Livestock Reservoir.? A statement
of opposition? was filed by Michel, who contended that his vested water
tights would be injuriously affected if the application were granted. After
a hearing on the application, the water referee issued a ruling awarding to
Front Range Land & Livestock Reservoir an absolute water storage right
for 69.8 acre feet, with the priority date of January 27, 1903, for recrea-
tional purposes, including fish propagation and wildlife habitat.4 The res-
ervoir is located in the NE/4 and N/2 SE/4 of Section 17, Township 4
North, Range 66 West of the 6th P.M. The sources of water supply are
springs, seepage, and irrigation return flow, all tributary to the South
Platte River. ‘

Michel filed a protest to the ruling of the referee5 A hearing on the
protest was held before the water judge, who confirmed and approved the
ruling of the referee and made that ruling a judgment and decree of court.®
Michel then appealed to this court.’ Michel was represented by counsel at
some times during the proceedings before the water referee and the trial
court, but he appears without counsel on this appeal.

The evidence before the water judge was adequate to establish each
element of Front Range’s claim and to support each finding of fact con-
tained in the judgment and decree of the court. Michel does not challenge
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of fact.

HI Michel bases his objection to the award of the water storage
right to Front Range Land & Livestock Reservoir upon his claim that he
is the owner of other water rights. Michel claims a water storage right for
the Warden Lake Reservoir and a decreed direct flow right for Big Bend
Ditch, among other water rights. He contends that Warden Lake Reser-
voir and Big Bend Ditch have the same sources of supply as Front Range

1 Some of the proceedings were conducted in the name of Reuben Michel and Ellen Irene Michel;
others were conducted in the name of Reuben Michel only. We refer to those persons as “Michel”
without stating in each instance whether a particular activity was conducted by both or by Reuben
Michel alone.

2 See section 37-92-302(1)(a), CRS. 1973.

3 See section 37-92-302(1)(b), CRS. 1973 (1979 Supp.).

4 See section 37-92-303(1), CRS. 1973.

5 See section 37-92-304(2), CRS. 1973.

® See section 37-92-304(5), CRS. 1973.

7 See section 37-02-304(9), CRS. 1973.

Land & Livestock Reservoir and that the locations of the two reservoirs
overlap. As a result, Michel claims that his water rights will be adversely
affected by storage of water pursuant to the Front Range Land & Live-
stock Reservoir decree.

The Warden Lake Reservoir claim is based upon a map and state-
ment of claim filed in the office of the state engineer on March 20, 1893,
showing that reservoir to be located in the E/2 NW/4, the W/2 NE/4,
and the SE/4 NE/4 of Section 17, Township 4 North, Range 66 West of
the 6th P.M. The statement of claim for Warden Lake Reservoir reflects
that the water is to be used for irrigation, fish, and ice purposes, and states
that work was commenced on the reservoir on March 16, 1893. The
Warden Lake Reservoir site and the Front Range Land & Livestock Res-
ervoir site overlap. No water right has been adjudicated for Warden Lake
Reservoir. The record does not establish whether Warden Lake Reservoir
ever was constructed. In June of 1976 Michel filed an application for a de-
termination of water storage right for Warden Lake Reservoir pursuant to
section 37-92-302, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.). That application was
amended in November 1977 and is pending in the water court for Water
Division No. 1.

Michel misperceives his legal rights and remedies. The only evidence
which he presented to the trial court related to the purported Warden
Lake Reservoir right and his claim to ownership of that right. It may be
that Michel can establish a water right for Warden Lake Reservoir. That
can be determined in the pending proceedings upon his application for de-
termination of such a right. The filing of the map and statement of claim
did not of itself establish an appropriation for the Warden Lake Reservoir.
DeHaas v. Benesch, 116 Colo. 344, 181 P.2d 453 (1947). Any conflict in
utilization of water pursuant to the Front Range Land & Livestock Reser-
voir right and pursuant to any right which may be adjudicated to the
Warden Lake Reservoir or which may have been adjudicated to Big Bend
Ditch can be administratively resolved by the state engineer® and can be
judicially resolved if necessary. Any differences arising from the overlap of
reservoir sites may be resolved in other appropriate proceedings.? None of
these issues is properly before the court in Front Range’s application for
determination of a water storage right. Section 37-92-302, C.R.S. 1973
(1979 Supp.); see Four Counties Water Users Association v. Colorado
River Water Conservation District, 159 Colo. 499, 414 P.2d 469 (1966).

8 See section 37-92-301, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.); section 37-92-501, CRS. 1973.

8 We note that Michel does not claim ownership of any part of the reservoir site of Front Range
Land & Livestock Reservoir. Although land ownership is not an issue in proceedings for determi-
nation of water rights, and the water judge made no findings with respect to land ownership, the
evidence indicated that Front Range owns all the land upon which Front Range Land & Livestock
Reservoir is situated.

107

This appeal represents only part of a number of disputes in the
process of litigation which has been initiated by Michel against Front
Range, other neighbors of Michel, and the state engineer. In its brief
Front Range requests that Michel be enjoined from appearing without
counsel in any pending or future litigation dealing with water rights. In
support of this request, Front Range contends that Michel has demon-
strated a lack of understanding of water law and that the extensive and al-
legedly meritless litigation has become burdensom for others. This request
is not properly before us and we do not consider it.

We affirm the judgment and decree of the trial court.

No. 80SA154

The People of the State of Colorado y. Oscar Wendell Triggs
(613 P.2d 317)

Decided June 16, 1980. Rehearing denied July 7, 1980.

108 Ce

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Kathleen M. Bowers, Assistant At-
torney General, for plaintiff-appellee.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Ilene P. Buchalter, Deputy,
for defendant-appellant.

En Banc.

JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The defendant appeals the denial of his motion for post-conviction re-
lief, contending that he is entitled to resentencing under the presumptive
sentencing provisions of the 1977 version of House Bill 1589. Colo. Sess.
Laws 1977, ch. 216, 18-1-105 at 867. We affirm the judgment.

The defendant pled guilty to second-degree burglary, a class three fel-
ony, section 18-4-203, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8), and on
March 14, 1977, he was sentenced to the Colorado State Penitentiary for
a term of fourteen to twenty years, consecutive to any sentence then being
served. The defendant appealed his sentence as excessive and the court of
appeals affirmed the sentence. We granted certiorari and also affirmed the
sentence. Triggs v. People, 197 Colo. 229, 591 P.2d 1024 (1979). There-
after, the defendant filed a motion for post-conviction relief, alleging that
he was entitled to re-sentencing under House Bill 1589, Colo. Sess. Laws
1977, ch. 216, 18-1-105 at 867.1 The trial court denied the motion with-
out a hearing.

HHI The issues raised on this appeal are identical to those decided
in People v. McKenna, 199 Colo. 452, 611 P.2d 574 (1980). McKenna
held that the legislative postponement of the effective date of House Bill

1 The effective date of H.B. 1589 was subsequently postponed from July 1, 1978, to April 1, 1979,
Colo. Sess. Laws 1978, First Extraordinary Session, ch. 1, and later to July 1, 1979. Colo. Sess.
Laws 1979, ch. 157, section 25 at 672.

The presumptive sentence for a class three felony was four and one-half years under the 1977 ver-
sion of H.B. 1589. Colo. Sess. Laws 1977, ch. 216, 18-1-105 at 867. In March 1979 the General
Assembly enacted an amended presumptive sentencing law and the presumptive range of sentence
for a class three felony is now four to cight years. Colo. Sess. Laws 1979, ch. 157, 18-1-105 at
669.

eS 109

1589 comported with the separation of powers doctrine under Article IIT
of the Colorado Constitution. McKenna also held that the prospective pro-
visions of section 25 of House Bill 1589, as amended in March 1979, Colo.
Sess. Laws 1979, ch. 157, section 25 at 672, did not constitutionally in-
fringe upon the rule making power of this court under Article VI, Section
21, of the Colorado Constitution.

I Because the defendant’s motion for post-conviction relief raised
questions of law only, the trial court properly could render a summary dis-
position of the motion without a hearing. E.g., People v. Johnson, 195
Colo. 350, 578 P.2d 226 (1978); People v. Trujillo, 190 Colo. 497, 549
P.2d 1312 (1976); ABA Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies
§ 4.5(a).

The judgment is affirmed.

110 ee

No. 79SA380

The People of the State of Colorado y. Ernest William Warren
(612 P.2d 1124)

Decided June 16, 1980. Rehearing denied July 7, 1980.

eS uu

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, David K. Rees, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Ilene P. Buchalter, Deputy,
for defendant-appellant.

En Banc.

JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The defendant pled guilty to two counts of first-degree sexual assault,
a class 2 felony carrying a term of imprisonment of not less than ten nor
more than fifty years,’ and admitted to the use of a deadly weapon during
the assaults, thereby subjecting himself to the mandatory sentencing pro-

1 Section 18-3-402(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). Sexual assault in the first-degree is a
class 3 felony unless the offender causes submission of the victim by the use of a deadly weapon,
in which case it is a class 2 felony.

M2 Pe)

visions for crimes of violence.” He received concurrent sentences of eighteen to
thirty years to the Colorado State Penitentiary and he challenges the sentences
as excessive. He also claims entitlement to re-sentencing under the presumptive
sentencing provisions of the 1977 version of House Bill 1589.* We affirm.”

The defendant was charged in a seven-count information with two
counts of first-degree kidnapping,* two counts of first-degree sexual as-
sault,5 one count of aggravated robbery,® and two counts of using a
deadly weapon during the commission of sexual assault.’ The dates of the
alleged offenses were January 29, 1978, and February 17, 1978, and a dif-
ferent victim was involved in the separate episodes. The defendant entered
a plea of guilty on July 28, 1978, to two counts of sexual assault in the
first degree, and admitted to the use of a hand gun during the commission
of the crimes. The remaining counts were dismissed on the motion of the
District Attorney. Proceedings were commenced under the Colorado Sex
Offender’s Act of 1968® but were subsequently terminated by the trial
court.2 On October 19, 1978, the court sentenced the defendant to con-
current terms of not less than eighteen nor more than thirty years on each
count of sexual assault in the first degree.1°

I.

The defendant first argues that the concurrent sentences of eighteen
to thirty years are excessive. His argument is based on the following selec-
tive biographical facts: his age of 25 years, the absence of any juvenile re-
cord, and a term of military service for one and one-half years. A review
of the record indicates that the sentences are not excessive.

We recognized in People v. Duran, 188 Colo. 207, 533 P.2d
1116 (1975), that, by its very nature, sentencing is a discretionary act that
is not subject to scientific precision. We noted that one of the objectives of
appellate review of sentences is the correction of sentences that are

2 Section 16-11-309, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

3 Colo. Sess. Laws 1977, ch. 216, 861-88.

4 Section 18-3-301, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

5 Section 18-3-402(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

6 Section 18-4-302, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

7 Section 16-11-309, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

® Section 16-13-201 ef seq., CRS. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

® Section 16-13-209, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

© Prior to sentencing the trial court appointed two psychiatrists to examine the defendant in con-
nection with possible commitment as a sex offender. Section 16-13-207, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.
Vol. 8). Both psychiatrists filed reports in which they concluded that the defendant, if at large,
would constitute a threat of bodily harm to members of the public; that he was not mentally defi-
cient; and that he could not be adequately supervised on probation. The prognosis for effective psy-
chiatric treatment of the defendant as a sex offender was poor. The psychiatrists recommended
that any treatment program be instituted by means of institutional transfer after the defendant was
sentenced. The trial court followed this recommendation and included in its sentence an order that
the defendant be transferred to the Colorado State Hospital for treatment, and then be returned to
the penitentiary at such time as the hospital deemed appropriate.

es 3

excessive in length, taking into account the nature of the offense, the char-
acter of the offender, and the protection of the public. People vy.
Malacara, 199 Colo. 243, 606 P.2d 1300 (1980); Triggs v. People, 197
Colo. 229, 591 P.2d 1024 (1979); section 18-1-409(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1979
Supp.); C.A.R. 4(c) (amended November 13, 1979); ABA Standards
Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences,§ 1.2.

HH Oftentimes, probation is a desirable disposition in criminal cases
because it promotes a rehabilitative program that prevents or deters subse-
quent criminality by the offender and fosters his productive re-integration
into the community at minimal cost to the public fisc. ABA Standards
Relating to Probation, § 1.2. However, while rehabilitation may be the
preferred method for preventing crime, an extended term of confinement
is sometimes necessary in order to protect the public from further criminal
activity by the offender and to adequately provide for individual deter-
rence and correction. ABA Standards Relating to Sentencing
Alternatives and Procedures, § 2.5.

HE The public interest in safety and deterrence is properly a focal
point of the sentencing decision in crimes of grave personal violence or
abuse, particularly when committed by a repeat-offender. E.g., Triggs v.
People, supra; see also, People v. Strong, 190 Colo. 189, 544 P.2d 966
(1976); People v. Euresti, 187 Colo. 266, 529 P.2d 1319 (1975). In such
cases the court should strive for a sentencing result that addresses both the
need of society for protection and the need of the defendant for correction.
When a sentence of an extended duration is imposed, the record must es-
tablish a clear justification in fact for the trial judge’s action. People v.
Duran, supra; People v. Strong, supra.

I Here, the record does establish a clear justification for the sen-
tencing judge’s action in imposing concurrent sentences of eighteen to
thirty years. The offenses to which the defendant pled guilty consisted of
serious acts of sexual abuse perpetrated against two victims on separate
occasions. On each occasion the defendant threatened and caused submis-
sion of the victim by the use of a gun. In the sexual assault on January 29,
1978, the defendant accosted the victim in the downtown streets of Gree-
ley during the evening hours, forced her at gun point into an automobile,
drove her to an unknown location, and there sexually assaulted her. In
subsequently releasing the victim, the defendant threatened to kill her if
she informed the police. The sexual assault on February 17, .1978, was
committed at about 1:30 a.m., after the defendant had followed the victim
to her residence in a vehicle, grabbed her as she left her vehicle, held a re-
volver to her head with the threat to kill her, robbed her of $2.00 at gun
point, and then took her to a nearby garage where the sexual assault took
place.

The character of the defendant was such that probation was not a via-
ble alternative for the court. He had been previously convicted of larceny

114 ee

from the person in 1973, for which he received probation, and forcible
rape in 1974, for which he was sentenced. Additionally, the presentence
report reflects that during the pendency of the charges in this case, the de-
fendant escaped from the Weld County jail and remained at large for sev-
eral days.

Under the circumstances of this case the public interest in safety and
deterrence was of ranking importance to the sentencing judge. The de-
fendant’s repeated acts of personal violence required the sentencing judge
to consider society’s interest in protection and individual deterrence, and
to address the need of the defendant for corrective confinement. The sen-
tencing judge adequately explained on the record the reasons for imposing
the sentence, and that record presents a clear justification, based upon the
evidence, for the sentencing decision.

I.

Il The defendant also argues that he is entitled to re-sentencing un-
der the presumptive sentencing provisions of the 1977 version of House
Bill 1589.11 These provisions would have become effective on July 1,
1978, but for subsequent amendatory legislation postponing their effective
date to April 1, 1979.12 In this regard the defendant contends that the
postponement of the effective date of House Bill 1589 resulted from an
impermissive convening of the General Assembly by the Governor in viola-
tion of the separation of powers doctrine. Colo. Const., Art. IIL.

Additionally, the defendant contends that the legislative amendment
to House Bill 1589 in March 1979, which made the presumptive sen-
tencing provisions prospective only and ineligible for retroactive applica-
tion based on changed legal standards under Crim. P. 35(b)(1)(VD),"* in-
fringes on this court’s rule-making power under Article IV, Section 21, of
the Colorado Constitution.

1 Colo. Sess. Laws 1977, ch. 216, 861-88. Under the 1977 version of H.B. 1589 the presumptive
sentence for a class two felony was seven and one-half years. Colo. Sess. Laws 1977, ch. 216 at
867.

% Célo. Sess. Laws 1978, First Extraordinary Session, ch. 1. The effective date was subsequently
changed to July 1, 1979, upon the enactment in March 1979 of an amended presumptive sentenc-
ing law. Colo. Sess. Laws 1979, ch. 157, 664-672.

18 Colo. Sess. Laws 1979, ch. 157, Sec. 25 at 672:

“This act shall take effect July 1, 1979, shall apply to offenses committed on or after said date,
and, notwithstanding any other provision of law or court rule, shall not apply to offenses commit-
ted prior to said date.”

¥ Crim. P. 35(b)(1)(VJ) provides for post-conviction relief if “there has been a significant change
in the law subsequent to July 1, 1972, applied to applicant’s conviction or sentence, requiring in
the interests of justice retroactive application of the changed legal standard . . . .” By amendment
to Crim. P, 35, effective November 13, 1979, Crim. P. 35(c)(I) now permits an application for
post-conviction relief by a person whose appeal is pending, when the application is based on a sig-
nificant change in the law which, when applied to the applicant’s conviction or sentence, allows in
the interests of justice retroactive application of the changed legal standard.

115

Recently, we rejected identical arguments in People v. McKenna,
199 Colo. 452, 611 P.2d 574 (1980). We held in McKenna that the Gov-
ernor’s call for the extraordinary session in 1978, which postponed the ef-
fective date of House Bill 1589, did not unconstitutionally usurp the law-
making power of the General Assembly. We also held that the prospective
provisions of Section 25 of House Bill 1589, as amended in March 1979,
did not unconstitutionally infringe upon the rule-making power of the Su-
preme Court.

The judgment is affirmed.

No. 79SA432

The People of the State of Colorado y. Patrick H. Able
(618 P.2d 1110)

Decided June 16, 1980. Rehearing denied July 7, 1980.

116

Paul Q. Beacom, District Attorney, Marc P. Mishkin, deputy, for
plaintiff-appellant.

Robert W. Caddes, for defendant-appellee.

En Banc.

JUSTICE ROVIRA delivered the opinion of the Court.

The People seek reversal of a decision of the district court dismissing
an information charging the appellee with operating a motor vehicle while
under the revocation as a habitual traffic offender. We reverse and re-
mand with directions to reinstate the information.

The relevant facts of this case are not in dispute. On December 18,
1975, the Department of Revenue held a hearing pursuant to section 42-2-
203, C.R.S. 1973, at which time the department’s hearing officer found
that the appellee had driving convictions sufficient to justify the entry of

u7

an order revoking his driver’s license for five years. One of the convictions
was based on a municipal ordinance prohibiting reckless driving. No ap-
peal of the revocation order was taken pursuant to section 42-2-204,
C.RS. 1973.

On February 20, 1979, the appellee was arrested and charged with
operating a motor vehicle while under the revocation as a habitual traffic
offender. Section 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973.

At a preliminary hearing in the county court, the parties stipulated as
to the 1975 order of revocation, the driving by the appellee on February
20, 1979, and the appellee’s awareness of the order of revocation. The ap-
pellee moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the hearing of-
ficer had improperly considered the municipal conviction for reckless driv-
ing at the 1975 revocation hearing.

The county court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the
municipal reckless driving conviction should not have been considered by
the hearing officer and, therefore, the order of revocation was void.

The People then filed an information in the district court charging the
same offense. The appellee renewed his motion to dismiss, which was
granted on the grounds that the 1975 order of revocation was void. The
district court held that the legislature, by not specifically including reck-
less driving among the traffic offenses enumerated in section 42-2-
202(2)(b), C.R.S. 1973, had “excluded a municipal reckless driving con-
viction from consideration by the Department of Revenue for the purpose
of habitual offender revocation.”

The People do not dispute, for the purpose of this proceeding, the ap-
pellee’s contention that the hearing officer should not have considered the
appellee’s municipal reckless driving conviction. The position of the People
is that: (a) the Department of Revenue had the power and jurisdiction to
revoke the appellee’s driver’s license; (b) a mistake as to the nature of an
underlying conviction or an incorrect application of the habitual traffic of-
fender statute amounts to no more than an error of law; (c) section 42-2-
204, C.R.S. 1973, provides for direct appeal of an order of revocation, and
the appellee was aware of his rights under section 42-2-204; (d) public
policy and expressed legislative intent preclude collateral attack on a
driver’s status adjudication during a subsequent criminal proceeding for
driving under revocation as a habitual traffic offender.

HEM A revocation proceeding under section 42-2-203, C.R.S. 1973,
is not a criminal proceeding. Its purposes are to deny the privilege of oper-
ating a motor vehicle to those persons who have demonstrated by their
conduct and record an indifference to the safety and welfare of others and
to impose an “increased and added deprivation of the privilege to operate
motor vehicles upon habitual offenders who have been convicted repeat-
edly of violations of the traffic laws.” Section 42-2-201, C.R.S. 1973. Ina
revocation proceeding, no fines are imposed and no loss of liberty is

118 |

involved. The results of an adjudication as a habitual offender are the re-
vocation of a person’s driver’s license and an order prohibiting operation of
a motor vehicle in this state for a period of five years.

We agree with the People’s contention that, in the criminal pro-
ceeding brought under section 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973, the appellee was not
entitled to collaterally attack the 1975 order revoking his driver’s license
on the basis that, in entering that order, the hearing officer had improp-
erly considered a municipal reckless driving conviction.

HB Collateral attack on the 1975 order of revocation would be justi-
fied only in two circumstances. First, collateral attack could be maintained
if the order were void, rather than merely erroneous or voidable, because
the department had in 1975 lacked jurisdiction over the person or the sub-
ject matter. Estate of Bonfils v. Davis, 190 Colo. 70, 543 P.2d 701
(1976); McLeod v. Provident Mutual Life Insurance Company of
Philadelphia, 186 Colo. 234, 526 P.2d 1318 (1974); Davidson Chevrolet
v. City and County of Denver, 138 Colo. 171, 330 P.2d 1116 (1958).
Second, the appellee would be entitled to collaterally attack the 1975 revo-
cation order had it been based on “a conviction obtained in violation of
{his] . . . constitutional rights”. People v. Heinz, 197 Colo. 102, ,
589 P.2d 931, 933 (1979). In this case, however, the department clearly
had jurisdiction over the person of the appellee and over the subject mat-
ter of license revocations for habitual traffic offenders, and, with respect
to the 1975 administrative proceeding, the appellee has raised no issues of
constitutional dimension.

When an administrative agency has jurisdiction over the person
and subject matter in question, and when the agency is not proceeding
contrary to the requirements of the state or federal constitution, the fact
that the agency’s order is erroneously or improvidently granted does not
justify failure to obey the order. The appellee did not challenge the revoca-
tion of his driver’s license until after he had been arrested for driving after
revocation. He had the duty to comply with the order of revocation until it
was rescinded pursuant to a direct appeal rather than a collateral attack.

The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is re-
manded with directions to reinstate the information.

es ng
No. 79SC70

Philip F. DiLeo y. Barry Koltnow, Boulder Daily Camera, Boulder
Publishing, Inc.; Colorado Press Association, Colorado Broadcasters
Association, and KBTYV, Inc.

(613 P.2d 318)

Decided June 23, 1980. Rehearing denied July 7, 1980.

a
S

es 121

Gerash & Robinson, P.C., Scott H. Robinson, for plaintiff-appellant.

Newcomer & Douglass, William A. Ahlstrand, for defendants-
appellees.

Yegge, Hall & Evans, Thomas B. Kelley; Davis, Graham & Stubbs,
Richard P. Holme, for amici curiae.

En Banc.
CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES delivered the opinion of the Court.

Plaintiff-appellant, Philip F. DiLeo, commenced a defamation action
against defendants-appellees Boulder Daily Camera, Boulder Publishing,
Inc., publisher of the Boulder Daily Camera, Barry Koltnow, a reporter,
and others. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judg-
ment and DiLeo appealed to the court of appeals. The case was trans-
ferred to this court prior to judgment pursuant to C.A.R. 50. We affirm
the trial court’s judgment.

The case arises out of a controversy stemming from DiLeo’s employ-
ment as a patrolman for the Boulder Police Department (Department).
DeLeo’s employment, which had commenced in October 1972, was termi-
nated by the Department in June 1973. DiLeo commenced a court action
in December 1973, alleging that his employment had been illegally termi-
nated. On October 20, 1975, the court ordered him reinstated.1

The Boulder Police Benefit Association (BPBA) is an unincorporated
association consisting of approximately 70 members of the Department.
The BPBA held a formal meeting on October 30, 1975. DiLeo’s fitness for
official duties as a police officer with the Department was discussed. At
this meeting, the BPBA passed a resolution which expressed the group’s
opposition to the reinstatement of DiLeo and urged the city council to ap-
peal the decision ordering DiLeo’s reinstatement.

On the morning of October 31, 1975, defendant Koltnow, a reporter,
noticed a copy of the resolution posted on the bulletin board at the Depart-
ment’s headquarters He conducted an investigation to verify statements
made in the resolution, and thereafter wrote an article reporting the
BPBA meeting and the contents of the resolution. This article was pub-
lished in the October 31, 1975 edition of the Boulder Daily Camera. It

1 On November 21, 1975, DiLeo resigned from the Department alleging that the Department had
not in good faith obeyed the court’s reinstatement order.

12 ee)

contained actual excerpts from the resolution. By affidavit, Stephen A.
Burton, vice president and acting chairman at the October 30, 1975 meet-
ing of the BPBA, stated that the newspaper’s account was a fair and accu-
rate report of the meeting and the resolution.

On the basis of this article, DiLeo commenced the present defamation
action. He asserts that the story contained the following untrue defama-
tory statements: ““DiLeo had on several occasions interfered with the in-
vestigation of criminal matters since his dismissal from the force,’ and that
‘on one noteworthy occasion DiLeo exposed an undercover narcotics offi-
cer’s identity to a known narcotics dealer in the middle of a narcotics
transaction’ and further published the false and reckless statement that
‘the B.P.B.A. members (about sixty were present for the meeting) made
those charges’ and that ‘the B.P.B.A. voted unanimously to oppose the re-
instatement ... .”

I The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judg-
ment, ruling that DiLeo was a public figure, that the matter was of public
concern, and that there were no disputed issues of fact indicating that the
defendants published the article with knowledge that it was false or pub-
lished the article with reckless disregard as to whether it was false. We
agree with these rulings.2

I
In New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 US. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710,

11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1963), it was held that the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments protect freedom of expression concerning public officials,3 and that
in order to accommodate this constitutional right, a public official can
only recover damages for a defamatory statement concerning his official
conduct by presenting clear and convincing proof that the statement was
made with actual malice. “Actual malice” in the New York Times sense,
means that the defamatory statement was known to be false or was made
with reckless disregard‘ of whether it was true or false. Although this rule
places a significant burden on the plaintiff's ability to recover damages,
such a rule was deemed necessary to balance the competing interests of

2 In written response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, DiLeo stated “[fJor the sole
purpose of this memorandum in opposition to the newspaper’s motion for Summary Judgment the
Plaintiff will assume these propositions {that DiLeo was a public figure and the matter which was
reported was of public concern] to be accurate statements of the law and facts.” Because of the
importance of these questions, we will address them notwithstanding this limited concession.

3 In New York Times, the public official was an elected city commissioner.

4 “Reckless disregard” has subsequently been explained as requiring sufficient evidence that the
defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the published statement. See
Herbert v. Lando, 441 US. 153, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 60 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979), St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968). In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
US. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Bd.2d 125 (1964), “reckless disregard” was defined as requiring that
the publisher act with a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. See also Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974).

es 123

protecting a person’s reputation while at the same time providing ample
breathing space to assure unrestricted debate of public issues. See New
York Times v. Sullivan, supra. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
supra. In New York Times, the United States Supreme Court noted a
profound national commitment that “debate on public issues should be un-
inhibited, robust, and wide-open .. . .”

The New York Times rule was held to include “public figures”
in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18
L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967). The rule was extended primarily for three reasons.
First, the public’s interest in obtaining information concerning either pub-
lic officials or public figures is substantially similar. Second, the same jus-
tifications exist whereby a public figure’s interest in protecting his reputa-
tion ought to defer to the public interest of assuring open discussion of
public issues. Both public officials and public figures usually have the abil-
ity to resort to effective self-help, i.e., the ability to refute criticism and
counteract false statements through effective channels of communication.
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 61 L.Ed.2d 411
(1979); Gertz, supra. Finally, and more important, is the normative con-
sideration that: “public figures, like public officials, have ‘voluntarily ex-
posed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood
concerning them.” Wolston vy. Readers Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 US.
157, 99 S.Ct. 2701, 61 L.Ed.2d 450 (1979), citing Gertz, supra. See also
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra.

A person may become a public figure in either of two ways:
“For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of es-
pecial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such
persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all
purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to
influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite
attention and comment.”
Gertz, supra. See also Hutchinson, supra; Wolston, supra; Time, Inc.
y. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 96 S.Ct. 958, 47 L.Ed.2d 154 (1976).

Thus, two categories of public figures exist. First, there are those
who acquired a status in society so as to have such persuasive power and
influence to be properly deemed public figures for all purposes of com-
ment. Such persons enjoy significant access to the effective channels of
communication to rebut defamatory falsehoods, and have broadly exposed
themselves to the increased risk of defamatory falsehoods through their at-
tainment of public prominence. The second category of public figures con-
sists of those who have thrust themselves to the forefront of a particular
public controversy to affect its resolution. Such individuals would gener-
ally be capable of effectively countering criticism and exposing the falsity
of defamatory statements concerning them. More importantly, this type of

124 eS

public figure has invited public attention and comment in regard to the
particular controversy.

In the instant case, we are asked to determine whether DiLeo
was a public figure for purposes of this libel action. It requires no lengthy
discussion to conclude that DiLeo was not a public figure for all purposes.
He does not occupy a position having “persuasive power and influence.”
See Hutchinson, supra; Wolston, supra; Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
supra; Gertz, supra. We therefore focus our discussion on whether Di-
Leo was a public figure for the limited purpose of comment on his involve-
ment in seeking reinstatement with the Department as a police officer.

In determining whether a person is a public figure in this category,
we must primarily focus on the “nature and extent of an individual’s par-
ticipation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation.”
Wolston, supra, at 167, 99 S.Ct. at 2707, 61 L.Ed.2d at 460, citing
Gertz, supra, at 352, 94 S.Ct. at 3013, 41 L.Ed.2d at 812. See also
Hutchinson, supra. The particular controversy in the present case evolves
from DiLeo’s termination of employment and his various suits seeking re-
instatement and redress for asserted violations of his civil rights.

DiLeo argues that the controversy concerned his suit to regain
his position with the Department, a purely private matter. See generally
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, supra. We disagree. Even if initially a private
matter, it became a public controversy through DiLeo’s efforts. Cf.
Hutchinson, supra; Time, Inc. v. Firestone, supra. He instituted sev-
eral lawsuits asserting the alleged illegal termination of his employment as
well as other violations of his civil rights.5 Rather than quietly seeking to
exert his legal rights, he invited public attention and comment. Also, at his
deposition, DiLeo admitted initiating contact with various newspapers and
reporters. He contacted reporters from the Boulder Daily Camera, Colo-
tado Daily, Rocky Mountain News, and the Denver Post on several occa-
sions regarding his various lawsuits. DiLeo explained that he believed the
cases to be newsworthy and that he wanted to get information to the pub-
lic.

That DiLeo effectively cast himself and his views into public contro-
versy is evidenced by the fact that his various lawsuits and charges at-
tracted the attention of Colorado newspapers, generating at least twenty

5 DiLeo v. City of Boulder, No. CA73-2467 (filed in the Boulder Dist. Ct. 12-7-72) in which Di-
Leo contested his termination from the Department and sought back pay; DiLeo v. City of
Boulder, No. CA75-478 (filed in the U.S. Dist. Ct., Dist. of Colo. 5-1-75) in which DiLeo as-

serted violations of his civil rights. In an unrelated matter, DiLeo initiated the action DiLeo v.

Board of Regents of the University of Colorado, No. CA75-2280 (filed in the Boulder Dist. Ct.
8-22-75) in which DiLeo challenged the admissions process to the University of Colorado School of

Law.

eS 125

articles.‘ This is not to say, however, that DiLeo was automatically converted to
a public figure simply because the media’s attention was attracted. Wolston v.
Readers Digest Ass’ n, Inc., supra; Time, Inc. v. Firestone, supra. Rather, itis
the fact that DiLeo himself stimulated and encouraged this news coverage that
caused him to become a public figure. By seeking out media coverage of his
effort to regain his position with the Department, he voluntarily exposed
himself to the increased risk of injury to his reputation resulting from de-
famatory falsehoods concerning his fitness as a police officer. Consequently,
the trial court correctly ruled that DiLeo was a public figure for purposes of this
libel action.

The defendant and amicus curiae also argue that DiLeo was a public
official, and that the defendants were privileged to report matters of pub-
lic or general concern. We do not consider these issues because of our reso-
lution of the question whether DiLeo was a public figure.

Il.

We next consider whether the trial court properly granted sum-
mary judgment. This determination hinges on whether DiLeo presented a
prima facie case that the defendants published the alleged defamatory
falsehoods with actual malice, and whether DiLeo has made such a show-
ing with convincing clarity. In resolving these questions, we must make an
independent examination of the entire record to insure that the First
Amendment freedom of speech has been properly protected. New York
Times v. Sullivan, supra. See also Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing
Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 26 L.Ed.2d 6 (1970). We
agree with the trial court that DiLeo has not successfully shown by con-
vincing clarity that the defendants published the article with actual mal-
ice, and accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted.

As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court has indi-
cated that the First Amendment requires a showing of actual malice when
a public official or public figure institutes a defamation action. A public
official or public figure must prove actual malice by “convincing clarity”
in order to recover damages resulting from a defamatory statement. New
York Times v, Sullivan, supra. See also Beckley Newspapers Corp. v.
Hanks, 389 US. 81, 88 S.Ct. 197, 19 L.Ed.2d 248 (1967); Walker v.
Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1025, 96 S.Ct. 469, 46 L.Ed.2d 399 (1975). The United
States Supreme Court has used the standard of proof by “clear and con-
vincing evidence” interchangeably with that of “convincing clarity.”
Gertz, supra. “Clear and convincing evidence” is “that evidence which is
stronger than a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ and which is unmistakable

® This does not include media coverage of DiLeo’s suit against the University of Colorado Board
of Regents in which DiLeo claimed he was denied admission to the law school as a result of “re-
verse discrimination.”

126

and free from serious or substantial doubt.” Colorado Jury Instructions
(2d ed.) 3:2.

Hl This standard of proof applies equally at the summary judgment
stage of judicial proceedings in this type of case. As aptly stated by the
Wyoming Supreme Court:

“In ruling upon the presence of a genuine issue of fact as to the existence
of actual malice the trial judge must decide whether: ‘the plaintiff has of-
fered evidence of a sufficient quantum to establish a prima facie case,
and the offered evidence can be equated with the standard or test of
‘convincing clarity’ prescribed by United States Supreme Court decisions
... .” (Emphasis in original.)
Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556, 562 (Wyo. 1976),
citing Chase v. Daily Record, Inc., 83 Wash.2d 37, 43, 515 P.2d 154,
157 (1973). See also Kidder v. Anderson, 354 So.2d 1306 (La. 1978).
Accord United Medical Laboratories v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 941,
89 S.Ct. 1197, 22 L.Ed.2d 454 (1969); Guitar v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 302
F.Supp. 1071 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 449 F.2d 306 (9th Cir.
1969). But see Weaver v. Pryor Jeffersonians, 569 P.2d 967 (Okla.
1977); Tagawa v. Maui Publishing Co., 427 P.2d 79 (Haw. 1967).
DiLeo argues that actual malice is an evasive, abstract concept,
hard to prove and hard to disprove, and therefore inappropriate for resolu-
tion by summary judgment. To the contrary, summary judgment is partic-
ularly appropriate in these cases. Were not summary judgment granted in
proper cases, the threat of protracted litigation might have a chilling effect
upon the full and free exercise of the First Amendment right sought to be
protected by New York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny. See, e.g.,
Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970);
Washington Post v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir.- 1967), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1011, 87 S.Ct. 708, 17 L.Ed.2d 548 (1967); Buchanan
y. Associated Press, 398 F.Supp. 1196 (D.C. 1975); Guitar v.
Westinghouse, supra; Cerrito v. Time, Inc., supra; Adams v. Frontier
Broadcasting, supra.

In this case, the defendants moved for summary judgment. In support
of their motion, they submitted several affidavits, answers to interrogato-
ties, and a summary of DiLeo’s deposition’? which, taken together, effec-
tively show that the defendants did not publish the article concerning Di-
Leo with actual malice as above-defined. It was shown that the defendants
had no reason to doubt the truth of the report of the BPBA meeting and
the allegations concerning DiLeo. The defendants’ sources were reliable,

7 DiLeo never objected to this summary of his deposition.

es 10

and a thorough independent investigation was conducted to substantiate
the truthfulness of the statements in the published newspaper article.

DiLeo, on the other hand, filed no opposing affidavits, answers to in-
terrogatories, or other supporting documents. Rather, he argued that no
rule of law required him to place his witnesses before the court and prove
his facts at a hearing on a motion for summary judgment. This position is
erroneous for two reasons. Most fundamentally, C.R.C.P. 56(e) provides
that: “When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this Rule, an adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations
or denials of his pleadings but his response by affidavits or otherwise pro-
vided in this Rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a gen-
uine issue for trial.” It was DiLeo’s responsibility to present a genuine is-
sue whether the defendants published the alleged defamatory falsehoods
knowing them to be false, or with reckless disregard as to their truthful-
ness. This DiLeo did not do. DiLeo’s general allegations that the state-
ments contained in the article were false, or that the defendants should
have known they were false, do little to establish a genuine issue of fact
whether the article was published with actual malice. See Martin
Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper, 417 F.Supp. 947 (D. D.C.
1976); F & J Enterprises, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems,
Inc., 373 F.Supp. 292 (N.D. Ohio 1974). DiLeo has failed to establish a
prima facie case by a sufficient quantum of evidence which can be equated
with the standard of convincing clarity.

Summary judgment was properly granted.

The judgment is affirmed.

128 rs
No. 27515
The People of the State of Colorado y. Ronald Lee Ferrell
(613 P.2d 324)
Decided June 23, 1980. Rehearing denied July 21, 1980.

129
J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,

Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, William Morris, Assistant Attorney
General, for plaintiff-appellee.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Shelley Gilman, Deputy,
for defendant-appellant.

En Banc.
CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES delivered the opinion of the Court.

The defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree
murder and first-degree murder. He was sentenced to death. On appeal,
he challenged the constitutionality of the death penalty statute under
which he was sentenced. Section 16-11-103, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol.
8). He also asserted several allegations of reversible error. We subse-
quently declared this death penalty statute unconstitutional in People v.
District Court, 196 Colo. 401, 586 P.2d 31 (1978). On a temporary re-
mand, we then ordered the trial court to resentence the defendant to life
imprisonment. Having reviewed the defendant’s remaining issues on ap-.
peal, we uphold his convictions and therefore affirm the trial court’s judg-
ment.

The defendant and two companions were associated with the decedent
in a series of illicit drug transactions. The decedent had supplied the de-
fendant with a large quantity of amphetamines, which was thereafter sold
in Kansas by one Carlos Allen, an associate of the defendant. The defend-
ant, together with Carlos Allen and Richard Hisle, planned to meet in El

130 PC“ tsSSCis
Paso, Texas, after the sale in Kansas to participate in the theft of a large
quantity of marijuana and cocaine from a man named “John.” The dece-
dent learned of the scheme and warned John about it. As a result, the
three men were unable to carry out the theft.

On their return trip to Colorado, the three men discussed the possibil-
ity of murdering the decedent and thereafter agreed on a plan. They in-
formed the decedent that they had been able to secure drugs in Texas and
told him to meet them in Woodland Park, which is several miles west of
Colorado Springs. The defendant and Carlos Allen took the decedent to a
remote area where the drugs were purportedly hidden. There, the defend-
ant shot the decedent first in the back, a second time as the decedent
turned and fell, and finally in the head as the decedent was lying on the
ground.

I.

The defendant’s first contention is that the trial court erred in exclud-
ing testimony that the decedent had severely beaten another man several
months prior to his death and that the defendant knew of this incident
prior to the homicide. Defense counsel had argued that the defendant
feared the decedent and that the killing was in self-defense.

HHI A defendant is entitled to present evidence of a prior violent
act of a victim only if (1) the defendant contends that he acted in self-
defense and there is competent evidence to support the contention, (2) ei-
ther the act occurred or defendant became aware of its occurrence within
a reasonable time of the homicide, and (3) the defendant knew of the vic-
tim’s prior violence at the time of the homicide. People v. Burress, 183
Colo. 146, 515 P.2d 460 (1973); Ballay v. People, 160 Colo. 309, 419
P.2d 446 (1966). Although there was evidence that the defendant knew of
the decedent’s prior violent act at the time of the homicide, there was no
evidence to support the defendant’s contention that he killed the decedent
in self-defense.

In order to justify a theory of self-defense, where the defendant
used deadly force, he must have reasonably believed that a lesser degree of
force was inadequate and that he or another person was in imminent dan-
ger of being killed or of receiving great bodily harm. Section 18-1-
704(2)(a), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). There was no evidence intro-
duced at trial to indicate that either the defendant or Allen was in immi-
nent danger of harm at the time the defendant shot the victim three times
in the remote area outside Woodland Park. In fact, the third and fatal
shot to the head was fired as the decedent was lying helpless on the
ground.

I.
I The defendant also asserts that certain statements made by the
prosecutor in closing argument constituted reversible error and that a
mistrial motion should have been granted. The first involved a comment to

131

the jurors indicating that they should retaliate against the defendant. The
prosecutor’s argument should be restricted to the evidence and reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom on the issue of whether guilt is proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant’s counsel used strong and color-
ful language in his closing argument, characterizing the situation as “kill -
or be killed, if I may call it the law of the jungle.” However, the prosecu-
tor’s response exceeded the bounds of proper argument and therefore can-
not be condoned.

Hl In People v. Elliston, 181 Colo. 118, 123, 508 P.2d 379 (1973),
we held:

“The granting or denial of a motion for a mistrial is within the sound dis-
cretion of the trial judge. In Maes v. District Court, 180 Colo. 169, 503
P.2d 621 (1972), we recently reaffirmed the standards to be applied by
trial judges when deciding whether such a motion should be granted. The
trial court’s determination will not be disturbed on review unless it is ap-
parent that the court abused its discretion. Barriner v. District Court,
174 Colo. 447, 484 P.2d 774 (1971); Falgout v. People, 170 Colo. 32,
459 P.2d 572 (1969); and Maisel v. People, 166 Colo. 161, 442 P.2d 399
(1968). As stated in Falgout v. People, supra, this standard of review is
founded on the principle that the trial court is in a better position than the
appellate court to evaluate the effect of any alleged irregularity upon the
jury’s determination.”

Again, we emphasize that the trial court was in the best position to deter-
mine the impact of the prosecutor’s improper argument upon the jury. Un-
der the facts of this case, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in denying the motion for mistrial.

As to the district attorney’s second comment in closing
argument, defense counsel neither objected nor raised it as error in his mo-
tion for new trial. Therefore, this issue was not properly preserved for ap-
peal.

Il.

Hl The defendant finally contends that certain expert testimony re-
garding the entrance wounds based upon a hypothetical question was
inadmissible. It is asserted that the expert’s testimony was based upon the
opinion of another expert. Such testimony is not admissible. Herness v.
Goodrich, 29 Colo. App. 322, 483 P.2d 412 (1971). See also People v.
McCormick, 181 Colo. 162, 508 P.2d 1270 (1973). Although the district
attorney’s question was inartfully stated, the answer of the expert makes it
clear that his testimony was based not upon the opinion of ‘the other ex-
pert, but upon the actual tests which were performed as the basis for the
other expert’s opinion. These tests constituted direct evidence upon which
he could give his independent opinion. See Fry Roofing Company v.
State Department of Health Air Pollution Variance Board, 191 Colo.
463, 553 P.2d 800 (1976).

132 eS

Judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE ERICKSON, JUSTICE DUBOFSKY and JUSTICE
QUINN dissent.

JUSTICE QUINN dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. I believe that the prosecutor’s rebuttal argu-
ment to the jury was so inflammatory and so deliberately calculated to ap-
peal to the passions of the jury as to render the defendant’s conviction an
egregious violation of fundamental fairness.

In the course of a very brief rebuttal argument the prosecutor stated
to the jury:

“Your job is not to be a cheerleader, your job is to say ‘All right, Andy
Fullbright, Ron Ferrell, we don’t approve of your jungle, we don’t approve
of your retaliation with each other, I don’t care which one got the other
the other one gets it from us.”” (Emphasis added.)

Defense counsel moved for a mistrial and the motion was denied.

The People attempt to justify the rebuttal argument as a legitimate
response to defense counsel’s allusion in closing argument to the jungle-
life, kill-or-be-killed lifestyle of the decedent and defendant. Defense coun-
sel’s argument was made in the context of the court’s instruction on self-
defense and the defendant’s right to act upon the appearance that Full-
bright was trying to kill him. The prosecutor’s rebuttal argument was not
a legitimate response to defense counsel’s argument on self-defense. On
the contrary, in a capital case such as this, it was nothing short of an
exhortation to mob-retribution and deprived the defendant of a fair trial.

Although the distinction between undignified or intemperate argu-
ment on the one hand, and hard but fair advocacy on the other, is not sub-
ject to any litmus type of analysis, it is basic to our criminal justice system
that a prosecutor, while free to strike hard blows, “is not at liberty to
strike foul ones.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629,
633, 79 L.Ed. 1314, 1321 (1935). “It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrong conviction, as it is to use
every legitimate means to bring about a just one.” Id.; see also, People v.
Walker, 180 Colo. 184, 504 P.2d 1098 (1973).

The prosecutor should not and must not use argument calculated to
influence the passions or prejudices of the jury. ABA Standards Relating
to the Prosecution Function § 5.8(c). Likewise, the prosecutor must re-
frain from argument which tends to divert the jury from its duty to decide
the case on the evidence, by injecting issues broader than the guilt or inno-
cence of the accused under the controlling law. ABA Standards Relating
to the Prosecution Function § 5.8(d).

eS 133

Although the majority opinion relies on People v. Elliston, 181
Colo. 118, 508 P.2d 379 (1973), in deferring to the discretion of the trial
court, I rely on the following statement of this court from that same case
to point up why the defendant’s conviction should not pass scrutiny under
this record:

“This court has repeatedly stated that the duty of a prosecutor is not
merely to convict, but to see that justice is done by seeking the truth of the
matter. In the type of case tried here, a prosecutor must be particularly
careful in his conduct to ensure that the jury tries the case solely on the
basis of the facts presented to them. The prosecutor’s improper statements
to the jury indicate a misplaced zeal to ‘win’ the case, a lack of self-
control, and either a lack of knowledge of — or worse, an indifference to

— elementary principles of fairness and legalities.” 181 Colo. at 126, 508
P.2d at 383.

As in People v. Walker, supra, the district attorney here, “in his over-
zealous effort to convict, prevented the defendant from having a fair
trial.” 180 Colo. at 190, 504 P.2d at 1101. “A prosecutor’s duty is to seek
justice, not merely to convict.” Id.

. The goal of our adversary system does not end with reliable factfind-
ing or protection of the innocent from unjust convictions, high as these ob-
jectives are. The primary goal of our adversary system is to “preserve the
integrity of society itself . . . [by] keeping sound and wholesome the pro-
cedures by which society visits its condemnation on an erring member.”

ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense

Function, Introduction at 5 (1971), quoting Fuller, The Adversary
System, Talks on American Law 30, 35 (Berman ed. 1960).

In a case such as this the proper inquiry is not merely whether there
was enough evidence to support the result. Rather, the proper inquiry is
whether the error likely influenced the result or affected the fairness of the
trial proceedings. If either occurred, or if one is left in grave doubt about
the matter, the conviction should not stand. See Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 US. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946); People v.
Wright, 182 Colo. 87, 511 P.2d 460 (1973); People v. Bugarin, 181
Colo. 62, 507 P.2d 875 (1973); People v. Walker, supra.

I cannot say, with fair assurance, that the defendant’s conviction of
first-degree murder was not to a substantial degree related to the prosecu-
tor’s totally unjustifiable invocation of revenge or retribution as a basis for
the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for a new
trial.

I am authorized to say that JUSTICE ERICKSON and JUSTICE
DUBOFSKY join me in this dissent.

No. 79SA204

Ann Caldwell and the Mountain Plains Congress of Senior Organizations
y. Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado; Commissioners
Edwin R. Lundborg, Edythe S. Miller, and Sanders G. Arnold; and Public
Service Company of Colorado and CF&I Steel Corporation; Colorado
Municipal League; General Services Administration; Home Builders
Association of Metropolitan Denver; Ideal Basic Industries, Inc.; Friends
of the Earth, Inc.; Colorado Utilities Taskforce; Elbridge Burham; Amax,
Inc.

(613 P.2d 328)

Decided June 23, 1980.

-
we
a

Edward T. Buckingham, for plaintiff-appellant, Ann Caldwell.

136 |

D. Bruce Coles, for plaintiff-appellant, Mountain Plains Congress of
Senior Organizations.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, John E. Archibold, Special Assist-
ant Attorney General, for defendants-appellees, Public Utilities Commis-
sion.

Kelly, Stansfield & O’Donnell, Susan R. Fox, James R. McCotter,
for defendant-appellee, Public Service Company of Colorado.

No appearance for intervenors-appellees.

En Bane.

JUSTICE LEE delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from an order of the district court affirming the de-
cision of the Public Utilities Commission (commission) in a rate proceed-
ing. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

On April 3, 1978, the Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC)
filed advice letters, accompanied by tariff revisions, with the commission.
PSC sought an increase of $35,296,000 based on its test year electric reve-
nues and an increase of $11,768,000 on its test year gas revenues.

On April 11, 1978, the commission suspended the effective dates of
the tariff revisions and set the matter of the requested increases for public
hearing and investigation. Eleven parties petitioned for and were granted
leave to intervene in the proceedings, including appellants Ann Caldwell
and Mountain Plains Congress of Senior Organizations (MPCSO). PSC
submitted written testimony in support of the rate increases, and hearings
were held for the purpose of cross-examination of the witnesses for the
PSC, the staff of the commission, and intervenor witnesses. Following the
hearings, various parties filed Statements of Position with the commission.

On August 1, 1978, the commission issued its decision, authorizing
increases of $20,420,359 for electric service and $8,813,600 for gas serv-
ice. Appellants filed timely applications for rehearing, which were denied
by the commission.

On September 21, 1978, appellants filed a “Complaint in the Nature
of Review” in Denver District Court, challenging the allowance of certain
operating expenses for ratemaking purposes: (1) advertising expenses of
$1,098,761; (2) expenditures for customer conservation programs; (3)

131

expenditures for solar power research and development; and (4) a yearly
contribution of $167,000 for the development of a liquid metal fast
breeder reactor. The district court affirmed the order of the commission.
Appellants present the same four issues for review in this court.

We note as a preliminary matter that the order of the commis-
sion is presumed to be reasonable. Contact v. Mobile Radio, 191 Colo.
180, 551 P.2d 203 (1976). Review of the order is limited by section 40-6-
115(3), C.R.S. 1973:

“. . . The review shall not extend further than to determine whether the
commission has regularly pursued its authority, including a determination
of whether the decision under review violates any right of the petitioner
under the constitution of the United States or of the state of Colorado, and
whether the decision of the commission is just and reasonable and whether
its conclusions are in accordance with the evidence.”

See, e.g., Colo. Municipal League v. PUC, 197 Colo. 106, 597 P.2d 586
(1979); Sangre de Cristo Elec. v. PUC, 185 Colo. 321, 524 P.2d 309
(1974); Mt’n States T & T v. Pub, Util. Comm., 182 Colo. 269, 513
P.2d 721 (1973).

. I. Advertising

In Decision No. 87474 (1975), the commission authorized the PSC to

include as a ratemaking expense certain categories of advertising which
the commission found to be of benefit to the ratepayers. Certain other cat-
egories were excluded for purposes of ratemaking. In Decision No. 91581
(1977), aff'd Colo. Municipal League vy. PUC, supra, the commission
further limited the categories of advertising allowed for purposes of rate-
making. In that order, the commission stated:
“. . . The Commission expects that in future proceedings Public Service
will provide detailed evidence showing the accuracy of the categorization
of expenses, as well as establishing that the advertisements included in the
categories are, in fact, objective, informative and of benefit to the ratepay-
ers.”

Appellants here argue that the PSC provided inadequate evidence to
support its advertising expenditures, and that the commission approved the
expenditures without the support of substantial evidence in the record,
without an adequate examination of the evidence, and without making the
necessary findings of fact thereon. We agree.

Found in the record are copies of all of the advertisements included
by the PSC for ratemaking purposes, as well as the testimony of the vice
president of accounting for the PSC, D. D. Hock. Hock testified that the
PSC had not provided any detailed evidence showing the accuracy of the
categorization of expenses but that such detail was available and had been
reviewed by the staff of the commission. He further testified that he had
personally reviewed all of the advertisements, that certain types had been
eliminated as ratemaking expenses in accordance with the requirements of

138 |

Decision No. 87474, supra, and that those advertisements remaining were
“properly categorized” and were “informative and of benefit to the rate-
payers of the company.”

Whether, under the standards set forth in Decisions Nos. 91581
and 87474, supra, there is sufficient evidence to support the inclusion of
advertising as a ratemaking expense is a fact determination that must be
made by the commission. Section 40-6-109(3), C.R.S. 1973. See Wells
Fargo v. PUC, 190 Colo. 204, 545 P.2d 707 (1976); P.U.C. v. Colorado
Co., 142 Colo. 361, 351 P:2d 241 (1960).

This court must ascertain whether the order of the commission in the

case here before us, allowing the inclusion of advertising expenses, is sup-
ported by findings of fact. See Mt’n States T & T v. Pub. Util. Comm.,
supra. In its Decision and Order, the commission stated:
“We agree that Public Service should give. careful scrutiny to how it
spends its advertising dollar. It is true that some of Public Service’s adver-
tising appears to be more promotional than informational. For example,
the ascription of alertness to the prong-horned antelope and the scarcity of
the black-footed ferret is not particularly relevant to energy conservation.
Nor is advertising with respect to litter control (although obviously true)
relevant to utility operations. The ‘hard’ informational value of this type of
advertising is open to question. Realistically, the Commission practically is
compelled to accept all Public Service’s advertising expenses, or none of it,
unless we painstakingly examine Public Service’s advertising copy item by
item. This latter course is an administrative burden which we cannot as-
sume. Thus, for purposes of this case, we will not make any accounting ad-
justment with respect to advertising expenses. However, Public Service
should be on notice that it carefully consider all types of advertising it uses
and be able to prove the customer benefit thereof. Otherwise, in the future
the Commission may be compelled to adopt the position advanced by Mr.
Spertus that advertising be disallowed as an operational expense in its en-
tirety.”

We cannot discern any findings of fact in that statement by
the commission. While we recognize the rule that findings of fact by the
commission need not be presented in any particular form, Aspen Airways
v, Public Util., 169 Colo. 56, 453 P.2d 789 (1969), and that they may
even be implied, see Colo. Mun. League v. Pub. Util., 172 Colo. 188,
473 P.2d 960 (1970), where the commission purports to make such find-
ings, they must be discernable to the reviewing court. See Colorado
Interstate Co. v. Comm’n, 324 US. 581, 65 S.Ct. 829, 89 L.Ed. 1206
(1945). We have previously held that findings of fact by the commission
must “show which of the evidence it accepts as competent, worthy of be-
lief, and that which it rejects.” Aspen Airways v. Public Util., supra. In
this case, however, we cannot even conclude that the necessary findings
were “implied” by the commission from its determination of the other

eS 139

issues presented to it. See Colo. Mun. League v. Pub. Util., supra.

Rather than indicating which evidence it accepted as competent, as
within the guidelines established in Decision No. 87474, supra, and which
evidence it rejected as not conforming to those guidelines, the commission
issued a veiled warning to the PSC that it must, in the future, prove the
benefit its customers derive from the advertisements or the commission
might have to disallow advertising as an operational expense entirely. This
warning parallels that set forth in Decision No. 91581, supra, but it is in-
sufficient to permit the inference that the advertisements submitted to the
commission for inclusion in ratemaking expenses are within acceptable
categories.

Hl We conclude, therefore, that in its consideration of advertising
expenses for purposes of ratemaking the commission failed to regularly
pursue its authority as required by section 40-6-115(3), C.R.S. 1973, and
thus this issue must be remanded for a redetermination in view of the re-
cord already established. See Haney v. PUC, 194 Colo. 481, 574 P.2d
863 (1978).

II. Customer Conservation Programs

Appellants next argue that the commission, without the support
of substantial evidence in the record, approved expenses for the customer
conservation programs established by the PSC. Again we note that
“[flindings and conclusions of the commission on disputed questions of
fact, when based on competent evidence, are final and not subject to re-
view by the courts.” P.U.C. v. Watson, 138 Colo. 108, 330 P.2d 138
(1958).

We have reviewed the extensive testimony and exhibits in the record
relating to energy conservation, and find that there is substantial evidence
to support the finding of facts by the commission. As an example, the
president of the PSC testified that the best way to measure the effect of
conservation is by the average annual usage per customer among residen-
tial customers. The commission found that the evidence showed that
“[g]as useage per customer on an annual basis has been reduced about 2
Mcf for a total of $1,200,000 Mcf.”

In response to the claim by a witness for appellant MPCSO that the
conservation program has not been proven to be cost effective, the com-
mission stated that, while “it would be appropriate for Public Service to
evaluate carefully the cost effectiveness of its various conservation pro-
grams, we do not agree that the absence of a cost/benefit analysis at this
time justifies the ‘below the line’ treatment . . .” advocated by the wit-
ness. That is a judgment of the commission which, lacking any indication
of abuse of discretion, we are not at liberty to overrule, even if we should
be so inclined. See Parrish v. P.U.C., 134 Colo. 192, 301 P.2d 343
(1956).

140

We find no merit to appellants’ argument that customer conservation
programs are similar to the sale of appliances and thus do not warrant
public utility treatment.

We conclude that there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the finding of the commission that the cost of customer conserva-
tion programs is allowable as a ratemaking expense.'

III. Solar Energy

In its order, the commission made no specific reference to the
inclusion of expenses for the solar energy research program established by
the PSC. Appellants contend that this failure to make a specific finding
constitutes reversible error.

As we noted heretofore, when the finding of the commission
can be inferred from other findings of the commission, we can treat the
matter as if the commission had made an express finding of fact. See
Colo. Mun. League v. Pub. Util., supra.

There is substantial evidence in the record indicating the rationale for
the involvement of the PSC in solar energy research and development. The
primary purpose is to provide a new source of fuel and to conserve existing
fuel supplies. Since the commission made extensive findings of fact in rela-
tion to energy conservation, and since it noted that it “is cognizant of the
measures taken by Public Service to date with respect to conservation,” we
can infer that the commission found such expenditures reasonable.

Accordingly, we treat this issue of solar energy research and develop-
ment as one for which the commission made specific findings of fact that
are supported by substantial evidence.

IV. Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Project

HH In his testimony before the commission, the vice president of
accounting for the PSC testified that the PSC had made a test year contri-
bution of $167,000 to the Edison Electric Institute for the development of
a liquid metal fast breeder nuclear reactor. Appellants challenge the inclu-
sion of the payment as a ratemaking expense, claiming that it is not a
“reasonable” expense.

As with the solar energy research and development program expenses,
the commission made no specific finding with regard to the reactor pro-
ject. Once again, however, we can infer the finding of the commission
from its general approval of the energy conservation project of the PSC.
Since the order of the commission is presumed to be reasonable, Contact
y. Mobile Radio, supra, and since appellants presented no evidence to
prove that inclusion of this contribution was, in fact, unreasonable, we
need only determine whether the findings of the commission are supported

' We take judicial notice.of the fact that the PSC is now required to develop appropriate conser
vation procedures to be made available to its residential customers. See National Energy Conserva-
tion Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 8201 et seq. (1978).

141

by the evidence.

There is substantial evidence in the record to support the commis-
sion’s inclusion of this project in the ratemaking expenses of the PSC.?

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the commission allowing inclu-
sion of the energy conservation, solar energy, and liquid metal fast breeder
reactor projects. We reverse the order allowing inclusion of advertising ex-
penses and return the cause to the district court with directions to remand
to the commission for further consideration of that issue in accordance
with the views expressed in this opinion.

No. 80SA259

In Re: Second Initiated Constitutional Amendment Respecting the Rights
of the Public to Uninterrupted Service by Public Employees of 1980;
Colorado AFL-CIO, Norman N. Pledger, Zelda Bransted, Joe Genova
and Tracy Smith and Ruth E. Prendergast, Hugh C. Fowler and George
W. Hawkins, and James C. Wilson, J. D. MacFarlane, and Mary Estill
Buchanan

(613 P.2d 867)

Decided June 23, 1980.

2 The record indicates that such payments have been allowed by the commission in three previous
ratemaking orders.

a
x

143

Brauer, Simons & Buescher, P.C., Walter C. Brauer III, Joseph M.
Goldhammer, for petitioner-opponents.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Stephen H. Kaplan, Assistant
Attorney General, General Legal Services Section, for Initiative Title
Setting Board.

No appearance for proponents.

En Banc.
JUSTICE DUBOFSKY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an original proceeding pursuant to section 1-40-102(3), C.R.S.

1973 (1979 Supp.). The Petitioners, Norman N. Pledger, Zelda Bransted,
Joe Genova, and Tracy Smith,' challenge the denial of their motion for

1 Petitioners are qualified electors who are dissatisfied with the titles, summary, and submission
clause of the proposed constitutional amendment. Section 1-40-102(3), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).
The petition was also filed by an organizational opponent, Colorado AFL-CIO, described by Peti-
tioners as an “interested party.” However, Colorado AFL-CIO is not a “qualified elector” as
required by statute, so we do not consider Colorado AFL-CIO as a petitioner in this action.

144 |

rehearing by the Initiative Title Setting Review Board (Board) regarding the
titles, summary, and submission clause fixed by the Board for the proposed
initiative on uninterrupted service by public employees.

Petitioners contend the Board exceeded its jurisdiction in fixing the
summary for the proposed initiative on May 8, 1980; that the ballot title
for the proposal conflicts with another ballot title previously selected for a
similar initiative; that the Board should not have acted because the propo-
nents of the initiative did not have a conference with the director of the
Legislative Council and the director of the Legislative Drafting Office
prior to submitting the initiative to the Board as required by section 1-40-
101(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.); that the titles and submission clause
are unfair because they inaccurately state that the initiative prohibits all
binding arbitration; that the summary does not express the true intent of
the initiative to require the discharge of employees; and that the summary
does not explain the fiscal impact of the initiative as required by section 1-
40-101(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).2 We affirm the Board’s denial of
the motion for rehearing on each of the Petitioners’ contentions.

HH The people have reserved to themselves the right of initiative in
Article V, Section 1, of the Colorado Constitution, and the duties of the
Board with respect to initiatives are in sections 1-40-101, et seq., C.R.S.
1973 (and 1979 Supp.). The initiated measures’ title as set by the Board
must be proper and fair, and must correctly and fairly express the true in-
tent and meaning of the proposed measure. The ballot title and submission
clause must be brief, and the summary must be a fair, concise, true and
impartial statement of the intent of the proposed measure. The summary
may not be an argument for or against the measure, nor can it be likely to
create prejudice for or against the measure. The summary is to include an
estimate of any fiscal impact upon the state or any of its political subdivi-
sions with an explanation thereof.

I The test to be applied by the Court in this case is well-
established:

“(1) [W]e must not in any way concern ourselves with the merit or lack
of merit of the proposed amendment since, under our system of govern-
ment, that resolution rests with the electorate; (2) all legitimate presump-
tions must be indulged in favor of the propriety of the board’s action; and
(3) only in a clear case should a title prepared by the board be held in-
valid.”

Bauch v. Anderson, 178 Colo. 308, 310, 497 P.2d 698, 699 (1972); In
the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title, Submission Clause and

2 The titles, summary, and submission clause fixed by the Board, as well as the proposed initiative,
are set forth in full in Appendix A.

re 145

Summary pertaining to the Branch Banking Initiative, 200 Colo. 85,.
612 P.2d 96 (1980); In the Matter of the Proposed Initiative on
Transfer of Real Estate to Amend the Colorado Constitution by
adding a section 9 to Article XVII, 200 Colo. 40, 611 P.2d 981
(1980); In re An Initiated Constitutional Amendment respecting
Rights of the Public to Uninterrupted Service by Public Employees,
199 Colo. 409, 609 P.2d 631 (1980).
L

Petitioners first contend that the Board exceeded its jurisdiction by
fixing the summary for the proposed initiative on May 8, 1980, one day
after the statutory date for the last meeting of the Board. Section 1-40-
101(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).2 The Board met as required at 2 p.m.
on Wednesday, May 7th, to consider the titles, submission clause, and
summary for the proposal. After the titles and submission clause were set,
the Board considered the summary. The Board is required by section 1-40-
101(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), if it determines that the proposed con-
stitutional amendment will have a fiscal impact on the state or any of its
political subdivisions, to request assistance in such matter from the Divi-
sion of Budgeting or the Department of Local Affairs. The Board inad-
vertently failed to request information from the Department of Local Af-
fairs and the Division of Budgeting. A representative of the Division of
Budgeting was present at the Board’s meeting, but members of the Board
were concerned that the failure to request and receive assistance from the
Department of Local Affairs could jeopardize the initiative. In response to
the Board’s suggestion of a brief recess to obtain the missing information,
one of the proponents‘ stated that he had another meeting to attend, and
requested that the hearing be continued to the next day, May 8th. No one
objected to the continuance, and the Board met on May 8, 1980, consid-
ered the comments of the Department of Local Affairs, and fixed the sum-
mary.

The purpose of the statutory time table for meetings of the

Board is to assure that the titles, submission clause, and summary of an in-
itiated measure are considered promptly by the Board well in advance of
the date by which the signed petitions must be filed with the Secretary of

3 Section 1-40-101(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), provides that the Board:

“shall proceed to designate and fix a proper fair title for each such proposed law or constitutional
amendment, together with a submission clause, at public meetings to be held on the first and third
Wednesdays of each month, beginning at 2 p.m., in which a draft has been submitted to the secre-
tary of state, with the last such meeting to be held the first Wednesday in May, and shall prepare
a clear, concise summary of the proposed law or constitutional amendment.”

The first Wednesday in May, 1980 was May 7th.

4 The initiative proponents are Ruth E. Prendergast, Hugh C. Fowler, and George W. Hawkins.

146 ee

State.* Here, the hearing was begun and substantially completed on the
statutorily required date.* A continuance to the next day in order to comply
fully with other statutory requirements does not frustrate the purpose of the
Statute. We believe that to invalidate this initiative on the basis of such{
minimal delay would be contrary to the spirit of the Colorado Constitution’
providing the right of initiative. The Colorado Constitution, as well as the
statutes which implement it, must be liberally construed so as not to unduly
limit or curtail the initiative rights of the people. Billings v. Buchanan, 192°
Colo. 32, 555 P.2d 176 (1976); Colorado Project-Common Cause v. An-
derson, 178 Colo. 1, 495 P.2d 220 (1972).
Il.

Section 1-40-101(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), requires that
ballot titles “shall not conflict with those selected for any petition previ-
ously filed for the same election . . . .” Petitioners contend that the bal-
lot title chosen here conflicts with the ballot title selected for an earlier ini-
tiative filed by the proponents concerning the right of the public to
uninterrupted service from public employees. The Board fixed the titles,
submission clause, and summary of the first initiative, and the Board’s de-

‘nial of a request for rehearing was challenged in Supreme Court No.
80SA207, presently pending before us, by the same petitioners who chal-
lenge the second proposal. Because the proponents have advised us they do
not intend to circulate the first initiative for signatures, we need not ad-
dress whether the titles selected conflict.

The first initiative petition has not been submitted to the Secretary of
State for approval. Section 1-40-107(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).? The
proponents have received approval from the Secretary of State for the sec-
ond initiative petition. We retain jurisdiction in Supreme Court No.
80SA207, the first challenge, and should any qualified electors attempt to
circulate the first version of this initiative, we direct the Secretary of State
to defer approval of the petition as to form and content until the opponents
have had an opportunity to raise the question of conflicting ballot titles.
Absent approval for the first petition, the issue raised of possible conflict
between the first and second measures is moot.

5 Section 1-40-104, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), requires that completed petitions must be filed with
the Secretary of State at least four months before the election at which the initiative is to be voted
upon.

© It is not clear from the statute (see footnote 3) that the summary must be prepared at the last
meeting.

7 Section 1-40-107(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), provides:

“No petition shall be printed, published, or otherwise circulated until the secretary of state has ap-
proved it as to form, and the secretary of state shall assure that the petition contains only the mat-
ters required by this article and contains no extraneous material.”

147

I.

Petitioners maintain that the Board should not have set the titles,
submission clause and summary because the proponents failed to have a
meeting with the directors of the Legislative Council and Legislative
Drafting Office as required by section 1-40-101(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1979
Supp.). The statute provides that the directors shall give the proponents
their comments on any problems encountered concerning the format or
content of the petitions. The comments become public documents when
the titles, submission clause, and summary are approved by the Board.

The record of the meeting on the Petitioners’ request for re-
hearing indicates that there was a meeting with the directors on the propo-
nents’ first initiative. The written comments from that meeting are public.
When the proponents filed their second version of essentially the same ini-
tiative, the directors told the proponents that a second review and meeting
with the directors would not be necessary because they had no comments
beyond those made on the first proposal. We agree that there has been
substantial compliance with the statutory prerequisites because the propo-
nents are not required to accept any comments made by the directors®
and because the directors indicated they had no further comments.

Iv.

HMM Petitioners next contend that the titles and submission clause
prepared by the Board are unfair and do not express the true meaning and
intent of the proposed amendment. The language to which the Petitioners
object declares that the initiative “prohibit[s] public employers from sub-
mitting to binding arbitration.” A proponent told the Board at its May 7th
meeting that one of the reasons for the second initiative was to clarify that
the amendment applied to “interest” or “economic” arbitration establish-
ing wages, hours or other terms and conditions of employment, and not to
“grievance” arbitration under a contract. The Board justifies the titles and
submission clause selected because of the need for brevity, and further
distinctions were not necessary to identify.the initiated measure described
by the titles and submission clause. Cf. Dye v. Baker, 143 Colo. 458, 354
P.2d 498 (1960) (purpose of submission clause is to “fairly and succinctly
advise the voters . . . so that in the haste of an election the voter will not
be misled . . . .”). The Board believed the distinction between types of
arbitration is more appropriate for the summary, where it is included, and
for public debate. Because we have a duty to make all legitimate presump-
tions in favor of the Board’s action, Bauch v. Anderson, supra, we con-
clude that the titles and submission clause set by the Board should not be
disturbed by this Court.

® Section 1-40-101(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).
® Cook v. Baker, 121 Colo. 187, 214 P.2d 787 (1950).

48 ee)

V.

HM Petitioners challenge the summary for failing to express the
true intent and meaning of the provision of the initiative requiring dis-
charge of employees violating its provisions. The Board considered at
length the challenged language at its meeting on the motion for rehearing
and concluded that the language of the summary was accurate. Our re-
view of the record confirms that the language chosen by the Board reflects
the true meaning and intent of the initiative.

VI.
Finally, the Petitioners contend that the statute requires that
the fiscal impact of the measure be explained. Section .1-40-101(2), C.R.S.
1973 (1979 Supp.).1° The Board summarized the fiscal impact of the pro-
posed amendment as “cannot be determined because of the many varia-
bles involved.” The Petitioners say that the explanation of the fiscal
impact should have included the reasons that the impact could not be de-
termined: i.e., the difficulty in predicting the number of strikes, the num-

ber of people who might participate, the number of appeals.

The Board correctly found that the fiscal impact of the proposed
amendment cannot be determined because of the many variables involved.
In re: An Initiated Constitutional Amendment Respecting Rights of
the Public to Uninterrupted Service by Public Employees, supra. The
Board determined that the Petitioners’ requested explanation would be an
argument for or against the proposal and would create prejudice for or
against the proposal in violation of section 1-40-101(2), C.R.S. 1973
(1979 Supp.). The Board’s decision not to supply an explanation of its ina-
bility to determine fiscal impact is supported by the record. Therefore, we
will not disturb the action taken by the Board.

. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the Initiative Title Setting Re-
view Board denying the Petitioner’s motion for rehearing.

APPENDIX A
PROPOSED INITIATIVE ON
UNINTERRUPTED SERVICES BY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
Adopted Title, Ballot Title, Submission Clause, and Summary

The title as designated and fixed by the Board is as follows:
AN AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE XII OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE STATE OF COLORADO PROHIBITING STRIKES, WORK
STOPPAGES, SLOWDOWNS, OR OTHER INTERRUPTION OF

19 Section 1-40-101(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), provides: “. . . . and the summary shall in-
clude an estimate of any such fiscal impact, together with an explanation thereof.”

re 149

SERVICES BY STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC EMPLOYEES; DI-
RECTING THE DISCHARGE, PURSUANT TO PROCEDURES AP-
PLICABLE IN THE JURISDICTION INVOLVED, OF A PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE FOUND TO HAVE ENGAGED IN SUCH PROHIB-
ITED ACTIVITIES; PROHIBITING PUBLIC EMPLOYERS FROM
SUBMITTING TO BINDING ARBITRATION; AND PROVIDING
THAT NO PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SHALL BE REQUIRED TO JOIN
OR TO PAY DUES TO ANY EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION AS A
CONDITION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT.

The ballot title and submission clause as designated and fixed by the
Board is as follows:

SHALL ARTICLE XII OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE
OF COLORADO BE AMENDED TO PROHIBIT STRIKES, WORK
STOPPAGES, SLOWDOWNS, OR OTHER INTERRUPTION OF
SERVICES BY STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC EMPLOYEES; TO
DIRECT THE DISCHARGE, PURSUANT TO PROCEDURES AP-
PLICABLE IN THE JURISDICTION INVOLVED OF A PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE FOUND TO HAVE ENGAGED IN SUCH PROHIB-
ITED ACTIVITIES; TO PROHIBIT PUBLIC EMPLOYERS FROM
SUBMITTING TO BINDING ARBITRATION; AND TO PROVIDE
THAT NO PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SHALL BE REQUIRED TO JOIN
OR TO PAY DUES TO ANY EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION AS A
CONDITION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT?

The summary as prepared by the Board is as follows:

The proposed amendment would prohibit strikes by public employees,
as well as work stoppages, slowdowns, or interruptions of service. Public
employees means employees of the state or any political subdivision
thereof, or any agency of either, including but not limited to, employees of
school districts, special districts, authorities, cities and counties, home rule
and statutory counties, cities, and towns, and territorial charter cities.

The amendment would provide for the immediate discharge, pursuant
to procedures applicable in the jurisdiction involved, of any employee
found by a court or by an appropriate entity of the public employer to
have engaged in any activities prohibited by the amendment.

The amendment would prohibit a public employer from submitting to
binding arbitration as to establishment of wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment of public employees; however, the amend-
ment would not limit access to the courts or other dispute-resolving meth-
ods where such access otherwise exists, in matters concerning such wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. In addition, any re-
quirement that a public employee join or pay dues or fees to any employee
organization as a condition of his public employment would be prohibited.

150 ee

The amendment would permit the general assembly to enact laws in
furtherance of the policy expressed in the amendment, but not laws re-
stricting the prohibitions or penalties of the amendment.

The fiscal impact of this proposed amendment cannot be determined
because of the many variables involved.

The proposed initiative AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE STATE OF COLORADO (of which the foregoing title is
hereby made or constituted a part) is as follows:

Be It Enacted by the People of the State of Colorado:

Article XII of the Constitution of the State of Colorado is amended
by the addition of a new section to read:

Section 16. Rights of the public to uninterrupted services by public
employees. (1) It is hereby declared to be against the public interest and
welfare, and in violation of the rights of the citizens of this state, for pub-
lic employees to interrupt services rendered to the citizens of this state.
Public employees in this state are prohibited from engaging in any work
stoppage, slowdown, or strike, or from engaging in any interruption of
services. For the purpose of this section, the term “public employer”
means the state or any political subdivision thereof, or any agency of ei-
ther, including, but not limited to, school districts, special districts, author-
ities, cities and counties, home rule and statutory counties, cities, and
towns, and territorial charter cities, and the term “public employee”
means any nonelective officer or employee of a public employer.

(2) Upon determination by any court having jurisdiction or by the in-
dividual, board, or agency having the duty to act on behalf of a public em-
ployer in the employment of public employees that any public employee
has engaged in activity prohibited by this section 16, such employee shall
be deemed to have abandoned his employment and shall be immediately
discharged from his employment pursuant to procedures applicable to em-
ployees of the jurisdiction involved.

(3) No public employer shall submit to binding arbitration establish-
ing the wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment of pub-
lic employees.

(4) No public employee shall be required to join or pay dues to any
employee organization as a condition of his employment with a public em-
ployer.

(5) The general assembly may enact laws in furtherance of the policy
of this section 16, but may not restrict its prohibitions or its penalties.

(6) This section is to be construed liberally to prevent actions by pub-
lic employees which deny, interrupt or diminish services to the public.

This section is in all respects self-executing.

151

No. 79SA572

Michael Joseph Clark y. Brad Leach,
Sheriff of Boulder County and State of Colorado

(612 P.2d 1130)

Decided June 23, 1980.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Ilene P. Buchalter, Deputy,
Norman R. Mueller, Deputy, for petitioner-appellant.

152

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Mary E. Ricketson, Assistant At-
torney General, Litigation Section, for respondent-appellee.

En Banc.
JUSTICE DUBOFSKY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Michael Joseph Clark appeals from a trial court order discharging a
Writ of Habeas Corpus in an extradition proceeding. Section 16-19-101,
et seq., C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8). We affirm.

Appellant was arrested on August 4, 1979 in Longmont, Colorado on
a disturbance charge and violation of the Longmont open container ordi-
nance. A routine warrant check revealed an outstanding warrant from Ne-
braska on a parole violation. On September 13, 1979, a governor’s warrant
for the appellant’s extradition was issued. Appellant filed a Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus. Following argument on the petition, the trial
court issued an order on November 6, 1979 discharging the writ. This ap-
peal was perfected, and the trial court issued a stay of execution pending
appeal.

HB Appellant contends that it was error to discharge the writ be-
cause the documents supporting the extradition demand were not properly
authenticated’ and because the Governor did not personally sign or issue
the governor’s warrant for extradition. We uphold the governor’s warrant.
The authentication required by the statute was made, and the governor’s
warrant was properly issued.

The requirements for the extradition demand are in section 16-
19-104, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8):
“No demand for the extradition of a person charged with crime in another
state shall be recognized by the governor unless . . . by a copy of a judg-
ment of conviction or of a sentence imposed in execution thereof, together
with a statement by the executive authority of the demanding state that
the person claimed has escaped from confinement or has broken the terms
of his bail, probation, or parole. . . [T]he copy of indictment, informa-
tion, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence must be authenti-
cated by the executive authority making the demand.”

+ Appellant’s lack of authentication argument is based on the failure to include a certificate of the
county clerk that the person who attested to the signature of the deputy administrator of the board
of parole is in fact a judge of the county court.

) 153

“Executive authority” is defined in section 16-19-102(1), C.R.S. 1973
(now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8), to include “the governor, and any person per-
forming the function of governor in a state other than this state.” Thus,
the only authentication required by statute is an authentication by the ex-
ecutive authority of the demanding state. The requisition sent by Ne-
braska includes a certification of authenticity of the included documents.
The requisition is signed by the Governor of Nebraska and complies with
the requirements of section 16-19-104.

Appellant’s second argument is a challenge to the validity of the gov-
ernor’s warrant due to the alleged failure of the Governor to personally re-
view the requisition documents. This issue was not raised in the trial court;
however, it was recently rejected by this Court in Whittington v. Bray,
200 Colo. 17, 612 P.2d 72 (1980). We find no reason to elaborate
further on the issue. :

I The requisition documents from the state of Nebraska comply
with the statutory requirements for a demand under section 16-19-104,
and the governor’s warrant was issued properly. We therefore affirm the
order of the trial court discharging the appellant’s Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Judgment affirmed.

P|
No. 80SA5

The People of the State of Colorado y. Fannie J. Fordyce
(612 P.2d 1131)

Decided June 23, 1980.

154

Paul Q. Beacom, District Attorney, Marc P. Mishkin, Deputy, Darrel
L. Campbell, Deputy, for plaintiff-appellant.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Terri L. Brake, Deputy, for
defendant-appellee.

En Banc.

JUSTICE DUBOFSKY delivered the opinion of the Court.

The People bring this interlocutory appeal under C.A.R. 4.1 seeking
review of the trial court’s suppression of a statement taken from the de-
fendant, Fannie Joyce Fordyce, as involuntary. We affirm the trial court’s
ruling.

On the evening of September 7, 1979, the defendant allegedly ignited
a fire in her mobile home in Thornton, Colorado, which killed one of the
mobile home’s occupants and injured the defendant. The defendant was
charged with first-degree murder under sections 18-3-102(1)(a) and (b),
C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8), and fourth-degree arson under
section 18-4-105, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

eS 155

The defendant gave the statement, which the trial court suppressed,
to a Thornton Police Department detective and a Thornton Fire Depart-
ment investigator who questioned her in the Intensive Care Unit at St.
Anthony’s Central Hospital. Before entering the defendant’s room, a
nurse required both men to dress in complete surgical garb, including
caps, gowns and gloves. The detective advised the defendant of her
Miranda rights and taped her subsequent inculpatory statement.

The defendant was in intensive care for treatment of second-degree
burns on her arms and hands and first-degree burns on her face and shoul-
ders. At the time she was interviewed, her treatment included intravenous
administration of morphine sulphate and penicillin, medication on her
face, dressings on her arms, rubber gloves on her hands, a heart monitor,
and a catheter in her bladder. The defendant’s medical records show she
had been receiving five milligrams of morphine at regular intervals begin-
ning September 8. Her treating doctor, a plastic surgeon, testified that the
dosage was effective to take the edge off her pain.

At the suppression hearing, one of the attending nurses and the de-
fendant’s treating doctor testified that the defendant appeared to be ori-
ented as to person, time and place.2 The witnesses characterized the de-
fendant as a reasonable patient who understood and followed directions al-
though her injuries were painful. The detective testified that the defendant
appeared to understand his questions and her responses were appropriate.

An expert toxicologist, testifying for the defense, characterized the
defendant’s morphine dosage as sufficient to achieve a steady state of tis-
sue saturation or morphine intoxication. The expert testified that the ef-
fect of morphine is predictable and that the defendant’s medical records,
the only basis for the expert’s testimony about the defendant, showed an
average reaction to an average dose of morphine. He explained that mor-
phine operates on a person’s central nervous system, and an effective dose,
which the defendant’s treating physician said she received, creates a eu-
phoria which takes away a patient’s perception of pain. The expert also
testified that although a patient may exhibit no outward signs of intoxica-
tion, an effective dose of morphine takes away a patient’s perception of
danger, thereby lessening self-protective instincts.

A second effect of morphine, according to the toxicologist, is interfer-
ence with short term memory. He indicated that 25 people had made notes
in the defendant’s intensive care medical chart and that it would be easy

1 The detective testified that the defendant’s doctor would not allow him to interview the defend-
ant in the Intensive Care Unit on September 9. On September 10, the doctor was not available,
and the head nurse for the Intensive Care Unit permitted the detective and the investigator to in-
terview the defendant.

2 There is no indication in the record that the defendant’s treating doctor saw her on September
10. No one did a mental status examination of the defendant while she was in intensive care.

156 ee

for the average person receiving morphine to confuse the medical person-
nel with the investigators dressed in hospital garb. The toxicologist’s opin-
ion based on reasonable medical probability was that an average person
under treatment with morphine would have difficulty understanding a
Miranda advisement and perceiving the important effect of information
given to the police. Based on the hearing testimony, the trial judge sup-
pressed as involuntary the defendant’s statement on September 10.

HM For the defendant’s statement to be admissible, it must be vol-
untary. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908
(1964). The People must establish the voluntariness of a confession by a
preponderance of the evidence. People v. Martinez, 185 Colo. 187, 523
P.2d 120 (1974). People v. Shearer, 181 Colo. 237, 508 P.2d 1249
(1973).

HH The People challenge the admission of the toxicologist’s testi-
mony and the weight given by the trial court to the expert testimony. They
concede that expert psychiatric testimony regarding a defendant’s mental
ability to make free and intelligent decisions at the time of an inculpatory
statement is admissible. People v. Parks, 195 Colo. 344, 579 P.2d 76
(1978). Here, however, they contend that the toxicologist testified only
about typical reactions of an average patient experiencing morphine intox-
ication. Such testimony, they maintain, did not describe the defendant,
and thus, should not have been admitted. The People claim that the toxi-
cologist’s testimony was not based upon the defendant’s medical records.
To the contrary, our review of the record indicates that the toxicologist’s
testimony was based on the defendant’s medical record. The People of-
fered no testimony that contradicted the expert’s description of the aver-
age effect of morphine, and indeed, the defendant’s treating doctor de-
scribed the morphine dosage to his patient as an “effective dose.” The fact
alone that an expert witness has not examined the subject of his opinion
does not disqualify him from expressing an opinion. People v. Manier,
184 Colo. 44, 518 P.2d 11 (1974). Once the opinion is given, the trial
court determines the expert’s credibility and the weight to be accorded his
opinion. People v. Parks, supra.

The People also challenge the trial court’s ruling as an abuse of dis-
cretion. The trial court described the issues as whether the defendant un-
derstood the Miranda warning and whether, in giving an inculpatory
statement, she voluntarily waived her Fifth Amendment rights. The trial
court found from the toxicologist’s testimony that the effect of morphine
saturation is to limit mental capacity to perceive danger. The court ob-
served that the Miranda protections allow an individual to understand the
consequences of making a statement before volunteering the statement.
The court held that under the totality of the circumstances, the People did
not meet their burden to prove the voluntariness of the defendant’s
statement by a preponderance of the evidence. See Schneckloth vy.

| 157

Bustamonte, 412 US. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); People
y. Moreno, 176 Colo. 488, 491 P.2d 575 (1971); Duncan v. People, 178
Colo. 314, 497 P.2d 1029 (1972).

HE (On review, we are bound by the trial court’s findings of fact
where they.are supported by adequate evidence in the record. People v.
Pineda, 182 Colo. 385, 513 P.2d 452 (1973); People v. Medina, 180
Colo. 56, 501 P.2d 1332 (1972); People v. Parks, supra. We recognize
that an appellate court is in no position to weigh conflicting testimony pre-
sented to the trial court. Here, the testimony of the treating doctor, nurse
and detective that the defendant’s behavior appeared rational does not
conflict with the toxicologist’s testimony describing morphine intoxication.
Thus, the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s mental state was im-
paired sufficiently that her statements were involuntary is supported by
the record and forecloses reversal by this Court.

Ruling affirmed.

No. 79SA444

People of the State of Colorado, ex rel. Miles C. Cortez, Jr. v.
David R. Calvert

(617 P.2d 797)

Decided June 20, 1980.

158 ee

Miles C. Cortez, Jr., Special Prosecutor, for complainant.

L. James Arthur, for respondent.

En Banc.
JUSTICE LOHR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Mr. Calvert, proceedings in discipline were conducted before the
Grievance Committee of this court based on charges that you had violated
certain provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The proceed-
ings resulted in a recommendation by the Grievance Committee that you
receive a public censure and be assessed the costs of the disciplinary pro-
ceedings. We adopt the recommendation.

The formal complaint charged you with violating the following provi-
sions of the Code of Professional Responsibility: DR 5-105 (conflict of in-
terest); DR 2-106(A) (charging an illegal or clearly excessive fee); and
DR 6-101(A)(2) (inadequate preparation). A hearings panel of the Griev-
ance Committee found that each of these charges had been established by
clear and convincing evidence."

The grievance proceedings are based upon your conduct in connection
with disputes among three persons whom we shall call Mr. Smith, Mr.
. Jones, and Ms. Ray.? A summary of the facts is necessary to an under-
standing of the nature of your misconduct. Mr. Calvert, you will be re-
ferred to as the respondent in this factual summary.

Mr. Smith and Ms. Ray met in 1969. Their relationship became close
and, in 1972, Mr. Smith began living with Ms. Ray in her house in Au-
rora, Colorado. Ms. Ray desired that they be married formally some day,
but she did not intend to enter into a common law marriage. She never
represented that she was married to Mr. Smith.

As time went on, Ms. Ray became emotionally involved with Mr.
Jones. In 1975 those two parties were married in a ceremony performed by
a minister. Ms. Ray lived with Mr. Jones for only a short time thereafter,
and then returned to her Aurora house, in which Mr. Smith had continued
to live.

During the summer of 1976 Ms. Ray started sharing her time be-
tween Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones. She was in love with each of them. Each

+ The formal complaint contained one additional charge, which the hearings panel found not to
have been established by the evidence.
2 The true names appear in the record; we have elected not to use them in this published opinion.

eS 159

man demanded her total attention and fidelity, and the situation was emo-
tional and filled with stress for Ms. Ray.

When Mr. Smith learned that Ms. Ray had married Mr. Jones, Mr.
Smith consulted his attorney, David R. Calvert, the respondent. Mr.
Smith had been introduced to the respondent by Ms. Ray, for whom re-
spondent had performed legal services on a small matter several years ear-

. lier. After this introduction, respondent represented Mr. Smith in two
matters, and by the summer of 1976 the respondent and Mr. Smith had a
well established attorney-client relationship. Mr. Smith discussed the mar-
tiage of Mr. Jones and Ms. Ray with respondent by telephone. Mr. Smith
advised respondent that Mr. Smith wished to have the ceremonial mar-
riage between Mr. Jones and Ms. Ray declared invalid.

In late July or early August of 1976, when Ms. Ray was living with
Mr. Jones, Mr. Smith took her to see the respondent. Mr. Smith was the
dominant force in that meeting, during which Ms. Ray was accused of bi-
gamy.? Mr. Smith instructed the respondent to commence suit on behalf
of Ms. Ray against Mr. Jones to have their ceremonial marriage declared
invalid, on the basis that there was a preexisting common law marriage
between Mr. Smith and Ms. Ray. The meeting was filled with emotion. At
no time during the meeting did respondent meet with Ms. Ray alone to
learn her true wishes or to determine whether there were grounds for as-
serting that a common law marriage existed between Mr. Smith and Ms.
Ray.

On August 2, 1976, the respondent obtained Ms. Ray’s signature on a
petition seeking to have her marriage to Mr. Jones declared invalid. The
respondent signed the petition as Ms. Ray’s attorney and filed it in Denver
district court on August 11, 1976. (We refer to this suit as the Jones suit.)
The petition is technically deficient in that it does not state grounds for as-
serting that the marriage was invalid.

After Mr. Jones was served with the petition in the Jones suit, he and
Ms. Ray went to see Mr. Jones’ attorney (attorney Breck).4 Mr. Jones
and Ms. Ray were then in complete agreement that they did not want
their marriage declared invalid. Ms. Ray explained to attorney Breck that
Mr. Smith had taken her to the respondent, who told her that she was a
bigamist.6 Ms. Ray stated that she had signed the petition because she
did not want to go to prison. After discussing the matter with Ms. Ray, at-
torney Breck advised her that he seriously doubted that she was a bigamist
and that, in any event, she would not go to jail as a result of the matter.

3 The evidence was in conflict as to whether the accusation was made by respondent, by Mr.
Smith, or by both, The hearings panel made no finding of fact on this question.

4 “Breck” is a name arbitrarily selected; we have elected not to use attorney Breck’s true name in
this opinion.

5 See note 3, supra.

160 )

He advised Ms. Ray that, if she did not want to pursue the Jones suit, she
should advise the respondent of that fact, and respondent would be obli-
gated to obtain a dismissal. Thereafter, attorney Breck prepared a re-
sponse in the Jones suit, to be signed by Mr. Jones pro se.

Ms. Ray never communicated directly with respondent after the
meeting which had given rise to the decision to file the Jones suit. Respon-
dent admitted that all his contacts with respect to the Jones suit were with
Mr. Smith, and that he always considered Mr. Smith to be his primary
client. Ms. Ray told Mr. Smith she wanted the respondent to dismiss the
action, but Mr. Smith told respondent that Ms. Ray was undecided and to
hold the matter in abeyance. During the late fall of 1976, the respondent
first learned from Mr. Smith that Ms. Ray wanted the Jones suit dis-
missed, but respondent took no action to obtain a dismissal at that time.

On February 15, 1977, Ms. Ray went to attorney Breck and discussed
what she might do to get Mr. Smith out of her house. Attorney Breck
wrote two letters on her behalf, the first stating that all rental money due
on the house should be paid to Ms. Ray through attorney Breck’s office,
and the second giving notice of termination of any tenancy which Mr.
Smith had in the house and requesting him to vacate the premises no later
than March 15, 1977. The letters were sent to Mr. Smith.

Immediately thereafter, on February 16, respondent filed a petition
on behalf of Mr. Smith in the Arapahoe County district court, alleging
that Mr. Smith and Ms. Ray were married and seeking a dissolution of
that marriage (the Smith suit). Based upon this new proceeding, the re-
spondent recorded a notice of lis pendens on behalf of Mr. Smith against
Ms. Ray’s house. By these actions, respondent was taking at least two po-
sitions contrary to Ms. Ray’s interests, i.e., (1) asserting that there was a
common law marriage to Mr. Smith (if true, this made Ms. Ray a bigam-
ist) and (2) maintaining that Mr. Smith had acquired an interest in Ms.
Ray’s house. At the time these positions were taken, the Jones suit was
still pending and the respondent was still Ms. Ray’s attorney of record in
that suit.

After Mr. Smith received the February 1977 letters written by attor-
ney Breck, respondent called attorney Breck to request that Ms. Ray ac-
cept service of process in the Smith suit. Attorney Breck expressed the
opinion to respondent that respondent had a conflict of interest in the mat-
ters involving Ms. Ray. Attorney Breck also explained that his representa-
tion of Ms. Ray was limited to matters concerning removal of Mr. Smith
from her house and that attorney Breck had no authority in connection
with the dissolution of marriage matter. He promised to check with Ms.
Ray to see if he could accept service of process. Shortly thereafter attor-
ney Breck acquired authority to accept service of process and called re-
spondent to inform him of that fact. In that conversation attorney Breck
requested respondent to dismiss the Jones suit.

161

The respondent then wrote a letter to attorney Breck on February 18,

1977, acknowledging his information that Ms. Ray did not desire to go

- forward with the Jones suit, and offering to withdraw as Mr. Smith’s
counsel in the Smith suit should Ms. Ray have any objection to his contin-
uing to represent Mr. Smith in that matter.

On March 7, 1977, Ms. Ray wrote to respondent, authorizing and re-
questing him to dismiss the Jones suit, expressing her belief that she was
lawfully married to Mr. Jones and objecting to respondent representing
anyone against her.

Respondent did not promptly take the steps to conclude the Jones suit
as requested and, for more than three months, continued to represent Mr.
Smith in the Smith suit. During this period respondent continued to nego-
tiate with attorney Breck, trying to obtain Ms. Ray’s agreement that Mr.
Smith had a property interest in her house. Attorney Breck took the posi-
tion that respondent should dismiss the Jones suit as requested, and should
dismiss the Smith suit as being without merit and contrary to Ms. Ray’s
interests. Respondent took the position that Mr. Smith had acquired an in-
terest in the house over the years by making house payments and improve-
ments.

On June 15, 1977, respondent withdrew as counsel for Mr. Smith in
the Smith suit. On June 16, respondent prepared a motion and order to
terminate the Jones suit and forwarded it to attorney Breck, together with
respondent’s statement to Ms. Ray for legal services in the amount of
$438.00.

The statement went unpaid. There was delay by attorney Breck in re-
turning the motion and proposed order to terminate the Jones suit. When
the motion was returned, the respondent presented it to the court and dis-
covered for the first time that Mr. Jones had entered a pro se response,
thereby requiring that a stipulation be signed by Mr. Jones before the
Jones suit could be ended. Later, on November 11, 1977, a stipulation was
signed by Mr. Jones and Ms. Ray agreeing that their marriage was valid
and agreeing that respondent should seek a dismissal of the Jones suit. The
order of dismissal was signed on December 9, 1977.

Meanwhile, in the Smith suit, the judge ruled that there was no com-
mon law marriage between Mr. Smith and Ms. Ray and dismissed that
action on September 22, 1977.

Mr. Calvert, your conduct constituted an open and blatant viola-
tion of DR 5-105, relating to conflicts of interest. Your real loyalties were
to Mr. Smith throughout the time you purported to represent Ms. Ray.
This conflict commenced in the Jones suit; you should have realized that
you were using Ms. Ray as an instrument to accomplish the desires of Mr.
Smith. You never counseled with Ms. Ray privately to determine her
wishes or to advise her as to the consequences of pursuing the various
options available to her at that time. Further, in February 1977, while you

162 ee

were still attorney of record for Ms. Ray in the Jones suit, you filed the
petition on behalf of Mr. Smith in the Smith suit in which Ms. Ray was
the opposing party. The motive for this suit was to obtain for Mr. Smith
an interest in Ms. Ray’s house. Such action constituted a clear and blatant
assertion of a position contrary to the interests of Ms. Ray.

You did nothing to benefit Ms. Ray. You were furthering the adverse
interests of Mr. Smith throughout. Under these circumstances the fee
which you charged to Ms. Ray was both illegal and excessive in violation
of DR 2-106.

You also violated DR 6-101(A)(2) by filing a deficient petition in the
Jones suit. This violation is substantially less serious than the others and is
not central to the conduct which has resulted in public censure.

Mr. Calvert, your conduct caused Ms. Ray to go through a great deal
of emotional distress and concern which proper and faithful representation
could have alleviated or avoided altogether. Your conduct in this case not
only harmed your client but tends to bring the legal profession into disre-
pute with the public. You have received two letters of admonition in the
past for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. We have taken
this past record into consideration in evaluating and approving the recom-
mendation of the Grievance Committee that you be censured publicly. For
the serious infractions of the Disciplinary Rules reflected in this opinion,
Mr. Calvert, you are hereby publicly censured.

It is further ordered that the costs of these proceedings in the amount
of $254.05 be assessed against you and that they be paid to the clerk of
this court within 60 days of the date of this opinion.

163

No. 79SA496

The People of the State of Colorado y.
Richard Donald Watkins, a/k/a Samuel James Patner

(613 P.2d 633)

Decided June 23, 1980. Rehearing denied July 7, 1980.

164 Pe
J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, David K. Rees, Assistant Attorney
General, for plaintiff-appellee.
J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Ilene P. Buchalter, Deputy,
for defendant-appellant.

En Bane.

JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appellant, Richard Donald Watkins, pled guilty to two felonies
and a misdemeanor and received concurrent sentences to the Colorado
State Penitentiary of six to ten years, two to five years, and six months re-
spectively. He appeals the sentences as excessive, and also claims entitle-
ment to re-sentencing under the 1977 version of the presumptive sentenc-

165

ing provisions of House Bill 1589.' We affirm the sentence and set forth
certain procedures to be followed in felony sentencings subsequent to the
date, of this decision,

Initially, the defendant was charged under the name of Samuel James
Patner in a three-count information with second-degree burglary,? third-
degree burglary? and misdemeanor theft.* He applied for a deferred
judgment and sentence.5 The probation department investigated the de-
fendant’s application and determined that his true name was Richard
Donald Watkins, and that he was an escapee from the Georgia State Peni-
tentiary with a long criminal record. The trial court denied the defendant’s
application for a deferred judgment and sentence, and permitted the dis-
trict attorney to file additional counts under the habitual criminal statute,®
based on Georgia convictions for burglary in 1975 and for possession of
heroin in 1977. Plea negotiations ensued and the defendant pled guilty to
the counts of second-degree burglary of a building, a class four felony,’
third-degree burglary, a class five felony,® and theft of property under
$50 in value, a class three misdemeanor.? Prior to the sentencing hearing,
a pre-sentence investigation was conducted by the probation department
and a pre-sentence report was filed with the sentencing judge. After hear-
ing testimony from the defendant and another witness at the sentencing
hearing, the judge sentenced the defendant concurrently to the Colorado
State Penitentiary for terms of six to ten years for second-degree burglary,
two to five years for third-degree burglary, and six months for misde-
meanor theft, and credited against the sentence 189 days spent in pre-
sentence confinement.'° The sentencing judge did not explain the reasons
for his sentence, but merely stated that he was sentencing the defendant
because of “the offense here in Colorado in view of your background.”

1 Colo. Sess. Laws 1977, ch. 216, 18-1-105 at 867.

2 Section 18-4-203, C.R'S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

8 Section 18-4-204, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

4 Section 18-4-401(2)(a), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

8 Section 16-7-403, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

® Section 16-13-101 et seq., CRS. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8 & 1979 Supp.).

7 On the date of the offense, January 18, 1978, a class four felony was punishable by a term of
one day to ten years. Section 18-1-105, CRS, 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

® A class five felony was punishable by a term of one day to five years. Section 18-1-105, CRS.
1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

8 A class three misdemeanor was punishable by a fine of fifty to seven hundred fifty dollars, or six
months imprisonment, or both. Section 18-1-106, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

1 The definite terms of six to ten years and two to five years were imposed under section 16-11-
101(1)(4), CRS. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), which provides for a determinate sentence when the
defendant has been previously convicted of a felony within five years, A concurrent sentence to the
penitentiary for a misdemeanor is authorized in those cases where the misdemeanor sentence is
concurrent with a felony sentence. Section 18-1-106, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

Fn

166

The defendant contests the propriety of the sentence i.e., the intrinsic
fairness or appropriateness of the sentence. See People v. Malacara, 199
Colo. 243, 606 P.2d 1300 (1980); section 18-1-409(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1978
Repl. Vol. 8); C.A.R. 4(c) (amended November 13, 1979). The defend-
ant’s claim of excessiveness centers on his willingness to lead a productive
life and to rehabilitate himself by ending his long dependence on drugs.
Before considering the issue of excessiveness, we find it necessary to ad-
dress a recurrent problem in cases involving appellate review of sentences.

J. THE REQUIREMENT OF A SENTENCING EXPLANATION

HHI Sentencing by its very nature is a discretionary decision which
requires the weighing of various factors and striking a fair accommodation
between the defendant’s need for rehabilitation or corrective treatment
and society’s interest in safety and deterrence. E.g., Triggs v. People,
197 Colo. 229, 591 P.2d 1024 (1979); People v. Strong, 190 Colo. 189,
544 P.2d 966 (1976); People v. Duran, 188 Colo. 107, 533 P.2d 1116
(1975); People v. Campbell, 188 Colo. 79, 532 P.2d 945 (1975); People
v. Euresti, 187 Colo. 266, 529 P.2d 1319 (1975). However, the discretion
implicit in the sentencing decision is not an unrestricted discretion devoid
of reason or principle. On the contrary, the sentencing decision should re-
flect a rational selection from various sentencing alternatives in a manner
consistent with the dominant aims of the sentencing process. The United
State Supreme Court in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct.
1079, 93 L.Ed.1337 (1949), alluded to the prevailing principle of modern
penology that “the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the
crime.” 337 U.S. at 247, 69 S.Ct. at 1083, 93 L.Ed. at 1342. Modern pe-
nology, to a great extent, has rejected the notion that “every offense in a
like legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the
past life and habits of a particular offender.” Id.

The Colorado Criminal Code, section 18-1-102.5(1), C.R.S.
1973 (1979 Supp.) acknowledges the manifold purposes of sentencing:
“(a) To punish a convicted offender by assuring the imposition of a sen-
tence he deserves in relation to the seriousness of his offense;
“(b) To assure the fair and consistent treatment of all convicted offend-
ers by eliminating unjustified disparity in sentences, providing fair warn-
ing of the nature of the sentence to be imposed, and establishing fair
procedures for the imposition of sentences;
“(c) To prevent crime and promote respect for the law by providing an
effective deterrent to others likely to commit similar offenses; and
“(d) To promote rehabilitation by encouraging correctional programs
that elicit the voluntary cooperation and participation of convicted offend-
ers.”
In recognition of the troublesome problems of sentencing disparity and the
need for rationality and fairness in the sentencing process, section 18-1-
409, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8 & 1979 Supp.), grants a defendant

es 167

convicted of a felony the right to one appellate review of the propriety of
the sentence, “having regard to the nature of the offense, the character of
the offender, and the public interest, and the manner in which the sen-
tence was imposed, including the sufficiency and accuracy of the informa-
tion on which it was based.””"4
The failure of a sentencing judge to state on the record the

basic reasons for the selection of a particular sentence creates a burden-
som obstacle to effective and meaningful appellate review of sentences. '2
E.g., United States v. Brown, 479 F.2d 1170 (2d Cir. 1973); McGee v.
United States, 462 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1972); ABA Standards Relating
to Appellate Review of Sentences § 2.3, Commentary at 45 (1968);
Labbe, Appellate Review of Sentences: Penology on the Judicial
Doorstep, 68 J. Crim. L. Criminology 122 (1977); Kutlak and Gottsch-
alk, In Search of a Rational Sentence: A Reiurn to the Concept of
Appellate Review, 53 Nebr. L. Rev. 463 (1974); Coburn, Disparity in
Sentences and Appellate Review of Sentencing, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 207
(1971); Doub, Recent Trends in the Criminal Law, 46 ABA Journal
139 (1960). If appellate review of felony sentences is to satisfy its stated
objectives, it requires that the sentencing judge state on the record the
basic reasons for imposing the sentence. ABA Standards Relating to
Appellate Review of Sentences § 2.3, Commentary at 47 (1968). This
requirement is particularly essential in those cases where the sentence in-
volves a very restrictive form of deprivation, such as a term of confinement
to a correctional facility.13

The requirement of a sentencing explanation for felony sentences
serves as an invaluable aid to the appellate court, ABA Standards
Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences § 2.3, Commentary at 47
(1968), and produces other benefits of comparable significance to the

11 A sentence imposed under the presumptive sentencing provisions of section 18-1-105, C.R.S.
1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8) is subject to an automatic non-adversarial appellate review if it is below
or above the presumptive range. Section 18-1-409.5, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.); CAR. 4(c)
(amended November 13, 1979). A sentence within the presumptive range is not subject to the au-
tomatic appeal provisions of section 18-1-409.5, but is appealable under the general provisions of
section 18-1-409, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8 & 1979 Supp.).

2 Jt has been estimated that as many as half of all appeals are taken because the defendant is
dissatisfied, not necessarily with the conviction, but with the sentence. ABA Standards Relating
to Appellate Review of Sentences, Introduction at 3 (1968).

18 By the phrase “term of confinement” we mean those sentences established for felony offenses by
section 18-1-105, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), including the sentences authorized when exceptional
mitigating circumstances exist. See generally, ABA Standards Relating to Sentencing
Alternatives and Procedures § 2.5.

By “correctional facility” we mean the state penitentiary, the state reformatory, and any other fa-
cility under the supervision of the Department of Corrections for holding in custody convicted fel-
ony offenders pursuant to a sentence, as well as residential or nion-residential community correc-
tional facilities for felony offenders sentenced there for at least the minimum term authorized for
felony offenses under section 18-1-105, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).

168 es

wee,

criminal justice system. Such explanation will serve as ““a powerful safe-
guard against rash and arbitrary decisions’ at this crucial stage of the
criminal process when the defendant's liberty is at stake.” United States
y, Brown, supra at 1172. It will foster consistency and fairness by mini-
mizing the risk that the sentencing judge might have acted on inaccurate
or unreliable information. Jd. It will assist the defendant in making an in-
formed decision on whether to seek an appellate review of his sentence,
and thereby afford him an opportunity to assert grievances he may have
regarding his sentence. ABA Standards Relating to Appellate Review
of Sentences § 1.2(ii). Additionally, a sentencing explanation in many
cases have therapeutic value for the defendant. See Robinson, The
Defendant Needs to Know, Fed. Probation, December 1962 at 3; ABA
Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences §2.3, Commen-
tary at 46 (1968). And also, it may prove beneficial to correctional author-
ities in determining the place and type of institutional confinement suited
to the defendant’s correctional needs. United States v. Brown, supra at
1173; ABA Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences §
2.3, Commentary at 46 (1968).

I Therefore, we require that hereafter in felony convictions involv-
ing the imposition of a sentence to a correctional facility the sentencing
judge state on the record the basic reasons for the imposition of sentence.
The statement of reasons need not be lengthy, but should include the pri-
mary factual considerations bearing on the judge’s sentencing decision.14

Il. THE ISSUE OF EXCESSIVENESS

In this case, the trial judge did not state the reasons for his sentencing
decision. Therefore, we must search the record and determine whether
that record establishes a clear justification for the imposition of concur-
rent sentences with a maximum of six to ten years. E.g., People v.
Strong, supra; People v. Duran, supra.

The charges in this case arose out of a burglary by the defendant and
two others of a business establishment in Greeley, Colorado in the early
morning hours of January 18, 1978. Prior to the burglary the defendant

+4 Given the many factual situations coming before the sentencing judge, it is impossible to cata-
logue here all the factors that are significant to the sentencing process. The following are merely
illustrative of some of the more common considerations: the gravity of the offense in terms of harm
to person or property; the gravity of the offense in terms of the culpability requirement of the law;
the defendant's history of prior criminal conduct; the degree of danger the defendant might present
to the community if released forthwith; the likelihood of future criminality in the absence of cor-
rective incarceration or treatment; the prospects for rehabili under some less drastic sentenc-
ing alternative, such as probation; and the likelihood of depreciating the seriousness of the offense
were a less drastic sentencing alternative chosen.

A proper and fair sentence is one that can be reasonably explained. ABA Standards Relating to
Appellate Review of Sentences § 2.3, Commentary at 45 (1968). A sentence which, without ex-
planation, may seem whimsical, may in fact have a basis in reason and fairness that becomes ap-
parent upon explanation.

es 169

and his two companions had been drinking in a nearby tavern. The defend-
ant admitted to drinking alcoholic beverages and liquid opium. A plan was
devised to gain entry into the building and break into a safe located inside.
After the tavern closed the defendant and his companions proceeded to the
building where they gained access to the roof by climbing up a conveyor
belt, and then entered the building through an opening in the roof. Once
inside the building, one of them broke into a pop machine. While the bur-
glary was in progress, the police arrived and apprehended the defendant
on the roof of the building.

The defendant’s social history depicts a bleak picture of repeated
criminal conduct since the age of eighteen years. The defendant was
twenty-five years old when he was sentenced in this case. At the age of
eighteen he was charged with and convicted of three burglaries and was
sentenced to the Georgia Industrial: Institute for three years. He was pa-
roled in April 1974, about a year after his incarceration, and shortly there-
after was charged with another burglary. He pled guilty to this offense in
1975 and received an indeterminate sentence not to exceed six years under
the Georgia Youthful Offender’s Act. In April 1976 he was granted a con-
ditional release, which was subsequently revoked in December 1976 upon
his arrest for possession with intent to distribute heroin. The defendant
was then remanded to the Georgia State Penitentiary to serve the remain-
der of the indeterminate sentence imposed in 1975. He pled guilty to pos-
session with intent to distribute heroin in February 1977 and he received a
split sentence of six years confinement plus four years probation. He was
received at the Georgia Correctional Institution in May 1977 and was
later placed in a work camp. He escaped on October 3, 1977, and eventu-
ally made his way to Greeley, Colorado.

Hl At the sentencing hearing in this case the defendant, although a
young man of 25 years, had already accumulated five prior felony convic-
tions on his record — four burglary convictions and one narcotics convic-
tion. Were it not for the defendant’s extensive criminal record, we might
well take a different view of the sentence. Under the circumstances of this
case, however, we conclude that the pre-sentence report and other evi-
dence in the record afford substantial justification for the sentences im-
posed.

Ill. THE ISSUE OF RE-SSENTENCING

The defendant also claims that he is entitled to re-sentencing un-
der the presumptive-sentence provisions of House Bill 1589, Colo. Sess.
Laws 1977, ch. 216, 18-1-105 at 867. People v. McKenna, 199 Colo. 452,
611 P.2d 57 (1980), resolved these issues adversely to the defendant.
McKenna held that the legislative postponement of the effective date of
House Bill 1589 comported with the separation of powers doctrine under
Article III of the Colorado Constitution, and that the prospective
provisions of section 25 of House Bill 1589, as amended in March 1979,

170 ee

Colo. Sess. Laws 1979, ch. 157, sec. 25 at 672, did not infringe upon the
rule-making power of this court under Article VI, Section 21, of the Colo-
rado Constitution.

The judgment is affirmed.

Le
No. 79SA506

Joe Berens vy. Ground Water Commission of the State of Colorado and
Jeris A. Danielson, Ex-officio Director of the Ground Water Commission
of the State of Colorado

(614 P.2d 352)

Decided June 30, 1980. Rehearing denied August 18, 1980.

im

Moses, Wittemyer, Harrison and Woodruff, P.C., David M. Brown,
Raphael J. Moses, for plaintiff-appellant.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Loren Swick, Special Assistant At-
torney General, Natural Resources, David Aschkinasi, Assistant, for de-
fendants-appellees.

Zook & Woolf, Marvin B. Woolf, Micheal W. Sutton, for amicus cu-
riae, Oliver Ozman.

En Banc.

JUSTICE ERICKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

Plaintiff-appellant Joe Berens appeals from a district court decision
which affirmed the Colorado Ground Water Commission’s (Commission)
rejection of his application to construct a well. The district court held that
there was no unappropriated ground water available in the three-mile cir-
cle surrounding Berens’ proposed well site and that further appropriations
would unduly deplete the aquifer to the detriment of senior appropriators.
We remand this case to the trial court for a further hearing and findings
of fact on the issues set forth in this opinion.

I

On March 27, 1974, Jack R. Bond filed an application with the Com-
mission for permission to construct a well in Kit Carson County. The ap-
plication requested permission to pump 400 acre-feet per year (afy) from
the Ogallala formation for the irrigation of 480 acres of land located in
the Northern High Plains Designated Ground Water Basin. Subsequent to
that filing, Joe Berens succeeded to Bond’s interest and became a replace-
ment.applicant for the proposed well (the Berens’ well.)'

1 In a letter addressed to Joe Berens, filed with the State Engineer on October 21, 1974, Bond re-
linquished his interest in the well application in favor of Berens. A postscript to that letter also
contained a promise to sell Berens one acre of land at the proposed well site. Subsequent to mak-
ing that promise, Bond sold the portion of his land which had been designated as the well site to
Bob Stricker, who testified that he had made no arrangement to sell land to Berens. In the district
court, Berens testified and the court found that it was his intention to ask for leave of the
Commission to move the well if the application was granted. Although we recognize that there is a
question under section 37-90-107, C.R.S. 1973, as to whether the well permit accurately reflects
the ownership of the proposed well site, that issue was not raised on appeal and we do not address
it here.

In eS

On May 31, 1974, the deputy state engineer notified Bond that his
application had been rejected based on the results of a preliminary evalua-
tion conducted by the Commission staff. The Commission’s evaluation,
which was conducted prior to the issuance of our opinion in Thompson v.
Colorado Ground Water Commission, 194 Colo, 489, 575 P.2d 372
(1978), consisted of a comparison of the total amount of ground water
available for appropriation with the sum of those amounts claimed by sen-
ior appropriators in their applications and conditional permits. The Com-
mission’s evaluator determined that there were 5,500 afy of ground water
available for appropriation in the three-mile circle surrounding the Berens
well (the Berens circle), and that the total claimed appropriation equalled
7,593 afy. :

Thereafter, Bond and replacement applicant Berens requested a hear-
ing before the Commission to-contest the denial of their application. See
section 37-90-114, C.R.S. 1973. At the conclusion of that hearing, the
Commission again denied the application and an appeal was taken to the
district court. See section 37-90-115, C.R.S. 1973.

I A trial de novo was held in the district court on April 4, 1979.
After hearing conflicting testimony from expert witnesses, the trial court
affirmed the Commission’s rejection of the well application, finding “that
the water requirements for the acres actually under irrigation exceed the
water available in the aquifer if the forty percent depletion in twenty-five
years criterion is to be accomplished.” The court stated that there were
approximately 3,100 acres presently under irrigation within the Berens
circle.

The district court did not make specific findings on the amount of
water available for appropriation in the Berens circle and the amount of
water subject to claims by prior appropriators. Because these factors play
a central role in the Commission’s 40% depletion in 25 years formula, we
are not in a position to review the trial court’s determination that the Ber-
ens circle was overappropriated. Accordingly, we remand this case to the
trial court to make further findings on the issues which are set forth in this
opinion

Il.
HB In Fundingsland v. Colorado Ground Water Commission,
171 Colo. 487, 468 P.2d 835 (1970), this Court first recognized and ap-
proved the Commission’s three-mile, 40% depletion in 25 years formula:
“The three mile test was developed for use in the Northern High Plains. It
is partly based on policy and partly based on fact and theory. Using that
test, a circle with a three mile radius is drawn around the proposed well

eS 173

site. A rate of pumping is determined which would result in a 40% deple-
tion of the available ground water in that area over a period of 25 years. If
that rate of pumping is being exceeded by the existing wells within the cir-
cle, then the application for a permit to drill a new well may be denied.
The formula again received our approval in Thompson v. Colorado
Ground Water Commission, 194 Colo. 489, 575 P.2d 372 (1978). In
Thompson, however, we disapproved the Commission’s practice of com-
puting the quantity of existing claims“ based on the amounts of ground
water claimed on the face of conditional permits. We held in Thompson
that the Commission must determine the actual amount of water being
put to beneficial use by the holders of conditional permits. That amount,
when added to amounts claimed in final permits, could then be used to de-
termine the quantity of existing claims senior to the applicants.

Peterson v. Ground Water Commission, 195 Colo. 508, 579 P.2d
629 (1978), addressed a further question arising from our rejection of the
Commission’s practice of evaluating well permit applications under the as-
sumption that all conditional rights to appropriate were being fully exer-
cised. In Peterson, we declared:

“Holders of conditional permits may not claim the maximum amount per-
mitted under their permits and yet place only a portion of the claimed
water to beneficial use... . Water claimed under conditional permits
which have expired is validly appropriated only to the extent of actual
beneficial use prior to the expiration of the conditional permit, regardless
of the fact a final permit based upon the extent of beneficial use has not
been issued.”

Our reasoning was founded upon the statutory scheme established in the
Colorado Ground Water Management Act, section 37-90-101, C.R.S.
1973, et seq., which provides conditional appropriators with a one-year pe-
riod in which to put their appropriation to beneficial use. See section 37-
90-108(3), C.R.S. 1973.2 In our view, the Act does not contemplate that
appropriators may acquire a vested right in water put to beneficial use
after their conditional permits have expired.

Til.

Although we are remanding this case to the trial court, further dis-
cussion of the issues to be addressed is necessary to facilitate the proceed-
ings below.

A. Quantity of Ground Water Available for Appropriation.

The trial court must initially determine the amount of ground water
that is available for appropriation under the Commission’s 40% depletion
in 25 years formula. Prior to our decision in Thompson, the Commission

2 The one-year limitation imposed by section 37-90-108 has recently been expanded to three years.
See section 37-90-108, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.)..

174 |)

employed what may be called its “standard” three-mile formula to deter-
mine the amount of ground water available for appropriation. Under the
Commission’s formula, such factors as the saturated thickness of the aqui-
fer, its specific yield, precipitation recharge, and the irrigated return ac-
cruing to the aquifer from surface irrigation were considered. In each eval-
uation, the Commission employed basin-wide values for all of the variables
used in its formula except saturated thickness, which was determined
through a series of tests conducted within the three-mile circle under ex-
amination. As a result, the Commission’s working formula computed
ground water available for appropriation as a function of saturated thick-
ness,

According to testimony by the Commission’s expert witness, Leonard
Mercer, the standard three-mile formula did not, in practice, result in a
40% depletion rate in 25 years. Mercer stated that, because a small shift
in a proposed well site could eliminate from consideration those senior
wells lying on the perimeter of a fully-appropriated circle, and cause the
acceptance of the proposed well, the circle could, as a result, be overappro-
priated.* In support of his position, Mercer cited Commission studies sug-
gesting that a number of fully-appropriated townships were actually over-
appropriated by about 40%.

Although Commission experts were aware that the standard formula
theoretically resulted in an overappropriation of ground water, they con-
cluded that any actual overappropriation would be negated by the Com-
mission’s policy of using claimed appropriation figures (as stated on condi-
tional permits) in their calculation of actual appropriation. Since these
figures grossly overstated the amount of water actually being appropri-
ated, their use resulted in an underappropriation of the three-mile circle
which compensated for the overappropriation inherent in the Commis-
sion’s standard three-mile formula.

As set forth in part two of this opinion, we disapproved the Com-
mission’s use of claimed appropriation figures in Thompson v. Colorado
Ground Water Commission, supra. As a result, the Commission has re-
cently modified its standard three-mile formula to take into account the

8 The following example, based on the testimony of Leonard Mercer during Commission hearings,
may help to clarify the Commission’s argument on this issue. Assume that applicant A was denied
a well permit on the grounds that a three-mile circle around his proposed site is fully appropriated.
Assume also that there are several wells near the east and west perimeters of A’s circle. If appli-
cant B applies for a permit at a location 3/4 of a mile to the east of applicant A’s location, the re-
sultant shift eastward in the circle would eliminate all of the western wells from consideration,
making B’s circle underappropriated. Applicant B’s permit would be granted while A’s would still

"be denied. In addition, applicant C could also get a permit based on a well site that was 3/4 of a
mile to the west of applicant A’s site. With the addition of wells for B and C (and potentially
others), the original circle would become greatly overappropriated.

ee) 175

percentage of overappropriation thought to be inherent in that formula.‘
Based on the Commission studies suggesting that a 40% overappropriation
resulted from the use of the Commission’s standard formula, the Com-
mission modified the formula to achieve a 40% reduction in its estimate of
the amount of available ground water for each three-mile circle.’ In the
Berens circle, for example, the Commission revised its estimate of available
ground water downward from 5,500 afy to 3,302 afy.*

On remand, the trial court is directed to make specific findings con-
cerning the Commission’s modified formula, including a determination as
to whether the estimate of 40% overappropriation is reasonable. The court
may conduct further hearings on this issue if necessary and should also
consider the reasonableness of any other modifications which the Commis-
sion made in the formula after the announcement of Thompson. As we
have pointed out in note 4, the applicant’s estoppel argument is rejected as
a matter of law and need not be considered on remand.

B. Quantity of Existing Claims.

Upon determining the amount of ground water available for appropri-
ation in the Berens circle, the trial court must then make a specific finding
as to the quantity of existing claims senior to Berens’ application. Inherent
in this determination are two issues relating to the three-mile circle: How
many acres are being irrigated in the three-mile circle and how much
ground water is being applied to each acre under irrigation? Only after
specific findings have been made on each issue may the trial court reach a
conclusion as to the quantity of existing claims senior to Berens’.

With respect to the first issue, the trial court found that there were
approximately 3,100 acres under irrigation at the time of trial. Although
Berens does not contest that determination, he argues that the trial court
should have determined how much acreage was under irrigation at the
time all conditional permits senior to Berens’ expired. Charles Hallenbeck,
Berens’ expert witness, testified that only 1,284 acres were under irriga-
tion in 1975, when, according to Berens, most or all of the permits senior
to Berens’ expired.

In Peterson v. Ground Water Commission, supra, we held that
water claimed under a conditional permit which has expired is valid only
to the extent that the water is appropriated and put to beneficial use prior

* Berens argues that the Commission should be estopped from substituting its new formula for the
standard formula upon which it relied to deny Berens’ application. In Colorado Ground Water
Commission y, Dreiling, 198 Colo, 560, 606 P.2d 836 (1979), we recognized that equitable estop-
pel may be applied against government agencies to prevent manifest injustice. There, however, we
held that the applicant had not reasonably relied on the Commission’s actions. In this case we sim-
ilarly find no reasonable reliance and therefore reject Berens’ claim.

5 According to evidence in the record, the Commission simply divided its standard formula by
140% in order to derive its new formula.

© The Commission has also modified several of the figures used in its three-mile formula to reflect
more current scientific information relating to the water-bearing characteristics of aquifers in the
Northern High Plains Basin.

1176 es

to the expiration of the conditional permit. Accordingly, on remand the
trial court is directed to determine when and if the conditional permits
senior to Berens’ application expired. Once it has been determined that
some or all of the conditional permits senior to Berens’ have expired, the
trial court must make an additional finding as to the number of acres un-
der irrigation at the time those permits expired. Of course, where condi-
tional permits have not expired as of the date of trial, the trial court
should assume that the full conditional appropriation will be put to benefi-
cial use.

The second issue to be resolved in determining quantity of existing
claims concerns the amount of ground water actually applied to each acre
under irrigation. Although we have not previously required that the Com-
mission adopt any particular procedure for making this calculation, the
clear import of our holding in Thompson was that the Commission should
take all reasonable steps to determine the actual amount of water applied
per acre. Presently the Commission allows each appropriator to claim an
average amount of water (30“), which is derived from a composite of such
factors as average rainfall, consumptive use, and the efficiency of the irri-
gation method chosen. The question to be addressed by the trial court on
remand is whether the Commission’s policy of allowing each appropriator
to claim an average amount of ground water squares with the doctrine in
Thompson.

At trial and on appeal, the Commission argues that its averaging pol-
icy is the only feasible means available for determining the amount of
ground water put to beneficial use by appropriators. Because the actual
amount of ground water subject to appropriation may be expected to vary
each year, depending on the crops being planted and the amount of rain-
fall that occurs, the Commission asserts that any attempt to measure the
actual amount of ground water put to beneficial use during the one year
life span of the conditional permit would result in an arbitrary distribution
of ground water. During years of low rainfall, for example, conditional ap-
propriators would put larger amounts of ground water to beneficial use
and would receive a vested right in their abnormally high appropriation.
Conversely, during a year marked by high rainfall, conditional appropria-
tors would put smaller amounts of ground water to beneficial use and
would lose their right to appropriate larger amounts in later years when
there is less rainfall. It is the Commission’s position that neither result is
consistent with the legislative intent underlying the Colorado Ground
Water Management Act, section 37-90-101, C.R.S. 1973, et seq.

In considering the propriety of the Commission’s averaging approach,
the trial court should carefully consider the evidence pertaining to the
Commission’s choice of 30” as an average figure for appropriation in the
Northern High Plains Basin. In Thompson, we expressed doubts about
this figure and, although we recognize the difference between application

177

and consumptive use, we are concerned that the Commission’s figures may

be overstated. Berens’ expert witness presented persuasive evidence to this
effect.

Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court for further hear-
ings and for specific findings on the issues set forth in the course of this

opinion.
No. 80SA23

The People of the State of Colorado v. David N. Steelman, II
(613 P.2d 334)

Decided June 30, 1980.

178 ee

Nolan L. Brown, District Attorney, Frederick B. Skillern, Deputy,
Robert Ruddy, Deputy, for plaintiff-appellee.

L. Gary Hebenstreit, for defendant-appellant.

En Banc.

JUSTICE ERICKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal involves issues arising out of a Crim. P. 11 providency
hearing and a subsequent denial of relief under the provisions of Crim. P.
35(b). We affirm.

David N. Steelman III was charged with fraud by check. See section
18-5-205, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8). Plea negotiations re-
sulted in a plea of guilty and the dismissal of ten other “bad check”
charges which were pending in Boulder, Adams, and Arapahoe Counties.

At the providency hearing the defendant was represented by
the public defender, who he now asserts was incompetent. The defendant
stated at that hearing that he had completed four years of law school. The
record does not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See
People v. White, 182 Colo. 417, 514 P.2d 69 (1973). See also People v.
Blalock, 197 Colo. 320, 592 P.2d 406 (1979); W. Erickson, Standards of
Competency for Defense Counsel in a Criminal Case, 17 Amer. Crim.
L. Rev. 233 (1979). Moreover, the providency hearing, which was con-
ducted in connection with the approval of the plea agreement and the ac-
ceptance of the plea of guilty, was sufficient. No ritual is required and the
record shows that the defendant was fully advised of the consequences of
his plea. See People v. Keenan, 185 Colo. 317, 524 P.2d 604 (1974). All
that is necessary is that the elements of the charge be explained in terms
that are understandable to the defendant. People v. Gleason, 180 Colo.
71, 502 P.2d 69 (1972). See also People v. Edwards, 186 Colo. 129, 526
P.2d 144 (1974).

At the providency hearing the defendant was advised that he was
pleading guilty to a class 4 felony and that section 16-11-101(1)(d),
C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8) required the imposition of a mini-
mum sentence of two years. The only question at the time was whether the
defendant’s prior felony convictions were committed within the last five

179

years. It is clear that the defendant was convicted of a felony in Alaska
within the last five years.

Prior to the sentencing hearing, an extended presentence investigation
report was prepared, which included the defendant’s lengthy criminal re-
cord. The report showed that the defendant was convicted of a felony in
Alaska on September 9, 1976. See Colo. Const. art. 18, § 4. See also
People v. Godding, 55 Colo. 579, 136 P. 1011 (1913). Before sentence
was imposed, the trial judge granted the defendant the right to allocution.
In his statement to the court, the defendant admitted that he had been
convicted in Alaska within five years, and said that he had served six
months at the State Correctional Center in Anchorage, Alaska. He also
informed the court that the sentence imposed in Alaska was to the Divi-
sion of Corrections for a term of three to five years and was conditioned
on five years probation.

I The defendant now claims that the legislature repealed section
16-11-101(1)(d), C.R.S. 1973 and that the repeal vitiates his sentence. He
bases his argument for post-conviction relief on section 18-1-410(1)(f)(D),
C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8), which grants the right to post-
conviction relief when a significant change in the law occurs. We do not
agree. The effective date of the repeal of section 16-11-101(1)(d), C.R.S.
1973, was July 1, 1979, more than three months after the defendant was
sentenced. Colo. Sess. Laws 1978, ch. 157, sec. 25 at 672. The repeal of
the statute does not have retrospective application. Perea v. District
Court, 199 Colo. 27, 604 P.2d 25 (1979). In our view, the repeal did not
entitle the defendant to relief under section 18-1-410(1)(f)(D.

In imposing a sentence of five to ten years imprisonment, the trial
judge did not exceed his statutory authority. The sentence imposed was
proper and the defendant’s motion for post-conviction relief was accord-
ingly denied. See People v. Lipinski, 196 Colo. 50, 580 P.2d 1243
(1978). :

The defendant’s remaining claim relates to an asserted error that was
committed when the trial judge denied him the right to withdraw his plea
of guilty after sentence was imposed. We find the contention to be totally
without merit when considered in the light of the record which is before
us.

Accordingly, we affirm.

JUSTICE DUBOFSKY does not participate.

No. C-1763

Great Western Producers Co-operative vy. Great Western United
Corporation

(613 P.2d 873)

Decided June 30, 1980.

eS 181
ee
Williams & Connolly, Jeremiah C. Collins, Daniel J. Meltzer, John

W. Vardaman, Jr., Bruce R. Genderson; White and Steele, P.C., Walter
A. Steele, James D. Hinga, for petitioner.

Shank, Irwin & Holmes, Hardin Holmes, Kenneth L. Starr, Michael
Touff; Shank, Irwin, Conant, Williamson & Grevelle, Ivan Irwin, Jr., A.
B. Conant, Jr., Robert B. Cousins, Jr., for respondent.

En Banc.

JUSTICE ROVIRA delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to consider the opinion of the Colorado Court
of Appeals in Great Western United Corporation v. Great Western
Producers Co-operative, 41 Colo. App. 349, 588 P.2d 380 (1978). We
now affirm the decision of that court.

L
Facts

The material facts are not in dispute. Great Western United Corpora-
tion (United) is a holding company, the principal asset of which is a
wholly-owned subsidiary, the Great Western Sugar Company (Sugar
Company). In 1971 and 1972, as part of a recapitalization effort, United
entered into negotiations for the sale of the stock of the Sugar Company to
the Great Western Producers Co-operative (Co-op), an organization com-
prised primarily of sugar beet producers. The Co-op had been formed in
1971 for the purpose of purchasing the Sugar Company from United.

182 ee

In October 1972, after a year of negotiations, United and the Co-op
entered into an agreement for the purchase of the capital stock of the
Sugar Company by the Co-op. Shareholder approval of the agreement was
secured, but the sale was not consummated because of outstanding law-
suits against United and because of financial difficulties experienced by
the Co-op. On August 1, 1973, the 1972 agreement terminated by its own
terms.

On March 22, 1974, after further negotiations, United and the Co-op
executed a second purchase agreement, pursuant to which United agreed
to sell, and the Co-op agreed to buy, the outstanding stock of the Sugar
Company. Immediately prior to the execution of the agreement, United’s
investment advisor had issued an opinion letter favoring the sale, and
United’s board of directors had unanimously determined that it was in
United’s best interests to sell the Sugar Company on the terms set forth in
the purchase agreement.

Because the stock of the Sugar Company was United’s major asset, it
was necessary that United’s security holders’ approve the sale to the Co-
op.?. Consumation of the purchase agreement was conditioned on that ap-
proval, and the agreement stated that:

“United will use its best efforts to obtain the approval of its shareholders
and debentureholders whose approval is solicited.”

The purchase agreement was to be “deemed terminated and abandoned by
mutual consent if not consummated on or before October 1, 1974,” which
was the closing date.

After the agreement was executed, United prepared proxy materials
and submitted them to the federal Securities and Exchange Commission.
At meetings in May and July 1974, United’s board of directors voted
unanimously in favor of resolutions reaffirming the determination, first
made in March 1974, that consummation of the purchase agreement

1 As used in this opinion, the term “security holders” includes: (a) the holders of United's com-
mon stock; (b) the holders of United’s $1.88 preferred stock; (c) the holders of United’s $3.00 pre-
ferred stock; and (d) the holders of United’s outstanding debentures.

2 United is incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware, and security holder approval of
the purchase agreement is governed by Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 271(a), which provides:

“(a) Every corporation may at any meeting of its board of directors sell, lease, or exchange all or
substantially all of its property and assets, including its goodwill and its corporate franchises, upon
such terms and conditions and for such consideration, which may consist in whole or in part of
money or other property, including shares of stock in, and/or other securities of, any other corpo-
ration or corporations, as its board of directors deems expedient and for the best interest of the
corporation, when and as authorized by a resolution adopted by a majority of the outstanding stock
of the corporation entitled to vote thereon at a meeting duly called upon at least 20 days notice,
The notice of the meeting shall state that such a resolution will be considered.”

See section 7-9-101(2), C.R.S. 1973; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 302 (1971);
Reese and Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Impact of
Full Faith and Credit, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1118 (1958); 17 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law
of Private Corporations § 8326 (rev. ed. 1977).

eS 183

would be in United’s best interests.

During the summer and fall of 1974, the price of sugar and the pro-
jected and actual profits of the Sugar Company escalated, causing a corre-
sponding increase in the value of the Sugar Company.

On August 15, 1974, United’s board of directors reviewed the price
and profit increases. For the first time, the members of the board were not
unanimous in favoring the sale of the Sugar Company to the Co-op. None-
theless, a majority voted to affirm the board’s prior resolutions favoring
the sale.

On August 24, 1974, the board of directors met to review the matters
considered on August 15. A majority of the directors in attendance voted
in favor of resolutions stating that the consideration to be received by
United pursuant to the purchase agreement was fair and recommending
that the security holders approve the sale.

On August 28, 1974, United distributed a proxy statement to its se-
curity holders, informing them that a majority of the board of directors
believed the consideration stated in the purchase agreement to be fair and
equitable and that a majority of the board recommended that the security
holders approve the sale. The security holders were also informed that a
minority of the directors disagreed because of the increases in sugar prices
and operating profits. The August 28 proxy statement included a solicita-
tion by United of proxies in favor of the purchase agreement.

Shortly after September 9, 1974, United’s president learned that at
least one-half of the members of the board of directors no longer favored
the terms of the purchase agreement. Accordingly, United suspended
proxy solicitation based on the information supplied to the security holders
in the August 28 proxy statement.

A special meeting of the board of directors was held on September
14, 1974, At that meeting, the board voted to accept a revised, higher pro-
jection of sugar prices and operating revenues. On the basis of that vote,
United’s investment advisor withdrew its opinion favoring the terms of the
purchase agreement. Two resolutions were adopted by a majority of the
board of directors. The first recommended that the security holders disap-
prove the purchase agreement since the board no longer thought the con-
sideration stated in the agreement to be fair. The second directed United’s
management to continue solicitation of proxies in favor of the purchase
agreement “‘in view of the Corporation’s obligations to the Co-Operative.”

Meanwhile, on September 9 and 11, 1974, two shareholder derivative
suits had been filed in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, alleging that the August 28 proxy statement vio-
lated both federal securities laws and the common law fiduciary duties of
United’s board of directors. On September 19, 1974, after learning of the
September 14 change in the directors’ recommendation to the security
holders, the federal judge before whom the derivative suits had been filed

184 ee)

entered a temporary restraining order enjoining United from using the
proxies which it had received pursuant to the August 28 proxy statement.
On September 20, 1974, the federal judge was further informed that
United intended to continue proxy solicitation in favor of the purchase
agreement, even though the revised proxy materials through which the fa-
vorable votes would be solicited would state that a majority of the board of
directors had recommended that the security holders disapprove the pur-
chase agreement. The judge enjoined the use of United’s revised proxy
materials, taking notice of the probability that United’s security holders
would erroneously assume that unmarked proxies would be voted consist-
ently with the recommendation of the board of directors, i.e., again rather
than for the purchase agreement.

Proxy solicitation in favor of the purchase agreement was never re-
sumed. On September 20, 1974, United distributed a supplemental proxy
statement advising the security holders that the board of directors recom-
mended against the sale of the Sugar Company and that unmarked prox-
ies would be voted consistently with that recommendation. On September
30, 1974, the security holders’ meeting was held. Sufficient votes were not
obtained to approve the purchase agreement.

IL.
Disposition in the Trial Court

United brought an action in the trial court, seeking a declaratory
judgment that the purchase agreement had been terminated and aban-
doned by mutual consent of the parties. The Co-op counterclaimed, alleg-
ing a breach by United of its “best efforts” obligation under the purchase
agreement.

With respect to the counterclaim for breach of contract, the trial
court instructed the jury that it must return a verdict for United unless it
found by a preponderance of the evidence that: (a) United contracted to
use its best efforts to obtain security holder approval of the sale of the
Sugar Company; (b) United “failed to so use its best efforts”; (c) “but
for United’s failure to use its best efforts, its shareholders and debenture-
holders, each having full knowledge of the facts, would have approved the
proposed sale”; and (d) the Co-op incurred damages as a result of Unit-
ed’s failure to comply with its “best efforts” obligation.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of United on the Co-op’s counter-
claim.

Il.
Disposition in the Court of Appeals
The court of appeals affirmed the jury verdict, holding that the trial
court should have granted United’s motion for a directed verdict on the
Co-op’s counterclaim. The appellate court reasoned that: (1) the purchase
agreement required United to exercise only its “best lawful efforts” to
obtain security holder approval of the sale of the Sugar Company; (2)

eS 185

both federal and state law obligated United and its board of directors “to
|inform ‘the security holders that, because of the change in circumstances
[i.e., the increases in sugar prices and profits and the corresponding in-
crease in the value of the Sugar Company], they believed the terms for the
sale of the Sugar Company were no longer fair and equitable”; and (3)

~ the September 14, 1974, reversal in the recommendation of United’s board
of directors to its security holders could not therefore constitute evidence
of a breach of the “best efforts” clause.

On certiorari review, the Co-op contends that the court of appeals
erred in holding that the trial court should have granted United’s motion
for a directed verdict on the Co-op’s counterclaim, because a reasonable
jury could have found that the September 14, 1974, change in the recom-
mendation of the board of directors to the security holders constituted a
breach by United of its “best efforts” obligation. Because we affirm the
decision of the court of appeals on the issue of whether the trial court
should have directed a verdict in United’s favor, we need not consider er-
rors assigned by the Co-op to the trial court’s instructions and evidentiary
rulings.

. Iv.

Although this case involves a transaction of some complexity, the is-
sue presented for review, as we perceive it, is well defined and narrow.
That issue is whether the “best efforts” clause contained in the March 22,
1974, purchase agreement prevented or prohibited United’s board of di-
rectors from reversing their original recommendation that United’s secur-
ity holders approve the sale of the stock of the Sugar Company. The co-op
argues that such a limitation was placed on the directors and that the
“best efforts” obligation was therefore breached on September 14, 1974,
when the board of directors reversed its prior recommendation favoring
the purchase agreement.? We disagree.

3 It is undisputed that the directors reversed their prior recommendation. Stated in procedural
terms, therefore, the issue before the trial court on United’s motion for a directed verdict was
whether the evidence of the reversal of position proved, as a matter of law, that United had
breached the “best efforts” obligation. See Alexander v. First National Bank in Fort Collins,
169 Colo. 252, 455 P.2d 861 (1969).

The Co-op does not challenge the propriety of United’s disclosure to the security holders of the
fact that the September 14, 1974, reversal in the directors’ recommendation had occurred (this dis-
closure was made in the supplemental proxy materials distributed to the security holders on Sep-
tember 20, 1974), Because the Co-op has raised no claim with respect to the disclosure effected by
the supplemental proxy materials, we discuss neither the federal Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 nor the regulations adopted pursuant to that Act, except to note that SEC rule 14a-9, 17
CER. § 240.14a-9 (1979), prohibits proxy solicitation through materials containing any state-
ment which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or
misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in
order to make the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement
in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or
subject matter which has become false or misleading.

186 ee

In the absence of evidence justifying a contrary inference, it
will be presumed that the parties to a contract intended to form a lawful
and enforceable agreement. Atchison v. City of Englewood, 170 Colo.
295, 463 P.2d 297 (1970); Standard Marine Insurance Company v.
Peck, 140 Colo. 56, 342 P.2d 661 (1959); Wyatt v. Larimer & Weld
Irrigation Company, 18 Colo. 298, 33 P. 144 (1893); Restatement of
Contracts § 236(a) (1932); 3 Corbin on Contracts § 546 (1960). On
the basis of this rule, we conclude that United and the Co-op did not in-
tend that the ‘‘best efforts’? clause would impose on United’s board of di-:
rectors any obligation which would conflict with the directors’ legal duties,
to the corporation’s security holders. These duties include fidelity, good
faith, and prudence with respect to the interests of security holders, as well
as the duty to exercise independent judgment with respect to matters com-
mitted to the discretion of the board of directors and lying ‘‘at the heart of
the management of the corporation.’’ Chapin v. Benwood Foundation,
Inc., 402 A.2d 1205, 1210 (Del. Ch. 1979); Abercrombie v. Davies, 35
Del. Ch. 599, 123 A.2d 893 (1956), rev'd. on other grounds, 36 Del. Ch.
371, 130 A.2d 338 (Del. St.Ct. 1957); University Computing Company
v. Lykes-Youngstown Corporation, 504 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (Supp. 1977).4 Pursuant to § 271(a) of the
“‘General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware,’’> United’s directors
were required to determine whether the terms, conditions, and considera-
tion set forth in the 1974 purchase agreement were ‘‘expedient and for the’
best interests of the corporation.”’ In our view, the determination required —
by § 271(a) lies ‘‘at the heart’? of the directors’ corporate management:
duties, and the directors may not lawfully agree to abrogate the continuing
duty to exercise their independent judgment with respect to that determi-
nation. Chapin v. Benwood Foundation, Inc., supra; Abercrombie v.
Davies, supra; University Computing Company v. Lykes-Youngstown
Corporation, supra.’ Cf. Finklea v. Carolina Farms Company, 196
S.C. 466, 13 S.E.2d 596 (1941).

The ‘‘best efforts’’ obligation required that United and its board of di-
rectors make a reasonable, diligent, and good faith effort to accomplish a
given objective, viz., security holder approval of the purchase agreement.

4 The responsibilities of the board of directors within United’s corporate structure are governed by
Delaware law. See authorities collected at fn. 2.

5 See fn. 2.

© Cf. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 271(b), which authorizes a corporation’s board of directors to aban-
don a proposed sale of all or substantially all of the corporation's assets after security holder ap-
proval for the sale has been secured. The abandonment authorized by § 271(b) is presumably
predicated on a change in the directors’ prior determination that the sale is "for the best interests
of the corporation."

7 There is no indication that United’s certificate of incorporation contains any provision inconsist-
ent with this conclusion. See Del, Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (Supp. 1977).

187

The obligation, however, must be viewed in the context of unanticipated
events and the exigencies of continuing business development and cannot
be construed to require that such events and exigencies be ignored or over-
come at all costs. In short, the ‘‘best efforts’ obligation was tempered by
the directors’ overriding duties under §§ 141(a) and 271(a) of the ‘‘Gen-
eral Corporation Law of the State of Delaware.’”

IM We therefore hold that the ‘‘best efforts’? clause did not bind
United’s board of directors to recommend security holder approval of the
purchase agreement when, subsequent to the execution of the agreement
and the directors’ initial determination under § 271(a), the directors in-
quired into changed circumstances and determined, pursuant to the exer-
cise of their independent good faith judgment, that the terms of the pur-
chase agreement were no longer in the security holders’ best interests.

We affirm the determination of the court of appeals to the effect that
the trial court should have directed a verdict in United’s favor on the Co-
op’s counterclaim.

Judgment affirmed.

JUSTICE LEE and JUSTICE DUBOFSKY do not participate.

No. 80SA88

The People of the State of Colorado vy. Thomas Ray Williams, Patrick
Kevin Sullivan, James Salnajs, and Gary Don Jenkins

(613 P.2d 879)

Decided June 30, 1980.

8 |
&
Ee

es 189

Nolan L. Brown, District Attorney, Michael B. Tully, Senior Deputy,
for plaintiff-appellant.

E. Michael Canges, for defendant-appellee, Williams.
Walter Gerash, for defendant-appellee, Sullivan.
Marshall Quiat, for defendant-appellee, Salnajs.

Joseph Saint-Veltri, Emerson B. Semple, for defendant-appellee, Jen-
kins.

En Banc.

JUSTICE LOHR delivered the opinion of the Court.

The defendants have been charged with possessing a narcotic drug
and with selling and dispensing a narcotic drug.’ In this interlocutory ap-
peal,? the People challenge the district court’s order granting the defend-
ants’ motions to suppress cocaine and other physical evidence relating to
those charges. We reverse.

The facts are uncontroverted. On March 28, 1979, and April 18,
1979, two undercover police agents (agents) met defendant Salnajs in the
parking lot of a restaurant. At the first meeting one-half ounce of cocaine
was purchased from Salnajs; one ounce of cocaine was purchased from
Salnajs at the second meeting.

On May 15, 1979, the agents met Salnajs at the same place where
they had met him on the two prior occasions. The meeting was arranged
among the parties to enable the agents to purchase one pound of cocaine.
The purchase price was to be $30,400, and Salnajs was to receive one
ounce of cocaine for arranging the transaction. Salnajs arrived at the
meeting place in a Mercedes driven by defendant Sullivan. Salnajs asked
the agents to follow the Mercedes to a different location. The agents
agreed to do so and were led to the 7400 block of South Teller Street in
Lakewood. Surveillance teams from the Lakewood Department of Public
Safety followed the two cars to that location.

Sullivan parked his car on the side of the road and approached a resi-
dence at 7428 South Teller Street. He was gone for about a minute and

1 Section 12-22-302, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 5).
2 See CAR. 4.1.

190 |

then came to the vehicle occupied by the agents and informed them that
the person he and Salnajs expected to meet at the house was not there.
Sullivan stated that the individual apparently had not come back from the
airport yet. Sullivan expressed concern that the individual might have
been arrested.

Approximately five minutes later another vehicle, a BMW, pulled
into the driveway of the residence at 7428 South Teller Street. As Sullivan
moved toward the BMW, the driver, defendant Williams, stepped out of
the car, opened the trunk, and removed something from it. Williams and
Sullivan then went toward the residence. Ten or fifteen minutes later Sul-
livan came to the agents’ vehicle with a sample of the cocaine that was to
be purchased. One of the agents informed Sullivan that the sample was
good. Sullivan then went back to the Mercedes and he and Salnajs went
toward the residence. About one-half hour later Salnajs brought a paper
bag to the agents’ vehicle. He gave them the paper bag, which contained
cocaine packaged in a cellophane bag, and informed the agents that one
ounce of cocaine had been removed from the pound. The ounce of cocaine
was payment for arranging the sale, in accordance with the earlier under-
standing. The agents arrested Salnajs immediately. At that time the
agents did not know the location of the ounce of cocaine that had been re-
moved.

The police who had been watching the agents joined the agents in
their car. A decision was made to “secure” the residence to prevent the
possible destruction of evidence believed to be located there. None of the
police or agents were in uniform. As the police and agents approached the
front of the house, an individual was seen looking out a window next to the
front door. The individual had pulled the drape which covered the window
back just far enough to look out. As soon as the police saw the drape fall,
they identified themselves as police and told the persons inside to open the
door. Upon receiving no response, the officers kicked in the door.

Four persons were in the livingroom of the house when the police en-
tered. While standing in the livingroom, one agent heard a toilet flush and,
fearing that someone was flushing contraband down the toilet, went to the
bathroom and found defendant Jenkins standing next to the toilet holding
a plastic bag dripping with water. All persons in the house were arrested
and taken off the premises. Two police officers remained in the house to
“secure” it while a search warrant was sought. Approximately one and
one-half hours later one of the agents returned with a warrant to search
the house for cocaine and other contraband and the house was searched.
Numerous articles were seized. ‘

The defendants moved to suppress all physical evidence found inside
the residence. A hearing was held, and the district court granted the mo-
tion, finding that there was no probable cause to justify the issuance of the
search warrant and that there were no exigent circumstances to justify the

es 191

forced entry into the house. We disagree.
I.

The defendants first seek to suppress the plastic bag which was found
in defendant Jenkins’ hand at the time of his arrest.

HA search without a warrant is presumed to violate the constitu-
tional provisions* forbidding unreasonable searches. Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); e.g.,
People v. Casias, 193 Colo. 66, 563 P.2d 926 (1972). The People have
the burden of proving that a warrantless search falls within a recognized
exception to the warrant requirements. E.g., People v. Railey, 178 Colo.
297, 496 P.2d 1047 (1972).

No search warrant was obtained prior to entry into the residence and
seizure of the plastic bag which was found in Jenkins’ hand. References to
that plastic bag and to the circumstances surrounding its discovery were
contained in the affidavit upon which the search warrant for the remain-
der of the physical evidence was issued. Therefore, it is necessary to decide
whether the plastic bag was lawfully discovered (1) to determine whether
it must be suppressed and (2) to determine whether information concern-
ing its discovery can be used to support issuance of a search warrant for
the other contraband. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83
S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 US. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); People v.
Baird, 172 Colo. 112, 470 P.2d 20 (1970); People v. Orf, Jr., 172 Colo.
253, 472 P.2d 123 (1970).

When the police decided to enter the residence, the facts recited
above gave them probable cause to believe that defendants Sullivan and
Williams had participated in the sale of cocaine. This information consti-
tuted probable cause to arrest those defendants. See section 16-3-102,
C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). The police also had probable cause to
believe that Sullivan and Williams were inside the residence.

Absent exigent circumstances, it is necessary to obtain an arrest
warrant in order to justify entry into a private home to make an arrest.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 64 L.Ed.2d 639
(1980); People v. Coto, 199 Colo. 508, 611 P.2d 969 (1980); People v.
Moreno, 176 Colo. 488, 491 P.2d 575 (1971).

HB Here, the urgent need for prompt arrest to prevent escape and
possible destruction of contraband is manifest. Salnajs had brought almost
a pound of cocaine to the agents and was to receive $30,400 as the pur-
chase price. The officers had probable cause to believe that Salnajs and
Sullivan were middlemen; that their compensation was to be one ounce of
cocaine; and that the money for the purchase of the cocaine would be paid

3 U.S. Const. amend. IV; Colo. Const. art. I, § 7.

192 ee

to someone else. It was reasonable to believe that Salnajs would be ex-
pected by his companions to return promptly to the residence with the*
money. Salnajs’ failure to return promptly could be expected to alarm the
other participants. In turn, their alarm would likely lead to the removal or
destruction of contraband, escape, or retaliation against the agents.
Prompt action to arrest Sullivan and Williams was imperative in the
course of sound police work. We conclude that exigent circumstances ex-
isted to enter the residence to make the arrests. See United States y.
Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1973);4 People v. Barndt, 199 Colo. 51,
604 P.2d 1173 (1980); People v. Boorem, 184 Colo. 233, 519 P.2d 939
(1974); People v. Duleff, 183 Colo. 213, 515 P.2d 1239 (1973); People
v. Vaughns, 175 Colo. 369, 489 P.2d 591 (1971).

Our conclusion is fortified by the fact that the agents had no advance
information as to the place where the sale of cocaine would occur. They
had no information connecting any of the defendants to 7428 South Teller
Street. Under the circumstances, there was no realistic opportunity to seek
a search warrant before the exigencies of the matter made it necessary to
enter the dwelling.

Hl Shortly after the police entered the residence, the sound of the
flushing toilet alerted one of the agents that another person was on the
premises, and that he might be destroying contraband. Additional investi-
gation was necessary in the interest of protecting the safety of the officers,
see People v. Barndt, supra, and to prevent destruction of contraband,
see People v. Boorem, supra. That investigation disclosed defendant Jen-
kins in the act of attempting to flush the contents of a plastic bag down
the toilet. The police action which led to this discovery was consistent with
constitutional requirements. See id. The plastic bag should not have been
suppressed and the information as to the circumstances of its discovery
could properly be used in an affidavit to support an application for a war-
rant to search the premises for cocaine.

Il.
The defendants also seek to suppress evidence which was seized
- as a result of the search pursuant to the search warrant, contending that
probable cause did not exist for the issuance of the search warrant. The
statements in the affidavit which the issuing judge found to constitute

* United States v. Rubin, supra, involved a warrantless search of a dwelling. The court stated
that circumstances relevant to evaluation of a claim of exigency or “emergency” include (1) the
degree of urgency involved and the amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant, (2) reasonable
belief that the contraband is about to be removed, (3) the possibility of danger to police officers
guarding the site of the contraband while a search warrant is sought, (4) information indicating
the possessors of contraband are aware that the police are on their trail, and (5) the ready des-
tructibility of contraband and the knowledge that efforts to dispose of narcotics and to escape are
characteristic of persons engaged in the narcotics traffic. We utilized these criteria in People v.
Boorem, 184 Colo. 233, 519 P.2d 939 (1974).

es 193

probable cause included (1) information which we held in part I consti-
tuted probable cause for the warrantless arrests and (2) the circumstances
surrounding discovery of the plastic bag which defendant Jenkins was
holding.

Before entering the residence the agents had probable cause to believe
that a quantity of cocaine had just arrived there. Although they could not
be sure that more than a pound had been received, the time taken between
the approval of the sample and the delivery of the agreed quantity could
reasonably have suggested a need for weighing and repackaging. There
was an ounce unaccounted for and, although it could have been on defend-
ant Salnajs, there was reason for strong suspicion that it was still in the
residence. Separation of the ounce would have necessitated weighing, giv-
ing rise to the possibility that residue might remain on equipment used for
that purpose. The time available to dispose of contraband after the offi-
cers’ presence became known was very limited. Once inside the residence,
the agents discovered Jenkins apparently disposing of a substance by
flushing it down the toilet. The substance had been packaged in a plastic
bag; the fifteen ounces received by the agents was in a cellophane bag. All
this information was set out in the affidavit for search warrant.

We have held many times that “probable cause deals with
probabilities which are not technical, but are factual and practical consid-
erations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men act.”
People v. Baird, 172 Colo. 112, 117, 470 P.2d 20, 24 (1970); People v.
Gonzales, 156 Colo. 252, 398 P.2d 236 (1965); see Brinegar v. United
States, 338 US. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). A magistrate
may draw reasonable inferences and may utilize his common sense in
making a determination of probable cause. People v. Lindholm, 197 Colo
270, 591 P.2d 1032 (1979); see United States v. Ventresca, 380 US.
102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965). We conclude that the informa-
tion known to the officers and agents and set forth in the affidavit for
search warrant was adequate to constitute probable cause that additional
cocaine would be found on the premises.

TI.

Defendants’ final contention is that the search warrant violated
the Fourth Amendment as it was overbroad and did not particularly de-
scribe the items to be seized. This contention is untenable as this court,
in People v. Schmidt, 172 Colo, 285, 473 P.2d 698 (1970), upheld a
search warrant which contained language very similar to the language in

5 The warrant described the items to be seized to include cocaine and other dangerous drugs and
narcotic drugs, vessels, implements, and furniture in which such substances are found, and items
tending to establish the identity of the person or persons in control of and occupying the premises.
Although probable cause was limited to cocaine, the inclusion of other drugs did not increase the
scope of the places to be searched and did not prejudice defendants.

194 eS

the search warrant in the instant case.
We reverse the ruling of the trial court which suppressed the physical

evidence in this case.
JUSTICE DUBOFSKY does not participate.

No. 80SA77

Dexter E. Heninger y. Alan N. Charnes, as Director, Department of
Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division, State of Colorado

(613 P.2d 884)

Decided June 30, 1980.

Daniel Plattner, for plaintiff-appellant.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Terre Lee Rushton, Assistant At-
torney General, for defendant-appellee.

En Banc.

JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Department of Revenue (Department) revoked the ‘driver’s li-
cense of Dexter E. Heninger (Appellant), and the order of revocation was
affirmed by the district court in a proceeding for judicial review under sec-
tion 24-4-106, C.R.S. 1973. This appeal raises constitutional issues relat-
ing to the license-revocation provisions of sections 42-2-122(1)(i) and 42-
2-203, C.R.S. 1973. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

The facts are not in dispute. Prior to the revocation of his driver’s li-
cense, the appellant had accumulated an extensive record of alcohol-
related traffic offenses. He was convicted of driving while under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor in 1970. On September 2, 1975, he sustained a
conviction for driving on March 13, 1975, while his ability was impaired.
On March 11, 1976, he sustained another conviction for driving under the
influence on October 3, 1975. Thereafter, on June 8, 1977, he was again
convicted for driving on January 2, 1976, while under the influence. After
having been duly served with notice, appellant appeared with counsel at a
hearing before the Department on September 3, 1977, and admitted the
prior convictions. Two orders of revocation were entered by the Depart-
ment. The first order revoked the appellant’s operator’s license for a pe-
riod of at least two years based on his three prior convictions for operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence. Section 42-2-122(1)(i), C.R.S.
1973.' The second order of revocation was for a period of at least five years

+ Section 42-2-122(1)(i) provides:
“(1) The department shall forthwith revoke the license of any driver . . . upon receiving a record
showing that such driver has:

“(j) Been convicted three times of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or any drug which made him incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle. The license of
any driver shail be revoked for an indefinite period and shall only be reissued upon application and
proof to a court of competent jurisdiction, upon failure of the department to take action, that said
driver is competent to drive, and an order shall issue from said court to the department to so reis-
sue said license. In no event shall such application be made in less than two years.”

eS 197

and was based on the appellant’s three convictions of driving while under the
influence or while impaired within a seven-year period. Section 42-2-203,
C.R.S. 1973.? Appellant claims that the mandatory revocation provisions of
sections 42-2-122 (1)(i) and 42-2-203, C.R.S. 1973, violate equal protection
of the laws, due process of law, and the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment under the United States and Colorado Constitutions.

I. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS

The appellant raises several claims with respect to equal protection of
the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion and Article II, Section 25 of the Colorado Constitution.’ Initially, he
claims that the revocation procedures authorized by sections 42-2-
122(1)(@i) and 42-2-203, C.R.S. 1973, for alcohol-related driving offenses
implicate fundamental rights — the right to drive an automobile and the
right to travel interstate. Appellant contends that since a fundamental
right is affected by the statutory revocation procedures, the proper stand-
‘ard for equal protection analysis is that of strict judicial scrutiny. Under
this standard the state has the burden of establishing that the statutory re-
vocation scheme is necessarily related to a compelling governmental in-
terest. E.g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 US. 1, 93
S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 US. 365,
91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971); Bernzen v. Boulder, 186 Colo. 81,
525 P.2d 416 (1974); Jarmel v. Putnam, 179 Colo. 215, 499 P.2d 603
(1972). Appellant maintains that the statutory scheme cannot satisfy this
stringent constitutional standard. Alternatively, appellant argues that even
if a fundamental right is not involved, the statutory revocation procedures,
by discriminating against alcoholics and problem drinkers, fail to satisfy

2 Section 42-2-203 provides:

“The department has the authority to revoke the license of any person whose record brings him
within the definition of an habitual offender in section 42-2-202 .. . .”

Section 42-2-202(2)(a)(1) defines an habitual offender as one who, within a seven-year period or
portion thereof, has accumulated three or more convictions for operating a motor vehicle while un-
der the influence of intoxicating liquor or while his ability is impaired in violation of section 42-4-
1202, CRS. 1973 (1979 Supp.). The convictions must be for separate and distinct offenses arising
out of separate acts.

3 Although the Colorado Constitution does not contain an explicit equal protection clause, equal
treatment under the laws is a right constitutionally afforded Colorado citizens and is included
within the due process clause of Article IJ, Section 25, of the Colorado Constitution. See
Vanderhoff v. People, 152 Colo. 147, 380 P.2d 903 (1963); Trueblood v. Tinsley, 148 Colo.
503, 366 P.2d 655 (1961); People v. Max, 70 Colo. 100, 198 P. 150 (1921).

198 P|

even the rational relationship test of equal protection analysis. Under this
latter standard a statutory classification will be upheld if it has a rational
basis and is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose.*
E.g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra; Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 USS. 56, 92 S.Ct. 862, 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972); Mosgrove v.
Town of Federal Heights, 190 Colo. 1, 543 P.2d 715 (1975); Gates
Rubber Co. v. South Suburban Metro. Recreation Dist., 183 Colo.
222, 516 P.2d 436 (1973).

HH With respect to the first prong of appellant’s strict scrutiny ar-
gument — the right to drive as a fundamental right — we have held in
several cases that the right to drive an automobile upon the public high-
ways of this state does not enjoy the selective status of fundamentality.
Fuhrer v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 197 Colo, 325, 592 P.2d 402 (1979); °
People v. Brown, 174 Colo. 513, 485 P.2d 500 (1971); Love v. Bell, 171
Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118 (1970); People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210, 363
P.2d 180 (1961). The clear import of these cases is that the issuance of a
driver’s license does not confer upon the licensee a right that is independ-
ently entitled to protection against any and all governmental interference
or restriction.

I] The second prong of appellant’s claim for strict scrutiny is that
the revocation of his license implicates his right to travel interstate. While
the right to travel interstate is without question a fundamental right under
the United States Constitution, Memorial Hospital vy. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 US. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), the crit-
ical inquiry in this case is whether the revocation of appellants’ license
burdens this fundamental right. We hold that it does not.

Any incidental disadvantage in appellant’s travel options is di-
rectly attributable to his voluntary and repeated violations of the traffic
laws. More importantly, such incidental disadvantage is of no constitu-
tional significance to his basic right to travel interstate. The revocation of
appellant’s license to drive in no manner impairs his freedom to move from
state to state. He has been neither locked into nor fenced out of the state
of Colorado and is as free to come and go at will as he was before the re-
vocation.

HN We also find no merit in appellant’s remaining equal protection
argument: the statutory revocation procedures discriminate against

4 The appellant makes no claim that the statutory revocation procedures render alcoholics and
problem drinkers a “suspect class” for equal protection purposes. When a “suspect class” is estab-
lished, the strict judicial scrutiny test applies. E.g., San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 US. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87
S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967). Classifications based on race, nationality or alienage are the
more obvious examples of “suspect class” categories, See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
91 S.Ct, 1848, 29 L.Bd.2d 534 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, supra.

es 199

alcoholics and problem drinkers and bear no reasonable relationship to a
legitimate governmental interest. The provisions of sections 42-2-122(1)(i)
and 42-2-203, C.R.S. 1973, do not create a statutory classification of alco-
holics and problem drinkers with respect to traffic offenses. The traffic
laws and the revocation procedures are aimed at all drivers who operate a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or while their ability is
impaired, regardless of their status as alcoholics or problem drinkers. See
sections 42-4-1202(1)(a) and (b), 42-2-122(1)(g) and (i), 42-2-
202(2)(a)(I), C.R.S. 1973. All persons, in other words, are prohibited
from operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated or while their ability is
impaired, and all persons are equally subject to revocation of their licenses
upon requisite proof that the statutory bases have been satisfied.

HI To the extent that one might consider as a classification the cate-
gorization of alcohol-related driving offenses, sections 42-2-122(1)(g) and
(i), 42-2-202(2)(a)(I), C.R.S. 1973, such classification is reasonably re-
lated to the expressed governmental interest of providing “maximum
safety for all persons who travel or otherwise use the public highway . . . .””
Section 42-2-201(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973; Fuhrer v. Dept. of Motor
Vehicles, supra. The alcoholic or problem drinker, however, suffers no
more restrictions on his driver’s license by reason of this classification than
does any other licensee. Accordingly, the appellant’s equal protection ar-
guments are rejected.

II. DUE PROCESS OF LAW

The appellant’s due process argument is directed only against section
42-2-203, C.R.S. 1973, which relates to the Department’s authority to re-
voke the driver’s license of a habitual offender. Section 42-2-202(2)(a)(I),
C.R.S. 1973, defines a habitual offender as any person who has accumu-
lated during a seven-year period three or more separate and distinct con-
victions arising out of separate acts for operating a motor vehicle while un-
der the influence of intoxicating liquor or while one’s ability is impaired.

The appellant argues that section 42-2-203, C.R.S. 1973, as applied
to him, violates due process of law because (1) it bears no reasonable rela-
tionship to a legitimate governmental purpose, and (2) it fails to provide
for a probationary license upon evidence of mitigating circumstances. The
appellant’s initial claim of unconstitutional application is based on his tes-
timony at the revocation hearing that he was then a reformed alcoholic
and had been on monitored Antabuse since January 1976.

The doctrine of unconstitutional application requires a demon-
stration that the application of a statute to the appellant under the circum-
stances of this case would directly interfere with his rights arising under
the federal or state constitution. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Cramp v. Board of Public
Institutions, 368 U.S. 278, 82 S.Ct. 275, 7 L.Ed.2d 285 (1961); United
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 80 S.Ct. 519, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960).

200 es

While one’s interest in maintaining a driver’s license is an interest that re-
quires a due process hearing before termination, Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), the right to drive an automo-
bile upon the public highways is not absolute. Repeatedly, we have recog-
nized the legislature’s prerogative to subject a licensed driver to reasonable
governmental restrictions in the interest of public health, safety and wel-
fare. E.g., Fuhrer v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, supra; People v. Brown,

supra; Love v, Bell, supra; People v. Nothaus, supra.

HMM The explicit legislative policy underlying the enactment of the
revocation provisions for habitual traffic offenders is “to provide maxi-
mum safety for all persons who travel or otherwise use the public high-
ways of this state,” and “to deny the privilege of operating motor vehicles
. . . to persons who by their conduct and record have demonstrated their
indifference to the safety and welfare of others and their disrespect for the
laws... .” Section 42-2-201(1)(a) and (b), C.R.S. 1973. In keeping
with this policy section 42-2-205, C.R.S. 1973 provides:

“(1) No license to operate motor vehicles in this state shall be issued to an
habitual offender, nor shall an habitual offender operate a motor vehicle
in this state:
“(a) For a period of five years from the date of the order of the depart-
ment finding such person to be an habitual offender; and
“(b) Until such time as financial responsibility requirements are met.”
The appellant’s reformation, commendable though it be, is not
a constitutionally significant fact that serves to exempt his prior convic-
tions from the operation of the habitual traffic offender law. Upon satis-
factory proof that the appellant had incurred the convictions necessary for
habitual offender status, the Department properly revoked his driver’s li-
cense. E.g., Fuhrer v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, supra.

The second basis for appellant’s due process claim is that he was enti-
tled to, and deprived of, a hearing for a probationary license. He concedes
that there is no statutory basis for such a hearing in the case of a habitual
offender, but claims entitlement on grounds of fundamental fairness. We
are not persuaded that appellant has been denied due process of law.

Whereas the legislature has chosen to afford a certain class of
traffic offenders manifesting a history of alcohol abuse an opportunity to
obtain a probationary license under certain conditions,5 the legislature

5 Section 42-2-122(4), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.) provides:

“Any individual who has had his license revoked pursuant to paragraph (g) or (i) of subsection (1)
of this section shall be eligible for a hearing for a probationary license upon the satisfactory com-
pletion of a course of alcohol treatment in a program approved by the division of highway safety.
Such a probationary license shall contain any restrictions the department deems reasonable and
necessary, be subject to cancellation for violation of any such restrictions, and be issued for the re-

maining period of suspension. No individual shall be eligible for more than one hearing in any
calendar year under this subsection (4).”

201

likewise has exercised its prerogative in expressly prohibiting the issuance
of any license to a habitual traffic offender. Section 42-2-205, C.R.S.
1973. Such legislative line-drawing is not unreasonable and does not erode
the constitutional interests of appellant. “When one has consistently dem-
onstrated a total disregard for his responsibilities as a driver and for the
safety of other drivers and pedestrians, he cannot complain when he loses
his conditional right to use the highways of the state.” Campbell v.
Colorado, 176 Colo. 202, 211, 491 P.2d 1385, 1390 (1971). Under the
circumstances present here, the revocation of the appellant’s license and
the revocation proceedings in connection therewith comported with due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article II, Section 25, of the Colorado Constitution.®
Il. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

Hs Appellant also argues that the revocation of his driver’s license
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 20,
of the Colorado Constitution.

We addressed and rejected a similar argument in Campbell v.
Colorado, supra, observing that “[i]ndefinite revocation here is a reme-
dial action designed to assure the general public safety in the use of its
highways.” 176 Colo. at 211, 491 P.2d at 1390. Campbell also held that a
revocation hearing is a civil, rather than a criminal, proceeding. Independ-
ent of the constitutional relevancy attaching to the civil nature of these
proceedings for purposes of the prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51
L.Ed.2d 711 (1977), the revocation of the appellant’s license under the cir-
cumstances present here cannot be characterized as grossly excessive, nor
was it arbitrarily imposed in a severe or cruel manner. See e.g., Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958).

The judgment is affirmed.

JUSTICE DUBOFSKY does not participate.

6 The appellant in his brief has raised the issue of his right to a hearing for a probationary license
under the rubric of due process. Both the brief and the record before the district court do contain
an occasional allusion to procedural equality, perhaps thereby raising an equal protection argu-
ment. We find nothing in the statutory revocation procedures applied to appellant that violates his
equal protection interests under the federal and state constitutions.

No. 79SC83

Keith Matthews, Barbara Matthews, and Carl B. Runyon vy.
Tri-County Water Conservancy District

(613 P.2d 889)

Decided July 7, 1980.

Sr 203
eS

Overholser and Slee, John W. Overholser, for petitioners.

Brooks, Miller, Brooks, & White, Ralph E. Miller, John A. Brooks,
Theodore L. Brooks, for respondent.

Fairfield and Woods, Charles J. Beise, for amicus curiae,
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District.

Baker and Cazier, Stanley W. Cazier, for amicus curiae, Middle Park
‘Water Conservancy District.

Lawrence W. McDaniel, for amicus curiae, Florida Water
Conservancy District. .

George R. Armstrong, for amicus curiae, Dolores Water Conservancy
District.

Sam P. Lockard, Delaney and Balcomb, Kenneth Balcomb, Scott
Balcomb, for amicus curiae, Ute Water Conservancy District.

Delaney and Balcomb, Kenneth Balcomb, Scott Balcomb, for amici
curiae, Basalt Water Conservancy District, West Divide Water
Conservancy District, and Silt Water Conservancy District.

Arthur A. Abplanalp, Jr., for amicus curiae, Board of County
Commissioners of Garfield County.

En Bane.

JUSTICE LEE delivered the opinion of the Court.

204 See ee)

Certiorari was granted to review the decision of the court of appeals
in Matthews v. Tri-County Water Conservancy Dist., 42 Colo. App.
80, 594 P.2d 586 (1979).

Petitioners seek to permanently enjoin the Tri-County Water Conser-
vancy District’ (district) from enforcing a new rate schedule and water
tap fee policy. The District Court of Montrose County denied petitioners’
motions for injunctive relief, and that action was affirmed on appeal. We
now affirm the court of appeals.

The district was organized in-1957 pursuant to the Water Conser-
vancy Act, now in section 37-45-101 et seq., C.R.S. 1973. The district’s
rules and regulations require subdividers to install water systems in their
subdivisions at their cost and to the district’s specifications. When a sys-
tem is completed, it is transferred to the district for operation and mainte-
nance and the district then sells taps to each lot owner within the subdivi-
sion.

Petitioners are the owners of two subdivisions in Montrose County. In
1975, they installed a water system in their first subdivision and connected
it to the occupied houses. The district rejected the system when, upon in-
spection, it found that it did not meet specifications. As a temporary solu-
tion, the district agreed to sell petitioners a 2-inch commercial tap, which
petitioners continue to use.? Petitioners then installed a subdivision pipe-
line system which was fed by the commercial tap, with a meter for each
residence. The district billed petitioners at a bulk rate; petitioners in turn
billed the owners of the residences for the amount of water used.

At the quarterly meeting of the board of directors of the district on
July 27, 1976, the board instructed its executive committee’ to formulate
revised rates and regulations governing commercial taps for trailer parks,
apartment houses, condominiums, and subdivisions. The new rates and
policies were adopted by the executive committee in August 1976 and ap-
proved by the board of directors in October 1976. They provide that com-
mercial taps supplying individual residences will no longer be billed at the
commercial bulk rate, but rather that the owner of the commercial tap
will be billed according to the number of residences supplied with water
from it. Owners of commercial taps will also be billed $500 for each new
residence in the subdivision connected to their taps.

Petitioners contend that the new rates and regulations are unlawful
and unenforceable. We do not agree.

1 The Tri-County Water Conservancy District serves Ouray, Montrose, and Delta Counties.

? Petitioners had also purchased eleven inactive taps in 1973. At that time, it was the policy of the
district to assess a minimum charge for inactive taps, although the policy was not implemented un-
til 1976,

3 The executive committee is composed of two persons from each of the three counties within the
boundaries of the district. Those individuals are also members of the district’s board of directors.

205

IL.

Initially, petitioners contend that the new rates and regulations were
not validly adopted by the district because only the full board of directors
jis authorized to act on behalf of the district. Here, petitioners assert that
the rates and regulations were established by the executive committee,
with the board of directors acting merely as a “rubber stamp.”

I] The board of directors has statutory authority to “fix rates at
which water not allotted to lands . . . shall be sold, leased, or otherwise
disposed of . . . .” Section 37-45-118(1)(g), C.R.S 1973. See section 37-
45-118(1)(j), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.). In this case, the record indicates
that the executive committee was acting under the direction of the full
board when it formulated the new rules and regulations.

At the July 27, 1976, meeting of the board of directors, the directors
discussed active and inactive water tap rates and the problems relating to
subdivision water systems. At least one of the petitioners was present at
this meeting. It was also at the July 27 meeting that the executive commit-
tee was requested to determine new rates and regulations. The committee
had the benefit, then, of the discussion, at a public meeting, of the issues it
was to address.

Once the executive committee formulated the new rates and regula-
tions, they were submitted to the board for approval and adoption. Thus, it
was the board of directors and not the executive committee which “fixed”
the new rates. We find no merit in petitioners’ contention that the rates
and regulations were not properly adopted by the board of directors.

Petitioners further argue that public policy requires that persons af-
fected by decisions of public entities be entitled to have such questions
considered at meetings of the entire board, with the opportunity for dis-
cussion in that forum. Such an opportunity was afforded members of the
public, both at the regular meeting when the executive committee was di-
rected to formulate new rates and regulations and at the quarterly meeting
in October 1976 when the new rates and regulations were approved and
adopted.

Petitioners also contend that, since the executive committee is an ap-
pointive group, aggrieved persons have no recourse to election or recall
remedies if they are dissatisfied with the actions of that group. This argu-
ment is without merit.

The membership of the board of directors is subject to the elective
process if steps are taken by the electors of the district as provided for in
section 37-45-114(2), C.R.S. 1973.4 Thus, if the electorate is dissatisfied
with the operation of the district, they may demonstrate their discontent

4 Tt was stipulated that Tri-County Water Conservancy District was organized in 1957 and, there-
fore, the alternative provision for election of directors is available.

206 |

by exercising their right to initiate the elective process.
Il.

HB We do not reach the merits of petitioners’ position that the board
of directors is subject to the State Administrative Procedures Act since pe-
titioners failed to raise this issue in the trial court and are thus precluded
from raising it on appeal. C.R.C.P. 59(f).

Til.

Petitioners next contend that the district is a public utility within the
meaning of section 40-1-103, C.R.S. 1973, and, therefore, may not set
rates and make regulations without first complying with the requirements
imposed on a public utility.

We do not agree that water conservancy districts are public utili-
ties subject to the regulation of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC).

The Water Conservancy Act [Act] declares that a water conservancy
district shall be a “political subdivision of the state of Colorado and a
body corporate with all the powers of a public or municipal corporation.”
Section 37-45-112(7), C.R.S. 1973. Among the specific powers granted to
it is that of fixing water rates at which water “not allotted to lands” shall
be sold, leased or otherwise disposed of.

The power of a conservancy district to engage in rate fixing for the
sale, leasing or disposition of its waters does not by this authority alone
give it public utility status or subject it to the rules, regulations, and super-
vision of the PUC. More significant is the extent to which the business or
enterprise is impressed with the public interest and the extent to which it
holds itself out as serving, or ready to serve, all of the public
indiscriminately. Section 40-1-103, C.R.S. 1973 (statutory definition);
P.U.C. v. Colorado Co., 142 Colo. 361, 351 P.2d 241 (1960). See
Robinson v. Boulder, 190 Colo. 357, 547 P.2d 228 (1976); Englewood v.
Denver, 123 Colo. 290, 229 P.2d 667 (1951). See also Parrish vy.
P.U.C., 134 Colo. 192, 301 P.2d 343 (1956).

rf A municipal corporation which operates as a public utility and
limits its services to the inhabitants of the municipality only is not subject
to PUC regulation. Loveland v. PUC, 195 Colo. 298, 580 P.2d 381
(1978); K. C. Elec. v. PUC, 191 Colo. 96, 550 P.2d 871 (1976);
Thornton v. P.U.C., 157 Colo. 188, 402 P.2d 194 (1965); People ex rel.
y. Loveland, 76 Colo. 188, 230 P. 399 (1924); Compare Schlarb v.
Sanitation Dist., 144 Colo. 590, 357 P.2d 647 (1960) (sanitation district
held not a public utility).

Significantly, the Act provides: “. . . but the sale, leasing, and deliv-
ery of water for irrigation and domestic purposes as provided in this sec-
tion shall only be made for use within the district.” Section 37-45-
118(1)G). (Emphasis added.) It follows that a water conservancy district,
a political subdivision of the state, having the powers of a public or
municipal corporation and having no obligation to sell, and being

207

prohibited by statute from selling water for use outside the district bound-
aries, does not rationally fall within the definition of a public utility or
within the regulatory control of the PUC.

Finally, as the court of appeals noted, the Act was enacted almost
twenty-five years after the creation of the PUC. It specifically provides:
“All acts or parts of acts conflicting in any way with any of the provisions
of this [Act] . . . are declared nonoperative and noneffective as to this
[Act] as completely as if they did not exist.” Section 37-45-107, C.R.S.
1973.

Since the Act specifically grants to the water districts the au-
thority to fix water rates for non-irrigation water, section 37-45-118(1)(g),
without any reference to the ratemaking procedure of the PUC, it is clear
that the legislature did not intend to make the district’s authority to set
water rates subject to the jurisdiction of the PUC.

Iv.

Il Petitioners argue in the alternative that, even if the district is not
subject to the jurisdiction of the PUC, it is subject to the jurisdiction of
the board of county commissioners. In support of their argument, they rely
on Colo. Const. art. XVI, sec. 8, and on article 85 of title 37, C.R.S.
1973, enacted pursuant thereto.

Article XVI, section 8, provides:

“The general assembly shall provide by law that the board of county com-
missioners in their respective counties, shall have power, when application
is made to them by either party interested, to establish reasonable maxi-
mum rates to be charged for the use of water, whether furnished by indi-
viduals or corporations.”

To implement this constitutional provision, the General Assembly en-
acted article 85 of title 37, C.R.S. 1973, which provides procedures by
which the boards of county commissioners may establish reasonable maxi-
mum rates for water.

The question is whether section 8 of article XVI of the constitution
and the statute implementing it have application to water conservancy dis-
tricts, which the General Assembly has denominated “political subdivi-
sions of the state of Colorado.” Section 37-45-112(7), C.R.S. 1973.

Section 8 of article XVI of the Colorado Constitution concerns rea-
sonable maximum rates to be charged for the use of water whether
furnished by “individuals or corporations.” Section 37-85-101 of the im-
plementing statute provides that “persons” as used in article 85 shall in-
clude “corporations and associations.”

Section 37-85-103 provides:

“The board of county commissioners of each county, at its regular sessions
in each year, and at such other sessions as it in its discretion may deem
proper, in view of the irrigation and harvesting season, and the
convenience of all parties interested, shall hear and consider all

208 Ce

applications which may be made to it by any party interested, either in
furnishing and delivering for compensation in any manner, or in
procuring for such compensation, water for irrigation, mining, milling,
manufacturing, or domestic purposes, from any ditch, canal, conduit, or
reservoir, the whole or any part of which lies in such county. The applica-
tion shall be supported by such affidavits as the applicant may present,
showing reasonable cause for such board of county commissioners to pro-
ceed to fix a reasonable maximum rate of compensation for water to
be thereafter delivered from such ditch, canal, conduit, or reservoir, within
such county.” (Emphasis added.)

Subsection (1) of section 37-85-106 requires the board of commis-
sioners to hear and examine testimony concerning the “original cost and
present value of works and structure of such ditch, canal, conduit, or reser-
voir, the cost and expense of maintaining and operating the same, and all
matters which may affect the establishing of a reasonable maximum
rate of compensation for water to be furnished and delivered therefrom.”
(Emphasis added.) Subsection (2) speaks also in terms of fixing a “just
and reasonable maximum rate of compensation for water” to be delivered
from such ditch or other work within the county.

Sections 37-85-109 and 110 provide criminal sanctions for collecting
excessive rates and for refusing to deliver water.

Finally, section 37-85-111 provides for proceedings in the nature of
quo warranto for the forfeiture of corporate rights, privileges and fran-
chises for any corporate defiance or attempted evasion of the provisions of
article 85.

It is our view that the language of section 8 of article XVI of the Col-
orado Constitution and of article 85 of title 37 is not applicable to a “polit-
ical subdivision of the state of Colorado.” Rather, it is our opinion that the
framers intended, and the General Assembly understood, that the consti-
tutional provision was applicable only to private persons or corporations
engaged in the business of storage, carriage, and sale of water for “irriga-
tion, mining, milling, manufacturing, or domestic purposes.”® Section 37-
85-103.

We find persuasive the following language in the landmark case of
Wheeler v. Northern Colorado I. Co., 10 Colo. 582, 17 P. 487 (1887),
the first case involving the interpretation of the constitutional provision
and the implementing statute:

5 The statutory terms “original cost and present value of works,” “cost and expense of mainte-
nance and operating the same,” and “reasonable maximum rate of compensation,” connote a busi-
ness enterprise wherein a reasonable rate of return is essential to the protection of a capital
investment. Such terms ordinarily do not apply to the functioning of a political subdivision of the
state.

eS 209

For convenience I [Mr. Justice Helm] shall, throughout this opinion, use
the terms ‘carrier’ and ‘consumer,’ meaning the canal company and the
tiller of the soil respectively.

“The agriculturists in the territory mentioned are, with few exceptions,
unable to convey water from the natural streams to their land. The annual
rainfall is increasing; yet at present, without irrigation, but a small frac-
tion of the producing capacity of the soil can be utilized, and, unaided,
these consumers will for years to come be practically helpless. To the suc-
cessful cultivation of that region the carrier and consumer are, therefore,
equally indispensable. Hence a wise legislative policy and an intelligent ju-
dicial construction requiré a careful consideration of the privileges, powers
and duties of the carrier, as well as the rights and obligations of the con-
sumer. The courts should protect the consumer in the full enjoyment of his
constitutional and statutory rights; but they should also jealously guard
the rights of the carrier; and so deal with it (the constitution and statutes
permitting) as to encourage the investment of capital in the
construction of reservoirs and canals for the storage and
transportation of water. (Emphasis added.)

“The constitution unquestionably contemplates and sanctions the
business of transporting water for hire from natural streams to distant
consumers . . . . (Emphasis added.)

“By section 8, article XVI, of the constitution, from which the foregoing
phrase is taken, the convention recognized the carrier’s right to
compensation for transporting water, and provided for a judicial, or
quasi-judicial, tribunal to fix an equitable maximum charge where the.
parties fail to agree. It requires no citation of authority to show that the
words ‘purchase’ or ‘sale,’ together with other words of like import, used in
this connection by the legislature, must receive a corresponding interpreta-
tion. Under the constitution, as I understand it, the carrier is at least a
quasi-public servant or agent. It is not the attitude of a private individual
contracting for the sale or use of his private property. It exists largely for
the benefit of others; being engaged in the business of transporting, for
hire, water owned by the public, to the people owning the right to its
use. It is permitted to acquire certain rights as against those subsequently
diverting water from the same natural stream. It may exercise the power
of eminent domain. Its business is affirmatively sanctioned, and its
profits or emoluments are fairly quarantied [sic]. But in consideration
of this express recognition, together with the privileges and protection thus
given, it is, for the public good, charged with certain duties and subjected
to a reasonable control. (Emphasis added.)

210 Ce

“But the constitution is not silent in the particular mentioned. It evinces,
beyond question, a purpose to subject this, as other branches of the
business, to a certain degree of public control. . . .” (Emphasis added.)®

Further fortifying our belief that the General Assembly understood
that section 8 of article XIV of the Colorado Constitution was intended by
the framers to apply only to persons and corporations, and not to “political
subdivisions,” was the inclusion in the statute of the penal sanctions found
in sections 37-85-109, 110, and 111. Such are inappropriate to “political
subdivisions.”

We do not suggest, however, that water conservancy districts are
without constraints in the fixing of rates for the sale of water. Section 37-
45-118(1)(g), C.R.S. 1973, mandates that “. . . rates shall be equitable
although not necessarily equal or uniform, for like classes of service
throughout the district.””

We conclude that water conservancy districts, when fixing rates for
sale of water, are not subject to the jurisdiction of the boards of the county
commissioners.

Vv.

Finally, petitioners argue that the district’s enforcement of the revised
rates and regulations deprives them of their constitutional rights. We have
reviewed their arguments and agree with the discussion and resolution of
this issue by the court of appeals. We deem it unnecessary to further

© The following are all of the cases found concerning the application of section 37-85-101, et seq.,
CRS. 1973. None involved a “political subdivision” as a party.

Golden Canal Co. v. Bright, 8 Colo. 144, 6 P. 142 (1884). Plaintiff was a landowner; defendant
was a corporation which constructed, owned, and maintained irrigation ditches.

S.B. & R.C.D. Co. v. Marfell, 15 Colo. 302, 25 P. 504 (1890). Plaintiffs were consumers; de-
fendant was a private water carrier.

Denver v. Walker, 45 Colo. 387, 101 P. 348 (1909). Plaintiffs were property owners receiving
water from a city-owned irrigation ditch; defendant was the city.

Montezuma W. & L. Co. v. McCracken, 62 Colo. 394, 163 P. 286 (1917). Plaintiff was owner
of irrigation canal which was subject to rates set by board of county commissioners. Defendant was
landowner.

Wanamaker Co. v. Pettit, 89 Colo. 344, 3 P.2d 295 (1931). Plaintiff owned irrigation ditch; de-
fendant was a user of the water.

Northern Co. v. Commissioners, 95 Colo. 555, 38 P.2d 889 (1934). Plaintiff was owner of an ir-
rigation ditch; the city and county of Denver acquired all of the shares of the corporation. Individ-
ual water users and various boards of county commissioners were defendants.

Farmers Co. v. Barrett, 151 Colo. 140, 376 P.2d 693 (1962). Plaintiff was a private ditch
company incorporated by certain water users; defendant was the board of county commissioners.
Northern Co. v. Pouppirt, 22 Colo. App. 563, 127 P. 125 (1912). Plaintiff was property owner;
defendant was a Colorado corporation which owned and operated an irrigation ditch.

Zoller v. Mail Crk. Ditch Co., 31 Colo. App. 99, 498 P.2d 1169 (1972). Plaintiffs were stock-
holders in defendant corporation, a “mutual ditch corporation.”

Pioneer Irr. Co. v. Board of Com’rs, 251 F. 264 (8th Cir. 1918). Plaintiff was a private com-
pany seeking to restrain enforcement of rate fixed by board of county commissioners for use of ir-
rigation water.

7 Tn case of a substantial departure from that standard in the fixing of rates, a water conservancy
district may be subject to restraint through appropriate judicial proceedings.

es 21

articulate our reasons for the conclusion that: petitioners’ constitutional
contentions do not have merit.
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.
a
No. 80SA282

The People of the State of Colorado v. Jon C. Hilgers
(612 P.2d 1134)

Decided July 7, 1980.

Linda Donnelly, for complainant.

Jon C. Hilgers, Pro se.

En Bane.

JUSTICE ERICKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

This disciplinary proceeding has a long and tortured background. Jon
C. Hilgers, the respondent, has misled the Court and has defaulted in his
appearance before the Colorado Supreme Court Grievance Committee.
The record before us establishes not only serious and aggravated discipli-
nary violations by the respondent, but also possible criminal conduct

212 ee

which has been the subject of formal charges in the Twentieth Judicial
District (Boulder, Colorado). See People v. Pacheco, 199 Colo. 108, 608
P.2d 334 (1980). We now order that the respondent be disbarred.

As a result of a number of serious complaints before the Grievance
Committee, the respondent was suspended on July 19, 1979. See C.R.C.P.
259(F). On August 16, 1979, the respondent, by reason of his petition and
stipulation, was permitted to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court
for a period of one year. His right to resign was predicated in part upon
his assertion that he had a complete defense to the charges which were
made against him. Subsequent proceedings before the Grievance Commit-
tee have demonstrated that the respondent did not have, or desire to as-
sert, a defense to the charges and that he had misappropriated substantial
sums of money from some of his clients.

HB Although he was personally served, the respondent did not ap-
pear in person, or by counsel, to answer the charges presented against him.
After clear and convincing evidence was presented on each charge, the
Grievance Committee recommended disbarment. Those recommendations
were mailed by the Clerk of the Supreme Court to all of the parties desig-
nated in C.R.C.P 251(E), including the respondent. Because the respon-
dent had moved and left no forwarding address, the certified letter con-
taining the Grievance Committee’s Findings, Conclusions and
Recommendations was returned unopened.’ His whereabouts are un-
known at this time.

Based on the uncontested allegations and the clear and convincing ev-
idence in the record, which establishes that the respondent has
misappropriated funds entrusted to him by his clients, we now approve the
Findings, Recommendations and Conclusions of the Grievance Commit-
tee. By his unethical conduct, the respondent has violated C.R.C.P.
241(B), together with D.R. 1-102(A)(4) and 6-101(A)(3). See People v.
Radinsky, 182 Colo. 259, 512 P.2d 627 (1973). Accordingly, we order
that the respondent be disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of at-
torneys authorized to practice before this Court.

The respondent shall not be permitted to apply for reinstatement for a
period of ten years and then only upon establishing that he has been reha-
bilitated, is fit to practice law, has complied with all disciplinary orders of
this Court, and has made restitution to his clients who have heretofore

1 C.R.C.P. 251(E) and 252(B) normally require that a copy of the Grievance Committee’s Find-
ings, Conclusions and Recommendations be sent to the respondent. In this case the respondent did
not receive a copy of the letter because he failed to file a supplemental change of address form
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court as required by C.R.C.P. 227 (1979 Supp.). Since the respon-
dent has not reported his change of address, and has previously been served, we hold that the certi-
fied mailing satisfied Rules 251(E) and 252(B). We also note that by failing to appear at the
grievance proceedings either in person or by counsel, the respondent waived his right to file excep-
tions to the Findings, Recommendations and Conclusions of the Grievance Committee.

213

filed complaints before the Grievance Committee for misappropriation of
funds. In addition, costs are assessed in the amount of $316.34, which
shall be paid to the Clerk of the Supreme Court within ninety days.

In view of the length of the minimum term of disbarment, the respon-
dent will not be permitted to establish his competence to practice law by
any other means than by retaking the bar examination. Moreover, he may
not take the bar examination until such time as he establishes to the satis-
faction of the Grievance Committee that the other conditions which we
have imposed have been satisfied.

No. 80SA217

The People of the State of Colorado, In the Interest of C.S., A Child, And
Concerning E.S.

(613 P.2d 1304)

Decided July 7, 1980.

214 es

Jerome V. Porter, for petitioner-appellee.

Joseph J. Lenihan, Guardian Ad Litem for C.S., a Child.

John Shanley, Dennis Green, for respondent-appellant

En Bane.
JUSTICE ROVIRA delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appellant, E.S., appeals an order of the Pueblo County District
Court which terminated his parental rights with respect to his minor
daughter, C.S. The appeal was transferred to this court pursuant to sec-
tions 13-4-102(1)(b) and 13-4-110(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973. We affirm the or-
der of the district court.

C.S. was born on August 21, 1970. Beginning in February 1972, the
Pueblo County Department of Social Welfare (department) started work-
ing with M.S., the mother of C.S., to assist her in providing proper care
for C.S. In July 1972, with the consent of her mother, C.S. was placed in a
foster home. On June 4, 1973, after unsuccessful attempts to improve
M.S.’s ability to care for her child, a “Petition in Dependency or Neglect”
was filed in the district court, naming as respondents M'S. and E.S., the
father of C.S. The petition alleged that C.S. lacked proper parental care,
that C.S. was abandoned, and that her parents failed to provide proper
sustenance and care necessary for her well-being. The petition and sum-
mons which were served on MLS. and E.S. advised them that termination

es ais

of parental rights was a possible remedy.

On September 17, 1973, the district court determined that C.S. was a
“dependent or neglected child” within the meaning of section 19-1-
103(20), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), and ordered the department to
continue to work with the family.

CS. continued to live in a foster home until December 1974, when,
after a further review of the dispositional order, the court returned C.S. to
the custody of M.S. and ES.

In May 1977, after considering a current report on the family situa-
tion, the court ordered M.S. and E.S. to undergo an examination at the
Comprehensive Alcoholic Treatment Center, and an examination by a
psychiatrist or psychologist to determine their parental abilities. C.S. was
also ordered to be “psychiatrically or psychologically examined.”

C.S.’s mother, M.S., died on August 1, 1977. On September 28,
1977, with E.S.’s consent, C.S. was again placed in the custody of the de-
partment. The department, in turn, placed C.S. in the physical custody of
her paternal uncle and aunt. E.S. was granted visitation rights, and the de-
partment was ordered to present a permanent plan for the placement of
C.S. In February 1978, the trial court ordered that both E.S. and C.S. be
evaluated to determine the possibility of reuniting the child and her father.
In May 1978, at a dispositional review hearing, the trial court continued
its previous order that the legal custody of the child should remain with
the department, that C.S. should remain with the paternal uncle and aunt,
and that E.S. should have reasonable rights of visitation.

Although the placement of C.S. with her uncle and aunt was initially
satisfactory, it eventually failed because of a dispute as to the scope of
E.S.’s visitation rights, and, once again, C.S. was placed in a foster home.
On June 26, 1978, the People requested the district court to terminate the
parent-child relationship between E.S. and C.S,

A termination hearing was held on October 6, 1978. The People pre-
sented the testimony of four witnesses: a clinical psychologist, a child psy-
chiatrist, and two caseworkers employed by the department. The witnesses
were unanimous in recommending that the parent-child relationship be
terminated. The uncontroverted testimony established that E.S. was a
chronic alcoholic whose drinking had resulted in irreversible brain dam-
age. The witnesses agreed, and E.S. does not dispute, that E.S. is incapa-
ble of exercising the judgment required of a custodial parent.

In addition, each witness expressed the opinion that long-term foster
care, with visitation rights in E.S., would not be an adequate alternative to
the termination of E.S.’s parental rights and the adoption of C.S. into a
stable and consistent family environment. The clinical psychologist and
the child psychiatrist specifically stated that E.S. could not reasonably be
expected to cooperate in a program of controlled visitation within the
context of long-term foster care, and that such an arrangement would be

216 es

unlikely to provide C.S. with the adult role models essential for her well-
being.

ES. presented no evidence at the termination hearing.

On May 17, 1979, the district court entered an order terminating the
parent-child relationship between E.S. and C.S. and placing C.S. with the
department for purposes of adoption. E.S. appeals from that order.

I

Because the department’s original petition alleging that C.S. was a
“dependent or neglected child” was filed prior to July 1, 1977, the termi-
nation of E.S.’s parental rights is governed by section 19-3-111(2)(a),
C.R.S. 1973. People in the Interest of H.A.C. v. D.C.C., 198 Colo. 260,
599 P.2d 881 (1979).

Il.

The standard for termination of parental rights established by
section 19-3-111(2)(a), C.R.S. 1973, is the “best interests and welfare of
the child.” This standard is met only when it is shown that: (1) there has
been a history of severe and continuous neglect by the parent whose rights
are sought to be terminated; (2) there is a substantial probability of fu-
ture deprivation; and (3) under no reasonable circumstances can the wel-
fare of the child be served by a continuation of the legal relationship of the
child with the parent. People in the Interest of M.M., 184 Colo. 298,
520 P.2d 128 (1974). The court must “explore and specifically eliminate”
alternatives to the termination of parental rights. Id.; People in the
Interest of H.A.C. v. D.C.C., supra.

HB Although the district court’s May 17, 1979, order is not phrased
in the precise language of appellate decisions construing section 19-3-
111(2)(a), People in the Interest of C.R., 38 Colo. App. 252, 557 P.2d
1225 (1976), it nonetheless includes the findings required by People in
the Interest of M.M., supra. On the basis of competent evidence in the
record, the district court found that, in 1973, C.S. had been determined to
be a “dependent or neglected child”; that E.S.’s neglect of his daughter
had continued since that time; that “‘[t]he emotional, physical, and mental
health of the child is such that unless a healthy home atmosphere can be
given to the child, it is likely the child will have further injury to her physi-
cal, mental, and emotional needs in the future”; and that “the conduct and
condition of the parent is unlikely to change within a reasonable period of
time.”

Further, it is apparent that the district court considered alternatives
less drastic than termination of E.S.’s parental rights. As noted supra in
this opinion, the testimony before the court dealt extensively with E.S.’s
proposal for the placement of C.S. in long-term foster care with visitation
rights in E.S. The People’s witnesses were unanimous in stating that the
proposal would not be in C.S.’s best interests. The district court’s order
terminating E.S.’s parental rights can only be read as an implicit

es 217

ratification of this uncontroverted testimony. In our view, no useful pur-
pose would be served by remanding this case for entry by the district court
of a specific finding to the effect that it had considered and rejected the
proposed alternative to the termination of the parent-child relationship.
Cf. People in the Interest of H.A.C. v. D.C.C., supra.
Il.

ES. argues that the standard set forth in section 19-3-
111(2)(a) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We disagree.

As construed by applicable decisions of this court, section 19-3-
111(2)(a) provides a standard which the average intelligent parent can un-
derstand and from which he can regulate his conduct. “Fundamental fair-
ness does not require a statute to enumerate in all-encompassing examples,
or exactly described acts, precisely how poorly a parent can treat a child
before risking loss of parental rights.” People in the Interest of D.A.K.,
198 Colo. 11, > 596 P.2d 747, 751 (1979), appeal dismissed, 444
US. 987, 100 S.Ct. 515, 62 L.Ed.2d 416 (1979). Cf. People in the
Interest of V.A.E.Y.H.D., 199 Colo. 148, 605 P.2d 916 (1980).

Iv.

The department, the court, and the social agencies in Pueblo have
been involved with C.S. and her family for the past eight years. The time
has come for this child to be given the opportunity to be adopted by a fam-
ily who can provide the love, security, care, and stable environment that
she needs.

In view of the uncontroverted evidence of E.S.’s history of alcoholism
and the resultant brain damage, we find it unnecessary to consider E.S.’s
challenge to the district court’s finding that “he has failed to comply with
or follow any of the recommendations of the Court or the Department of
Social Services to cure the illness of alcoholism.”

Judgment affirmed.

JUSTICE DUBOFSKY and JUSTICE QUINN dissent.

JUSTICE QUINN dissenting:

The trial court’s failure to specifically eliminate long-term foster care
as a less drastic alternative to termination compels me to respectfully dis-
sent. Even accepting the majority’s interpretation of the decree as an
implicit determination that this alternative was inappropriate, the rela-
tionship at stake here is too basic and fundamental to allow its termination
to rest on anything less substantial than an explicit determination of re-
cord that under no reasonable circumstances can the welfare of the child
be served by the less drastic alternative. The requirement of explicitness is
particularly appropriate in this case, since long-term foster care was the
competing alternative proposed to the trial court.

218 eS

The rights severed in this case are of the first order and find protec-
tion in both the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31
L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); Overturf v. District Court of 20th Judicial
District, 198 Colo. 516, 602 P.2d 850 (1979). Termination of parental
tights “severs permanently not only the rights . . . of the parent relative
to the child, but those of the child as well,” such as the right to support
and inheritance. People in the Interest of K.S. and M.S., 33 Colo. App.
72, 76, 515 P.2d 130, 132-33 (1973). Because of the awesome finality at-
taching to a decree of termination, we have wisely and consistently re-
quired that the trial court explore and specifically eliminate less drastic
alternatives. E.g., People in the Interest of H.A.C. v. D.C.C., 198
Colo. 260, 599 P.2d 881 (1979); People in the Interest of M.M., 184
Colo. 298, 520 P.2d 128 (1974); People in the Interest of K.S. and
M.S., supra. I would impose that requirement in this case and would re-
mand for specific findings in that regard.

I am authorized to say that JUSTICE DUBOFSKY joins me in the

dissent.

No. 80SA82

The People of the State of Colorado vy. Harry Hardie Haddock
(613 P.2d 335)

Decided July 7, 1980.

eS 219
es

Linda Donnelly, disciplinary prosecutor.

Harry Hardie Haddock, Pro se.

En Banc.

JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Mr. Haddock, you are hereby publicly censured for your unprofes-
sional conduct as attorney for the Estate of Mary Louella Farquhar. You
were the respondent in a complaint filed with the Grievance Committee
charging you with violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR
6-101(A)(3), and you were present and testified at the hearing before the
Grievance Committee. The following events led to this public censure.

HH In March 1966 Robert Collier, nephew of Mary Louella Farqu-
har, was appointed guardian of the Estate of Mary Louella Farquhar. On
February 15, 1972, Mary Louella Farquhar died intestate and Robert
Collier, who was then in the military service, retained you to handle legal
matters in connection with both the guardian and intestate estates of the
decedent, and you knowingly undertook the responsibility for these mat-
ters.

On November 12, 1973, Robert Collier signed a motion prepared by
you requesting that you be substituted as guardian of the Estate of Mary
Louella Farquhar. You petitioned the court for this substitution on July 5,
1974. On August 23, 1974, you filed in the Denver Probate Court a Peti-
tion for Letters of Administration and Determination of Heirship. You re-
quested that Vera Hillenkamp be designated as Administratrix. Vera Hil-
lenkamp was 84 years old and did not understand her responsibilities and
relied totally upon you for closing the estate. When you failed to close the
estate Mrs. Hillenkamp contacted you several times about the estate and
you failed to act on her requests.

Commencing in October 1975, Mrs. Gertrude Hubbard, an heir of ©
the decedent, wrote a series of letters to the Denver Probate Court re-
questing a status report on the estate, and complained that you had not
closed the estate and that you had not arranged for distribution of assets
to the heirs. You were advised of these complaints by the Clerk of the Pro-
bate Court and you failed to respond to Mrs. Hubbard. You were again
reminded by the Clerk about Mrs. Hubbard’s complaints in February

220 ee

1976. You wrote Mrs. Hubbard at this time and advised her that the es-
tate would soon be closed. However, you took no action to close the estate.

As a result of your inaction Mrs. Hubbard was required to obtain le-
gal counsel to facilitate the closing of the estate and the distribution of as-
sets. Upon demand of Mrs. Hubbard’s attorney for an accounting and for
distribution of assets, you responded that the estate would be closed within
thirty days. The estate was not closed and, although a distribution of some
assets was made in February 1978 to all heirs, shares of General Motors
stock were not distributed and no final accounting was made. You testified
before the Grievance Committee that your continued inaction in this mat-
ter was caused by the loss of a General Motors stock certificate for a con-
siderable period of time and that, after finding the stock certificate in the
fall of 1978, you then waited for the stock to increase in value.

The last pleading filed in the estate was in November 1977, when you
filed a claim for legal fees for your work on the estate. As of November
1979, when the matter was heard before the Grievance Committee, the
Estate of Mary Louella Farquhar had not yet been closed. It was the opin-
ion of an expert in probate matters that the estate should have been closed
within eighteen months. Nevertheless, over six years elapsed from your
undertaking of responsibility in connection with the guardian and intestate
estates of Mary Louella Farquhar until the hearing before the Grievance
Committee in November 1979.

The Grievance Committee concluded that you violated DR 6-
101(A)(3) and that you should be publicly censured. We agree with this
recommendation. In addition, the Grievance Committee found that you
were not completely candid and forthright in your explanation of the delay
in resolving these estate matters. We also agree with this finding.

DR 6-101(A)(3) of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that “[a] lawyer shall not . . . [nJeglect a legal matter entrusted to him.”
You have violated this provision by your neglect in handling the guardian
and intestate estates of Mary Louella Farquhar. You are accordingly pub-
licly censured for this neglect of your professional responsibility.

It is ordered that you pay the costs of this proceeding in the amount
of $1,091.03 to the Clerk of the Court within ninety days.

No. 80SA8

Rueben F. Gardner and Pauline M. Gardner, Donald C. Dorrell and
JoAnn Dorrell, Glenn E. McCormick and Beverly E. McCormick, Arthur
James Estes and Shelia Rhae Estes, George R. Broughton and Vernice
M. Broughton, Larry E. Loesch and Jackqueline L. Loesch, Okey D.
Squires and Arlia M. Squires, Verner D. Mead and Elma M. Mead, Olive
S. Johnson, Charles McAlary, William H. Haynes, and John Savage v.
State of Colorado, Lee R. Enewold, Division Engineer, Water Division
No.5

(614 P.2d 357)

Decided July 7, 1980.

a
cs)

223

Delaney & Balcomb, Kenneth Balcomb, for applicants-appellants.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Dennis M. Montgomery, Assistant
Attorney General, David Aschkinasi, Assistant, for appellees.

En Banc.

JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal raises the question whether the Water Right Determina-
tion and Administration Act of 1969 (Water Right Act), section 37-92-
101 et seg., C.R.S. 1973, permits the water judge, in connection with an
application for a determination of abandonment filed under section 37-92-
302(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973, to enter a decree that certain water rights of un-
known persons have been abandoned, when the only notice of the applica-
tion is its inclusion in the monthly resume published by the water clerk un-
der section 37-92-302(3)(b), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.). The water judge
determined that subsection (1)(a) of section 37-92-302, C.R.S. 1973, did
not include within the resume-notice procedures an application for a deter-
mination of abandonment, and he dismissed the application. We affirm.

On June 18, 1978, Rueben F. Gardner, Pauline M. Gardner and
eighteen others (Applicants) filed with the water clerk for Water Division
No. 5 an application for a determination that certain water rights of un-
known parties had been abandoned. The application alleged that no water
had been diverted or applied to beneficial use for at least 50 years, and
that the identity and location of the owners were unknown to the appli-
cants. The water clerk included the application in the resume for June
1978 and caused publication of the resume pursuant to the resume provi-
sions of section 37-92-302(3)(b), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.). No statement
of opposition to the application was filed. The water referee then made an
investigation of the application and ruled that the allegations were true
and the application should be granted. The water judge suspended the rul-
ing of the referee for the reason that an application for determination of
abandonment was not within the resume-notice procedures of section 37-
92-302, C.R.S. 1973. The water judge ordered the applicants to make ef-
forts to identify the original owners or their successors in interest, serve

224 es

them with process pursuant to C.R.C.P. 4, and make them party defend-
ants pursuant to C.R.C.P. 19. The applicants were directed to notify the
court whether they wished to proceed in accordance with the court’s order
by September 30, 1979. The applicants elected to stand on their original
application filed pursuant to section 39-92-302(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973, and
the water judge then reversed the ruling of the referee and dismissed the
application. The judgment of dismissal entered by the water judge consti-
tutes the basis of this appeal. The division engineer was named as appellee
pursuant to C.A.R. I(e).

Il Proceedings under the Water Right Act, section 37-92-101 et
seq., C.R.S. 1973, are special statutory proceedings within the contem-
plation of C.R.C.P. 81(a), Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
Rocky Mountain Power Co., 174 Colo. 309, 486 P.2d 438 (1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 996, 92 S.Ct. 1245, 31 L.Ed.2d 465 (1972), and along
with the provisions of C.R.C.P. 4 dealing with service by publication, serve
as a backdrop to the resolution of the issue raised by this appeal.

Section 37-92-302(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973, provides the statutory mecha-
nism for filing applications with respect to water rights:

“Any person who desires a determination of a water right or a conditional
water right and the amount and priority thereof, including a determina-
tion that a conditional water right has become a water right by reason of
the completion of the appropriation, a determination with respect to a
change of a water right, approval of a plan for augmentation, or quadren-
nial finding of reasonable diligence, shall file with the water clerk in quad-
tuplicate a verified application setting forth facts supporting the ruling
sought, a copy of which shall be sent by the water clerk to the state engi-
neer and the division engineer.”

Any person opposing the application may file a verified statement of oppo-
sition setting forth why the application should not be granted or why it
should be granted only in part or on condition. Section 37-92-302(1)(b),
C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).

I Proceedings commenced under section 37-92-302(1)(a), C.R.S.
1973, are not subject to the service of process requirements of C.R.C.P. 4,
but rather are handled through the unique resume-notice provisions of
sub-section (3) of section 37-92-302, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.). Under
these procedures the water clerk, not later than the fifteenth day of each
month, prepares a resume of all applications filed in the water division
during the preceding month. The resume must state the name and address
of the applicant, a description of the water right involved, and a descrip-
tion of the ruling sought. A copy of the resume is mailed to each person
who is likely to be affected by the application or who has requested a copy.
The clerk is further directed to publish the resume or portion thereof
“[njot later than the end of such month... in a newspaper or

es 225

newspapers as is necessary to obtain general circulation once in every
county affected, as determined by the water judge.” Section 37-92-
302(3)(b), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).

The water judge must refer all applications and statements of
opposition filed under section 37-92-302 to a water referee. Section 37-92-
203(7), C.R.S. 1973. After the resume is published the referee conducts
an investigation to determine whether the statements in the application
are true, and then rules on the application:"

“Jn accordance with procedures specified in this article, the referee in
each division shall in the first instance have the authority and duty to rule
upon determinations of water rights and conditional water rights and the
amount and priority thereof, including a determination that a conditional
water right has become a water right by reason of completion of the ap-
propriation, determinations with respect to changes of water rights, plans
for augmentation, approvals of reasonable diligence in the development of
appropriations under conditional water rights, and determinations of
abandonment of water rights or conditional water rights; and he may in-
clude in any ruling for a determination of water right or conditional water
right any use or combination of uses, any diversion or combination of
points or methods of diversion, and any place or alternate places of storage
and may approve any change of water right as defined in this article.”
Section 37-92-301(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).

The water judge may reverse any ruling by the referee which is contrary
to law. Section 37-92-304(5), C.R.S. 1973.

In contrast to these resume-notice procedures, C.R.C.P. 4 sets forth

procedures for accomplishing service upon persons in actions affecting spe-
cific property or in any proceeding in rem. C.R.C.P. 4(g)(1) authorizes
service by mail upon a person whose identity and address are known:
“Tf the person to be served is without the state of Colorado, the party de-
siring service by mail shall file a motion verified by the oath of such party
or of someone in his behalf for an order for service by mail. Such motion
shall state the facts showing why such method of service is advisable, and
the address of the person to be served. The court may, after hearing the
motion ex parte, direct the clerk to send by registered or certified mail a
copy of the process and a copy of the complaint, addressed to such person
at such address, requesting a return receipt signed by addressee only. Such
service shall be complete on the date of the filing of the clerk’s proof
thereof, together with such return receipt attached thereto signed by such
addressee.”

1 Instead of ruling on the application, the referee may again refer the matter to the water judge.
Section 37-92-303(2), CRS. 1973.

226 ee

C.R.C.P. 4(h) provides for service by publication upon a person whose
identity or address is unknown:

“The party desiring service of process by publication shall file a motion
verified by the oath of such party or of someone in his behalf for an order
of publication. It shall state the facts authorizing such service, and shall
show the efforts, if any, that have been made to obtain personal service
within this state and shall give the address, or last known address, of each
person to be served or shall state that his address and last known address
are unknown. The court shall hear the motion ex parte and, if satisfied
that due diligence has been used to obtain personal service within this
state or that efforts to obtain the same would have been to no avail, shall
order publication of the process in a newspaper published in the county in
which the action is pending. Such publication shall be made for four
weeks. Within fifteen days after the order the clerk shall mail a copy of
the process to each person whose address or last known address has been
stated in the motion. Service shall be complete on the day of the last publi-
cation. If no newspaper is published in the county, the court shall desig-
nate one in some adjoining county.”

I The applicants argue that, contrary to the order of the water
court in this case, the Water Right Act, section 37-92-101 et seg., C.R.S.
1973, does permit the water judge to make a determination of abandon-
ment under section 37-92-302(1)(a), when the application has been filed
in accordance with the resume-notice procedures outlined in subsection (3)
of section 37-92-302. We do,not agree. Under the Water Right Act, the
types of applications the water judge may determine under the resume-
notice procedure of section 37-92-302(3) are those applications expressly
authorized to be filed under section 37-92-302(1)(a). The policies underly-
ing the Water Right Act and the plain language of section 37-92-
302(1)(a) dictate this result.

HM A water right is a legal right to use water; often, it is charac-
terized as a property right. E.g., Colo. Const., Art. XVI, Sec. 6; Green v.
Chaffee Ditch Co., 150 Colo. 91, 371 P.2d 775 (1962); Sherwood
Irrigation Co. v. Vandewark, 138 Colo. 261, 331 P.2d 810 (1958); Fort
Lyon Canal Co. v. Rocky Ford Canal, Reservoir, Land, Loan & Trust
Co., 79 Colo. 511, 246 P. 781 (1926); Nichols v. McIntosh, 19 Colo. 22,
34 P. 278 (1893); Fuller v. Swan River Placer Mining Co., 12 Colo. 12,
19 P. 836 (1888). A decree of abandonment terminates the water right
and divests the owner of any interest in it, thereby rendering the water
once again subject to appropriation by the public under Article XVI, Sec-
tion 5, of the Colorado Constitution. Section 37-92-102(2), C.R.S. 1973;
e.g., Knapp v. Colorado River Water Conservation District, 131 Colo.
42, 279 P.2d 420 (1955).

es 227

One of the avowed purposes of the Water Right Act is to af-
ford some practicable degree of protection to water rights and uses vested
prior to the effective date of the act, June 7, 1969. Section 37-92-
102(2)(a), C.R.S. 1973. In view of the finality attaching to a decree of
abandonment and the aforementioned legislative policy, the decision of the
General Assembly not to include applications for determination of aban-
donment filed under section 37-92-302(1)(a) from the resume-notice pro-
visions of section 37-92-302(3) is the exercise of a reasonable legislative
option.

Hl Water right records are kept in the name of the diversion or stor-
age structure, rather than by owner name, and water right transfers are
not recorded. Harrison and Sandstrom, The Groundwater-Surface
Water Conflict and Recent Colorado Water Legislation, 43 Colo. L.
Rev. 1, 27, n. 95 (1971). An application for determination of abandon-
ment filed under section 37-92-302(1)(a) in most instances would describe
the water right by diversion or storage structure, and it is that description
which would be included in the monthly resume published in the news-
paper. Particularly where the applicant takes under the same source as the
putative abandoned interest, or where the applicant’s position in relation
to unknown owners or their successors in interest is such that the appli-
cant’s water right will be enhanced by the decree, it is reasonable to re-
quire that the applicant utilize notice procedures more likely to apprise the
water right owners or their successors in interest of the pending action
than the resume-notice provisions of section 37-92-302(3). We believe this
construction of section 37-92-302(1)(a), as excluding applications for de-
termination of abandonment from the resume-notice provision of section
37-92-302(3), is consistent with the presumption that the legislature in-
tended a just and reasonable result. Section 2-4-201(1)(c), C.R.S. 1973.

HH The legislative intent not to include applications for determina-
tion of abandonment from the notice-resume provisions of section 37-92-
302(3) is also apparent from the statutory language employed in section
37-92-302(1)(a). Section 37-92-302(1)(a) expressly authorizes the filing
of the following: (1) an application for a determination of a water right or
conditional water right, including the amount and priority thereof; (2) an
application for a determination with respect to a change of a water right;
(3) an application for approval of a plan for augmentation; and (4) an
application for a quadrennial finding of reasonable diligence. Each type of
application authorized by this section is either expressly defined or de-
scribed by some other section of the Water Right Act. For example, condi-
tional water rights and water rights are defined in sections 37-92-103(6)
and (12). Section 37-92-103(5) defines a change of water right. Section
37-92-103(9) (1979 Supp.) defines a plan for augmentation. And the re-
quirement of a quadrennial showing of reasonable diligence is delineated
in section 37-92-601. Considering the overall statutory framework of the

228 |

Water Right Act, we believe that the exclusion of applications for deter-
mination of abandonment from the notice-resume procedure of section 37-
92-302(3) was a purposeful legislative decision.?

Ill.

The applicants point out that section 37-92-301(2), C.R.S. 1973
(1979 Supp.), expressly authorizes the water referee to make a determina-
tion of abandonment “[i]n accordance with procedures specified in this ar-
ticle,” and argue therefrom that the Water Right Act contemplates the fil-
ing of applications for determination of abandonment under subsection
(1)(a) of section 37-92-302. We do not agree with this argument.

The authority of a water judge to determine applications
filed under section 37-92-302(1)(a) is readily determinable from the statu-
tory language in that section. Additionally, the authority of the water ref-
eree is derivative from, and not greater than, that of the water judge, sec-
tion 37-92-203(5), C.R.S. 1973. All decisions of the water referee are
subject to review by the water judge. Section 37-92-304(5), C.R.S. 1973.
The statutory delegation of authority to water referees to make determina-
tions of abandonment is merely a recognition that statements of opposition
to an application may be based on the theory of abandonment as an af-
firmative defense to the application. See CF&I Steel Corporation v.
Purgatoire River Water Conservancy District, 183 Colo. 135, 515 P.2d
456 (1973).

Applicants also contend that the provisions of section 37-92-
302(3)(a), C.R.S. 1973, which direct the water clerk to include in the re-
sume all applications filed under subsection 37-92-302(1)(a), thereby ex-
pand the types of applications that may be filed under the resume-notice
procedures. We reject this contention of the applicants. Section 37-92-
302(3)(a) gives ministerial direction to the water clerk with respect to ap-
plications filed under subsection (1)(a) of 37-92-302. To adopt the statu-
tory interpretation proposed by the applicants would negate the clear and
direct language of section 37-92-302(1)(a).

Iv.

HEE (Our construction of the Water Right Act as excluding appli-
cations for determination of abandonment under section 37-92-302(1)(a)

2 In other sections of the Water Right Act, the legislature defined abandonment both as to condi-
tional water rights and water rights. Section 37-92-103(1) and (2), C.R.S. 1973. Also, the legisla-
ture made express provisions for abandonment determinations by the state engineer pursuant to the
tabulation procedure of section 37-92-402, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.). The state engineer is respon-
sible for the administration and distribution of the waters of the state, section 37-92-301(1), CRS.
1973, and has neither a direct nor a proprietary interest in the determination that a particular
water right has been abandoned. His interest is a marked contrast from the interest of a water
right owner who files an application for a determination of abandonment with respect to the water
rights of others taking under the same source. In the latter case the applicant obviously has a di-
rect interest in the outcome, since his own water right will be enhanced by the determination of
abandonment.

229

does not mean that the water judge is without authority to make determi-
nations and enter decrees of abandonment. To the contrary, abandonment
of a water right is a water matter within the jurisdiction of the water
court. See section 37-92-203(1), C.R.S. 1973; Perdue v. Fort Lyon
Canal, 184 Colo. 219, 519 P.2d 954 (1974). When an application for a
determination of abandonment is filed, the water judge, as here, may re-
quire the applicant to make reasonable efforts to determine the identity
and location of the owner or the successor in interest, and, if those efforts
are successful, to proceed under the pertinent provisions of C.R.C.P. 4 and
19. See Elk-Rifle Water Co. v. Templeton, 173 Colo. 438, 484 P.2d
1211 (1971); Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., supra. If the efforts to deter-
mine the identity and location of the owner or the successor in interest are
unsuccessful, then the applicant may still proceed under the service by
publication provision of C.R.C.P. 4(h).° See Hoff v. Armbruster, 125
Colo. 324, 244 P.2d 1069 (1952).

The judgment is affirmed.

JUSTICE LOHR does not participate.

a
No. 79SC18

Peyton F. Perry v. Bruce B. Brundage
(614 P.2d 362)

Decided July 14, 1980. Opinion modified and as modified rehearing denied -August
18, 1980.

3 The applicant, of course, can always proceed under the tabulation procedures for determination

of abandonment by the Jivision engineer. These procedures are set out in section 37-92-402, C.R.S.
1973 (1979 Supp.).

a
nN

eS 231
eS

Gorsuch, Kirgis, Campbell, Walker and Grover, Charles E. Rhyne;
Bosworth & Slivka, Arthur H. Bosworth II, for petitioner.

Holland & Hart, R. Brooke Jackson, Richard G. Caldwell, for
respondent.

En Banc.

CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review the opinion of the court of appeals in
Brundage v. Perry, 41 Colo. App. 526, 592 P.2d 6 (1978). The trial court
voided a real estate contract on the ground that it constituted an unreason-
able restraint on alienation. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s
tuling and also held that the contract did not violate the rule against per-
petuities. We agree that the trial court erred in voiding the contract but
reach this result on the basis of rationales which we believe are more ap-
propriate in resolving the issues of this case.

I.

In 1968 respondent Brundage purchased a tract of land in Arapahoe
County and formed the Sierra Vista Subdivision, which was designed for
single family residences. Brundage received financial support from three
others who thereupon joined with Brundage in executing a nominee agree-
ment whereby each of the four would own one of the lots for his personal
use. According to the agreement, Brundage became the nominee-fiduciary
for three of the subdivision lots to be held for the three investors. Brund-
age’s duties were to contribute financially, to complete the purchase of the
tract, and to sell the lots. .

According to the nominee agreement, Brundage was to be the nomi-
nal owner of record of the tract, but was to make the three other investors
the owners of record of their three lots as soon as practicable. More impor-
tantly, the agreement provided that if any of the four individuals wished to
sell his lot to a non-investor before the termination of the nominee agree-
ment, the other investors would have the right of first refusal exercisable

232 P|

in a designated order of priority. Brundage had the highest priority.

In 1970, before the termination of the nominee agreement, Mr.
Hurth, one of the three investors, desired to sell his lot to the petitioner,
Mr. Perry. The two agreed on a selling price of $16,500, but first the sale
of the lot had to be offered to Brundage and the other investors.

Through negotiations, Brundage entered into two separate agree-
ments whereby he would retain the right to purchase the lot at a later
date. He first entered into an agreement with the other investors that they
would irrevocably waive their right of first refusal to buy the lot. The sec-
ond, and more complicated, was an agreement between Perry, Brundage
and Hurth, which has given rise to the present dispute. The Hurth lot was
then transferred to Perry.

The agreement stated that in consideration for the present waiver of
Brundage’s right of first refusal, Perry could purchase the lot for the pur-
pose of constructing a residence, but that if Perry failed to build a resi-
dence on the lot, Brundage could repurchase it at a later date for the same
price of $16,500 which Perry would pay to Hurth for the lot. The relevant
portions of that agreement provide:

2. Perry agrees that Brundage, his heirs, personal representatives and as-
signs shall have a right to repurchase the premises under the following cir-
cumstances:

(a) If, at the expiration of six years from the date of the warranty deed
from Brundage to Perry, a residence has not been constructed on the prop-
erty and a certificate of occupancy has not yet been issued to Perry by the
appropriate governmental authority, or

(b) If Perry desires to sell the premises before a residence has been con-
structed thereon and [before] such certificate of occupancy has been is-
sued by the appropriate governmental authority (in which event, Perry
must first give Brundage a written notice of the same).

In either case the purchase price shall be equal to the total cost to Perry of
the premises. The written notice to Brundage shall be sent to him at 6830
South Logan Street, Littleton, Colorado, or at such other address as
Brundage may from time to time give to Perry. Brundage shall have the
period of 21 days following the expiration of such six-year period or re-
ceipt of such notice, as the case may be, in which to elect to repurchase the
premises on the above described terms. If Brundage elects to so repur-
chase, Brundage must give written notice of such election to Perry at 10
Emerson Street, Denver, Colorado, or such other address as Perry may
from time to time give to Brundage. If Brundage elects not to repurchase
or does not tender his notice of intention to repurchase to Perry within
such 21-day period, then Perry may for a period of six months following
the end of such 21-day period, sell the premises to any party of his choos-
ing. In the case of a proposed sale under circumstances covered by
paragraph 2(b) above, if no sale occurs within such six-month period,

eS 233

notice in the above manner must again be given to Brundage prior to any
sale of the property. It is understood that, upon completion and occupancy
by Perry of a permanent residence upon the premises, this agreement with
respect to repurchase of the premises shall no longer be in force and effect.
3. A sale of the premises by Perry other than in accordance with the re-
purchase provisions of this agreement shall be void and of no effect and
the purported purchaser thereunder shall take no interest in the premises.

When six years had passed and Perry had not built or obtained a cer-
tificate of occupancy for a residence on the lot, Brundage attempted to ex-
ercise his right to purchase the lot under clause 2(a) for the sum of}
$16,500. By this time, the lot had greatly appreciated in market value?
to the sum of $55,000,' and Perry refused to sell the lot to Brundage.

Brundage filed suit in the trial court seeking specific performance of
the agreement. At trial to the court, Perry advanced several theories in de-
fense of his refusal to sell: (1) The agreement was void for a lack of con-
sideration; (2) The agreement constituted an unreasonable restraint on al-
ienation; and (3) The agreement violated the rule against perpetuities.
The trial court found in favor of Perry on his second theory of defense,
thereby finding it unnecessary for it to rule on the remaining theories.

The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the agree-
ment which Brundage was seeking to enforce did not constitute an unrea-
sonable restraint on alienation. In addition, the court of appeals found that
clause 2(a), the option to purchase, operated for only six years and twenty-
one days, thereby not violating the rule against perpetuities.

Il.

The question before this court is the validity of the restrictions placed
upon the transfer of the property from Hurth to Perry by the three-way
agreement between Hurth, Brundage and Perry. The validity of that
agreement is subject to two well-known doctrines of property law: (1) the
rule against perpetuities, and (2) the rule against unreasonable restraints
on alienation.

The nature of the restrictions placed upon the transfer of the property
in fee to Perry involved two separate and distinct interests. The first, cre-
ated by clause 2(a) and the subsequent explanatory language, was a pur-
chase option conditioned on Perry’s failure to construct and obtain a certi-
ficate of occupancy for a residence on the property. The second, created
by. clause 2(b) and the related provisions was a preemptive right to pur-
chase which was triggered by Perry’s desire to sell the property to a third
person.

The option right became exercisable only at the end of six years and
then only for a period of twenty-one days. The preemptive right, on the

* By the time of trial, the property was valued at $75,000.

234 |

other hand, was much more extensive. This interest required Perry to first
offer the property to Brundage at the fixed price of $16,500 before he
could sell the property to a third person. If Brundage chose not to exercise
this right, Perry would have to reoffer the property to Brundage each time
he wished to sell unless he could consummate a sale within six months of
Brundage’s decision not to exercise his right.

Til.

HH The rule against perpetuities, as stated in its most basic form,
provides:

“No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one
years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.”

Smith v. United States National Bank of Denver, 120 Colo. 167, 207
P.2d 1194 (1949), quoting Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities. This rule
applies to both options and preemptive rights, whether in the grantor or
third persons. Atchison v. City of Englewood 170 Colo. 295, 463 P.2d
297 (1969). See also IV Restatement of the Law of Property §§ 393,
394 & 413 at 2444,

Here, the purchase agreement reserved alternative rights in
Brundage. The option right clearly does not violate the rule because it
must be exercised, if at all, within six years and twenty-one days from the
date of its creation. Thus, the court of appeals was correct in finding that
clause 2(a) did not violate the rule.

HB However, the inquiry does not end with the application of the
tule only to clause 2(a), for there is also a second purchase right under
clause 2(b). Even though Brundage exercised his option right under clause
2(a) and not his preemptive right under 2(b), consideration must be given
to the perpetuities question as it relates to clause 2(b). Although a future
interest which is void under the rule does not necessarily affect the re-
mainder of the interests created by the transfer, in certain circumstances,
any part of or the entire transfer as provided for may also be declared void
under the doctrine of “infectious invalidity.” See IV Restatement of the
Law of Property §§ 402 and 403; VI American Law of Property §§
24.47-24.52.

Here, the preemptive right under clause 2(b) violates the rule
against perpetuities. Atchison, supra. It creates an interest which will ter-
minate only upon the occurrence of one of two events which may never
take place: the construction and occupation of a house on the property by
Perry, or his ability to consummate a transfer of the property to a third
person within six months after Brundage has decided not to exercise his
preemptive right. Contrary to Brundage’s argument in this court, this
preemptive right does not terminate on the death of Perry because clause 7
of the agreement provides: “The rights and obligations of the parties
hereto shall inure to their heirs, personal representatives, successors and
assigns.” Thus, the interest may vest after the lives in being plus twenty-

eS 235

one years.

We come then to the application of the “infectious invalidity”
doctrine to the present case. Where a transfer is restricted by independent
and alternative interests, and one interest is void as against the rule, the
other is not likewise void as long as that interest is itself valid. See VI
American Law of Property § 24.49. Here, there were two alternative in-
terests which acted independently of one another. We hold that the inval-
idity of the preemptive right did not infect the validity of the option right
provided in 2(a) under which Brundage brought this action. Cf. First &
C Corp. v. Wencke, 253 Cal. App.2d 719, 61 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1967) (In-
validity of a year-to-year lease provision reserved in the vendor did not in-
fect the validity of the tenancy at will provision also reserved in the ven-
dor.).

Iv.

HE “The common law doctrine of restraints on alienation is part of
the common law in Colorado” and prohibits “unreasonable restraints.”
Malouff v. Midland Federal Savings and Loan Assn., 181 Colo. 294,
509 P.2d 1240 (1973); see section 2-4-211, C.R.S. 1973. This doctrine in-
volves the determination of the validity of a future restraint on property
transfer when weighed against the public policy that property should be
freeley alienable. The test for the validity of a restraint was adopted by
this court in Malouff, supra:

“We subscribe to the view that the question of the invalidity of a restraint
depends upon its reasonableness in view of the justifiable interests of the
parties.”

In applying this test, we must look at the totality of the circumstances tak-
ing into account the respective interests of the parties and the duration
and nature of the restraint used to enforce those interests.

HH The option agreement under 2(a) on its face is not a classic re-
straint on alienation. Classic restraints generally place a limitation upon
the owner’s right to sell the property to a third person. Here, the option
right under 2(a) is not triggered by Perry’s desire to sell the property.
Nevertheless, it is a restraint on alienation because it creates a limitation
on Perry’s right to freely alienate the property during the period of the op-
tion. See VI American Law of Property § 26.66 at 509.

There can be little question that Brundage had a justifiable interest in
seeing that the property was developed for residential purposes; he was the
primary force in the development of the subdivision and was a resident
thereof. He had already attempted to protect his and the other investors’
interests by including a right of first refusal clause in the original nominee
agreement. As the court of appeals correctly noted, Brundage surrendered
this right in exchange for the three-way agreement which included both

236 es

the option and preemptive rights with Perry.”

In order to protect his interest, Brundage was able to prevent Perry
from purchasing the property for land speculation purposes by entering
into this agreement. Yet, it still provided Perry with the ability to con-
struct a house, thereby terminating any right to purchase in Brundage.
Under clause 2(a), the restraint took the form of a forfeiture restraint?
which terminated at the end of six years and twenty-one days. Perry, of
course, agreed to this restraint so that Brundage would not exercise his
right of first refusal on the sale from Hurth to Perry. When these justifia-
ble interests and the limited duration and form of restraint are weighed
against any possible adverse effect upon public policy, we find such re-
straint to be reasonable and enforceable.

The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.

No. 79SA22

The People of the State of Colorado y. Ronald David Lyle
(613 P.2d 896)

Decided July 14, 1980.

2 However, the court of appeals incorrectly viewed this as the consideration for the restrictive
rights reserved in Brundage. Although the agreement was separate from the deed which transferred
the property and contained the signature of Brundage, it was merely an agreement between Hurth
and Perry defining the restrictions on the transfer of the property. Thus, the consideration for
Perry’s $16,500 was the property with the restrictions enforceable by Brundage. See Easterly v.
Hall, 182 S.E.2d 671 (S.C. 1971).

3 See IV Restatement of the Law of Property §§ 404(1)(c) and (4).

5
oO
a

Nolan L. Brown, District Attorney, Dan B. Fahrney, Chief Deputy,
Janis E. Chapman, Deputy, for plaintiff-appellant.

Gerash & Robinson, P.C., Walter I. Gerash, Scott H. Robinson, for
defendant-appellee.

En Banc.

CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES delivered the opinion of the Court.

The People bring this appeal pursuant to section 16-12-102, C.R.S.
1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8). The defendant was acquitted of the
charges brought against him, and the People seek review and disapproval
of numerous trial court rulings which they allege involved important ques-
tions of law. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

1

Hl The People first argue that the trial court erroneously granted
the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of first-
degree murder, thereby submitting the case to the jury only on the lesser
offense of second-degree murder. An advisory opinion is sought on this
court’s interpretation of section 18-3-102(1)(d), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.
Vol. 8) (homicide “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
to the value of human life’) as it relates to the evidence presented. We de-
cline to do so. The granting of a motion for judgment of acquittal is based

- upon the facts of each individual case. This court’s opinion would there-
fore serve little purpose and would have no significant precedential value.
People v. Martinez, 198 Colo. 577, 603 P.2d 944 (1979); People v.
Berry, 198 Colo. 258, 598 P.2d 1044 (1979); People v. Chmielewski,
187 Colo. 268, 529 P.2d 1337 (1975); People v. Kirkland, 174 Colo. 362,
483 P.2d 1349 (1971).

es 239

II.

[J The People next challenge the appropriateness of the admission
into evidence of certain prior violent acts by the deceased, Vernon “Rip”
Clark. We have recently reiterated the test for the admissibility of such
evidence:

“A defendant is entitled to present evidence of a prior violent act of a vic-
tim only if (1) the defendant contends that he acted in self-defense and
there is competent evidence to support the contention, (2) either the act
occurred or defendant became aware of its occurrence within a reasonable
time of the homicide, and (3) the defendant knew of the victim’s prior vio-
lence at the time of the homicide.” ;

People v, Ferrell, 200°Colo..128, 613 P.2d 324 (1980). the purpose;
of this test is to establish the relevancy of such evidence. Without a nexus
between the deceased’s prior violent acts and the actions of the defendant,
the occurrence of these prior violent acts would be of no consequence in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. See C.R.E.
401.

The People’s contention is two-fold. First, it is asserted that the
defendant failed to lay a proper foundation for the relevancy of such evi-
dence prior to its actual introduction at trial. It is the People’s position
that there must be competent evidence to satisfy the Ferrell test as a con-
dition precedent to the presentation of the prior violence evidence. We dis-
agree. The federal courts have long recognized, and this court has recently
codified, the admissibility of evidence conditioned on fact. F.R.E. 104(b)
and C.R.E. 104(b) allow the trial court to admit evidence, the relevancy of
which is conditioned upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, either
upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence to establish that fact.

The policy behind these rules is to allow some flexibility in the order
of proof in order to avoid undue delay and confusion. The efficient admin-
istration of justice is well served by this policy. The rigid rule which the
People would have this court adopt would unnecessarily lead to the calling
of witnesses out of order, the retention of witnesses subject to recall, and
restrictions upon the strategic presentation of the evidence by the respec- -
tive parties.

In order to comply with the requirements of C.R.E. 104(b), the
defendant must, at a minimum, make an offer of proof that there will be
“the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fuifill-
ment of the condition.” Here, defense counsel did make a proper offer of
proof that the condition would be met, and the trial court was correct in
relying upon defense counsel’s assurance that foundation evidence would
be presented as a basis for the admission of the prior violent act evidence.
A court must act under the presumption that defense counsel, as an officer
of the court, has made an offer of proof which will later be supported by
the evidence.

240 es

This brings us to the People’s second contention regarding the admis-
sibility of the prior violence evidence. At the close of all the evidence, the
district attorney moved for a mistrial based upon the failure of the defend-
ant to introduce evidence that he knew of the prior violent acts at the time
of the homicide and that he acted in self-defense.1 If there was no evi-
dence to satisfy the Ferrell test, it would have been proper for the trial
court to declare a mistrial or impose any other appropriate sanction.

However, the Ferrell test does not have to be met by evidence
introduced solely by the defendant. It may be met through direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence presented by either the prosecution or defense and
need only establish a basis upon which the jury can infer that each of these
three elements have been met. Here, the prosecution conceded at trial that
the violent acts occurred within a reasonable time prior to the homicide.
Therefore, the only remaining issues were whether the defendant acted in
self-defense and whether he acted with an awareness of these prior violent
acts. A review of the record reveals that there was direct evidence, through
the defendant’s own testimony, that he acted in self-defense. Also, there
was sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to infer that the defend-
ant was aware of these prior violent acts at the time of the homicide. The
trial court properly denied the motion for mistrial.

iI.

Il The third issue raised by the People relates to the trial court’s re-
fusal to permit the testimony of two rebuttal witnesses for the prosecution.
It is conceded that these witnesses were never endorsed by the People as
required by Crim. P. 16, Part II(c),? even though the defendant fully
complied with the discovery requirements of the rule. Thus, the only ques-
tion left to be resolved is whether the sanction imposed by the trial court
— exclusion of the witnesses — was appropriate under the facts and cir-
cumstances of this case. Since this matter is one within the sound discre-
tion of the trial court, we do not clarify this as an appropriate question of
law under section 16-12-102, which restricts appeals to those matters of
great legal importance and subject to repetition.

Iv.

The fourth and final argument by the People can best be de-
scribed as a challenge to a hodgepodge of various and sundry rulings by
the trial court, which allegedly impeded the prosecution’s ability to prove
its case. This challenge is not appropriate under section 16-12-102.

* On appeal, the People have expanded upon the basis for the mistrial. However, they, like all
other appellants, are bound by the grounds for the motion in the trial court.

2 It provides in pertinent part:

Upon receipt of the information required by this subsection (c), the prosecuting attorney shall no-
tify defense counsel of any additional witnesses which he intends to call to rebut such defense
within a reasonable time before trial after their identity becomes known.

241

Judgment affirmed.

No. 80SA142

The People of the State of Colorado y. Anthony W. Lanza
(613 P.2d 337)

Decided July 14, 1980.

Linda Donnelly, Disciplinary Prosecutor, for complainant.

‘No appearance for attorney-respondent.

En Banc.
JUSTICE LEE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Two formal complaints were filed by the Attorney General of the

State of Colorado, charging the respondent, Anthony W. Lanza, with un-
professional conduct in violation of the Code of Professional

242 |

Responsibility.

Respondent failed to answer the charges against him and, although
he was served with notice of the formal hearing, he failed to appear, either
in person or by attorney, to defend the accusations against him.

The hearing was held on December 10, 1979, and three witnesses tes-
tified in support of the allegations of the two complaints. Twelve docu-
mentary exhibits were admitted into evidence. After consideration, the
hearing panel made the following findings of fact and conclusions.

Respondent was licensed to practice law in the state of Colorado on
October 3, 1969. Prior to these proceedings he had been suspended from
the practice of law for failure to pay the annual registration fee.

The first formal complaint involved respondent’s representation
of a widow in her early seventies. She was obviously indigent and some-
what enfeebled. Her grasp of the English language was poor. She had suc-
ceeded to an interest in real property, as the sole heir at law of her de-
ceased brother, and she desired to convey her property to herself and a son
in joint tenancy, in order to avoid the necessity of an estate proceeding on
her death.

Some time in 1976, the respondent undertook this service and re-
ceived from his client the original deeds to the property involved. The re-
spondent neglected to perform the services undertaken by him, although
the client inquired numerous times at respondent’s office concerning the
preparation of the joint tenancy deeds.

Unable to obtain help from the respondent, the client sought assist-
ance from the Colorado Rural Legal Services in Durango. Two letters
were directed to respondent on April 29 and June 20, 1977, asking for the
return of the client’s original deeds. Both letters went unanswered. Up to
the time of the hearing, the respondent had not returned the original
deeds, nor did he ever prepare the joint tenancy deeds requested.

The hearing panel found that respondent’s failure to perform the rou-
tine services undertaken by him became a somewhat more aggravated
breach of responsibility to his client by reason of the following factors: his
client was old and indigent; she was concerned about the prospect of an
early death; she was hospitalized and nearly died; the time necessary to
complete the work would have been minimal; a real urgency existed to
complete the services undertaken; and, finally, the client was compelled to
seek assistance of the Colorado Rural Legal Services.

The hearing panel concluded that the respondent was grossly and
inexcusably derelict in the performance of his duty to his client.

The second formal complaint involved a dissolution of marriage pro-
ceeding. Respondent’s client paid him a total of $1,700 for services to be
rendered in this proceeding, which involved a contest over the custody of a
child.

Ss 243

A court hearing on a motion for temporary custody had to be resche-
duled because respondent failed to advise his client of the hearing date.
Throughout the handling of the dissolution case, the client was unable to
contact the respondent, who had moved his office on three occasions with-
out informing the client of his new locations. Respondent refused to return
telephone calls and failed to keep the client informed of the progress of the
case. The client testified that respondent had not performed the investiga-
tion work in connection with the custodial problem and had not discharged
adequately the responsibility undertaken by him.

The hearing panel concluded that respondent’s conduct in the han-
dling of the dissolution case demonstrated a general inattention and lack
of concern for his client’s welfare.

Further, the hearing panel also found that the respondent’s failure to
respond to the charges against him, to file any kind of pleading or re-
sponse in this grievance proceeding, and to appear at the hearing after ac-
tual notice thereof, all indicate that respondent is totally unconcerned
about his professional responsibility and that, in effect, he has abandoned
his profession.

The hearing panel concluded that respondent’s conduct was violative
of C.R.C.P. 241(B)(1), (2), and (5), and that it specifically violated DR
1-102(A)(6), DR 2-110(A)(2), DR 6-101(A)(2) and (3), and DR 9-
102(B)(4) of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Because of the foregoing violations and the respondent’s complete in-
difference to these grievance proceedings, the hearing panel recommended
that respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, and
that he not be permitted to apply for reinstatement for a period of one
year. :

The grievance committee approved the findings of the fact and con-
clusions of the hearing panel. In our view, the record supports the findings
and conclusions by undisputed, clear, and convincing evidence, and we
agree with the disciplinary recommendation of the committee.

It is not necessary to comment beyond the recitation of the facts con-
cerning respondent’s demonstrated professional irresponsibility other than
to observe that respondent’s derelictions tend to foster public contempt for
and bring dishonor upon the legal profession.

It is the order and judgment of the court that the respondent, An-
thony W. Lanza, be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law and
that he shall not be permitted to apply for reinstatement for a period of at
least one year, and then only upon a demonstration to the grievance com-
mittee that he has rehabilitated himself and has been found worthy to
reenter into the practice of law.

It is further ordered that the costs of this proceeding in the sum of
$877.10 shall be paid to the Clerk of this court within ninety days from
the date hereof.

244 es
SO ORDERED this 14th day of July 1980.

No. 28462

People of the State of Colorado,
In the Interest of D.L.E., a Child and Concerning J.E.

(614 P.2d 873)

Decided July 14, 1980. Rehearing denied August 5, 1980.

eS 24s

Reams and Kaye, Bruce J. Kaye, for petitioner-appellee.

Jerry W. Uhrlaub, William M. Kane, for appellant.

En Banc.

JUSTICE ERICKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

Acting in its capacity as a juvenile court, the district court adjudi-
cated D.L.E., who was twelve years old, a “dependent child” under section
19-1-103(20)(d)-(e), C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8). The court
held a dispositional hearing the same day, and awarded the Mesa County
Department of Social Services legal custody of D.L.E. with directions to
arrange for medical treatment. D.L.E. appeals and we reverse.

As a result of brain damage occurring at the time of his birth, D.L.E.
has experienced a series of grand mal epileptic seizures. On religious
grounds tied to her membership in the General Assembly and Church of
the Living Born, D.L.E.’s adoptive mother, J.E., has refused to comply
with a program for medical treatment for D.L.E. A religious tenet of that
sect is that if a member of that faith becomes ill, he should seek out
church elders, who will pray over the sick person, anoint him with oil, and
ask that God intercede.t A church member who seeks aid from a doctor
demonstrates a lack of faith in the teachings of the church. Neither D.L.E.
nor his mother believes that medical treatment is warranted in this case.
They assert their right to religious freedom as a defense to the state’s de-
pendency petition, which alleged a failure to provide proper medical care.
U.S. Const. amend. I; Colo. Const. art. II, sec. 4.

The juvenile court adjudicated D.L.E. a dependent child under sec-
tion 19-1-103(20), C.R.S. 1973, which provides:

“Neglected or dependent child’ or ‘dependent or neglected child’ means a
* child:

“(d) Whose parent, guardian, or legal custodian fails or refuses to pro-
vide proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or any other
care necessary for his health, guidance, or well-being;

1 Church members base their belief on the Fifth Chapter, Fourteenth Verse of James: “Any sick
among you let him call for the elders of the church, and let them pray over him annointing with
oil in the name of the Lord and the prayer of faith shall save the sick, and the Lord shall raise
him up and if they have committed sin, it shall be forgiven them.”

246 |

“(e) Who is homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with his
parent, guardian, or legal custodian through no fault of such parent,
guardian, or legal custodian.”

At the dependency hearing and on appeal D.L.E. and J.E. assert that their
right to refuse medical treatment on religious grounds? is recognized by
section 19-1-114, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8), which provides:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no child who in good
faith is under treatment solely by spiritual means through prayer in ac-
cordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious
denomination by a duly accredited practitioner thereof shall, for that rea-
son alone, be considered to have been neglected within the purview of this
title.” (Emphasis added.)

The juvenile court held that, while section 19-1-114 barred a finding of
neglect under section 19-1-103(20), it did not bar a finding of dependency.
We disagree.

HH Although the trial court correctly noted that section 19-1-114
states only that a child shall not be found neglected if he is treated in ac-
cordance with his parents’ religious beliefs, we do not agree that the legis-
lature intended to allow a finding of dependency under the same circum-
stances. The terms neglected or dependent are used interchangeably in
section 19-1-103(20) and by setting these out in the alternative the legisla-
ture intended that “neglected or dependent child’ or ‘dependent or ne-
glected child” would stand for a single concept.? In this regard, we find it
persuasive that in no.other section of this title are the terms given inde-
pendent meaning. Under the facts of this case and based upon the expert
testimony in the record, the trial court was precluded by section 19-1-114
from finding D.L.E. dependent pursuant to section 19-1-103(20).

Hl In reaching our decision, we emphasize by way of limitation that
this is not a case where D.L.E.’s life is in imminent danger through a lack
of medical care. Compare, People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Il.
618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947). See also, In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387
(1972). Although the trial court found that D.L.E.’s life would be in
danger if he did not receive treatment, there is no support in the record for

2 We recognize that the United States has placed a heavy burden upon the state and the courts to
justify any infringement of an individual's First Amendment freedoms, E.g. Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S, 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Bd.2d 965 (1963), As Judge Dreier aptly put it in Muhlenberg
Hospital v. Patterson, 128 N.J. Super. 498, 320 A.2d 518 (1974):

“The Courts have been and will continue to be the guardian of the religious rights of the individu-

als to see that this power of the State is not exercised beyond the area where treatment is neces-

sary for the sustaining of life or the prevention of grievous bodily injury.”

2 None of our our previous decisions have recognized a distinction between a finding of depen-

dency and neglect. People in the Interest of D.A.K., 198 Colo. 11, 596 P.2d 747 (1979); Denver
v. Juvenile Court, 182 Colo. 157, 511 P.2d 898 (1973); Jones v. Koulos, 142 Colo. 92, 349 P.2d
704 (1960).

eS 247

this conclusion. Expert testimony presented by Doctor James Piper sug-
gested that while D.L.E. was presently suffering from periodic seizures,
these seizures would not be life endangering unless they progressed to the
medical state of status epilepticus, a state of continual seizures.4 Accord-
ing to Doctor Piper, D.L.E.’s chances of progressing to status epilepticus
were somewhere between 1 in 10,000 and 1 in 50,000, and he could not
state with a reasonable degree of medical certainty whether D.L.E. would
ever reach this state. See Daugaard v. People, 176 Colo. 38, 488 P.2d
1101 (1971). Consequently, we need not consider whether a finding of de-
pendency or neglect would be precluded by section 19-1-114 where a mi-
nor’s life was in imminent danger due to a lack of medical treatment.

We also note that the treatment of epileptic seizures involves poten-
tial dangers to the child which militate against treatment. Doctor Piper
testified that the prescribed treatment for epileptic seizures included the
long-term use of a drug commonly known as Dilantin. In the course of his
testimony the doctor stated that a common side effect from the use of this
drug is the reduced ability to produce bone marrow and red and white
blood cells. On cross-examination he alluded to other reported side effects
including gum hypertrophy, which is the swelling of the gum around the
teeth; ataxia, which is unsteadiness of gait; and “headaches and other
signs of increased cranial pressure known to medicine as pseudotumor cer-
ebri.”5 According to Doctor Piper, the risk of experiencing these side ef-
fects is time and dose related and, since D.L.E. would have to take in-
creasing amounts of Dilantin, the probability of their occurrence would in-
crease in the future.®

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the juvenile court and re-
mand this case with directions to vacate the order of dependency and to
dismiss the petition.

4 Doctor Piper testified that a given percentage of children who progress to status epilepticus will
die due to a vascular swelling in the brain.

5 Other common side effects caused by the use of Dilantin include allergic reactions, skin rash,
drug fever, headaches, dizziness, slurred speech, confusion, muscle twitching, nausea, vomiting,
constipation, joint aches and pains, and enlargement of lymph glands, and potential injury to the
liver. J. Long, The Essential Guide to Prescription Drugs, 514 (1977). See also Gruber,
Diphenylhydantoionsodicum, U.S.P. (Dilantin) in 4 Cyclopedia of Medicine, Surgery,
Specialties, 645 (1961); Gray’s Attorney's Textbook of Medicine, ch. 132, at 211-12 (3d Ed.).
© In Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952), the Missouri Court of Appeals,
considering a similar dependency issue, stated that:

“Where proposed treatment is dangerous to life, or there is a difference of medical opinion as to
the efficiency of a proposed treatment or where medical opinion differs as to which of 2 or more
remedies should be followed, requiring the exercise of sound discretion, the opinion: of the parent
should not be lightly overridden.”

IN

48
No. 80SA243

The People of the State of Colorado v. James Heintze
(614 P.2d 367)

Decided July 14, 1980.

249

Jack Healy, District Attorney, Chester H. Budz, Jr., Deputy, for
plaintiff-appellant.

Eugene D. Lorig, for defendant-appellee.

En Banc.
JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the Court.

250 |

The People in this interlocutory appeal challenge a ruling of the dis-
trict court suppressing a three and one-half hour tape recorded statement
taken from the defendant at the Eagle County jail on December 14, 1979.
The trial court concluded that the statement was obtained in violation of
Crim. P. 5(a)(1) because the defendant had not been taken before a judge
and advised of his rights without unnecessary delay after his arrest on De-
cember 11, 1979. We reverse and remand with directions.

On December 8, 1979, an architect was beaten to death with a claw
hammer in his apartment in Vail, Colorado. An initial investigation by the
Vail Police Department indicated that the victim’s roommate, James
Heintze, the defendant, was the primary suspect. The defendant could not
be located and law enforcement officers throughout the state were notified
that he was a suspect in the murder.

On December 11, 1979, at approximately 6:40 p.m. the defendant
walked into the Denver Police building and stated to a Denver detective,
William Martin, that he “wanted to talk to somebody about a murder.”
Detective Martin asked the defendant where the murder had occurred and
the defendant stated that it had occurred in Vail over the weekend and
identified the victim. When asked the cause of death the defendant stated
that he beat the victim to death with his fist and a hammer. The detective
immediately telephoned the Vail Police Department and confirmed the
homicide. He then placed the defendant under arrest and at 6:50 p.m. ad-
vised him of his Miranda rights. The defendant acknowledged that he un-
derstood his rights and then described in some detail the homicide.

The defendant stated that he had been staying with the victim at an
apartment in Vail. On the evening of the homicide the victim made im-
proper sexual advances towards the defendant and he initially struck the
victim with his fist and thereafter several times with a claw hammer. The
defendant then picked up some articles belonging to him and to the victim
and fled to Denver. He stated that he had entered the police building and
confessed because he “wanted to get it off his chest.”

The defendant, pursuant to the detective’s request, wrote out a state-
ment about the homicide in his own words. After completing the written
statement the defendant executed a written consent to search his room. At
this time a Vail police investigator, Ted Shih, was already at the Denver
Police Building interviewing a friend of the victim in connection with the
homicide. Investigator Shih re-advised the defendant of his Miranda
rights and the defendant proceeded to discuss further details of the homi-
cide with Shih.

The police then searched the defendant’s hotel room and recovered
various personal belongings of the defendant and the victim. The defend-
ant was formally booked into the Denver jail during the evening hours of
December 11, 1979.

eS 251

On December 12, 1979, Denver police officers transported the de-
fendant to Vail, Colorado, arriving there at approximately 10:00 a.m. At
12:00 noon a Vail police officer, after advising the defendant of his
Miranda rights, discussed the homicide again with him. This interroga-
tion was completed at about 1:00 p.m. and the defendant was then trans-
ported to the Eagle County jail in Eagle, Colorado, where he was booked
in at 1:40 p.m.

Later that afternoon, at about 3:00 p.m., Vail police investigator Shih
went to the Eagle County jail for the purpose of clarifying certain facts
surrounding the homicide. Shih advised the defendant orally of his
Miranda rights, and the defendant again responded to questions about the
homicide.

At no time on December 12, 1979, was the defendant brought before
a judge and advised of his rights pursuant to Crim. P. 5(a)(1). Nor did
law enforcement officers make any effort on December 13 to present the
defendant for a judicial advisement, in spite of the fact that a judge was
sitting in Eagle County. At about 5:00 p.m. on December 13 Vail police
officers again visited the Eagle County jail and brought with them a tape
recorder for the purpose of taping an additional interrogation of the de-
fendant. The defendant was advised once again of his Miranda rights and
agreed to talk to the officers. At this point a tape-recorded interrogation of
3 1/2 hours took place. The interrogation was later transcribed and the
transcription consisted of 83 pages. The interrogation began at about 5:00
p.m. and concluded at about 8:30 p.m.

On the following day, December 14, 1979, at approximately 9:00
a.m., the defendant was taken before a county judge for advisement pur-
suant to Crim. P. 5(a)(1). The administrator of the Eagle County jail tes-
tified that he was aware of the requirements of taking an accused before a
judge without unnecessary delay but could give no explanation whatever
why the defendant spent approximately 2 days in the jail without being ju-
dicially advised of his rights.*

In ruling on the defendant’s motion to suppress, the district judge
concluded that the defendant was fully advised of his Miranda rights, that
he freely and knowingly waived those rights at each interrogation, and
that the consent to search executed by the defendant was voluntarily and
knowingly made. The court suppressed the 3 1/2 hour tape recorded state-
ment taken on the evening of December 13, 1979, on the ground that the

1 The jail administrator testified that he understood Colorado law required him to bring an ar-
rested person before a judge as soon as possible. He testified that he had been hypnotized twice in
an effort to recall why the defendant had not been advised but these hypnotic efforts were unsuc-
cessful. :

The district judge in ruling on the motion to suppress judicially notices that “this court was in
session on that day [December 13, 1979] in this county.”

252 ee

statement was obtained during a period of unnecessary delay in violation
of Crim. P. 5(a)(1). However, the court made no determination with re-
spect to the relationship between the unnecessary delay and the tape re-
corded statement. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case to the dis-
trict court for this additional determination.
I. UNNECESSARY DELAY

HM Crim. P. 5(a)(1) provides in pertinent part: “If a peace officer

. makes an arrest, either with or without a warrant, the arrested per-
son shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the nearest available
county or district judge.” Crim. P. 5(a)(2) imposes on the judge at the ac-
cused’s first appearance the duty to inform him of, and to make certain
that he understands, those basic rights applicable upon the initiation of
formal criminal proceedings, especially his privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to the appointment of an attorney at state ex-
pense if he is financially unable to retain one. The purpose of rule 5 is to
furnish a prophylaxis against abuses in the detention process and, more
importantly, to place the accused in early contact with a judicial officer so
that the right to counsel may not only be clearly explained but also be im-
plemented upon the accused’s request. See e.g., United States vy.
Robinson, 439 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Chadwick,
415 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1969); Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d 574
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Roots v. United States, 393
US. 1067, 89 S.Ct. 722, 21 L.Ed.2d 710 (1968); see also, 1 L. Orfield,
Criminal Procedure Under the Federal Rules § 5.43 (1966).

We have consistently declined to adopt a per se rule of exclusion
in rule 5 violations; instead, we have required the defendant to show that
the delay was unnecessary and that some prejudice resulted from the de-
lay. People v. Hosier, 186 Colo. 116, 525 P.2d 1161 (1974); People v.
Casey, 185 Colo. 58, 521 P.2d 1250 (1974); People v. Gilmer, 182 Colo.
96, 511 P.2d 494 (1973); People v. Reed, 180 Colo. 16, 502 P.2d 952
(1972); People v. Weaver, 179 Colo. 331, 500 P.2d 980 (1972); Aragon
v, People, 166 Colo. 172, 442 P.2d 397 (1968).

Here, there is no question about the delay being unnecessary.
From the time of the defendant’s arrest at 6:40 p.m. on December 11,
1979, to his rule 5 advisement at 9:00 a.m. on December 14, 1979, sixty-
two hours elapsed without any effort by law enforcement officers to take
the defendant before a county or district judge. A “necessary delay” is one
reasonably related to the administrative process attendant upon the arrest
of the accused, viz. delays associated with fingerprinting, photographing,
taking inventory of personal belongings, preparation of necessary charging
documents and reports, and other legitimate administrative procedures.
£.g., Adams y. United States, supra at 579 (Burger, J., concurring);
Commonwealth v. Abu-Ibn Hanifah Bey, 462 Pa. 533, 341 A.2d 907
(1975); see also State v. Thurston, 393 A.2d 1345 (Me. 1978); 1 C.

eS 253

Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 74 (1969). Where, as here,
prolonged inadvertence is the only basis for the delay, that delay is unnec-
essary.
II. PREJUDICE FROM THE DELAY

HH] The more troublesome question in this case relates to the second
prong of an alleged rule 5 violation: whether prejudice resulted to the ac-
cused from the unnecessary delay. The trial court in its order of suppres-
sion did not address this issue and we therefore remand for this necessary
determination.

In order to dispel possible confusion about the standard applica-
ble to the determination of prejudice, we find it necessary to address cer-
tain arguments raised by the People in their brief. Relying on People v.
Weaver, supra, the People argue that prejudice requires a showing of a
“studied attempt” by law enforcement officers to avoid taking the accused
before a judge. Although Weaver expressly noted the absence of any
“studied attempt” to violate rule 5 in that case, we did not thereby mean
that prejudice requires a showing of an intentional or willful disregard of
tule 5 requirements. To the contrary, an accused may be as much preju-
diced from a prolonged indifference to his rights as from an intentional or
willful disregard of them.

The People also urge that the repeated Miranda warnings to the
accused dispel any notion of prejudice. Compliance with Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 US. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), however,
is not a substitute for the speedy presentment requirements of Crim. P. 5.
While a proper Miranda warning provides some assurance that the de-
fendant’s “right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered
throughout the interrogation process,” Miranda v. Arizona, supra at
469, 86 S.Ct. at 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d at 721, it has not yielded the guarantee
that the defendant’s right to counsel will be implemented upon request.
Cf. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570
(1975). Were we to accept the People’s argument, the Miranda advise-
ment would become a ready device for avoiding the safeguards inherent in
tule 5 proceedings.

In determining the existence of prejudice the proper inquiry is
whether the unnecessary delay reasonably contributed to the acquisition of
the challenged evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, supra;
Adams vy. United States, supra; Morales v. United States, 344 F.2d
846 (9th Cir. 1965); Commonwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 301 A.2d
701 (1973); Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417
(1972); see also Aragon v. People, supra. In view of the important role
played by Crim. P. 5 in speedily implementing the right to counsel espe-
cially for an indigent defendant, some important considerations on the is-
sue of prejudice are: whether an attorney had already been retained by, or
had been made available to, the defendant during the period of

254 ee

unnecessary delay; whether that attorney was accessible to the defendant
prior to the challenged statement; and whether the defendant freely and
knowingly waived the presence of the-attorney in making the challenged
statement to the police.

Upon remand, if the trial court determines that the unnecessary delay
reasonably contributed to the acquisition of the challenged statement, then
the motion to suppress should be granted. If, on the other hand, the trial
court is not satisfied that the unnecessary delay reasonably contributed to
the acquisition of the statement, then the motion to suppress should be de-
nied.

Accordingly, the ruling is reversed and the cause remanded to the
trial court with directions to proceed in accordance with the views herein

set forth.

No. 80SA144

Donald E. Tyler y. The District Court in and for the County of Adams,
State of Colorado, the Honorable Marvin E. Foote, sitting as judge of
said Court, and Gregory Lyman, Clerk of said Court

(613 P.2d 899)

Decided July 14, 1980. Rehearing denied August 5, 1980.

255

Donald E. Tyler, Pro se.

Zarlengo, Mott and Zarlengo, John C. Mott; Paul D. Renner, John
R. Rodman; Frank Plaut, P.C., for respondents.

En Banc.
JUSTICE DUBOFSKY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner Donald E. Tyler filed this original proceeding under
C.A.R. 21 for relief in the nature of mandamus. He challenges as an abuse
of discretion the trial court’s ordering a mistrial when it discovered a sec-
ond inconsistent signed jury verdict after the jury was discharged. We is-
sued a rule to show cause and now make the rule absolute.

Petitioner, a former member of the medical staff of Brighton Com-
munity Hospital, filed suit against Galen Marks and Robert Larsen,
physicians on the executive committee of the hospital; John Vowell, the
hospital administrator; and the Brighton Community Hospital Associa-
tion, seeking damages for libel, slander, breach of contract, and interfer-
ence with the practice of medicine.

The trial began February 19, 1980 and concluded on March 6. The
trial court gave the jury two forms for general verdicts and a set of inter-
rogatories. When the jury returned to render the verdict, the judge re-
ceived the jury’s papers. The judge read into the record a verdict for the
petitioner-plaintiff (the first verdict) which assessed actual damages of
$682,000 arid exemplary damages’ of $48,000.' The judge also read for the

+ Damages were allocated among the defendants by the jury. Actual damages: $170,500 against
defendant Marks; $170,500 against defendant Larsen; $136,400 against defendant Vowell; $204,-
600 against the Hospital Association. Exemplary damages: $12,000 against Marks; $12,000 against
Larsen; $12,000 against Vowell; $12,000 against the Hospital Association.

256 |

record the answers to the interrogatories, all but one of which were answered.
in the affirmative.? The judge then asked the jurors if this was their
unanimous verdict, and they assented. Defense counsel requested a poll of
the jury, and each juror responded that he or she agreed with the vedict as
read by the trial court. The court accepted the verdict, ordered judgment
entered in accordance with it, and discharged the jury.

I A few hours later, the court advised the plaintiff and “defense
counsel of an irregularity in the verdict and set a hearing for late after-
noon. The hearing concerned a verdict for the defendant (the second ver-
dict) signed by the foreman which the judge’s clerk found among the jury
papers. The verdict had not been mentioned by the foreman when the jury
returned, and the trial court did not notice it.$ The trial court found that
the two verdicts were inconsistent and granted the defendant’s motion for
a mistrial. Because we find that the first verdict was the decision of the
jury, we vacate as an abuse of discretion the trial court’s order for a mis-
trial.

C.R.C.P. 47 governs rendition of jury verdicts:
“(q) Declaration of Verdict. When the jury has agreed upon its verdict
it shall be conducted into court by the officer in charge. The names of the
jurors shall be called, and the jurors shall be asked by the court or clerk if’
they have agreed upon a verdict, and if the answer is in the affirmative,
they shall hand the same to the clerk. The clerk shall enter in his records
the names of the jurors. Upon a request of any party the jury may be
polled.

(s) Verdict Recorded, Disagreement. The verdict, if agreed upon by all
jurors, shall be received and recorded and the jury discharged. If all the
jurors do not concur in the verdict, the jury may be again sent out, or may
be discharged.”

The record here indicates that the court followed the proper procedure for
declaring and recording a jury verdict. In addition, the judge questioned
each juror individually.

A verdict shall be given effect if possible. However, a court
may not look beyond the face of the record to examine the thought
processes of the jurors. If the intent is clear from the record, as in this
case, the verdict shall be given effect. Martinez v. Huerta, 155 Colo. 555,
396 P.2d 237 (1964); Boynton v. Fox Theaters, 121 Colo. 227, 214 P.2d

2 The only negative response was to a question regarding a specific act of defamation by defendant
Vowell. The answer was consistent with the verdict for the petitioner.

8 Although the record is unclear, the second signed verdict apparently was among the papers
handed to the court by the foreman.

ee 237

793 (1950); Kinsell v. Stice, 109 Colo. 173, 123 P.2d 397 (1942); Drake
y. Justice Gold Mining Company, 32 Colo. 259, 75 P.912 (1904).

In Harper v. Blasi, 112 Colo. 518, 151 P.2d 760 (1944), unlike the
case before us, there was no record of the declaration and return of the
jury verdict. No one knew of an inconsistent verdict until the preparation
of the record for appeal. There, the confusion of verdict forms and instruc-
tions with no record to support one of the verdicts made it impossible to
determine the jury’s true decision. Cf. Calnon v. Sorel, 108 Colo. 467,
119 P.2d 615 (1941).

HM Here the record is clear. The trial court read the verdict for the
petitioner in open court, and all the jurors assented to it. Each juror was
questioned, reinforcing the evidence of the jury’s intentions.* The verdict
for the petitioner in open court is the verdict of the jury. Randles v.
Lowry, 4 Cal.App.3d 68, 84 Cal.Rptr. 321 (1970).

Hf It follows that the second signed verdict form found by the clerk
is not the verdict of the jury. Any irregularity of form in a verdict should
be disregarded if it fairly appears that the jury intended a given verdict.
Bartlett v. Hammond, 76 Colo. 171, 230 P. 109 (1924); Boynton,
supra; Davis v. Shepard, 31 Colo. 141, 72 P. 57 (1903).

Thus, there is no inconsistency because there is only one verdict. The
verdict of the jury awarded the petitioner damages of $750,000 allocated
as shown on the verdict form. The trial court is directed to vacate its order
granting a mistrial and to enter a judgment in accordance with the verdict
of the jury.

Rule made absolute.

4 Petitioner submitted affidavits from five of the six jurors that the verdict for the petitioner was
their intended verdict. Because the record adequately supports the first verdict, we do not consider
the propriety of the affidavits.

258

No. 79SC251

Alfred Quintana y. The People of the State of Colorado
(613 P.2d 1308)

Decided July 21, 1980.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Thomas M. Van Cleave,
III, Deputy, for petitioner.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, William Morris, Assistant Attorney
General, for respondent.

eS 259

En Banc.

CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES delivered the opinion of the Court.

Quintana’s petition for certiorari was granted to review the decision
of the Colorado Court of Appeals in People v. Quintana, 42 Colo. App.
477, 601 P.2d 637 (1979). The sole issue is whether the trial court abused
its discretion in denying Quintana’s Motion for Correction of Mittimus
pursuant to Crim. P. 36. This motion was filed by Quintana after his sen-
tence for aggravated robbery had been commuted by the governor. The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial, and after review, we af-
firm the judgment of the court of appeals.

Petitioner Quintana was originally sentenced to fifty to sixty years’
imprisonment on his conviction for aggravated robbery and five to ten
years’ imprisonment on his conviction for conspiracy. The sentences were
ordered to be served concurrently. The order of judgment and sentence
stated: “Further Order: Time already served in county jail be credited to
this sentence.” However, the order failed to indicate the amount of time to
be credited.

In response to a request by the petitioner, the trial court issued an
amended order of judgment and sentence nunc pro tunc, which reflected
the time already served to be three years, one month and twenty-eight
days. Shortly thereafter, the trial court sent a letter to the petitioner indi-
cating that he had “ordered an Amended Mittimus giving you credit for
three years, one month and twenty-eight days.”

Apparently through a typographical error, the wrong word was
crossed off the amended form order of judgment and sentence (mittimus)
indicating that credit for time served would not be given. Shortly there-
after, the governor commuted the petitioner’s sentence on the aggravated
robbery conviction to a minimum of twenty-nine years and a maximum of
forty years. There was no mention of credit for time served in the gover-
nor’s commutation order. :

Almost a year later, the petitioner filed a motion seeking cor-
rection of the apparent clerical error, which motion was denied by the trial
court.

Crim. P. 36 provides:

“Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record and
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected
by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.”
(Emphasis added.)

The language of this rule indicates that the decision to correct the error is
discretionary rather than mandatory. See Raymond Lee Organization,

260 ee

Inc. v. Securities Commission, 36 Colo. App. 417, 543 P.2d 75 (1975). Al-
though there may be a valid reason to correct a clerical error in a mittimus
at any time, the governor’s commutation in this case superseded the origi-
nal sentence, and the trial court’s subsequent correction of the mittimus
could have no effect upon the sentence as commuted. See People v.
Simms, 186 Colo. 447, 528 P.2d 228 (1974) and People ex rel. Dunbar
v. District Court, 180 Colo. 107, 502 P.2d 420 (1972).

This is not to say that the trial court was without jurisdiction to cor-
rect the clerical error. However, absent a showing in the record that the
defendant was in some way prejudiced by the clerical mistake, we cannot
say that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the Crim.
P. 36 motion.1

The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.

JUSTICE ERICKSON and JUSTICE DUBOFSKY do not partici-

pate.

No. 80SA46

Jerry L. Manka, Barbara R. Manka, and Ricky A. Manka v. Jerry D.
Martin, Rodney Simmons, Richard Hewitt, E. L. Post, T. V. Middle, C.
F. Jeffers, L. C. Hoeffer, Frank T. Beckwith, Roland J. Brumbaugh, Alan
Charnes, and Joseph F. Dolan

(614 P.2d 875)

Decided July 21, 1980. Rehearing denied August 11, 1980.

1 There has been much speculation in the briefs and oral argument regarding the effect of the pre-
sentence confinement mistake upon the commutation ordered by the governor. There is nothing in
this record to demonstrate that even if the mittimus had been correct, there would be any differ-
ence in the commutation order.

=
.°
a

262 |

Jerry L. Manka, Barbara R. Manka, and Ricky A. Manka, Pro se.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessy, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Billy Shuman, Assistant Attorney
General; Yegge, Hall & Evans, Carol M. Welch, for defendants-appellees.

En Banc.

JUSTICE LEE delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal’ is from summary judgments entered in favor of appel-
lees, the Colorado Department of Revenue and certain named agents, in
five cases filed in August and September 1977 in the District Court of El
Paso County by appellants, Jerry L., Barbara R., and Ricky Manka. We
affirm.

The actions arose from the levying and collection of sales, use, and in-
come taxes by the Colorado Department of Revenue (the Department) in

1 Although appellants filed their appeal in the court of appeals, because in their briefs they chal-
lenged the constitutionality of certain state statutes, the court of appeals requested that this court
determine the proper jurisdiction. We ordered the appeal transferred to this court pursuant to sec-
tion 13-4-102, CRS, 1973.

eS 263

1976 from appellants, individually and under the business names of Cen-
tral Cycle Shoppe and Track and Wheel Equipment Company.? In
March 1978, on the motion of the appellees, the district court consolidated
the cases into No. 95403. The trial date was set for August 1979.

On July 31, 1979, the district court granted summary judgment in fa-
vor of appellees in three of the cases (Nos. 95490, 95491, and 95554).

The court also granted partial summary judgment to appellees in the
remaining two cases. The partial summary judgment limited appellants’
possible recovery in No. 95403 to the amount of the refund allegedly due,
plus interest, and, in No. 95470, to the market value plus interest of any
automobile parts proven to have been lost from the automobile due to ap-
pellees’ conduct. These two cases remained consolidated and were tried to
a jury in August 1979. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the appel-
lees in No. 95470 and in favor of the appellants in No. 95403 in the
amount of $535.62. Appellants failed to file any motion pursuant to
C.R.C.P. 59 for a new trial or an amended judgment. They did, however,
timely file a notice of appeal from the summary judgments.

The record before this court does not contain any direction by the dis-
trict court that the partial summary judgment granted to the appellees in
cases Nos. 95403 and 95470 be made a final judgment for purposes of ap-
peal. C.R.C.P. 54(b).

The issues on appeal may be stated as follows: (1) whether sections.
39-22-601 et seq. and sections 39-21-103, 104, 105, 113, and 114, C.R.S.
1973, are unconstitutional; and (2) whether the trial court erred in grant-
ing appellees’ motion for summary judgments in Nos. 95490, 95491 and
95554; erred in granting appellees’ motion for partial summary judgment
in Nos. 95403 and 95470; and erred in denying appellants’ motion for
summary judgment in all five cases.

L

Appellants raise as an issue on appeal the constitutionality of the var-
ious statutes, all of which relate to the procedures to be followed concern-
ing tax claims and the administration of the, Colorado Department of

2 The summary judgment order contained a brief description of each complaint. We here summa-
rize the descriptions.

The appellants Jerry L, and Barbara R. Manka brought the following actions against appellees:

In No, 95403, plaintiffs sought damages arising from action of appellees in refusing to refund $1,-
014.23 in taxes which appellants paid under protest.

In No. 95470, plaintiffs sought damages arising from actions of the appellees in seizing and
holding their automobile. This action is apparently based on unlawful seizure and negligence.

In No. 95490, plaintiffs sought relief from, and compensation for damages arising from, an alleg-
edly fraudulent and unlawful audit by appellee Jeffers.

In No, 95491, plaintiffs sought damages arising from actions of appellees in allegedly unlawfully
seizing their pickup truck.

All three appellants in No. 95554 sought damages arising from an allegedly illegal seizure of their
personal property. This is the only suit in which appellant Ricky A. Manka is named as plaintiff.

264 |

Revenue.

I Having carefully examined the record, and, in particular, the
complaints, we can find no indication that the constitutionality of any of
these statutes was raised as an issue at the trial level. Questioning the con-
stitutionality of a statute for the first time in an appellate brief will not
successfully raise the issue for review by this court on appeal. Hessling v.
Broomfield, 193 Colo. 124, 563 P.2d 12 (1977); Johnson v. People, 96
Colo. 175, 40 P.2d 615 (1935); Loan Company v. Ira, 75 Colo. 379, 226
P. 136 (1924). We find no reason to depart from this rule in this appeal.

Appellants claim that they believed they were identifying the is-
sue at the trial level by citing 42 U.S.C. 1983 in their complaints. A mere
recitation of 42 U.S.C. 1983, a federal statute recognizing a cause of ac-
tion in a citizen of the United States arising from a deprivation of consti-
tutional rights, is not sufficient to identify as an issue the constitutionality
of particular Colorado statutes.

Il.

We next consider appellants’ claim that the trial court erred in grant-
ing summary judgments in favor of appellee.

(A) Actions Nos. 95403 and 95470

As indicated above, the trial court granted partial summary judg-
ments in actions Nos. 95403 and 95470. In doing so, the court ruled that,
as a matter of law, appellees prevailed except as to appellants’ claim for a
refund and for reimbursement for the value of the missing auto parts. In
neither of these cases was the action terminated by the order of partial
summary judgment.

When a summary judgment disposes of less than the entire ac-
tion, the judgment is not final unless the trial court expressly determines
that there is no just reason for delay and directs the entry of a final judg-
ment. C.R.C.P. 54(b). If a trial court does not make such a determination,
the court’s decision “shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims

.” C.R.C.P. 54(b). Because partial summary judgments in actions
Nos. 95403 and 95470 were not final judgments, they are not appealable.
The rights and liabilities of the parties remain yet to be determined.
Stillings v. Davis, 158 Colo. 308, 406 P.2d 337 (1965).

Furthermore, after these two cases were tried and the parties’
rights and obligations were determined, appellants could have, and indeed
should have, moved for a new trial or an altered or amended judgment un-
der C.R.C.P. 59. Because they did not timely file such motions and allow
the trial court an opportunity to review its possible errors, appellants are
not barred on appeal from asserting error by the trial court. Rueckhaus v.
Snow, 167 Colo. 51, 445 P.2d 577 (1968).

We dismiss the appeal from the partial summary judgments in ac-
tions Nos. 95403 and 95470.

265

(B) Action No. 95490

The district court in its summary judgment order took judicial notice
of a 1976 civil action, Manka v. Martin, Civil Action No. 92349, and
ruled that the decision there barred the instant action under the doctrine
of res judicata. We agree with that ruling.

In the earlier action (No. 92349), Jerry L. and Barbara R. Manka
had sought and received a temporary restraining order from the El Paso
County District Court against the Department and, specifically, against
Jerry Martin, a collection and enforcement agent, and Joseph F. Dolan,
the Director of the Department. The order prohibited further seizure and
holdings of the Mankas’ property . It was based upon their allegations that
the value of the property already seized by the Department exceeded the
amount of their tax deficiency, and that the assessment of the tax deficien-
cies was unlawful. Following a hearing, the trial court vacated the tempo-
rary restraining order and denied the request for relief in the nature of
mandamus and permanent injunction. The court did so because it found
that, contrary to the assertions of the Mankas, they had failed to follow
the proper administrative appeal procedure by requesting a hearing pur-
suant to section 39-21-103, C.R.S. 1973, as set forth in the notices of defi-
ciency which they had received. No timely appeal was taken from the
ruling in that action.

The district court also noted that the complaint in action No. 95490
was based upon the same alleged facts as in the 1976 complaint (No.
92349) and that the causes of action in both cases were identical, viz., an
alleged wrongful audit. Based upon these identities of fact and claims,
the district court ruled that the present action must be dismissed under the
doctrine of res judicata.

In Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344, 517 P.2d 396 (1973),
this court discussed the doctrine of res judicata.
“. . . The doctrine holds that an existing judgment is conclusive of the
rights of the parties in any subsequent suit on the same claim. It bars reli-
tigation not only of all issues actually decided, but of all issues that might
have been decided. It requires an identity of parties or their privies
(Restatement, Judgements §§ 83-92 (1942)), as it would be unfair to pre-;
clude a party from litigating an issue merely because he could have liti-
gated it against a different party.”

% A taxpayer’s failure to pursue the proper administrative courses available to him as possible rem-
edies bars him from later attacking the final determination and notice of tax deficiency. Liebhardt
v. Revenue Department, 123 Colo. 369, 229 P.2d 655 (1951).

* The only factual difference between the two actions is that one distraint warrant complained of
in the instant case was issued after the temporary restraining order was vacated in the earlier case.
However, since the same facts served as the basis for the issue of all the distraint warrants, we
agree with the trial court that this factual difference is of no consequence to the present issue.

266 |

It is not significant that the named defendants in the instant case
include individual agents and employees of the Department not named in
the earlier case. The doctrine of res judicata does not require that all par-
ties to the previous suit be parties to the subsequent suit, and vice versa,
but only that the party against whom the doctrine is asserted shall have
been a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication on the
same claim. Pomeroy v. Waitkus, supra; Murphy v. No. Colo. Grain,
30 Colo. App. 21, 488 P.2d 103 (1971).

I Jerry L. and Barbara R. Manka were plaintiffs in both cases
Nos. 92349 and 95494. The alleged causes of action in each were identi-
cal. The court in No. 92349 decided the issue of a wrongful audit against
them. They are therefore barred under the doctrine of res judicata from
relitigating the issue in this case. Summary judgment was properly or-
dered in case No. 95490.

(C) Action No. 95491

In this action, appellants apparently allege that the Department’s sei-
zure of their pickup truck from the public streets on June 11, 1976, was
unlawful. The allegations in their complaint, and amendments to the com-
plaint, are far from clear. The district court in its summary judgment or-
der summarized appellants’ argument as asserting that the distraint war-
rant was “not directed toward it [the truck].” To the extent that the
Mankas are arguing that the Department lacked authority to assess their
tax liability and to pursue collection procedures by seizing the truck, we
refer to part II(B) of this opinion and hold that the doctrine of res judicata
supports the district court’s grant of summary judgment against appel-
lants.

To the extent that appellants are arguing that the seizure of the
truck was invalid as a violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, we do not agree. It is plain that warrantless seizures
of automobiles from public streets by tax enforcement authorities are not
violative of the Fourth Amendment. G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United
States, 429 US. 338, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977). Conse-
quently, even if the distraint warrant were “not directed toward” the
truck, that fact is immaterial to the legality of the seizure.

Appellants cite numerous other provisions of the United States Con-
stitution which they claim have been violated by the Department’s seizure
of their property. We can find no merit to these arguments.

We affirm the district court’s summary judgment i in favor of appel-
lees in action No. 95491.

(D) Action No. 95554

All three appellants were plaintiffs in this action. They claimed that
seizure of a Dodge truck and other personal property by the Department,
on April 19, 1976, was unlawful. Appellants argue on appeal that the
illegality resulted from (1) seizure of property belonging to Ricky A.

eS 261

Manka pursuant to warrants concerning Jerry and Barbara Manka, and
vice versa, and (2) the Department’s failure to establish ownership of the
seized property.

The district court found, on the basis of the pleading, that all assets of
the businesses were owned by Jerry L. and Barbara Manka, and that
Ricky Manka, as holder of a sales tax license for one of the businesses,
was at most a nominal plaintiff. Indeed, there are no allegations in the
complaint or amendments that Ricky Manka was the owner of the prop-
erty seized pursuant to distraint warrants issued in the names of Jerry and
Barbara Manka. Neither is there any support offered for the argument
that the Department’s seizure of the property was unlawful because the
Department failed to establish the ownership of the property seized.
Rather, the pleadings are replete with conclusionary statements and de-
void of factual allegations necessary to a successful statement of a claim
for relief.

HH Because appellants have not presented any discernibly meritori-
ous argument concerning the unlawfulness of the seizures, and because we
see no genuine issue as to any material fact, we affirm the district court’s
summary judgment dismissing action No. 95554.

In conclusion, we note that appellants elected to proceed pro
se both at the trial and appellate level. We repeat what we have said be-
fore in similar circumstances:

“... A litigant is permitted to present his own case, but, in so doing,
should be restricted to the same rules of . . . procedure as is required of
those qualified to practice law before our courts; otherwise, ignorance is
unjustly rewarded.” Knapp v. Fleming, 127 Colo. 414, 258 P.2d 489
(1953).

“.. . If a litigant, for whatever reason, sees fit to rely upon his own un-
derstanding of legal principles and the procedures involved in the courts,
he must be prepared to accept the consequences of his mistakes and errors
....” Viles v. Scofield, 128 Colo. 185, 261 P.2d 148 (1953).

The appeal from the partial summary judgments in actions Nos.
95403 and 95470 is dismissed.

The judgments are affirmed in actions Nos. 95490, 95491, and
95554.

JUSTICE ERICKSON and JUSTICE DUBOFSKY do not partici-

pate.

268 ee

No. 79SC9
Durango School District No. 9-R, the Board of Education of Durango
School District No. 9-R, and Donald Bushnell, Marvin Giersch, Sam

Callaway, Larry Bruton, Gino Picolli, Robert Ashburn and J. C. Brasher,
individually and as Directors of said District vy. John Thorpe

(614 P.2d 880)

Decided July 21, 1980.

=

Hamilton, Hamilton, Shand & McLachlan, P.C., E. B. Hamilton, for
petitioners.

270 ee

Hobbs and Waldbaum, P.C., Larry F. Hobbs, Douglas B. Koff, for
respondent.

Miller & Swearingen, Reese Miller, Richard B. Wagner, for amicus
curiae, Colorado Association of School Boards

En Banc.
JUSTICE ROVIRA delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review the decision of the Colorado Court of
Appeals in Thorpe v. Durango School District No. 9-R et al., 41 Colo.
App. 473, 591 P.2d 1329 (1978). We now affirm the judgment of the ap-
pellate court.

I

The respondent, John Thorpe, was a non-tenured teacher employed
by the petitioner Durango School District No. 9-R during the 1974-1975
and 1975-1976 school years. In April 1976, the district did not renew the
respondent’s teaching contract for the 1976-1977 school year. He brought
suit against the petitioners (the school district, its board of education, and
the members of the board) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976),' alleging that
the district had failed to renew his teaching contract “in retaliation for”
specified activities for which he claimed protected status under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The re-
spondent alleged violations of his rights to free speech, academic freedom,
and freedom of association.

Trial was held to a jury. The evidence showed that the respondent
had been employed by the district as a mathematics teacher for the 1974-
1975 school year and that his contract had been renewed for 1975-1976.
During this two-year period, the respondent became active in the affairs of
the Durango Education Association (DEA), a teachers’ organization
which represented its members in dealing with the board of education.

1 Section 1983 provides:

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”

The court of appeals correctly noted that state courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction with federal
district courts over suits brought to enforce § 1983. Young v. Board of Education, 416 F.Supp.
1139 (D.Colo. 1976).

es 21

In the spring of 1975, the respondent was elected to represent the fac-
ulty of Miller Junior High School on the executive board of the DEA. His
duties in that position were to act as liaison between the faculty and the
DEA, collecting dues and informing the faculty of decisions made by the
DEA board.

In the fall of 1975, the DEA and the board of education were en-
gaged in negotiations relating to salaries and working conditions. The re-
spondent was asked to become the DEA “crisis committee” chairman. In
that position, he helped to coordinate communications among the teachers
and to the public.

In the spring of 1976, the board of education considered whether the
respondent should be offered a contract for the 1976-1977 school year.
After reviewing the matter at two separate meetings, the board decided
not to renew the contract.

Five of the seven members of the board who participated in the non-
renewal decision testified at trial. They acknowledged that they had dis-
cussed the respondent’s DEA activities during their deliberations about re-
newing his contract, but denied that their votes against renewal had been
motivated, or substantially influenced, by the respondent’s membership in
that organization per se. Rather, the board members testified that they
had considered only those DEA activities which they considered “im-
proper,” viz.: (a) an incident in which the respondent had exhorted his
fellow teacher and DEA member, Dianne Edison, to participate in a DEA
leafletting program; and (b) a second incident in which the respondent
had urged payment of DEA dues by teacher Laddie John, perceived by
John as an implied threat that his sabbatical leave would be jeopardized
by failure to pay the dues. These incidents are discussed more fully in Part
III of this opinion, infra.

The board members testified that the nonrenewal decision had also
been influenced by reports that the respondent was impatient with slow
students, that he had publicly embarrassed several students and had been
the subject of numerous parental complaints, and that he had on one occa-
sion improperly rescheduled a flag football practice session.

The trial court instructed the jury? that:

“a school board may not base a decision to non-renew a teacher on his
constitutionally protected conduct.

“The right of public school teachers to join, work for and speak out on be-
half of an employee organization, such as the Durango Educational Asso-
ciation, is protected by the United States Constitution, so long as such
conduct does not actually, substantially and materially interfere with the

2 The trial court’s instruction has not been challenged on appeal. It is consistent with the analysis
in Parts IL-IV of this opinion, infra.

2 ee)

proper function of the school.

“Tn this case, if the [respondent] proves that his constitutionally protected
conduct was a motivating factor in [petitioners’] decision not to rehire
him, then your verdict must be for the [respondent], unless the [petition-
ers] prove one of the following affirmative defenses:

“(1) That the [respondent’s] conduct caused an actual, substantial and
material interference with the appropriate function of the school;

or

“(2) That the [respondent] would have been nonrenewed in any event for
some other reason unrelated to the constitutionally protected conduct.”

The jury returned a verdict for the respondent. However, on the peti-
tioners’ motion, the trial court entered a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, see C.R.C.P. 50(b), stating that: (a) as a matter of law, there was
no evidence from which the jury could properly have concluded that the
petitioners considered any constitutionally protected activities of the re-
spondent in arriving at their decision to not renew his teaching contract;
and (b) the respondent’s DEA activities were not a substantial or motivat-
ing factor in the petitioners’ nonrenewal decision.

The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court had erred
in granting the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, because there was
sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the jury’s verdict. We agree.

Il.

HH A nontenured public school teacher does not have a right to
annual renewal of his teaching contract. In order to effect nonrenewal, the
board of education need only give the teacher written notice on or before
April 15 of the school year immediately preceding that for which renewal
is in question. No specification, proof, or reasons for nonrenewal are re-
quired. See section 22-63-110, C.R.S. 1973. Nonetheless, the board may
not base its decision not to renew a teacher’s contract on his or her exer-
cise of constitutionally protected rights. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.
593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968);
Franklin v. Atkins, 409 F.Supp. 439 (D.Colo. 1976), aff'd., 562 F.2d
1188 (10th Cir. 1977).

In this case, the respondent claims that the nonrenewal of his
teaching contract was constitutionally impermissible under Perry v.
Sinderman and Pickering v. Board of Education, supra, because it was
based on speech and association protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. That claim is governed by Mt. Healthy City School
District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50
L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). In Mt. Healthy, thé United States ‘Supreme Court held

3 The United States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed its Mt. Healthy analysis. See Givhan
v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Bd.2d 619
(1979).

| 273

that: (a) a plaintiff in the respondent’s position has the burden to show that
his conduct was constitutionally protected and that it was a ‘‘substantial’’ or
“‘motivating”’ factor in his employer’s decision not to renew his employment;
and (b) if the plaintiff makes this initial showing, the employer may avoid
liability by demonstrating ‘‘by a preponderance of the evidence that jt would
have reached the same decision as to [plaintiff's] reemployment even in the
absence of the protected conduct.’’ Jd., 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. at 576, 50
L.Ed.2d at 484. _ .

Under Mt. Healthy, the jury in this case was properly instructed
that it was required to determine: (1) whether constitutionally protected
conduct on the respondent’s part had been considered by the board of edu-
cation when it decided not to renew his teaching contract; (2) whether
such conduct, if considered by the board, had been a substantial or moti-
vating factor in the nonrenewal decision; and (3) whether the board of ed-
ucation would have voted not to renew the contract even if it had not con-
sidered constitutionally protected conduct.

I.
Constitutional Protection for the
Respondent’s Conduct

As noted in Part I of this opinion, supra, during their
deliberations with respect to the respondent’s teaching contract, the mem-
bers of the board of education considered reports of incidents which had
occurred between the respondent and two of his fellow teachers. The evi-
dence presented at trial as to the nature of those incidents was in conflict.
However, the question of what had actually transpired between the re-
spondent and his fellow teachers was clearly one of fact, and our examina-
tion of the record convinces us that the evidence was sufficient to justify
the submission of the question to the jury. Therefore, on the petitioners’
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court was re-
quired to view the evidence concerning this factual issue in the light most
favorable to the respondent, making every reasonable inference which
could legitimately be drawn from the evidence in his favor.

Hollinger v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company, 192 Colo.
377, 560 P.2d 824 (1977); Alexander y. First National Bank in Fort
Collins, 169 Colo. 252, 455 P.2d 861 (1969); Roberts v. Bucher, 41
Colo. App. 138, 584 P.2d 97 (1978), rev’d. on other grounds, 198 Colo.
1, 595 P.2d 239 (1979). When evaluated pursuant to this standard, the ev-
idence supports the following version of the incidents which occurred
between the respondent and his colleagues Diane Edison and Laddie John.

274 re

The Dianne Edison incident. In October 1975, during a lunch
break, the respondent engaged in a discussion with several DEA members,
including Dianne Edison, concerning a plan to publicly distribute leaflets
containing information about ongoing salary negotiations between the
DEA and the board of education. The respondent assumed that everyone
present approved of the plan. Dianne Edison, however, indicated that she
did not approve, and she and the respondent engaged in a brief discussion
about her unwillingness to participate in the leafletting program. Later in
the day, after school hours, the discussion was resumed, and the respon-
dent vigorously urged Edison to reverse her position, stating that it would
not be in her best interests to be “singled out” by the board of education
as ‘‘being different.’’ Edison was upset by the discussion and ‘ended.
up. . . in tears.’’

The Laddie John incident. Laddie John had not paid his DEA dues,
and, during a lunch period, the respondent initiated a discussion with him
on the subject. The respondent asserted that John had a contractual obli-
gation to pay the dues, and John stated that he had previously dropped his
DEA membership. John asked whether his refusal to pay DEA dues would
affect his application for sabbatical leave, scheduled to be decided by a
committee composed primarily of DEA members. In response, the respon-
dent stated that “it was best if we all got along under the trying circum-
stances we were under.” The respondent himself had no authority with re-
spect to the sabbatical proposal and did not intend his statement as a
threat that the proposal would not be approved if John did not pay his
dues. Nonetheless, John perceived the respondent’s remark as an implied
threat to that effect.

In granting the petitioners’ motion for a judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict, the trial court implicitly concluded that the respondent’s
above-described speech activities did not come within the free speech pro-
tections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The sufficiency of the
evidence to support a jury finding as to whether the respondent’s speech
activities were entitled to constitutional protection was an issue of law, ap-
propriate for determination on a reserved basis by the trial court under
C.R.C.P. 50(b). See Wheeler & Lewis v. Slifer, 195 Colo. 291, 577 P.2d
1092 (1978). Accord, Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563,
578-579 n. 2, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968); Franklin v. Atkins,
409 F.Supp. 439 (D.Colo. 1976), aff’d., 562 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1977).
In our view, however, the issue was wrongly decided by the trial court.

HB Constitutional protection vel non for the respondent’s speech ac-
tivities depends on the balance between:

“the interest of the teacher, as citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”

Pickering v. Board of Education, supra, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. at

es 215

1734-1735, 20 L.Ed.2d at 817.

The balance will be struck in favor of the latter interest when it is demon-
strated that the teachers’ speech activities constitute a material or sub-
stantial interference with the teaching program, appropriate discipline, or
the rights of others. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969);

Franklin v. Atkins, supra. In the instant case, there was a complete fail-
ure of proof in this regard. The petitioners’ theory at trial was that the re-
spondent’s speech activities had so upset Dianne Edison and Laddie John
that their respective abilities to teach in the classroom were diminished.
However, neither Edison nor John, nor any other witness, testified to this
effect. No showing was made that the respondent’s speech had engendered
the sort of “disharmony among coworkers” which would remove it from
constitutional protection under Pickering v. Board of Education, supra.
Cf. Los Angeles Teachers Union v. Los Angeles City Board of
Education, 71 Cal.2d 551, 455 P.2d 827, 78 Cal.Rptr. 723 (1969) (under
Pickering v. Board of Education, the “government has no interest in
preventing the sort of disharmony which inevitably results from the mere
expression of controversial ideas”) with Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Society,
312 F.Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d., 445 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1971)
(employee’s speech activities held to have had a “definite [negative] im-
pact on the internal operation” of the public service office in which he was
employed).

We therefore hold that the trial court erred in concluding that
the respondent’s speech activities in connection with the Dianne Edison
and Laddie John incidents did not come within the protection of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.

Iv:

I Implicit in the jury’s verdict for the respondent are findings,
within the analysis of Mt. Healthy, supra, that the board of education’s
consideration of the respondent’s constitutionally protected speech activi-
ties was a substantial or motivating factor in the board’s decision not to re-
new the respondent’s teaching contract, and that the board of education
would not have made that decision had it not considered the protected ac-
tivities. These questions of causation are issues of fact appropriate for jury
determination. See Marshall v. Commonwealth Aquarium, 611 F.2d 1
(1st Cir. 1979); Brule v. Southworth, 611 F.2d 406 (1st Cir. 1979). The
evidence in this case was not such that no reasonable juror could decide
these issues against the petitioners, when viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the respondent and making every reasonable inference
in his favor. Hollinger v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company,
supra; Alexander y, First National Bank in Fort Collins, supra;
Roberts v. Bucher, supra. Therefore, with respect to the Mt. Healthy
causation issues, the trial court’s entry of a judgment notwithstanding the

276 ee

verdict was not justified.
Vv.

In order to facilitate trial court and appellate review of jury verdicts
in future cases of this nature, we encourage the use of written interrogato-
ries, as authorized by C.R.C.P. 49, with respect to the issues of fact in-
volved in the Mt. Healthy analysis.

We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals which reversed the
trial court’s entry of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

JUSTICE ERICKSON and JUSTICE DUBOFSKY do not partici-

pate.

No. 79SA191

The People of the State of Colorado vy. Thomas Darland
(613 P.2d 1310)

Decided July 28, 1980.

es 2m

Robert N. Miller, District Attorney, Elizabeth Strobel, Deputy, for
plaintiff-appellant.

Robert C. Burroughs, for defendant-appellee.

En Banc.
JUSTICE LEE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The People bring this appeal, pursuant to section 16-12-102, C.R.S.
1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8) and C.A.R. 4(b), from an order of the Weld
County District Court granting its sua sponte motion for judgment of ac-
quittal. We reverse and remand.

Defendant-appellee, Thomas Darland, was charged with two counts
of violation of section 18-3-405, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), sexual
assault on a child. The district court granted defendant’s motion for judg-
ment of acquittal on the second count at the conclusion of the prosecu-
tion’s case. Defendant did not, however, move for judgment of acquittal on
count one, either at that time or at the conclusion of the defendant’s case.

Count one was submitted to the jury. After the jury reported that it
was unable to reach a verdict, the court, on February 26, 1979, discharged
it and continued the case until March 12, 1979, “for trial resetting or dis-
position.”

On March 12, the People requested that the case be set for trial; there
was no objection by the defense to that motion. The court, however, in-
structed the parties to prepare to argue the question of whether the court
should, on its own motion, enter a judgment of acquittal. Argument was
set for March 21, 1979.

At the hearing on March 21, the court heard testimony from the fore-
man of the jury as to the reasons the jury was unable to reach a verdict.
After noting that the evidence in a retrial would be presented by the same
witnesses in the same manner and would consist of the same facts, the
court ruled:

“T can’t assess the probability of conviction or acquittal upon retrial, but I
think I may, given the manner in which the jury was divided at the time of
deadlock, seven guilty and five not guilty, that on the assumption that they
were all reasonable men and on the assumption that their opinions were
expressed and held in good faith that the probability upon retrial is an-
other mistrial by way of deadlock.

“I consider also the fact that these witnesses and their mothers must be
subpoenaed from the State of Texas, were originally subpoenaed and the

278 ee

additional expense in this case, taking into consideration the expense of a
retrial and the probability in the return of a verdict one way or the other
upon retrial being slim. I’m going to find that it is in the interest of justice
in this case to enter a judgment of acquittal and discharge the Defendant
in this cause.”

The People raise two issues on appeal: first, whether pursuant to
Crim. P. 29 the district court had jurisdiction to enter a valid judgment of
acquittal under the circumstances of this case; and, if it did have jurisdic-
tion, whether judgment of acquittal was justified on the facts of this case.
We need only reach the first issue.

Crim. P. 29(a) provides:

“. . . The court on motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall order
the entry of a judgment of acquittal . . . if the evidence is insufficient to
sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses, . . .”

The People, however, rely on Crim. P. 29(c), which provides:

“If the jury returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having re-
turned a verdict, a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or re-
newed within ten days after the jury is discharged or within such further
time as the court may fix during the ten-day period. If a verdict of
guilty is returned, the court may on such motion set aside the verdict and
enter judgment of acquittal. If no verdict is returned, the court may enter
judgment of acquittal. It shall not be necessary to the making of such a
motion that such a similar motion has been made prior to the submission
of the case to the jury.” (Emphasis added.)

The People contend that the court was without jurisdiction to enter a
judgment of acquittal since the action was not taken within the ten-day
period or within the further time period fixed by the court. For the reasons
set forth below, we agree.

On the day the jury was discharged, the court continued the action
fourteen days until March 12, 1979, “for trial resetting or disposition.”
The defendant did not file a motion for judgment of acquittal on or before
March 12, 1979, nor did the court of its own motion order the entry of a
judgment of acquittal. Instead, the court again continued the case, until
March 21, 1979, at which time the parties were to present arguments as to
whether the court should enter a judgment of acquittal.

We hold that the court could not sua sponte order a judgment
of acquittal after the date it had “fixed” pursuant to Crim P. 29(c). Any
extension of time after March 12, 1979, was a nullity for purposes of en-
tertaining a motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Haskell,
217 F. Supp. 534 (D. Conn. 1963), aff'd 327 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. denied 377 US. 945, 84 S.Ct. 1351, 12 L.Ed.2d 307 (1964); Mills

279

v. United States, 281 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1960).' Since the court was without
jurisdiction to enter a judgment of acquittal, the judgment is void.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further pro-
ceedings.

CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES, JUSTICE ERICKSON and JUS-
TICE DUBOFSKY do not participate.

No. 79SA419

The Peeple of the State of Colorado v. Robert Glenn Cameron
(613 P.2d 1312)

Decided July 28, 1980.

defendant and the court. “We think that expiration of time within which relief can anoaly be asked
of the judge, terminates the time within which it can properly be granted on the court’s own initia-
tive.” United States v. Smith, 331 US. 469, 67 S.Ct. 1330, 91 L.Bd.1610 (1947).

280 rs

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, David K. Rees, Chief, Appeals
Litigation Section, for plaintiff-appellee.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Terri L. Brake, Deputy, for
defendant-appellant.

En Banc.

JUSTICE ROVIRA delivered the opinion of the Court.

The defendant was initially charged in a five-count information with
two counts of aggravated robbery,‘ one count of attempted first-degree
murder,? and two counts of using a deadly weapon during the commission
of a robbery.? Subsequently, an additional count charging first-degree as-
sault* was filed, and, on motion of the district attorney, the attempted
first-degree murder count was dismissed.

The defendant entered a plea of guilty on October 16, 1978, to the
two counts of aggravated robbery and the one count of first-degree

1 Section 18-4-302, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

2 Sections 18-2-101 and’18-3-102, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).
3 Section 16-11-309, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

4 Section 18-3-202, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

es 281

assault, and admitted that he had used a deadly weapon during the com-
mission of the robberies.

On December 4, 1978, the trial court sentenced the defendant to con-
current terms of not less than 20 nor more than 25 years on each count of
aggravated robbery and first-degree assault.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the sentences are excessive®
and that he is entitled to re-sentencing under the presumptive sentencing
provisions of the 1977 version of House Bill 1589.6 We affirm the sen-
tence entered by the trial court.

IL

The defendant argues that the sentences are excessive because the
trial court did not give proper consideration to the possibility of his reha-
bilitation and, further, that the sentences are so excessive that they deny
any possibility of rehabilitation.

HB While it is true that rehabilitation is an important factor in de-
termining the sentence to be imposed, it must be considered along with de-
terrence, punishment, and protection of society. Triggs v. People, 197
Colo. 229, 591 P.2d 1024 (1979); People v. Duran, 188 Colo. 207, 533
P.2d 1116 (1975).

As has been often stated, we should not modify the sentence un-
less it appears that the trial court has failed to give appropriate considera-
tion to both the needs of the defendant and those of society. People v.
Strong, 190 Colo. 189, 544 P.2d 966 (1976).

I In an appellate review of a sentence, a careful perusal of the re-
cord is required, along with consideration of the factors set out in section
18-1-409, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). ,

I The offenses to which the defendant pled guilty were committed
on May 18 and 19, 1978. On the earlier date, the defendant committed an
aggravated robbery of the Dependable Cleaners in Lakewood, Colorado,
and, on the latter date, he repeated the offense at the Your Valet Clean-
ers. During the second robbery, the defendant shot a clerk in the arm, re-
sulting in her hospitilization for five days.

The record before the trial court at the time of sentencing consisted
of: (1) two pre-sentence investigative reports — one dated November 20,
1978, prepared by the Second Judicial District probation department, and
one dated November 28, 1978, prepared by the First Judicial District
probation department; and (2) three reports from the Colorado State

5 In the circumstances of this case, section 18-1-409, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), provides
for one appellate review of the propriety of the sentence having regard to the nature of the offense,
the character of the offender, the public interest, and the manner in which the sentence was im-
posed.

© Colo, Sess. Laws 1977, ch. 216, 861-888. The defendant’s appeal was transferred to this court
from the court of appeals pursuant to sections 13-4-102(1)(b) and 13-4-110(1), C.R.S. 1973, be-
cause of constitutional issues raised with respect to the 1977 version of House Bill 1589.

282 a

Hospital dated 1967, 1975, and 1978.

A brief recitation of the defendant’s criminal activities and the oppor-
tunities given to him for rehabilitation will be sufficient to demonstrate
the propriety of the sentences entered by the trial court in this case.

The reports considered by the trial court indicate that the defendant
had been convicted of or pled guilty to five felonies. In 1971, he entered a
plea of guilty to a charge of burglary and was sentenced te an indetermi-
nate to 10-year term at the Colorado State Reformatory. After serving
nine months, he was granted parole, but the parole was revoked approxi-
mately one year later. He was again paroled, and, within six months, his
parole was once more revoked.

In March 1974, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to a charge of
first-degree criminal trespass. This offense occurred while he was on pa-
role. In April 1974, he was sentenced to an indeterminate to 5-year term,
to run consecutively with the sentence imposed with respect to his parole
violation. In July 1974, while incarcerated at the Colorado State Peniten-
tiary, the defendant escaped but was subsequently recaptured. He was
then charged with escape, convicied, and sentenced to an indeterminate to
5-year term. In November 1975, he was paroled, and his parole was again
revoked as the result of a fourth felony conviction.

in July 1976, the defendant was arrested and charged with first-
degree burglary and conspiracy. On September 1, 1976, he entered a plea
of guilty to the charge of conspiracy, and, in October 1976, he was sen-
tenced to the Colorado State Penitentiary for an indeterminate to 5-year
term. He was paroled in April 1978 to the Alcohol Treatment Program at
the Colorado State Hospital, where he remained until May 3, 1978, when
he left without permission and without completing the program.

On May 30, 1978, the defendant was arrested on a charge of commit-
ting aggravated robbery in Denver on May 16, 1978. In October 1978, he
entered a plea of guilty to the crime of robbery, for which he received a
sentence of 8-10 years at the Colorado State Penitentiary.

The foregoing resume does not detail the defendant’s entire record,
but it is more than sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that it
should place primary emphasis on the protection of society, rather than
the rehabilitation of the defendant, in imposing the sentences from which
the defendant appeals. °

ik.

I The defendant also argues that he is entitled to be re-sentenced
under the presumptive sentencing provisions of the 1977 version of House
Bill 1589. In People v. McKenna, 199 Colo. 452, 611 P.2d 574 (1980),
this issue was decided contrary to the defendant’s position. The arguments
now advanced do not persuade us otherwise.

The sentence is affirmed. ,

283

CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES, JUSTICE ERICKSON, and JUS-
TICE DUBOFSKY do not participate.

No. 79SA564

The People of the State of Colorado vy. David K. Fester
(615 P.2d 652)

Decided July 28, 1980. Rehearing denied August 25, 1980.

284 eS

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Susan P. Mele-Sernovitz, Assistant
Attorney General, for plaintiff-appellee.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Norman R. Mueller,
Deputy, for defendant-appellant.

En Banc.
JUSTICE ROVIRA delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 1975, the defendant was convicted by a jury. of aggravated robbery
and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. He was also found to be a
habitual criminal and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 40-80
years.

In 1977, in an unpublished opinion, the Colorado Court of Appeals
affirmed the aggravated robbery and conspiracy convictions, but vacated
the habitual criminal sentence. On April 4, 1978, on remand from the ap-
pellate court, the trial court re-sentenced the defendant to concurrent sen-
tences of 35-40 years for aggravated robbery, and an indeterminate to 10-
year sentence for conspiracy.

On May 2, 1978, the defendant filed a notice of appeal with respect
to the 35-40 year aggravated robbery sentence. See section 18-1-409,
C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8),' and C.A.R. 4(c).

1 At the time of this sentencing, section 18-1-409, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), provided for
“one appellate review of the propriety of the sentence, having regard to the nature of the offense,
the character of the offender, and the public interest, and the manner in which the sentence was
imposed, including the sufficiency and accuracy of the information on which it was based.” Such
appellate review was available for class 2 and class 3 felonies only when the minimum sentence
imposed was more than three years greater than the minimum sentence provided for the offense.
Aggravated robbery is a class 3 felony, see section 18-4-302(3), C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl.
Vol. 8), for which a minimum sentence of five years was authorized, see section 18-1-105(1),
CRS. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

es 285

In July 1978, while the appeal brought pursuant to section 18-1-409
was pending, the defendant filed a motion in the trial court pursuant to
Crim. P. 35(a),? seeking a reduction of the 35-40 year sentence. In Janu-
ary 1979, after a hearing on the Crim. P. 35(a) motion, the trial court re-
duced the sentence to a minimum of 25 years and a maximum of 40 years.
The defendant then filed a notice of appeal with respect to the trial court’s
disposition of the Crim. P. 35(a) motion.

The appeals were consolidated and transferred to this court pursuant
to sections 13-4-102(1)(b) and 13-4-110(1), C.R.S. 1973, because of the
constitutional issues raised by the defendant (see Part IV of this opinion,
infra).

I

The offenses of which the defendant was found guilty occurred in
1973. The defendant and two partners, masked and armed, entered a
Thriftway grocery store. The building was soon surrounded by police, and,
rather than surrendering, one of the defendant’s partners attempted to
take a hostage. There was a struggle, and the hostage escaped, only to be
killed by a police officer outside the store.

The defendant has two pre-1975 felony convictions — a 1959 con-
viction for burglary and a 1963 conviction for robbery and conspiracy.

The defendant was granted probation for the 1959 conviction, but the
probation was subsequently revoked, and the defendant was sentenced to
the state reformatory. He was paroled in June 1960, returned to the re-
formatory as a parole violator in August 1961, and again paroled in July
1962.

In 1963, while on parole pursuant to the 1959 conviction, the defend-
ant was convicted of robbery and conspiracy and sentenced to concurrent
penitentiary terms of 8-15 years and 8-10 years. He was again paroled in
July 1970, but the parole was revoked in September 1970, and the defend-
ant remained in the penitentiary until February 1971.

At the April 4, 1978, re-sentencing hearing, the defendant testified
concerning his efforts at rehabilitation and submitted numerous letters
from employees of the penitentiary attesting to his cooperation and de-
scribing him as a model prisoner. At the January 1979 Crim. P. 35(a)
hearing, five witnesses testified on behalf of the defendant, and each wit-
ness spoke highly of him as a prisoner who had demonstrated success in

2 Crim. P. 35 has been extensively amended, effective November 13, 1979. See Crim. P. 35 (1979
Supp.).

286 ee

rehabilitation.
TE.
Appeal of the Sentence Reduction
Entered Pursuant to the Crim. P. 35(a) Motion

On two alternate bases, we dismiss the appeal of the trial court’s or-
der, entered in January 1979 pursuant to the defendant’s Crim. P. 35(a)
motion, reducing the aggravated robbery sentence from 35-40 years to 25-
40 years. :

HM First, we note that Crim. P. 35(a) provides that “{t}he [trial]
court may not reduce a sentence reviewed by an appellate court pursuant
to C.A.R. 4(c) except as ordered by the reviewing court.” In this case, the
defendant’s appeal under section 18-1-409, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol.
8), and C.A.R. 4(c) was perfected on May 2, 1978. In July 1978, during
the pendency of that appeal, the defendant filed his motion for reduction
of sentence pursuant to Crim. P. 35(a). Under the above-quoted provision
of that rule, however, the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear the
defendant’s motion.? The trial court’s order reducing the aggravated rob-
bery sentence to a term of 25-40 years is therefore void.

I Second, we have recently held that “a defendant has no right to
appea! a denial of his Crim. P. 35(a) motion where the issue before the ap-
pellate court is the propriety of the sentence.” People v. Malacara, 199
Colo. 243, , 606 P.2d 1300, 1303 (1980). The trial court in the in-
stant case reduced the defendant’s sentence after hearing his Crim. P.
35(a) motion. However, in appealing the trial court’s action, the defendant
seeks a further reduction of his sentence. Therefore, for purposes of
Méalacara, supra, the defendant’s appeal is properly treated as an appeal
of the “denial” of a Crim. P. 35(a) motion raising the issue of the “pro-
priety of the sentence.” The appeal must therefore be dismissed.

Til.
Statutory Appeal of the Sentence
Entered on April 4, 1978

The defendant’s appeal under section 18-1-409, C.R.S. 1973
(1978 Repi. Vol. 8), and C.A.R. 4(c) is brought on the grounds that his
35-40 year sentence for aggravated robbery is excessive in light of his
prior record, the circumstances of the offense, and his post-incarceration
conduct.

During the past several years, we have commented at length on the
standards to be applied by a sentencing court and the objectives of appel-
late review of criminal sentences. People v. Warren, 200 Colo.110,
612 P.2d 1124 (1980); Triggs v. People, 197 Colo. 229, 591 P.2d 1024

3 As noted in fn. 2, supra, Crim. P. 35 has been amended, effective November 13, 1979. The por-
tion of the new rule which concerns reduction of sentences, Crim. P. 35(b) (1979 Supp.), does not
contain the language which we have quoted from Crim. P. 35(a).

287

(1979); People v. Strong, 190 Colo. 189, 544 P.2d 966 (1976); People v.
Duran, 188 Colo. 207, 533 P.2d 1116 (1975).

We have reviewed the record in this case, and have applied the stand-
ards articulated in the cited authorities to the 35-40 year sentence for ag-
gravated robbery. We cannot conclude that the sentence was excessive or
that the trial court abused its discretion when it entered the sentence on
April 4, 1978. However, subsequent to this appeal, the defendant may file
a motion in the trial court pursuant to Crim. P. 35(b)(2) (1979 Supp.), as
amended and effective November 13, 1979, seeking reconsideration by
that court of the 35-40 year sentence.

IV.

I] The defendant also argues that he is entitled to be re-sentenced
under the presumptive sentencing provisions of the 1977 version of House
Bill 1589.4 This issue was decided contrary to the defendant’s position in
People v. McKenna, 199 Colo. 452, 611 P.2d 574 (1980), and the argu-
ments advanced in this case do not persuade us to a different view.

The appeal of the January 1979 order of the trial court is dismissed.
The 35-40 year sentence entered by the trial court on April 4, 1978, is af-
firmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES, JUSTICE ERICKSON, and JUS-
TICE DUBOFSKY do not participate.

4 Colo.’Sess. Laws 1977, ch. 216, 861-888.

No. 79SA355

William B. Schoengarth vy. Harold Bray, Sheriff of Jefferson County
(615 P.2d 655)

Decided July 28, 1980. Rehearing denied September 15, 1980.

| 289

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Robert Breindel, Deputy,
for petitioner-appellant.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, John Daniel Dailey, Assistant At-
torney General, for respondent-appellee.

En Banc.

JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant William Schoengarth appeals the denial of habeas corpus
relief in connection with extradition proceedings initiated by Texas. The
trial court discharged the writ and ordered Schoengarth extradited. We
affirm the judgment.

On July 23, 1976, while on parole from a federal sentence, appellant
was arrested and charged with second-degree forgery in a Texas state
court. He remained incarcerated for sixteen months awaiting disposition
of the Texas charge. On October 4, 1977, he pled guilty to the charge and
was sentenced to a term of not less than two nor more than 10 years. His
federal parole having been previously revoked, the Texas court made the
state sentence concurrent with the remainder of his four-year federal sen-
tence, and granted the appellant credit on the state sentence for all presen-
tence confinement since July 23, 1976. The sentence expressly provided
that the appellant was to be released to the custody of the federal authori-
ties to complete the federal sentence, subject, however, to the Texas de-
tainer. Upon completion of the federal sentence he was to be returned to
the Texas Department of Corrections to serve the remainder of the state
sentence,

On October 27, 1977, the appellant was transferred to the federal au-
thorities and served out the balance of his federal sentence in various cor-
rectional institutions, the last of which was the correctional facility at En-
glewood, Colorado. On January 9, 1978, Texas lodged a detainer against
the appellant at the Englewood institution. On March 9, 1979, the appel-
lant was discharged from federal custody, having completed his federal
sentence. However, he was not held by the federal authorities on the Texas
detainer.

Approximately one week after his discharge on the federal sentence,
the appellant was arrested in Jefferson County, Colorado, as a fugitive
from the state of Texas. On April 11, 1979, the Governor of Texas for-
warded requisition documents requesting the appellant’s return to Texas

290 ee

for completion of his sentence. On April 27, 1979, the Governor of Colo-
rado issued his warrant for the arrest of appellant. Upon his arrest the ap-
pellant unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus relief.

Appellant contends on this appeal that Texas waived its right to ex-
tradition by not making a timely effort to reassert custody over him upon
his discharge from the federal sentence. We disagree.

The right of a state to demand the return of a convicted of-
fender emanates from the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. Art.
TV, § 2(2), and the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, section 16-19-101
et seq., C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). A waiver of a state’s right to ex-
tradite will not be presumed from a silent record. Rather, a finding of
waiver requires affirmative evidence of a state’s intent to waive jurisdic-
tion over the fugitive. See, e.g., Massey v. Wilson, 199 Colo. 121, 605
P.2d 469 (1980); Gottfried v. Cronin, 192 Colo. 25, 555 P.2d 969
(1976); In re Patterson, 64 Cal. 2d 357, 411 P.2d 897, 49 Cal. Rptr. 801
(1966).

HI The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act contemplates that the
mere transfer of custody to another jurisdiction will not be deemed a pre-
sumptive or implied waiver of jurisdiction by the demanding state. 11 Uni-
form Laws Annot., Crim. Law and Procedure at 295 (1974); Gottfried v.
Cronin, supra, In re Roessel, 136 Vt. 324, 388 A.2d 835 (1978);
Commonwealth v. Haas, 439 Pa. 39, 266 A.2d 94 (1970). Even when a
state’s actions indicate a lack of eager pursuit of a fugitive or an arguable
lack of interest in his return, courts have been unwilling to find a waiver
from that evidence alone. E.g., Piper v. Estelle, 485 F.2d 245 (Sth Cir.
1973); Gaches v. Third Judicial District, 416 F.Supp. 767 (W.D. Okla.
1976).

II In this case there is no affirmative evidence that Texas intended
to waive jurisdiction over the appellant. Texas filed a detainer against the
appellant while he was still serving his federal sentence in the correctional
institution at Englewood, Colorado. In the absence of any affirmative evi-
dence of waiver, appellant was not entitled to the removal of that detainer
upon his release from federal custody. E.g., Williams v. Department of
Corrections, 438 F.2d 78 (9th Cir. 1971).

Appellant argues that a waiver can be found in the failure of Texas
authorities to be present upon the appellant’s discharge from federal cus-
tody. This argument has no merit. There is nothing in the record indicat-
ing that Texas authorities had prior knowledge of the appellant’s precise
discharge date, nor does the record disclose any reason why the federal au-
thorities did not hold the appellant on the Texas detainer. The record does
show, however, that within a matter of days after his release from federal
custody, Texas manifested sufficient interest in the appellant to request his
arrest in Colorado on the fugitive warrant and to immediately forward to
Colorado the governor’s demand for his return. These actions dispel any

291

notion of waiver by Texas of its right to demand the return of appellant to
that state.

We affirm the judgment which discharged the appellant’s writ of ha-
beas corpus and which ordered his return to the state of Texas.

CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES, JUSTICE ERICKSON and JUS-
TICE DUBOFSKY do not participate.

No. 79SA253

The Joslin Dry Goods Company, a Colorado corporation v. Joseph Dolan,
Executive Director of the Department of Revenue, State of Colorado

(615 P.2d 16)

Decided August 5, 1980. Opinion modified and as modified rehearing denied August
25, 1980. .

292

Ivins, Phillips, & Barker, Eric R. Fox; Grant, McHendrie, Haines
and Crouse, P.C.; Pred & Miller, P.C., David A. Bottger, for plaintiff-
appellee.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Chris J. Eliopulos, Special
Assistant Attorney General, General Legal Services Section, for
defendant-appellant

eS 293

William D. Dexter, General Counsel, for amicus curiae, Multistate
Tax Commission.

Jay T. Schmelter, for amici curiae, Committee on State Taxation and
The Colorado Association of Commerce and Industry.

En Bane.

JUSTICE LEE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Colorado Department of Revenue (department) appeals from an
order of the Denver District Court granting the motion for summary judg-
ment made by the Joslin Dry Goods Company (Joslin). We reverse the ©
judgment of the district court.

Joslin is a Colorado corporation which operates a number of depart-
ment stores in Colorado. During the tax years in issue, 1971 through 1974,
it was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Mercantile Stores Co., Inc., (Mercan-
tile), a Delaware corporation primarily engaged in the operation of full-
line retail department stores and the holding of stock in other corporations
engaged in the operation of retail department stores.

During the tax years in issue, Joslin filed its Colorado corporate in-
come tax returns on a separate accounting basis.1 On January 14, 1976,
the department issued a Notice of Deficiency, assessing $125,452.09 in ad-
ditional taxes and interest for those years.

In order to determine Joslin’s taxable corporate income from sources
in Colorado, the department employed a combined accounting report
based upon the unitary operation of Joslin with Mercantile. Joslin’s corpo-
rate tax for the years in issue was then determined by a three-factor for-
mula method of allocation and apportionment of taxable income based
upon the combined audit report.?

Following an administrative hearing before the deputy director of the
department on December 15, 1976, a Final Determination was issued, up-
holding the assessment. The department concluded that Joslin was part of
a unitary business, that the use of the separate accounting method of re-
porting by Joslin was inadequate since it did not properly reflect income

1A “separate accounting” is a segregation of the business income attributable to a state by a se-
paration on the books of the sales, costs, and expenses resulting from business done within the
state. G. Altman and F. Keesling, Allocation of Income in State Taxation, (Ist ed. 1946) at p.
37.

2 The three-factor formula based on property, payroll, and sales is contained in Article IV of the
Multistate Tax Compact, section 24-60-1301, C.R.S. 1973.

294 ee

from sources within Colorado, and that the only way such income could be
properly determined was through combined reporting.

Joslin appealed the Final Determination, contending that the depart-
ment’s recomputation of its taxable Colorado income by a “combined re-
port” constituted distribution or allocation of gross income and deductions
among affiliated corporations under section 39-22-303(5), C.R.S. 1973,
but that the department had failed to show that such action was necessary
“in order to prevent evasion of taxes,”? as required by the statute. The
district court agreed, holding that the action of the department “falls
squarely within the ambit of section 39-22-303(5), C.R.S. 1973,” but that
the department, by its own admission, had neither alleged nor shown that
such action was necessary to prevent tax evasion.

In reviewing this case, we note that in its Final Determination
the department found that Joslin was a part of a unitary business. The rec-
ognized test for a unitary business is “whether or not the operation of the
portion of the business within the state is dependent upon or contributory
to the operation of the business outside the state.” G. Altman and F. Kees-
ling, supra, fn. 1. Accord, Edison California Stores v. McColgan, 30
Cal. 2d 472, 183 P.2d 16 (1947). In its brief, Joslin stated that the cor-
rectness of the department’s factual determination — that Joslin is a part
of a unitary business — is not an issue before this court. We assume the
correctness of this finding by the department.*

This court has recognized the validity of the unitary concept and
has held that, in apportioning net income of a unitary business between
the states, “a method of allocation is valid if it is fairly calculated to assign
to a state that portion of the net income ‘reasonably attributable’ to the
business transacted in that state.” UPRR v. Heckers, 181 Colo. 374, 509
P.2d 1255 (1973). Joslin does not challenge the reasonableness of the de-
partment’s method of computing the deficiency assessment.5

The sole issue in the case is whether the department can require
Joslin to file a combined report® in light of the language found in section
39-22-303(5). That section states:

“In case of two or more corporations, whether domestic or foreign, owned
or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the executive di-
rector may distribute or allocate the gross income and deductions between
or among such corporations or may require returns on a consolidated

3 This phrase was deleted in 1979, See Colo. Sess. Laws 1979, ch. 373, 39-22-303(6) at 1445.

4 In its amended order on Joslin’s motion for summary judgment, the district court stated that it
could find no genuine issue of material fact.

5 Joslin also waived any challenge to the constitutionality of the unitary business concept, of com-
bined reporting, or of the allocation formula used by the department; and to the power of the de-
partment to apply the unitary business concept to a single, unaffiliated corporation.

® A combined reporting sysiem is alternatively referred to by the courts and the commentators as
“formula allocation method” and “unitary apportionment method.”

re 295

basis, if deemed necessary, in order to prevent evasion of taxes and to
clearly reflect income.”

The department asserts that the dual criteria — evasion of
taxes and clear reflection of income — found in section 39-22-303(5) do
not control the department’s authority to require a combined report since
the combined report is “only a device to ascertain the income attributable
to the [in-state] business activity of the taxpaying corporation.”
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Lenckos, 77 Ill. App.3d 90, 395 N.E.2d 1167
(1979). We recognize that a combined report is distinct from the “consoli-
dated return” referred to in the statute. See Keesling, “A Current Look at
the Combined Report and Uniformity in Allocation Practices,” 42 J. of
Taxation 106 (Feb. 1975); G. Altman and F. Keesling, supra; Rudolph,
“State Taxation of Interstate Business: The Unitary Business Concept and
Affiliated Corporate Groups,” 25 Tax. L. Rev. 71 (1970); Keesling &
Warren, “The Unitary Concept in the Allocation of Income,” 12
Hastings, L. J. 42 (1960).

Hl Section 39-22-303(5) provides that the department may distrib-
ute or allocate income and deductions, or may require returns on a consoli-
dated basis. We conclude that it is that statutory provision for distribution
and allocation of income and deductions which authorizes the department
to require combined reports since a combined report does allocate or ap-
portion income. See Keesling, supra; Coca Cola Company v.
Department of Revenue, 271 Or. 517, 533 P.2d 788 (1975). :

The law in other jurisdictions which have addressed this issue is clear
— the power of the taxing authority to require a combined report is inde-
pendent of the power to require a consolidated return.

The leading case in this area is Edison California Stores v.
McColgan, supra. In that case, the court interpreted statutory language
which was almost identical to the Colorado statute at issue here.

The plaintiff in Edison California Stores argued that the statute did
not authorize the tax commissioner to apply the formula allocation
method (combined reporting) to a California corporation, and even if the
commissioner had the authority, application of the method was arbitrary
and unreasonable since there was no issue of tax evasion.

The California court held that the authority to apply the formula al-
location method
“... is not derived from the authority to require the filing of
consolidated returns, since the latter indicates that the income of the
group will be taxed as a unit. The power flows from the authorized
method of ascertaining the income attributable to a taxpayer’s
activities within the state; and by a parity of reasoning the authority to
pursue the method is present whenever activities are partially within and
partially without the state... .” Edison California Stores, supra.
(Emphasis added.)

po

296 PO )

Accord Zale-Salem, Inc. v. Tax Commission, 237 Or. 261, 391 P.2d
601 (1964). See Keesling & Warren, supra. The California court also
held that “[t]ax evasion is not a factor which must be present before the
formula allocation method may be employed.” (Emphasis added.)

In Caterpillar Tractor Co., supra, Caterpillar argued that Edison
California Stores was not controlling since Illinois had an express ban on
consolidated returns in the reporting of Illinois corporate income tax. The
Illinois court held that such a ban was “irrelevant to a determination of
whether the unitary method of apportionment is to be used in Illinois,” re-
lying on the California court’s determination that “the power [to require
combined reporting] was not dependent on the power to require consoli-
dated returns.” Caterpillar Tractor Co., supra.

In support of its position, Joslin relies on the holding in Interstate
Finance Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Tax., 28 Wis.2d 262, 137 N.W.2d
38 (1965). In that case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to follow
Edison California Stores because it found that the Wisconsin statutes
did not authorize the department to require a consolidated return. The
court found that difference “significant and controlling.”

HL We do not find the reasoning in Interstate Finance Corp. per-
suasive. As the California court held, the power to require combined re-
ports is not based upon the authority to require consolidated returns.”

Joslin contends that, even if section 39-22-303(5) authorizes com-
bined reports, the department may only require such a report after making
a showing that one is necessary in order to both prevent tax evasion and
reflect income. We do not agree. See Edison California Stores, supra.

As we construe section 39-22-303(5), the legislature provided sepa-
tate methods which the department is authorized to employ in order to
carry out the legislative intent to “tax all the income that Colorado can
constitutionally tax,” Coors v. Colorado, 183 Colo. 325, 517 P.2d 838
(1973), by taxing “the net income of every corporation derived from
sources within this state.” Gen’! Motors v. Colo., 181 Colo. 360, 509
P.2d 1260 (1973).

HH Pursuant to section 39-22-303(5), the department may distrib-
ute or allocate the income of corporations owned or controlled by the same
interests if it concludes that that is the most effective method of taxing
“all the income that Colorado can constitutionally tax.” Coors vy.
Colorado, supra. See section 39-22-301(1), C.R.S. 1973. Alternatively,
the department may require such corporations to file a consolidated return
if it deems that one is necessary “in order to prevent evasion of taxes and
to clearly reflect income.”

7 We note that a number of commentators have concluded that the Wisconsin court misinterpreted
Edison California Stores. See Keesling, supra, and Rudolph, supra.

eS 297

Thus, the department need not show that a Colorado corpora-

tion, such as Joslin, which is part of a unitary business, is attempting to
evade taxes in order to require that that corporation submit a combined
report. To interpret the statute differently would defeat the intent of the
legislature to tax all income “reasonably attributable to [the taxpayer’s]
business activities in this state.” Gen’l Motors v. Colo., supra. As the Il-
linois court noted in Caterpillar Tractor Co., supra:
“The major advantage of the unitary method is that, with regard to the
taxation of a parent company and its various subsidiaries, there is no ele-
vation of form over substance. Without the unitary method there would be
a different tax application for an integrated business which is run as a
number of separate corporations rather than a single multistate corpora-
tion. (See Coca-Cola Co. v. Department of Revenue, (Or. 1975), 533
P.2d 788). Since the whole point of the income tax act is to ascertain that
portion of the business which is done within the state, there is no reason to
find different results based simply on the formal structure of the busi-
ness.” ‘

Hs sJoslin argues that the interpretation of section 39-22-303(5)
that we here adopt would result in an unconstitutional delegation of legis-
lative power to the department because it would render the statute without
any guidelines for the exercise of its discretionary power to allocate in-
come and deductions. We do not agree. The guidelines are found in the
obligation of the corporate taxpayer to pay an income tax “equal to five
percent of the net income from sources within Colorado” (section 39-22-
301(1)) and the duty of the department to ascertain the net income attrib-
utable to sources within Colorado in order to effectuate the intent of the
legislature.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further pro-
ceedings consonant with the views expressed herein.

CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES does not participate.

298
No. 79SC130

Robert A. Gandy y. Park National Bank,
a National Banking Institution

(615 P.2d 20)

Decided August 5, 1980.

es 299

Ware and Marroney, David E. Ware, for petitioner.

William F. Mattoon, for respondent.

En Bane.

JUSTICE LEE delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals in
Park National Bank v. Gandy, 42 Colo. App. 203, 595 P.2d 704 (1979).
We now reverse.

The facts are not in dispute. On February 28, 1975, the U.S. Na-
tional Mortgage Company borrowed $25,000 from respondent, Park Na-
tional Bank (bank), giving two promissory notes, one for $15,000 due in
ninety days, and one for $10,000 due in sixty days. The interest rate on
both notes was eleven and one-half percent. On the same day, petitioner,
Robert A. Gandy, executed a “Continuing Guaranty” of the notes with in-
dividual liability not to exceed $15,000.

On April 28, 1975, Gandy mailed a letter of revocation of the guar-
anty, which was admittedly received by the bank. At that time, the bal-
ance on one note was $15,000 and on the other was $3,000. Subsequent to
Gandy’s revocation, the bank extended the date of payment on each note
four times, and on one extension increased the rate of interest on the notes
to thirteen percent. Gandy was not informed of these actions by the bank.

In September 1976, the bank brought an action against Gandy to re-
cover on the notes. The district court found that Gandy continued to be li-
able on the guaranty, and entered judgment against Gandy for $15,000.

The court of appeals affirmed, holding that “the guaranty expressly
authorized extensions and renewals as well as changes in the interest
rate,” and that “no new indebtedness was created after defendant revoked
his guaranty.” Park National Bank v. Gandy, supra.

In interpreting a contract of guaranty, this court has held that
“Tt}he liability of the guarantor is not to be extended by implication be-
yond the express limits or terms of the instrument, or its plain intent. It
has been said that a guarantor is like a surety, a favorite of the law.”
Burkhardt v. Bank, 127 Colo. 251, 256 P.2d 234 (1953).

The contract of guaranty signed by Gandy states in pertinent part:
“(1) . . . The word ‘indebtedness’ is used herein in its most comprehen-
sive sense and includes any and all advances, debts, obligations and liabili--
ties of Borrowers or any one or more of them, heretofore, now, or here-
after made, incurred or created, whether voluntary or involuntary and

300 Pe)

however arising, whether due or not due, absolute or contingent, liqui-
dated or unliquidated ....

“(2) . . . This is a continuing guaranty relating to any indebtedness, in-
cluding that arising under successive transactions which shall either con-
tinue the indebtedness or from time to time renew it after it has been
satisfied. This guaranty shall not apply to any indebtedness created after
actual receipt by Bank of written notice of its revocation as to future
transactions ....

“(4) Guarantors authorize Bank, without notice or demand and without
affecting their liability hereunder, from time to time to (a) renew, com-
promise, extend, accelerate or otherwise change the time for payment of,
or otherwise change the terms of the indebtedness or any part thereof, in-
cluding increase or decrease of the rate of interest thereon . . . .”

We are concerned here with whether the extension of the payment
date on the debt by the bank “created” an indebtedness after the bank had
received written notice of Gandy’s revocation of his guaranty. We con-
clude that it did.

The term “indebtedness,” as defined in the contract of guar-
anty, specifically includes a debt “arising under successive transactions
which shall either continue the indebtedness or from time to time renew
it.” Thus, any extension or renewal of the original debt is an “indebted-
ness”’ within the express language of the guaranty.

The contract further provides that the guaranty shall not apply
to an indebtedness if it is created “after actual receipt by Bank of written
notice of its revocation as to future transactions.” In this case, the bank
“created” an indebtedness by granting to the borrower an extension of the
original debt after it had received notice of Gandy’s revocation. By doing
so, we hold that the bank relieved Gandy of liability for the indebtedness.
To hold otherwise would render without meaning the express authority to
revoke the contract of guaranty contrary to the fundamental rule that a
contract must be construed as a whole and effect given, if possible, to
every provision. Pub. Util. v. Durango, 171 Colo. 553, 469 P.2d 131
(1970); Brown v. Brown, 161 Colo. 67, 419 P.2d 444 (1966).

This conclusion is consistent with the generally recognized rule
that, unless specifically provided for “in clear and unequivocal terms,”
Straus-Frank Co. v. Hughes, 138 Tex. 50, 156 S.W.2d 519 (1941), “a
continuing guaranty does not cover renewals, after revocation, of obliga-
tions which were covered by the guaranty at the time of revocation.”
Southern California First National Bank v. Olsen, 41 Cal. App.3d
234, 116 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1974); Bank of United States v. Andron, 155
Misc. 21, 277 N.Y.S. 594 (1934); Annot. 100 A.L.R. 1236 (1936).

es 301

In Southern California First National Bank v. Olsen, supra, the
contract of guaranty provided that that guaranty “‘shall not apply to any
indebtedness created after actual receipt by Bank of written notice of its
revocation as to future transactions.” The contract also provided that an
indebtedness included “all renewals and extensions . . . .”” In that case,
the note was renewed by the bank at a higher rate of interest after the
bank had received notice of revocation from the guarantor. The California
court held that the bank’s action created a new indebtedness which was
not covered by the contract of guaranty. Accord Merchants’ Nat. Bank
v. Cressey, 164 Iowa 721, 146 N.W. 761 (1914); Bedford y. Kelley, 173
Mich. 492, 139 N.W. 250 (1913).1

Although both the court of appeals and respondent bank cite First
New Jersey Bank v. F.L.M. Business Machines, Inc., 130 N.J. Super.
151, 325 A.2d 843 (1974) in support of the proposition that an extension
or renewal does not create a new indebtedness, we find that case to be con-
sistent with the general rule as stated above.

In First New Jersey Bank, the guaranty provided that it could be
terminated by written notice, but that the guarantor “‘shall nevertheless
remain liable with respect to the aforesaid Obligations ... and any
renewals, extensions, or other liabilities arising out of the same .. . .””
First New Jersey Bank v. F.L.M. Business Machines, Inc., supra.
(Emphasis added.) The guaranty thus specifically provided that revocation
would not terminate the liability of the guararitor upon renewal or exten-
sion of the debt. Accord, Brenton Bank & Trust Co., Clarion v.
Beisner, 268 N.W.2d 196 (Iowa 1978).

We find ample support, both in the language of the contract of guar-
anty before us and in the case law, for the conclusion that Gandy was re-
lieved of liability for transactions entered into by the bank after it had re-
ceived notice of his revocation of the guaranty as to future transactions.

The judgment is reversed with directions that the case be remanded
to the district court for entry of judgment of dismissal in favor of Gandy.

JUSTICE ROVIRA dissents.

CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES does not participate

JUSTICE ROVIRA dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The language of the guaranty agreement exe-
cuted by Gandy permits the extension of the date of payment of the

1 Cf. American City Bank v. Tourtelot, 86 Cal. App. 3d 585, 150 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1978) (In-
debtedness renewed by bank after it had received notice of guarantor’s death. Estate of guarantor
held Jiable under guaranty which provided: ““Either before or after revocation hereof . . . the
bank may alter, compromise, accelerate, extend or change the time or manner for the payment of
any indebtedness.” (Emphasis added.))

302 |

guaranteed promissory note. By extending the date of payment, the re-
spondent did not create a new indebtedness. Rather, it took a course of ac-
tion affecting the existing indebtedness, clearly contemplated by the guar-
anty contract.

Conclusions as to the scope of a guaranty agreement must be based
on the language of the particular agreement. In this case, the authority
given to the respondent bank in paragraph 4 of the guaranty agreement to
“renew, compromise, extend, accelerate, or otherwise change the time for
payment” is to be read in conjunction with paragraph 1, which defines
“indebtedness,” and paragraph 2, which provides that the guaranty relates
to “any indebtedness, including that arising under successive transactions
which shall either continue the indebtedness or from time to time renew it
after it has been satisfied.”

My reading of the agreement leads to the conclusion that a new “in-
debtedness” was not created when the respondent extended the note, for to
create means “to bring into existence: make out of nothing and for the
first time.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1971). Fur-
ther, the funds were borrowed by the mortgage company before the letter
of revocation was issued by Gandy. Extensions of the existing notes were
made as contemplated by the guaranty agreement, but these extensions
continued the prior obligation and did not create any new obligation.

I cannot agree with the majority opinion in its attempt to distinguish
First New Jersey Bank v. F.L.M. Business Machines, Inc., 130 N.J.
Super. 151, 325 A.2d 843 (1974). In that case, the guaranty agreement
provided that the guarantor “shall nevertheless remain liable with respect
to the aforesaid Obligations . . . and any renewals, extensions, or other
liabilities arising out of the same.” Id. 130 N.J. Super. at 156, 325 A.2d
at 846. The majority finds no similar language in the guaranty agreement
involved in this case, but, in my view, a fair reading of that agreement
leads to the conclusion that Gandy authorized renewals and extensions of
the note and guaranteed the payment of the indebtedness as it would from
time to time be continued or renewed. I would affirm.

303
No. 79SA427

The People of the State of Colorado y. Leroy Cunningham
(614 P.2d 886)

Decided August 5, 1980.

pO

304 ee

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Kathleen M. Bowers, Assistant At-
torney General, for plaintiff-appellee.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Terri L. Brake, Deputy, for
defendant-appellant.

En Bane.

JUSTICE ROVIRA delivered the opinion of the Court.

In November 1977, the defendant was charged in a five-count infor-
mation with two counts of first-degree assault,! one count of aggravated
robbery,? and two habitual criminal counts.

After initially entering pleas of not guilty, the defendant entered a
plea of guilty to one count of first-degree assault and one count of aggra-
vated robbery.4 The remaining counts were dismissed on the motion of
the district attorney.

On November 8, 1978, the trial court sentenced the defendant to con-
current terms of not less than 28 nor more than 40 years on the counts of
first-degree assault and aggravated robbery.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the sentences are excessive>
and that he is entitled to resentencing under the presumptive sentencing
provisions of the 1977 version of House Bill 1589.6 We affirm the sen-
tence imposed by the trial court.

I

The defendant argues: (1) that the concurrent sentences of 28-40
years are excessive in view of his psychiatric problems; and (2) that the
trial court did not give proper consideration to the possibility of

1 Section 18-3-202, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).
2 Section 18-4-302, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

3 Section 16-13-101, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

+ Prior to accepting the defendant's plea of guilty, the trial court appointed two psychiatrists to ex-
amine the defendant for the purpose of determining his competency to proceed. Section 16-8-110,
CRS. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). Both psychiatrists filed reports in which they concluded that the
defendant was competent to proceed.

5 In the circumstances of this case, section 18-1-409, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), provides
for one appellate review of the propriety of the sentence having regard to the nature of the offense,
the character of the offender, the public interest, and the manner in which the sentence was im-
posed.

® Colo. Sess. Laws 1977, ch. 216, 861-888. The defendant’s appeal was transferred to this court
from the court of appeals pursuant to sections 13-4-102(1)(b) and 13-4-110(1), C.RS. 1973, be-
cause of constitutional issues raised with respect to the 1977 version of House Bill 1589.

eS 305

rehabilitation, crucial because of the defendant’s “tender age of twenty-
three years.”

There can be no doubt that rehabilitation is an important factor
for the trial court to consider when imposing sentence. However, there are
other factors to be placed on the scales, and these must be carefully
weighed in arriving at a sentence which does justice to both the defendant
and society. Triggs v. People, 197 Colo. 229, 591 P.2d 1024 (1979);
People v. Duran, 188 Colo. 207, 533 P.2d 1116 (1975).

A review of the record discloses that, prior to sentencing, the district
attorney and defense counsel had entered into plea discussions and, pur-
suant to section 16-7-302, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8), had
disclosed their tentative agreement to the trial judge. The trial judge, at
the request of counsel and upon their representations of what the pre-
sentence report would contain, indicated the range of sentences he would
impose on the defendant.”

At the time the defendant entered his plea of guilty, he knew what
the sentence would be and knowingly accepted that sentence in exchange
for the dismissal of one count of first-degree assault, two habitual criminal
counts, and another case in which he was charged with aggravated rob-
bery.

The offenses to which the defendant pled guilty were committed on
October 16, 1977. Jozef Krawczyk, a cab driver, was approached by the
defendant and the defendant’s companion, Mark Hatten. The defendant
held a knife to the cab driver’s head and asked for his money. After ob-
taining only five dollars, the defendant demanded more money. Krawezyk
then attempted to escape, and the defendant stabbed him three times in
the back. After Hatten kicked and tripped him, the defendant repeatedly
stabbed Krawezyk in the chest.

Two police officers arrived on the scene, and the defendant fled, with
Officer Kenny in pursuit. After the officer stopped the defendant and at-
tempted to handcuff him, the defendant struck the officer and stabbed
him three times in the side and arm. When other officers arrived on the
scene, the defendant held Officer Kenny in front of him, placed a knife at
his neck, and released him only on the other officers’ command at gun-
point. As a result of the defendant’s acts, Krawczyk and Officer Kenny
were both hospitalized, and Officer Kenny suffered a partial loss of the
use of his left hand.

7 Section 16-7-302, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8), provides that, although the trial
judge shall not participate in plea discussions, he may, upon request of the parties, permit the dis-
closure to him of the tentative agreement and the reasons for that agreement. The judge may then
indicate whether he will concur in the proposed disposition. See Sober v. District Court, 197
Colo. 250, 592 P.2d 400 (1979). In the instant case, the propriety of the procedure followed is not
before us.

po

306 ee

The defendant has prior felony convictions arising from two criminal
episodes. In July 1975, he was found guilty by a jury of two counts of ag-
gravated robbery, two counts of felony menacing, and one count of sec-
ond-degree burglary. In August 1975, in another case, the defendant pled
guilty to robbery. In September 1975, he was sentenced to concurrent
terms of indeterminate to 15 years for the aggravated robbery, and lesser
sentences for the other offenses.

The defendant was paroled 15 months later and was still on parole
when he committed the crimes for which he received the sentences which
he now claims are excessive.

The offenses to which the defendant pled guilty were violent
crimes which resulted in serious bodily injury to a citizen and to a uni-
formed police officer. A civilized society cannot tolerate violence and may,
with reason and compassion, take such steps as are necessary to protect its
citizens and those whose duty it is to protect them.

The trial court gave the defendant ample notice of its intention
to impose the 28-40 year sentence. The court repeatedly reminded the de-
fendant of what the sentence would be when it advised him, at the time of
the acceptance of his plea of guilty, pursuant to Crim. P. 11. At no time
did the defendant or his counsel protest the sentence or raise an objection
that the trial court was not properly exercising its discretion in imposing
the sentence, The defendant cannot now, after benefitting from the plea
bargain, claim that he has been unjustly sentenced.

Il.

I] The defendant also argues that he is entitled to be re-sentenced
under the presumptive sentencing provisions of the 1977 version of House
Bill 1589. In People v. McKenna, 199 Colo. 452, 611 P.2d 574 (1980),
this issue was decided contrary to the defendant’s position. The arguments
now advanced do not persuade us otherwise.

The sentence is affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES does not participate.

307

No. 79SA575

The People of the State of Colorado y. Alfredo Ramos Espinosa
(614 P.2d 889)

Decided August 5, 1980.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Lynne Ford, Assistant Attorney

308 ee
General, for plaintiff-appellee.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Terri L. Brake, Deputy, for
defendant-appellant.

En Banc.

JUSTICE ROVIRA delivered the opinion of the Court.

The defendant was initially charged in August 1978, in Criminal Ac-
tion No. 11077, with one count of first-degree assault’ and two habitual
criminal counts.? Subsequently, an additional count charging second-
degree assault? was filed, and, on motion of the district attorney, the first-
degree assault count was dismissed. The habitual criminal counts were dis-
missed by the trial court on motion of the defendant.

On February 26, 1979, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to the
charge of second-degree assault. °

In January 1979, in Criminal Action No. 79CR26, the defendant was
charged with two counts of second-degree assault and one count of man-
datory sentence for violent crime.4 On February 26, 1979, the defendant
entered a plea of guilty to the charge of second-degree assault, and, on
motion of the district attorney, the remaining two counts were dismissed.

On March 26, 1979, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term
of not less than 7 nor more than 10 years in each of the two cases, with the
sentences to be served concurrently.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the sentences are excessive®
and that he is entitled to resentencing under the presumptive sentencing
provisions of the 1977 version of House Bill 1589.6 We affirm the sen-

_tenées entered by the trial court.

1 Section 18-3-202, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

2 Section 16-13-101, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

3 Section 18-3-203, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

4 Section 16-11-309, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

5 In the circumstances of this case, section 18-1-409, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), provides
for one appellate review of the propriety of the sentence having regard to the nature of the offense,
the character of the offender, the public interest, and the manner in which the sentence was im-
posed.

& Colo. Sess. Laws 1977, ch. 216, 861-888. The defendant’s appeal was transferred to this court
from the court of appeals pursuant to sections 13-4-102(1)(b) and 13-4-110(1), C.R.S. 1973, be-
cause of constitutional issues raised with respect to the 1977 version of House Bill 1589.

a 309

I.

The defendant argues that the sentences are excessive for the follow-
ing reasons: (1) the minimum sentence that could be imposed’ was two
years;’ (2) the probation department recommended that the sentence be
for a moderate period of time; (3) the defendant is not a hardened crimi-
nal who commits serious or vicious crimes; and (4) the length of the sen-
tence gives the defendant little chance for rehabilitation.

The standards applicable to appellate review of sentences have been
stated in numerous opinions of this court, and little benefit would be
gained by repetition. People v. Warren, 200 Colo. 110, 612 P.2d
1124 (1980); Triggs v. People, 197 Colo. 229, 591 P.2d 1024 (1979);
People v. Strong, 190 Colo. 189, 544 P.2d 966 (1976); People v. Duran,
188 Colo. 207, 533 P.2d 1116 (1975).

HH Our duty is to examine the record and test the sentence imposed
by the trial court against those standards and against the specific provi-
sions of section 18-1-409, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

Here, the record supports the sentence. In Criminal Action No.
11077, the defendant stabbed another man, and, in Criminal Action No.
79CR26, the defendant, while armed with a hammer, participated in the
beating of a man in a downtown Greeley store.

The defendant, although only 21 years of age at the time of sentenc-
ing, had been convicted of two prior felonies. In October 1976, he pled
guilty in one case to the class 4 felony of engaging in a riot,® and, in an-
other case, he pled guilty to attempted second-degree burglary,® a class 5
felony.

The defendant was granted probation for both offenses. In 1979, a pe-
tition for revocation of probation was filed because of the charges made in
Criminal Action No. 79CR26. This petition for revocation was dismissed
on February 26, 1979, as a result of the defendant’s plea of guilty to sec-
ond-degree assault in the cases which are here the subject of review.

All of the foregoing information, and more, was available to the trial
court, .

The defendant’s acts of violence, his failure to take advantage of the
rehabilitative opportunity offered to him in 1976 when he was granted
probation, and his continued and repeated illegal activities warranted the
sentences from which he appeals.

7 Pursuant to section 16-11-201, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), the defendant was not eligible
for probation because of two prior felony convictions. At the time of the sentencing in this case,
section 16-11-101(1)(d), CRS, 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), provided that a person who had been
convicted of a felony within five years prior to the date of the offense for which he is being sen-
tenced would not be eligible for an indeterminate sentence. Under section 16-11-101(1)(d), the
minimum sentence for second-degree assault, a class 4 felony, was 2 years.

® Section 18-9-104, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

® Sections 18-4-203 and 18-2-101, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

310 ee)

IL.

I The defendant also argues that he is entitled to be re-sentenced
under the presumptive sentencing provisions of the 1977 version of House
Bill 1589. In People v. McKenna, 199 Colo. 452, 611 P.2d 574 (1980),
this issue was decided contrary to the defendant’s position. The arguments
now advanced do not persuade us otherwise.

The sentences are affirmed. .

CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES does not participate.

No. 79SA399

Emanuel Weibert, Jeris A. Danielson, State Engineer, and James R.
Clark, Division Engineer, for Water Division No. 1 y. Rothe Brothers,
Inc., and City and County of Denver, acting by and through its Board of
Water Commissioners, Bijou Irrigation District and Bijou Irrigation
Company

(618 P.2d 1367)

Decided August 5, 1980. Rehearing denied September 22, 1980. Opinion
modified and as modified rehearing denied November 10, 1980.

“
=
a)

312

Musick, Williamson, Schwartz, Leavenworth & Cope, P.C., Stephen
T. Williamson, John B. Houtchens, for Emanuel Weibert.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Dennis M. Montgomery,
Assistant, for State Engineer and Division Engineer.

David J. Miller, James A. Gustafson, for Rothe Brothers, Inc.

es 313

Wayne D. Williams, Michael L. Walker, for City and County of
Denver.

En Banc.

JUSTICE LOHR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Upon the application of Rothe Brothers, Inc. (Rothe) the water court
issued a judgment and decree which awarded a water right for a new irri-
gation well, granted a change of point of diversion for an existing irriga-
tion well, and approved a plan for augmentation. The state engineer and
Emanuel W. Weibert’ appealed. We reverse.

Rothe filed an application in the water court on February 10, 1977,
for a water right for a proposed well (Rothe well) in the amount of 1.78
cfs for irrigation purposes. The water was to be used to irrigate 130 acres
of land (Rothe land) surrounding the well site near the South Platte River
in Morgan County. In that application Rothe also sought approval of a
plan for augmentation under which Rothe would commit 15 private rights
of Riverside Reservoir & Land Co. for use to replace to the South Platte
River the water to be diverted by the Rothe well.

Thereafter, Rothe filed an amended application, requesting additional
relief. Rothe sought a change of point of diversion and place of use to per-
mit diversions to be made from the Rothe well for application to the Rothe
land based upon the water right (Furrow water right) decreed to another
well (Furrow well) on August 19, 1974, in the amount of 1.11 cfs, for irri-
gation purposes, with the appropriation date of April 1, 1937. The Rothe
well is approximately 30 miles downstream from the Furrow well, with
reference to the South Platte River. The Furrow water right had been
used to irrigate 130 acres of land surrounding the Furrow well. The Fur-
row well was to be plugged and abandoned if the change in point of diver-
sion were granted.

The water court found that the change in return flow pattern incident
to change of the point of diversion of the Furrow right to the Rothe well
would reduce flow in the South Platte River by 55 acre feet between No-
vember 17 and June 7 of each year. As we interpret the decree of the
water court, the following relief was granted: (1) The point of diversion of
the Furrow water right was changed to the Rothe well, but diversions were

1 Weibert is the owner of a well near Rothe’s new irrigation well.

314 ee

limited to 212 acre feet per annum;? (2) 0.67 cfs was decreed to the Rothe well
for irrigation purposes, with an appropriation date of April 7, 1978 (Rothe
water right), but diversions were limited to 55 acre feet per annum;? (3) the
Rothe land was designated as the intended place of use of the Furrow water right
. and the Rothe water right; (4) Rothe was required to make available to the state
engineer 55 acre feet of surface water per annum from 15 private rights of
Riverside Reservoir & Land Co. in order to meet any valid call of a prior
appropriator;* and (5) the Furrow well was required to be closed permanently.
The appellants assert, and we agree, that:the water court erred in
three principal respects: (1) by ruling that the doctrine of res judicata pre-
vented consideration of historical use of the Furrow well from the April 1,
1937, appropriation date to the August 19, 1974, adjudication date of the
Furrow water right, for the purpose of determining whether the change of
point of diversion would adversely affect rights of others; (2) by refusing
to consider evidence concerning the Riverside Reservoir & Land Co.
rights for the purpose of determining the adequacy of the plan for aug-
mentation; and (3) by failing to include in the decree the provision ri
quired by section 37-92-304(6), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), retaining juris-
diction to reconsider the decree on the question of injury to the vested
rights of others.

lL
The application for change of point of diversion and change in place
of use with respect to the Furrow water right constitutes an application for
a “change of water right.” Section 37-92-103(5), C.R.S. 1973.5 The

2 Although the decree does not specify the source of this limitation, and the exhibits were not
made part of the record in this court, the briefs in the trial court indicate that 212 acre feet is the
amount of water which must be applied annually to grow pasture grass on the Furrow land. We
may infer that the trial judge concluded that the decree for the Furrow water right established
that the Furrow water right had been used in an optimum manner and as the sole source of water
to produce pasture grass on the Furrow land. At a pumping rate of 1.11 cfs approximately 93 days
pumping for 24 hours a day would be necessary to achieve this production.

3 We infer, although in absence of the exhibits the record does not establish, that 267 (i.e., 212
55) acre feet must be applied to the Rothe land annually to grow corn, the crop typically grown in
the area of the Rothe land. The decree contains no provision to permit the Rothe water right to be
exercised out of priority. Rothe has been operating the Rothe well under a temporary plan for aug-
mentation permitting diversions out of priority in return for supply of replacement water through
contracts between Rothe and Groundwater Appropriators of the South Platte River Basin, Inc.
(GASP). That temporary plan was approved pursuant to section 37-92-307(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973, re-
pealed by Colo. Sess. Laws 1977, ch. 483, section 6 at 1704. It appears from the briefs that Rothe
plans to make out-of-priority diversions based on the Rothe water right by utilization of replace-
ment water obtained through GASP contracts, under an arrangement with the state engineer. See
section 37-92-501.5, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.). The arrangement with respect to GASP replace-
ment water is not part of the plan for augmentation approved by the water court.

4 The findings indicate that this condition should be limited to the period from November 17 to
June 7 when the diversions based upon the Furrow water right will cause loss to the river. The de-
cretal language is not so limited.

5 “Change of water right” means a change in the type, place, or time of use, a change in the point
of diversion . . . .” Section 37-92-103(5), C.R.S. 1973.

es 315

application to commit 15 private rights of Riverside Reservoir & Land Co.
for use as replacement water constitutes a “plan for augmentation.” Sec-
tion 37-92-103(9), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).®

The standard by which an application for a change of water right or

for approval of a plan for augmentation is to be evaluated is set forth in
section 37-92-305(3), C.R.S. 1973, as follows:
“A change of water right or plan for augmentation, including water ex-
change project, shall be approved if such change or plan will not injuri-
ously affect the owner of or persons entitled to use water under a vested
water right or a decreed conditional water right. If it is determined that
the proposed change or plan as presented in the application would cause
such injurious effect, the referee or the water judge, as the case may be,
shall afford the applicant or any person opposed to the application an op-
portunity to propose terms or conditions which would prevent such injuri-
ous effect.”

The appellants contend that the 212 acre feet per annum transferred
to the Rothe well greatly exceeds actual historical diversions from the Fur-
tow well. The appellants urge that to permit diversions to be increased to
212 acre feet per annum at the new point of diversion based on the Furrow
water right will injuriously affect others, contrary to section 37-92-305(3),
C.R.S. 1973. It is the appellants’ position that Rothe has the burden of
proving actual historical use of the Furrow well in order to establish that
the decreed change of point of diversion and plan for augmentation will
not cause such injurious effect. The water court ruled that the original de-
cree was res judicata as to the historical use of the Furrow well during the
period beginning: with the date of appropriation and ending with the date
of the decree awarding the Furrow water right.’ For this reason it refused
to consider any evidence of actual historical use.

I.

Well-established principles of water law form the background for our
consideration of the issues in this case.

A water right is a property right. Green v. Chaffee Ditch
Co., 150 Colo. 91, 371 P.2d 775 (1962); Farmers Highline Canal &

© “Plan for augmentation’ means a detailed program to increase the supply of water available for
beneficial use in a division or portion thereof by the development of new or alternate means or
points of diversion, by a pooling of water resources, by water exchange projects, by providing sub-
stitute supplies of water, by the development of new sources of water, or by any other appropriate
means.” Section 37-92-103(9), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).

7 The water court did not set forth in its decree an explanation for its determination that the de-
cree awarding the Furrow water right was res judicata as to the annual production of 212 acre
feet. We infer that the water court considered the decree to have established continued beneficial
use from the date of appropriation to the date of the decree. The exhibits apparently reflected that
212 acre feet of water per annum must be applied to the Furrow land optimally to grow pasture
grass, the crop grown on the Furrow land. The court considered that to be the amount which could
be, and therefore pursuant to the decree had been, beneficially used. See footnote 2.

316 ee

Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d 629 (1954). One of
the incidents of a water right is the right to change the point of diversion
or place of use. Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., supra; Cline v. McDowell,
132 Colo. 37, 284 P.2d 1056 (1955); Farmers Highline Canal &
Reservoir Co. v. City af Golden, supra. That right is qualified in that
injury to others must not result from the change. Cline v. McDowell,
supra; Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden,
supra, City of Colorado Springs v. Yust, 126 Colo. 289, 249 P.2d 151
(1952); Brighton Ditch Co. v. Englewood, 124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116
(1951); Enlarged Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John’s Flood
Ditch Co., 116 Colo. 589, 183 P.2d 556 (1947); Section 37-92-305(3),
C.R.S. 1973. It is the burden of the applicant to show that injury will not
result from a proposed change. E.g., Farmers Highline Canal &
Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, supra; Trinchera Ranch Co. v.
Trinchera Irrigation District, 83 Colo. 451, 266 P. 204 (1928). If the
water judge determines that injury will result from the proposed change,
the applicant and the persons opposed to the application must be given an
opportunity to propose terms or conditions which would prevent the injuri-
ous effect. Section 37-92-305(3), C.R.S. 1973; see City of Colorado
Springs v. Yust, supra; Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v.
City of Golden, supra.

We have always recognized limitations on the right of the owner
of a water right to divert at the full decreed rate at all times. The owner of
a water right has no right as against a junior appropriator to waste water,
i.e., to divert more than can be used beneficially. Pulaski Irrigating
Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, 70 Colo. 565, 203 P. 681 (1922); Baca
Ditch Co. v. Coulson, 70 Colo. 192, 198 P. 272 (1921); Fort Lyon
Canal Co. v. Chew, 33 Colo. 392, 81 P. 37 (1905). Nor may he extend
the time of diversion to enable him to irrigate lands in addition to those for
which the water was appropriated. Enlarged Southside Irrigation Ditch
Co. v. John’s Flood Ditch Co., supra; Baca Ditch Co. v. Coulson,
supra; Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Chew, supra; Cache La Poudre
Reservoir Co. v. Water Supply & Storage Co., 25 Colo. 161, 53 P. 331
(1898). These limitations are read into every water right decree by impli-
cation. Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden,
supra, Baca Ditch Co. v. Coulson, supra.

HN The right to change a point of diversion or type of use with re-
spect to water rights decreed for irrigation purposes is limited to the “duty
of water” with respect to the decreed place of use. Farmers Highline
Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, supra. Duty of water is de-
fined in that case as follows:

“Tt is that measure of water, which, by careful management and use, with-
out wastage, is reasonably required to be applied to any given tract of land
for such period of time as may be adequate to produce therefrom a

es 317

maximum amount of such crops as ordinarily are grown thereof. It is not a
hard and fast unit of measurement, but is variable according to condi-
tions.”
129 Colo. at 584, 272 P.2d at 634. The numerous facts relevant to deter-
mination of the duty of water are stated in that same case to include:
“Land characteristics at the place of use are important; location; slope;
depth of soil; whether it is loose or close; if underlain with gravel or imper-
vious material; its composition and general adaptability for the growing of
irrigated crops; all are taken into consideration. Climate is a feature not to
be overlooked, as also are the kinds of crops ordinarily grown thereon and
the proportion of the area devoted to each type of crop and the rotation
thereof. In fact, every element that concerns or affects the consumption of
water in the particular case before the court is to be considered.”
Id. See Trinchera Ranch Co. v. Trinchera Irrigation District, supra.
The right to change a point of diversion or place of use is also
limited in quantity and time by historical use. See City of Westminster v.
Church, 167 Colo. 1, 445 P.2d 52 (1968); Hoehne Ditch Co. v.
Martinez, 71 Colo. 428, 207 P. 859 (1922); Baca Ditch Co. v. Coulson,
supra. Historical use could be less than the optimum utilization repre-
sented by the “duty of water” in the instant case because the Furrow well
could not physically produce at the decreed rate on a continuing basis, the
well had been used historically only to supplement other rights, or for
other reasons.° “Historical use” as a limitation on the right to change a
point of diversion has been considered to be an application of the principle *
that junior appropriators have vested rights in the continuation of stream
conditions as they existed at the time of their respective appropriations.
City of Westminster v. Church, supra, citing Enlarged Southside
Irrigation Co. v. John’s Flood Ditch Co., supra, Green v. Chaffee
Ditch Co., supra, and Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v.
City of Golden, supra.

Where expansion of use is the injury asserted, establishment of
historical use is the burden of the applicant. See City of Colorado
Springs v. Yust, supra; Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v.
City of Golden, supra; Trinchera Ranch Co. v. Trinchera Irrigation
District, supra.

In.
The water judge held that the doctrine of res judicata barred any in-
quiry into historical use of the Furrow water right prior to August 19,

® We have recognized situations in which years of nonuse based upon damage or destruction of a
diversion and distribution system would not limit future diversion. Flasche v. Westcolo, Co., 112
Colo. 387, 149 P.2d 817 (1944). Such a situation is not involved here, so we need not consider the
interrelation of such cases and those cases limiting future diversions on the basis of historical use.

318 ee

1974, the date of adjudication of that water right.” We do not agree.

HMM Res judicata is applicable only when there exists identity of

subject matter, cause of action, parties to the action, and capacity in the
persons for which or against whom the claim is made. City of
Westminster v. Church, supra. In that case we quoted from Pomponio
vy. Larsen, 80 Colo. 318, 321, 251 P. 534, 536 (1926), as follows:
“The best and most accurate test as to whether a former judgment is a bar
in subsequent proceedings between the same parties, according to the au-
thorities, is whether the same evidence would sustain both, and if it would,
the two actions are the same, and this is true although the two actions are
different inform ... .” See also Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., supra.

A decree in a water adjudication confirms that steps have
been completed to effect an appropriation. Cresson Consolidated Gold
Mining and Milling Co. v. Whitten, 139 Colo. 273, 338 P.2d 278
(1959). One of those steps is application of water to beneficial use. Con-
tinuation of beneficial use of the amount of water which would be prod-
uced by diversions at the claimed rate from the date of initiation of the ap-
propriation to the date of the decree is not an issue in a water adjudication
proceeding. See Four Counties Water Users Ass’n v. Colorado River
Water Conservation District, 159 Colo. 499, 414 P.2d 469 (1966). Often
the period and pattern of use are not known with certainty at the time a
water right is adjudicated. We have long recognized that there is read into
every decree awarding priorities the implied limitation that diversions are
limited to those sufficient for the purposes for which the appropriation was
made, regardless of the fact that such limitation may be less than the de-
creed rate of diversion. Hoehne Ditch Co. v. Martinez, supra; Baca
Ditch Co. v. Coulson, supra. It follows that historical use was not in is-
sue in adjudication of the Furrow water right, and the decree awarding
that right is not res judicata as to historical use. It was error to refuse to
consider evidence of historical use.

Iv.

Rothe’s plan for augmentation consists of making available 15 rights
in Riverside Reservoir & Land Co. to be used by the state engineer to sat-
isfy valid calls by prior appropriators. The appellants sought to develop ev-
idence concerning those rights, but were not permitted to do so. We con-
cluded that this was error.

A plan for augmentation is to be approved by the water judge
based on the same criterion involved in evaluating an application for
change of water right, i.e., approval is required.

°® The water judge appears to have concluded that the “duty of water” for the Furrow lands estab-
lished the upper limit for diversions based on the Furrow water right. See footnote 2.

Pe 319

“if such change or plan will not injuriously affect the owner of or persons
entitled to use water under a vested water right or a decreed conditional
water right.”

Section 37-92-305(3), C.R.S. 1973.

The purpose of committing the 15 rights in Riverside Reservoir &
Land Co. to the plan for augmentation was to compensate for 55 acre feet
which the trial judge found would be lost to the river between November
17 and June 7 as a result of a change in return flow pattern upon imple-
mentation of the change of water right with respect to the Furrow well.

In order to determine the adequacy of the plan to accomplish
its intended purpose, it is necessary to consider the adequacy of the re-
placement water rights. Section 37-92-305(8), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).
The trial court should have allowed evidence with respect to the replace-
ment water, including the amount and timing, to be made available by ex-
ercise of the Riverside Reservoir & Land Co. rights. It then should have
determined the adequacy of the plan for augmentation on the basis of the
facts and appropriate legal standards. See section 37-92-305(3), (8),
CRS. 1973 (1979 Supp.).

Finally, the appellants urge that the trial court should have in-

cluded in the decree the provisions prescribed in section 37-92-304(6),
C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), making the approval subject to reconsideration
by the water judge on the question of injury to vested rights of others.'°
Rothe agrees that this is required but contends that paragraph 39 of the
trial court’s judgment and decree satisfies the requirement. That para-
graph provides:
“39, This Court retains jurisdiction of this Decree for the purpose of pro-
viding an immediate hearing to review the validity of a call, or require-
ment for providing replacement water or any question as to the
administration of the plan of augmentation herein approved.”

10 “37.92-304. Proceedings by the water judge. (6) Any decision of the water judge as speci-
fied in subsection (5) of this section dealing with a change of water right may, and in the case of
a plan for augmentation shall, include the condition that the approval of such change or plan shall

be subject to reconsideration by the water judge on the question of injury to the vested rights of
others for such period after the entry of such decision as is necessary or desirable to preclude or
remedy any such injury. the [sic] water judge shall specify his determination as to such period in

his decision, but the period may be extended upon further decision by the water judge that the non-

occurrence of injury shall not have been conclusively established. Any decision may contain any

other provision which the water judge deems proper in determining the rights and interests of the

persons involved. All decisions of the water judge, including decisions as to the period of reconsid-

eration and extension thereof, shall become a judgment and decree as specified in this article and

be appealable upon entry, notwithstanding conditions subjecting them to reconsideration on the

question of injury to the vested rights of others as provided in this subsection (6).” Section 37-92-

304(6), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).

320 |

It makes no reference to the criterion of injury to the vested rights of
others and accordingly is not adequate to satisfy section 37-92-304(6),
C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.). An appropriate revision consistent with that
statutory requirement should be included in the decree upon remand.

We reverse the judgment and decree of the water court and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES does not participate.

No. 80SA106

In re the Marriage of Sharon Kay Glickman y. Charles Duane Mesigh
(615 P.2d 23)

Decided August 5, 1980.

ill

322 ee

Jerry L. Valentine, for petitioner-appellee.

Nathan Lee Baum, for respondent-appellant.

En Banc.

JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The respondent-appellant, Charles Duane Mesigh, brings this appeal
from an order of the district court modifying a child support provision in a
California decree of dissolution.1 The action in the district court was com-
menced by the petitioner-appellee, Sharon Kay Glickman, under section
14-11-101, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.). We affirm the judgment.

Sharon Kay Glickman (petitioner) and Charles Duane Mesigh (re-
spondent) were divorced on June 8, 1971, pursuant to an interlocutory de-
cree of dissolution entered by the superior court of Santa Clara County,
State of California. A final decree of dissolution was entered on November
30, 1971. The California decree awarded custody of the couple’s only
child, Toni Michele Mesigh, to the petitioner. The respondent was not re-
quired to pay child support at that time, but the decree expressly provided
that the provisions for child support “are subject to modification . . . by
any court of competent jurisdiction, upon the motion of either of the par-
ties and the proper showing of changed conditions justifying modifica-
tions.”

On January 18, 1978, petitioner filed a petition for child support, as-
serting that she was unable to provide necessary support for the minor
child without financial assistance from the respondent. The trial court al-
lowed the petitioner to file an amended petition under section 14-11-101,
C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), which provides for the enforcement and modi-
fication of foreign decrees and judgments in cases for support of minor
children. At the commencement of the Colorado action petitioner and her
daughter resided in Virgina and respondent resided in Colorado. Personal
service was effected on respondent in Colorado.

The trial proceedings were prolonged and complicated due to disputes
relating to pleading and discovery. The petitioner originally failed to list
her address on the complaint and the respondent moved to dismiss the pe-
tition. This information was subsequently furnished by letter to the re-
spondent and the court denied the motion to dismiss. The respondent also

1 This appeal was originally filed in the court of appeals and subsequently was transferred to this
court pursuant to section 13-4-110(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973.

es 323

filed a motion for a cost bond under section 13-16-101, C.R.S. 1973, and
the trial court denied that motion. Respondent sought extensive discovery
of financial data about petitioner’s sources of income. The trial court de-
nied respondent’s motion to compel additional discovery and entered a
protective order on behalf of petitioner.

On November 28, 1978, a hearing was held on the petition for child
support and the court found that the financial conditions of the parties
had changed substantially since the entry of the California decree. Ac-
cordingly, the court modified the California decree to require a payment
by the respondent of $300 per month as child support commencing on De-
cember 1, 1978.

The respondent on this appeal asserts several grounds for reversal: the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order of child support under sec-
tion 14-11-101, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.); alternatively, if the trial court
did have jurisdiction, the award of $300 per month child support was
grossly excessive; the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint for
failure of the respondent to list her address, and additionally erred in fail-
ing to order a cost bond; and the trial court erred in its discovery rulings.

I. JURISDICTION

The respondent argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
enter the order for child support under section 14-11-101, C.R.S. 1973
(1979 Supp.), because such order is in violation of the full faith and credit
clause of Article IV, Section 1, of the United States Constitution. That
constitutional provision mandates that “[f]ull faith and credit shall be
given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of
every other state.” See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738.

HS The full faith and credit clause requires that the California de-
cree be enforced in courts of this state to the extent that it is final and un-
modifiable. See, e.g., Barber v. Barber, 323 US. 77, 65 S.Ct. 137, 89
L.Ed. 82 (1944); Sistare v. Sistare, 218 US. 1, 30 S.Ct. 682, 54 L.Ed.
905 (1910); Gruber v. Wallner, 198 Colo. 235, 598 P.2d 135 (1979);
Potter v. Potter, 131 Colo. 14, 278 P.2d 1020 (1955). However, Colorado
courts need not give conclusive effect to a foreign decree when that decree
is subject to modification by the courts of the rendering state. See, e.g.,
People ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 137, 91 L.Ed.
1133 (1947); Gruber v. Wallner, supra; Potter v. Potter, supra; Mock
v. Mock, 155 N.J. Super. 282, 382 A.2d 702 (1977); Mittenthal y.
Mittenthal, 99 Misc.2d 778, 417 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1979); In re Sagan, 396
A.2d 450 (Pa. Super. 1978). When a modifiable decree of a sister state is
before a Colorado court, the full faith and credit clause permits the Colo-
rado courts to alter or modify it, just as the rendering state could. See,
e.g., People ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, supra; Barber v. Barber, supra;
Vincent v. Vincent, 38 N.C. App. 580, 248 S.E.2d 410 (1978);
McCullough v. Hudspeth, 389 A.2d 1242 (R.I. 1978); Restatement

324 |

(Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 109 (1971). Thus, since the California de-
cree expressly provided for modification upon changed circumstances, the
Colorado court had as much leeway to modify or alter the California de-
cree as did the California court which rendered it.

Section 14-11-101, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), clearly gives Col-

orado courts subject matter jurisdiction over foreign judgments for sup-
port of minor children:
“(1) Upon the docketing in a court of competent jurisdiction in this state
of exemplified copies of all the written pleadings and court orders, judg-
ments, and decrees in a case of divorce, separate maintenance, or annul-
ment, or for support of minor children or a spouse, or for a combination of
the same entered in any court of competent jurisdiction in any other state
or jurisdiction having reciprocal provisions for a like enforcement of or-
ders, judgments, or decrees entered in the state of Colorado and upon ob-
taining jurisdiction by personal service of process as provided by the Colo-
rado rules of civil procedure, said court in this state shall have jurisdiction
over the subject matter and of the person in like manner as if the original
suit or action had been commenced in this state, and is empowered to
amend, modify, set aside, and make new orders as the court may find nec-
essary and proper so as to do justice and equity to all parties to the action
according to the public policy of this state, and has the same right, power,
and authority to enter orders for temporary alimony, support money, and
attorneys’ fees as in similar actions originating in this state.”

This statute reflects a legislative effort to prevent the state of Colo-
rado from becoming a haven for a parent against whom minimal or, as in
this case, no support orders have been entered in the jurisdiction of rendi-
tion by granting Colorado courts explicit authority to enter appropriate or-
ders in a manner consistent with the full faith and credit clause.? See
generally Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, 17 N.J. 409, 111 A.2d 631
(1955). Both the California judgment and California statutory law provide
for modification of support orders upon a showing of conditions similar to
those demonstrated here. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 4700, 4811 (West Supp.
1980). California law also provides for like enforcement of foreign support
orders under conditions substantially identical to those set forth in section
14-11-101, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.). Cal. Civ. Proc. § 1699 (West
Supp. 1980).

2 A proceeding to enforce a foreign judgment of support under section 14-11-101, C.R.S. 1973
(1979 Supp.), is one of several remedies available to a custodial parent seeking support from a
non-custodial parent. Other remedies include a proceeding under the Uniform Enforcement of For-
eign Judgments Act, section 13-53-101 e¢ seq., C.R.S. 1973, and a proceeding under the Revised
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), section 14-5-101 et seq., C.R.S. 1973.
Section 14-5-104 of URESA states that the remedies provided therein are in addition to and not in
substitution for any other remedies.

Be

eS 325

The respondent correctly points out that this court in Minnear
vy. Minnear, 131 Colo. 319, 281 P.2d 517 (1955), held unconstitutional
CRS. ‘53, 46-4-1, which dealt with enforcement of foreign decrees and
was the predecessor to section 14-11-101, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.). In
that case the former husband commenced an action in Colorado to set
aside a property settlement agreement incorporated into a Florida divorce
decree on grounds of fraud. Although the complaint requested the court to
declare the Florida decree void, jurisdiction, nevertheless, was invoked un-
der C.R.S. ‘53, 46-4-1. Because the statute addressed only the
enforcement of foreign decrees, it had no application to a complaint to set
aside a foreign decree. In holding that the complaint did not sufficiently
state a claim to set aside the foreign judgment on grounds of fraud,
Minnear stated that the legislature lacked constitutional authority to
adopt the statute in question because it violated Article IV, Section 1, of
the United States Constitution. To the extent that Minnear might be read
to prohibit Colorado courts from modifying a foreign decree that is subject
to alteration by the courts of the rendering state, we expressly overrule it.
Minnear is contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority which we
find persuasive. See, e.g., People ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, supra;
Barber v. Barber, supra; Gruber v. Wallner, supra; Potter v. Potter,
supra; Elkind v. Byck, 68 Cal. 2d 453, 439 P.2d 316, 67 Cal. Rptr. 404
(1968); Mock v. Mock, supra; Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, supra;
Mittenthal v. Mittenthal, supra; Vincent v. Vincent, supra; In re
Sagan, supra; McCullough v. Hudspeth, supra; see also Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 109 (1971); Comment, Interstate
Modification of Support Decrees, 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 355 (1956).

Hl Subsequent to Minnear the legislature has consistently re-
enacted, with only minor amendments in form, the provisions of the origi-
nal foreign decree statute adopted in 1947. Colo. Sess. Laws 1947, ch. 178
at 398; C.RS. ‘53, 46-4-1; C.R.S. 1963, 46-4-1; section 14-11-101, C.R.S.
1973 (1979 Supp.). We hold that the legislature, in re-enacting section 14-
11-101, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), did grant Colorado courts power to
modify or alter a foreign judgment for child support under the circum-
stances present here, and such legislation does not offend the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. Art. IV, Sec.
1.8

3 In this case the order of modification by which the court ordered the respondent to pay child
support in the amount of $300 per month was in keeping with the statutory policy of California,
Cal. Civ. Code §§ 4700, 4811 (West Supp. 1980), and was also consistent with the law of Colo-
rado under the circumstances present here. See section 14-10-122(1), C.R.S. 1973. We do not de-
cide whether a Colorado court, consistent with the full faith and credit clause, could modify a for-
eign judgment for support under section 14-11-101 in accordance with Colorado statutory policy
when that policy is substantially different from or inconsistent with the statutory policy of the state
of rendition, See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 US. 430, 64 S.Ct. 208, 88 L.Ed. 149
1943).

326 ee

Il. THE ORDER FOR SUPPORT

I Respondent argues that even if the trial court had subject matter
jurisdiction, nevertheless the award of $300 per month child support was
grossly excessive. We find this argument totally lacking in merit.

In June 1971, when the California decree was entered, the respondent
was earning approximately $700 per month. When the November 1978 or-
der was entered in this case, he was earning approximately $2,500 per
month. The petitioner’s monthly income in November 1978 was $1,145
per month, attributable primarily to trust income and dividends; and, ac-
cording to the trial court, she had the potential of earning an additional
$400 to $500 per month during 1979.

When the California decree was entered in June 1971, the minor
child was one year old and required minimal expenses. When the district
court entered the November 1978 order in this case, the child was eight
years old and required substantial monthly expenditures for schooling,
health needs, baby sitting, food and clothing. The trial court found that
the monthly expenses for the petitioner and her minor child amounted to
$2,020.

Under these circumstances we find that the district court’s award of
$300 per month child support was based upon a showing of changed cir-
cumstances that warranted a modification of the 1971 California decree.
See section 14-10-122(1), C.R.S. 1973; Cal. Civ. Code §§ 4700, 4811
(West Supp. 1980).

Il. THE PETITIONER’S ADDRESS AND THE COST BOND

The respondent contends that the trial court erred in refusing to dis-
miss the complaint upon the petitioner’s failure to list her address thereon,
and the trial court also erred in failing to order a cost bond.

Hl The omission of the petitioner’s address in the complaint was an
oversight which was cured shortly after it was brought to the attention of
the court and the petitioner. The original failure to comply with C.R.C.P.
11 by omitting the address of the party does not warrant dismissal of an
action. The omission may be corrected, as it was in this case. See Harris
v. Municipal Court, 123 Colo. 539, 234 P.2d 1055 (1951).

With respect to the motion to require a cost bond, section 13-16-
101, C.R.S. 1973, requires the court in the case of a non-resident party to
give security for the payment of costs. See Edgar Coal and Silver
Mining Co. v. Taylor, 10 Colo. 110, 14 P. 113 (1887). The trial court in
this case denied the motion because the petitioner’s attorney agreed to
guarantee the payment of court costs. See Code of Professional Responsi-
bility, Disciplinary Rule DR 5-103(B). As costs were not awarded to the
respondent, there was no prejudice to him by the court’s failure to require

327

the bond mandated by statute. Accordingly, we find no reversible error in
this respect.
IV. DISCOVERY RULINGS

Respondent claims that the trial court committed error in failing to
grant his motion to compel production of additional documents. The mo-
tion to compel was directed to such items as the petitioner’s W-2 forms, a
list of assets owned by two trusts, of which she is a discretionary benefi-
ciary, a trustee’s report on the condition of the trusts, and a profit and loss
statement of a family corporation, Glickman, Inc., in which petitioner has
a seventeen percent interest.

Petitioner apparently was unable to locate the W-2 forms requested
but did furnish the respondent with copies of her income tax returns for
the years 1971 through 1977. Petitioner also was unable to obtain a list of
trust assets, a trustee’s report, and a profit and loss statement of Glick-
man, Inc. However, petitioner did furnish copies of the trust agreements
and supplied detailed information about the amounts she received yearly
in trust distributions and dividends. Petitioner also answered interrogato-
ries about her employment history, sources of income and expenses, and
she furnished a virtual panoply of financial data covering the period from
1971 to the date of the answers to interrogatories. With respect to the re-
spondent’s request for a listing of assets owned by the trusts and Glick-
man,Inc., Norman H. Glickman, the trustee and brother of petitioner,
filed an affidavit stating that he would not disclose the assets of the trusts
to petitioner and would not disclose a profit and loss statement of Glick-
man, Inc. to petitioner.

The trial court held an extensive hearing on these discovery is-
sues and denied the respondent’s motion to compel. Considering the rather
extensive financial information which petitioner furnished in the course of
discovery, the questionable pertinency of the additional information re-
quested by respondent, and the showing by petitioner that reports on the
financial status of the trusts and family corporation were not within her
ability to furnish, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in deny-
ing the respondent’s motion to compel additional discovery. Cf. Chicago
Cutlery v. District Court, 194 Colo. 10, 568 P.2d 464 (1977) (trial court
has discretion to balance litigant’s interest in obtaining information
against burden imposed on opponent in furnishing it).

The trial court granted petitioner’s motion for protective orders in
connection with respondent’s request for additional financial information
about the two trusts and the family corporation. We conclude the trial
court acted within its discretion because the petitioner previously had pro-
vided financial information in one form or another as it related to the issue

- of child support. Moreover, at best, much of the information sought was of
questionable materiality to the issues involved in these proceedings. See
Mote v. Koch, 173 Colo. 82, 476 P.2d 255 (1976).

328 |

The judgment is affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES does not participate.

No. 79SC154 & 79SC173

Public Employees Retirement Association, Carl S. Wilkerson, as
Chairman of the Public Employees Retirement Association, and Scott
Nichols v. Charlotte Nichols

(615 P.2d 657)

Decided August 11, 1980.

329
es

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, David W. Robbins, Deputy,
Edward G. Donovan, Solicitor General, Nathan B. Coats, Assistant
Attorney .General, for petitioners Public Employees Retirement
Association and Carl S. Wilkerson.

Trott, Kunstle & Hughes, Howard Kunstle, for petitioner Scott
Nichols

Brauer, Simons & Buescher, P.C., Walter C. Brauer III, for
respondent.

En Banc.

JUSTICE LEE delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals in
Nichols v. PERA, 42 Colo. App. 302, 596 P.2d 406 (1979). We now re-
verse.

The parties stipulated to the facts. William J. Nichols was employed
by the City of Colorado Springs at the time of his death in January 1976,
and was a member of the Public Employees’ Retirement Association
(PERA). Nichols was survived by his widow, Charlotte Nichols, the re-
spondent in this action, who was the designated beneficiary of Nichols’
PERA account. He was also survived by his eighteen-year-old son, Scott
Nichols (Scott). At the time of his father’s death, Scott was unmarried
and was working to earn money to attend college. He enrolled in an ac-
credited college in September 1976.

The sole issue raised on appeal is whether a surviving child, who is be-
tween the ages of eighteen and twenty-three, must be a student in an ac-
credited school at the time of the PERA member’s death in order to
qualify for survivor benefits under section 24-51-806, C.R.S. 1973.

The statute in effect at the time this action was initiated states in per-
tinent part:1
“Tf the said deceased member leaves an unmarried child under age eight-
een, or under age twenty-three if such child is found by the board to be
enrolled in a duly accredited school . . . such child shall receive an

1 Section 24-51-806 was amended in 1977. See discussion infra.

330 ee

‘annuity .... Any such annuity payable to a child shall terminate... upon
graduation or the child’s twenty-third birthday, whichever occurs first.”

After a hearing, the board of directors of PERA concluded that Scott
was entitled to receive survivor benefits as a student under age twenty-
three enrolled in an accredited school. It ruled that if any sum remained in
Nichols’ retirement account upon termination of Scotts’ eligibility it
should be refunded to Charlotte Nichols. The board denied Charlotte Ni-
chols’ demand for a lump sum payment of all Nichols’ accumulated
PERA deductions. :

Respondent sought review of the ruling of the board of directors in
the district court, which affirmed the ruling. An appeal was then taken to
the court of appeals, which reversed the district court.

The court of appeals held that the effective date for determination of
eligibility for a surviving child under section 24-51-806, C.R.S. 1973, is
the date of the member’s death and therefore a surviving child who is
eighteen years old must be a student in an accredited school at the time of
the member’s death in order to qualify for survivor’s benefits. Nichols v.
PERA, supra.

In reversing the ruling of the board of directors, the court of appeals
relied on PERA v. Greene, 195 Colo. 575, 580 P.2d 385 (1978). In that
case, this court recognized that section 24-51-117(1), C.R.S. 1973 (pro-
viding that a deceased member’s accumulated deductions be paid to the
designated beneficiary if the member had not received an annuity), and
section 24-51-801, C.R.S. 1973 (requiring that a member’s accumulated
deductions be transferred to the survivors’ benefit reserve fund when survi-
vors’ benefits are payable), “are inconsistent to the extent that each pur-
ports to establish a superior claim to a deceased members’ accumulated
deductions.” PERA v. Greene, supra. This court reasoned that, since sec-
tion 24-51-801 was enacted subsequent to section 24-51-117(1), it modi-
fied the designated beneficiary provision.

That rationale of PERA v. Greene, supra, also applies to this
case. Part 8 of article 51 of title 24, C.R.S. 1973, providing for survivors’
benefits, was enacted later in time than section 24-51-117(1), C.R.S.
1973. To the extent that there is a conflict, the last in time controls. As
reasoned in PERA v. Greene, section 24-51-117(1) is modified by section
24-51-806. Thus, if Scott is among the class of individuals entitled to an
annuity under section 24-51-806, his claim is superior to that of Charlotte
Nichols.

The court of appeals recognized the principle of statutory construc-

- tion employed in PERA v. Greene. However, it interpreted our statement
‘in that case — “that the General Assembly intended a specific statutory
disposition of a member’s accumulated deductions to occur at death” —
to mean that the circumstances at the time of the death of the member
control the determination of eligibility of a surviving child who is eighteen

es 331

years old but under twenty-three years of age.?

We do not agree with the court of appeals that a surviving
child, such as Scott, must be a student at the time of his parent’s death in
order to qualify for survivor benefits. In reaching this conclusion, we in-
voke the principles of statutory construction that the statutes relating to
the disposition of a members’ accumulated deductions on his death (sec-
tion 24-51-117, C.R.S. 1973) and to survivors’ benefits must be construed
together and considered as a whole in order to give effect to the legislative
intent as evidenced by the entire statutory scheme. PERA v. Greene,
supra; State Hwy. Comm. v. Haase, 189 Colo. 69, 537 P.2d 300 (1975).

Part 8 of article 51 of the statute does not generally contemplate im-
mediate payment of the entire amount of the deceased member’s accumu-
lated deductions. Rather, it provides for annuities to surviving widows,
children, and dependent parents, based upon the enumerated eligibility re-
quirements set forth in sections 24-51-803 to 24-51-807. Compare section
24-51-804 (widow becomes eligible “on or after her attainment of age
sixty years ....”) and section 24-51-805 (widow who has in her care chil-
dren of the deceased member “shall receive an annuity . . . so long as there
is one qualified child... . If the widow dies or remarries while having the
care of such qualified child, such child shall receive an annuity... .”).

We recognize that section 24-51-806 was amended subsequent to the
initiation of this action. The amended statute reads in pertinent part:
“|. If the said deceased member leaves an unmarried child under age
eighteen or under age twenty-three if such child is found by the board to
have been enrolled on a full-time basis within six months subsequent
to the date of the members’ death in a duly accredited school . . . .” Sec-
tion 24-51-806, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.). (Emphasis added.)

I Respondent contends that the statutory amendment demon-
strates the prior legislative intent that no survivor benefits were to accrue
to an eighteen-year-old who was not enrolled in a duly accredited school
on the date of the member’s death, since the amendment grants to the
child an additional six months from the date of death in which to enroll in
school. We do not agree. We conclude that section 24-51-806 was
amended in order to establish a limited and definite time period within
which a surviving child, who was not enrolled in school at the time of
death, might enroll in school to take advantage of the educational benefit
provided by the statute.* This interpretation is consistent with the legislative in-

2 Although the court of appeals relies on this language from PERA v. Greene in support of a con-
trary conclusion, that language was incidental to the issue before the court then and thus is not
binding on the court now. Young v. The People, 54 Colo. 293, 130 P. 1011 (1913); Parker v.
Plympton, 85 Colo. 87, 273 P. 1030 (1929).

3 We consider the statute to have been “open-ended” until at least the surviving child had attained
the age of twenty-three years, at which time he lost all rights to a survivor's benefit. It was within
the discretion of the General Assembly to require that the surviving child must elect to enroll in
school within six months after the date of the death of the member.

332 |

tent implied in the companion provisions of part 8 of article 51, that the accumu-
lated deductions of the deceased member should be held in a reserve fund to be
applied to the benefit of the members’ eligible dependants.

The statutory interpretation of the court of appeals would prevent any
surviving child who was planning to enroll in school, but who was finan-
cially unable to do so and was not currently enrolled at the time of the
members’ death, from receiving survivor benefits. In our view, the legisla-
ture did not intend such a result.

We hold that the ruling of the board of directors of PERA awarding
survivor benefits to Scott Nichols under section 24-51-806, C.R.S. 1973,
was proper.

The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed.

JUSTICE ERICKSON does not participate.

No. 80SA255

The People of the State of Colorado v. Charles E. Meldahl
(615 P.2d 29)

Decided August 11, 1980.

es 333

Linda Donnelly for complainant.

F. Michael Ludwig for attorney-respondent.

En Banc.

JUSTICE DUBOFSKY delivered the opinion of the Court.

The proceedings here are the result of a number of complaints filed
with the Supreme Court Grievance Committee against respondent,
Charles E. Meldahl, who was admitted to the practice of law in Colorado
on November 4, 1968. Based upon stipulated facts presented to the Griev-
ance Committee, we suspend the respondent indefinitely from the practice
of law.?

The stipulation contains eight counts. The first concerns the respon-
dent’s agreement to file both bankruptcy proceedings and an uncontested
divorce for a client. The client paid the respondent $450 in October, 1974,
to file bankruptcy proceedings. Although the respondent had informed his
client that he filed the bankruptcy case, he had not filed it when he re-
turned the fee two years later. The respondent also misrepresented to his
client that he had taken steps to file dissolution of marriage proceedings.

_ When he finally filed the dissolution action on behalf of both parties, he
made no disclosure to them of possible effects of his dual representation.

As described in the second count, the respondent represented a seller
in the sale of his residence. At closing, the purchasers gave a promissory
note to the seller. In due course, the respondent received $600 from the
purchasers in full payment of the promissory note, and he cancelled the
note. The respondent failed to remit the $600 to his client.

Two counts involve the failure of the respondent to file petitions in
separate uncontested dissolutions of marriage. In both cases the respon-
dent received a fee but failed to complete the dissolution proceedings. He
also failed to respond to telephone messages from his clients.

* ‘The respondent presently is suspended from the practice of law under C.R.C.P. 256.

334 es

Two other counts involve clients who hired the respondent to repre-
sent them in simple closings for the sale of their homes. In one, the respon-
dent failed to transfer home owner insurance to the buyers as he had
promised, to file loan assumption papers with the: bank, and to provide
documents after closing to his clients. The respondent did not return his
client’s telephone calls seeking information about the papers. In the other,
the client paid the respondent $107.90 for title insurance which the re-
spondent promised to obtain. The respondent did not obtain title insurance
or return the client’s money. Again, the respondent refused to return tele-
phone calls from his client.

The subject of another count was the respondent’s failure to inform
his client, a corporation, of the status of collection efforts on a promissory
note. A final count charged the respondent with failing to cooperate with
investigators for the Grievance Committee.

The Grievance Committee accepted the stipulation that the respon-
dent’s conduct violated C.R.C.P. 241 and the following disciplinary rules:
DR 1-102(A)(4) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepre-
sentation); DR 1-102(A)(5) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice); DR 1-102(A)(6) (conduct that adversely reflects on an attorney’s
fitness to practice law); DR 2-106(A) (excessive fee); DR 2-110(A)(2)
(withdrawal from employment without taking reasonable steps to avoid
foreseeable prejudice to the rights of a client); DR 2-110(A)(3) (with-
drawal from employment without refunding promptly any part of a fee
paid in advance that has not been earned); DR 2-110(B)(2) (employment
that violates a disciplinary rule); DR 5-105(B) (employment when the in-
terests of another client may impair an attorney’s independent professional
judgment); DR 6-101(A)(1) (incompetence); DR 6-101(A)(2) (inade-
quate preparation); DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglect of a legal matter); DR 7-
101(A)(1) (failure to seek the lawful objectives of a client); DR 7-
101(A)(2) (failure to carry out a contract of employment with a client);
DR 7-101(A)(3) (prejudice to a client); DR 7-102(A)(5) (statement of
law or fact known to be false); DR 9-102(A) (reservation of a client’s
funds separately from those of the lawyer); DR 9-102(B)(2) (safekeeping
.of a client’s securities and properties); and DR 9-102(B)(4) (prompt pay-
ment or delivery to a client of requested funds, securities, or other proper-
ties).

The Grievance Committee recommended that the respondent be sus-
pended indefinitely from the practice of law until he demonstrates his
eligibility for reinstatement under C.R.C.P. 253, and that the respondent
not be permitted to apply for reinstatement for at least two years. The
committee also recommended that the respondent be assessed the costs of
the proceedings. We accept the committee’s recommendations.

A license to practice law assures the public that the lawyer
who holds the license will perform basic legal tasks honestly and without

335

undue delay, in accordance with the highest standards of professional con-
duct. In addition, the public has a right to expect that one who engages in
professional misconduct will be disciplined appropriately.

Accordingly, it is ordered that respondent Charles E. Meldahl be
suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. The respondent may not
apply for reinstatement for a period of at least two years from the date of
this opinion, and he will not be reinstated until he demonstrates his eligi-
bility for reinstatement under C.R.C.P. 253. In addition, the respondent
shall pay the costs of $1,506.36 incurred in the disciplinary proceedings to
the Clerk of this Court within 60 days.

No. 80SA145

The People of the State of Colorado y. Frank R. Lucero
(615 P.2d 660)

Decided August 11, 1980.

2
8

337

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Morgan D. Rumler, Assistant
Attorney General, for plaintiff-appellee.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Terri L. Brake, Deputy, for
defendant-appellant.

En Banc.

JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The defendant, Frank R. Lucero, appeals his conviction for assault in

the first degree on a peace officer, section 18-3-202(1)(e), C.R.S. 1973
(1978 Repl. Vol. 8), and his punishment as a habitual offender, section

338 rs

16-13-101(1), C.R.S 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8, 1979 Supp.).' The defendant
represented himself at the trial and urges several grounds for reversal. His
principal contentions are that he was denied his right to counsel and that the trial
court erroneously denied his request for a trial continuance. We address these
arguments but are not persuaded by them. However, we concluded that the
court’s reference to the defendant’s prior convictions at the commencement of
the trial proceedings and the admission of other evidence of bad character during
the trial neccessitate a reversal and a new trial. Because of this disposition of the
case, we deem it unnecessary to address other issues raised by the defendant.

On June 14, 1977, the defendant was charged by direct information
with assault in the first degree by threatening a peace officer with a
deadly weapon and with habitual criminality stemming from two prior fel-
ony convictions in 1976 for aggravated robbery. The charge of first-degree
assault arose out of a confrontation between three inmates at the Colorado
State Penitentiary and a prison guard on March 26, 1977. The defendant
requested and the court appointed an attorney to represent him. After a
preliminary hearing, this attorney was permitted to withdraw because of
irreconcilable differences with the defendant. At the defendant’s request,
the court continued the case for several months to allow him to retain pri-
vate counsel. He was unsuccessful in his efforts and, on January 9, 1978,
he filed a written waiver of counsel and advised the court that he would
represent himself. The court accepted the defendant’s decision to represent
himself but, over his objection, it appointed an attorney as advisory coun-
sel to assist the defendant with trial preparation and trial in the event the
defendant requested such assistance.2 This attorney was permitted to
withdraw shortly after his appointment because of a possible conflict
arising from his position as a hearings officer at the penitentiary. On Jan-
uary 26, 1978, the court appointed another attorney as advisory counsel,
once again over the defendant’s objection, and set the case for trial on
May 31, 1978.

The defendant filed several motions on his own behalf, resulting in a
further postponement of the trial. On October 6, 1978, the court, as it had
done previously, asked the defendant if he desired an attorney, and the

‘ This appeal was transferred to this court from the court of appeals pursuant to section 13-4-
110(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973.

2 See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 US. 806, 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct, 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562,
581 (1975); Reliford v. People, 195 Colo. 549, 579 P.2d 1145 (1978). ABA, Standards Relating
to the Function of the Trial Judge § 6.7 provides for the appointment of “standby” or advisory
counsel. See also Note, The Accused as Co-Counsel: The Case for the Hybrid Defense, 12
Val. L. Rev. 329 (1978); Note, Assistance of Counsel: A Right to Hybrid Representation, 57
B.U.L. Rev. 570 (1977); Note, Faretta v. California and the Pro Se Defense: The
Constitutional Right of Self-Representation, 25 Am. U.L. Rev. 897 (1976).

339

defendant once again insisted on his right of self-representation. The ap-
pointment of advisory counsel was reconfirmed, and the case was set for
trial on February 5, 1979.

On the day of trial, immediately prior to jury selection, the defendant
advised the trial judge that he was not prepared for trial and requested a
postponement. The court conducted a hearing on the request and denied it.
Advisory counsel was present and available to assist the defendant
throughout the trial.

At the commencement of jury selection, the trial judge advised the
jury panel of the charges, including the two prior felony convictions al-
leged in the habitual criminal counts. During jury selection and at practi-
cally every stage of the trial, the judge asked the defendant if he wanted
assistance from advisory counsel. The defendant either rejected these of-
fers or refused to answer the court.

During the trial on the substantive offense, the prosecution elicited
testimony that the defendant was housed with the incorrigible prison pop-
ulation. In the course of the secondary phase of the trial, the prosecution
presented evidence of several criminal acts committed by the defendant in
addition to the two felony convictions alleged in the information.

The defendant asked no questions of jurors during jury selection, con-
ducted no cross-examination of the state’s witnesses, presented no evidence
on his own behalf and made no summation to the jury. The jury found him
guilty of assault in the first degree at the completion of the first phase of
the trial, and thereafter determined that he had been previously convicted
of the two felonies underlying the habitual criminal counts. The court sen-
tenced the defendant to a term of twenty-five to fifty years consecutive to
the sentences he was then serving.

J. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

The defendant claims that he was denied his right to counsel and due
process of law guaranteed by the United States and Colorado constitu-
tions. His claims are based on three assertions: (1) he was not competent
to the task of self-representation; (2) he requested an attorney during the
trial and that request was denied by the trial court; and (3) the advisory
attorney appointed for him did not effectively assist him in trial prepara-
tion or in the trial itself.

HM A «criminally accused clearly has the right of self-
representation. U.S. Const. Amend. VI and XIV; Colo. Const. Art. II,
Sec. 16. In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45
L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) the United States Supreme Court held that this right
has its source in the structure and history of the Sixth Amendment. The
right is personal to the defendant, and the value it furthers is that of per-
sonal autonomy:

“It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide
whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he

340 ee

may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice
“must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the life
blood of the law.” Faretta v. California, 422 US. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at
2541, 45 L.Ed.2d at 581.

See also Russell v. State, Ind. , 383 N.E.2d 309 (1978).

HE The responsibility of the trial court when confronted with a re-

quest for self-representation is to ascertain whether the accused knowingly
and intelligently decides to forego the traditional benefits associated with
the right to counsel. See e.g., Faretta v. California, supra; Reliford v.
People, 195 Colo. 549, 579 P.2d 1145 (1978); Martinez v. People, 172
Colo. 82, 470 P.2d 26 (1970). As long as the court is satisfied that the de-
fendant “knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open,”
Faretta v. California, supra, it must honor his request for self-
representation even though the defendant lacks the technical knowledge,
skill and experience of the lawyer. E.g., Faretta v. California, supra;
United States v. Price, 474 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1973); Reliford v.
People, supra. :

The record establishes that the defendant, fully understanding
his constitutional right to counsel, knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
relinquished the benefits of counsel, and elected to represent himself.?
Once having elected to represent himself, the defendant cannot thereafter
whipsaw the court between his constitutional right of self-representation
and his own ineffectiveness at trial. For “whatever else may or may not be
open to him on appeal, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot

8 Counsel was originally appointed for the defendant on June 28, 1977, shortly after the filing of
charges. This attorney filed several motions and represented the defendant at a preliminary hear-
ing. After he was allowed to withdraw, the defendant filed a pro se motion for a continuance of
the trial date which was then set for October 4, 1977. He also requested time to retain private
counsel. When he filed the written waiver of counsel on January 9, 1978, the court appointed advi-
sory counsel for the defendant and told the defendant it was doing this “because selection of a
jury, the voir dire of a jury, cross-examination of witnesses, preparation of jury instructions —

there are many things which arise in a trial of a felony case that a person proceeding pro se would
have some difficulty with.” The defendant voiced his objection to advisory counsel in this occasion,
and again on January 26, 1978, when the second advisory counsel was appointed. The defendant at
this appearance stated that he did-not want advisory counsel to assist him, that he was “perfectly
able to represent” himself and that “the United States Constitution says that I can represent my-
self.” Thereafter, the defendant filed various motions on his own bebalf.

Against this background, the court once again, on October 6, 1978, asked the defendant if he
desired counsel appointed for him, and the defendant stated that he did not and would represent
himself. The defendant, in response to the court’s question, acknowledged that by representing him-
self he might be at some disadvantage in the trial of the case but persisted in his choice. The court
reconfirmed the appointment of advisory counsel and informed the defendant that his right of self-
representation would be honored, but the court stood ready to appoint an attorney if he so desired.

It is desirable for the trial court to make a detailed inquiry into the question of the defend-
ant’s knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel when the defendant first insists on his
right of self-representation. See Reliford v. People, supra. We are satisfied from the entire re-
cord in this case that the defendant fully understood his right to counsel and knowingly, intelli-
gently and voluntarily waived that right.

es 341

thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a de-
nial of ‘effective assistance of counsel’.” Faretta v. California, 422 US.
at 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d at 581.

HMM The second prong of the defendant’s right to counsel claim fo-
cuses on his request to the trial court on the day of trial that a lawyer be
appointed for him. The defendant’s request for an attorney was accompa-
nied by a simultaneous rejection of assistance from advisory counsel.
Where the defendant exercises his constitutional right of  self-
representation, advisory counsel can assist the defendant only if and when
the defendant requests such assistance. See, e.g., Faretta v. California,
supra; United States v. Price, supra; United States v. Dougherty, 473
F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Reliford v. People, supra. Viewed in the
context of the defendant’s prior rejection of the court’s repeated offers to
appoint counsel and his continued opposition to any assistance from advi-
sory counsel at all times, the defendant’s request for counsel on the day of
trial is more akin to a calculated effort to forestall the trial than to a legit-
imate request for legal assistance.

I The defendant’s assertion that advisory counsel did not offer as-
sistance is also lacking in merit. Advisory counsel’s function is “to aid the
accused if and when the accused requests help, and to be available to rep-
resent the accused in the event that termination of the defendant’s self-
representation is necessary.” Faretta v. California, 422 US. at 834 n.
46, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, 45 L.Ed. 2d at 581. Advisory counsel by written let-
ter on February 6, 1978, offered his assistance to the defendant. The de-
fendant rejected this offer at that time and on every occasion when the
trial judge invited him to avail himself of advisory counsel’s service. He is
bound by his choices, however ill-advised they may be.

The defendant claims that his two or three unsuccessful attempts to
contact advisory counsel in October 1978 constitute conclusive evidence
that he was denied these services. The evidence is uncontradicted, how-
ever, that advisory counsel never received these messages and, more im-
portantly, the defendant neither wrote to the attorney at any time nor
made any effort to contact him by telephone or otherwise prior or subse-
quent to the month of October. In fact, advisory counsel contacted the de-
fendant shortly after his appointment, and the defendant told him in no
uncertain terms that he neither desired nor needed any assistance in this
matter. The record in this case belies the defendant’s assertion that advi-
sory counsel somehow faltered in his responsibilities. Accordingly, we re-
ject the defendant’s claim that he was denied his constitutional right to
counsel and due process of law under the federal and state constitutions.

Since we are reversing this defendant’s conviction for other reasons,
the district court, upon remand, once again should inquire of the defend-
ant whether he desires counsel appointed for him. If he does, the court
should make the appointment. On the other hand, if he elects to represent

342 es

himself, the court may proceed as it has in the past.

Il. THE DENIAL OF A TRIAL CONTINUANCE

The defendant contends that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in denying his request for continuance because he was unprepared for
trial. We disagree. This case was originally set for trial on October 4,
1977, but was continued because of several motions filed by the defendant,
including a motion to disqualify the trial judge and a petition for writ of
prohibition in this court. On October 6, 1978, the case was set for trial
on February 5, 1979. At these pre-trial hearings, the defendant was per-
sonally present in court and, with advisory counsel available, had adequate
opportunity to prepare for trial. Under the circumstances present here, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s “eleventh
hour” request for a continuance. E.g., People v. Martinez, 190 Colo.
507, 549 P.2d 758 (1976); People vy. McClure, 190 Colo. 250, 545 P.2d
1038 (1976); People v. Saavedra, 184 Colo. 90, 518 P.2d 283 (1974);
People v. Peery, 180 Colo. 161, 503 P.2d 350 (1972) People v. Buckner,
180 Colo. 65, 504 P.2d 669 (1972); Leyba v. People, 174 Colo. 1, 481
P.2d 417 (1971); Johnson v. People, 172 Colo. 72, 470 P.2d 37 (1970). A
defendant who has been given adequate opportunity and time to prepare
for trial cannot complain if the court orders the trial to commence at the
appointed time. See, e.g., Altobella v. Priest, 153 Colo. 309, 385 P.2d
585 (1963).

Il. REFERENCES TO DEFENDANT'S
CRIMINALITY AND INCORRIGIBILITY

HH The prejudicial error requiring a new trial in this case relates to
information improperly conveyed to the jury about the defendant’s prior
criminality and anti-social behavior at various stages of the trial. Although
the defendant failed to make a contemporaneous objection when these in-
cidents occurred, he did raise them as error in his motion for a new trial.
We conclude that the cumulation of these irregularities constitutes revers-
ible error. Crim. P. 52(b).

At the commencement of jury selection the trial judge read to the
jury panel not only the charge of assault in the first degree but also the
two counts alleging prior felony convictions for aggravated robbery in
1976. The judge also informed the jury panel that these two additional
counts were in “violation of Colorado Revised Statutes 1973, 16-13-

4 The motion to disqualify was granted not on the merits but, according to the court, to move the
case along. The defendant had filed various motions including a motion to consolidate his case with
one of the original codefendants from whom his case had been severed, motions for free transcripts,
a motion to utilize an original codefendant as amicus curiae, a motion for access to the law li-
brary, and a petition for removal of the case to the United States District Court. The original pro-
ceeding filed in this court related to his right to represent himself without physical restraints, and
was resolved favorably to the defendant. Lucero v. Lundquist, 196 Colo. 95, 580 P.2d 1245
(1978).

343

101(1) as amerided, punishment for habitual criminals.”

During the initial phase of the trial on the substantive offense the
state’s only witness, in response to the district attorney’s question about
how he knew the defendant prior to the date of the assault, testified that
the defendant “was housed in cellhouse 7 in the R-1 Section for the incor-
rigible population ....”

After the jury returned a guilty verdict on assault in the first degree,
the district attorney presented evidence of the defendant’s two prior con-
victions. The trial court admitted into evidence a duly authenticated copy
of the official records of the Denver district court pertaining to the defend-
ant’s conviction for aggravated robbery in June 1976. These records prop-
erly included the judgment of conviction, sentence and mittimus; however,
they improperly included the original information charging the defendant
not only with aggravated robbery but also the felony of second-degree kid-
napping.

The district attorney followed a similarly infirm procedure with re-
spect to proving the defendant’s conviction for aggravated robbery in Au-
gust 1976 in the district court of Jefferson County. Attached to the
judgment of conviction, sentence and mittimus for aggravated robbery was
a copy of the affidavit originally filed in that case requesting an arrest
warrant for the defendant for the crime of aggravated robbery and first-
degree kidnapping. The affidavit described in detail the manner in which
the defendant committed the aggravated robbery and the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding the alleged kidnapping. The court also admitted
into evidence the penitentiary records of the defendant indicating that on
January 11, 1977, a detainer was lodged against him for rioting in a cor-
rectional institution and criminal mischief. ,

We have observed on prior occasions that evidence of prior
criminality casts “damning innuendo likely to beget prejudice in the minds
of juries.” Stull v. People, 140 Colo. 278, 284, 344 P.2d 455, 458 (1959);
accord, People v. Honey, 198 Colo. 64, 596 P.2d.751 (1979); Huerta v.
People, 168 Colo. 276, 450 P.2d 648 (1969); Naranjo v. People, 161
Colo. 76, 419 P.2d 953 (1966); Kostal v. People, 144 Colo. 505, 357 P.2d
70 (1960); Abbott v. People, 89 Colo. 121, 299 P. 1053 (1931); Cargill
y. People, 73 Colo. 218, 214 P. 387 (1923).

The reason for the general exclusion of evidence of prior criminality
and bad character “in the case of a criminal defendant is that he may be
found guilty on the present charge, not because he is believed to be guilty,
but because his bad character may be thought by the jury to deserve pun-
ishment or to deprive an erroneous verdict of its moral injustice.” III A J.
Wigmore, Evidence § 921 at 724 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970); see
generally Lawson, Credibility and Character: A Different Look at an
Interminable Problem, 50 Notre Dame Law. 758 (1975).

Fn
344 es

At the very inception of this case, the disclosure to the jury panel of
the defendant’s two prior felony convictions so burdened the trial with the
baggage of his prior criminality that a fair trial as we know it became an
impossibility. This weighty encumbrance was made even heavier during
the trial by the improper reference to his incorrigibility, and by the equally
improper admission of evidence relating to kidnapping offenses (for which
he apparently was never convicted) and to his alleged rioting and criminal
mischief while in an institution (for which he apparently was never
charged). See, e.g., Hawkins v. People, 161 Colo. 556, 423 P.2d 581
(1967); Webb v. People, 97 Colo. 262, 49 P.2d 381 (1935); Tarling v.
People, 69 Colo. 477, 194 P. 939 (1921).

Where, as here, the defendant is charged with a serious sub-
stantive offense and with habitual criminality, and is proceeding pro se,
the district attorney and the court must be sensitive to their mutual re-
sponsibility to avoid the admission of, and any reference to, inherently pre-
judicial matters. The defendant’s prior criminality and bad character had
no place in the first phase of the trial proceedings because the defendant
did not take the witness stand in his own defense. Section 16-13-103(5),
C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). The statutory procedures mandate a bi-
furcated trial in this situation precisely to obviate the prejudicial effect of
prior convictions on the trial of the substantive offense. See People v.
Fullerton, 186 Colo. 97, 525 P.2d 1166 (1974); Heinze v. People, 127
Colo. 54, 253 P.2d 596 (1953); Routa v. People, 117 Colo. 564, 192 P.2d
436 (1948). Likewise, the admission into evidence during the second phase
of the trial of offenses not alleged as the basis of habitual criminality vio-
lated a basic precept of our criminal law: “Thou shalt not convict a person
of an offense by proof that he is guilty of another”. Stull vy. People, 140
Colo. at 284, 344 P.2d at 458.

The People contend that the errors in this case were harmless because
the substantive charge involved proof that the defendant, while an inmate
at the penitentiary, assaulted a prison guard. Thus, the argument con-
cludes, evidence of the defendant’s status as a convicted felon was inevi-
tably admissible on the substantive offense. We do not agree that the er-
rors in this case were harmless.

The defendant’s status as an inmate at the time of the assault could
have been established without parading before the jury the nature and
number of defendant’s prior convictions and his alleged incorrigibility.
Also, the prosecution could well have proven the defendant’s two prior
convictions in the secondary stage of the trial without informing the jury
that he had been involved in two kidnappings, rioting in an institution and
criminal mischief. Under the circumstances present here, the cumulative
effect of these errors and defects substantially affected the fairness of the
trial proceedings and the integrity of the fact-finding process. See, e.g.,
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L. 1557

345

(1946); People v. Hardin, 199 Colo. 229, 607 P.2d 1291 (1980); People
y. Bugarin, 181 Colo. 62, 507 P.2d 875 (1973); Crim. P. 52(b).

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the district
court for a new trial.

JUSTICE ERICKSON does not participate.

No. 80SA167

R.McG. and C.W. y. J.W. and W.W.
(615 P.2d 666)

Decided August 11, 1980.

347

Feder, Morris & Tamblyn, P.C., Leonard M. Goldstein, Margaret N.
Dillon, for plaintiffs-appellants.

David Burnell Smith, for defendants-appellees.
En Banc.

JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal raises the question whether the Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA), section 19-6-101 et seq., C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), by not
expressly granting a claiming natural father the right to bring an action
for a determination of his paternity of a child born during the marriage of
the natural mother to another, violates equal protection of the laws under
the federal and state constitutions and the equal rights amendment to the
Colorado Constitution.! We hold that the claiming natural father is con-
stitutionally entitled to bring this action and reverse the summary judg-
ment denying him statutory capacity or standing to seek a determination
of his paternity.

Plaintiff-appellant R.McG. commenced an action in 1978 in the Den-
ver Juvenile Court against defendants-appellees, J.W. and W.W., on be-
half of himself and the minor child, C.W.,? to establish his paternity of
C.W. The complaint alleged that R.McG. is the natural father of C.W.,
who was born in 1976 to R.McG. and J.W., the natural mother, that at
the time of the conception and birth of C.W., J.W. was married to W.W.;
that R.McG. is the only man who had sexual intercourse with J.W. at any
possible time of conception; that J.W. admitted that R.McG. is the natu-
ral father of C.W.; and that blood tests have been unable to exclude
R.McG. as the natural father. J.W. and W.W. in their answer denied the
alleged paternity of R.McG. and moved for summary judgment on the
ground that R.McG. lacked statutory capacity or standing under the UPA
to bring the action.*

1 The case was transferred to this court from the court of appeals pursuant to section 13-4-
110(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973. .

2 Section 19-6-110, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), provides that the child whose paternity is in
dispute shall be made a party to the action, as well as the natural mother, each man presumed to
be the father under section 19-6-105, and each man alleged to be the natural father, if subject to
the jurisdiction of the court.

The juvenile court appointed a guardian ad litem for the protection of the interests of the minor
child, C.W. Section 19-6-110, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

2 The juvenile court resolved the motion for summary judgment in terms of R.McG.’s statutory
capacity to seek a declaration of paternity. The parties in their briefs often posture their argu-
ments in terms of R.McG.’s standing. Although in some cases the distinction between capacity
and standing may be important, see Friendly Village v. Silva & Hill Construction Co., 31
Cal.App.3d 220, 107 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1973), that distinction is not significant to our determination
of this case. Standing problems may be analyzed in terms of two inquiries: (a) whether the party
alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact; and (b) whether the interest
sought to be protected is arguably within the zone of interests encompassed by the statute or con-
stitutional guarantee in question. E.g., Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v.
Camp, 397 US. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Bd.2d 184 (1970); Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo.
163, 570 P.2d 535 (1977).

348 eS

Prior to hearing the motion for summary judgment, the court granted
R.McG.’s motion for serological testing of R.McG. and W.W.4 The re-
sults of these tests indicated that R.McG. could not be excluded as the fa-
ther of C.W., and that the probability of R.McG.’s paternity was 98.89
percent. The testing laboratory was unable to isolate a sufficient number
of lymphocytes from the blood sample of W.W. and requested another
blood sample from him, but he refused to comply with the request. In op-
position to summary judgment R.McG. filed an affidavit stating that he
was the natural father of C.W., and that he and J.W. had intercourse reg-
ularly at any possible time of conception; that he and J.W. had planned to
divorce their respective spouses and marry each other; that J.W. acknowl-
edged in a sworn codicile to her will and in correspondence that he was the
natural father of C.W.;° and that C.W. had visited almost daily with him
until she was 1 1/2 years old and had developed a close relationship with
R.McG.’s three other children.

R.McG. opposed the motion for summary judgment on the grounds
that the application of the UPA in a manner that denied him statutory ca-
pacity or standing to bring an action for a determination of his paternity
of C.W. would violate his right to equal protection of the laws under the
federal constitution, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, and under the state consti-
tution, Colo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 25, and also would violate the equal

* Section 19-6-112, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), provides for blood grouping tests and their
receipt into evidence, as set forth in section 13-25-126, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.). Under section
13-25-126(1)(c)(iv) the presumption of legitimacy is overcome if the court finds that the conclu-
sions of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests, show that the husband or
wife is not the parent of the child.

8 The probability of R.McG’s paternity of C.W. was calculated by comparing (a) the probability
that a mating of a random male in the population of the same race as the putative father with a
female of the mother’s phenotype would produce an offspring of the child’s phenotype, and (b) the
probability that a mating of a male of the putative father’s phenotype with a female of the moth-
er’s phenotype would produce such an offspring.

® In the codicil to the will of J.W., she swore that her present husband, W.W., did not have sexual
intercourse with her at any time during which C.W. could have been conceived, and W.W. is not
and could not be the father of C.W.; J.W. also swore that the only person with whom she had sex-
ual intercourse during the time C.W. could have been conceived was R.McG., and to the best of
J.W.’s knowledge R.McG. is the father of C.W. The codicil also contained a request that R.McG.
be appointed guardian or custodian parent of C,W. in the event J.W. died while C.W. was an un-
married minor.

9

rights amendment to the Colorado Constitution, Colo. Const. Art. Il,
Sec. 29.

The juvenile court rejected the constitutional claims of R.McG. and
granted the motion for summary judgment on behalf of J.W. and W.W.,
holding that R.McG. lacked capacity under the UPA to bring this action.
We determine that under the circumstances of this case the failure of the
UPA to grant R.McG. the right to bring an action for a determination of
his paternity of C.W. violates equal protection of the laws under the fed-
eral and state constitution and the equal rights amendment to the Colo-
rado Constitution.

L

Before the enactment of the UPA, a putative father had no statutory
right to commence an action to-establish his paternity. The then existing
statute authorized an action by the child’s mother or guardian or the
county department of social services, as the exclusive means of establish-
ing paternity. Section 19-6-101, C.R.S. 1973; see People in the Interest
of L.B., 19 Colo. App. 101, 482 P.2d 1010 (1976), aff'd, 179 Colo. 11,
498 P.2d 1157 (1972); appeal dismissed mem., 410 US. 976, 93 S.Ct.
1497, 36 L.Ed.2d 173 (1973). The UPA was enacted in 1977 and fur-
nishes the statutory framework for the constitutional issues raised on this
appeal.

One basic purpose of the UPA is the establishment of the par-
ent-child relationship, section 19-6-104, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8),
and another is the protection of that relationship, section 19-6-103, C.R.S.
1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). Section 19-6-102 defines that relationship as the
legal relationship existing between a child and a natural parent, and ex-
pressly includes the father-child relationship. The parent-child relationship
extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the mari-
tal status of the parents. Section 19-6-103, C.R.S. 1973. Section 19-6-104
authorizes the establishment of the paternal relationship between a child
and its natural father and recognizes the right of putative fathers to bring
an action to establish paternity under the applicable provisions of the
UPA.

The UPA, however, makes no provision for a male claiming to be the
natural father of a child to bring an action to establish his paternity under
the circumstances present here. Section 19-6-107 of the UPA, insofar as
pertinent to this case, provides:

“(1) A child, his natural mother, or a man presumed to be his father un-
der section 19-6-105(1)(a) . .. may bring an action:

“(a) At any time for the purpose of declaring the existence of the father
and child relationship presumed under section 19-6-105(1)(a), ...; or
“(b) For the purpose of declaring the nonexistence of the father and
child relationship presumed under section 19-6-105(1)(a) . . . only if the
action is brought within a reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of

350 es

relevant facts, but in no event later than five years after the child’s birth.
After the presumption has been rebutted, paternity of the child by another
man may be determined in the same action, if he has been made a party.”

Under section 19-6-105(1)(a) a man is presumed to be the natu-
ral father of a child if he and the child’s natural mother are or have been
married to each other and the child is born during the marriage. Section
19-6-105(2) provides that this presumption and other statutory presump-
tions of paternity may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, and a
presumption is rebutted by a court decree establishing paternity in another
man.

The juvenile court, relying on the interpretative rule of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, reasoned that since section 19-6-107(1) ex-
pressly provided that certain categories of persons may commence an ac-
tion in paternity, including a presumed father under section 19-6-
105(1)(a), the legislature thereby intended to prohibit anyone outside the
specifically designated categories, such as a claiming natural father not
married to the natural mother, from commencing a paternity action in
connection with a child born to the natural mother during her marriage to
another,

II.

HB R.McG. argues the juvenile court’s construction denying him
statutory capacity or standing to establish that he is the natural father of
C.W. violates equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 25, of the
Colorado Constitution,’ and, in addition, violates the equal rights amend-
ment to the Colorado Constitution, Colo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 29. We
agree with R.McG.’s argument. The UPA, as construed by the juvenile
court, denies R.McG. equal protection by impermissibly discriminating
between natural mothers and claiming natural fathers, and such statutory
classification is not substantially related to an important governmental in-
terest. A fortiori, we also determine that the denial of statutory capacity
or standing to R.McG. is based on a gender classification that violates the
equal rights amendment to the Colorado Constitution, which prohibits the
denial or abridgement of equality of rights on the. basis of sex. Colo.
Const. Art. II, Sec. 29.

I “Gender-based distinctions ‘must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of these objec-
tives’ in order to withstand judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause.” Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d

7 Equal protection of the laws is a constitutionally recognized right included within the due process
clause of Article Il, Section 25 of the Colorado Constitution. See Vanderhoof v. People, 152
Colo. 147, 380 P.2d 903 (1963); Trueblood v. Tinsley, 148 Colo. 503, 366 P.2d 655 (1961);
People v. Max, 70 Colo. 100, 198 P. 150 (1921).

| 351

297 (1979); see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d
397 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225
(1971). No one questions the interest of the state in preserving the integ-
rity of family units already in existence and fostering child rearing in har-
monious family settings. See section 19-1-102, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.
Vol. 8). These interests are important and within the power of the state to
implement. The controversy here is not with governmental ends but rather
with the choice of means to achieve those ends:

“|. . [T]he unquestioned right of the State to further these desirable ends
by legislation is not in itself sufficient to justify the gender-based distinc-
tion... . Rather, under the relevant cases applying the Equal Protec-
tion Clause it must be shown that the distinction is structured reasonably
to further these ends .. . [S]uch a statutory ‘classification must be reason-
able, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all per-
sons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 USS. at 391, 99 S.Ct. at 1767, 60 L.Ed.2d at 306.

We, therefore, must analyze the pertinent provisions of the UPA under
this intermediate standard of judicial scrutiny applicable to gender-based
classifications.

Section 19-6-107(1)(a) grants statutory standing to a child, her natu-
ral mother and a presumed father to establish the father-child relation-
ship. Were the restrictive standing provisions to end there, it is at least ar-
guable that the statutory classification, although under-inclusive in its
omission of a claiming natural father, might satisfy substantially the gov-
ernmental interest by insulating a continuing family relationship from the
potentially disruptive effects of a judicial determination of paternity in an-
other. However, it is unnecessary for us to resolve that question because
constitutional infirmities are evident in section 19-6-107(1)(b), which per-
mits the natural mother to undo the state’s interest in preserving family
stability by seeking both a declaration of non-paternity in the presumed
father and a declaration of paternity in the non-family natural father. Sec-
tion 19-6-107(1)(b) does not condition the natural mother’s right to seek a
declaration of paternity in a non-spousal father upon the failure of her ex-
isting marriage to the presumed father, or the presumed father’s desertion
or non-support; the statute requires only that the natural mother’s action
be commenced within five years after the child’s birth.

This statutory scheme creates more than a difference in treatment of
natural mothers and fathers. It establishes contrary treatment. Although a
statutory classification under the intermediate level of scrutiny need not
be tailored precisely to the interest sought to be achieved, it must at least
mesh substantially with the purpose that the statutory classification is de-
signed to accommodate. The statutory classification and corresponding
difference in treatment created by section 19-6-107(1) fail to pass

ee

352 ee

constitutional muster under equal protection doctrine. Section 19-6-107(1)
exemplifies a gender-based classification predicated on an overbroad gen-
eralization that a mother has a legitimate interest in establishing a deter-
mination of paternity in a non-spousal father, while such father has no in-
terest in establishing a determination of paternity in himself.2 See, e.g.,
Caban v. Mohammed, supra; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92
S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); ef. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 US.
246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978) (unwed father, who never
sought custody of eleven-year-old minor child, was granted full hearing on
his interest in child, but his interest cannot prevent child’s adoption by
natural mother’s husband). Under the circumstances present here, the
claiming natural father, no less than the mother, must have the right to es-
tablish the significant relationship of paternity as to the child he has alleg-
edly sired.

The gender-based inequality of section 19-6-107(1) is compounded by
the statutory presumption of section 19-6-105(1)(a). Although the UPA
makes all presumptions rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence, sec-
tion 19-6-105(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), only presumed fathers
would have the necessary standing to rebut the presumption under the re-
strictive categories of section 19-6-107(1). R.McG., in spite of a threshold
showing of 98.89 percent probability of his paternity of C.W., is effec-
tively precluded not only from establishing his own claim of paternity but
also from rebutting the statutory presumption of paternity in W.W.

Under the circumstances of this case, the rebuttable presumption
of paternity in W.W., the husband of the natural mother, is converted into
a conclusive presumption against the claiming natural father. Thus, the
statutory scheme denies the claiming natural father, R.McG., judicial ac-
cess to establish a constitutionally significant relationship, Stanley v.
Illinois, supra, while simultaneously granting the natural mother practi-
cally unencumbered judicial access to establish that same relationship if
she so desires.

Procedure by presumption is permissible, but when that procedure
“forecloses the determinative issues . . . [and] explicitly disdains present
realities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks running
roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child.” Stanley
y, Illinois, supra. We hold that so long as the UPA grants a natural
mother judicial access for a period of years to seek a determination of pa-
ternity against the natural father of a child born during the marriage of
the natural mother to another, equal protection of the laws under the

® Gender as the basis of statutory differential in treatment is also apparent in section 19-6-122,
CRS. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), which provides that any interested party may bring an action to
determine the existence or nonexistence of the mother and child relationship. A claiming natural
mother, of course, would qualify as an interested party under this section.

Po

353

United States and Colorado Constitutions mandates that a claiming natu-
ral father be granted judicial access and standing to establish his paternity
of that child during that same period of time.

Because we have found that section 19-6-107(1) falls short of satisfy-
ing the intermediate level of judicial scrutiny applicable to gender-based
classification under equal protection doctrine, it necessarily follows that
section 19-6-107(1) fails to satisfy the stricter judicial scrutiny standard
applicable to the equal rights amendment of the Colorado Constitution,
Colo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 29. See People v. Green, 183 Colo. 25, 514
P.2d 769 (1973).

II.

I The natural mother and her husband, J.W. and W.W., citing
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510
(1965), contend that granting R.McG. standing to pursue his claim for a
declaration of paternity will violate their constitutional right of privacy
emanating from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The privacy interest implicated in Griswold was that of reproductive au-
tonomy. See Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678,
97 S.Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 US.
438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972). That privacy interest belongs
to the individual and not to the family as a unit, e.g., Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788
(1976), and it is not involved in the posture of this case. Moreover, what-
ever interests of J.W. and W.W. might be impacted by the continuation of
R.McG.’s claim, those interests certainly are no greater than the interest
of R.McG. in establishing his paternity of C.W., and the interest of C.W.
in determining her biological parentage and the rights incident thereto.
See Caban v. Mohammed, supra; Stanley v. Illinois, supra; In re Lisa
R., 13 Cal.3d 636, 119 Cal.Rptr. 475, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475,
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1014 (1975). Therefore, we find the argument of
J.W. and W.W. unpersuasive.

Iv.

We are not unmindful that the continuation of this paternity proceed-
ing might affect the relationship of J.W. and W.W. However, a prohibi-
tion of the proceedings will produce at least equally adverse consequences
to the claiming father. Also, we are aware of the potential consequences
that these proceedings might create for the minor child. In that regard we
note that the juvenile court appointed a guardian ad litem to protect the
child’s interests, and the guardian ad litem’s position consistently has been
that R.McG. should not be denied standing to establish his claimed paren-
tage of C.W. In fact, after the court granted summary judgment, the
guardian ad litem requested the court that it permit the action to continue
on behalf of the child so that biological parentage and other rights of the
child, such as inheritance and support, might be determined. That request

354 es
was denied. The guardian ad litem’s position reflects a candid admission
that the best interests of the child, under the circumstances of this case,
are not necessarily coextensive with those of J.W. and W.W., and are ex-
tremely difficult to determine.

In summary, we hold that where, as here, the statutory scheme
allows a natural mother to seek a judicial declaration of paternity in the
natural father in connection with a child born to the natural mother dur-
ing her marriage to another, the equal protection guarantee of the federal
and state constitutions as well as the Colorado equal rights amendment re-
quire that a claiming natural father be accorded standing to file and pro-
ceed with his claim for a judicial declaration of paternity in himself with
respect to a child born to the natural mother during her marriage to an-
other.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the juvenile
court with directions to vacate the summary judgment and to proceed in a
manner consistent with the views expressed herein.

JUSTICE DUBOFSKY specially concurs.

JUSTICE LOHR dissents.

JUSTICE DUBOFSKY specially concurring:

I concur in the majority’s result based on the constitutional infirmity
in section 19-6-107(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), but I analyze
the putative father’s standing to seek a declaration of paternity in terms of
due process rather than equal protection.

The majority finds that because the statute allows the mother to seek
a determination of paternity in a non-spousal father, and the claiming nat-
ural father has no corresponding right to seek a determination of his pater-
nity, the classification discriminates on the basis of gender. The state in-
terest in this statutory scheme, according to the majority, is preserving the
integrity of family units already in existence and fostering child rearing in
harmonious family settings. Consequently, the statute may be read as pro-
tecting the mother’s family unit (because her husband is presumed to be
the child’s father) without providing the same protection for the putative
father’s family unit.

I believe that the legislature may give preference in paternity pro-
ceedings to a mother’s family unit in which the child resides without run-
ning afoul of constitutional guarantees of equal protection. Usually, no
one questions the identity of the mother because of the mother’s preg-
nancy and delivery of the child. Paternity is not as easy to determine.

The statutory preference for the mother’s family unit, however, does
not entitle the state to exclude by the conclusive presumption in section
19-6-107(1) the putative father’s right to a court hearing on his claimed

eS 355

parenthood. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the due
process right of a natural father, absent a finding that he is unfit, to
maintain a parental relationship with his children. Stanley v. Illinois,
405 US. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 US. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978). A Califor-
nia Supreme Court decision, Jn re Lisa R., 13 Cal.3d 636, 532 P.2d 123,
119 Cal.Rptr. 475, cert. denied, 421 US. 1014, 95 S.Ct. 2421, 44
L.Ed.2d 682 (1975), gave an unwed father standing to challenge a Cali-
fornia statute’s presumption that a child of a married woman is a legiti-
mate issue of the marriage.1 The unwed father prevailed because such a
presumption is contrary to due process which requires an opportunity for
one to be heard in protection of the basic right to conceive and raise one’s
children. Stanley v. Illinois, supra; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923).

Due process consists of those procedural safe-guards designed to ac-
cord to the individual “the right to be heard before being condemned to
suffer grievous loss of any kind” as a result of governmental acts or omis-
sions. Joint Anti-Fascists Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 168, 71 S.Ct. 624, 646-7, 95 L.Ed. 817, 852 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). The nature of due process means that the procedures needed
to minimize error and reduce the dangers of arbitrary action vary “accord-
ing to specific factual contexts.” Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442,
80 S.Ct. 1502, 1514, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307, 1321 (1960).

In order to determine if due process provides the putative father
standing to rebut the presumption that the child is the issue of the moth-
er’s husband, we must weigh competing private and state interests. Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).?
Here I believe we should weigh the putative father’s indication of interest
in the child as described in the majority opinion with the state’s interest in
protecting the integrity of the family unit in which the child resides. Had
the father not made continuing efforts to maintain contact with the child
and indicated his desire to support the child, the state’s interest would pre-
vail. But here, where R.McG. has no alternate remedy to protect his inter-
est as the child’s natural father, I think we must find that he has standing

1 Like the Colorado presumption, the California presumption could be rebutted only by the woman
and her husband.

2 Such a weighing process in Stanley was struck in favor of the unwed father’s right to submit ev-
idence in rebuttal of a presumption that he was unfit to care for his illegitimate children. The
weighing process in Quilloin found that a court determination of the “best interest” of the child
protected the father’s due process rights.

8 Although the best interests of the child are not at issue in this case, the state has a legitimate in-
terest in protecting the integrity of the family unit in which the child resides as opposed to protect-
ing, under an equal protection analysis, the family unit of the putative father in which the child
does not reside.

356 ee

to assert those interests in a court proceeding. Otherwise, his constitu-
tional right to due process of law in order to protect his basic right to con-
ceive and raise his child has been denied.*

JUSTICE LOHR dissenting:

The Uniform Parentage Act’ permits the mother of a child born in
wedlock to bring an action to determine that her husband is not the father
of the child. The paternity of the child by another man may then be deter-
mined in that same action if that other man (third-party father)? has
been made a party to the action. The third-party father is given no right to
bring an action to determine that the husband is not the father of the
child. Section 19-6-107, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). The majority
concludes that such disparity in the rights accorded to the mother and the
third-party father denies the latter equal protection of the laws, U.S.
Const. amend. XIV; Colo. Const. Art. Il, § 25, and violates the equal
tights amendment to the Colorado Constitution, Colo. Const. Art. IL, §
29. I respectfully dissent.

The facts are set out in the majority opinion.

I

The Uniform Parentage Act is part of the Colorado Children’s Code.?
The purposes of the Colorado Children’s Code have been declared by the
General Assembly to include:

“(1) (a) To secure for each child subject to these provisions such care
and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will best serve his welfare
and the interests of society;

“(b) To preserve and strengthen family ties whenever possible, including
improvement of home environment;

“(2) To carry out these purposes the provisions of this title shall be liber-
ally construed.”
Section 19-1-102, C.R.S. 1973.

We have recognized and implemented these purposes in various fac-
tual settings. See R.M. v. District Court, 191 Colo. 42, 550 P.2d 346
(1976); In re People in Interest of M.M., 184 Colo. 298, 520 P.2d 128
(1974); see also People in Interest of S.S.T., 38 Colo. App. 110, 553

4 His standing to bring a court action to determine paternity is limited by statute to five years for
actions to declare the non-existence of a presumed father and child relationship.

1 Sections 19-6-101 to -129, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

2 For convenience the term “third-party father” will be used to describe a person who claims to
be, or is claimed to be, the natural father of a child born during a marriage, and who is not pre-
sumed to the the natural father pursuant to section 19-6-105(1)(a), (b), or (c), C.R.S. 1973 (1978
Repl. Vol. 8).

3 Title 19, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

es 357

P.2d 82 (1976). The public policy reflected in the stated purposes of the
Colorado Children’s Code is expressed in similar ways in related statutes.*
There can be no doubt of the strength and legitimacy of the state interest
in fostering harmonious marital relationships and strong family relation-
ships. The majority opinion recognizes the strength of the state interest
but finds that the means selected to advance that state interest do not pass
constitutional muster in this case. I cannot agree.
IL.

» The presumptions of paternity found in the Uniform Parentage Act
faithfully implement the declared legislative purposes. The mother’s hus-
band is presumed to be the natural father of a child born during a mar-
riage or attempted marriage. Section 19-6-105(1)(a), (b), C.R.S. 1973
(1978 Repl. Vol. 8).5 He is also presumed to be the natural father of a
child born prior to the marriage in certain circumstances where he has
married or attempted to marry the mother and has acknowledged pater-
nity. Section 19-6-105(1)(c), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). A pre-
sumption of paternity exists in another in two instances only: (1) where
the third-party father acknowledges paternity in writing, the mother does
not dispute the acknowledgment, and any person presumed to be the natu-
ral father gives written consent, section 19-6-105(1)(e), C.R.S. 1973
(1978 Repl. Vol. 8); and (2) where the third-party father receives the
child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child, sec-
tion 19-6-105(1)(d), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).6 Any presumption
of paternity created by the statute may be rebutted only by clear and
convincing evidence. Section 19-6-105(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol.

4 The Uniform Marriage Act reflects the legislative purposes of strengthening and preserving the
integrity of marriage and safeguarding meaningful family relationships. Sections 14-2-101 to -113,
CRS, 1973. Section 14-2-102, C.R.S. 1973, provides in pertinent part:

“(1) This part 1 shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes.

“(a) To strengthen and preserve the integrity of marriage and to safeguard meaningful family re-
lationships;”

These purposes are again expressed in our marriage counseling statute, section 14-12-101, C.R.S.
1973, as follows:

“1412-101, Legislative declaration, It is the declared public policy of this state to maintain desir-
able marital and family relations; to promote and foster the marriage relationship and reconcilia-
tion of estranged spouses; and to take reasonable measures to preserve marriages, particularly
where minor children are involved, in the interest of strengthening the family life foundation of our
society, and in reducing the economic and social costs to the state resulting from broken homes. In
furtherance of this policy, it is the purpose of this article to make competent marriage counseling
services available through the district courts of the state to spouses involved in domestic difficul-
ties.”

5 The presumption of legitimacy is one of the strongest presumptions known to the law. Beck v.
Beck, 153 Colo. 90, 384 P.2d 731 (1963); Lanford v. Lanford, 151 Colo, 211, 377 P.2d 115
(1962). As those cases reflect, the presumption existed long prior to adoption of the Uniform Par-
entage Act.

6 In summarizing the statutory presumptions, much of the detail has been omitted in the interest
of simplicity.

358 ee

8).

Only a child, his natural mother, or a man presumed to be his father
under section 19-6-105(1)(a), (b), or (c) may bring an action to declare
the existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship presumed
under section 19-6-105(1)(a), (b), or (c). Section 19-6-107(1)(a), (b),
C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). No action may be brought more than
five years after the birth of the child to declare the nonexistence of the
presumed father and child relationship. Section 19-6-107(1)(b), C.R.S.
1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). Thus the persons who may challenge the pre-
sumption of the husband’s paternity with respect to a child born during a
marriage are limited to certain persons inside the family unit created by
the marriage, and the time for challenge is limited. The denial of any right
of a person outside a family unit to make such a challenge implements the
legislative purpose of preserving and strengthening family ties wherever
possible.

In the event the presumption of paternity is rebutted in an action
brought under section 19-6-107(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8),
paternity of the child by another man may be determined in the same ac-
tion, if he has been made a party. Section 19-6-107(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973
(1978 Repl. Vol. 8). It thus appears that a third-party father would have a
tight to intervene in such a proceeding, and to participate once the pre-
sumption of paternity in the husband has been rebutted. See C.R.C.P. 24.
It also appears that a third-party father can bring an independent action
to establish his paternity after the presumption of the husband’s paternity
has been rebutted. See section 19-6-107(3), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol.
8), permitting a person alleging himself to be the father to bring such an
action “with respect to a child who has no presumed father under section
19-6-105.” It would seem that, once the presumption of paternity created
by that latter section has been rebutted, the child has no such presumed
father.

Ill.

We must determine whether creation of the two statutory classes, the
members of one of which may challenge the presumption that the husband
is the natural father and the members of the other of which may not, de-
nies equal protection of the laws to a third-party father, who is a member
of the latter class.

It has been recognized that a man who has sired and raised children
born of an unwed mother has a cognizable and substantial interest in re-
taining custody of his children. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92
S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). Contrary to the majority’s contention,
this principle has never been extended to a conclusion that an interest in a
determination of parental status with respect to a child born during a mar-
riage exists in a person other than the husband of the mother of that child.
Whether such an interest exists in a third-party father at all may be

359

doubted, at least in circumstances where the child is conceived during the
marriage and lives within the family unit after birth. No matter how we
may perceive the mores of our society, it is not without significance that
adultery is an act so contrary to declared public policy that it has been
prohibited in the Colorado Criminal Code in a section enacted in 1971.
Section 18-6-501, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8); but see Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 US. 380, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979) (the
father, who was cohabiting with the mother for a substantial time sur-
rounding the birth of the children, was married to another; the court made
nothing of that fact in considering the father’s interest with respect to
those children). Against the background of that statute and the state inter-
est in preservation of marriages, it requires more imagination than I can
summon to find any legitimate expectation of a legally recognized rela-
tionship based solely on the blood ties between the child conceived of an
adulterous relationship and the natural father of that child.

Even assuming that the third-party father has or can develop an in-
terest which is constitutionally cognizable, the Uniform Parentage Act
does not deny him equal protection of the laws in the circumstances of the
instant case. Certainly any interest which might be recognized in the
third-party father does not rise to the level of a fundamental right, requir-
ing that the legislative classification preventing nonfamily members from
attacking the presumption that the husband is the natural father be tested
by the standard of strict scrutiny. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 US.
535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942). The majority opinion does not
contend that a standard of strict scrutiny applies.

Absent an infringement of a fundamental right or the creation of a
suspect classification, the appropriate test to determine whether equal pro-
tection standards are satisfied is whether the classification is reasonable,
not arbitrary, and bears a rational relationship to legitimate state objec-
tives. Mosgrove v. Town of Federal Heights, 190 Colo. 1, 543 P.2d 715
(1975), citing Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct.
1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974). Mathematical precision in establishing
classifications is not required. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90
S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970).

The legislative purpose of preserving the family ties is not only legiti-
mate but strong. It would be difficult to imagine anything more disruptive
to a family relationship than a challenge to the presumption that the hus-
band is the father of a child born during the marriage. The recognition of
the right of persons within the family unit to make such a challenge simply
reflects the reality that, public policy notwithstanding, marriages do fail.
See Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act, sections 14-10-101 to -133,
C.R.S. 1973. When relationships reach the point that someone within the
family wishes to challenge the presumption of the husband’s paternity, the
legislature could reasonably determine that no useful purpose would be

360 ee

served by preventing that person from doing so. This is entirely consistent
with denial of that right to third-party fathers unless,and until the pre-
sumption of the husband’s paternity has been rebutted. The statutory
classification bears a reasonable relationship to legitimate legislative pur-
poses. See generally People in Interest of L.B., 179 Colo. 11, 498 P.2d
1157 (1972), appeal dismissed mem., 410 U.S. 976, 93 S.Ct. 1497, 36
L.Ed.2d 173 (1973).
Iv.

The majority views the nature of the classification differently and, in
my view, erroneously. Because the mother may challenge the presumption,
but the third-party father may not, the majority views the classification as
gender-based and therefore suspect. But the class which may challenge the
classification extends beyond the mother to her husband, and to the child,
who may be of either gender. The criterion for membership in the class is
not gender-based, so the higher level of scrutiny which the majority would
apply to the test for gender-based classifications for equal protection pur-
poses is not applicable. I would construe the statutes to permit a third-
party father to intervene to assert his paternity in any action brought by
another to challenge the presumption of paternity in the husband, see sec-
tion 19-6-107(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), or to bring an inde-
pendent action for that purpose once the presumption of the husband’s pa-
ternity has been rebutted, see section 19-6-107(3), C.R.S. 1973 (1978
Repl. Vol. 8). The statutory scheme, as so construed, reflects a sensitive
recognition and accommodation of the public policy considerations and
private interests involved. In the circumstances here, where the child was
conceived and born during the marriage and never lived with the third-
party father, and where the husband and wife were not separated at the
times of conception and birth, in my view the strong public policy of
strengthening and preserving family ties would cause the classification to
survive even that level of scrutiny which the majority concludes to be ap-
propriate, ie., that the classification has been shown to serve important
governmental objectives and is substantially related to achievement of
those objectives. See Caban v. Mohammed, supra; see also People v.
Green, 183 Colo. 25, 514 P.2d 769 (1973).

V

From the conclusion that the class is not gender-based, it follows that
the equal rights amendment of the Colorado Constitution’ has no applica-
tion.

7 Colo. Const, Art. I, § 29. That section provides: “Equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged by the State of Colorado or any of its political subdivisions on account of sex.”

ee 361

VI.

The concurring opinion concludes that due process of law is denied to
the third-party father by the Uniform Parentage Act, in contravention of
U.S. Const. amend. XIV and Colo. Const. Art. II,§ 25.

As discussed in Part III, it is not at all certain that the third-party fa-
ther has a constitutionally protected interest under the facts of the instant
case. Those facts make this case very different from Stanley v. Illinois,
supra. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 US. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d
511 (1978). If the third-party father has a constitutionally cognizable in-
terest, I agree with the concurring opinion that the competing private and
state interests must be weighed in determining whether due process of law
requires that a hearing be accorded to the third-party father to permit him
to attempt to rebut the presumption that the husband is the father. In
light of the public policy interests in preserving and strengthening family
ties and providing stable home environments for children, I cannot con-
clude that due process of law is denied to the third-party father in this
case because he is precluded from determining his paternity unless and un-
til the presumption of the husband’s paternity is rebutted in an action
brought by someone within the family unit. See Quilloin v. Walcott,
supra.

It may be that factual circumstances could exist which would invite
the recognition of an interest in a third-party father which would mandate
an opportunity for hearing with respect to the presumption of the hus-
band’s paternity in order to accord due process of law to the third-party
father. This is not such a case. The facts before the trial court reflect
that both the mother and the third-party father were married to other per-
sons when the child was conceived and born and that both marriages con-
tinued. The child has never lived with the third-party father, although for
one and one-half years she visited in his home periodically and became ac-
quainted with his older children. The child has always been in the custody
of the mother and her husband and has been supported by them. The
third-party father’s only contacts with the child have been during the
course of visits permitted by the mother. To me, the important criteria
would be the duration and quality of the relationship of the parties, not
the probability that the third-party father could in fact prove paternity.®

8 Section 19-6-105(1)(d), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), would create a presumption of pater-
nity in any male person who receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his
natural child. Whether this is sufficiently extensive to protect any constitutionally cognizable inter-
est of a third-party father in all imaginable factual contexts we need not decide today.

® See Mr. Justice Stewart’s dissent in Caban v. Mohammed, supra, in which he says, “Parental
rights do not spring full blown from the biological connection between parent and child. They re-
quire relationships more enduring.” 441 U.S. 380, 397, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 1771, 60 L.Ed.2d 297, 310
(1979). See also In re Lisa R., 13 Cal.3d 636, 119 Cal.Rptr. 475, 532 P.2d 123, cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1014, 95 S.Ct. 2421, 44 L.Ed.2d 682 (1975).

362 ee

A person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not
be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably
be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the court.
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830
(1973); accord, People v. Stage, 195 Colo. 110, 575 P.2d 423 (1978);
People v. Blue, 190 Colo. 95, 544 P.2d 385 (1975).

It may be objected that to draw a line between any factual circum-
stances in which a third-party father cannot be denied a hearing to chal-
lenge the presumption of the husband’s paternity and factual circum-
stances in which a hearing for such purpose need not be permitted would
be a difficult task. This is undoubtedly true. Litmus test certainty in appli-
cation has never been the criterion for adoption of rules of constitutional
adjudication. Development of limits of constitutional protections on the
basis of case by case determinations is a traditional role of the courts. We
should not shirk the task with respect to the issue involved here.

I would affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

No. 79SA264

The People of the State of Colorado vy. George Whitesel
(615 P.2d 678)

Decided August 18, 1980.

a 363

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Sarah Scott Sammons, Assistant
Attorney General, for plaintiff-appellee.

Woodrow, Roushar, Weaver & Withers, Frank J. Woodrow, for
defendant-appellant.

En Banc.

CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES delivered the opinion of the Court.

The defendant was convicted of sexual assault on a child by the use of
force, intimidation or threat, a class 3 felony. Section 18-3-405, C.R.S.
1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). The victim, the defendant’s eleven-year-old
daughter, testified at trial that the defendant entered her bedroom late one
evening and had sexual contact with her. She also testified, over defense
counsel’s objections, that there had been numerous other similar incidents
during the prior six-month period.

At the close of all the evidence, defense counsel challenged the suffi-
ciency of-the evidence of the use of force, intimidation or threat against
the victim to support the class 3 felony charge and urged the trial court to
enter a judgment of acquittal on this charge. The trial court ruled there
was sufficient evidence on this charge and therefore instructed the jury on
this offense and the lesser offense of simple sexual assault on a child, a
class 4 felony. The jury returned a guilty verdict on the class 3 felony
charge. We reverse and remand the cause for entry of a judgment and sen-
tence on the lesser offense.

On this appeal, the defendant first contends that the trial court
committed reversible error in allowing into evidence testimony of prior
sexual episodes with the victim. We have previously rejected this same
challenge, where, as here, the evidence goes to prove a common plan,
scheme or design, which is admissible under section 16-10-301(1), C.R.S.
1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). See People v. Elliston, 181 Colo. 118, 508

po

364 ee

P.2d 379 (1973); Godfrey v. People, 168 Colo. 299, 451 P.2d 291 (1969);
Hood v. People, 130 Colo. 531, 277 P.2d 223 (1954). We find no reason
to reach a different result in the present case.

II Secondly, the defendant questions the sufficiency of the evidence
to support his conviction for the class 3 felony charge. Our review of the
record supports the defendant’s position. There is no evidence in this re-
cord “to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” of the class 3 felony charge. People v.
Bennett, 183 Colo. 125, 515 P.2d 466 (1973). Although the victim testi-
fied that she did not resist the defendant’s advances because she feared his
reprisal, there is no evidence in this record to indicate that the defendant
used any force, intimidation or threat. To the contrary, the evidence re-
veals that during this particular incident, the defendant said nothing to the
victim nor did he use any force to commit the sexual act. The record also
reveals that at no time prior to or subsequent to this incident did the de-
fendant do or say anything to the victim which would justify a finding by
the jury that the sexual contact was obtained by the use of force, intimida-
tion or threat. The victim, in fact, testified that the defendant “was very
nice to me.” In addition, the victim’s fear that she would be beaten if she
told anyone of the incident was shown to be unfounded when the defend-

- ant, upon learning that his daughter had told her mother of the assault,
merely stated, “Tattletale, that was supposed to be yours and my secret.”

Hl Under these facts and circumstances, the trial court erred in fail-
ing to enter a judgment of acquittal on the greater offense of sexual as-
sault by force, intimidation or threat. The evidence, however, fully sup-
ports a finding of guilt on the lesser offense. Therefore, the defendant’s
conviction is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for the
entry of a judgment and sentence for the lesser offense of simple sexual as-
sault on a child, a class 4 felony.

365

No. 79SA266

The People of the State of Colorado v. Cornelius Lane Scott
(615 P.2d 680)

Decided August 18, 1980.

366 es
J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,

Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Nathan B. Coats, Assistant
Attorney General, Litigation Section, for plaintiff-appellee.

Bruce P. Fierst, for defendant-appellant.

En Banc.
JUSTICE LEE delivered the opinion of the Court.

Cornelius Lane Scott, appellant, appeals from his conviction of Driv-
ing After Judgment Prohibited, section 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973. We affirm
the judgment and remand for reconsideration of the sentence.

On April 7, 1977, Scott was charged with Driving While License Re-
voked, in violation of section 42-2-130, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1979 Supp.).
On May 27, 1977, he appeared, pro se, and tendered a plea of not guilty to
the charge. A pretrial conference was held on July 14, 1977, and the case
was then set for trial to the court on September 19, 1977.

On September 19, Scott appeared with counsel and tendered a plea of
guilty to the charge. On that same date, it had been brought to the atten-
tion of the district attorney that Scott had been adjudicated a habitual
traffic offender in December of 1976. Based on that information, and be-
fore the court ruled on Scott’s plea of guilty, the People moved to dismiss

367

the charge of Driving While License Revoked. The motion was granted.1

On October 20, 1977, Scott was charged with the felony of Driving
After Judgment Prohibited, section 42-2-206, as well as with the misde-
meanor Driving While License Revoked. Because an incorrect address was
listed for Scott, he was not notified of the new charge against him until
January 1978. On April 4, 1978, he filed a motion to dismiss both charges,
alleging violation of his right to a speedy trial and of his right to have all
charges arising out of a single incident brought at the same time. The mo-
tion was denied, and the case was bound over to the district court.

On April 24, 1978, Scott filed a further motion to dismiss on the
grounds that he had been denied a speedy trial and the court lacked juris-
diction to proceed against him. The court also denied that motion.

Trial to the court was held on October 5, 1978. Scott was convicted of
Driving After Judgment Prohibited. The court dismissed the charge of
Driving While License Revoked. At the sentencing hearing, the court de-
nied Scott’s motion to declare section 42-2-206 unconstitutional, and sen-
tenced him to an indeterminate period not to exceed five years. The court
also ruled that Scott was not eligible for a community correction program.

IL.

Scott first contends that the district court erred in denying his motion
to dismiss pursuant to Crim. P. 48(b) and section 18-1-408(2), C.R.S.
1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). We do not agree.

Both Crim. P. 48(b) and section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1978
Repl. Vol. 8) require that a defendant be brought to trial “on the issues
raised by the complaint” within six months after a plea of not guilty. In
this case, Scott was brought to trial within six months of his plea of not
guilty to the charge of Driving After Judgment Prohibited, but not within
six months of his not guilty plea to the charge of Driving While License
Revoked. The question before us is whether the six-month speedy trial pe-
riod began to run after the not guilty plea to the Driving While License
Revoked charge, or after the not guilty plea to the Driving After Judg-
ment Prohibited charge.

HH In Amon v. People, 198 Colo. 172, 597 P.2d 569 (1979), the
court set out a two-part test to be applied in determining whether the stat-
utory right to speedy trial was violated where a complaint is amended
after the defendant has entered a plea of not guilty to the original charge.
The court held that it is crucial to the speedy trial issue to determine
“whether the amended complaint charged any new, different, or

1 Section 42-2-206(2) requires that the court, before hearing charges of Driving While License Re-
voked, “shall require the district attorney to determine whether such person has been determined to
be an habitual offender ... . If the district attorney determines that the accused has been so
held, he shall cause the appropriate criminal charges to be lodged against the accused.”
(Emphasis added.)

368 es

additional offense, thus requiring the entry of another plea by the defend-
ant. If so, then the good faith of the prosecution in amending the com-
plaint should be scrutinized to determine if there was an attempted cir-
cumvention of the speedy trial rule.”

Applying the Amon test to the facts of this case, we note first
that, by charging Scott with the felony offense of Driving After Judgment
Prohibited, the prosecution charged a new, different, and additional of-
fense to the original charge of Driving While License Revoked. The latter
charge is a misdemeanor, requiring proof that the accused was driving
while his license was revoked. The offense of Driving After Judgment Pro-
hibited required proof that the accused was driving while his license was
revoked and that the accused had been determined to be a habitual of-
fender, pursuant to section 42-2-202, C.R.S. 1973. The filing of the felony
charge necessitated another arraignment of Scott.

The Amon test also mandates that the court examine the good faith
of the prosecution to determine if, by not filing the felony charge at the
time the original misdemeanor charge was filed, the prosecution was at-
tempting to circumvent the speedy trial rule as set out in Crim. P. 48(b).
Scott does not allege that the district attorney acted in bad faith, nor does
the record indicate that the district attorney indiscriminately dismissed
and refiled the charges in order to avoid the mandate of the speedy trial
tule. See People v. Wilkinson, 37 Colo. App. 531, 555 P.2d 1167 (1976).2
The record does indicate that, once the district attorney became aware
that Scott had been determined to be a habitual offender, the district at-
torney took the necessary steps to charge him with Driving After Judg-
ment Prohibited, as required by section 42-2-202(2). We hold that Scott
was not denied a speedy trial.

I.

I We find no merit in Scott’s argument that he was entitled to a
dismissal under section 18-1-408(2) and Crim. P. 8(a). Section 18-1-
408(2) provides, in pertinent part:

“If the several offenses are known to the district attorney at the time of
commencing the prosecution . . . all such offenses upon which the district
attorney elects to proceed must be prosecuted by separate counts in a sin-
gle prosecution if they are based on the same act or series of acts arising
from the same criminal episode. . . .” (Emphasis added.)

Scott does not contend that the prosecution was aware that he was a ha-
bitual offender at the time that the initial charge was filed against him.
The statute and Crim. P. 8(a) apply only where the prosecution is aware
of other offenses at the time the original action is commenced.

2 We note that Scott has not raised any argument that his constitutional right to speedy trial was
violated.
8 The provisions of Crim. P. 8(a) are to like effect.

369

Il.

HH Scott next argues that section 42-2-206 is unconstitutional as vi-
olative of equal protection of the law in that it has created an irrational
and arbitrary classification in providing that habitual traffic offenders be
subjected to mandatory sentencing, whereas other offenders whose con-
duct is of far greater culpability may be granted probation or be given sus-
pended sentences. Scott concludes that this inequity of treatment of habit-
ual traffic offenders is patently unfair and as such constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. We do not agree. It is only where “two statutes pro-
vide disparate penalties for similar criminal conduct” that equal protection
guarantees are violated. People v. Montoya, 196 Colo. 111, 582 P.2d 673
(1978); People v. Czajkowski, 193 Colo. 352, 568 P.2d 23 (1977).

It is well-settled that “[t]his court cannot hold that the Gen-
eral Assembly has constitutionally erred in providing more severe penalties
for an act which it believes to be of greater social consequence. .. . The
constitution does not demand symmetry of punishment where valid classi-
fications, based on varieties of evil, exist.” People v. Czajkowski, supra.
The habitual offenders statute is specifically intended “[t]o discourage
repetition of criminal acts by individuals against the peace and dignity of
this state and its political subdivisions and to imposed increased and added
deprivation of the privilege to operate motor vehicles upon habitual of-
fenders who have been convicted repeatedly of violations of traffic laws.”
Section 42-2-201(1)(c), C.R.S. 1973. Thus, we hold that the classification
under the habitual traffic offender statute has a rational basis and does
not violate the requirement of equal protection of the law. Nor is the pun-
ishment mandated so disparate to the gravity of the offense as to consti-
tute cruel and unusual punishment.

Iv.

I Finally, Scott argues that the court erred in holding that it was
precluded from sentencing him to a community correction program. The
People concur in this argument, and we agree.

Section 17-27-105(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8) provides:

... A sentencing judge is authorized to sentence a nonviolent felony
offender to a residential or nonresidential community correctional facility
or program ... . Such facilities may be utilized for such persons . . .
who have been sentenced, including sentences for probation.”
In People ex rel. VanMeveren v. Dist. Ct., 195 Colo. 65, 572 P.2d 483
(1978), this court held that, even though an individual has twice been con-
victed of a felony and thus is ineligible for probation, such convictions “do
not foreclose a court from sentencing a defendant to a community correc-
tional program... .” Accord, People v. District Court, 195 Colo. 34,
575 P.2d 4 (1978).

We extend the same rationale to an individual sentenced pursuant to
section 42-2-206(1), which provides that “[n]o portion of [the sentence for

“

370 ee

a class 5 felony] may be suspended, and no probation may be granted
. . . .”’ Scott may be considered for a community correction program.

We further note that the court apparently misapprehended the statu-
tory minimum sentence required for a class 5 felony. The court, in sen-
tencing petitioner, indicated that it intended to impose the minimum sen-
tence it could under the statute. It imposed an indeterminate to five-year
sentence which in fact is the maximum sentence that could be imposed
pursuant to section 16-11-101(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), for
a class 5 felony, section 18-1-105(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).
Section 16-11-101(1)(b) provides that the authorized maximum sentence
for a class 5 felony “shall be no more than the maximum sentence pro-
vided by law for violation of the statute involved and which shall be no
less than one-third of the maximum sentence provided by law for viola-
tion of the statute involved.” (Emphasis added.) Since the maximum sen-
tence in this case is indeterminate to five years, a sentence of no less than
one-third of five years, or an indeterminate to one and two-thirds years
sentence would be the maximum sentence that could be imposed.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court and remand for re-
sentencing in accordance with the views expressed herein.

No. 79SC107

Franklin Contract Sales Co. y. First National Bank of Denver and Percy
Wilson Mortgage and Finance Corporation

(615 P.2d 684)

Decided August 18, 1980.

es 371
es

Stephen H. Diamond, for petitioner.

Towey & Zak, James J. Zak, for respondents.

En Banc.
JUSTICE LEE delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals in
Amco Electric v. First National Bank, 42 Colo. App. 124, 596 P.2d 70
(1979). We now reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

Petitioner Franklin Contract Sales Company (Franklin), installed
carpeting and draperies in a condominium project pursuant to an oral con-
tract with the developer. Franklin completed the installation on December
26, 1974, and recorded its mechanic’s lien on January 13, 1975. The pro-
ject was deemed completed (abandoned) on March 23, 1975.1

Amco Electric Company (Amco) commenced a foreclosure action on
its mechanic’s lien on the same condominium project on December 3,
1974. Franklin filed a Motion to Intervene pursuant to section 38-22-

+ Section 38-22-109(7), CRS. 1973 (now in 1979 Supp), provides: “For the purposes of [the me-
chanic’s lien statute] abandonment of all labor, work, services, and furnishings of materials under
any unfinished contract or upon any unfinished building . . . shall be deemed equivalent to a com-
pletion thereof.”

372 P|

111(3), C.R.S. 1973, in the Amco action on August 21, 1975, within the
six-month period for commencing an action to enforce a lien pursuant to
section 38-22-110, C.R.S. 1973. The court did not grant the motion until
October 27, 1975, after the six-month period had expired.

In February 1977, after hearing testimony and argument, a court-

appointed Master held that Franklin’s mechanic’s lien was timely and
valid, superior to the deeds of trust held by respondents. The Master con-
cluded:
“ |. , An action is commenced by the filing of a Complaint pursuant to
Rule 3 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure and the Master considers
the filing of the Motion to Intervene as the equivalent of a Complaint.
Since delays in docketing with the Court or other scheduling problems be-
yond the control of Franklin could affect the date upon which the said
Motion was considered by the Court, the Master believes that the filing of
the motion should be considered as the commencement of the action to en-
force a mechanic’s lien.”

The trial court accepted those findings and entered judgment in favor
of Franklin. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the mere filing of
a motion to intervene within the six-month period is not sufficient to com-
ply with the statutory requirements, but that the intervenor must also be
joined by order of court within that period.

Section 38-22-110 provides in pertinent part:

“No lien claimed by virtue of this article . . . shall hold the property
longer than six months after the last work or labor is performed . . . or
after the completion of the building . . . unless an action has been com-
menced within that time to enforce the same . . . .”

Section 38-22-111 provides:

“(1) Any number of persons claiming liens against the same property and
not contesting the claims of each other may join as plaintiffs in the same
action; and when separate actions are commenced, the court may consoli-
date them upon motion of any party in interest or upon its own motion.
“(2) Upon such procedure for consolidation, one case shall be selected
with which the other cases shall be incorporated; and all the parties to
such other cases shall be made parties plaintiff or defendant as the court
may designate in said case so selected. All persons having claims for liens,
the statements of which have been filed as provided in this article, shall be
made parties to the action.

“(3) Those claiming liens who fail or refuse to become parties plaintiff,
or for any reason have not been made such parties, shall be made
parties defendant. Any party claiming a lien within the period provided
in section 38-22-109, may be allowed to intervene by motion, upon cause
shown, and may be made a party defendant on the order of the court
. .. .” (Emphasis added.)

373

I) The mechanics’ lien law contemplates that all lien claimants be
made parties to an action to foreclose. In this case, Franklin was not a lien
claimant at the time Amco commenced its action and thus could not ini-
tially be joined in the action. However, within six months of the filing of
its lien, Franklin sought to intervene as provided by subsection (3) of sec-
tion 38-22-111. This court has stated that “[i]t is unmistakably clear that
it was contemplated by the lawmakers that ‘all persons having claims for
liens’ were to be made parties [in a single action], ‘if the statements have
been filed’ within the statutory time.” Natl. Un. Fire v. Denver Brick,
162 Colo. 519, 427 P.2d 861 (1967). (Emphasis added.)

I The court of appeals, in determining that the mere filing of a
motion to intervene was not sufficient when the motion was not granted
within the six-month statutory period, relied on Rogers Concrete, Inc. v.
Jude Contractors, 38 Colo. App. 26, 550 P.2d 892 (1976). We do not
find the rationale of Rogers, as interpreted by the court of appeals in Cox
v. Bankers Trust Co., 39 Colo. App. 303, 570 P.2d 6 (1977), to be in
conflict with the conclusion reached here. the Cox court specifically noted
that the mechanic’s lien claimant did not seek intervention prior to the ex-
piration of the statutory six months. The Cox court also found that situa-
tion to be “clearly distinguishable” from Nat/. Un. Fire v. Denver Brick,
supra, in which the claimant’s “motion to intervene was made well within
the six month statutory period.” (Emphasis added.) Rogers, Cox and
Natl. Un. Fire all.contemplate that time of the filing of the motion to in-
tervene, and not the granting of the motion, is the critical date for deter-
mination of whether the intervention procedure is timely. We hold that the
order of intervention properly relates back to the date of the filing of the
motion to intervene in a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action. Thus, in this
case, the filing was well within the six-month statutory period.

The motion to intervene was aceompanied by an answer, counter-
claim, and cross-claim. The counterclaim served the same purpose in the
pending case as a complaint would serve in an independent action to fore-
close petitioner’s lien. It would be an anomaly that, had petitioner chosen
to commence an independent action on August 21, 1975, to foreclose his
mechanic’s lien, his action could not have successfully been challenged as
being untimely, whereas his claim, having been asserted by the filing of a
counterclaim in the pending case through the intervention process, could
be successfully attacked as untimely.

To penalize a lien holder who has timely filed a motion to in-
tervene, but whose motion was not granted within the statutory period be-
cause of docket congestion or otherwise, is not within the intent of the me-
chanic’s lien statute. “[M]echanics’ lien laws should be construed in favor
of lien claimants.” Bankers Trust v. El Paso Precast, 192 Colo. 468,
560 P.2d 457 (1977).

w

74 ee

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the court of ap-
peals for determination of the other issues on appeal.

No. 79SA364

The People of the State of Colorado y. Eugene Velarde
(616 P.2d 104)

Decided August 18, 1980, Rehearing denied September 22, 1980.

315

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Maureen Phelan, Assistant
Attorney General, Litigation Section, for plaintiff-appellee.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Craig L. Truman, Chief
Deputy, Steven H. Denman, Deputy, for defendant-appellant.

En Banc.
JUSTICE LEE delivered the opinion of the Court.

Eugene Velarde was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery and
conspiracy, and his conviction was affirmed by this court in People v.
Velarde, 196 Colo. 254, 586 P.2d 6 (1978). Velarde then filed a Crim. P.
35(b) motion to vacate his sentence. The motion was denied by the district
court and Velarde has appealed from that ruling.

Velarde alleges that, as an atheist, his constitutional right to a fair
and impartial jury and to due process of law was denied when the district
court failed to inquire into the religious affiliations and beliefs of the pro-
spective jurors at his trial, and when the jurors were “required” to swear
an oath to God. The district court dismissed the Rule 35(b) motion with-
out an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the district court.

IJ It is the responsibility of an appellant to designate the record on
appeal or such parts thereof as he deems necessary for his appeal and to
ensure that the record is transmitted to the appellate court. Till v.
People, 196 Colo. 126, 581 P.2d 299 (1978). See C.A.R. 10(b). The re-
cord before us does not include a transcript of the jury voir dire or oath-
taking at Velarde’s trial. The record shows that at the commencement of
the jury selection the reporting of the voir dire examination was waived by
agreement of both counsel.

I Where, as in this case, no report of the voir dire was made at
trial, and a transcript is unavailable, C.A.R. 10(c) provides that the appel-
lant “may prepare a statement of the . . . proceedings from the best
available means, including his recollection.” Velarde has not provided the
court with any statement ‘of the voir dire proceedings other than to assert
that the court failed to interrogate prospective jurors concerning their reli-
gious beliefs, or lack thereof, as bearing upon their ability to swear an oath

316 es

“by the everliving God.” Nowhere in the record as transmitted to this
court is there any suggestion that the jury selection process was not con-
sistent with constitutional requirements. The burden is on a defendant who
objects to alleged irregularities in the trial process to preserve the same for
review on appeal. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that
there is no merit to appellant’s argument.

We briefly address the substance of Velarde’s arguments. First,
it has consistently been held that it is within the discretion of the trial
judge whether to make inquiry of the jurors on voir dire as to their reli-
gious affiliations. See Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir.
1967); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967), vacated on
other grounds, 392 US. 651, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1317 (1968);
Yarborough v. United States, 230 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
351 US. 969, 76 S.Ct. 1034, 100 L.Ed. 1487 (1956). Particularly in a
case such as the one before us, where there is no showing that there is any
issue of religious significance involved in the case and where there is no in-
dication in the record that the jurors were even aware that Velarde was an
atheist, it is not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to fail to inquire as
to the juror’s religious beliefs. See Crim. P. 24(a).

Hl Second, the jurors were not required to swear an oath “by the
everliving God” in order to serve on the jury. Section 24-12-102, C.R.S.
1973, provides that, whenever an individual is required to take an oath,
“and such person has conscientious scruples against taking an oath, he
shall be permitted to make his solemn affirmation or declaration . . .
which solemn affirmation or declaration is equally valid as if such person
had taken an oath in the usual form . . . .” It is not a violation of the
first amendment establishment clause to require jurors either to take an
oath or to affirm. Accord, Jones v. State, 585 P.2d 1340 (Nev. 1978);
State v. Albe, 10 Ariz. App. 545, 460 P.2d 651 (1969); Rocker v. State,
240 A.2d 141 (Del. 1968). Cf., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81
S.Ct. 1680, 6 L.Ed.2d 982 (1961) (provision of the Maryland Constitution
requiring a declaration of a belief in God as a qualification for public of-
fice).

HI Finally, the district court properly dismissed the Rule 35(b)
motion without a hearing. Where the motion and the record of the case
show, to the satisfaction of the court, that the prisoner is not entitled to re-
lief, a hearing is not necessary. People v. Trujillo, 190 Colo. 497, 549
P.2d 1312 (1976); People v. Hutton, 183 Colo. 388, 517 P.2d 392
(1973). The issues presented by Velarde in his Rule 35(b) motion were is-
sues of law, and thus an evidentiary hearing was not required. People v.
Trujillo, supra.

Judgment affirmed.

JUSTICE QUINN does not participate.

377

No. 28038

The People of the State of Colorado y. New Horizons, Inc., a Colorado
corporation, d/b/a The News Stand

No. 28096
The People of the State of Colorado y. Johann Skinner, Darryl I.
Deighton, Wayne Fair, Jesse Jay Weaver and Richard Browning

No. 28136
The People of the State of Colorado vy. Renegade Royale, Ltd., a Colorado
corporation, James Allen Hildebrandt and Suzanne M. Hildebrandt

No. 28200
The People of the State of Colorado v. Bry-Lyn Corp., a Colorado
corporation, d/b/a Adult Gift Shoppe

No. 28413
The People of the State of Colorado y. Plateau Management and
Investment Co., Inc., a Colorado corporation, doing business as Kitty’s
Pleasure Palace, Inc.

No. 79SA322

The People of the State of Colorado y. G.N.A. Incorporated, Kristy
Nease, William Robert McCall and Wayne Hickerson

(616 P.2d 106)

Decided August 18, 1980. Rehearing denied September 8, 1980 in 79SA322 and
28096.

rc)
i .

es 319

Alexander M. Hunter, District Attorney, Kevin M. Shea, Deputy, for
plaintiff-appellee in 28038.

Arthur M. Schwartz, P.C., for defendant-appellant in 28038.
Bruce Taylor, for Charles H. Keating, Jr., amicus curiae in 28038.

Robert L. Russel, District Attorney, Lance M. Sears, Deputy, for
plaintiff-appellee in 28096.

Arthur M. Schwartz, P.C., for defendants-appellants in 28096.
Charles H. Keating, amicus curiae in 28096.

J. E. Losavio, District Attorney, Warren T. Marshall, Deputy, Amy
S. Isaminger, Deputy, for plaintiff-appellant in 28136.

Nicholas J. Bourg, Lloyd C. Kordick, for defendants-appellees in
28136.

Lance M. Sears, Deputy, for plaintiff-appellee in 28200.
Arthur M. Schwartz, P.C., for defendant-appellant in 28200.

Dale Tooley, District Attorney, Brooke.Wunnicke, Chief Appellate
Deputy, for plaintiff-appellee in 28413.

Arthur M. Schwartz, P.C., Neil Auervais, for defendant-appellant in
28413.

Robert N. Miller, District Attorney, Stanley C. Peek, Assistant, for
plaintiff-appellee in 79SA322.

380 |

Arthur M. Schwartz, P.C., for defendants-appellants in 79SA322.

En Banc.
JUSTICE ERICKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

Hl In these appeals, which have been consolidated for the purposes
of this opinion, we are called upon to determine the constitutionality of the
Colorado Obscenity Statute, section 18-7-101, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978
Repl. Vol. 8), et seg. The defendants in People v. Skinner, People v.
Royale and People v. G.N.A., Inc., were charged with promoting ob-
scene material, pursuant to section 18-7-103, C.R.S. 1973, and conspiracy
to promote obscene material, pursuant to section 18-2-201, C.R.S. 1973
(now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8), which provide the foundation for the constitu-
tional claim that the statute abridges the First Amendment. In People v.
New Horizons, People v. Plateau Management and Investment Co.,
and People v. Bry-Lyn Corp., the prosecution sought to enjoin the distri-
bution of obscene material. We hold the Colorado Obscenity Statute to be
unconstitutional because of the statutory definition of obscene materials,
and remand to the respective trial courts for dismissal. (People vy.
Renegade Royale, Ltd., et al. has previously been dismissed.)

The facts in these cases are substantially similar and may be amply il-
lustrated by reference to People v. G.N.A., Inc. In G.N.A., officers of
the Greeley Police Department purchased several allegedly obscene maga-
zines from employees of the Greeley News Agency, located in Greeley,
Colorado. Each of the magazines contained written textual material ac-
companied by photographs of a number of sexual acts. The sex acts de-
picted in the photographs included intercourse, fellatio, masturbation, and
other explicit sex acts. The prosecution subsequently charged G.N.A. and
several of its employees with promoting obscene materials and with con-
spiring to promote obscene material.

After a trial to the court, the defendants were convicted on all counts.
On appeal, the defendants challenge the constitutionality of the Colorado
Obscenity Statute and assert other issues relating to their convictions. Our
resolution of the constitutional issue obviates the need to address the other
contentions raised by the defendants.

: I.
In People v. Tabron, 190 Colo. 149, 544 P.2d 372 (1976), and its

381

companion cases,' we conducted an extensive review of the history of obscenity
regulation, from the first reported common-law decision on obscenity through
the United States Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973). Although we are not inclined to
repeat that exegesis in this opinion, we feel that a review of the ‘‘take as a whole”’
standard, which requires the examination of allegedly obscene matter in its
entirety, is a necessary predicate to the resolution of the constitutional issue
which lies at the heart of the cases before us. .

At early common law, many courts adopted the definition of obscen-
ity set forth in Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). In that case,
Chief Justice Cockburn defined the test for obscenity as:

“Whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave and
corrupt those whose minds are open to such influences, and into whose
hands a publication of this sort may fall.”

As construed by the courts, the Hicklin test had two effects. First, it es-
tablished a standard for obscenity based on the material’s impact on par-
ticularly sensitive persons; and second, it allowed the challenged material
to be judged by the impact of isolated excerpts without regard for the im-
pact of the work taken as as a whole. See People v. Tabron, supra, An-
not., 5 A.L.R.3d 1178, 1183.

In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d
1498 (1957), the Hicklin test was rejected on the ground that its ap-
proach to the determination of obscenity based on the use of isolated pas-
sages could infringe upon legitimate materials which, on the whole, de-
served First Amendment protection. The Supreme Court of the United
States emphasized that “books, pictures and circulars must be judged as
whole, in their entire context, and you are not to consider detached or sep-
arate portions in reaching a conclusion.” 354 U.S. at 490. With this prin-
ciple in mind, the United States Supreme Court formulated a new test
which required a determination that an average person, applying contem-
porary community standards, would find that the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appealed to prurient interests. Subsequent deci-
sions, while modifying the prurient interest standard, adhered rigidly to
the requirement that challenged materials be considered in their entirety.
See A Book Named ‘John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure” vy. Attorney General of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 86 S.Ct. 975, 16 L.Ed.2d 1 (1966) (ob-
scene material must be utterly without redeeming social value).

The 1973 decision of Miller v. California, 413 US. 15, 93 S.Ct.
2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973), marked the latest resolution of the

1 People v. Tabron, 190 Colo. 161, 544 P.2d 380 (1975); Menefee, Jr. v. Denver, 190 Colo.
163, 544 P.2d 382 (1975); People v. Hildebrandt, 190 Colo. 167, 544 P.2d 384 (1975).
2 The King v. Sir Charles Sedley, 1 Keble 620 (K.B. 1663).

382 es

obscenity issue. Miller provided the basis for the enactment of a host of
new obscenity statutes, including the Colorado statute before us today. In
Miller, the Court announced that the following three guidelines as to ob-
scenity must be placed before the trier of fact:
“(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary standards’
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient inter-
est. ..,
“(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
“(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, political
or scientific value.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Significantly, while the Supreme Court of the United States again modi-
fied its definition of obscenity, most notably by abandoning the Memoirs’
requirement that the work be utterly without redeeming social value, it re-
affirmed the necessity of judging the material which is asserted to be ob-
scene as a whole.
IL.

Section 18-7-101(6), C.R.S. 1973 of the Colorado Obscenity Statute
provides the following definition of “obscene material:”
“Obscene material’ means that material, as defined in subsection (5) of
this section, which:
“(a) Taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of the average
person, applying contemporary statewide standards; and
“(b) Depicts or describes hard-core sexual conduct; and
“(c) Taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value.”
The term “material” is defined in subsection (5) of the same statute:
“Material’ means any physical object, facsimile, recording, transcription,
pictorial representation, motion picture, or reproduction, whether mechan-
ical, electrical, or chemical, which is used as a means of communicating
sensation or emotion to human beings to or through the visual, aural, or
tactile senses, but does not include the printed or written word.” Sec-
tion 18-7-101(5), C.R.S. 1973. (Emphasis added.)
A plain reading of subsections (5) and (6) leads to the conclusion that the
proscribed material, which must be examined in its entirety, does not in-
clude any printed or written textual matter which accompanies the alleg-
edly obscene photographs or is included in the same work. Stated another
way, where an allegedly obscene magazine consists of both words and pic-
tures, the pictures could be declared obscene and the entire magazine
banned under the statute without reference to whether the included text or
other articles imbued the magazine with serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value. A medical treatise, where the text was illustrated with
explicit anatomical photographs, could possibly fall within the statutory
definition of obscenity.

383

In Part I of this opinion, we traced the development of the
United States Supreme Court’s “taken as a whole” standard and con-
cluded that the test requires consideration of a challenged work in its en-
tirety prior to any determination that portions of it are obscene. See
Penthouse Intern. Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1980);
Bryers vy. State, 480 S.W.2d 712 (Tex Crim. App. 1972). The essence of
this standard mandates that the entire magazine or book must be exam-
ined, including articles, interviews, reviews, letters, drawings, and photo-
graphs. When the literary work, taken as a whole, violates the Miller v.
California test, the material can be outlawed as obscene without violating
the First Amendment. Because the Colorado Obscenity Statute does not
allow the trier of the fact to consider the challenged work in its entirety,
but requires that the obscene material be considered without reference to
any accompanying words, we are compelled to hold that the statute uncon-
stitutionally fails to meet the “taken as a whole” requirement as enumer-
ated by the Supreme Court of the United States. Accordingly, the statute
cannot be relied upon to support either a civil injunction or a criminal
charge.

In reaching our decision, we are not unmindful of the legiti-
mate purpose that the General Assembly may have had in excluding the
printed or written word from the definition of obscene material. Clearly,
the General Assembly may declare that materials containing only the
written or printed word cannot be considered obscene under any circum-
stances. In this case, however, the statute goes beyond such a legitimate
purpose and its provisions impinge upon interests protected by the First
Amendment. While we recognize a duty, whenever possible, to authorita-
tively construe a Colorado statute to conform to constitutional standards,
we are bound by the clear language of the statute and must declare it un-
constitutional. Statutes must be drafted compatible with the constitution
as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. See People v.
Tabron, supra at 159-160.

Accordingly, we hold the Colorado Obscenity Statute, section 18-7-
101, C.R.S. 1973, et seg., unconstitutional and remand the consolidated
cases to the respective district courts with directions to dismiss.

384 ee

Nos. 28489 and 28490

IRM, Inc., a Colorado corporation, d/b/a Joy of Life v. Board of County
Commissioners of Adams County, et al; JRS, Inc., a Colorado
corporation, d/b/a Eve’s Fig Leaf v. Board of County Commissioners of
Adams County, et al.

(615 P.2d 31)

Decided August 18, 1980.

|) 385

No appearance for plaintiffs-appellees.

S. Morris Lubow, County Attorney, John E. Bush, Jr., Assistant, for
defendants-appellants.

En Bane.

JUSTICE ERICKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

IRM, Inc., d/b/a Joy of Life, and JRS, Inc., d/b/a Eve’s Fig Leaf,
who operated massage parlors, applied to the Board of County Commis-
sioners of Adams County for a massage parlor license. Licenses were de-
nied to both applicants. The applicants sought a declaratory judgment and
certiorari review in the district court.

The district court held that the Colorado Massage Parlor Code
(Code) was constitutional, but declared that the regulations adopted by
the Board of County Commissioners, pursuant to section 12-48.5-118,
C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 5), denied the applicants due process
of law. The County Commissioners were ordered to adopt new regulations
and to grant the applicants a new hearing. We reverse.

Section 12-48,.5-118 provides:

“This article is intended to provide minimum standards for the licensing of
massage parlors. Nothing in this article shall prohibit a local government
from. enacting an ordinance or resolution providing more stringent stand-
ards for such licensing, but such ordinance shall meet the minimum stand-
ards established by this article.”

The County Commissioners adopted regulations establishing fees, lo-
cation of massage parlors, requirements that employees possess identity
cards, and restrictions on the transfer of a license. In declaring the regula-
tions to be unconstitutional, the district court concluded that the Board of
County Commissioners utilized more stringent standards than were re-
quired by the Code. None of the regulations were more stringent than the
Code.

The Code requires that the licensing authority examine an ap-
plicant’s character before granting a license. Section 12-48.5-108(1)(e),
C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 5). In making this examination, the
Board of County Commissioners is not restricted to inquiring into prior

386 ee

felony convictions. See R & F Enterprises v. Board of County
Commissioners, 199 Colo. 137, 606 P.2d 64 (1979). The district court in-
correctly relied on section 24-5-101, C.R.S. 1973, which limits denial of a
license solely on the basis of a felony conviction, but does not prohibit de-
nial for other conduct which would establish the absence of good moral
character. Here, consideration by the Board of County Commissioners of
evidence of sex acts and nudity in the operation of massage parlors by the
applicants was proper and could be considered.

Moreover, the procedures established by the Board of County
Commissioners to determine the reasonable requirements of the neighbor-
hood were consistent with section 12-48.5-104(4), C.R.S. 1973 (now in
1978 Repl. Vol. 5). The district court erred in declaring the regulations to
be unconstitutional. .

Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions to determine
whether sufficient evidence is in the record to support the denial of a li-
cense and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Board of
County Commissioners v. Thompson, 167 Colo. 402, 448 P.2d 639
(1968).

387

No. 80SA209

The People of the State of Colorado y. Danny Joseph Burns
(615 P.2d 686)

Decided August 18, 1980.

388 —CsSCiés
Dale Tooley, District Attorney, Brooke Wunnicke, Chief Appellate
Deputy, Donald Eberle, Deputy, for plaintiff-appellant.

Davies and Saint-Veltri, Robert J. Driscoll, for defendant-appellee.

En Banc.

JUSTICE ROVIRA delivered the opinion of the Court.

The defendant has been charged with second-degree burglary.’ In
this interlocutory appeal, filed pursuant to C.A.R. 4.1, the People chal-
lenge the district court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress
evidence and statements obtained at the time of the defendant’s arrest, as
well as the in-court identification of the defendant by a prosecution wit-
ness. We reverse the district court’s order.

This appeal arose from the following facts. On November 28, 1978,
at approximately 3:30 a.m., the owner of the Jolly Feast restaurant in
Denver, Mr. Daddis, was informed that the burglar alarm at his restau-
rant had sounded. Daddis and a friend drove to the restaurant and parked
their car in a position from which they would be able to see the front and
back doors of the building. A few moments later, three men came out the
front door. Daddis recognized one of the men, the “tall guy,” as a patron

1 Section 18-4-203, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

389

of the restaurant, although he could not remember his name.

The police arrived within a few minutes, and Daddis told them that
he had recognized the tall man and that his janitor, who lived in an apart-
ment house behind the restaurant, knew that man. The police and Daddis
went immediately to the janitor’s apartment. After being given a descrip-
tion of the tall man by Daddis, the janitor identified him as “Danny” and
stated that he lived in a nearby apartment.

The police officers, accompanied by Daddis, went to the apartment to
which they had been directed, knocked on the front door, and identified
themselves. After a short time, the defendant opened the door, and Daddis
immediately identified him as the man he had described to the police as
the “tall guy.”

The defendant was arrested while standing in the doorway of his
apartment, was searched for weapons, and was then allowed to go back
into his apartment with one of the officers to obtain his clothes. :

The defendant initially moved to suppress all physical evidence re-
moved from his person or apartment? at the time of his arrest, and any
statements made by him at that time, on the grounds that the arrest was
illegal. At the hearing held on the defendant’s motion, he further re-
quested that the court suppress any in-court identification of him by Dad-
dis. In support of his motions, he argued that, in the absence of an arrest
warrant, his arrest was illegal, and that the identification by Daddis vio-
lated his due process rights.

A hearing was held, and the district court granted the defendant’s
motions, finding that: (1) the warrantless arrest was illegal and in viola-
tion of the defendant’s constitutional rights; (2) Daddis would not be per-
mitted to testify at trial concerning any of the events subsequent to the
time at which he saw the three men leave the restaurant; (3) Daddis
would not be permitted to make an in-court identification of the defendant
because the illegal arrest tainted his identification at the scene of the ar-
rest.

The People advance two arguments on appeal. First, they contend
that the trial court erred in finding that the arrest of the defendant was il-
legal. Second, they argue that, regardless of the propriety of the arrest, the
trial court mistakenly applied the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained
prior to that arrest.

L
The Warrantless Arrest
In this case, we are required to determine whether the warrant-
less arrest of the defendant, effected while he was standing in the doorway

2 Because no physical evidence was in fact removed from the defendant’s person or apartment, this
portion of the suppression motion is not at issue here.

390 es

of his apartment, violated the constitutional provisions forbidding unrea-
sonable seizures.3 The arrest without a warrant is presumed to have been
unconstitutional, and the People have the burden of rebutting that pre-
sumption by showing both that the arrest was supported by probable
cause, DeLaCruz v. People, 177 Colo. 46, 492 P.2d 627 (1972), People
y. Feltch, 174 Colo. 383, 483 P.2d 1335 (1971), People v. Valdez, 173
Colo. 410, 480 P.2d 574 (1971), and that it fell within a recognized excep-
tion to the warrant requirement, People v. Williams, 199 Colo. 515, 613
P.2d 879 (1980).

HE The same constitutional standards for determining probable
cause apply whether a search or an arrest is being made by the police.
These standards are applicable whether or not the police have obtained a
warrant. People v. Vaughns, 182 Colo. 328, 513 P.2d 196 (1973). In
People v. Vigil, 198 Colo. 185, 597 P.2d 567 (1979), we stated that:

“a warrantless arrest is authorized [i.e., supported by probable cause] if
the information possessed by the arresting officer is sufficient to warrant a
reasonably cautious and prudent police officer in believing, in light of his
training and experience, that an offense has been committed and that the
person arrested committed it.” Id., 198 Colo. at 187, 597 P.2d at 569.
Here, the arresting officers arrived at the scene of the burglary a few min-
utes after the offense occurred. They obtained a physical description, from
the victim, of one of the men seen leaving the restaurant. In addition, al-
though the victim could not remember the name of the man he identified,
he knew that one of his employees was acquainted with that man and
might know his name and where he lived. The officers continued their in-
vestigation and, when they were told the name and address of the individ-
ual identified by the victim, they went to that address, knocked on the
front door, and identified themselves. When the defendant opened the
door of his apartment and was immediately identified by the victim, the
police had probable cause, as delineated in Vigil, supra, to arrest the de-
fendant. :

a Further, the warrant requirement is excused in this case because
the defendant was arrested while standing in the open doorway of his
apartment, where he was “as exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and
touch as if [he] had been standing completely outside [his apartment]”
and where he therefore had no expectation of privacy within the scope of
the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42, 96
S.Ct. 2406, 2409, 49 L.Ed.2d 300, 305 (1976), citing United v. Watson,
423 US. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); section 16-3-
102(1)(c), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

3 U.S. Const. amend. IV; Colo. Const. Art. Il, Sec. 7.

es 391

Il.
The Pre-Trial Confrontation Between
Daddis and the Defendant

At the suppression hearing, defense counsel argued that the pre-trial
confrontation between Daddis and the defendant which occurred immedi-
ately prior to the latter’s arrest was “so unnecessarily suggestive and con-
ducive to irreparable mistaken identification” as to constitute a violation
of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 US.
293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1972, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1206 (1967). The trial
court suppressed both Daddis’ testimony about the pre-trial confrontation
and his in-court identification of the defendant based on that confronta-
tion.* We conclude that the trial court erred in suppressing Daddis’ testi-
mony and in-court identification.

HH It is true that one-on-one confrontations for the purpose of pre-
trial identification of criminal suspects are not favored, but they are not
per se violative of due process. Roper v. Beto, 454 F.2d 499 (Sth Cir.
1971); People v. Williams, 183 Colo. 241, 516 P.2d 114 (1973). In this
case, our review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the arrest
of the defendant and the police conduct which led to his identification by
Daddis indicates that the defendant’s due process rights have not been de-
nied. The victim assisted the police throughout their investigation. It was
the victim who first identified the defendant prior to the arrest, and there
is no indication that the police suggested to him that they harbored inde-
pendent suspicions as to the defendant’s involvement in the robbery. Only
a short time period elapsed between the crime and the identification of the
defendant. At the outset of the investigation, the victim described the de-
fendant to the police and stated that he had recognized him as a patron of
the Jolly Feast restaurant. In these circumstances, we find the one-on-one
pre-trial confrontation to have been fully justified, and any suggestiveness
in the confrontation countervailed, by the necessity for the police “swiftly
to determine whether they were on the right track, so that they could
properly deploy their forces,” by the interest in “sparing innocent suspects
the ignominy of arrest by allowing eyewitnesses to exonerate them,” and
by the slight probability of misidentification of the defendant by Daddis.

+The suppression was ordered at least partially on the grounds that the pre-trial confrontation be-
tween Daddis and the defendant had been tainted by what the trial court considered to have been
an illegal arrest of the defendant. See Part I of this opinion, supra. However, we have held that
the arrest violated neither the Fourth Amendment nor the comparable provision of the Colorado
Constitution. Therefore, the conduct of the police in effecting the arrest provides no occasion for
application of the exclusionary rule to Daddis’ in-court identification of the defendant. Moreover,
we note that the pre-trial confrontation occurred prior to the arrest of the defendant, and that the
arrest could not in any event have constituted a proper basis for application of the exclusionary
tule to the in-court identification.

392 ee

Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384-385, 88 S.Ct. 967, 971-972,
19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 1253-1254 (1968). See also Stovall v. Denno, supra;
United States yv. Jones, 517 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v.
Perry, 449 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1971); People v. Williams, supra.

The district court’s order granting the defendant’s suppression motion

is reversed.

No. 79SA362

The People of the State of Colorado vy. Randy C. Nees
(615 P.2d 690)

Decided August 18, 1980. Rehearing denied September 15, 1980.

393

Craig S. Westberg, District Attorney, Robin K. Auld, Assistant, John
D. Phillips, Deputy, for plaintiff-appellee.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Terri L. Brake, Deputy, for
defendant-appellant.

En Bane.

JUSTICE DUBOFSKY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Defendant Randy C. Nees, in a consolidated appeal, challenges his
convictions in the District Court of La Plata County for aggravated rob-
bery’ (No. CR-587, the Holiday Inn robbery) and for aggravated robbery
and habitual criminal (No. CR-588, the Ramada Inn robbery).? The de-
fendant contends that the trial court should not have permitted either an

1 Section 18-4-302, C.R.S. 1973 (current version in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

2 In No. CR-587, the defendant was sentenced to the Colorado State Penitentiary for a term of
not less than ten nor more than fifteen years, to be served concurrently with a federal sentence in
another case. In No. CR-588, the defendant was sentenced as an habitual criminal to the peniten-
tiary for a term of not less than twenty-five nor more than forty years, to run concurrently with all
other sentences.

4 es

in-court identification or testimony about the line-up in either of the ag-
gravated robbery trials because the line-up was impermissibly suggestive
and there was an inadequate showing of an independent basis for the in-
court identification of the defendant by the witness. We find the line-up
was not impermissibly suggestive and affirm the convictions for aggra-
vated robbery in both cases.

The defendant also contends that the trial court should have dis-
missed habitual criminal charges as outside the scope of the statute [sec-
tion 16-13-101, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8, current version in 1979
Supp.)] because they relate to offenses committed after the one for which
he was being tried. We agree and reverse the habitual criminal conviction
in No. CR-588.

The F.B.I. and local law enforcement officers suspected the defendant
had committed extortion of a Durango bank on March 30, 1976. Their in-
vestigation of the extortion uncovered evidence linking the defendant to a
series of robberies in Durango, including the Ramada Inn on February 11,
1976, and the Holiday Inn on March 24, 1976.

On March 30, 1976, the defendant was arrested for the bank extor-
tion. While in custody on March 31, 1976, he was advised of his Miranda®
tights with regard to the robberies. The prosecution requested a court or-
der for non-testimonial identification evidence (a line-up) under Crim. P.
41:1, The order authorizing the line-up noted there was probable cause to
believe the defendant committed the aggravated robberies.

On April 1, 1976, the Durango police conducted a line-up, and the
victims of the robberies identified the defendant. The police did not take
photographs or keep any records of the line-up. The next day, the prosecu-
tion filed an information charging the defendant with the robberies.

Nees was convicted on May 28, 1976 in federal court for the March
30, 1976, bank extortion. On March 2, 1977, he was found guilty of the
March 24, 1976 Holiday Inn robbery. The day he was sentenced for that
robbery, the prosecution added habitual criminal counts based on the fed-
eral conviction and the Holiday Inn conviction to the information for the
February 11, 1976, Ramada Inn aggravated robbery. Subsequently, a jury
returned guilty verdicts on the aggravated robbery and habitual criminal
counts.

lL

Hl Testimony about a line-up may be challenged in a pre-trial hear-
ing or at trial on the basis that the line-up was unduly suggestive. From
police and witness testimony at the suppression hearing and trials we know
that each victim viewed the line-up separately. They first saw the partici-
pants in full view and then wearing masks and hats which matched the

8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

eS 395

descriptions given by the victim. Each participant repeated the robber’s
words.

In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19
L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that a pre-
trial identification would be unduly suggestive if it gave “rise to a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification” 390 U.S. at 384.
See also Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d
1199 (1967). The likelihood of misidentification is determined on a case-
by-case basis, with the court reviewing the totality of the circumstances.
People v. Pickett, 194 Colo. 178, 571 P.2d 1078 (1977). Here the testi-
mony indicated that there was no gross disparity in height or build among
the participants in the line-up. All were dressed alike, even when they
donned hats and masks similar to those worn by the robber. Although
there was some difference in age among the participants, the testimony
does not indicate that the line-up was conducted in a manner which “sug-
gested” a culprit to the victims. From the totality of the circumstances we
conclude that the line-up was not impermissibly suggestive. Simmons,
supra; Pickett, supra.

Because we find that the line-up was properly conducted, we do not
need to consider whether there was an independent basis for the in-court
identification of the defendant by the witnesses. Testimony about the line-
up and the in-court identification were properly admitted.

IL.

I The District Attorney amended the information for the Ramada
Inn robbery to add habitual criminal counts when the defendant was con-
victed for criminal incidents occurring after the Ramada Inn robbery. The
trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the new counts, and a
jury found the defendant guilty of being an habitual criminal under sec-
tion 16-13-101, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8, current version in 1979
Supp.).

Section 16-13-101 provides:
“(1) Every person convicted in this state of any felony for which the maxi-
mum penalty prescribed by law exceeds five years who, within ten years of
the date of the commission of the said offense, has been twice previously
convicted upon charges separately brought and tried, either in this state or
elsewhere, of a felony or, under the laws of any other state, the United
States, or any territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of
a crime which, if committed within this state, would be a felony shall be
adjudged an habitual criminal and shall be punished by confinement in
the state penitentiary for a term of not less than twenty-five years nor
more than fifty years.”

The trial court interpreted the statutory language, “who, within ten
years of the date of the commission of the said offense, has been twice pre-
viously convicted,” to mean that a conviction may be ten years before or

TT

396 ee

after the commission of the offense and be “within” the statutory period.*
We disagree.

We interpret “twice previously convicted” to refer back to “commis-
sion of the said offense.” Thus, the ten year limitation applies only to con-
victions previous to the commission of the offense subject to the habitutal
criminal penalty enhancement. Therefore, in the instant case, it was im-
proper for the trial court to have allowed convictions which were sustained
after the commission of the subject crime to be the basis for habitual crim-
inal counts.

There are two reasons for our statutory interpretation. First,
the habitual criminal statute shall be narrowly construed in favor of the
accused. Smalley v. People, 134 Colo. 360, 304 P.2d 902 (1956). Second,
the policy of the habitual criminal statute is to punish repeat offenders.
People v. District Court, 192 Colo. 375, 559 P.2d 235 (1977).

The general rule is that penalty enhancement statutes for repeat

offenders apply only if the presently charged offense was committed after
there had been a conviction of any offenses sought to be used as a basis
for the penalty enhancement. See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 56 Ill. App.3d
689, 371 N.E.2d 1214, 14 Ill. Dec. 161 (1978); State v. Neal, 347 So.2d
1139 (La. 1977); Cooper v. State, 259 Ind. 107, 284 N.E.2d 799 (1972);
State v. Midell, 40 Wisc.2d 516, 162 N.W.2d 54 (1968). But see Strode
y. State, 259 Ark. 859, 537 S.W.2d 162 (1976); United States v.
Hilliard, 366 A.2d 437 (D.C. 1976).
“Traditional American principles of criminal responsibility of an individ-
ual for his conduct do not permit the state to convert a formal charge
against him for a less serious offense, into a charge for a more serious of-
fense, on the legal basis of a change of status or other incident which oc-
curs after the initial offense charged. Criminal conduct ordinarily subjects
an individual to the imposition of criminal penalties applicable to the act
at the time it is committed.” State v. Neal, supra, 347 So.2d at 1141.

I The deterrent purpose of the statute is to put the defendant on
notice that future conduct of the same kind will result in more severe pen-
alties. People v. District Court, supra. Enhanced penalty statutes warn
a first offender of the consequences of a second conviction. Moreover, it is
not known legally that an offense has been committed until there is a con-
viction. An enhanced penalty should not be imposed until the offender has
the opportunity to reform because of the salutary discipline from the pun-
ishment for the first conviction. People v. Phillips, supra.

4 To read the statute as the trial court did makes “previously” refer back to “convicted . .. of any
felony” in the first two lines of the statutory provision, supra. Under that construction, any convic-
tions prior to the date of the conviction in the habitual criminal proceeding could be considered for
enhancement purposes.

es 397

A conviction such as the one here, which imposes the more severe
penalty for the first offense, does not comply with the statutory objectives.

The trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the
habitual criminal charges. Therefore, we reverse the defendant Randy
Nees’ habitutal criminal conviction in No. CR-588.

Judgment in No. CR-587 affirmed.

Judgment in No. CR-588 for aggravated robbery affirmed, and for
habitual criminal reversed.

398
No. 80SA295

Sonia F. Widener v. District Court in and for the County of Jefferson and
Ronald J. Hardesty, a Judge of said Court

(615 P.2d 33)

Decided August 18, 1980.

es 399
Pe

Arthur R. Karstaedt III, for petitioner.

Gary L. Polidori, P.C., Gary L. Polidori, for respondents.

En Banc.

JUSTICE LOHR delivered the opinion of the Court.

We issued a rule directing the district court to show cause why the
petition of Sonia F. Widener to permit late filing of a notice of appeal
should not be granted. We now make that rule absolute.

Re/Max Suburban, Inc. , obtained a judgment in the amount of $3,955 plus
costs against Sonia F. Widener (defendant) in district court on or about March
13, 1980. On April 17, 1980, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a
new trial. The thirty-day period allowed by C.A.R. 4(a) for filing a notice of
appeal in the trial court expired on May 19, 1980.'On May 16 the defendant filed
“ amotion to stay judgment and for approval of a supersedeas bond. No notice of

appeal was filed at that time. On May 21, 1980, the defendant discovered that a
notice of appeal had not been filed. On the following day the defendant filed a
motion to permit late filing of a notice of appeal, together with a notice of
appeal. Ater a hearing the trial court denied that motion. The defendant then
brought this original proceeding pursuant to C.A.R. 21.

In order to take an appeal from the judgment of a trial court in
a civil case, a notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the trial
court within thirty days of the date of the judgment where, as here, the

+ The thirtieth day was May 17, a Saturday. May 18 being Sunday, the defendant was allowed
until May 19 to accomplish the filing. C.A.R. 26(a).

400 |

parties are present at the time the judgment is announced.? C.A.R. 3(a),
4(a). Certain provisions are made for extension of time by an order of the
trial court upon a showing of excusable neglect. C.A.R. 4(a). Failure to
file a notice of appeal within the prescribed time deprives the appellate
court of jurisdiction and precludes a review of the merits. Bosworth Data
Services, Inc. v. Gloss, 41 Colo. App. 530, 587 P.2d 1201 (1978).

The defendant contends that a notice of appeal had been prepared for
filing concurrently with the filing of the motion to stay judgment and for
approval of a supersedeas bond. She contends that the failure to accom-
plish such filing resulted from a mistake in her attorney’s office; that the
mistake was discovered by the attorney in reviewing the court file on May
21; that the motion to permit late filing of the notice of appeal was filed
promptly thereafter; and that such circumstances constitute excusable ne-
glect within the meaning of C.A.R. 4(a).

We conclude that the motion to stay judgment and for approval
of a supersedeas bond contains language which is adequate to serve as a
notice of appeal. For this reason we need not consider the circumstances
which caused the notice of appeal not to be filed within the prescribed
time, or whether such circumstances in themselves would make it an abuse
of discretion for the trial court to refuse to extend the time for filing the
notice of appeal pursuant to the authority in C.A.R. 4(a).

The content of the notice of appeal is prescribed by C.A.R. 3(c) as
follows:

“Content of the Notice of Appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the
party or parties taking the appeal; and shall designate the judgment, or-
der, or part thereof appealed from.”
The motion to stay judgment and for approval of a supersedeas bond con-
tains the following relevant language:
“1, That Notice of Appeal was filed with this Court on May 16, 1980,
appealing this Court’s denial of new trial and judgment in the amount of
Thirty-nine Hundred Fifty-five Dollars ($3,955.00) and costs against De-
fendant, Sonia F. Widener.”
That language contains everything necessary to comply with the require-
ments of C.A.R. 3(c) with respect to the content of the notice of appeal.
The motion was served on the plaintiff by mailing a copy to its counsel.
The purpose of the notice of appeal is simply to put the other
party on notice that an appeal will be taken and to identify the action of
the trial court from which the appeal is to be taken. See Happy Canyon
Investment Co. v. Title Insurance Co. of Minnesota, 38 Colo. App.
385, 560 P.2d 839 (1976); Comtrol, Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone

2 It can be inferred from the materials filed in this court that the judgment was announced in the
presence of the parties at the conclusion of the trial.

es 401

and Telegraph Co., 32 Colo. App. 384, 513 P.2d 1082 (1973); see also
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Palmer, 350 US.
944, 76 S.Ct. 321, 100 L.Ed. 823 (1956), rev’g per curiam, 225 F.2d 876
(9th Cir. 1955); Department of Transportation v. Galley, 12 Ill. App-
3d 1072, 299 N.E.2d 810 (1973). If the prevailing party could not be mis-
led as to the intention to appeal or as to the judgment from which the ap-
peal is to be taken, any technical defect in the notice of appeal is harmless.
See Happy Canyon Investment Co. v. Title Insurance Co. of
Minnesota, supra; Comtrol, Inc. v. Mountains States Telephone and
Telegraph Co., supra. Substantial compliance with C.A.R. 3(c) is all
that is required. See Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974); Des
Isles v. Evans, 225 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1955). Lack of designation in the
caption that the document is a notice of appeal will not defeat substantial
compliance. See Johnson v. Johnson, 74 N.M. 567, 396 P.2d 181 (1964);
see generally Grimes v. Greenblatt, 47 Colo. 495, 107 P. 1111 (1910).
We conclude that the defendant substantially complied with
C.A.R. 3(c) and 4(a) by filing the motion to stay judgment and for ap-
proval of a supersedeas bond. Under the particular circumstances present
here, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court not to rule that the
motion to stay judgment and for approval of a supersedeas bond was ade-
quate to constitute a notice of appeal, or in the alternative to permit late
filing of a notice of appeal pursuant to C.A.R. 4(a) in order to clarify the
record.
The rule is made absolute.

aN
S
is)

No. 79SA473

The People of the State of Colorado v. Robert Scott
(615 P.2d 35)

Decided August 18, 1980.

es 403

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, David K. Rees, Assistant Attorney
General, for plaintiff-appellee.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Shelley Gilman, Deputy,
for defendant-appellant.

En Banc.
JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The defendant, Robert Scott, appeals his sentence to a term of
twenty-five to thirty-five years for attempted murder in the first degree on
the ground that it is excessive. The defendant also claims entitlement to
re-sentencing under the presumptive sentencing provisions of either the
1977 version of House Bill 1589, Colo. Sess. Laws 1977, ch. 216, 18-1-105
at 867, or the 1979 version of House Bill 1589, Colo. Sess. Laws 1979, ch.
157, 18-1-105 at 669. We affirm.

The defendant was charged originally with three counts of criminal
attempt to commit murder in the first degree, section 18-2-101, C.R.S.
1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), and three counts of assault in the first degree,
section 18-3-202, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). The charges arose out
of a shooting incident on March 10, 1978, in a tavern in which three sepa-
rate victims were shot by the defendant at close range.

As a result of plea negotiations the district attorney filed a seventh
count charging the defendant with criminal attempt to commit murder in
the first degree against two of the three victims, Coyote Lightfeather and

4o4 es

Victor Ehrlich. Upon the defendant’s plea of guilty the other six counts
were dismissed. The charge to which the defendant pled guilty was a class
two felony and, on the date of the offense, carried a penalty of ten to fifty
years. Section 18-1-105, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

At the sentencing ‘hearing on November 3, 1978, the court had the
benefit of a comprehensive pre-sentence report and also heard testimony
from two of the victims shot by the defendant. The court in sentencing the
defendant to a term of twenty-five to thirty-five years indicated that it was
imposing the sentence because of the extreme injury inflicted upon the
three victims, especially on Coyote Lightfeather who had been shot in the
head.

The facts of the shooting are not disputed. The defendant, claiming
an exchange of harsh words between himself and the victims while they
were at a tavern, pulled out a gun and shot Coyote Lightfeather twice in
the head, Victor Ehrlich in the back, and a third victim in the hand and
back as he ran from the tavern. Mr. Lightfeather required extensive medi-
cal treatment and will need continuous treatment in the future. Since the
shooting he has only slight feeling on the left side of his body, has experi-
enced seizures, and one bullet still remains lodged in his head. He is un-
able to work and his disability is apparently permanent. His medical bills
as of the date of sentencing exceeded $20,000. The other two victims re-
covered without significant disability, although they incurred medical bills
in excess of $7,000.

L

The defendant’s claim of excessiveness centers on his lack of any prior
felony record, his age of 46 years, and his physical impairment of high
blood pressure. We note that, although the defendant had not sustained a
felony conviction in the past, he had been arrested and convicted of several
misdemeanor offenses, including carrying a concealed weapon on two oc-
casions and assault about two years prior to the shooting in this case.

HH In determining whether sentence is intrinsically unfair or ex-
cessive we must consider its propriety or fairness within the context of the
nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the public inter-
est. Section 18-1-409(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.); e.g., People v.
Warren, 200 Colo. 110, 612 P.2d 1124 (1980); People v. Malacara, 199
Colo. 243, 606 P.2d 1300 (1980); Triggs v. People, 197 Colo. 229, 591
P.2d 1024 (1979); People v. Duran, 188 Colo. 207, 533 P.2d 1116
(1975). Although the absence of a prior felony conviction or significant
criminal involvement, by itself, certainly may constitute a mitigating fac-
tor worthy of consideration by the court, see section 16-11-203(2)(g),
C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), it is only one factor and is not conclusive
on the sentencing decision. E.g., People v. Naranjo, 200 Colo. 1, 612
P.2d 1099 (1980).

| 405

HE Likewise, the public interest in safety and deterence, when con-
sidered in isolation, might well justify an alternative to sentencing in the
case of a first-time offender, at least in crimes not causing or threatening
serious harm to the person or property of others. See section 16-11-
203(2)(a), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). Rarely, however, does a given
component bearing on the sentencing decision exist in isolation, or lend it-
self to a measured calculus. The most that can be expected is that the trial
judge consider the various factors of the case and arrive at a synthesis
which is reflective of the interests of society and the defendant. See, e.g.,
People v. Naranjo, supra; People v. Warren, supra; Triggs v. People,
supra; People v. Duran, supra.

In recognition of the discretionary nature of sentencing and its
intractability to scientific precision, we have required that a sentence for
an extended term, as in this case, be clearly justified in the record. E.g.,
People v. Watkins, 200 Colo. 163, 613 P.2d 633 (1980); People y.
Warren, supra; Triggs v. People, supra; People vy. Duran, supra.
Here, the record does furnish support for the sentence. The offense was
extremely grave in nature and effect. The defendant’s shooting of three
persons was totally unjustified, unprovoked, and inexcusable, and could
easily have resulted in the death of any or all of them. The trial judge
noted the aggravated nature of the offense and imposed a sentence close to
the median of the applicable statutory extremes. Under the totality of cir-
cumstances present here we conclude that the sentence was not excessive.
E.g., People v. Cunningham, 200 Colo. 303, 614 P.2d 886 (1980);
People v. Naranjo, supra; People v. Warren, supra; Triggs y. People,
supra; People v. Duran, supra; People v. Euresti, 187 Colo. 266, 529
P.2d 1319 (1975).

Il.

Hl The defendant also claims that he is entitled to re-sentencing un-
der the presumptive sentencing provisions of either the 1977 version of
House Bill 1589, Colo. Sess. Laws 1977, ch. 216, 18-1-105 at 867, or un-
der the 1979 version of House Bill 1589, Colo. Sess. Laws 1979, ch. 157,
18-1-105 at 669. The arguments made by the defendant for re-sentencing
were rejected in People v. McKenna, 199 Colo. 452, 611 P.2d 574
(1980), and we have consistently adhered to that decision. Z.g., People v.
Cunningham, supra; People v. Watkins, supra; People v. Warren,
supra. We decline to address this issue again.

The judgment is affirmed.

§

16
No. 79SA495

The People of the State of Colorado v. Donald Edward Self
(615 P.2d 693)

Decided August 18, 1980.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Susan P. Mele-Sernovitz, Assistant,

es 407

for plaintiff-appellee.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Shelley Gilman, Deputy,
for defendant-appellant.

En Banc.

JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The defendant, Donald Edward Self, appeals his sentence for aggra-
vated robbery to a term of ten to twenty years, consecutive to a sentence of
fifteen to thirty years he was then serving for another aggravated robbery,
on the ground that the sentence is excessive. Aggravated robbery is a class
three felony and, on the date of the offense, carried a penalty of five to
forty years. He also claims entitlement to re-sentencing under the pre-
sumptive sentencing provision of either the 1977 version of House Bill
1589, Colo. Sess. Laws 1977, ch. 216, 18-1-105 at 867 or the 1979 version
of House Bill 1589, Colo. Sess. Laws 1979, ch. 157, 18-1-105 at 669.

| | In People v. McKenna, 199 Colo. 452, 611 P.2d 574 (1980), we
resolved adversely to the defendant the identical argument for resentenc-
ing made here, and we have adhered consistently to that decision. E.g.,
People v. Cunningham, 200 Colo. 303, 614 P.2d 886 (1980); People v.
Watkins, 200 Colo. 163, 613 P.2d 633 (1980); People v. Warren, 200
Colo. 110, 612 P.2d 1124 (1980). Accordingly, we address only the issue
pertaining to the propriety of the sentence. We conclude that the sentence
was not excessive and we affirm.

On January 6, 1978, the defendant was arrested and charged in the
district court of Jefferson County with aggravated robbery, section 18-4-
302(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), and with the use of a deadly
weapon during the aggravated robbery, thereby requiring a mandatory
sentence to at least the minimum term provided for aggravated robbery,
section 16-11-309, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). Section 18-1-105,
C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). The charge arose out of the hold-up of a
Walgreen’s drug store on November 23, 1977, during which cash and
checks totaling $5,744 were taken from an employee of the store.

An attorney was appointed for the defendant and shortly thereafter
the defendant was released on bail. While on bail he was arrested for and
charged with other crimes, including an aggravated robbery in Colorado
Springs, Colorado. On October 31, 1978, he appeared in the district court
of Jefferson County and, as a result of a plea agreement, pled guilty to ag-
gravated robbery and admitted the use of a deadly weapon during that

408 |

crime. The defendant’s guilty plea resulted in the dismissal of a second de-
gree forgery case and another aggravated robbery case pending in the Jef-
ferson County district court, as well as an aggravated robbery case pend-
ing in the Denver district court. Upon accepting the plea of guilty the
court continued the case to January 8, 1979, for sentencing. In the interim
the defendant was sentenced in the district court of E] Paso County on his
plea of guilty to aggravated robbery to a term of fifteen to thirty years.

At the sentencing hearing on January 8, 1979, the court had the ben-
efit of a comprehensive pre-sentence investigation. The court rejected the
defendant’s plea for a concurrent sentence and made the sentence of ten to
twenty years consecutive to the previously imposed sentence of fifteen to
thirty years. The sentencing judge stated that he was making the sentence
consecutive because of the defendant’s extensive criminal record and the
potential for serious injury implicit in the use of a weapon during an ag-
gravated robbery.

The defendant’s claim of excessiveness is based on the consecutive na-
ture of the sentence. In his argument the defendant relies on ABA
Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures §3.4(b). The
standard acknowledges that the question of a concurrent or consecutive sen-
tence for convictions of multiple offenses separately punishable is generally a
matter for the court’s discretion, but states that the aggregate maximum of a
consecutive term should not exceed the term authorized for a habitual offender.

Assuming arguendo the propriety of ABA Standard 3.4(b) as the out-
side measure of a proper sentence, the defendant’s sentence is not exces-
sive.’ The aggregate of both sentences, twenty-five to fifty years, equals
but does not exceed the term authorized for a twice previously convicted
offender under section 16-13-101(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).
More importantly, when the court imposed the consecutive sentence of ten
to twenty years, the defendant had already sustained three prior felony
convictions and, under section 16-13-101(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.
Vol. 8), he would have been subject to a sentence of life imprisonment if
he had been tried and convicted as a thrice previously convicted habitual
offender.

The defendant also claims that the consecutive sentence is excessive
because it undermines rehabilitation. We find this argument lacking in
-merit. The nature of the offense in this case had the potential for serious
bodily injury to the victim. The defendant entered the stockroom of a

1 The ABA Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures were substantially
amended in 1979. The new standard 18-4.5(b)(i)(2d ed. 1979) provides that “[t]here should be a
ceiling on the aggregate maximum of consecutive terms which is reasonably related to the severity
of the offenses involved.” See also standard 18-4.2 dealing with maximum terms and standard 18-
4.4 dealing with habitual offenders.

es 409

Walgreen’s drug store at night, pulled a revolver from his waistband,
pointed it at the victim, directed him to the store safe, threatened to “blow
him away” if the victim looked at his face, and took cash and personal
checks amounting to $5,744.

The character of the defendant also militates against his argument on
rehabilitation. He had been previously convicted of three felonies — first
degree robbery in California in 1965 when he was twenty-six years old;
aggravated robbery in Colorado in 1975 at the age of thirty-six; and an-
other aggravated robbery in Colorado in 1979 at the age of thirty-nine. In
addition, the defendant over the years had sustained numerous convictions
for misdemeanor offenses, and he failed to take advantage of rehabilitative
opportunities associated with probation and parole on prior occasions.

We reject the defendant’s claim that his record is free of any violent
incidents. The crime of aggravated robbery is a crime of violence and our
statutes denominate it as such. Section 16-11-309(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1978
Repl. Vol. 8). The only fair characterization of the crime committed by
the defendant in this case is that it was an act of violence, involving as it
did the brandishing of a weapon accompanied by a threat to use it against
the victim.

We have previously observed that the sentencing judge prop-
erly may consider the public interest in safety and deterrence in sentencing
an offender, especially in crimes of serious personal violence. E.g., People
vy. Warren, supra; Triggs v. People, 197 Colo. 229, 591 P.2d 1024
(1979); People v. Strong, 190 Colo. 189, 544 P.2d 966 (1976); People v.
Euresti, 187 Colo. 266, 529 P.2d 1319 (1975). Judicial focus on the pro-
tection of the public interest is also appropriate in the case of an offender
who threatens the security of another with a weapon and whose record is
such that he is not eligible for probation. See section 16-11-201(2), C.R.S.
1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8); see also, e.g., People v. Espinosa, 200 Colo.
307, 614 P.2d 889 (1980); People v. Cunningham, supra; People v.
Warren, supra; Triggs v. People, supra.

Taking into consideration the nature of the offense, the character
of the offender and the protection of the public, section 18-1-409(1),
C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.); C.A.R. 4(c) (amended November 13, 1979);
People v. Warren, supra; People v. Malacara, 199 Colo. 243, 606 P.2d
1300 (1980); Triggs v. People, supra; ABA Standards Relating to
Appellate Review of Sentences § 3.2, we cannot say that the consecutive
sentence of ten to twenty years was excessive under the circumstances of
this case.

The judgment is affirmed.

410 ee

No. 79SA388

The People of the State of Colorado v. Francis Stephen Driscoll
(615 P.2d 696)

Decided August 25, 1980.
7
Paul Q. Beacom, District Attorney, Marc P. Mishkin, Deputy, for
plaintiff-appellant. .

John W. Hornbeck, for defendant-appellee.

En Banc.

CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES delivered the opinion of the Court.

The People appeal the district court’s refusal to permit them to file a
felony information pursuant to Crim. P. 7(b)(3)' in the district court. We affirm
the district court’s ruling.

1 This rule provides:
An information may be filed, without consent of the trial court having jurisdiction, for any offense
against anyone who has either:

(1) Failed to file a motion requesting a preliminary hearing in the county pursuant to Rule 5; or
(il) Had a preliminary hearing and has been bound over by the county court to appear in the
court having trial jurisdiction.

ee

a 411

A complaint was originally filed in the Adams County Court charg-
ing the defendant-appellee with aggravated robbery, conspiracy, and vio-
lent crime. The defendant appeared before the county court for arraign-
ment on March 30, 1979, at which time he was advised of his right to a
preliminary hearing. On April 9, 1979, the defendant, who had obtained
trial counsel, appeared pro se and orally requested a preliminary hearing.
The county court accepted the request and set May 4, 1979 for the date of
the preliminary hearing. Although the district attorney was not present at
this proceeding, his office was sent a notice of the hearing date by the
clerk of the court shortly thereafter.

On April 17, 1979, the district attorney filed a motion pursuant to
Crim. P. 5(a)(5) to bind over the defendant to the district court because
no written motion requesting a preliminary hearing had been filed as re-
quired by Crim. P. 5(a)(4)(1). The county court denied the motion stating
that a valid request had been made and a date already set. The People re-
sponded by filing a C.R.C.P. 106 action in the Adams County District
Court to compel the county court to bind over the defendant. A rule to
show cause was issued, and a hearing was conducted by the district court.
The district court discharged the rule finding that under the peculiar cir-
cumstances of this case, there had been substantial compliance with Crim.
P. 5 to entitle the defendant to a preliminary hearing in the county court.
As a matter of strategy, the People did not seek judicial review of the dis-
trict court’s ruling.

On June 20, 1979, when no preliminary hearing had been held, the
defendant moved to dismiss the charges. On the same date, the district at-
torney filed a motion to continue the date for holding the hearing. The
county court subsequently ruled that the time for a preliminary hearing
had already expired; that a continuance would therefore not be granted;
and that the defendant was entitled to have the charges against him dis-
missed. Again, the People did not appeal this adverse ruling.

Instead, the People attempted to file a direct information in the dis-
trict court based upon the same charges which had previously been filed in
the county court. The district court summarily ruled that the information
could not be filed under Crim. P. 7(b)(3) because the court had already
held in the C.R.C.P 106 action that a valid request for a preliminary hear-
ing had been made. It is this final ruling which is the subject of this ap-
peal.

The People’s contention is that the district court has no discretion to
tefuse the filing of a direct information if there has been no written

412 ee

request by the defendant for a preliminary hearing filed in the county
court. Crim. P. 7(b)(3)(I). It is argued that the district court erred in re-
fusing to even consider whether a written motion had in fact been filed.
We disagree. The district court had already ruled that the defendant had
substantially complied with Crim. P. 5(a)(4)(I) in another action arising
from the same charges. That ruling was not appealed, and the People are
estopped from relitigating the validity of the defendant’s request for a pre-
liminary hearing. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25
L.Ed.2d 469 (1969).

Here, the People have attempted to circumvent the effect of the
C.R.C.P. 106 order by arguing that the former judgment did not resolve
the issue of whether a request for a preliminary hearing had been filed in
the county court. Crim. P. 7(b)(3)(I). We reject this attempt to nullify the
full force and effect of the final judgment in the C.R.C.P. 106 proceeding.
Once the district court determined that the defendant had substantially
complied with Crim. P. 5(a)(4)(D, the effect of this determination was
that the court would treat the oral request as a written motion as required
by Crim. P. 5. Thus, whether a motion had been filed in the county court
was of no consequence in the determination of whether the district court
must accept the People’s direct filing. The district court correctly applied
its former ruling in summarily disposing of the newly filed information.

Judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE DUBOFSKY does not participate.

413

No. 79SC321

Ustacio F. Garcia y. The People of the State of Colorado
(615 P.2d 698)

Decided August 25, 1980.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Robert L. Pastore, Deputy,
for petitioner.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Robert C. Lehnert, Assistant

414 eS

Attorney General, for respondent.

En Bane.
CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES delivered the opinion of the Court.

This court granted certiorari to review a district court’s affirmance of
petitioner Garcia’s conviction on a misdemeanor charge in county court
after a trial by jury. The sole issue is whether the county court erred in de-
nying the petitioner’s oral request to waive his constitutional right to a
trial by jury. We reverse the district court’s judgment affirming the peti-
tioner’s conviction.

The stipulated facts are that the petitioner made several oral requests
in the county court to have his case tried to the court rather than to a jury.
These requests were orally opposed by the district attorney. The county
court refused the petitioner’s request based upon the prosecutor’s objec-
tions and set the matter for trial by jury. The petitioner was found guilty
and appealed the judgment of conviction to the district court. This judg-
ment was affirmed by the district court, which relied solely upon the lan-
guage of Crim. P. 23(a)(5):

“Except as to class 1 felonies, the person accused of a felony or a misde-
meanor may waive a trial by jury by express written instrument filed of
record, or by his announcement in open court appearing of record if the
prosecuting attorney consents. Trial shall then be by the court.”

The district court on considering the grounds of appeal found that no writ-
ten waiver was filed by the petitioner in the county court and that, each
time an oral request was made by him, the prosecuting attorney opposed
the request. Therefore, the district court held that the county court cor-
rectly ordered a trial by jury because the requirements of Crim. P.
23(a)(5) had not been met.1

At the outset, it should be noted that a defendant’s right to waive a
trial by jury has been the subject of many comments and cases. See 51
A.L.R.2d 1346 (1975) and A.L.R.2d Later Case Service (1978). From
this massive amount of legal analysis, it can be fairly stated that this re-
mains a troublesome area of the law. Nevertheless, there are several well-
settled legal principles which are helpful in the resolution of the present
case.

1 In People v. Linton, 193 Colo, 64, 565 P.2d 919 (1977), Crim. P. 23(a)(5) is discussed under
circumstances where the defendant had complied with requirements of the rule in waiving his right
to a jury trial.

es 41s

HM First, under the Constitution of the United States, a criminal
defendant has a right to a trial by jury except in petty offense cases (maxi-
mum punishment less than six months). U.S. Const. amend. VI; Baldwin
v. New York, 399 US. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970). This
right of a trial by jury has been expanded in Colorado to include petty of-
fenses. Colo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 23; section 16-10-109, C.R.S. 1973
(now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8). However, it has been held that there is no ab-
solute constitutional right of a criminal defendant to waive his right to
trial by jury. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 85 S.Ct. 783, 13
L.Ed.2d 630 (1965); see People v. Brisbin, 175 Colo. 428, 488 P.2d 63
(1971).

HB On the other hand, a prosecutor has no constitutional right to ei-
ther demand or waive a trial by jury? (U.S. Const. amend. VI and Colo.
Const. Art. II, Sec. 23, only guarantee the right to a jury trial to an ac-
cused).

In Colorado, section 18-1-406(2), C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl.
Vol. 8), and Crim. P. 23(a)(5) deal with the question of waiver of trial by
jury by a criminal defendant. Section 18-1-406(2) provides:

“Except as to class 1 felonies, the person accused of a felony or misde-
meanor may waive a trial by jury by express written instrument filed of re-
cord, or by announcement in open court appearing of record.”

Crim. P. 23(a)(5) provides an additional requirement not present in
the statute, to-wit: the prosecutor’s consent must be obtained as a condi-
tion before a defendant’s oral request to waive his right to a jury trial may
be allowed. We conclude that the general assembly purposely excluded the
consent of the prosecutor provision in section 18-1-406(2). The statute and
the rule are not reconcilable and are in direct conflict with each other. We
therefore must determine which governs, and this turns on the question of
whether the right to waive a trial by jury is procedural or substantive.

We recognized in Hardamon v. Municipal Court, 178 Colo.
271, 497 P.2d 1000 (1972), that the right to a jury trial “is a substantive
right granted to all citizens of the state.” The correlative right to waive a
trial by jury must similarly be substantive in nature. Such reasoning is
supported by this court’s acknowledgment of the power of “the legislature
to interpose reasonable requirements upon the right to waive trial by
jury.” People v. Brisbin, supra. Any condition imposed on the right to
waive trial by jury by a defendant is substantive.

I We therefore hold that the statute (section 18-1-406(2), C.R.S.
1973 (now in Repl. Vol. 8)) controls over Crim. P. 23(a)(5). The consent
of the prosecuting attorney cannot be imposed by rule as a condition on

2 This court, however, has recognized that a prosecutor may have a legitimate interest in seeing
that cases are tried to a jury. People v. Brisbin, supra. See also Singer v. United States,
supra.

416 ee

the defendant’s right to waive trial by jury. Because the petitioner’s waiver
of his constitutional right to a jury trial was not allowed, his conviction
cannot stand and he is entitled to a new trial. See section 13-6-310(2),
CRS. 1973.

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause is re-

manded for a new trial.

Nos. 27225 and 27367

The People of the State of Colorado v. Freddie Lee Glenn, Jr., now known
as Siyani Funsani Masamba; and The People of the State of Colorado v.
Freddie Lee Glenn, Jr., now known as Siyani Funsani Masamba

(615 P.2d 700)

Decided August 25, 1980.

ef
=
+

Robert L. Russel, District Attorney, Jerry C. Nelson, Chief Deputy,
for plaintiff-appellant (No. 27225).

Jeffrey I. Tompkins, George C. Wing, for defendant-appellee (No.
27225).

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Edward G. Donovan, Solicitor General, Robert C. Lehnert, Assistant At-
torney General, for plaintiff-appellee (No. 27367).

Jeffrey I. Tompkins, for defendant-appellant (No. 27367).

En Banc.
JUSTICE ROVIRA delivered the opinion of the Court.

The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, second-degree
kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. The People filed an appeal in this
court pursuant to C.A.R. 4(b), alleging error in specified rulings of the
trial court (Case No. 27225). The defendant filed an appeal in the court of
appeals (Case No. 27367), and that appeal was transferred to this court
pursuant to section 13-4-110(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973. For purposes of this
opinion, we have consolidated the People’s and the defendant’s appeals.
‘I. THE PEOPLE’S APPEAL

The defendant was initially charged in an amended indictment with
the crimes of first-degree murder,’ first-degree kidnapping,? aggravated
robbery, and rape.*

A.

Prior to trial, the defendant moved to strike the charge of rape on the
ground that the statute on which the charge was based, section 18-3-401,
C.R.S. 1973, had not been in effect at the time of the criminal conduct al-
leged in the amended indictment. In support of his motion, the defendant

+ Section 18-3-102, C.R.S. 1973 (Vol. 8 & 1976 Supp.).
2 Section 18-3-301, C.R.S. 1973.
% Section 18-4-302, C.R.S. 1973.
4 Section 18-3-401, C.RS. 1973

es 419

offered into evidence a certified copy of House Bill 1042 from the 1975
Session of the Colorado General Assembly.5 House Bill 1042 repealed
and re-enacted section 18-3-401 et seq., C.R.S. 1973, substituting multi-
ple forms of the crime of “sexual assault” for the previous offenses of
“tape,” “gross sexual imposition,” and related crimes. The amended in-
dictment charged the defendant with the crime of “rape,” as that offense
was set out in section 18-3-401, C.R.S. 1973, prior to the enactment of
House Bill 1042.

House Bill 1042 contained a stated effective date of July 1, 1975, but
the bill was not signed by the Governor until 3:50 p.m. on that date. It was
stipulated in the trial court that the criminal conduct alleged in this case
had occurred after 12:01 a.m. but prior to 3:50 p.m. on July 1, 1975.

In seeking a dismissal of the rape charged based on section 18-3-401,
C.R.S. 1973, the defendant argued that House Bill 1042 had been effec-
tive for the purpose of repealing that statute as of the bill’s stated effective
date, i.e., as of 12:01 a.m. on July 1, 1975. In support of this argument,
the defendant cited Colo. Const. Art. V, Sec. 19, which states in part that
“Ta]n act of the general assembly shall take effect on the date stated in the

”” The defendant argued that he could not properly be charged with
rape under section 18-3-401, C.R.S. 1973, since it had been stipulated that
the criminal conduct alleged in the amended indictment had occurred
after 12:01 a.m. on the date in question.®

In opposing the defendant’s motion, the People contended that House
Bill 1042 did not become effective for the purpose of repealing section 18-
3-401, C.R.S. 1973, until 3:50 p.m. on July 1, 1975, when the bill was
signed by the Governor. In support of their position, the People cited
Colo. Const. Art. IV, Sec. 11, which states in part that “[e]very bill
passed by the general assembly shall, before it becomes a law, be pre-
sented to the governor. If he approve, he shall sign it, and thereupon it
shall become a law.” (Emphasis added.) The People argued that the de-
fendant had been properly charged under section 18-3-401, C.R.S. 1973
(as it existed prior to House Bill 1042), since it had been stipulated that
the criminal conduct charged in the indictment had occurred before 3:50
p.m. on the date in question.”

5 Colo. Sess. Laws 1975, ch. 171, at 627-633.

© Citing the federal and state constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto criminal legislation
(U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10; Colo. Const. Art. Il, Sec. 11), the defendant also argued that the
revised multiple forms of “sexual assault” enacted by House Bill 1042 were ineffective with respect
to criminal conduct which occurred before 3:50 p.m. on July 1, 1975. Both in the trial court and
on appeal, the People have agreed with this position and have not sought to charge the defendant
with a violation of the revised sexual assault statutes.

7 See section 2-4-303, C.R.S. 1973, the general “saving clause,” which provides in part that:
“[tJhe repeal . . . of any statute . . . shall not have the effect to release, extinguish, alter, mod-
ify, or change in whole or in part any penalty, forfeiture, or liability, either civil or criminal, which
shall have been incurred under such statute, unless the repealing . . . act so expressly provides,
and such statute . . . so repealed . . . shall be treated and held as still remaining in force for the
purpose of sustaining any and all proper actions, suits, proceedings, and prosecutions, criminal as
well as civil, for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability, as well as for the purpose
of sustaining any judgment, decree, or order which can or may be rendered, entered, or made in

such actions, suits, proceedings, or prosecutions imposing, inflicting, or declaring such penalty, for-
feiture, or liability.” :

420 es

The trial court ruled that House Bill 1042 had become effective for
purposes of repealing section 18-3-401, C.R.S. 1973, at 12:01 a.m. on July
1, 1975. The court therefore dismissed from the amended indictment the
rape charge based on that statute. We reverse the ruling of the trial
court. :

This case presents the unusual situation in which a bill repealing a
criminal statute is signed into law by the Governor after its stated effec-
tive date. We must determine whether the repeal of the criminal statute is
effective as of the bill’s stated effective date (in this case, 12:01 a.m. on
July 1, 1975), or as of the date on which the bill was signed by the Gover-
nor (in this case, 3:50 p.m. on July 1, 1975). In order to make this deter-
mination, we must consider an apparent conflict between the provisions of
Colo. Const. Art. IV, Sec. 11, and Colo. Const. Art. V, Sec. 19.

= When a bill repealing a criminal statute is signed into law after
the bill’s stated effective date, the directive contained in Art. IV, Sec. 11,
to the effect that the bill does not “become a law” until it is signed by the
Governor,? takes precedence over the directive contained in Art. V, Sec.
19, to the effect that a legislative act “shall take effect on the date stated
in the act.” In our view, then, House Bill 1042 did not “become a law”
for any purpose until it was signed by the Governor at 3:50 p.m. on July
1, 1975. It follows that section 18-3-401, C.R.S. 1973, was not repealed
until 3:50 p.m. on that date, and, since the criminal conduct charged in
this case occurred before 3:50 p.m., the defendant was properly charged
with rape under section 18-3-401, C.R.S. 1973. Accord, United States v.
Casson, 434 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Robey v. Broersma, 181 Md.
325, 29 A.2d 827 (1943); In re Borough of Sharpsburg, 163 Pa.Super.
84, 60 A.2d 557 (1948).11

® The trial court also struck the word “rape” from that portion of the first-degree murder count of
the amended indictment which charged the defendant with the crime of felony murder. See section
18-3-102(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973 (1976 Supp.). Because the defendant was nonetheless convicted of
first-degree murder under section 18-3-102, C.R.S. 1973 (Vol. 8 & 1976 Supp.), the People have
not directly challenged the striking of the word “rape” from the murder charge of the indictment.

® Art. IV, Sec. 11, of course, provides two alternate methods through which a bill may “become a
law,” viz., legislative override of a gubernatorial veto, and failure of the Governor to return a bill
to the General Assembly within ten days of its presentment to him unless such return is prevented
by the adjournment of the General Assembly. Neither alternate method, however, is implicated in
the enactment of House Bill 1042.

1 The corollary of our holding is that the language in Art. V, Sec. 19, to the effect that a legisla-
tive act “shall take effect on the date stated in the act” is limited to the situation in which the act
“becomes a law” pursuant to Art. IV, Sec. 11, prior to the stated effective date.

11 The defendant's reliance on Hirschburg v. People, 6 Colo. 145 (1881), for the proposition that
House Bill 1042 was effective for purposes of repealing section 18-3-401, C.R.S. 1973, as of 12:01
a.m. on July 1, 1975, and for purposes of enacting the new multiple forms of the crime of sexual
assault as of 3:50 p.m. on that date, is misplaced. A careful reading of Hirschburg indicates that
it stands only for the proposition that, when the repeal of a criminal statute takes effect after the
commission of acts which the statute would otherwise proscribe, the statute cannot thereafter be
applied with respect to those acts in the absence of a “saving clause” such as that contained in sec-
tion 2-4-303, C.R.S. 1973. See fn. 7, supra.

es 421

B. -

At the close of the People’s case, the defendant moved for a judgment
of acquittal as to the charge of first-degree kidnapping, arguing that the
People’s evidence had not shown the specific intent required by section 18-
3-301, C.R.S. 1973,12 to have existed at the time of the initial seizure of
the kidnapping victim. The trial court granted the judgment of acquittal,
holding that the evidence was insufficient to show ‘‘that the Defendant. . -. had
the specific intent at the time of the kidnapping to force the victim to make a
concession or give up something of value in order to secure her release.”

The court, however, held the evidence sufficient to support a verdict
on the lesser included offense of second-degree kidnapping.*? The jury
was accordingly instructed on the elements of that lesser offense, and a
guilty verdict was returned.

On appeal, the People request us to disapprove" the trial court’s
reduction of the crime charged from first-degree to second-degree kidnap-
ping. They characterize the court’s ruling as a ratification of the defend-
ant’s argument that, as a matter of law, the People were required to show
the existence of the specific intent required for a conviction under section
18-3-301, C.R.S. 1973, at the outset of the kidnapping episode. We do not
share the People’s view of the nature of the trial court’s ruling, however,
and therefore do not address the issue raised by the People on appeal.
Rather, we approve the trial court’s ruling as a determination, supported
by the evidence, that the specific intent required for a conviction of first-
degree kidnapping had not been shown to have existed either at the outset
of the kidnapping episode or at any subsequent time during the kidnap-
ping. See People v. Bennett, 183 Colo. 125, 515 P.2d 466 (1973).

Il. THE DEFENDANT’S APPEAL
A.

The defendant’s first argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred in admitting into evidence two color photographs of the body of the
homicide victim. He contends that the photographs “were unduly

1 See People v. Bridges, 199 Colo. 520, 612 P.2d 1110 (1980); People v. Chatfield, 199 Colo.
530, 612 P.2d 516 (1980); People v. Naranjo, 200 Colo. 1, 612 P.2d 1099 (1980); People v.
Naranjo, 200 Colo. 11, 612 P.2d 1106 (1980).

18 Section 18-3-302, C.R.S. 1973.

¥4 See section 16-12-102, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

am es

inflammatory and lacked any probative value with respect to the issues
presented at trial.” We do not agree.

The photographs were introduced to show the appearance of the vic-
tim’s body at the scene of the homicide, as well as the nature and location
of her wounds. The record shows that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion when it balanced the potential inflammatory effect of the photo-
graphs with their probative value and concluded that the photographs
should be admitted into evidence. People v. White, 199 Colo. 82, 606
P.2d 847 (1980); People v. Sepeda, 196 Colo. 13, 581 P.2d 723 (1978);
People v. Steele, 193 Colo. 87, 563 P.2d 6 (1977); People v. McCrary,
190 Colo. 538, 549 P.2d 1320 (1976); People v. Pearson, 190 Colo. 313,
546 P.2d 1259 (1976).

B.

As his second argument on appeal, the defendant contends that the
trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial on the basis of a remark
made by a prospective juror during voir dire by the trial court. We do not
agree. :

The remark on which the defendant bases his argument was made
during the following voir dire exchange:

“THE COURT: Had you read or heard anything about the case before?
JUROR NO. 3: Yes, this and a previous trial, concerning —

THE COURT: Just a minute, just a minute. Just answer my questions
yes or no.

JUROR NO. 3: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Don’t go into any elaboration.

JUROR NO. 3: Okay.

THE COURT: You have read something about the case before, is that
right?

JUROR NO. 3: Yes, sir.” (Emphasis added.)

Because of the prospective juror’s further statement that he had formed an
opinion of the defendant’s guilt, the trial court excused the juror. The
court, however, refused to grant a mistrial on the basis of the juror’s unsol-
icited reference to “a previous trial,” which was made in the presence of
other prospective jurors, some of whom were included in the jury panel be-
fore which the defendant was tried.

I We find no reversible error in the trial court’s refusal to grant
the mistrial, in view of that court’s wide discretion when ruling on claims
of actual or probable prejudice resulting from the receipt by members of a
jury in a criminal trial of collateral information about the defendant’s un-
charged criminal conduct. Quintana v. People, 158 Colo. 189, 405 P.2d
740 (1965), citing Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 79 S.Ct.
1171, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250 (1959). In this case, the unsolicited remark cited by
the defendant was brief and equivocal. It was not specific to the
defendant, and the trial court took immediate measures to prevent

es 3

elaboration by the prospective juror who made the remark. The voir dire
record demonstrates a very slight possibility of prejudice to the defendant,
and, in our view, retrial of the defendant is not mandatory in the circum-
stances of this case. People v. Anderson, 41 Colo. App. 55, 582 P.2d
1069 (1978).

Cc.

I] The defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing his
tendered instruction on the crime of simple robbery*® as a lesser included
offense of aggravated robbery. We disagree.

The defendant would have been entitled to the simple robbery in-
struction had there been “‘a rational basis for the jury to acquit [him] of
the greater offense [i.e., aggravated robbery] but convict him of the lesser
offense [i.e., simple robbery].” People v. White, 191 Colo. 353, 356, 553
P.2d 68, 70 (1976); Graham v. People, 199 Colo. 439, 610 P.2d 494
(1980). However, the evidence presented to the jury showed, at a mini-
mum, that the defendant had participated as a complicitor’® in the com-
mission of an aggravated robbery, as proscribed by section 18-4-302,
C.R.S. 1973. There was no rational basis on which the jury could have
acted to acquit the defendant of aggravated robbery while convicting him
of simple robbery, and the trial court did not therefore err in refusing to
instruct the jury on the latter offense.

D.

[I The defendant’s fourth argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred in refusing to allow him to call the foreman of the grand jury which
returned the amended indictment as a witness in a pretrial hearing con-
cerning the procedures followed by the grand jurors in their secret deliber-
ations. In his brief filed in this court, the defendant concedes that his sole
purpose in seeking to call the grand jury foreman as a witness was to “de-
termine if the written amended indictment, signed by the Grand Jury
Foreman, was specifically read and considered by each individual [grand]
juror.” The defendant argued in the trial court that the amended indict-
ment should be quashed in the event that each juror had not individually
read the written indictment form.17

Our recent decision in People v. Campbell, 194 Colo. 451, 573 P.2d
557 (1978), is dispositive of this issue. In Campbell, we held, inter alia,

18 Section 18-4-301, C.R.S. 1973.

16 See People v. Calvaresi, 198 Colo. 321, 600 P.2d 57 (1979); People v. Larson, 194 Colo.
338, 572 P.2d 815 (1977); section 18-1-603, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

‘7 The record of the pretrial hearing indicates that the transcript and minutes of the grand jury’s
general session had been provided to defense counsel, the amended indictment had been read in its
entirety to the grand jurors before they retired for their secret deliberative session, copies of the
amended indictment had been left in the jury room for the jurors’ use during their secret session,
and the jurors voted unanimously to return the amended indictment as drafted and submitted to
them before their secret session.

424 ee

that it was not “essential for all members of a grand jury who issue a true
bill to specifically observe the formal charging paper and approve its for-
mal language.” Id., 194 Colo. at 453, 573 P.2d at 558. In this case, then,
since there was no requirement that the grand jurors individually read the
written indictment form, the trial court did not err in refusing to allow the
defendant to call the grand jury foreman as a witness on the issue of
whether they had in fact done so.
E.

The defendant assigns as error the form of the verdict submitted to
the jury on the charge of first-degree murder. The verdict as returned by
the jury stated that:

“We, the jury, find the Defendant . . . GUILTY of Murder in the First
Degree, as charged in Count One of the Indictment.”

The defendant contends that the trial court erred in submitting to the jury
a general verdict form phrased in terms of the crime of first-degree mur-
der “as charged in Count One of the Indictment,” on the ground that the
amended indictment under which the charge was originally made was
phrased conjunctively, i.e., charging the commission by the defendant of
intentional homicide committed “after deliberation” (as proscribed by sec-
tion 18-3-102(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973 (1976 Supp.)) and the commission by
the defendant of felony murder (as proscribed by section 18-3-102(1)(b),
C.RS. 1973 (1976 Supp.)).

However, the trial court’s instruction on the charge of first-
degree murder stated clearly that the jury was entitled to find the defend-
ant guilty of that crime if it determined that he had committed the crime
proscribed by section 18-3-102(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973 (1976 Supp.), or the
crime proscribed by section 18-3-102(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973 (1976 Supp.).
The use of a general verdict form referring to the crime “as charged in the
information [or indictment]” has been specifically approved by this court
in the circumstances presented here. We find no error in the form of the
verdict submitted to the jury on the first-degree murder charge. People v.
Edwards, 184 Colo. 440, 520 P.2d 1041 (1974); Hernandez v. People,
156 Colo. 23, 396 P.2d 952 (1964).

: F.

HM Finally, the defendant asserts error in the form of the first-
degree murder charge contained in the amended indictment, as well as in
the method through which the word “rape” was struck from the felony
murder portion of that charge.1® However, the asserted errors were not
preserved for appellate review through contemporaneous objections in the
trial court and through inclusion in the defendant’s motion for a new trial

18 The word “rape” was stricken from Count One of the amended indictment on the motion of the
defendant. See Part I.A. of this opinion as well as fn. 8, supra.

425

filed pursuant to Crim. P. 33(a). Since we find no plain error in the form
of the indictment or in the method through which it was amended, we do
not consider the defendant’s arguments. Crim. P. 52(b).

We reverse the district court’s dismissal of the rape charge made pur-
suant to section 18-3-401, C.R.S. 1973, and approve the district court’s
entry of judgment of acquittal on the charge of first-degree kidnapping
made pursuant to section 18-3-301, C.R.S. 1973. The convictions for first-
degree murder, second-degree kidnapping, and aggravated robbery are af-
firmed.

No. 79SA12

The People of the State of Colorado y. Richard Lahr
(615 P.2d 707)

Decided August 25, 1980.

426 es
J. E. Losavio, Jr., District Attorney, Amy S. Isaminger, Deputy, for
plaintiff-appellant.

No appearance for defendant-appellee.

En Banc.

JUSTICE DUBOFSKY delivered the opinion of the Court.

The People appeal’ the trial court’s dismissal of the attempted sec-
ond-degree kidnapping charge after the prosecution had concluded its
case, and the decision of the trial court to instruct the jury on misde-
meanor menacing, a lesser included offense of felony menacing. We affirm
in part and disapprove in part.

+ Section 16-12-102, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8), allows the People to appeal a deci-
sion in a criminal case in which the defendant was acquitted when a trial court commits a material
error of Jaw prejudicial to the State and an appellate decision will have precedential value. People
v. Kirkland, 174 Colo. 362, 483 P.2d 1349 (1971).

ee 427

Shortly after midnight on April 30, 1978, the defendant stopped a
passing car and braced his shotgun on the hood, pointing it at the people
inside. He told them, “Don’t move or I'll blow you away.” He then went to
the open window on the driver’s side, put the shotgun against the driver’s
head, and told him to slide over. The driver moved to the front passenger
seat, and his wife, who had been in the passenger seat, fled. Two other
people were in the back seat.

The defendant dropped his shotgun to the level of the driver’s stom-
ach as he got into the car. The car was running, but the handbrake was on.
The defendant tried to put the car in gear, but it stalled. When he was not
successful in re-starting the car, the defendant threw the shotgun away,
stating that it was not loaded anyway. The police arrived shortly there-
after.

At trial, the defendant testified that he remembered nothing of the
event. The trial judge instructed the jury on felony menacing and the
lesser included offense, misdemeanor menacing. The jury acquitted the de-
fendant of felony menacing, but found him guilty of misdemeanor menac-
ing. The trial judge dismissed an attempted second-degree kidnapping
charge at mid-trial.

I

I The defendant was charged with attempted second-degree kid-
napping under section 18-3-302, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), and sec-
tion 18-2-101, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).? A person is guilty of at-
tempted second-degree kidnapping if he knowingly engaged in conduct
which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of his purpose to knowingly
seize or carry another person from one place to another without his con-
sent and without lawful justification. At the close of the prosecution’s
case-in-chief, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for a directed
judgment of acquittal on the attempted kidnapping charge because the ev-
idence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution was insuffi-
cient.

The district attorney urges that the evidence tending to show
that the defendant had taken a substantial step toward commission of sec-
ond-degree kidnapping was sufficient, as a matter of law, to withstand a
motion for directed judgment of acquittal. The test for sufficiency is stated
in People v. Downer, 192 Colo. 264, 268, 557 P.2d 835, 837-39 (1976):

2 Section 18-3-302(1) provides: —

“Any person who knowingly, forcibly, or otherwise seizes and carries any person from one place to
another, without his consent and without lawful justification, commits second degree kidnapping.”
Section 18-2-101(1) provides:

“A person commits criminal attempt if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for
commission of an offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the commis-
sion of the offense. A substantial step is any conduct . . . which is strongly corroborative of the
firmness of the actor’s purpose to complete the commission of the offense.”

428 ee

“Only when the evidence is such that the jury must necessarily have a rea-
sonable doubt should the judge direct a verdict in favor of the defendant.
The trial court must give the prosecution the benefit of every reasonable
inference which might fairly be drawn from the evidence.”

See also People v. Roberts, 197 Colo. 304, 592 P.2d 801, 802 (1979).

Questions of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence “by
[their] very nature must be reviewed on an ad hoc basis, and it is the ex-
ceptional case where such review will involve questions of ‘sufficiency’
generally applicable to future cases.” People v. Kirkland, supra, 174
Colo. at 364, 483 P.2d at 1351; People v. Samora, 188 Colo. 74, 532
P.2d 946 (1975). This is not such a case. Nor is review merited to “settle a
controversy” since the defendant cannot be placed in jeopardy a second
time. People v. Kirkland, supra.

Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. dismissing the at-
tempted second-degree kidnapping charge.

Il.

The People contend that the court’s decision to give the instruction on
misdemeanor menacing was error because the defendant’s use of a shot-
gun, a deadly weapon, intentionally placed another in fear of imminent
bodily injury.* The trial court found that the shotgun was jammed against
the head of one of the victims, and that the evidence was adequate to show
in this instance menacing by use of a deadly weapon. The court refused to
accept the People’s argument that a shotgun is a deadly weapon as a mat-
ter of law and instructed the jury on felony menacing and the lesser in-
cluded offense, misdemeanor menacing. The jury acquitted the defendant
of felony menacing and convicted him of misdemeanor menacing.

Our decision in People v. McPherson, 200 Colo. 429, 619
P.2d 38 (1980) controls the result in this case. We held there as a matter
of law that an unloaded firearm is a deadly weapon. The court erred in
submitting to the jury the issue of whether the shotgun was a deadly
weapon. We disapprove the court’s ruling.

The elements of misdemeanor menacing and felony menacing
are identical but for the added requirement of the use of a deadly weapon.
The submission to the jury of an included crime is justified only if there is
evidence supporting the jury finding the accused innocent of the higher
crime and guilty of the lesser included crime. Section 18-1-408(6), C.R.S.
1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8); People v. Shannon, 189 Colo. 287, 539
P.2d 480 (1975). Here, the evidence supported a conviction for felony
menacing, and the trial court improperly submitted the instruction on

3 Section 18-3-206, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8) provides:

“A person commits the crime of menacing if, by any threat or physical action, he knowingly places
or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. Menacing is a class
3 misdemeanor, but, if committed by the use of a deadly weapon, it is a class 5 felony.”

429

misdemeanor menacing to the jury.

We disapprove the trial court’s ruling submitting misdemeanor
menacing to the jury. However, because the defendant cannot be placed in
jeopardy a second time, People v. Kirkland, supra, we affirm the convic-
tion for the lesser included offense, misdemeanor menacing. We also af-
firm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the attempted second-degree
kidnapping charge.

.
No. 79SC275

The People of the State of Colorado y. Martin J. McPherson
“(619 P.2d 38)

Decided August 25, 1980. Opinion modified and as modified rehearing denied
September 22, 1980.

430 ee
Pe —CtSCis
J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,

Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, William Morris, Assistant Attorney
General, for petitioner.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Richard D. Irvin, Deputy,
for respondent.

En Banc.

JUSTICE DUBOFSKY delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in People v. McPherson, 43 Colo. App. 96,
601 P.2d 355 (1979), to consider the Court of Appeals’ decision that the
defendant, Martin J. McPherson, could not be convicted of felony menac-
ing because he used an unloaded firearm. We reverse.

About 12:30 a.m. on April 19, 1977, the defendant entered the lobby
of the University of Colorado dormitory, Stearns West, in the Williams
Village Complex, and confronted the night clerk, an 18-year-old woman
student, with a rifle. He first asked her how to get to the roof, and when
she did not respond, he ordered her at gunpoint to the elevator. Just then
the elevator door opened, and the defendant ordered the two people in the
elevator, along with the night clerk, to go outside with him. One of the
people in the elevator started to run, and the defendant raised his rifle and
yelled “Stop.”

The night clerk testified that she was afraid the defendant would
shoot her. The defendant, apparently realizing how frightened the people |
he was holding were, backed away from them, apologizing, “I’m sorry I
scared you. I was looking for someone else.” As he left he warned, “I have
a high-powered rifle here, and if anyone touches that phone, I'll blow a
hole right through you.”

Another student arrived at the dormitory in time to identify the de-
fendant’s car. Within a short time, the police found the defendant as he

431

left his car in a nearby apartment complex parking lot. He was carrying a
rifle in a case and a full box of shells.

At trial, the defendant testified that he spent most of the evening
drinking at a bar in a shopping center across the street from the dormi-
tory. Near midnight, he bumped into a man on a narrow stairway, and
they exchanged hostile words. The defendant claimed the man threatened
to kill him. As the defendant left the bar, he saw his antagonist walk to-
ward Stearns West. The defendant went home and took the rifle and a box
of shells from his parents’ bedroom. He returned to the dormitory area, in-
tending to confront the man and tell him that he should not threaten peo-
ple.

The defendant testified that the rifle was unloaded, but he did not tell
the people he encountered in the lobby that it was unloaded. He denied
verbally threatening anyone and left when he realized he had scared the
people he was menacing. There was no evidence that the defendant at-
tempted to use the rifle as a bludgeon or that anyone feared he would do
80.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquit-
tal. The motion was based on the premise that an unloaded firearm cannot
be a deadly weapon sufficient to sustain a conviction for felony menacing.
In the alternative, the defendant requested the court to instruct the jury on
misdemeanor menacing, a lesser included offense of felony menacing, or
reckless endangerment. The court denied the requested instructions. -Dur-
ing deliberations, the jury asked whether an unloaded weapon constitutes
a “deadly weapon.” The judge replied that the jury had already been in-
structed on the law. The jury convicted the defendant of felony menacing,
and the court sentenced him to two years’ probation.

The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction, holding
that an unloaded rifle is not a deadly weapon.’ and remanded the case for
the jury to determine if the rifle was loaded. If the evidence conflicted on
whether the rifle was loaded, the trial court was directed to instruct the
jury on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor menacing.

The question before us is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
holding as a matter of law that an unloaded firearm is not a deadly
weapon. We conclude as a matter of law that under the felony menacing
statute an unloaded firearm is a deadly weapon. Therefore, we reverse the
Court of Appeals’ decision and uphold the defendant’s conviction.

We base our decision on the statutory definition of a deadly weapon
and the purpose of the felony menacing statute. The felony menacing
statute provides:

* The dissenting opinion set forth the argument that it is immaterial whether the rifle was loaded
or not; the essential element of the offense is the specific intent to cause fear, and the defendant
intended that his victims think the rifle loaded.

432 eS

“A person commits the crime of menacing if, by any threat or physical ac-
tion, he knowingly places or attempts to place another person in fear of
imminent serious bodily injury. Menacing is a class 3 misdemeanor, but, if
committed by the use of a deadly weapon, it is a class 5 felony.” Section
18-3-206, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

A “deadly weapon” is defined in section 18-1-901(3)(e), C.R.S. 1973
(1978 Repl. Vol. 8) as:

“|. . any firearm,? knife, bludgeon, or other weapon, device, instrument,
material, or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the man-
ner it is used or intended to be used is capable of producing death or seri-
ous bodily injury.’’?

Hl The Court of Appeals assumed that the clause “‘which in the
manner it is used or intended to be used is capable of producing death or
serious bodily injury’’ in the definition of deadly weapon applies to each
type of weapon listed. To the contrary, the phrase ‘‘which in the manner it
is used. . .”’ modifies only the last antecedent, ‘‘other weapon, device, in-
strument, material, or substance, whether animate or inanimate.’’ ‘‘Other
weapon’’ is preceded by an ‘“‘or’’, and the general rule of statutory con-
struction is that relative and qualifying words and phrases, where no con-
trary intention appears, are construed to refer solely to the last antecedent
with which they are closely connected. Moschetti v. Liquor Licensing
Authority of the City of Boulder, 176 Colo. 281, 490 P.2d 299 (1971);
Wheeler v. Rudolph, 162 Colo. 410, 426 P.2d 762 (1967).

Our reading of the statute is consistent with its purpose. The
specific intent of the defendant to cause fear is the gravamen of the of-
fense of felony menacing. People v. Stout, 193 Colo. 466, 568 P.2d 52
(1977). The felony menacing statute enhances the punishment if the de-
fendant uses a deadly weapon because a deadly weapon will cause a
greater degree of fear in the person menaced. The victim does not know
whether the firearm is unloaded, and the victim’s apprehension and conse-
quent reactions will be the same as if the firearm were loaded. The victim
may attempt to escape, as did one of the persons menaced in the case be-
fore us, or to defend himself by the use of violence.

The Court of Appeals thought menacing a more serious crime when a
deadly weapon is used because of the increased risk of death or serious
bodily injury. The Court of Appeals concluded that the increased risk is
not present when the firearm is unloaded, and therefore, the more severe

2 “Firearm” is defined as “any handgun, automatic, revolver, pistol, rifle, shotgun, or other instru-
ment or device capable or intended to be capable of discharging bullets, cartridges, or other explo-
sive charges.” Section 18-1-901(3)(h), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). There is no question here
that the rifle was a “firearm.”

3 In 1979 the General Assembly amended the definition of ‘‘deadly weapon’’ as follows: ‘‘any fire-
sarm, whether loaded or unloaded . . . .’’ section 18-1-901(3)(e) (1979 Supp. to 1978 Repl. Vol.
8).

433

penalty should not apply. The Court of Appeals relied on cases finding
that except where used as a bludgeon an unloaded firearm is not a deadly
weapon for felony menacing where present ability to commit violent injury
is required before a weapon can be considered deadly. Hobbs v. State,
363 P.2d 357 (Alaska, 1961); People v. Wood, 10 App.Div.2d 231, 199
N.Y.S.2d 342 (1960). See also United States v. Garcia, 555 F.2d 708
(9th Cir. 1977); People v. Orr, 43 Cal.App.3d 666, 117 Cal.Rptr. 738
(1974); Else v. State, 555 P.2d 1210 (Alaska, 1976); Loretta v. Sheriff,
93 Nev. 344, 565 P.2d 1008 (1977).

The Colorado General Assembly changed the statutory definition of
assault from present ability to inflict injury to apparent ability to inflict
injury when assault and battery were merged into the present assault stat-
utes.4 Jurisdictions with statutes which require only apparent ability to
cause serious bodily injury have held that an unloaded firearm is a deadly
weapon per se. Sousa v. United States, 400 A.2d 1036 (D.C.App.),
cert. denied 444 US. 981, 100 S.Ct. 484, 62 L.Ed.2d 408 (1979); State
y. Deutscher, 225 Kan. 265, 589 P.2d 620 (1979); State v. Maxwell,
328 A.2d 801 (Me. 1974); Commonwealth v. Henson, 357 Mass. 686,
259 N.E.2d 769 (1970).

The apparent ability cases might help us resolve concerns about
whether a weapon is “capable of producing death or serious bodily injury”
if we were considering an assault statute requiring intent to cause bodily
injury. In such a case, the fact the weapon is loaded may establish that the
defendant had the requisite statutory intent to commit assault. However,
the specific intent for felony menacing is the intent to place another in fear
of imminent serious bodily injury. Whether the defendant had the intent
or ability to inflict injury is not the gist of felony menacing. The use of a
firearm to menace places the victim who has no way of knowing whether
the firearm is loaded in fear of serious bodily injury. Therefore, we hold,
as a matter of law, that an unloaded firearm is a deadly weapon under the
felony menacing statute.

The trial court refused the defendant’s tendered instructions on
the lesser included offense, misdemeanor menacing, and reckless endan-
germent.5 Because we have ruled that menacing with an unloaded firearm

+The earlier statute, C.R.S. 1963, 40-2-33, defined assault as ‘tan unlawful attempt coupled with
a present ability to commit a violent injury on the person of another.’” ‘The present statute, for ex--
ample, section 18-3-203(1), C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8), provides that .
“{a] person commits the crime of assault in the second degree if:

(b) [w]ith intent to cause serious bodily injury to another person, he causes or attempts to cause
such injury to any person by means of a deadly weapon.”

The assault statute and the felony menacing statute have the same definition for “deadly weapon,”
section 18-1-901(3)(e), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8, current version in 1979 Supp.).

5 Section 18-3-208, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8), provides: “[a] person who recklessly
engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to another person
commits reckless endangerment .. . .”

434 es

is menacing with a deadly weapon, there is no evidence to support the giv-
ing of a misdemeanor menacing instruction. Likewise, since there is no ev-
idence to support a conclusion that the defendant created “a substantial
tisk of bodily injury,” no instruction on reckless endangerment was re-
quired. People v. White, 191 Colo. 353, 553 P.2d 68 (1976).®

We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and return the
cause to that court for disposition consistent with the views expressed
herein.

No. 80SA25

‘The People of the State of Colorado v. Craig Spies
(615 P.2d 710)

Decided August 25, 1980.

© The defendant contends that the jury also should have been instructed on the lesser non-included
offense of prohibited use of 2 weapon, section 18-12-106(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl.
Vol. 8). It is not clear from the record whether the defendant tendered an instruction on the of- ,
fense. It is clear, however, that the defendant did not preserve the issue in his motion for a new
trial, and therefore, we do not consider it. People v. Stephens, 188 Colo. 8, 532 P.2d 728 (1975).

435

Dale Tooley, District Attorney, Brooke Wunnicke, Chief Appellate
Deputy, Donna Skinner Reed, Deputy, for plaintiff-appellant.

Marks & Olom, Jonathan L. Olom, for defendant-appellee.

En Banc.
JUSTICE LOHR delivered the opinion of the Court.

436 eS

In this interlocutory appeal pursuant to C.A.R. 4.1, the People chal-
lenge the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress
physical evidence. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

On the evening of March 16, 1979, a police officer observed an Olds-
mobile automobile in the parking lot of Mile High Stadium. A temporary
license was displayed on the rear window of the Oldsmobile, but the vehi-
cle described on the temporary license was a Dodge. Upon inquiry the offi-
cer learned that the Denver police department had received a report that
the Oldsmobile had been stolen. The police kept the vehicle under surveil-
lance. Later that evening the defendant and a woman entered the Oldsmo-
bile, and both were arrested. An officer then searched the vehicle and
found another temporary license plate crumpled up on the floor of the
back seat. This temporary license plate had been issued for a vehicle other
than the Oldsmobile. The police investigated and learned that both tempo-
rary license plates had been stolen.

The defendant was charged with aggravated motor vehicle theft, sec-
tion 18-4-409, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8) (1979 Supp.),’_ and theft
by receiving, section 18-4-410, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). Both
charges were based upon theft of the Oldsmobile. The trial court granted
the defendant’s motion to suppress the crumpled temporary license plate
found inside the automobile.?

In this appeal the People do not contend that the search of the inte-
rior of the automobile was consistent with constitutional provisions prohib-
iting unreasonable searches. See U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV; Colo.
Const. art. II, § 7. Instead, the People claim that the defendant lacks
standing to question the legality of the search. We shall consider this
claim first within the framework of the Fourth Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States and then within the framework of Colo.
Const. art. II, § 7.

I.

HJ The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of estab-
lishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the chal-
lenged search or seizure. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421,
58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); see People v. Pearson, 190 Colo. 313, 546 P.2d
1259 (1976); People v. Trusty, 183 Colo. 291, 516 P.2d 423 (1973). Es-
tablishment of such a violation gives an individual “standing” to assert the
issue of the legality of the search or seizure. See Rakas v. Illinois,

1 Section 18-4-409(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), provides, in pertinent part:

“(2) A person commits aggravated motor vehicle theft if he knowingly obtains or exercises control
‘over the motor vehicle of another without authorization or by threat or deception and:

“(a) Retains possession or control of the motor vehicle for more than seventy-two hours; . . .
2 The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the temporary license plate which was
displayed on the rear window of the Oldsmobile. That ruling is not subject to review by interlocu-
tory appeal. C.A.R. 4.1,

487

supra; People v. Pearson, supra.

The defendant contends that he has automatic standing to assert that
the search of the automobile and the seizure of the temporary license were
illegal, under the authority of Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80
S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). That case held that, where possession of
the seized evidence is an essential element of the offense charged, the de-
fendant is not obligated to establish that his own Fourth Amendment
rights were violated but only that the search and the seizure were uncon-
stitutional.? In the instant case an element of the crime of aggravated mo-
tor vehicle theft with which the defendant is charged is retention of posses-
sion or control of the vehicle for more than seventy-two hours. The
information charges that the required period of possession occurred some
time between August 18, 1978, and March 16, 1979, the date of the chal-
lenged search and seizure. Thus, the defendant contends that he is not re-
quired to establish that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated in
order to challenge the legality of the search and seizure.*

Whether the defendant would have automatic standing to claim
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under the rule of Jones v.
United States, supra, is a question we need not consider. The automatic
standing rule of Jones has been overruled recently by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct.
2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980). There, the court noted that the underpin-
nings of Jones had been substantially destroyed by later decisions.

The automatic standing rule of Jones was created to solve two prob-
lems which no longer exist. First, absent such a rule a defendant charged
with a possessory offense might be able to establish standing to challenge
a search and seizure only by giving self-incriminating testimony which
would be admissible at his trial as evidence of guilt. This problem has been
eliminated by the decision in Simmons y. United States, 390 U.S. 377,
88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). See Brown v. United States, 411
US. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973). In Simmons it was held
that testimony given by a defendant in support of a motion to suppress evi-
‘dence on Fourth Amendment grounds cannot be admitted in evidence
against the defendant at trial on the issue of guilt unless the defendant

3 Jones v. United States, supra, has been followed in Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93
S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973). Brown made it clear that possession at the time of the”
contested search and seizure must be an essential element of the offense charged in order to in-
yoke the automatic standing rule.

4 Although automatic standing cases usually deal with situations in which possession of the item
seized is an essential element of the crime charged, the considerations are the same where, as here,
possession of the place searched is an essential element of the crime charged. See Williams v.
United States, 412 F.2d 729 (Sth Cir. 1969); Glisson v. United States, 406 F.2d 423 (5th Cir.
1969); Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965).

438

makes no objection.*

HB Second, it was considered inappropriate to permit the People to
maintain contradictory positions. At the suppression hearing, in order to
avoid the conclusion that a defendant had standing, the People would as-
sert that he did not have possession of the property seized. Later, at the
trial, the People would assert that the defendant did have such possession,
in order to establish an element of the substantive offense. In United
States v. Salvucci, supra, the court found the concern as to the appro-
priateness of permitting such contradictory positions to have been resolved
in Rakas y. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978).
That case established that the essential inquiry to determine a defendant’s
ability to contest the legality of a search is not whether he had possession
of the item seized but whether he had a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the invaded place. Possession of the place searched or of the item seized
is but one factor bearing on that question; possession is not the sole crite-
rion to determine whether a protected Fourth Amendment interest exists.
Id. Thus, without being legally contradictory, the People can maintain
that a defendant possessed the property in question but that his Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated by seizure of the property. See
United States v. Salvucci, supra.

Salvucci establishes that the defendant has no automatic right
under the Fourth Amendment to assert the illegality of the search and sei-
zure.

il.

Next, we must consider whether the automatic standing rule should
be applied in the instant case to protect those values guaranteed by Colo.
Const. art. II, § 7.

The first concern expressed in Jones v. United States, supra —
that the defendant may be able to establish standing only by giving self-
incriminating testimony which would be admissible at his trial as evidence
of guilt — is greatly diluted in the case at bar.

At the suppression hearing it was the defendant’s position that he was
in possession of the vehicle, but that the possession was not wrongful. At
the defendant’s request his affidavit was received in evidence at that

5 Simmons v. United States, supra, leaves unanswered the question whether self-incriminating
testimony by a defendant at a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence can be used to impeach

that defendant if he chooses to testify at his trial on the issue of guilt. In United States v:
Salvucci, supra, the court stated that this potential detriment to the defendant should be consid-
ered in determining the scope of the Simmons rule in an appropriate case, rather than being uti-
lized as a reason to retain the rule of automatic standing. In United States v. Havens, 446 US.
620, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980), a somewhat related question was answered. There,

physical evidence obtained in violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights was permitted
to be used in the government’s rebuttal case to impeach a statement made by the defendant on

cross-examination by the prosecutor. See also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43
L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971);

Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Bd. 503 (1954).

Fn

eS 439

hearing. The affidavit states that the Oldsmobile was provided to the de-

fendant for his personal use in December 1978; that he used the vehicle at
all times under the belief that it was not stolen and that the party provid-

ing it for his use was authorized to do so; and that at the time of his arrest
the defendant believed that he was in lawful possession of the vehicle
based upon the authorization he had been given to use the Oldsmobile.

Thus, although the defendant claims automatic standing, he has already
placed of record his sworn statement with respect to possession of the
Oldsmobile and his state of mind with respect to his right to use the vehi-
cle. These are the matters central to a determination whether the defend-
ant has a constitutionally protected interest which would permit him to
object to the unlawful search and seizure. See Rakas v. Illinois, supra,®

People v. Pearson, supra. To recognize automatic standing in the de-

fendant at this time would not prevent the use of the affidavit for im-
peachment at the trial in any manner consistent with the law. See United:
States v. Salvucci, supra.

The second concern expressed in Jones — that it is inappropriate to
permit the People to maintain contradictory positions at the suppression
hearing and at the trial — is not present in this case. The People do not
base their claim that the defendant lacks standing to challenge the search
upon a contention that the defendant did not have possession of the Olds-
mobile. Their position at the suppression hearing was that the defendant’s
possession was not lawful and thus could not be used as a foundation for
standing to challenge the legality of the search. See People vy.’ Pearson,
supra. Predictably, in order to establish the crime of aggravated motor ve-
hicle theft, the People’s position with respect to possession of the Oldsmo-
bile will be the same at the trial.

The reasons which gave birth to the automatic standing rule
have little or no applicability to the facts of this case. Under these circum-
stances, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to recognize automatic
standing in the defendant to challenge the legality of the search. See
Rakas vy. Illinois, supra.”

Il.

HB In Rakas vy. Illinois, supra, it was held that the questions of
standing and reasonableness of the search merge into one: whether the
government officials violated any legitimate expectation of privacy held by

© We need not consider for present purposes whether the ambit of constitutionally protected inter-

est under the Rakas standard includes all those interests which would be recognized and protected

under Colo. Const. art. Il, § 7. Cf. People v. Bannister, 199 Colo. 281, » 607 P.2d 987,
988 n. 1 (1980) (reserving the question whether the standing limitations imposed by Rakas v.

Illinois, supra, apply to suppression motions based on the provisions of Colo. Const. art. II. § 7).
7 Whether Colo. Const. art. II, § 7, requires that automatic standing be recognized in other fac-
tual situations, notwithstanding that its demise as a part of Fourth Amendment law has been rec-

ognized in United States v. Salvucci, supra, is a question we leave for another day.

440 es

the defendant. Accord, Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct.
2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980); see People v. Little, 198 Colo. 244, 598
P.2d 140 (1979). Such a determination is appropriately based upon the to-
tality of the circumstances in each case. See Rawlings v. Kentucky,
supra. If the Oldsmobile had been stolen, and the defendant knew that it
had been stolen, the defendant could have no expectation of privacy which
the law would recognize as legitimate. See Rakas v. Illinois, supra;
People v. Pearson, supra. On the other hand, if the Oldsmobile had not
been stolen or if the defendant reasonably believed that it had not been
stolen, and if the defendant reasonably believed that he had a right to use
the vehicle, he would have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehi-
cle. See People v. Pearson, supra; see also United States v. Ochs, 595
F.2d 1247 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Lopez, 474 F. Supp. 943
(C.D, Cal. 1979).

The trial court did not make the factual findings necessary to de-
termine whether the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the Oldsmobile at the time of the search. The evidence in the record is
conflicting on this point. The defendant’s affidavit says that the vehicle
had been provided to him for his personal use in December 1978 and that
he used the vehicle at all times under the belief that it was not stolen.
However, the record also contains evidence that the temporary license
plate on the rear window of the Oldsmobile did not correspond to the de-
scription of the vehicle; that it had been removed from the vehicle for
which it was issued without the owner’s consent; and that there was no
registration in the vehicle when the search was conducted. This circum-
stantial evidence casts doubt on the accuracy of the defendant’s affidavit.
The relevant factual determinations with respect to whether the defendant
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle should be made by
the trial court after a further hearing.®
Then that court will be able to determine whether the defendant’s consti-
tutional rights were violated, based on the standards discussed in this opin-
ion.

We reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand this case for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUSTICE ERICKSON and JUSTICE QUINN dissent.

JUSTICE QUINN dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.

® The recent developments in the law which have been discussed in this opinion make it appropri-
ate that a further hearing be held to give the parties an opportunity to present additional evidence
relevant to the correct legal standards.

a 441

The charges of aggravated motor vehicle theft, section 18-4-409,
C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), and theft by receiving, section 18-4-410,
C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), are clearly possessory in nature, requir-
ing as an essential element the possession of the motor vehicle. The de-
fendant filed a motion to suppress a temporary motor vehicle license plate
seized by police officers from inside the vehicle in the course of a warrant-
less search. Several hours before the search the officers observed the vehi-
cle unoccupied and parked in a parking lot at Mile-Hi Stadium in Denver.
They determined that the vehicle was stolen and proceeded to disable it by
releasing the hood latch and pulling spark-plug wires from the engine.
They closely watched the vehicle for several hours. The defendant, who
was attending a hockey game in the vicinity, eventually returned to the ve-
hicle and entered it. He was immediately placed under arrest. The officers
then searched the vehicle and seized the challenged evidence from the
back-seat area.

In ruling on the defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial court con-
cluded initially that the defendant had standing on the basis of the posses-
sory nature of the offenses. The district attorney requested a continuance
of the hearing in order to provide additional legal authorities to the court.
The court expressed its concern over the issue of standing and accommo-
dated the district attorney. During the course of further legal argument
the defendant offered into evidence an affidavit stating that he came into
possession of the vehicle in December 1978, three months before the
search, and at no time did he know that it was stolen. The affidavit was
admitted without objection. After extensive arguments the court again
ruled that the defendant had standing. The court granted the motion to
suppress on the ground that the officers had disabled the vehicle and had
it under their close observation for three hours and, accordingly, a search
warrant was constitutionally required under these circumstances. See e.g.,
People v. Bannister, 199 Colo. 281, 607 P.2d 987 (1980). The People
contest only the court’s ruling on standing.

I dissent from the majority for two reasons: (1) the majority, in ad-
hering to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980), unduly
expands the prosecution’s right to use the defendant’s suppression testi-
mony for impeachment at trial in the event the defendant exercises his
constitutional right to testify in his own defense; and (2) the failure to ac-
cord the defendant automatic standing in this case, which involves posses-
sory offenses, undercuts constitutional protections previously existing un-
der Article II, Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution.

1

The majority properly adheres to the holding of United States v.
Salvucci, supra, as it must, in rejecting automatic standing as part of
Fourth Amendment doctrine. However, the majority states that the

42 es

defendant’s ability to establish standing at the cost of furnishing self-
incriminating evidence by testifying at the suppression hearing has been
eliminated by the holding of Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,
88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). I disagree.

Simmons’ holding that the defendant’s suppression testimony may
not be admitted against the defendant at trial as evidence of guilt does not
afford complete protection against the self-incrimination dilemma, be-
cause Simmons does not expressly address the issue of impeachment-use
of such testimony. Even Salvucci, in rejecting the automatic standing rule
in possessory crimes, recognizes that impeachment-use at trial of an ac-
cused’s suppression testimony is still an open question that “more aptly re-
lates to the proper breadth of the Simmons privilege . . . .” Thus, unless
Simmons is extended to protect an accused’s suppression testimony from
impeachment-use at trial, the accused is confronted with the Hobson’s
choice of waiving his privilege against self-incrimination in order to assert
a Fourth Amendment claim. The majority declines to address this issue.

The doctrinal trend evidenced in recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court authorizing the impeachment-use of evidence illegally ob-
tained by law enforcement officers in violation of the accused’s constitu-
tional rights is not dispositive of this issue. See United States v. Havens,
446 US. 620, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980); Oregon v. Hass,
420 US. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971); Walder v.
United States, 347 US. 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954). These
cases do not deal with testimonial evidence offered by the defendant in
furtherance of a basic constitutional right. Simmons accorded such evi-
dence great deference and regarded it “as an integral part of his Fourth
Amendment exclusion claim”:

“It seems obvious that a defendant who knows that his testimony may be
admissible against him at trial will sometimes be deterred from presenting
the testimonial proof necessary to assert a Fourth Amendment claim. The
likelihood of inhibition is greatest when the testimony is known to be ad-
missible regardless of the outcome of the motion to suppress... .
Since search-and-seizure claims depend heavily upon their individual
facts, and since the law of search and seizure is in a state of flux, the inci-
dence of such marginal cases cannot be said to be negligible. In such cir-
cumstances, a defendant with a substantial claim for the exclusion of evi-
dence may conclude that the admission of the evidence, together with the
Government’s proof linking it to him, is preferable to risking the admission
of his own testimony connecting himself with the seized evidence.”

“In these circumstances, we find it intolerable that one constitutional right
should have to be surrendered in order to assert another. We therefore
hold that when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress

443

evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter
be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no
objection.” 390 USS. at 392-94, 88.S.Ct. at 975-76, 19 L.Ed.2d at 1258-
59.

While I agree with the principle that the defendant’s right to assert a
Fourth Amendment violation does not include the right to commit perjury,
e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1
(1971), the imposition of a sanction in the form of unconditional use of
such testimony for impeachment purposes at trial can have no effect other
than the discouragement of legitimate assertions of constitutional claims.
The interest of the state in deterring perjury and the interest of the de-
fendant in asserting his Fourth Amendment claim can be accommodated
by requiring the prosecution, as a condition precedent to trial-use of the
defendant’s suppression testimony, to establish to the satisfaction of the
trial court that: (1) the defendant gave a statement at the suppression
hearing that is contrary to a matter about which he testified at trial; (2)
the statement is material to the issues of the case; and (3) either the state-
ment at the suppression hearing or the testimony at trial is false. This
showing by the prosecution should be made in camera before there is any
reference to the defendant’s prior testimony in front of the jury. The pros-
ecution, in other words, should not be permitted to engage in a far ranging
cross-examination before the jury in an effort to import secondary and ter-
tiary issues into the case and thereby create a foundation for impeach-
ment-use of the defendant’s suppression testimony. See Agnello v. United
States, 269 US. 20, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145 (1925).

Unless such restrictions are imposed on the use at trial of defendant’s
suppression testimony, his exercise of constitutional rights is skewed on
two counts. First, his assertion of a Fourth Amendment claim will require
him to risk furnishing evidence to the government for virtually unres-
tricted impeachment-use against him at trial and to that extent will en-
cumber his constitutional right to testify in his own defense. Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Brooks
v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 92 S.Ct. 1891, 32 L-Ed.2d 358 (1972);
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 81 S.Ct. 756, 5 L.Ed.2d 783 (1961).
Second, his election to keep open an unimpaired option to testify in his
own defense at trial will incline him to forego a full and effective assertion
of Fourth Amendment rights. Simmons v. United States, supra. In ei-
ther instance, it is the prospect of unrestricted governmental use for im-
peachment purposes of the defendant’s suppression testimony that chills
the exercise of basic constitutional rights by penalizing the exercise of
them. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20
L.Ed.2d 138 (1968); Simmons v. United States, supra; Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965); see
also C. Whitebread, Criminal Procedure, § 15.06(c) at 319-20 (1980).

444 ee

Il.

The majority scuttles the automatic standing rule in possessory offen-
ses as part of Colorado constitutional doctrine on the ground that the vice
of governmental self-contradiction has been resolved by Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). The elimina-
tion of governmental self-contradiction, however, is but a secondary conse-
quence of the United States Supreme Court’s holdings in Salvucci and
Rakas. The primary effect of those holdings is the diminution of privacy
and property rights previously available to a person aggrieved by an un-
lawful search and seizure. The diminution inevitably flows from the rejec-
tion of the automatic standing rule for possessory offenses, and the adop-
tion of Rakas’ legitimate-expectancy-of-privacy test as the criterion for
standing in those cases. The majority’s holding thus programs the develop-
ment of state constitutional doctrine under Article II, Section 7, of the
Colorado Constitution to the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of the
United States Supreme Court. With this I disagree.

In Rakas, the issue was whether an automobile passenger, who did
not assert either a proprietary or possessory interest in the automobile or
in the property seized therefrom, nevertheless could claim entitlement to
Fourth Amendment protection as one “legitimately on the premises” un-
der the automatic standing rule of Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257,
80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). In denying entitlement to the passen-
ger, Rakas extracted from Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct.
507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), a partial description of the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection and converted that extraction into a formula of
limitation. Rakas read Katz to hold that “capacity to claim the protection
of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property right in the in-
vaded place but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the
Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.”
439 US. at 143, 99 S.Ct. at 430, 58 L.Ed.2d at 401.

Privacy interests always have been central to Fourth Amendment jur-
isprudence. See Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and
Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 945 (1977). Katz, however, clearly rec-
ognized that Fourth Amendment protections are not necessarily co-
extensive with privacy interest. The teaching of Katz is that the Fourth
Amendment “protects individual privacy against certain kinds of govern-
mental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing
to do with privacy at all.” 389 U.S. at 350, 88 S.Ct. at 510, 19 L.Ed.2d
at 581 (emphasis added). This was also the teaching of Jones, namely,
that the Fourth Amendment was designed as a “protection against official
invasion of privacy and the security of property.” 362 US. at 261, 80
S.Ct. at 731, 4 L.Ed.2d at 702 (emphasis added).

es 445

To say, as the Court did in Rakas, that in all cases entitlement to
Fourth Amendment protection requires a threshold demonstration of a le-
gitimate expectation of privacy is to misunderstand the teaching of Katz.
The Fourth Amendment consistently has accorded protection to certain
property interests — houses, papers and effects — and, in addition, has
offered protection against governmental intrusions into privacy interests
emanating, not from property, but from personhood. These personal pri-
vacy interests exist independently of any property interest and, therefore,
well might require a threshold showing of legitimate expectation. In fact,
Charles Katz’ use of a public telephone booth to transmit words to another
represents a prime example of a privacy interest existing independently of
traditional categories of Fourth Amendment property interests. Katz v.
United States, 389 US. at 352, 88 S.Ct. at 511-12, 19 L.Ed.2d 582. In
many cases, however, the interest of an accused in a house, an automobile,
a document or a personal effect has its source in the fact that it is his or
hers — that is, it originates in the accused’s possessory or proprietary in-
terest in the property seized. The automatic standing rule helps to insulate
these interests against unjustified governmental intrusions, not against le-
gitimate intrusions.

Although ostensibly attributing diminishing importance to property
considerations in its analysis of Fourth Amendment issues, the United
States Supreme Court after Rakas has utilized, as it must, those very
property considerations in making the initial determination whether an ac-
cused’s expectation of privacy in the property seized was legitimate. See
United States v. Salvucci, supra; Rawlings v. Commonwealth, 448
US. 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633, (1980). This phenomenon of cir-
cularity is inevitable because privacy interest, while admittedly of greater
depth and breadth than property interest, cannot be severed totally from
property considerations without turning the Fourth Amendment topsy-
turvy.

Just as the abandonment of the “legitimately on the premises” rule of
Jones was a declaration of “open season” on automobiles, insofar as pas-
sengers are concerned, Rakas v. Illinois, supra (White, J., dissenting),
so also the abandonment of the automatic standing rule in this case signals
an “open season” on other forms of personal property that might be inno-
cently possessed by an unknowing defendant. We now require a defendant
charged with a possessory offense to establish a reasonable doubt with re-
spect to his guilt before he even can claim entitlement to the protections of
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II,
Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution. The majority formulates the fol-
lowing directions to the trial court upon remand:

“If the Oldsmobile had been stolen, and the defendant knew that it had
been stolen, the defendant could have no expectation of privacy which the
law would recognize as legitimate. See Rakas v. Illinois, supra; People

446 es

y. Pearson, supra. On the other hand, if the Oldsmobile had not been stolen
or if the defendant reasonably believed that it had not been stolen, and if
the defendant reasonably believed that he had a right to use the vehicle, he
would have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle.”

The logical progression of this approach leads inevitably to a per se rule
that one may never claim as legitimate an expectation of privacy in any
property the possession of which is prohibited, or in property which might
be material evidence in a criminal proceeding.

Ill.

I believe that Article II, Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution con-
templates greater protection for privacy interests than is presently avail-
able under Fourth Amendment doctrine. We have recognized on other oc-
casions that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, while
entitled to respectful consideration, are not controlling on the issue of con-
stitutional protections emanating from identical or similar provisions in
the Colorado Constitution. Charnes v. Digiacomo, 200 Colo. 94, 612
P.2d 1117 (1980); Denver v. Nielson, 194 Colo. 407, 572 P.2d 484
(1977); People v. Hoinville, 191 Colo. 357, 553 P.2d 777 (1976); People
vy. District Court, 165 Colo. 253, 439 P.2d 741 (1968); see also, Bren-
nan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional
Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 Va. L. Rev. 873 (1976);
Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the
State Constitution, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 297 (1977).

I would adhere to the automatic standing rule and continue it as part
of state constitutional doctrine. The rule affords salutary protection to pri-
vacy interests by allowing an accused to assert his rights under Article II,
Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution without unduly burdening his
right to testify in his own defense at trial. The state’s interest in deterring
perjury can be effected by allowing impeachment-use of the accused’s sup-
pression testimony upon a demonstration that the defendant testified
falsely on a material fact either at the suppression hearing or at trial.

The automatic standing rule broadens the range of constitutional pro-
tection attaching to both the privacy interests of the accused and those of
society at large by removing inducements to illegitimate governmental in-
cursions into those interests. Accommodation of the conflicting societal
and personal interests in criminal proceedings by limitation of the right of
privacy does not produce an incremental benefit to society when that ac-
commodation is itself an erosion of the constitutional principle to be pro-
tected. If the rights of the accused end with those designed to preserve the
reliability of the trial process and to prevent conviction of the innocent, it
is difficult to imagine the purpose of the protection afforded under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II,
Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution. See Shrock & Welsh, Up From

447

Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 Minn.
L. Rev. 251 (1974).

I would affirm the ruling of the trial court.

Iam authorized to say that Justice Erickson joins me in this dissent.

JUSTICE ERICKSON dissenting:

I join Justice Quinn in his dissent.

The exclusionary rule was made applicable to the states in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 US. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). The exclu-
sionary rule was created to serve two purposes: (1) the factual basis is to
deter police misconduct; and (2) the normative function is to avoid the evil
of the judiciary sanctioning illegal police conduct. Experience has estab-
lished that the exclusionary rule has not fully met either of its intended
purposes. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 667 (1970).

I strongly favor an alternative to the exclusionary rule to prevent ille-
gal police conduct,’ and believe that the focus of any trial should be on
the guilt or innocence of the accused. The narrowing of Fourth Amend-
ment rights by the sophisticated legal vehicle of standing was as much a
creature of the Supreme Court of the United States as the exclusionary
tule itself. The Supreme Court of the United States, by limiting an ag-
grieved person from asserting that police conduct violated rights of pri-
vacy, denies Fourth Amendment protections on an’ overly technical prop-
erty law concept. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct.
2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100
S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980).

In my view, we should not accept Salvucci and Rawlings as a sound
approach for interpreting the Colorado Constitution. The constitutional
rights guaranteed by the Colo. Const., art. IT, § 7, should be protected.
Until a better means is proposed, I am not willing to see the constitutional
tights of Colorado citizens sacrificed under the guise of lack of standing.
The purposes for the exclusionary rule are dissipated and ignored by the

1 “The Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force suggested that the exclusionary rule be at least
modified and favored alternative methods as deterrents to illegal police activity. The Pound
Conference Follow-Up Task Force, 74 F.R.D. 159 (1976). Erickson, The Pound Conference
Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76
F.RD. 277 (1978); Erickson, New Directions in the Administration of Justice: Responses to
The Pound Conference, 64 A.B.A.J. 48 (Jan. 1978); and Bell, Responses of the Justice
Department, 48 AB.A.J. 53 (1978) highlight many of the recommendations made by the Follow-
Up Task Force and point to many decisions that question the efficacy and wisdom of excluding re-
liable evidence, See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 US. 98 (1977); United States v. Janis, 428
USS. 433 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The Task Force has called for increased
efforts to develop ways to protect constitutional rights, while at the same time allowing trial courts
to focus on their proper subject — the guilt or innocence of the accused. See Wilkey, The
Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence? 62 Judicature 214 (1978).” Erickson,
Pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court Relating to the Criminal Law Field
1978-1979, 5 Nat'l. J. Crim. Defense 1, 7 (Spring 1979).

448 es

elimination of the automatic standing rights formerly guaranteed by
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697
(1960).

Accordingly, I join Justice Quinn in the dissent.

No. 79SC391

Ronald H. Lancaster v. The People of the State of Colorado
(615 P.2d 720)

Decided August 25, 1980.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Lee Belstock, Special
Deputy, for petitioner.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Edward G. Donovan, Solicitor General, Kathleen M. Bowers, Assistant
Attorney General, for respondent.

En Bane.

JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals in
People v. Lancaster, 43 Colo. App. 328, 605 P.2d 67 (1979), affirming
the petitioner’s conviction for sexual assault on a child, section 18-3-405,
C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). We affirm the judgment of the court of

450 ee

appeals.

The charge in this case arose out of an incident occurring on Septem-
ber 3, 1977, and involving the petitioner-defendant (defendant), a victim
who was not quite three years old, and the victim’s seven-year-old brother.
The evidence at the trial established that the defendant, who was an adult-
friend of the victim’s mother, asked the mother’s permission to take the
children to the grocery store. The mother consented and the defendant left
with the children at approximately 7:15 p.m. He took the children to his
apartment in a rooming house and told the seven year old boy to play out-
side. The defendant then accompanied the infant girl to his room.

At approximately 7:30 p.m. the defendant’s landlady noticed the boy
playing on the porch of the house. She went to the defendant’s room and
knocked on the door. After a delay the defendant opened the door and the
landlady observed the young girl on the defendant’s bed. She was un-
clothed from the waist down but appeared unharmed. The defendant told
the landlady that the girl was in his room because she had to go to the
bathroom, which was located across the hall from the defendant’s room.
The landlady called the police and the defendant left the premises.

Upon their arrival the police found the child on the bed wearing a
white blouse, shoes and socks. They took the child and her brother to their
mother’s home, arriving there about 7:45 p.m. Shortly after arriving home
the girl said to her mother, “Ron hurt my pee-pee, Momma.” The girl was
taken to a hospital for examination and a hair was removed from her vagi-
nal area. According to expert testimony elicited at trial, this hair matched,
within a high degree of probability, pubic hairs taken from the defendant.

Upon his arrest the defendant waived his Miranda rights and, upon
being told by the interrogating officer what the girl said to her mother, he
responded that “she is‘only a baby and if . . . she said it, she was proba-
bly telling the truth.” This testimony was admitted at trial without objec-
tion by the defendant and its admission is not questioned on this appeal.

The defendant contests two rulings made by the court during the
trial. The court permitted the victim’s mother to testify, over the defend-
ant’s hearsay objection, to the statement made to her by her young daugh-
ter after she was brought home by the police. The basis of the court’s rul-
ing was that the girl’s statement was within the res gestae exception to
hearsay. Also, the court determined that the victim’s seven-year-old
brother was competent, and permitted the boy to testify about the defend-
ant instructing him to play outside while his young sister was taken into
the apartment.

J. THE RES GESTAE EXCEPTION

The defendant claims that the res gestae exception was improperly
invoked in this case for three reasons: (1) the declarant’s age of 2 years,
10 months, rendered her incompetent as a witness under section 13-90-
106, C.R.S. 1973; (2) the one-half-hour interval between the act and the

es 451

hearsay assertion defeated the spontaneity requirement of the exception;
and (3) the application of the exception in this case violated the defend-
ant’s constitutional right of confrontation, U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Colo.
Const. Art. II, Sec. 16.

A.

The res gestae or excited utterance exception applies to state-

ments relating to a startling act or event made spontaneously and without
reflection while the declarant was under the stress of excitement, and of-
fered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.1 E.g., Dolan v. People,
168 Colo. 19, 449 P.2d 828 (1969); Fitzpatrick v. People, 159 Colo. 485,
412 P.2d 893 (1966); Abeyta v. Denver, 132 Colo. 472, 289 P.2d 918
(1955); Martinez v. People, 55 Colo. 51, 132 P. 64 (1913); Denver City
Tramway Co. v. Brumley, 51 Colo. 251, 116 P. 1051 (1911); Graves v.
People, 18 Colo. 170, 32 P. 63 (1893); see also VI J. Wigmore,
Evidence § 1750 at 202 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976); C. McCormick,
Evidence § 297 at 704 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972). Wigmore points up the
basis in trustworthiness for the exception:
“Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domi-
nation of the senses, and during the brief period when considerations of
self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflec-
tion, the utterance may be taken as particularly trustworthy (or at least as
lacking the usual grounds of untrustworthiness), and thus as expressing
the real tenor of the speakers’ belief as to the facts just observed by him;
and may therefore be received as testimony of those facts.” VI J.
Wigmore, supra § 1747 at p. 195.

Although there is no Colorado case called to our attention which spe-
cifically addresses the question whether a declarant’s testimonial incapac-
ity due to age vitiates the admission of that declarant’s assertion under the
res gestae exception, there is an abundance of authority from other juris-
dictions extending the exception to assertions by children of tender years.
E.g., State v. Evans, 104 Ariz. 434, 454 P.2d 976 (1969) (five-year-old

1 Commonly included within the res gestae category are words or utterances which are not hear-
say at all because they are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Examples include
words which have independent legal significance, such as contractual terms, or a slander; words ac-
companying and explanatory of an act, traditionally referred to as a verbal act; and words used
circumstantially as evidence of an inferred fact, such as words of notification to prove notice. See

VI J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1746 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976); C. McCormick, Evidence }

*§-288 ‘at 686 (2nd ed. E. Cleary, 1972).

The statement at issue in this case, however, was clearly assertive and was offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted — i.e., that the defendant sexually assaulted the declarant. This type
of statement is categorized under res gestae as a spontaneous declaration or an excited utterance.
VI J. Wigmore, supra at § 1747; C. McCormick, supra at § 297.

C.R.E. 803(1) and 803(2) define a spontaneous sense impression and an excited utterance. These
rules, however, do not apply to this case because they were not in effect at the time of the defend-
ant’s trial. Our resolution of the evidential issue raised here is based on the law of evidence prior
to the adoption of the Colorado Rules of Evidence.

452 ee

declarant); State v. Boodry, 96 Ariz. 259, 394 P.2d 196 (1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 949, 85 S.Ct. 448, 13 L.Ed.2d 546 (1964) (five-year-old
declarant); Soto v. Territory, 12 Ariz. 36, 94 P. 1104 (1908) (four-year-
old declarant); Territory v. Kinoshita, 38 Haw. 335 (1949) (four-and-
one-half-year-old declarant); Logsdon v. Commonwealth, 215 Ky. 707,
286 S.W. 1067 (1926) (three-year-old declarant); State v. Gorman, 229
Minn. 524, 40 N.W.2d 347 (1949) (four-year-old declarant); Ball v.
Gessner, 185 Minn. 105, 240 N.W. 100 (1931) (three-year-old declar-
ant); State v. Simmons, 52 N.J. 538, 247 A.2d 313 (1968), cert. denied,
395 US. 924, 89 S.Ct. 1779, 23 L.Ed.2d 241 (1969) (sixteen-year-old
deaf-mute declarant with intellectual age of less than seven years); State
v. Godwin, 51 N.M. 65, 178 P.2d 584 (1947) (three-year-old declarant);
New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Co. v. Kovatch, 120 Ohio
St. 532, 166 N.E. 682 (1929) (declarant was an unidentified little girl at a
railroad accident); State v. Hutchison, 222 Or. 533, 353 P.2d 1047
(1960) (five-year-old declarant); Powell v. Gallivan, 44 R.I. 453, 118 A.
769 (1922) (two-year-old declarant); Kenney vy. State, 79 S.W. 817 (Tex.
Crim. 1903) (three-and-one-half-year-old declarant); Watkins v. State,
78 Tex. Crim. 65, 180 S.W. 116 (1915) (four-year-old declarant).

We find these cases persuasive and reject the defendant’s claim
that the testimonial incapacity of the declarant due to her age renders her
hearsay assertion inadmissible. The requirement of spontaneity and excite-
ment subsumed by the res gestae exception furnishes a sufficient guaran-
tee of trustworthiness implicit in the rationale of hearsay exceptions. See
generally, Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1368 (1962) (declarant’s age as affecting
admissibility under res gestae); Annot., 157 A.L.R. 1359 (1945) (admis-
sibility of hearsay declaration as affected by declarant’s incompetency be-
cause of age or other reason); VI J. Wigmore, supra at § 1751(c); C.
McCormick, supra at § 297; 2 C. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal
Evidence § 297 (13th ed. 1972).

B.

I Similarly, the fact that the hearsay assertion by the young girl
was made neither contemporaneously with the event nor immediately
thereafter does not preclude its admissibility. While we have alluded to the
importance of the temporal proximity of the statement to the event in a
number of cases, e.g., Gushurst v. Benham, 160 Colo. 428, 417 P.2d 777
(1966); Balltrip v. People, 157 Colo. 108, 401 P.2d 259 (1965), we also
have noted that contemporaneity of the act and the assertion is not re-
quired. E.g., Abeyta v. Denver, 132 Colo. 472, 289 P.2d 918 (1955);
Denver City Tramway v. Brumley, 51 Colo. 251, 116 P. 1051 (1911);
New York and Colorado M.S. & Co. v. Rogers, 11 Colo. 6, 16 P. 719
(1887).

HB What is of critical significance to res gestae is the spontaneous
character of the statement and its natural effusion from a state of

eS 453

excitement. “[T]his state of excitement may well continue to exist after
the exciting fact has ended. The declaration, therefore, may be admissible
even though subsequent to the occurence, provided it is near enough in
time to allow the assumption that the exciting influence continued.”
VI J. Wigmore, supra, § 1756 at 231.

Considerable latitude in temporal proximity is particularly evi-
dent in cases involving assertions by very young children after a stressful
experience. E.g. State v. Boodry, supra (one-half-hour interval); Soto v.
Territory, supra (one-and-one-half-hour interval); Territory vy.
Kinoshita, supra (two-and-one-half-hour interval); Logsdon vy.
Commonwealth, supra (statement by child upon returning home); State
y. Godwin, supra (one-half-hour interval); Watkins v. State, supra
(one-half-hour interval). This latitude is a recognition of the fact that chil-
dren of tender years are generally not adept at reasoned reflection and at
concoction of false stories under such circumstances. Contrary to defend-
ant’s assertion, the time interval of one-half-hour between the alleged as-
sault and the hearsay declaration does not constitute an impediment to the
admissibility of the statement.?

con

Hs The defendant asserts that the application of the res gestae ex-

ception in this case violated his confrontation rights. The United States
Supreme Court recently set forth the dual predicates necessary to satisfy
constitutional confrontation:
“[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial,
the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavaila-
ble. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indi-
cia of reliability.’ Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where
the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed. 597 (1980).

The declarant in this case was unavailable as a witness due to her age.
Section 13-90-106, C.R.S. 1973; see generally Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408
US. 204, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972). And the requirement of
spontaneity underlying the res gestae exception provides an adequate

2 The foundation for the admission of the res gestae statement or excited utterance was less than
ideal in this case. However, the defendant made no objection to the sufficiency of the foundation
and does not question it here. His trial objections were that the res gestae exception does not ap-
ply to the contested assertion because of the declarant’s age and the time interval between the al-
leged assault and the assertion, and because of the unavailability of the declarant for cross~
examination. We note in passing that the proponent of evidence carries the burden of establishing

preliminary facts essential to satisfy a particular hearsay-exception. See, e.g., People v. Marlott,

191 Colo. 304, 552 P.2d 491 (1976); Bugarin v. People, 181 Colo. 62, 507 P.2d 875 (1973);
Gushurst v. Benham, supra; Balltripp v. People, supra; Carney v. Pennsylvania Railroad
Co., 428: Pa.’.489, 240 A.2d 71 (1968); Parking, Inc. v. Dalrymple, 375 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Ct-
App. (1964); see also I J. Wigmore, Evidence § 18 at 347 (3d ed. ‘1940); Ladd, Objections, Mo-
tions and Foundation Testimony, 43 Cornell L.Q. 543 (1958).

454 ee
proxy for the truth-exacting sanction of an oath. See, e.g., Ohio v.
Roberts, supra; Mancusi v. Stubbs, supra; Dutton vy. Evans, 400 U.S.
74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970); California v. Green, 399 US.
149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970); Mattox v. United States,
146 U.S. 140, 13 S.Ct. 50, 36 L.Ed. 917 (1892). Under these circum-
stances we conclude that the admission of the hearsay assertion under the
res gestae exception did not violate the confrontation rights of the defend-
ant.
Il. THE COMPETENCY OF THE WITNESS

I The defendant asserts that the trial court erred in permitting the
seven-year-old brother of the victim to testify because the boy was “inca-
pable of receiving just impressions of the facts”, and was therefore incom-
petent under section 13-90-106, C.R.S. 1973. We disagree.

The court conducted an in camera hearing and questioned the wit-
ness about his understanding of the obligation to testify truthfully and his
observations about the incident on September 3, 1977, and expressly de-
termined that he was a competent witness. Although there was some con-
fusion on the part of the witness as to the date of the incident, that confu-
sion, by itself, does not add up to incompetency under the record of this
case. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination of
the witness’ competency. E.g., Marn v. People, 175 Colo. 242, 486 P.2d
424 (1971); Jordan v. People, 161 Colo. 54, 419 P.2d 656 (1966); Hood
v. People, 130 Colo. 531, 277 P.2d 223 (1954); Wesner v. People, 126
Colo. 400, 250 P.2d 124 (1952).

The judgment is affirmed.

No. 80SA22

Michael Motors, Inc., vy. Colorado Dealer Licensing Board,
State of Colorado

(616 P.2d 110)

Decided September 2, 1980. Rehearing denied September 29, 1980.

456 |

David Pehr, William Pehr, for plaintiff-appellant.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Billy Shuman, Special Assistant
Attorney General, for defendant-appellee.

En Banc.

CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appellant automobile dealer seeks reversal of the trial court’s af-
firmance of the Colorado Dealer Licensing Board’s (Board) order sus-
pending its license for 17 days. Several constitutional challenges are raised
with regard to the Automobile Dealers Act, sections 12-6-101 to 12-6-124,
C.R.S. 1973. Appellant also asserts that the Board’s findings, conclusion
and order are improper and not supported by the evidence. We reject these
challenges and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The suspension of the appellant’s license was based upon the “inten-
tional failure to perform any written agreement with any retail buyer.”
Section 12-6-118(3)(f), C.R.S. 1973. The record reveals that in late 1978,
a prospective buyer came to the premises of appellant, Michael Motors,
Inc., pursuant to a sales advertisement. He was greeted by a Mr. Den-
holm, a salesman, who was alone on the premises, except for several me-
chanics. Mr. Denholm informed the prospective buyer that the advertised
vehicle had been sold, and then proceeded to show him other vehicles: for
sale. The buyer became interested in a pickup truck and inquired as to the
price. Mr. Denholm informed him that the asking price was $1,095. The
two men began to negotiate, and finally Mr. Denholm lowered the pur-
chase price to $750.

a 431

The buyer then agreed to purchase the truck at this price, and the two
men signed a written agreement for the sale of this vehicle. The buyer
gave Mr. Denholm a $95.75 deposit and since it was a Saturday, he
agreed to return the following week after obtaining the balance of the pur-
chase price from his bank account. The agreement included a line for the
buyer’s signature and a line for the “MANAGER’S SIGNATURE.” Mr.
Denholm signed the agreement in the latter location. Below the “MAN-
AGER’S SIGNATURE” line it stated “THIS ORDER MUST BE
SIGNED BY AN OFFICIAL OF THE COMPANY.”

There is a dispute whether Mr. Denholm did or did not inform the
buyer that the agreement was subject to approval of a person other than
himself. As to this, the Board found that Mr. Denholm acted as “manager
and agent” of the appellant, thereby creating a “written agreement” with
a retail buyer. Since there is substantial evidence in the record to support
this finding, it will not be rejected on appeal.

The buyer returned to the appellant’s place of business the following
week to consummate the sale. Although he understood that he had a writ-
ten agreement, he was informed by the president that the deal would not
be completed unless the purchase price was increased. The buyer was in-
formed that the caveat on the agreement required approval of the presi-
dent of Michael Motors, Inc.; that there was no “manager”; and that only
the president approved all agreements. The evidence presented revealed
that on the day of this particular agreement, the president was out of
town.

The buyer complained to the licensing authority, and the proceedings
before the Board were commenced. Following a hearing, it was deter-
mined that the plaintiff’s license should be suspended for 17 days as a re-
sult of its refusal to honor the agreement. The appellant then commenced
an action in the trial court challenging the suspension. The district court
affirmed the Board’s order. ;

I The appellant makes two contentions regarding the action of the
Board. First, he argues that the evidence does not support the findings of
the Board. We disagree. A complete review of the record indicates that
there was substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support the
findings of the Board. Although Mr. Denholm may not have had actual
authority to bind the appellant to the written agreement in this case, under
the facts and circumstances as shown in this record,.the doctrine of appar-
ent authority is clearly applicable. See Bowser v. Union Bag Co., Inc.,
112 Colo. 373, 149 P.2d 800 (1944); White v. Brock, 41 Colo. App. 156,
584 P.2d 1224 (1978); Russell v. First American Mortgage Co., 39
Colo. App. 360, 565 P.2d 972 (1977); Zambruk v. Perlmutter 3rd
Generation Builders, Inc., 32 Colo. App. 276, 510 P.2d 472 (1973).

Second, the appellant argues that the requisite intent under sec-
tion 12-16-118(3)(£) was not demonstrated because the president refused

458 ee

to honor the written agreement under the assumption that it was not a
valid contract. One of the grounds for suspension of a motor vehicle
dealer’s license under this statutory provision is “intentional failure to per-
form any written agreement with any retail buyer.” Appellant claims that
the intent under the statute is a specific intent which is negated by his as-
sumption that the agreement was not an enforceable contract. We note
that the question regarding the contractual nature of the agreement is a
question of law, and it is axiomatic that a mistake of law is no defense to
the culpability of a person’s actions. See Kirkendoll v. People, 138 Colo.
267, 331 P.2d 809 (1958). It is therefore clear that even if the president
was mistaken as to the enforceability of the written agreement, the Board
correctly determined that the appellant, acting through its president, in-
tentionally failed to perform the agreement.

This brings us to the appellant’s constitutional challenges to the
Automobile Dealers Act. (Sections 12-6-101 to 124, C.R.S. 1973). The
challenges can be categorized into two basic areas. The first challenge fo-
cuses upon appellant’s assumption that the written agreement must be a
valid and enforceable contract before the Board can impose a sanction. On
this premise, it is asserted that the appellant is deprived of its opportunity
to litigate the contractual nature of the agreement in a court of law,
thereby violating its right to due process and equal protection. Also, the
appellant claims that an issue of law is therefore being resolved by an
agency of the executive branch of government in violation of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine.

The appellant’s position is untenable because the assumption is not
supported by the language of section 12-6-118(3)(f). Had the legislature
contemplated that the statute apply only to valid and enforceable con-
tracts, it would have so stated. However, it chose to authorize sanctions for
the refusal to honor “any written agreement with any retail buyer.” (Em-
phasis added.) The enforceability of an agreement need not be found by
the Board before it may impose a sanction for violation of the statute.

Appellant’s next constitutional challenge relates to the vague-
ness and overbreadth of section 12-6-118(3)(f). First, we find the applica-
tion of the statute with regard to the refusal to honor any written agree-
ment with a retail buyer is not overbroad. Such a prohibition clearly fits
within the justifiable legislative intent of the Automobile Dealers Act to
induce “trust and confidence of the purchaser” in retail transactions, and
it does not create a chilling effect upon any constitutionally protected right
of an automobile dealer. Nor is the statute unconstitutionally vague. The
burden to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in cases such as
this is great. See Beathune v. Colorado Dealer Licensing Board, 198
Colo. 483, 601 P.2d 1386 (1979). The appellant has failed to overcome
this presumption. We find that this subsection is sufficiently clear to place
automobile dealers on notice as to what is prohibited and to allow the

459

uniform enforcement of this provision by the Board.
Judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE LEE does not participate.

No. 79SA517

Betty L. Cesario, Earnest E. Clemons, Donald H. Goede, Alden L.
Marvel, A.W. Mullan, Jr.,.and Lawrence Strom, Jr., vy. The City of
Colorado Springs, a municipal corporation, The City Council of the City
of Colorado Springs, and as members of The City Council of Colorado
Springs, Robert Isaac, Thomas I. Anderson, Michael C. Bird, Leon
Young, Peter M. Susemihl, Katherine N. Loo, George James, Margaret
Vasquez and Mary Kyer and State of Colorado

(616 P.2d 113)

Decided September 2, 1980. Rehearing denied September 24, 1980.

460

Cleveland, Wengler & Robbins, P.C., Edward D. Cleveland, Frank
E. Robbins, for plaintiffs-appellees and cross-appellants.

Gorden D. Hinds, City Attorney, M. Allen Ziegler, Jr., Deputy, for
defendants-appellants and cross-appellees.

J.D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, William Morris, Assistant Attorney
General, for Intervenor.

Blake T. Jordan, Staff Attorney, for Colorado Municipal League,
amicus curiae.

| 461
En Banc. .

JUSTICE ERICKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal to review a proceeding to unilaterally annex prop-
erty by the City of Colorado Springs. Plaintiffs, Betty Cesario, et al., filed
suit in the district court seeking a determination that defendant, City of
Colorado Springs (City), exceeded its jurisdiction and abused its discre-
tion in annexing an area southwest of the City. The district court held that
the annexation was null and void, and ruled that any additional annex-
ation proceedings must start anew. We affirm.

On September 12, 1978, the City commenced a unilateral annexation

proceeding by adopting a resolution of intent to annex an area southwest
of the City, including portions of the Broadmoor Hotel, Inc. (Broadmoor).
Section 31-12-106(2) of the Municipal Annexation Act of 1965, as
amended (section 31-12-101, et seg., C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1977 Repl.
Vol. 12)) (Act), regulates the unilateral annexation of property which is
partially surrounded by the annexing municipality, and provides:
“Annexation of unincorporated areas which have had more than two-
thirds boundary contiguity with the annexing municipality for a period of
not less than three years. The eligibility requirements of section 31-12-104
shall not apply to annexations pursuant to this subsection (2). The gov-
erning body of any municipality may annex such area by the following
procedure: Adopt a resolution setting forth the intent of the governing
body to annex the area described in said resolution if, after notice and
hearing as provided in sections 31-12-108 and 31-12-109, the governing
body finds and determines that the proposed annexation complies with the
provisions of section 31-12-105. Such findings and determinations shall be
in writing and shall be included in the minutes of the governing body’s
meeting. The governing body, by ordinance, may approve such annex-
ation.”
Notice was given pursuant to section 31-12-108, and a public hearing was
set by the City Council for November 9, 1978 on the proposed annexation.
Attached to the notice was a legal description of the area that was to be
annexed.

At the November 9 hearing, the city engineer presented a map which
identified the proposed southwest annexation area and four other annex-
ations which had occurred during the previous three years. These recently-
annexed areas were situated between the southwest annexation area and
the City limits as they existed prior to the recent annexations. The city en-
gineer testified that, on the basis of his measurements and his method of
computation, the proposed southwest annexation area had over two-thirds

462 Ce

boundary contiguity with the City for at least three years as required by
section 31-12-106(2).

The plaintiffs appeared at the hearing in opposition to the annexation.
They contended that, as a result of a different method of computation,
there was less than the two-thirds boundary contiguity with the City for
three years. The plaintiffs also alleged that the Broadmoor had not con-
sented in writing to the annexation as required by section 31-12-105(1)(b)
of the Act. After hearing all testimony, the City Council adopted a resolu-
tion setting forth findings of fact and conclusions thereon regarding the
southwest annexation area. This resolution found that there was more
than two-thirds boundary contiguity with the City for at least three years,
and that the annexation of the southwest area was authorized. The City
Council also adopted Ordinance No. 78-219 on first presentation, annex-
ing the southwest area to the City. The district court found that the City
Council then adjourned the hearing sine die.

On November 22, 1978, the City Council, without additional notice
pursuant to the statute, amended Ordinance No. 78-219 by revising its le-
gal description to remove a portion of City-owned park land from the an-
nexation area. This action reduced the noncontiguous boundary so that,
regardless of the method of computation, a contiguous boundary in excess
of two-thirds was obtained. The amended ordinance was then passed by
the City Council on second presentation.

At a meeting on December 12, 1978, the City Council adopted Ordi-
nance No. 78-219. The effective date of the annexation was December 31,
1978.

On January 4, 1979, plaintiffs instituted this action in the district
court, seeking a determination that the City had exceeded its jurisdiction
and abused its discretion in annexing the southwest area. Plaintiffs also
sought an order to require the City to proceed with an annexation election
under section 31-12-112, a declaration that the Annexation Act is uncon-
stitutional, and a general finding that the southwest annexation was null
and void.

The district court ruled that unilateral annexation of the southwest
area by the City, purportedly accomplished by Ordinance No. 78-219, as
amended, was void, and that any additional annexation proceedings must
start anew. The court found that plaintiffs had standing to raise the issue
of Broadmoor’s consent to the southwest annexation, and further declared
that the Broadmoor had not consented to the subject annexation as re-
quired by section 31-12-105(1)(b). The court also ruled that a petition for
annexation election filéd by the plaintiffs on December 11, 1978, was
properly rejected by the City Council. The district court concluded that it
was unnecessary to rule on the constitutionality of the Annexation Act.

The City appealed to the court of appeals, seeking a reversal of the
district court’s judgment that the southwest annexation was void.

es 463

Plaintiffs cross-appealed, seeking a declaration that the petition for annex-
ation election was proper and should not have been rejected. We accepted
jurisdiction and took certiorari pursuant to C.A.R. 50. For the reason set
forth below, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I.

We first consider whether, at the hearing on November 9, 1978, the
southwest annexation area had more than two-thirds boundary contiguity
with the City of Colorado Springs for not less than three years. We hold
that it did not.

At the hearing, plaintiffs and the City disagreed over the correct
method of measuring boundary contiguity. Plaintiffs presented evidence
which demonstrated that, when the four areas annexed within the previous
three years were excluded from the measurement, the total boundary of
the southwest annexation area measured not less than 141,813.53 feet.
The portion of that measurement which had been contiguous to the City
for at least three years was 93,578.36 feet. The measurements on bound-
ary contiguity were based upon figures furnished by the city engineer’s of-
fice and were not disputed by the City. Under the plaintiffs’ method of
computation, the areas where the southwest annexation area was contigu-
ous to the four recently-annexed areas was excluded as part of the conti-
guous boundary. This computation resulted in 65.99% boundary contigu-
ity with the City for at least three years, or less than the required two-
thirds. Under cross-examination, the city engineer admitted that, using
such methods for ascertaining boundary contiguity, the southwest annex-
ation area did not have more than two-thirds boundary contiguity with the
City for three years.

The city engineer’s office measured the boundary contiguity of the
southwest annexation area by including the four recently-annexed area in
its measurement. Essentially, the City’s measurements followed the
boundaries of those four areas where they were contiguous to the City lim-
its; these measurements were included as part of the contiguous boundary
of the southwest annexation area. Under this method, the total measure-
ment of the southwest area was 141,215 feet, and 97,266 feet were conti-
guous to the City. This computation resulted in 68.88% boundary contigu-
ity — more than the two-thirds requirement of section 31-12-106(2). In
support of its method, the City asserts that, since the southwest annex-
ation area and the four recently-annexed areas are contiguous to each
other, the southwest area is contiguous to the City limits along the bound-
ary between those four areas and the City. We disagree and conclude that
the trial court was correct in adopting plaintiff's computation of boundary
contiguity.

In reaching our decision, we note that no cases have interpreted
the “unincorporated area” requirement of section 31-12-106(2) to include
any areas other than those which are the subject of the annexation

464 es

proceeding. In fact, the converse is true. The two-thirds boundary contigu-
ity requirement was applied to the “subject property” and the “parcel to
be annexed” in Board of County Comm’rs. v. City & County of
Denver, 37 Colo. App. 395, 548 P.2d 922 (1976); to the “territory pro-
posed to be annexed” in Pomponio v. City of Westminster, 178 Colo.
80, 496. P.2d 999 (1972); and to the “area to be annexed” and the “terri-
tory to be annexed” in Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 F.
Supp. 1397 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 399 US. 901, 90 S.Ct. 2197, 26 L.Ed.2d
555 (1970). For the purposes of a unilateral annexation, the plain meaning
of “unincorporated area” cannot logically include areas which are not be-
ing considered for annexation or areas which have already become part of
the annexing municipality. We conclude, therefore, that the measurements
for determining boundary contiguity under section 31-12-106(2) must be
confined solely to the perimeter of the area proposed to be annexed.

Further, section 31-12-106(2) requires that the requisite boundary
contiguity exist with the annexing municipality for a period of not less
than three years. Since it is undisputed in the record that the four re-
cently-annexed areas had not been part of the City for the requisite period
of time, plaintiffs were correct in computing portions of the southwest an-
nexation area that are contiguous with these four areas as part of the non-
contiguous boundary. Accordingly, at the November 9, 1978 hearing, the
southwest annexation area did not have the requisite boundary contiguity
for the required period of time to be eligible for a unilateral annexation.

IL.

We next address the propriety of the City’s amendment of the legal
description of the southwest annexation area at the meeting of the City
Council on November 22, 1978. At that meeting, a portion of City-owned
property was excluded from the legal description of the proposed annex-
ation area, thereby reducing the noncontiguous boundary so that the req-
uisite contiguity existed regardless of the method of computation. The
City contends that the contiguity requirements need not be established un-
til the final enactment of the annexation ordinance, and therefore, that its
amendment of the legal description after the November 9, 1978 hearing
was proper.

= In support of its position, the City argues that section 31-12-
106(2) does not require an annexing municipality to make findings and
determinations with respect to boundary contiguity at a findings hearing.
We do not so read the statute. The requirements of two-thirds boundary
contiguity for at least three years are the very basis upon which a City’s
power to initiate a unilateral annexation proceeding exists. The purpose of
notice and hearing under the Annexation Act is to give interested persons
an opportunity to be heard “upon any matter to be determined by the gov-
erning body.” Section 31-12-109. Allowing an annexing municipality to
alter a proposed annexation area by adding or subtracting areas from its

es 465

legs description at any time up to the final passage of the annexation ordi-
nance defeats the purpose of the statute.

Under voluntary annexation proceedings, the legislature had spe-
cifically provided for findings of eligibility at a hearing pursuant to sec-
tions 31-12-104 and 31-12-110. However, we conclude that the eligibility
requirements for an involuntary, unilateral annexation proceedings pur-
suant to section 31-12-106(2) are not to be given any less effect or impor-
tance by their inclusion in section 31-12-106(2) itself. The specific re-
quirements set forth in section 31-12-106(2) do not defeat the general
requirement that findings regarding an area’s eligibility for annexation
must be made at a hearing. Any other interpretation would effectively de-
stroy the only protection interested parties have in assuring that a unilat-
eral annexation is properly accomplished. We concluded, therefore, that,
in a unilateral annexation pursuant to section 31-12-106(2), the legislative
body with annexing authority must make specific findings at a hearing
that the proposed area to be annexed has had the requisite boundary con-
tiguity for the requisite period of time before such an area is eligible for ~
annexation by the governing body. See e.g., Board of County Comm’rs.
v. City & County of Denver, supra; Pomponio v. City of Westminster,
supra; and Adams y. City of Colorado Springs, 178 Colo. 241, 496
P.2d 1005 (1972). These decisions specifically addressed the issue of
whether there was sufficient evidence in the record to sustain a municipal-
ity’s finding of boundary contiguity at a hearing. Further, the City Coun-
cil’s actions in the instant case suggest that it considered a finding and de-
termination of the requisite boundary contiguity to be necessary at the
November 9 hearing. The agenda of that hearing contemplated such a ne-
cessity, and the City Council did in fact make such a finding, albeit erro-
neously, in the resolution it adopted at the close of the hearing.

Once the hearing had been adjourned, the City Council was
without jurisdiction to amend Ordinance No. 78-219 by changing the legal
description of the southwest area without making specific findings for the
newly-described area at an additional hearing. The meeting of the City
Council on November 22, 1978, during which the amendment was made,
was not a new hearing that had been scheduled with proper notice. It also
was not a continuance of the hearing on November 9, which had been ad-
journed sine die. Rather, it was a proceeding at which no evidence was
heard and no findings were made regarding the compliance of the newly-
defined area with the provisions of section 31-12-106(2).

Accordingly, we hold that the City’s purported amendment of the
southwest annexation area at its meeting on November 22, 1978, was in-
valid. The only area eligible to be annexed was that which had been con-
sidered for annexation at the initial findings hearing on November 9,
1978. As described in part I of this opinion, the original southwest
annexation area did not meet the contiguity requirements of section 31-12-

466

106(2). Therefore, the district court holding that the annexation proceed-
ing was null and void and must start anew is correct.1 Judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE LEE does not participate.

No. 79SC252

Leslie K. Cumhuriyet v. The People of the State of Colorado
(615 P.2d 724)

Decided September 2, 1980.

1 Because of our resolution of this case, we need not address other issues raised on appeal and
cross appeal. We recognize, in this long and on going dispute, that annexation proceedings for the
same general area may be initiated again. Therefore, we are compelled to note that plaintiffs do
not have standing to raise the issue of the Broadmoor’s consent to this annexation. The issue of
standing arises solely from differing interpretations of a 1973 contract between the Broadmoor and
the City. The plaintiffs are not entitled to litigate the terms of a contract to which none of them
were parties. Only the Broadmoor would be sufficiently aggrieved by the City’s action to have
standing to challenge the terms of their contract with the City in a unilateral annexation proceed-
ing.

ee 467
ee

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Ilene P. Buchalter, Deputy,
for petitioner.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, David K. Rees, Assistant Attorney
General, for respondent.

En Banc.
JUSTICE DUBOFSKY delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
in People v. Cumhuriyet, 42 Colo. App. 532, 604 P.2d 690 (1979), that
restitution for a sum not the subject of criminal charges was a proper con-
dition of probation. We reverse.

On October 26, 1977, the defendant Leslie Cumhuriyet, who was
shopping with another woman at a Fashion Bar store on South Broadway
. in Denver, attempted to pay for a coat priced $119.99 with a Fashion Bar
credit card. The defendant signed the sales slip with the name on the
credit card. The shoppers’ conduct made the assistant manager suspicious,
and he called the woman whose name was on the card. She said that she
never had received the Fashion Bar card she had requested. The assistant
manager called the police, who recovered the coat and arrested the de-
fendant.

468 Se

The defendant pled guilty to misdemeanor theft [section 18-4-401,
C.R.S. 1973, (1978 Repl. Vol. 8)], and the trial court dismissed charges of
second-degree forgery [section 18-5-103, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol.
8)], fraudulent use of a credit device [section 18-5-202, C.R.S. 1973 (1978
Repl. Vol. 8)], and conspiracy to commit second-degree forgery [section
18-2-201, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8)]. All the charges related to the
transaction at the South Broadway store.

The pre-sentence report included Fashion Bar records showing the
stolen credit card was used also on October 26, 1977, the purchase shoes
and socks for $43.96 at a Northglenn Fashion Bar. The trial court fol-
lowed the probation officer’s recommendation, placed the defendant on
probation, and ordered her to pay to Fashion Bar restitution in the amount
of $21.98, one-half of the Northglenn purchase. The defendant was never
charged with any crime allegedly committed at the Northglenn store. The
defendant accepted probation, but her timely objection to the restitution is
included in the record of the probation hearing.

The defendant argues that the statute governing the conditions of
probation [section 16-11-204, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8)]1 does not
authorize restitution when there is no showing that the defendant caused
the injury. If the statute authorizes such an order, the defendant claims
that the order violates the defendant’s due process rights guaranteed by
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Because we resolve the issue here on statutory grounds, we need not reach
the defendant’s constitutional claims.

I) The Court of Appeals affirmed the restitution order because pro-
bation is a privilege which the defendant could refuse. Holdren v. People,
168 Colo. 474, 452 P.2d 28 (1969). The reliance of the Court of Appeals
on Holdren is misplaced. There, the defendant complained about the se-
verity of the terms of probation, not whether the terms were authorized by
statute. Other cases have established that a defendant may challenge the
terms of probation because they are not within the statutory authority of
the court. See, e.g., People v. A. F., 192 Colo. 207, 557 P.2d 418 (1976);
People v. Ledford, 173 Colo. 194, 477 P.2d 374; Logan v. People, 138
Colo. 304, 332 P.2d 897 (1958).

The terms and conditions of probation are statutory. People v.
Ledford, supra. The conditions to be imposed with probation are those
which “the court in its discretion deems reasonably necessary to insure
that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life and to assist him to do so.”
Section 16-11-204(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8, current version in
1979 Supp.).?

+ Current version section 16-11-204.5, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).
2 Restitution is now a required condition of probation. Section 16-11-204(1) and 204.5, C.RS.
1973 (1979 Supp.).

es 469

Section 16-11-204(2)(e) provides that as a condition of probation the
trial court may require the defendant to
“[mlake restitution . . . to the victim of Ais conduct for the damage or
injury which was sustained . . . . When any restitution . . . is a condi-
tion of probation, the court shall fix the amount thereof, which shall not
exceed an amount the defendant can or will be able to pay and shall fix
the manner of performance . . . .” (Emphasis added.)?

The question here is whether the damage or injury sustained by Fash-
ion Bar in the Northglenn theft is properly a liability of the defendant in
the court’s restitution order.

Restitution, which is intended to make the victim whole, means
that a defendant should not be forced to repay a victim when there has
been no indication that the damage or injury sustained by the victim was
inflicted by the defendant. Here, Fashion Bar suffered damage when mer-
chandise worth $43.96 was purchased at the Northglenn store with the
stolen credit card. The defendant attempted to use the stolen card later the
same day at a different store, but there is no indication that the defendant
made the purchase at the Northglenn store. The trial court’s requirement
that the defendant pay one-half of the Northglenn loss because the de-
fendant was with another woman at the time of the South Broadway inci-
dent acknowledges the speculation upon which restitution was based.

Hf Section 16-11-204(2)(e) requires that the injury of the victim be
sustained as a result of the conduct of the defendant. More than specula-
tion is required in order for the defendant to bear responsibility for the in-
jury. State v. Cox, 35 Ore. App. 169, 581 P.2d 104 (1978); State v.
Glewwe, 307 Minn. 513, 239 N.W.2d 479 (1976); State v. Caudle, 276
N.C, 550, 173 S.E.2d 778 (1970).

We leave open the question of a showing short of a criminal convic-
tion required to establish the defendant’s culpability for the injury before
restitution may be imposed. The probation report may be enough to sup-
port an order for such restitution if the defendant is given an opportunity
to question the pre-sentence report at the probation hearing. Some juris-
dictions require notice and an opportunity for the defendant to be heard
before considering restitution for losses from related offenses. People v.
Lent, 15 Cal.3d 481, 541 P.2d 545, 124 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1975); Fresneda
v. State, 347 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1977).

[i The trial court here improperly ordered restitution based on the
pre-sentence report. Without more evidence showing the defendant’s re-
sponsibility for the injury sustained by Fashion Bar, restitution for the
uncharged theft was not a proper condition of probation.

% Current version section 16-11-204.5(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).

470 ee

Judgment reversed.
JUSTICE LEE does not participate.

Le
No. 80SA104

The People of the State of Colorado y. James A. Lowe
(616 P.2d 118)

Decided September 2, 1980.

i

an es

Dale Tooley, District Attorney, Brooke Wunnicke, Chief Appellate
Deputy District Attorney, O. Otto Moore, Assistant, Donald Eberle,
Deputy, for plaintiff-appellant.

J. Gregory Walta, Colorado State Public Defender, Ilene P.
Buchalter, Deputy, for defendant-appellee.

En Banc.
JUSTICE LOHR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this interlocutory appeal the People challenge the trial court’s rul-
ing granting the defendant’s motion to suppress certain statements made
by him and certain physical evidence. We affirm.

On June 26, 1979, Michelle Conley, an 11-year-old girl, was swim-
ming at the Pinehurst County Club (Club) in Denver. At approximately
8:00 p.m. she left the pool area to go to the women’s locker room. When
she did not return by 8:40 p.m., a search for her was commenced. The po-
lice were called at about 9:00 p.m. and, following an extensive search,
Michelle’s body was found in a maintenance room at the Club at 1:45
a.m., June 27, 1979. The location and condition of the body indicated that
the girl was the victim of a homicide.

At 2:26 a.m. on June 27, 1979, Detective Wyckoff began an investi-
gation into the homicide. After several hours, numerous witnesses had
been questioned and it became apparent that the defendant was the pri-
mary suspect. Two police officers were then sent to the defendant’s resi-

| 13

dence where he was arrested at approximately 5:40 a.m., June 27, 1979.1
He was then taken to the police station.

Detective Wyckoff arrived at the police station at 6:40 a.m. and di-
rected the defendant to an inner office. Before advising the defendant -of
his Miranda? rights, Detective Wyckoff asked the defendant, “Do you
know why you are here?”. The defendant responded, “I know. I kind of
thought you would be out to the house at 6:00.”

Following this statement, at 6:54 a.m. the detective advised the de-
fendant of his Miranda rights. The defendant stated that he understood
his rights. He signed an advisement form acknowledging an understanding
of his rights but did not sign the portion of the form which contains a
statement that the subject wishes voluntarily to talk to the police. The de-
tective did not ask the defendant if he wished to waive his privilege against
self-incrimination and his right to counsel. The detective simply told the
defendant that he wanted him to tell what had happened. In response to
this request, the defendant said it was his girlfriend’s fault and either her
parents’ fault or his parents’ fault. The defendant appeared to be sober
and coherent at this time, although his eyes were red and he was some-
what upset. The detective used no promises, threats, force, or coercion
against the defendant.

At 7:14 a.m. on June 27, 1979, the detective began to interrogate the
defendant. This interview was tape recorded. At the commencement of the
interview the defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights and he
indicated that he understood them. During the course of this interrogation,
the defendant was asked where he obtained equipment that he used on
Michelle. The defendant answered that he did not want to talk about it.
The detective made no determination as to whether the defendant was
claiming his privilege against self-incrimination, but continued the interro-
gation.

During the interrogation, the defendant confessed that he had killed
Michelle; identified the clothes he was wearing the previous night; and
identified the locker at the Club in which he had placed those clothes. Fol-
lowing the interview, the defendant signed a consent to search that locker.
The locker was searched later that morning and several articles were
seized.

* The issues of whether there had been an arrest and whether there was probable clause to make
an arrest were before the trial court. The court decided that an arrest had occurred when the de-
fendant was picked up at his residence and that the officers had probable cause to make the arrest.
Because these issues were decided in favor of the People, they are not before the court on this ap-
peal. See C.A.R. 4.1. Even if the defendant was not technically under arrest, there éan be little
doubt that he was “seized” in the Fourth Amendment sense. See Dunaway v. New York, 442
USS. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Bd.2d 824 (1979).

2 Miranda vy. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

474 SS

The defendant was charged with murder in the first degree, section
18-3-102, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), and first-degree kidnapping,
section 18-3-301, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), based upon the events
surrounding the death of Michelle Conley. After a preliminary hearing in
the county court, only the first-degree murder charge was bound over to
the district court for trial.

In the district court, the defendant moved to suppress the statement
he made prior to the time he was given his Miranda rights; the statements
he made in the tape-recorded interview which began at 7:14 a.m.; the arti-
cles which were found in his locker at the Club as a result of the search to
which he had consented; and the written consent to search the locker. A
hearing was held and the trial court suppressed all statements and the evi-
dence found in the locker. We conclude that the trial court ruled properly.

L
The People first contend that the initial question by Detective
Wyckoff, “Do you know why you are here?”, did not constitute custodial
interrogation within the meaning of Miranda v. Arizona, supra. Accord-
ingly, the People argue that no Miranda warnings were required and that
the defendant’s response to this question should not have been suppressed
as having been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.*

There is no doubt that the defendant was in custody, as he was under
arrest at the time he was asked the question. Our inquiry therefore focuses
solely on whether the defendant was “interrogated” by the detective in vi-
olation of the standards promulgated in Miranda v. Arizona, supra.

We are aided in our consideration of this question by the United
States Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of “interrogation” as that
term is used in Miranda. In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100
S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), the Court said:

“We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a
person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its func-
tional equivalent. That is to say, the term ‘‘interrogation’’ under Miranda
refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on
the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an in-
criminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition
focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the in-
tent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards
were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of

2 The motion was framed in general terms; the specific items listed are included within the general
terms used in the motion and are the items involved in this interlocutory appeal.

‘The trial court found that the defendant’s response was obtained in violation of his privilege
against. self-incrimination, U.S. Const. amend. V, Colo, Const. art. I, § 18, and his right to coun-
sel, U.S. Const. amend. VI, Colo, Const. art. II, § 16.

eS 415

protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective
proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the police
should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a
suspect thus amounts to interrogation.”

Id. at , 100 S.Ct. at 1689-1690 (footnotes omitted). In a footnote,
the Court further stated that it was not saying that intent of the police is
irrelevant. The Court recognized that intent

“may well have a bearing on whether the police should have known that
their words or actions were reasonably likely to envoke an incriminating
response. In particular, where a police practice is designed to elicit an in-
criminating response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will
not also be one which the police should have known was reasonably likely
to have that effect.”

Id. at , 1.7, 100 S.Ct. at 1690.

In the case at bar, at the hearing on the motion to suppress, Detective
Wyckoff stated that he had no intention of advising the defendant of his
rights until the defendant made a statement to him. Based on this testi-
mony, the trial court found that the detective’s intent in asking the defend-
ant the question as to why he was at the police station was to elicit a re-
sponse from the defendant that would involve him in the homicide. This
finding was supported by the record and will not be disturbed on review.
People v. Martinez, 186 Colo. 388, 527 P.2d 534 (1974).

Accordingly, we find that under the standards enunciated in Rhode
Island y. Innis, supra, the detective’s initial question to the defendant
constituted custodial interrogation. The detective intended to elicit an in-
criminating response from the defendant. Given the circumstances of this
case, the detective should have known that his question was reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant. The trial
court properly suppressed the defendant’s response to this question.

Il.

The People next argue that the trial court improperly suppressed the
defendant’s tape-recorded statement. The trial court suppressed the state-
ment on two grounds. The court first found that the tape-recorded state-
ment was “fruit of the poisonous tree”;5 i.e., it was so tainted by the ille-
gal custodial interrogation discussed in Part I as to render that statement
illegal. The court also found that the tape-recorded statement was not
based on a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the defendant’s
Miranda rights.

II The burden is on the prosecution to establish that the tape-
recorded statement was not the product of the defendant’s prior

5 See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 US. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319
(1920); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); People
v. Orf, Ir., 172 Colo. 253, 472 P.2d 123 (1970).

416 ee

incriminating response, which was illegally obtained. Harrison v. United
States, 392 U.S. 219, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968). The prose-
cution failed to meet its burden in the instant case.

In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9
L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), the United States Supreme Court held that not all
evidence is “fruit of the poisonous tree” simply because it would not have
come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. If the evidence to
which the objection is made has been produced by exploitation of the ini-
tial illegal police action, the evidence is tainted and inadmissible. But if
the evidence has been obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint, the evidence is admissible. Id.; People v.
Bates, 190 Colo. 291, 546 P.2d 491 (1976). Thus, if passage of time has
caused the connection between the initial illegal police action and the of-
fered evidence to become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint, the evi-
dence is admissible. Wong Sun v. United States, supra; People v.
Algien, 180 Colo. 1, 501 P.2d 468 (1972).

Simply reading a defendant his Miranda rights is not necessarily
sufficient to purge the taint of the initial illegal questioning by breaking
the causal chain between that questioning and the statement obtained sub-
sequent to the. time the defendant received his Miranda rights. See-
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824
(1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416
(1975). We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the 7:14 a.m. state-
ment was not purged of the taint of the illegally obtained oral statement
which was made by the defendant at some time between 6:40 a.m. and
6:54 a.m. Rather, it appears that the questioning which took place begin-
ning at 7:14 a.m. was merely a continuation of the question which had eli-
cited the previous incriminating remark. The two statements were made
within 35 minutes of each other. During this time the defendant was con-
tinuously in police custody. He had no opportunity to meditate or reflect
upon his situation after the Miranda advisement was given. The circum-
stances of this case compel us to conclude that the original taint had not
dissipated at the time the 7:14 a.m. statement was made. See People v.
Pineda, 182 Colo. 385, 513 P.2d 452 (1973); People v. Algien, supra.

The trial court found that, even if it had determined that the
taint of the original illegal interrogation had been purged, the 7:14 a.m.
statement would have been inadmissible because the defendant had not
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. The
burden of establishing waiver rests upon the People. People v. Stephens,
188 Colo. 8, 532 P.2d 728 (1975). A waiver must be established by clear
and convincing evidence. Constantine v. People, 178 Colo. 16, 495 P.2d
208 (1972). The waiver need not be express and the defendant’s refusal to
sign a written acknowledgment is not preclusive of a knowing and
intelligent waiver. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct.

ee 471

1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); People v. Stephens, supra. In determining
whether the defendant has waived his constitutional rights, the court must
consider all of the circumstances, including details of the interrogation and
the defendant’s conduct. North Carolina v. Butler, supra; People v.
Ferran, 196 Colo. 513, 591 P.2d 1013 (1978); Reed v. People, 171 Colo.
421, 567 P.2d 809 (1970).

In the instant case, the defendant was first advised of his
Miranda rights immediately after he had made an incriminating response
to the detective’s initial question. Although the defendant acknowledged
on a written advisement form that he understood those rights, he did not
sign a portion of that form stating that, with knowledge of his rights, he
wished voluntarily to talk to the police. The detective never asked the de-
fendant if he was waiving his privilege against self-incrimination and his
tight to counsel. Furthermore, in the course of his tape-recorded state-
ment, in response to the detective’s question as to where the defendant got
the equipment used on the girl, the defendant said, “I don’t want to talk
about it.” Despite this statement, the detective continued the questioning
without determining whether the defendant was invoking his privilege
against self-incrimination or was merely reluctant to answer questions
about the equipment used on the girl. Based on these circumstances, the
trial court properly determined that the defendant did not make a know-
ing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his rights.

HB Although the defendant’s 7:14 a.m. statement cannot be used in
the prosecution’s case in chief, it can be used for impeachment purposes if
the statement was voluntarily made, i.e., if the “trustworthiness of the evi-
dence satisfies legal standards.” Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct.
1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975), citing Harris v. New York, 401-U.S. 222,
224, 91 S.Ct. 643, 645, 28 L.Ed.2d 1, 4 (1971); People v. Velarde, 196
Colo. 254, 586 P.2d 6 (1978). The trial court found that the record con-
tained no evidence which would render the defendant’s statement involun-
tary or untrustworthy. This finding is supported by the record and there-
fore will not be disturbed on review. People v. Martinez, supra; People
y. Medina, 180 Colo. 56, 501 P.2d 1332 (1972).

Til.

Finally, the People urge that we reverse the trial court’s ruling sup-
pressing the defendant’s consent to search the locker as well as the items
obtained when that locker was searched. Both the consent and the con-
tents of the locker were suppressed as being the fruits of the interrogation
which we held unlawful in Part II.

Generally, when a defendant contends that a search to
which he consented violated his Fourth Amendment rights, the rights af-
forded in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, do not apply. People v. Phillips,
197 Colo. 546, 594 P.2d 1053 (1979). The inquiry is simply whether,
based on the totality of the circumstances, the consent was voluntary.

[

a eS

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854
(1973); People v. Phillips, supra. Voluntariness is a question of fact.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra. The People have the burden of prov-
ing voluntariness by clear and convincing evidence. People v. Trujillo, 40
Colo. App. 186, 576 P.2d 179 (1977). The fact that the defendant is in
custody is not sufficient, in and of itself, to render the consent involuntary.
United States vy. Watson, 423 US. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598
(1976); Capps v. People, 162 Colo. 323, 426 P.2d 189 (1967).

In the instant case, the consent to search was signed by the defendant
at 7:43 a.m., immediately following the 7:14 a.m. interrogation. The de-
fendant had told the detective about the locker during the course of the in-
terrogation. The defendant was given a written consent to search form in
which he was advised of his right to refuse to allow the search. The trial
court found that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily executed the
consent to search. This finding is supported by the record and will not be
disturbed on review. People v. Trujillo, supra; People v. Martinez,
supra; People v. Medina, supra.

But in this case, our inquiry cannot end with the determina-
tion that the consent to search was voluntary. The police knowledge of the
locker and of some of its contents and the defendant’s consent to search
were products of the interrogation of the defendant that commenced at
7:14 a.m., which violated the defendant’s Miranda rights. Accordingly,
the items obtained in the search, as well as the consent to search, must be
suppressed as being the fruits of an unlawful interrogation. Wong Sun v.
United States, supra; cf. Commonwealth v. White, Mass. >
371 N.E.2d 777 (1977), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court
sub nom. Massachusetts v. White, 439 U.S. 280, 99 S.Ct. 712, 58
L.Ed.2d 519 (1978) (statements obtained in violation of Miranda rights
cannot be used for the purpose of establishing probable cause sufficient to
obtain a valid search warrant). We note, however, that, because the con-
stitutional infirmities in the search are based on a Miranda violation and
not a Fourth Amendment violation, the items seized may be used for im-
peachment purposes if the defendant testifies at trial. See Oregon v.
Hass, supra, citing Harris v. New York, supra; People v. Velarde,
supra.

We affirm the ruling of the trial court and remand this case for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUSTICE ROVIRA specially concurs.
JUSTICE QUINN does not participate.

eS a9

JUSTICE ROVIRA specially concurring:

Almost twenty years ago, the United States Supreme Court made a
policy choice when it made applicable to the states the exclusionary rule
for evidence in criminal cases.1 This rule of evidence was originally ap-
plied to the use of evidence secured through a search and seizure con-
ducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment, in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). Since that time,
reliable and probative evidence has been suppressed and excluded from
criminal proceedings whenever it has been obtained through searches and
seizures that violate the Fourth Amendment, confessions obtained in viola-
tion of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and identification testimony ob-
tained in violation of these amendments.2_

The basic rationale of the rule is that suppression of evidence ob-
tained in violation of an individual’s constitutional rights was necessary to
deter the police from using improper methods to obtain that evidence.?
Although other reasons have been advanced to support the rule, such as
the need to protect privacy of the individual* and the need to avoid the
evil of government participation in illegal activity,5 it is clear that “the
raison d’etre of the exclusionary rule is the deterrence of lawless law en-
forcement.”

As it must, the majority applies the exclusionary rule to the well
stated findings of fact made by the trial court in this case. We have no al-
ternative, and it is to this situation that my views are directed in this con-
curring opinion.

There can be no doubt that the constitutional guarantees of both the
United States and Colorado Constitutions must be protected against un-
lawful acts of those we employ to uphold the law. Having thus stated a
proposition with which I believe there can be little argument, the question
remains as to what form that protection should take. Under existing doc-
trine as developed by the United States Supreme Court, the exclusionary
tule is the sole method through which the cited constitutional guarantees
may be protected.

1 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Bd.2d 1081 (1961).

2 Mapp v. Ohio, supra fn. | (search and seizure); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct.
1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (confessions); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951,
18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967) (identification).

3 The deterrence theory was reaffirmed by Justice Powell, writing for the Court in United States
v. Calandra, 414 USS, 338, 347, 94 S.Ct. 613, 619, 38 L.Ed.2d 561, 571 (1974): “the rule’s prime
purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct.” See also Elkins v. United States, 364 US.
206, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960).

4 Justice Clark in Mapp v. Ohio, supra fn. 1, 367 US. at 655, 81 S.Ct. at 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d at
1090.

5 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Justices Bran-
deis and Holmes dissenting).

© Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 Duke L.J. 319, 334.

480 es

The exclusionary rule has been subject to continued and increasing
criticism by scholars and judges.” The criticism which I find most compel-
ling is that the impact of the exclusionary rule falls upon society as a
whole rather than on the person who has violated another person’s consti-
tutional rights, the official wrongdoer.

Others have also directed their attention to the anomalous situation in
which the individual official whose illegal conduct results in the exclusion
of evidence in a criminal trial suffers no direct or indirect sanction. As
pointed out by Chief Justice Burger in his dissenting opinion in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403. U.S. 388, 416, 91 S.Ct.
1999, 2015, 29 L.Ed.2d 619, 638 (1971):

“[w]ith rare exceptions law enforcement agencies do not impose direct
sanctions on the individual officer responsible for a particular judicial ap-
plication of the suppression doctrine . . . . Thus there is virtually noth-
ing done to bring about a change in his practices.”

See also Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U.Chi. L.Rev. 665 (1970), where it was noted that “[but] dil-
igent inquiry has failed to reveal a single law enforcement agency where
individual sanctions are tied to an application of the exclusionary rule. The
tule is apparently expected to achieve its purpose without them.”

While other defects in the exclusionary rule have been the subject of
comment,? no good purpose would be served by setting them out at
length.

The purpose of a criminal trial is to determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused. How can this be accomplished while at the same time pro-
tecting the constitutional rights of all citizens?

Chief Justice Burger in Bivens suggested that Congress take the lead
and provide a meaningful and effective remedy against unlawful conduct
by government officials, a remedy that would afford compensation and
restitution for persons whose constitutional rights have been violated.
Judge Wilkey? suggests disciplinary measures against erring law enforce-
ment officials and effective civil damage action against both the police and
the governmental agency which employs them. In support of the tort rem-
edy approach, Professor Oaks has stated that:

“Ta] practical tort remedy would give courts an occasion to rule on the
content of constitutional rights (the Canadian example shows how), and it
would provide the real consequence needed to give credibility to the

7 Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-American Mistake, 19 De Paul L.Rev. 80 (1969); Friendly, The
Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif. LRev. 929 (1965); Schaefer, The
Fourteenth Amendment and Sanctity of the Person, 64 Nw.U. LRev. 1 (1969).

8 See Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 Judicature 214
(1978).

8 Wilkey, supra, fn. 8.

481

guarantee. A tort remedy could break free of the narrow compass of the
exclusionary rule, and provide a viable remedy with attendant direct deter-
rent effect upon the police whether the injured party was prosecuted or
not. Such an arrangement is long overdue. It is time to have a comprehen-
sive judicial remedy against all illegal arrests and searches and seizures by
the police. And it is time to abandon the irrational and costly procedure by
which police behavior is reviewed only when the injured party is prosecu-
ted, and the only compensation for injury effectively puts both guilty par-
ties beyond the reach of the law.” Oaks, supra, 37 U.Chi. L.Rev. at 757.
(Footnote omitted.)

In my view, it is necessary to adopt an effective alternative remedy to
the exclusionary rule — a remedy that will both deter the governmental
agent from improperly exercising the authority given to him and provide
the citizen with an effective means of redress. In the absence of a change
in position of the United States Supreme Court or action on the part of
the Congress’? or the state legislatures to develop such a remedy, how-
ever, there is no alternative to enforcement of the exclusionary rule.

No. 28404

The People of the State of Colorado v. Bobbie G. Moore
(615 P.2d 726) .

Decided September 2, 1980.

1 s, 881, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess. (1973), a proposal to abolish the exclusionary rule and, in lieu
thereof, impose financial liability on the federal government to the victims of illegal search and sei-
zure.

482

J.D, MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Anthony M. Marquez, Assistant
Attorney General, for plaintiff-appellee.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Steven H. Denman,
Deputy, James England, Deputy, for defendant-appellant.

En Bane.

JUSTICE LOHR delivered the opinion of the Court.

483

Bobbie G. Moore, the appellant, was convicted in district court of
driving while his license was suspended, section 42-2-130, C.R.S. 1973
(1979 Supp.) (count one), and Driving After Judgment Prohibited, section
42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973 (count two). Each conviction was based upon a
plea of guilty. Moore appeals from orders denying certain motions for
post-conviction relief directed to his conviction for Driving After Judg-
ment Prohibited.1 We reverse.

Two basic contentions provide the basis for this appeal. First, the ap-
pellant argues that count two fails to charge an offense. Second, the appel-
lant urges that section 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973, is constitutionally deficient
in a number of respects. Because we agree with the appellant’s first con-
tention, we do not reach his second.?

Below.the caption, on the title page of the direct criminal information
by which the defendant was charged, appears the following language, ap-
parently intended to summarize the charges:

“DRIVING WHILE LICENSE SUSPENDED, REVOKED OR DE-
NIED [C.R.S. 1973, 42-2-130 as amended] HABITUAL OFFENDER
[C.R.S. 1973, 42-2-206 as amended]”

On the next page count one is set forth in terms appropriate to charge a vi-
olation of section 42-2-130, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.). The third page is
devoted to count two, which provides in full as follows:

“AND AS A FURTHER AND SECOND COUNT, AND PAUL Q.
BEACOM, District Attorney as aforesaid, in the name and by the author-
ity of the People of the State of Colorado, further informs the court [sic]
that on the 12th day of July A.D., 1975, at 3547 St. Paul Street in the
City and County of Denver, State of Colorado, BOBBIE G. MOORE was
duly advised by certified mail that an Order of Revocation as a Habitual
Offender under C.R.S. 1973, 42-2-202 and 42-2-203 as amended, had
been entered and that his license was revoked effective July 31, 1975, and
that said revocation would continue for a period of five years, This order
of Revocation was duly entered by a competent legal authority in the
premises, William J. Smyth, Chief of Driver Improvement Section, Motor
Vehicle Department, Department of Revenue, for the State of Colorado;
contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and
against the peace and dignity of the People of the State of Colorado.”

Notably absent from the charge are two elements of the crime of
Driving After Judgment Prohibited: (1) operation of a motor vehicle in
Colorado (2) while the order of revocation of the appellant’s driver’s

1 The appellant has not appealed from his conviction for driving while his license was suspended,
section 42-2-130, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).

2 Many of the constitutional questions with respect to the validity of section 42-2-206, CRS.
1973, have been resolved adversely to the appellant’s position by our decision in People v.
McKnight, 199 Colo. 313, 617 P.2d 1178 (1980).

4s es

license as an habitual offender was in effect.

The appellant moved to vacate the judgment and sentence pursuant
to Crim. P. 12(b)(2), alleging that count two of the information is fatally
defective. The trial court denied that motion. We conclude that the motion
should have been granted.

L

HI An information is sufficient if it advises the defendant of the
charge he is facing so that he can adequately defend himself and be pro-
tected from further prosecution for the same offense. People v. Albo, 195
Colo. 102, 575 P.2d 427 (1978); People v. Ingersoll, 181 Colo. 1, 506
P.2d 364 (1973). Section 16-5-202(1)(d), C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl.
Vol. 8), and Crim. P. 7(b)(2) both require that an information “set forth
[the offense charged] with such degree of certainty that the court may
pronounce judgment on a conviction.”

Section 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973, 3 defines a distinct offense. It
prohibits one whose license has been revoked by reason of his status as an
habitual traffic offender from operating a motor vehicle in this state while
the order revoking his license remains in effect. It is therefore unlike the
habitual criminal statute, section 16-13-101 to 103, C.R.S. 1973 (1978
Repl. Vol. 8) (1979 Supp.), which does not create a new or independent
crime but rather prescribes circumstances wherein one found guilty of a
specific crime may be more severely penalized because of his previous
criminal conduct. See Casias v. People, 148 Colo. 544, 367 P.2d 327
(1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 862, 82 S.Ct. 952, 8 L. Ed. 2d 20 (1962).*
A proper charge of a violation of section 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973, must in-
clude not only an allegation that the license of an accused driver had been
revoked upon a determination that he was an habitual traffic offender, but
also an allegation that the accused was operating a motor vehicle on the
highways of this state while that revocation was still in effect. The omis-
sion of the latter allegation resulted in a failure to advise the defendant of
essential elements of the offense. The allegations in count two do not
charge a crime.

3 Section 42-2-206, C.R.S 1973, provides in pertinent part as follows:

“42-2-206. Driving after judgment prohibited. (1) It is unlawful for any person to operate any
motor vehicle in this state while the revocation of the department prohibiting the operation remains
in effect. Any person found to be an habitual offender, who is thereafter convicted of operating a
motor vehicle in this state while the revocation of the department prohibiting such operation is in
effect, is guilty of a class 5 felony. No portion of such sentence may be suspended, and no proba-
tion may be granted; except that, in a case where the defendant establishes that he had to drive
the motor vehicle in violation of this subsection (1) because of an emergency, the ‘mandatory
prison sentence may not apply.”

4 The trial court apparently concluded that count two was merely a basis for enhancing the sen-
tence for violation of count one. This is a misapprehension of the nature of section 42-2-206,
C.R.S. 1973, which defines a distinct substantive offense.

es 485

The People argue that, if any defect is present in count two of
the information, the defect is cured when counts one and two are read to-
gether. This argument is unsound. It has long been the general rule that
each count of an information must be judged independently. See 41 Am.
Jur., Information and Indictments, § 221 (1968). Absent a clear and
specific incorporation by reference, each count of an information “to be
valid must be independent of the others, and in itself charge the defendant
with a distinct and different offense.” Roland v. People, 23 Colo. 283,
286, 47 P. 269, 270 (1896); accord, Martinez v. People, 163 Colo. 503,
431 P.2d 765 (1967).

When an information fails to charge a crime, the court acquires no
jurisdiction. People v. Garner, 187 Colo. 294, 530 P.2d 496 (1975);
People v. Westendorf, 37 Colo. App. 111, 542 P.2d 1300 (1975). Ac-
cordingly, we hold that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the of-
fense charged in count two.>

The judgment of the trial court is reversed with respect to count two,
Driving After Judgment Prohibited.

JUSTICE LEE does not participate.

5 As count two was insufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, the appellant has
not been in jeopardy on that charge. People v. Garner, supra.

No. 79SA371

The People of the State of Colorado vy. Dewey Kenneth McKnight
(617 P.2d 1178)

Decided September 2, 1980. Rehearing denied November 3, 1980.

6
iy
+

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Nathan B. Coats, Assistant

490 ee

Attorney General, for plaintiff-appellee.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Michael Heher, Deputy,
for defendant-appellant.

En Bane.

JUSTICE LOHR delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appellant, Dewey Kenneth McKnight, was convicted in district
court of Driving After Judgment Prohibited, section 42-2-206, C.R.S.
1973. McKnight has appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the
statutes upon which his conviction is based. We affirm the conviction but
vacate the sentence and remand the case to the trial court for resentenc-
ing.

A brief outline of the relevant statutes will be of assistance in under-
standing the events in this case. The habitual traffic offender statute, sec-
tions 42-2-201 to 208, C.R.S. 1973, defines an habitual traffic offender*
as one having a designated number of convictions for specified traffic of-
fenses within a prescribed period of time. Section 42-2-202, C.R.S. 1973.
The Colorado Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division (DMV), is
authorized to conduct hearings to determine whether a person is an habit-
ual traffic offender and to revoke the driver’s license of an habitual traffic
offender for a period of five years. Sections 42-2-203 and 205, C.R.S.
1973. Anyone who operates a motor vehicle in Colorado while his driver’s
license is under revocation by reason of his status as an habitual traffic of-
fender is guilty of Driving After Judgment Prohibited, a class 5 felony.
Section 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973. In sentencing for that crime, probation
and suspension of sentence are prohibited unless the defendant establishes
that he had to drive because of an emergency. Id.

On August 11, 1977, a state patrolman noticed that an automobile
driven by the appellant had an expired state inspection sticker, and
stopped the vehicle. When the appellant could not produce a driver’s li-
cense, the patrolman investigated and discovered that the appellant’s
driver’s license had been revoked because he had been found to be an ha-
bitual traffic offender. See section 42-2-203, C.R.S. 1973. The appellant
subsequently was charged with Driving After Judgment Prohibited, in vio-
lation of section 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973.

1 The statute uses the term “habitual offender”; we use the term “habitual traffic offender” to
avoid confusion with other habitual criminal statutes.

es 491

At trial the prosecution presented evidence that on August 11, 1977,
the appellant had been operating a motor vehicle within Colorado. The
prosecution then introduced an order of revocation dated May 19, 1977,
signed by a hearing officer for the DMV, together with testimony that the
order remained in effect on August 11, 1977. The order contains a finding
that the appellant’s record sustains revocation of his driver’s license be-
cause of his status as an habitual traffic offender, and orders revocation of
that license for a period of five years. See section 42-2-203 and 205,
C.R.S. 1973. The appellant’s signature, acknowledging service of the orig-
inal copy of the order, appears on the face of the order.

On the reverse-side of the order appears the following written advise-
ment, signed by McKnight:

“ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS: I have been advised of the purpose of
this hearing and the possible consequences. I understand I am subject to
REVOCATION as provided in 42-2-203 C.R.S. 1973 as amended. I also
understand that pursuant to 42-2-127 C.R.S. 1973 as amended, I may ob-
tain judicial review of the hearing officer’s determination if applied for
within thirty days from the date of this hearing.”

The advisement contains a notation that “student counsel” and the appel-
lant’s wife appeared at the hearing.”

McKnight was 67 years of age at the time of the license revocation
hearing. He testified that he had driven knowing that his license had been
taken away and that he was not supposed to drive. He explained that he
considered his conduct necessary in order to obtain medicine for his seri-
ously ailing wife. The appellant further testified that he was hard of hear-
ing; that he could not hear what was going on at the license revocation
hearing; that he forgot to bring his glasses to that hearing and could not
read the forms; that he simply signed the forms which the hearing officer
told him to sign; and that the consequences of habitual offender status,
other than loss of his driver’s license, were never explained to him. The
prosecution, by cross-examination and rebuttal evidence, called into ques-
tion the illness of the appellant’s wife and the need for the appellant to
have driven the vehicle.

The jury found McKnight guilty? and, in response to a special

2 At the same hearing at which his license was revoked, McKnight’s privilege to operate a motor
vehicle was suspended for one year pursuant to section 42-2-124, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.). He
signed a written advisement with respect to that proceeding, containing the statement “I have
checked my driving record and found it to be correct,” verifying that it reflected 31 points within
24 months and acknowledging that such record required suspension under section 42-2-123, C.R.S.
1973. That form reflects that McKnight’s wife and the person designated “student counsel” on the
back of the revocation order were present at the hearing. Evidence of these matters was also re-
ceived at the trial.

8 The jury was instructed that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt as an ele-
ment of the crime that McKnight had driven the motor vehicle “with knowledge that [his]
operator’s and chauffeur’s license have been revoked pursuant to the habitual offender statute.”

492 ee

interrogatory on the verdict form, found that he “did not drive a motor ve-
hicle because of an emergency.” The court sentenced the appellant to the
state reformatory for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years.
McKnight appealed, based upon the denial of motions to dismiss the
charge because of several alleged constitutional deficiencies in the habit-
ual traffic offender statute, sections 42-2-201 to 208, C.R.S. 1973.

I We start with the proposition that the statute is presumed to be
constitutional. E.g., People v. Edmonds, 195 Colo. 358, 578 P.2d 655
(1978); Howe v. People, 178 Colo. 248, 496 P.2d 1040 (1972). The de-
fendant has the burden of proving the statute to be unconstitutional be-
yond a reasonable doubt. E.g., People v. Albo, 195 Colo. 102, 575 P.2d
427 (1978); People v. Gonzales, 188 Colo. 272, 534 P.2d 626 (1975).

I.

Hf The appellant first contends that he has’ been denied due process
of law* because of inadequate protections afforded by statute to one
charged with Driving After Judgment Prohibited. We do not agree.

HM An habitual traffic offender is defined to include one having,
within a seven-year period, three or more convictions of operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Section 42-2-202,
C.R.S. 1973. That portion of the definition was the basis for the DMV’s
finding that the appellant was an habitual traffic offender.

An administrative proceeding to revoke the license of an habitual
traffic offender is authorized by section 42-2-203, C.R.S. 1973, which pro-
vides: .

“42-2-203. Authority to revoke license of habitual offender. The de-
partment [DMV] has the authority to revoke the license of any person
whose record brings him within the definition of an habitual offender in
section 42-2-202; except that the hearing procedure, as specified in section
42-2-123(7) to (12) shall be employed prior to any such revocation.”

The hearing procedure so specified5 includes written notice of hearing,
hearing, and the right to appeal to the district court from an order of the
DMV revoking a driver’s license. Section 42-2-123(7) to (12), C.RS.
1973 (1979 Supp.). Pursuant to such procedures, the appellant was found
to be an habitual traffic offender. He did not appeal.

The criminal conviction from which McKnight has appealed is based
upon section 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973, which provides in pertinent part:

4 U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Colo. Const. art Il, § 25.

5 Sections 42-2-123(7) through (12), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), provide for notice to the operator

that a hearing will be held concerning the possible revocation of the operator’s driver’s license. The

hearing is held at a DMV district office before an authorized DMV hearing officer. If the record

of the operator kept by the DMV reflects a sufficient quantity and type of traffic convictions

within a specified time, all as provided by statute, the operator's license must be revoked. Fuhrer
v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 197 Colo. 325, 592 P.2d 402 (1979). See section 42-2-202,
203, C.R.S. 1973.

es 493

“42-2-206. Driving after judgment prohibited. (1) It is unlawful for
any person to operate any motor vehicle in this state while the revocation
of the department [DMV] prohibiting the operation remains in effect.
Any person found to be an habitual offender, who is thereafter convicted
of operating a motor vehicle in this state while the revocation of the de-
partment prohibiting such operation is in effect, is guilty of a class 5 fel-
ony. No portion of such sentence may be suspended, and no probation may
be granted; except that, in a case where the defendant establishes that he
had to drive the motor vehicle in violation of this subsection (1) because of
an emergency, the mandatory prison sentence may not apply.”

The appellant does not directly challenge the license revocation proce-
dures in the habitual traffic offender statute to the extent that such proce-
dures divest an habitual traffic offender of his license to drive a motor ve-
hicle. He contends, however, that to use the DMV revocation order as an
essential element of the crime of Driving After Judgment Prohibited vio-
lates constitutional protections of the accused in that criminal proceeding.

The appellant’s argument runs as follows: (1) The key element of the
offense of Driving After Judgment Prohibited is the defendant’s status as
an habitual traffic offender; (2) therefore, the hearing at which a deter-
mination is made of the defendant’s status as an habitual traffic offender
is a critical stage of the criminal proceedings and due process rights apply;
and (3) due process requires, at a minimum, the right to assistance of
counsel, the right to compulsory attendance of witnesses, and the right to
confront adverse witnesses at the license revocation hearing.® See U.S.
Const. amends. VI and XIV; Colo. Const. art II, §§ 16 and 25.

A.

HM The administrative proceeding to revoke a driver’s license be-
cause of habitual traffic offender status is a civil one. People v. Able, 200
Colo. 115, 618 P.2d 1110 (1980). The only immediate consequence of a
determination that the licensee is an habitual traffic offender is the loss of
his driver’s license for a period of five years. Section 42-2-205, C.R.S.
1973. Thus, the constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants
need not be provided to the licensee in such a proceeding. The appellant
does not question this to the extent that the consequence attaching to ha-
bitual traffic offender status is loss of driving privileges, but contends that,
because the determination of habitual traffic offender status is so central
to a conviction for Driving After Judgment Prohibited, the administrative
habitual traffic offender hearing must be considered a critical stage of the
criminal case. This contention was considered and rejected in Ferguson v.
Gathright, 485 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 933, 94

© In his motion for new trial, the appellant contends that the right to trial by jury applies, al-
though this is not urged in his briefs, See Colo. Const. art. Il, § 23.

494 es

S.Ct. 1447, 39 L.Ed.2d 491 (1974). In rejecting an analogy to a parole re-
vocation hearing the court said at p. 506:

“There is, though, a fatal flaw in this analogy. At the parole revocation,
an adverse finding brings an immediate and automatic loss of liberty. No
such result follows from a license revocation. In the latter situation, the
defendant loses simply his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public
highways; he suffers no loss of liberty or threat of incarceration. He is not
substantially different in condition from thousands of others who, for one
reason or another have been denied, or have suffered a loss of, a driving
permit. He comes under the threat of incarceration only if he subse-
quently determines to take the law into his own hands and to operate a
motor vehicle on the public highway without a valid permit.

“It is his subsequent defiance of the law, and only indirectly his revocation
proceedings, that brings into play the criminal processes and places him in
peril of imprisonment.”
Other cases which have considered this question have reached the same
conclusion. Mays v. Harris, 523 F.2d 1258 (4th Cir. 1975); Whorley y.
Virginia, 215 Va. 740, 214 S.E.2d 447 (1975); see People v. Able,
supra.
I We conclude that the DMV administrative hearing which results
in license revocation pursuant to section 42-2-203, C.R.S. 1973, is not a
“critical stage” of the prosecution for Driving After Judgment Prohibited.
That hearing, therefore, need not be conducted as a criminal trial. This is
true even though the administrative determination is an element of the
criminal charge.
B.
If the procedures from which a license revocation results are so
lacking in fundamental fairness as to cast doubt on the ability to obtain a
fair and accurate determination of habitual traffic offender status, the use
of that determination as an element of a criminal offense might well vio-
late due process of law. See Ferguson v. Gathright, supra.
Revocation of a driver’s license does implicate procedural due
process protections. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29
L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). There can be little doubt that the Colorado proce-
dures, which require notice and administrative hearing in advance of revo-
cation, and which permit appeal of any order of revocation, are fully ade-
quate to accord procedural due process to the licensee. See Dixon v.
Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 Us S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1974); see
generally Campbell v. Colorado, 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385 (1971).
A review of the habitual traffic offender administrative proce-
dures reflects that they are well calculated to produce a fair and accurate
result. That conclusion is reinforced by the availability of judicial scrutiny

495

of the administrative action.

The only issue to be determined in a license revocation hearing
involving an alleged habitual traffic offender is whether the licensee has
sustained the requisite number of convictions for specified traffic offenses
within the prescribed period of time, all as established by statute. This de-
termination is made by a hearing officer by reference to the licensee’s
driving record, as reflected in DMV records. See generally Gillespie v.
Director of the Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicles Division, 41
Colo. App. 561, 592 P.2d 418 (1978). The licensee may point out any al-
leged mistake in his driver’s record at the hearing. He may not relitigate
the issue of guilt of the offenses shown on his record. See Zaba v. Motor
Vehicle Division, 183 Colo. 335, 516 P.2d 634 (1973). The determination
as to the licensee’s record is not a complex one, so the risk of error is not
great. See Dixon v. Love, supra. The hearing officer has no discretion as
to remedy; if the licensee is found to be an habitual offender, his license
must be revoked for a period of five years. Fuhrer v. Department of
Motor Vehicles, 197 Colo. 325, 592 P.2d 402 (1979).

HMI the licensee believes that the hearing officer’s decision is
erroneous, he may appeal to the district court. Section 42-2-123(11),
C.R.S. 1973; see Gillespie v. Director of the Department of Revenue,
Motor Vehicle Division, supra. Furthermore, if the licensee contends
that any conviction supporting the administrative order of revocation was
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, he may raise this issue
and obtain a full review of his contention by the court in the criminal pro-
ceeding under section 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973. People v. Heinz, 197 Colo.
1102, 589 P.2d 931 (1979); see People v. Able, supra. He may also as-
sert in the criminal proceeding that a court which entered any conviction
supporting his habitual offender status lacked jurisdiction over his person
or over the subject matter. See People v. Able, supra. Absent a chal-
lenge that a conviction supporting the administrative order of revocation
was obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights or that
the court lacked jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter, no such
conviction is subject to collateral attack. People v. Able, supra. Thus, all
permissible grounds for attacking the underlying convictions may be as-
serted in the criminal proceeding under section 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973.

We conclude that the procedures upon which prosecutions un-
der section 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973, are based are fundamentally fair, are
adequate to assure an accurate determination of habitual traffic offender
status, and accord due process of law to a licensee later accused of Driving
After Judgment Prohibited. See Ferguson v. Gathright, supra.

I.

The appellant also asserts that the method of establishing his status

as an habitual traffic offender fails to accord him constitutional rights to

496

equal protection of laws.”

The foundation for this contention is that other acts providing for en-
hancement of punishment on the basis of prior convictions afford a de-
fendant notice of the convictions relied upon, a right to jury trial with re-
spect to the existence of the prior convictions, and a right to require the
prosecution to prove such convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. See sec-
tions 16-13-101 to 103, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8) (1979 Supp.)
(the habitual criminal act); and section 42-4-1202(4), C.R.S. 1973 (1979
Supp.) (driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic
drugs).

HM The appellant does not assert that the habitual traffic offender
statute creates any suspect classification or infringes any fundamental
right. Accordingly, the test to be applied to determine whether equal pro-
tection standards have been violated is whether the classification is reason-
able, not arbitrary, and bears a rational relationship to legitimate state ob-
jectives. Mosgrove v. Town of Federal Heights, 190 Colo. 1, 543 P.2d
715 (1975), citing Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 US. 1, 94
S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974); Fuhrer v. Department of Motor
Vehicles, supra (summarizing the test as to whether the classification is
“without rational basis”). Mathematical precision in establishing classifi-
cations is not required. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct.
1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970).

The habitual criminal act prescribes enhanced punishment for offend-
ers who have been convicted of felony offenses at least twice before the
commission of the offense upon which the habitual criminal charge is
based. Potential penalties are 25 to 50 years in the state penitentiary for a
third-time offender and life imprisonment for one convicted four or more
times. Section 42-4-1202(4), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.), deals with a situ-
ation where a repeat offender of driving under the influence of intoxicat-
ing liquor or narcotic drugs is subject to enhanced punishment. The poten-
tial penalty under both of these statutes follows directly from the
conviction, whereas under the habitual traffic offender statute no criminal
sanction attaches unless and until the offender elects to operate a motor
vehicle notwithstanding an administrative order revoking his driver’s li-
cense. The matters treated, the immediacy and severity of the penalties,
and the public policy considerations are so different that we cannot find
the classifications unreasonable or lacking in a rational relationship to le-
gitimate state objectives. See Mosgrove v. Town of Federal Heights,
supra.

7 U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Colo. Const. art. Il, § 25.

ee 497

Other aspects of the appellant’s argument that he has been deprived
of equal protection of the laws have been resolved adversely to him in
People v. Scott, 200 Colo. 365, 615 P.2d 680 (1980).

IIL.

The appellant urges that his rights to due process of law were violated
because the DMV failed to insure that he was fully informed of the conse-
quences of driving during the period of revocation as an habitual traffic
offender. He argues that due process requires such a warning when the ad-
ministrative order revoking his license is issued, because of the severity of
the penalty involved for operating a motor vehicle while his license is re-
voked. In People v. Heinz, supra, the defendant charged with Driving
After Judgment Prohibited attacked one of the convictions upon which his
status as an habitual traffic offender had been administratively deter-
mined. The basis for his attack was that, at the time he offered a plea of
guilty upon which the third conviction was based, he was not advised that
his conviction made him subject to enhanced punishment as an habitual
traffic offender. What we said there is applicable by analogy here:

“At the time the defendant entered the plea of guilty which brought about
his third conviction, the enhanced punishment with which he is now faced
was contingent upon his future conduct. The trial judge who accepted that
plea was not required to advise defendant of his continuing duty to act as a
law abiding citizen. Russel v. District Court, 191 Colo. 298, 552 P.2d
297 (1976). We note also that neither the American Law Institute Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, see § 350.4 and comments thereto
(1975), the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Pleas of
Guilty, 14-1.4 (Approved Draft, 1978), nor the American Bar Association
Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge, 6-4.2 (Approved
Draft, 1978), require that a defendant be informed of the possible future
application of habitual offender laws.”

People v. Heinz, 197 Colo. 102, > 589 P.2d 931, 934 (1979).

HE (Our constitution does not require an explanation of every
consequence of a state-conferred status. The requirements of due process
are satisfied by the notice which is given through publication of the stat-
utes. See Vigil v. Motor Vehicle Division, 184 Colo. 142, 519 P.2d 332
(1974). A trial court need not advise an accused of the many legal conse-
quences of a guilty plea, particularly those arising from the accused’s own
future misconduct. People v. District Court, 191 Colo. 298, 552 P.2d
297 (1976). The trial court’s duty to advise the defendant of the conse-
quences of his plea extends only to those consequences which have “a
definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of [a

® “Jt is an axiom as old as jurisprudence, that ignorance of the substantive law is no excuse for a
violation thereof, and the offender must accept the penalties incurred as a consequence of his
transgression.” Kirkendoll v. People, 138 Colo, 267, 270, 331 P.2d 809, 810 (1958).

498 ee

defendant’s] punishment.” People v. Heinz, supra, quoting from
Cuthrell v. Director, 475 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1973). We conclude that
constitutional due process standards do not mandate that notice be given
to persons adjudged habitual traffic offenders under section 42-2-203,
C.R.S. 1973, as to the possible criminal penalty for driving in violation of
an administrative order revoking the habitual traffic offender’s driver’s li-
cense.

We also reject the contention that a gratuitous advisement of the con-
sequences of violation of an order revoking a driver’s license in one habit-
ual traffic offender proceeding requires such an advisement in all other
such proceedings in order to accord equal protection of the law.

IV.

HH The appellant claims the establishment of Driving After Judg-
ment Prohibited as a class 5 felony with mandatory sentencing violates the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amends.
VIII, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 20. This contention has been resolved
adversely to the appellant in our opinion in People v. Scott, 200 Colo.
365, 615 P.2d 680, (1980).

Vv.
The sentence imposed for violation of section 42-2-206, C.R.S.
1973, may not be suspended and probation may not be granted unless the
defendant establishes that he was required to drive because of an “emer-
gency.” Section 42-2-206(1), C.R.S. 1973. The appellant argues that the
section unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof to a defendant, is im-
permissibly vague, and lacks a standard of proof by which to guide a jury
in determining whether an emergency has been proven. While we disagree
with the first two of these contentions, we find merit in the last as it re-
lates to the instant case.
A.

HEM «A defendant has the right to have the state prove every ele-
ment of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jn re Winship, 397 US.
358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); People v. Vinnola, 177 Colo.
405, 494 P.2d 826 (1972). In the instant case, however, the fact of emer-
gency has no bearing on the establishment of the offense. Its sole signifi-
cance is in determining whether an otherwise mandatory sentence may be
suspended or probation granted. Even if an emergency is established, the
court retains the discretion to deny probation and suspension of sentence
and to impose any sentence of confinement authorized for a class 5 felony.
Thus the penalty range is not automatically revised by establishment of an
emergency. Information with respect to an alleged emergency is peculiarly
within the knowledge of the defendant. We conclude that to require the
defendant to prove emergency does not shift the burden of proof with re-
spect to any fact essential to the offense charged contrary to the dictates
of due process of law. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97

eS 499

S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977); Gilbert v. State, Ind.

369 N.Ed.2d 650 (1978); cf. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 US. 684, 95 S.Ct. Ct.
1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975); see generally Note, The Constitutionality
of Affirmative Defenses After Patterson v. New York, 78 Colum. L.
Rev. 655 (1978).

B.

HMB Existence of an emergency does not affect the criminality of the
conduct of driving in violation of section 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973. It does,
however, have a substantial effect on the trial court’s discretion in sentenc-
ing. Acknowledging the importance of the emergency provision, we never-
theless disagree with the appellant’s assertion that it is unconstitutionally
vague. :
An essential of due process is that a statute state its mandate
with reasonable clarity. People v. Blue, 190 Colo. 95, 544 P.2d 385
(1975). The test for vagueness is commonly expressed as whether a statute
describes prohibited conduct in terms such that men of ordinary intelli-
gence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion. See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 US. 385, 46 S.Ct.
126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); People v. Garcia, 197 Colo. 550, 595 P.2d 228
(1979). In the context of this case we are concerned with whether the
meaning of “emergency” is so indefinite that a judge or jury could not ob-
jectively determine whether the mandatory sentence provision of 42-2-206,
C.R.S. 1973, applies.

The legislature is not required to define readily comprehen-
sible and everyday terms which it uses in statutes. People v. Griffith, 197
Colo. 544, 595 P.2d 231 (1979). Thus, terms such as “possession”, “in-
volving”, and “force or violence” have been held sufficiently clear in them-
selves without need of a further statutory definition. See People v.
Griffith, supra; People v. Blue, supra. Neither is a statute which re-
quires the jury to determine a question of “reasonableness” too vague to
afford a practical guide for accepted behavior. People v. Prante, 177
Colo. 243, 493 P.2d 1083 (1972). We conclude that “emergency” has a
sufficiently well understood common meaning® within the context of sec-
tion 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973, to be applied by judge or jury’? without vio-
lating due process rights of the defendant.

® Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary gives the following definition: “1: an unforeseen
combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action 2: a pressing
need: EXIGENCY”

10 In the instant case the defendant requested a jury determination and the prosecution did not ob-
ject. Although the term “emergency” was not defined for the jury, the record does not reflect that
the defendant objected or tendered any proposed instruction defining the term.

500 es

Cc.

TH The statute does not specify the standard of proof which the de-
fendant must meet to establish an “emergency”. In absence of statutory
specification of a different standard, we conclude that the defendant must
prove the existence of an emergency by a preponderance of the evidence.

HH In the instant case the trial judge submitted the question of
emergency to the jury but failed to instruct them on the burden of proof
which the defendant had to meet. We cannot assume that the jury applied
the correct standard.1’ In view of the conflicting evidence the standard
for burden of proof could well have controlled the result. We therefore
hold that this failure was plain error, requiring that the sentence be va-
cated and that the case be remanded to the district court for a new hearing
on the question of emergency using the proper burden of proof. See
People v. Aragon, 186 Colo. 91, 525 P.2d 1134 (1974); People v. Hill,
182 Colo. 253, 512 P.2d 257 (1973).

Although the statute is not explicit, we construe section 42-2-206,
C.R.S. 1973, as requiring the trial judge and not the jury to make the de-
termination regarding the existence of an emergency. This determination
should be made at the sentencing hearing and not as a part of the trial on
the issue of guilt.

We affirm the judgment of the conviction but vacate the sentence and
remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with
the views expressed in this opinion.

JUSTICE LEE does not participate.

1 Because the People had the burden of proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt, the jury may well have placed that same burden on the defendant to prove emergency.

501
No. 79SC305

Leslie Gene Mince y. Darren Lee Butters, by and through his next friend,
Bonnie D. Butters

(616 P.2d 127)

Decided September 2, 1980.

502 CP —C“(tSCis
ee
White and Steele, P.C., R. Eric Peterson, Glendon L. Laird, for
petitioner.

Anderson, Calder & Lembke, P.C., Stephen P. Calder, Gary L.
Calder, for respondent.

En Banc.

JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals in
Butters y. Mince, 43 Colo. App. 89, 605 P.2d 922 (1979). We reverse the
judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to that court for
determination of other issues.

The respondent-plaintiff, Darren Butters (Butters), by and though his
mother as next friend, commenced a tort action against the petitioner-
defendant, Leslie Mince (Mince), as a result of an accident on February 3,
1976. Butters, who was then 14 years old, was riding a bicycle outside a

’ designated bicycle path in an easterly direction on East Sixth Avenue in
Aurora, Colorado, when he was struck by a pickup truck operated by
Mince. Butters sustained several injuries, including a fractured pelvis.
Mince stipulated at trial that he was intoxicated and negligent at the time
of the accident. The only issue submitted to the jury were Butter’s contri-
butory negligence, proximate causation, general and special damages, and
whether punitive damages should be assessed against Mince.

The trial court instructed the jurors, in accordance with Colo. J.I.
5:3, that upon an award of actual damages to Butters, they may then
award a reasonable sum as exemplary damages if satisfied beyond a

eS 503

reasonable doubt that Butters’ injuries were attended by a wanton and
reckless disregard of his rights and feelings. The trial court refused to give
the following instruction tendered by Butters:

“The operation of a motor vehicle by one who is consciously under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor so as to impair the ability of the operator to
drive carefully, is a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety
of others.”

The jury found that Butters was 10% contributorily negligent and
fixed his compensatory damages at $1,500, which were accordingly re-
duced to $1,350.1 The jury also found by special verdict that Mince was
not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of wanton and reckless conduct.

Butters appealed to the court of appeals, alleging that the trial court
erred in refusing his tendered instruction, and that the compensatory dam-
ages awarded by the jury were inadequate. In reversing the judgment the
court of appeals noted that the instruction tendered by Butters “was, in ef-
fect, a request for a directed verdict, taking the issue of wanton and reck-
less disregard from the jury”. Nevertheless, the court held that Butters
was entitled to such an instruction because reasonable persons could reach
only one conclusion based on the evidence: “that [Mince’s] intoxication
constituted wanton and reckless disregard of [Butters’] rights and safety.”
The court of appeals remanded for a new trial on compensatory and exem-
plary damages, but made no determination that the jury’s total award of
$1,500 compensatory damages was inadequate. We conclude that the
court of appeals erred.

I. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

In Colorado exemplary damages are a creature of statute. Sec-
tion 13-21-102, C.R.S. 1973, which is almost identical to the original stat-
ute enacted in 1889, Colo. Sess. Laws 1889, p. 64, provides in pertinent
part:
“In all civil actions in which damages are assessed by a jury for a wrong
done to the person . . . and the injury complained of is attended by cir-
cumstances of . . . a wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s
rights and feelings, the jury, in addition to the actual damages sustained
by such party, may award him reasonable exemplary damages.”
See also C.R.C.P. 101(d). The general purposes of exemplary damages
are punishment of the defendant and deterrence against the commission of
similar offenses by the defendant or others in the future. See, e.g., Frick

+ Section 13-21-111, C.R.S. 1973. The jury also awarded Bonnie D. Butters $1,500 on her claim
against Mince for medical expenses incurred by Mrs. Butters on behalf of her injured son. This
amount was reduced by 10%, representing the percentage of contributory negligence found by the
jury, and by another $894.65, representing the amount of medical bills paid by Mince’s insurance
carrier under the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act (No-fault), section 10-4-701 ef seq.,
CRS. 1973. Mrs. Butters did not appeal this judgment for medical expenses.

504 |

y. Abell, 198 Colo. 508, 602 P.2d 852 (1979); Ark Valley Alfalfa Mills,
Inc, v. Day, 128 Colo. 436, 263 P.2d 815 (1953); French v. Deane, 19
Colo. 504, 36 P. 609 (1894). Consistent with those purposes, section 13-
25-127(2), C.R.S. 1973, requires that the plaintiff establish a claim for
exemplary damages beyond a reasonable doubt.

Butters argues that since his tendered instruction would have been
appropriate for a jury determination of liability under the previously exist-
ing guest statute, section 42-9-101, C.R.S. 1973 (repealed Colo. Sess.
Laws 1975, ch. 379, sec. 1 at 1568), it is proper in this case, where the
standard of culpability for punitive damages is identical to guest-statute li-
ability. We do not agree.

Admittedly, Mince’s operation of a motor vehicle while under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor properly may be viewed as a violation of an
important societal standard of conduct, section 42-4-1202, C.R.S. 1973,
thereby giving rise to an obligation to compensate persons for injuries
caused by that violation. See, e.g., City and County of Denver v. De
Long, 190 Colo. 219, 545 P.2d 154 (1976); Ankeny v. Talbot, 126 Colo.
313, 250 P.2d 1019 (1952); Barsch v. Hammond, 110 Colo. 441, 135
P.2d 519 (1943). In such a case the liability to an injured person flows
from the offender’s action. It is quite another matter, however, to conclude
that in addition to compensation, the defendant should be punished as a
matter of law over and above the amount of just compensation deter-
mined by the jury.

In the context of this case, the infirmity of the tendered instruction is
that it is tantamount to a directed verdict against the defendant on the
plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. The California Supreme Court, in
speaking to this issue, made the following observation which we find per-
suasive:

“A plaintiff, upon establishing his case, is always entitled of right to com-
pensatory damages. But even after establishing a case where punitive
damages are permissible, he is never entitled to them. The granting or
withholding of the award of punitive damages is wholly within the control
of the jury, and may not legally be influenced by any direction of the court
that in any case a plaintiff is entitled to them.” Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal.
143, 173, 116 P. 530, 543 (1911).

See also, e.g., Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 197
P.2d 713’ (1948); Syester v. Banta, 257 Iowa 613, 133 N.W.2d 666
(1965); Malco, Inc. v. Midwest Aluminum Sales, Inc., 14 Wis. 2d 57,
109 N.W.2d 516 (1961); Mader v. Stephenson, 552 P.2d 1114 (Wyo.
1976).

The court of appeals erred in holding, in effect, that Butters
was entitled to a directed verdict on exemplary damages. While the ques-
tion of the sufficiency of evidence to justify an award of exemplary
damages is a question of law, e.g., Reyher v. Mayne, 90 Colo. 586, 10

eS 50s

P.2d 1109 (1932), the allowance or denial of such damages rests in the
discretion of the trier of fact. See, e.g., Bolten v. Gates, 105 Colo. 571,
100 P.2d 145 (1940); Schlessman v. Brainard, 104 Colo. 514, 92 P.2d
749 (1939). “{T]he trier of fact is not required to award punitive damages
in a case in which they are permissible, and it is error for a trial judge to
instruct the jury that punitive damages must be given.” Restatement
(Second) of Torts, § 908, Comment d (1979); accord, C. McCormick,
Damages § 84 (1935); D. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products
Liability Litigation, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 1258, 1337-39 (1976). Thus, we
hold that even where the evidence might irrefutably establish a basis for
exemplary damages, the decision to award such damages is an exclusive
function of the jury, and it would be error for a trial court to direct the
jury to make such an award/?
Il. THE REMAND ON DAMAGES

II In its order of remand the court of appeals ordered a new trial on
compensatory and punitive damages. However, the court of appeals made
no determination of the adequacy or inadequacy of the compensatory
damages awarded to Butters. If the verdict is manifestly inadequate, or so
small in amount as to clearly and definitely indicate that the jury ne-
glected to take into consideration evidence of Butters’ injuries, pain and
suffering, and resulting disability, if any; or if the record indicates that the
jury was influenced by prejudice, passion or other improper considera-
tions; or if the jury was improperly instructed on the elements of compen-
satory damages, then a new trial on the issue of damages would be war-
ranted. See, e.g., Kistler v. Halsay, 173 Colo. 540, 481 P.2d 722 (1971);
Denton v. Navratil, 170 Colo. 158, 459 P.2d 761 (1969); Lewis v. Great
Western Distributing Co., 168 Colo. 424, 451 P.2d 754 (1969); Staples
y. Langley, 148 Colo. 498, 366 P.2d 861 (1961); Lehrer v. Lorenzen,
124 Colo. 17, 233 P.2d 382 (1951); Reynolds v. Farber, 40 Colo. App.
467, 577 P.2d 318 (1978). In the absence of an articulated basis in fact or
law, a new trial on damages would not be justified. The court of appeals
must make this determination based on the record and the contentions of
the parties as set forth in their briefs filed with that court.?

2 A directed verdict on exemplary damages in a comparative negligence case, such as this, creates
the anomaly of determining as a matter of law the defendant’s greater culpability for a wanton
and reckless disregard of others’ rights, while simultaneously submitting to the jury for their con-
sideration the issue whether the defendant should be held responsible to the plaintiff for damages
under the lesser standard of comparative negligence. Generally, punitive damages cannot be
awarded without some form of liability having been established against the defendant. See, e.g.,
Armijo v. Ward Transport, Inc., 134 Colo. 275, 302 P.2d 517 (1956); Ress v. Rediess, 130
Colo. 572, 278 P.2d 183 (1954).

8 Prior to trial Mince made an offer of judgment under C.R.C.P. 68. The trial court assessed cer-
tain costs against Butters because the judgment was less favorable than the offer. The propriety of
the trial court’s order of assessment, which was an issue before the court of appeals, should also be
determined by that court in connection with the issue of the adequacy or inadequacy of damages.

506 |

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to
the court of appeals for further proceedings in accordance with the views
expressed herein.

JUSTICE LEE does not participate.

No. 80SA384

Mary Estill Buchanan y. John Ulvang, Deputy Secretary of State of the
State of Colorado, Donald H. Fisher, Jr., Hearing Officer, State
Department of Administration, Division of Hearing Officers, and Hal
Shroyer

(616 P.2d 130)

Decided September 3, 1980.

Head, Moye, Carver & Ray, John F. Head, James K. Kreutz, for
appellant. . .

Po 507
J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,

Terre Lee Rushton, Assistant, Stephen H. Kaplan, First Assistant, for ap-
pellees.

Marvin Dansky, for appellee Hal Shroyer.

En Banc.

Per Curiam

Il In this discretionary appeal, Mary Estill Buchanan seeks a deter-
mination whether the petition filed by her pursuant to section 1-14-
207(2)(c), C.R.S. 1973, qualifies her as a Republican primary candidate
for the office of United States Senator at the primary election to be held
on September 9, 1980. We accept jurisdiction under section 1-14-212,
C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).

The dispositive issue on this appeal is whether the number of signa-
tures which must be obtained on appellant’s petition should be based on
the number of votes cast in the 1974 or in the 1978 general election for the
Republican Party’s candidate for United States Senator.

Section 1-14-207(2)(c), C.R.S. 1973, when read in conjunction with
the Colorado Election Code of 1963, section 1-1-101, et seq., C.R.S.
1973, including section 1-16-104, C.R.S. 1973, causes us to conclude that
the number of petition signatures necessary to qualify Mary Estill Bu-
chanan for the primary election ballot is at least two percent (2%) of the
votes cast in each congressional district at the 1974 general election for
the Republican Party’s candidate for the office of United States Senator.

We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the cause
to that court for the entry of an appropriate judgment forthwith in accord-
ance with this opinion.

A previous appeal filed on behalf of Mary Estill Buchanan under Su-
preme Court No. 80SA376 is dismissed as moot.

SEPTEMBER _TERM 1980
ae
No. 80SA266

The People of the State of Colorado y. Louis Peoples, Jr.
(616 P.2d 131)

Decided September 8, 1980.

Paul Q. Beacom, District Attorney, Marc P. Mishkin, Deputy, Steven
Barnard, Deputy, for plaintiff-appellant.

Edward L. Kirkwood, for defendant-appellee.

En Bane.

CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an interlocutory appeal brought by the People challenging a
ruling of the trial court suppressing photographs of the defendant’s hands.
We reverse.

The premises of a lumber company were burglarized. Entry was
gained by scaling a barbed wire fence. At the time of the defendant’s ar-
rest for this burglary, it was noted that there were a number of small cuts
on his hands which the police officers believed may have been caused by
contact with barbed wire. Photographs were made of the defendant’s
hands to preserve evidence of their condition at the time of arrest.

The People sought to introduce the photographs at trial, but the trial
court excluded them on two grounds: (1) as violative of the defendant’s
Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination and (2)
for failure on the part of the police to obtain a court order for nontestimo-
nial identification pursuant to Crim. P. 41.1. Defendant also contends that
the taking of these photographs was an unconstitutional seizure in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment.

L

HHI In his brief, attorneys for the defendant concede that the first
basis for suppression of the photographs, violation of the defendant’s Fifth
Amendment privilege, is without merit. The Fifth Amendment protects a
criminal defendant from disclosing knowledge by way of compelled testi-
mony, but it does not prohibit authorities from recording physical charac-
teristics of a person. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct.
1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). In Sandoval v. People, 172 Colo. 383,
388, 473 P.2d 722, (1970), this court followed the Wade rule stating:

“We reject Sandoval’s contention that the taking of photographs of a sus-
pect involves his privilege against self-incrimination. This privilege is con-
cerned with and limited to testimonial compulsion as distinguished from a

es 311

compulsion to exhibit physical characteristics.”
: Il.

Turning to the second basis upon which the district suppressed
the photos, we find that Crim. P. 41.1 is not applicable to nontestimonial
identifications of persons already in police custody pursuant to a lawful ar-
rest.

In Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22
L.Ed.2d 676 (1969), the United States Supreme Court held that taking
persons into custody without probable cause for nontestimonial identifica-
tions was unconstitutional. However, in its opinion, that court did not pre-
clude states from adopting procedures to allow authorities to conduct non-
testimonial identifications on something less than probable cause. Crim. P.
41.1 was adopted to allow police to bring persons into custody for purposes
of a nontestimonial identification if, inter alia, there is probable cause to
believe that an offense has been committed and “reasonable grounds, not
amounting to probable cause,” to suspect the person brought into custody
committed the offense.

In the instant case, however, Crim. P. 41.1 is inapplicable be-
cause the defendant was already in police custody pursuant to a lawful ar-
test based on probable cause. Authorities must obtain a judicial order pur-
suant to Crim. P. 41.1 only when they take someone presently at liberty
into custody for purposes of the nontestimonial identification.

Crim. P. 41.1(b) is wholly consistent with this interpretation of the
rule. Subsection (b) states that an order may be required “prior to the ar-
rest of a suspect, after arrest and prior to trial or . . . during trial.” In
each of those circumstances, the rule presumes that the person to undergo
the identification is at liberty when the identification is sought and not al-
ready lawfully in police custody.

Il.

Finally, the defendant argues that the taking of photographs of his
hands was an unconstitutional seizure in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. We do not agree.

The photographs of the defendant’s hands were taken incident to a
lawful arrest based on probable cause. Such searches have long been ap-
proved by the United States Supreme Court. See Weeks v. United
States, 232 US. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). In United
States v. Robinson, 414 US. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973),
the Supreme Court ruled that a full body search of the defendant incident
to a lawful arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The court stated:
“Tt is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to
search, and we hold that in a case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search
of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that
Amendment.”

512 es

And in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d
685 (1969), the Supreme Court said, ‘‘[W]hen an arrest is made, it is. . .
entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any °
evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or de-
struction.”

I We hold that the taking of photographs of a defendant’s hands
incident to a lawful arrest based on probable cause does not violate the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. See also United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 100 S.Ct. 1244,
63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980).

The ruling of the trial court is reversed.

a
No. 80SA237

The People of the State of Colorado y. Gordon E. Bugg
(616 P.2d 133)

Decided September 8, 1980.

Linda Donnelly, Disciplinary Prosecutor, for Complainant.

Gordon E. Bugg, Pro se.

es 913

En Banc.

JUSTICE ERICKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

This disciplinary proceeding against Gordon E. Bugg (respondent)
was resolved by the Grievance Committee on stipulated facts. The Griev-
ance Committee recommended a six-month suspension with the right to
automatic reinstatement at the expiration of that period. We approve the
recommendation and suspend the respondent for six months from the is-
suance of this opinion. We also order the respondent to pay the costs in-
curred.

The respondent was admitted as a member of the bar of this Court on
October 3, 1967. He has no previous record of professional misconduct ex-
cept for a letter of admonition in 1976. In a stipulation he has admitted vi-
olations of the Code of Professional Responsibility and a breach of his pro-
fessional duties to this Court. He asserted mitigating circumstances before
the Grievance Committee which it accepted as having some impact on the
respondent’s misconduct.

In this case, the respondent was guilty of two serious derelictions
of duty in handling the affairs of two separate clients. The respondent
failed to process an estate for four years, and no justification exists for his
neglect of client’s work. The respondent also failed to communicate with
his clients, causing his clients great inconvenience and unwarranted travel
expenses to determine the status of the estate.

The most severe criticism leveled at the respondent concerns his fail-
ure to file a quiet title action. He represented to his client that a quiet title
action had been filed, when in fact, no action had been filed. He then told
his client that the court had cleared the title, when the title contained a
flaw and was clouded by a quitclaim deed. The respondent intended to
mislead his client and to cause the client to believe that work was done
which was neglected and ignored. Moreover, the respondent’s failure to
complete the quiet title action prevented the property from being sold.

The only mitigating factors brought to our attention relate to the re-
spondent’s family problems at the time that his clients were neglected. The
respondent was burdened with his daughter’s medical problems. Moreover,
his wife, who served as his secretary, eventually divorced the respondent.
His unfortunate marital difficulties may have caused some of the delay in
his law office. The respondent claims that all of these facts tended to dis-
rupt his office practice, but these circumstances do not justify the delay,
expense, and total disregard that respondent showed for his clients’ rights.

The respondent was guilty of neglect of legal matters entrusted
to him. DR 6-101(A)(3). In addition, he was not candid with his clients

514 |

and misrepresented facts relating to the status of his client’s lawsuit. DR
1-102(A)(4). It is also apparent from a review of the stipulation that the
respondent’s conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice. DR
1-102(A)(5). A lawyer owes an obligation to his client to act with dili-
gence in handling his client’s legal work and in his representation of his
client in court. People v. Heyer, 176 Colo. 188, 489 P.2d 1042 (1971).
His conduct violates Rule 241(B), C.R.C.P., and provides grounds for our
disciplinary action.

Accordingly, we order that the respondent be suspended for a period
of six months from the announcement of this opinion, and that he be rein-
stated at the expiration of this period without further order of this Court.
We also order that the respondent pay costs of $316.30 to the Clerk of this

Court within sixty days.

No. 79SA323

Darlene M. Mishek y. Robert P. Stanton
(616 P.2d 135)

Decided September 8, 1980. Rehearing denied September 29, 1980.

515

Sandra I. Rothenberg, for plaintiff-appellant.

Hansen and Breit, P.C., John L. Breit, William H. ReMine, III, for
defendant-appellee.

En Banc.

JUSTICE ROVIRA delivered the opinion of the Court.

The plaintiff-appellant, Darlene M. Mishek (“plaintiff”), brought an
action against the defendant-appellee, Dr. Robert P. Stanton (“defend-
ant”), alleging negligence and battery in providing medical services to the
plaintiff during the birth of her daughter. On the basis of the six-year stat-
ute of limitations contained in section 13-80-105, C.R.S. 1973, the trial
court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff

516 ee

appealed the trial court’s ruling to the court of appeals, and the appeal
was transferred to this court pursuant to sections 13-4-102(1)(b) and 13-
4-110(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I

The childbirth and medical services on which this case are based oc-
curred on March 10, 1966. In her complaint, filed in the trial court on De-
cember 29, 1977, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had been negli-
gent in administering specified medications to her during childbirth
because those medications were administered in overdoses and were “un-
necessary and detrimental to the health and safety” of the plaintiff and
her daughter. The complaint also alleged that certain of the medications
were administered by the defendant without the plaintiff’s informed con-
sent.

Further, the complaint stated that the plaintiff had been “unsuccess-
ful in discovering the nature of [the] medications [administered by the de-
fendant] despite repeated and diligent efforts, until on or about December
30, 1975,” that she had been unaware until that date of the connection be-
tween the medications and the health problems of which she complained,
and that the defendant. had “knowingly and willfully concealed from [the
plaintiff] the type .. . and extent of medication administered to her
prior to and during the birth of her child.”

In his answer, the defendant cited section 13-80-105, C.R.S. 1973, as

a bar to the plaintiff’s causes of action for negligence and battery. Subse-
quently, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on that
statute. The trial court granted the motion, relying specifically on the six-
year limitations period set forth in the final sentence of section 13-80-105,
C.RS, 1973:
“No person shall be permitted to maintain an action, whether such action
sounds in tort or contract, to recover damages from . . . any person li-
censed in this state or any other state to practice medicine . . . on ac-
count of the alleged negligence or breach of contract of such person in the
practice of the profession for which he is licensed or on account of his fail-
ure to possess or exercise that degree of skill which he actually or im-
pliedly represented, promised, or agreed that he did possess and would ex-
ercise, unless such action is instituted within two years after the person
bringing the action either discovered or in the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence and concern should have discovered the seriousness and character of
his injuries and the negligence or breach of contract which gave rise to
such action. In no event may such action be instituted more than six
years after the act or omission which gave rise thereto, except where
the action arose out of the leaving of an unauthorized foreign object
within the body of such person.’’ (Emphasis added.)'

1 The statute at issue has been amended by the legislature and now appears as section 13-80-105,
CRS. 1973 (1979 Supp.). See Colo. Sess. Laws 1977, ch. 198, 13-80-105 at 816 and Colo. Sess.
Laws 1976, ch. 90, 13-80-105 at 527.

es S17

Il.

The complaint and answer in this case clearly set up a genuine issue
of material fact as to the date on which the plaintiff, pursuant to the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the defendant’s al-
leged negligence. See C.R.C.P. 56(c). Nonetheless, for the limited purpose
of his successful argument in support of the motion for summary judg-
ment, the defendant conceded the accuracy of the plaintiff's allegation
that she did not discover the “type . . . and extent” of medications ad-
ministered to her until December 30, 1975. The trial court based its ruling
on this concession of fact, and the defendant has made no contrary argu-
ment on appeal.

Therefore, we will proceed on the basis that no genuine issue of fact
exists with respect to the initial discovery by the plaintiff on December 30,
1975, of the defendant’s alleged negligence. The trial court properly con-
cluded that the plaintiff's cause of action accrued on that date, Owens v.
Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970), and that the statute of
limitations in effect on December 30, 1975, section 13-80-105, C.R.S.
1973, applies to the plaintiff's causes of action, Valenzuela v. Mercy
Hospital, 34 Colo. App. 5, 521 P.2d 1287 (1974).

In this case, the “act or omission” which gave rise to the plain-
tiff’s causes of action occurred on March 10, 1966. The plaintiff's suit,
however, was not instituted until December 29, 1977, more than eleven
years later. In our view, therefore, the trial court was correct in holding
the plaintiff's suit to have been barred by the plain language of the final
sentence of section 13-80-105, C.R.S. 1973, as of March 10, 1972.

TI.

Both in the trial court and on appeal, the plaintiff has argued that the
defendant is equitably estopped from asserting section 13-80-105, C.R.S.
1973, as a bar to her causes of action, on the grounds that he fraudulently
concealed his alleged negligence from her. The plaintiff's theory is that
until December 30, 1975, she discovered neither the nature of the medica-
tions administered by the defendant nor, as a result, his alleged negli-
gence, because she was prevented from reviewing the hospital records
which detailed the types and amounts of those medications.

However, the plaintiff's theory concerning fraudulent conceal-
ment by the defendant is based only on the “mere allegations” of her com-
plaint. See C.R.C.P. 56(e). The complaint contains only an unsupported
statement to the effect that the defendant acted ‘‘knowingly and willfully’’
to conceal the plaintiff's causes of action. At no point in her pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or arguments in opposition to the

518 ee

defendant’s motion for summary judgment has the plaintiff “set forth spe-
cific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” as to the defend-
ant’s alleged fraudulent acts. See C.R.C.P. 56(e). Specifically, the plain-
tiff has neither pleaded nor proved that the defendant was connected with
or responsible for the nonavailability to her of her hospital records. In the
context of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, therefore, the
plaintiff's “mere allegations” of fraudulent concealment by the defendant
are insufficient to set up a genuine issue of fact as to the defendant’s as-
serted fraudulent acts and, accordingly, as to the equitable estoppel urged
by the plaintiff. CR.C.P. 56(e); Fritz v. Regents of the University of
Colorado, 196 Colo. 335, 586 P.2d 23 (1978); Bunger v. Uncompahgre
Valley Association, 192 Colo. 159, 557 P.2d 389 (1976); Norton y.
Dartmouth Skis, Inc., 147 Colo. 436, 364 P.2d 866 (1961).
Iv.

The plaintiff also contends that the application to her of the six-year
statute of limitations contained in the final sentence of section 13-80-105,
C.R.S. 1973, violates the due process clauses of the state and federal con-
stitutions (U.S. Const. amend, XIV; Colo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 15). The
limitations period set out in section 13-80-105 commences to run against a
litigant in the plaintiff's position as of the date of the “act or omission”
which gave rise to her cause of action. It was added to section 13-80-105
during the 1971 Session of the General Assembly, as a companion to the
two-year limitations period contained in the statute, which begins to run
as of the date on which the “person bringing the action either discovered
or in the exercise of reasonable diligence and concern should have discov-
ered the seriousness and character of his injuries and the negligence . . .
which gave rise to such action.” See Colo. Sess. Laws 1971, ch. 232, 87-
1-6 at 952. The plain language of the 1971 act demonstrates a legislative
intent to follow the “strict” rule as to the date on which the new six-year
limitations period commences to run, while applying the “liberal” rule to
the date on which the retained two-year limitations period commences.
See Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970); Rosane y.
Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944).

The general rule is that a statute of limitations, including a
statute which is to be applied retroactively, does not violate due process
“unless the time fixed by the statute is manifestly so limited as to amount
to a denial of justice.” Oberst v. Mays, 148 Colo. 285, 292, 365 P.2d 902,
905 (1961); Town of DeBeque v. Enewold, 199 Colo. 110, 606 P.2d 48
(1980); Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957).
“The legislature is the primary judge of whether the time allowed . . . is
reasonable.” Oberst v. Mays, supra, 148 Colo. at 292, 365 P.2d at 905;
Wichelman v. Messner, supra. In this case, the plaintiff does not con-
tend that the time period subsequent to the passage of the 1971 act within
which she could have brought her cause of action against the defendant

519

(i.e., the period between the effective date of the act, May 22, 1971, and
the date as of which the new six-year limitations period ran with respect to
the plaintiff's cause of action, March 10, 1972) was so unreasonably short
as to violate due process. Rather, she contends that the legislative decision
to commence the running of the new statutory period as of the date of the
defendant’s alleged wrongful or negligent act or omission, i.e., the deci-
sion to follow the “strict” rule with respect to the new limitations period,
constitutes a denial of due process because of the possibility that an in-
jured party’s cause of action might be barred at the end of the applicable
six-year period even though she had not yet become aware of its existence.
We do not agree under the facts of this case.

In our view, the legislative decision implicated in the adoption of
the “strict” rule with respect to the new six-year limitation period con-
tained in section 13-80-105, C.R.S. 1973, is well within the legislative dis-
cretion recognized in Oberst v. Mays and Wichelman vy. Messner,
supra, particularly in view of the fact that one of the primary purposes for
the adoption of statutes of limitations is to “forestall the prosecution of
stale claims.” Colorado State Board of Medical Examiners v.
Jorgensen, 198 Colo. 275, , 599 P.2d 869, 872 (1979), citing
Rosane v. Senger, supra. As pointed out in Clark v. Gulesian, 429 F.2d .
405 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 993, 91 S.Ct. 461, 27 L-Ed.2d
1441 (1971): ‘‘[T]his is a policy decision. The rights are not one-sided .

TIhe state may reasonably recognize that a defendant has an interest in
repose, and in the avoidance of stale claims, however free from fault the
claimant’s delay may be. Such a conclusion does not deprive the plaintiff
of any constitutional right to fair or equal treatment.” Id., 429 F.2d at
406.
Accord, Ornstein v. Regan, 604 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1979).2

Vv

HL As her final argument on appeal, the plaintiff contends that “no
reasonable basis exists for separating medical and healing professionals
from other professionals and lay persons and granting them the special
protection afforded by the six-year maximum statute of limitations” and
therefore section 13-80-105, C.R.S. 1973, violates constitutional provisions
guaranteeing equal protection and the state constitutional prohibition
against special legislation. This argument was rejected in McCarty v.
Goldstein, 151 Colo. 154, 376 P.2d 691 (1962), and the plaintiff, on the
facts of this case and under the statute in effect at the time, has not per-
suaded us to depart from the reasoning or result of that decision. See also
Bailey v. Clausen, 192 Colo. 297, 557 P.2d 1207 (1976); Anderson v.

2 However, we do not reach the question whether a shorter statute of limitations violates due
process.

po

520 CT

Wagner, 79 Ill.2d 295, 37 Ill. Dec. 558, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1980).
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

No. 80SA276-

The People of the State of Colorado vy. Edward E. Dixon
(616 P.2d 103)

Decided September 8, 1980

Linda Donnelly, Disciplinary Prosecutor, for complainant.

Edward E. Dixon, Pro se.

En Banc.

JUSTICE ROVIRA delivered the opinion of the Court.

A formal complaint was lodged with the Supreme Court Grievance
Committee against respondent, Edward E. Dixon, who was admitted to
the practice of law in Colorado on September 16, 1963.

es 521

The complaint evolved from respondent’s attorney-client relationship
with David James, which began in June or July 1978 when he was re-
tained by James to recover the value of his motorcycle which had been
held by a garage in Montrose County.

In December 1978, respondent filed a complaint in the district court,
and James paid him $85 for costs. An answer was filed in January 1979,
and interrogatories were served on respondent at approximately the same
time.

HB Although James answered the interrogatories, the respondent
failed to forward them to defense counsel. In April 1979, after being ad-
vised that a hearing would be held to compel discovery, respondent failed
to appear at the hearing. The civil action was dismissed without prejudice,
and defense counsel was granted judgment against James for $200 for at-
torney’s fees and travel expenses. Respondent was ordered by the district
court to appear on May 10, 1979, to show cause why he should not be held
in contempt. Respondent failed to appear.

In June 1979, the respondent sent $200 to the court to pay the judg-
ment and advised the court, by letter, that he had purchased a business out
of the state and did not intend to renew his license to practice law in 1980.

Between January and April 1979, James tried repeatedly to reach the
respondent by telephone, but with no success. Respondent never told
James that his case had been dismissed and did not return the $85 which
James had given him.

The formal complaint filed with the Supreme Court Grievance Com-
mittee charged respondent with violation of C.R.C.P. 241 B(1) and (5)
(conduct that violates the Code of Professional Responsibility; conduct
that constitutes gross carelessness or gross negligence); DR 6-101 (A)(3)
(neglect of a legal matter); and DR 7-101 (A)(2) (failure to carry out a
contract of employment entered into with a client for professional serv-
ices).

The respondent filed an answer to the complaint but did not appear in
person or by counsel at the evidentiary hearing.

The Grievance Committee made findings and concluded that the alle-
gations of the formal complaint had been proven by clear and convincing
evidence and recommended that respondent’s license to practice law be
suspended for an indefinite period and that he be required to pay the costs
of the grievance proceeding.

Our review of the record supports the findings, conclusions and rec-
ommendations of the Grievance committee. The respondent failed to per-
form his duties and carry out his responsibilities in a manner commensu-
rate with the high standards of professional conduct expected of him.

It is ordered that the respondent Edward E. Dixon be suspended from
the practice of law for an indefinite period and pay the costs of $313.16
incurred in the disciplinary proceedings to the Clerk of this Court within

522 |

sixty days.

Le
No. 80SA290

The People of the State of Colorado v. Roger D. Witt
(616 P.2d 139)

Decided September 8, 1980.

Linda Donnelly, disciplinary prosecutor, for complainant.

Roger D. Witt, Pro Se.

En Banc.

JUSTICE DUBOFSKY delivered the opinion of the Court.

eS 523

The proceedings here are the result of four complaints filed with the
Supreme Court Grievance Committee against respondent, Roger D. Witt,
who was admitted to the practice of law in Colorado on April 7, 1966.
Based upon the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Griev-
ance Committee, we suspend the Respondent from the practice of law for
one year.

The first count in the Grievance Committee’s findings concerns the
Respondent’s agreement to probate an estate. The estate contained suffi-
cient cash to pay the outstanding bills. The Respondent did not open the
estate, nor did he return telephone calls or letters from the Personal Rep-
resentative who was threatened with suit for the deceased’s funeral expen-
ses because the bills had not been paid. After ten months of attempting to
teach the Respondent, the Personal Representative hired another attorney
who paid the bills, the inheritance tax, and closed the estate. The Personal
Representative incurred penalties and interest in the amount of $347.43
because of the Respondent’s neglect.

The subject of the second count was the Respondent’s failure to pro-
ceed with a specific performance action filed in April, 1977. The Respon-
dent filed the action on behalf of a buyer of real property against the seller
who failed to transfer the property. After the action was filed, the client
tried for two years to contact the Respondent. He never obtained a re-
sponse. The client hired substitute counsel who obtained a judgment for
the buyer. The seller, who apparently assumed the law suit had been
dropped because nothing had happened for two years, was angered when
new counsel revived it. The buyer was the victim of numerous instances of
vandalism which he attributes to the seller. There is no direct evidence
linking the Respondent to the vandalism, but the Respondent’s former
client suffered emotional distress.

As described in the third count, the Respondent was hired in Decem-
ber, 1974, to handle a small estate. The Respondent opened the estate,
sold the assets, and notified his client that the estate was ready to close
upon payment of his attorney’s fees. The client paid the fees, but the Re-
spondent never closed the estate. The probate court issued several citations
to show cause why the estate had not been closed, and finally issued a con-
tempt citation. When the client received the contempt citation, he hired
substitute counsel who attempted contact the Respondent but received no
response. Substitute counsel never received the estate documents, and had
to re-do some of the Respondent’s work. The estate was finally closed in
September, 1979. The Respondent’s client incurred additional attorney’s
fees of $500 which were for work he had paid the Respondent to complete.
Again, the client made numerous attempts to call the Respondent, but
none of the calls were returned.

A fourth count involved failure of the Respondent, in a dissolution of
marriage case, to return the calls of his client and to prepare properly for

p

524 ee

a permanent orders hearing. The Grievance committee, noting conflicting
testimony and the lack of any substantial injury to the client, concluded
that the charges in Count IV were not sustained by clear and convincing
evidence.

In addition, the Respondent failed to cooperate with an investigator
for the Grievance committee and failed to respond to the grievance com-
plaints until one day before the hearing. The Respondent gave no explana-
tion for his neglect of legal matters, nor for his failure to respond to client
inquiries.

The complaints alleged that the Respondent’s conduct violated
C.R.C.P. 241(B), DR 1-102(A) (violation of a Disciplinary Rule; conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice; or any other conduct that ad-
versely reflects on an attorney’s fitness to practice law), and DR 6-
101(A)(3) (neglect of a legal matter). Based on the conclusion that the
Respondent’s conduct evidences a pattern of neglect and delay of legal
matters and a total disregard for the necessity of maintaining communica-
tion with his clients, the Grievance Committee recommended that the Re-
spondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year. The Com-
mittee also recommended that the Respondent pay the costs of the
grievance proceedings, reimburse the client described in Count I $347.43
for interest and penalties resulting from the Respondent’s delays, and
reimburse the client described in Count III $500 for additional attorney’s
fees. We accept the Committee’s recommendations.

A license to practice law assures the public that the lawyer who
holds the license will perform basic legal tasks honestly and without undue
delay, in accordance with the highest standards of professional conduct. In
addition, the public has a right to expect that one who engages in profes-
sional misconduct will be disciplined appropriately.

Accordingly, it is ordered that Respondent Roger D. Witt be sus-
pended from the practice of law for one year. In addition, the Respondent
shall reimburse the client described in Count I the sum of $347.43; the
client described in Count III the sum of $500; and pay the costs of
$234.06 incurred in the disciplinary proceedings to the Clerk of this Court
within sixty days. Receipts for the reimbursement to both clients shall be
filed with the Clerk of this Court within sixty days.

525
No. 79SA435

Don McKee, Sally Collins, John Leary, Jeannine Malmsbury and James
A. Cederberg, individually and as the representatives of Qualified
Electors of the City of Louisville, Colorado vy. The City of Louisville, a
Colorado municipal corporation, Howard Berry, Lawrence Caranci,
Anthony De! Pizzo, Eugene Di Carlo, Robert Kelker and Norbert Meier,
as Members of the City Council of the City of Louisville, Colorado, and
John Waschak, as Mayor and Hanover Development Company, Zenith
Builders, Inc., a Colorado corporation, WJS Corporation, a Colorado
corporation, and William & Associates, a Colorado corporation

(616 P.2d 969)

Decided September 8, 1980.

Re)
vay

eS 527

Caplan and Earnest, Gerald A. Caplan, Richard E. Bump, for
plaintiffs-appellants.

Rautenstraus & Joss, Curt D. Rautenstraus, W. Bruce Joss; Musick,
Williamson, Schwartz, Leavenworth & Cope, P.C., Stephen T.
Williamson, for defendants-appellees and special counsel to the City of
Louisville.

French & Stone, Joseph C. French, Robert W. Stone for intervenor-
appellee, Hanover Development Company.

En Bane.

JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal questions the extent to which the legislative body of a
municipality, by adopting an annexation ordinance as an emergency mea-
sure, can thereby curtail the initiative and referendum powers reserved to
the people by Article V, Section 1, of the Colorado Constitution.

The plaintiffs-appellants, Don McKee and four other qualified elec-
tors (electors), commenced this action individually and as representatives
of all qualified electors of the City of Louisville against the members of
the city council, the Louisville mayor, and the City of Louisville. The com-
plaint alleged that the electors’ constitutional rights to referendum and

528 ee

initiative were abridged by the failure of the named Louisville city offi-
cials to refer an annexation ordinance, ordinance 637, to the voters of
Louisville, and by their failure to submit to the vote of the electorate an
initiated measure repealing ordinance 637. After a trial on the merits, the
district court ruled that the electors had no right to either a referendum or
initiative election and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. We reverse
the judgment of dismissal and remand the cause with directions.

On December 13, 1978, Hanover Development company, Zenith
Builders, Inc., WJS Corporation and William and Associates (property
owners) filed a petition with the City of Louisville for annexation of cer-
tain land they had assembled. The land consisted of 1,407 acres which
they intended to develop as both residential property and a regional com-
mercial center known as Centennial Valley Mall. A ‘public hearing on the
proposed annexation was held on February 13, 1979. One week later, on
February 20, 1979, the Louisville City Council introduced and unani-
mously approved on first reading ordinance 637, which purported to annex
the property in question. The ordinance contained an emergency or safety
clause rendering it effective upon its adoption as necessary for the public
health, safety and welfare. No mention of the emergency clause was made
at the February 20 meeting and the ordinance was read by title only. At
this meeting the electors orally requested the city council to refer the ordi-
nance to a vote of the qualified electors of the city. This request was sum-
marily denied and a public hearing on the ordinance was scheduled for 30
days later, March 20, 1979. The electors then filed duly signed petitions
for a referendum with the city clerk. The city council refused to refer the
ordinance to a vote of the electorate.

At the public hearing on March 20, 1979, the electors asked the city
council what they were required to do in order to place the ordinance be-
fore the electorate. The received no response. At the March 20 meeting
the city council unanimously adopted ordinance 637.1

Upon adoption of the ordinance the electors immediately refiled the
referendum petition with the city clerk. On the following day, March 21,
1979, the electors at 8:15 a.m. also filed with the city clerk initiative peti-
tions duly executed by a sufficient number of qualified electors. The initia-
tive petitions proposed a measure to repeal ordinance 637. The city offi-
cials of Louisville refused to submit the initiated measure to the electorate.

The electors, on March 21, 1979, filed an action in the district court
requesting the court to suspend the effect of ordinance 637 and to order a
referendum election, or alternatively, to order the Louisville city officials

1 The city council on March 20, 1979, also adopted ordinance 638, which zoned by section the
property annexed by ordinance 637 for residential, commercial and agricultural uses.

529

to publish the initiated measure and to submit it to a popular election. On
motion of the property owners, the district court permitted them to inter-
vene because of their interest in the matter.2 After a trial on the merits
the court held that the electors had no right to a referendum on the annex-
ation ordinance because the inclusion of the emergency clause exempted it
from the referendum provision of the Colorado Constitution. Colo. Const.
Art. V, Sec. 1. The court also held that the electors had no constitutional
right to an election on the initiated measure because, under the Municipal
Annexation Act of 1965 (Municipal Annexation Act), sections 31-12-101

et seq., 31-12-501, 31-12-601, C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Repl. Vol. 12), neither
the city council nor the electorate have the power to disconnect annexed
land without the consent of the property owners.

On this appeal the electors claim that Article V, Section 1 of the Col-
orado Constitution entitles them to a referendum election on ordinance
637 despite the inclusion of an emergency clause in the ordinance,? or at
least to an initiative election on the proposed repeal measure. We find it
unnecessary to address the electors’ claim regarding a referendum elec-
tion, as the electors were clearly deprived of their constitutional right to
initiative.

Il.

HN “All political power is vested.in and derived from the people,”

and all government originates from the people. Colo. Const. Art. II, Sec.
1; Colorado Project-Common Cause v. Anderson, 178 Colo. 1, 495
P.2d 220 (1972); Hudson v. Annear, 101 Colo, 551, 75 P.2d 587 (1938).
By the express provisions of the Colorado Constitution the people have re-
served for themselves the right to legislate. Colo. Const. Art. V, Sec. 1.
This right is of the first order; it is not a grant to the people but a reserva-
tion by them for themselves. E.g., In re Legislative Reapportionment,
150 Colo. 380, 374 P.2d 66 (1962). The right of initiative pertains to any
measure, whether constitutional or legislative, and, in the case of munici-
palities, it encompasses legislation of every character:
“The initiative . . . powers reserved to the people by this section are
hereby further reserved to the legal voters of every city, town and munici-
pality as to all local, special municipal legislation of every character in or
for their respective municipalities.” Colo. Const. Art. V, Sec. 1.4

2 The electors on this appeal have challenged the order of the district court permitting the prop-
erty owners to intervene under C.R.C.P. 24. In view of our disposition of the case we find it un-
necessary to address this issue.

3 Colo. Const. Art. V, Sec. 1, excepts from the referendum provisions laws necessary for the im-
mediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety.

4 Section 1-40-116, C.R.S. 1973, provides for the submission by qualified voters to the legislative ,
body of a municipality any proposed ordinance, charter, or charter amendment, and also contains
procedures for an election on the proposed measure. Louisville Municipal Code, § 1.16.020, states
that any proposed ordinance may be submitted to the city council upon petition of qualified elec-
tors in the manner provided by the state law.

530 ee

Like the right to vote, the power of initiative is a fundamental right at the
very core of our republican form of government. E. g., Bernzen v. City of
Boulder, 186 Colo. 81, 525 P.2d 416 (1974); Brownlow vy. Wunsch, 103
Colo. 120, 83 P.2d 775 (1938).

This court has always liberally construed this fundamental

tight, and, concomitantly, we have viewed with the closest scrutiny and
governmental action that has the effect of curtailing its free exercise. E.g.
Billings v. Buchanan, 192 Colo. 32, 555 P.2d 176 (1976). Colorado
Project-Common Cause v. Anderson, supra; Burks v. City of
Lafayette, 142 Colo. 61, 349 P.2d 692 (1960); Yenter v. Baker, 126
Colo. 232, 248 P.2d 311 (1952); Baker v. Bosworth, 122 Colo. 356, 222
P.2d 416 (1950). Especially in cases where, as here, the power of referen-
dum is ostensibly unavailable to the people through the constitutional ex-
emption of an emergency clause, nothing short of jealous judicial protec-
tion of the one remaining power of the electorate is in order. We expressly
recognized this responsibility in Van Kleeck v. Ramer, 62 Colo. 4, 156 P.
1108 (1916):
“Under the reserved power of the initiative and referendum, after the dec-
laration by the General Assembly that a law is necessary for the immedi-
ate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, when not referred to
the people for their judgment, it still remains with them if they are dissat-
isfied with it, to cause a measure to be submitted at the next general elec-
tion for its repeal.” 62 Colo. at 13, 156 P. at 1111.

HH Governmental officials have no power to prohibit the exercise of
the initiative by prematurely passing upon the substantive merits of the in-
itiated measure. City of Rocky Ford v. Brown, 133 Colo. 262, 293 P.2d
974 (1956). Nor may the courts interfere with the exercise of this right by
declaring unconstitutional or invalid a proposed measure before the
process has run its course and the measure is actually adopted. City of
Rocky Ford v. Brown, supra; Speer v. People, 52 Colo. 325, 122 P. 768
(1912). Then and only then, when actual litigants whose rights are af-
fected are before it, may the court determine the validity of the legislation.
City of Rocky Ford v. Brown, supra; Speer v. People, supra.

The trial court’s dismissal of the electors’ complaint in this case is
flawed in two respects. First, the court determined that the interest of the
intervening property owners in the annexed property permitted it to rule
upon the validity of the initiated measure before its adoption. And second,
the court based its dismissal upon a premature judicial determination that
the initiated measure, if approved, would be invalid as beyond the legisla-
tive power of the city council and, accordingly, beyond the initiative power
of the electorate.

eS 531

Til.

In rejecting the electors’ claim for a judicially ordered initiative elec-
tion, the trial court ruled that the interests of the intervening property
owners would be adversely affected by the initiated measure and, there-
fore, the court could properly determine the validity of that measure in ad-
vance of its adoption. In so ruling the court rendered an advisory opinion
on a measure not yet affecting the intervenors’ property interests and pre-
empted the initiative process itself.

The initiated measure proposed by the electors is clothed in the

first instance with a presumption of validity, and its actual validity may be
considered by the court only if and when it is adopted into law by the elec-
torate. Rocky Ford v. Brown, supra. In Speer v. People, supra, at 342-
45, 122 P. at 773-774, which dealt with an initiative election on an amend-
ment to the Denver City Charter, this court clearly articulated the opera-
tive principles in these matters:
“The courts have no power to interrupt the process of amendment before
it is complete, to restrain a popular vote upon a constitutional proposal,
even though they may be clearly of the opinion that the popular vote will
be ineffective because of defects already apparent in the method of pro-
posal. They must wait until the amending process is fully completed, and
then pass upon the validity of the amendment if this question is properly
presented in litigation before them. In accordance with this view it would
seem that the courts should compel by mandamus administrative acts inci-
dent to the amending process .. . .””

“Future possibilities, that a measure may be invalid . . ., count for noth-
ing in the presence of the overwhelming necessity of obeying the plain
mandates of the constitution, and of keeping inviolate the distribution of
powers as made until the people themselves, in their sovereign power, see
fit to make a change . . . . Not until the measure is adopted and made a
.part of the charter have the courts any power to determine its validity and
then only when actual litigants, whose rights are affected, are before
them.”

The interests claimed by the intervening property owners in this
case consist of the receipt of various municipal services, such as water
services and police and fire protection, and other benefits incidental to the
zoning of the annexed property. Assuming that such interests might be le-
gally implicated and adversely affected by the initiated repeal of the an-
nexation ordinance — and we intimate nothing in regard td°the validity
of that claim or the propriety of relief in that instance — those interests
do not override the legitimate and fundamental right of the electorate to
seek the only available redress for municipal legislation which to them
may seem unreasonable, burdensome or outrightly offensive.

532 ee

If the repealing measure is not adopted at the initiative election, the
claimed interests of the property owners will not have been affected in any
manner, and the electors will have received their constitutional entitlement
under the initiative clause. If, on the other hand, the repealing measure re-
ceives a majority of the votes cast at the election, section 1-40-113, C.R.S.
1973, the fundamental right of the electors will have been preserved and
the property owners may then, if they so desire, resort to the judicial
process on their claimed abridgement of interest.§

HM Prior to an actual election on the initiated measure, neither due
process of law nor any other constitutional principle serves to elevate the
claimed interest of the intervening property owners to a constitutional ab-
solute. At this stage of the proceedings those interests are entitled to no
more process than that which an initiative election affords them, and the
qualified electors of Louisville are entitled to no less under the Colorado
Constitution. See Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 US.
668, 96 S. Ct. 2358, 49 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1976).

Iv.

In dismissing the electors’ complaint with prejudice the trial court de-
_ termined that “the Louisville City Council has no authority to pass an or-
dinance disconnecting annexed property from the City without the prop-
erty owner’s consent,” and “[s]ince the Louisville City Council cannot
disconnect the intervenors’ property from the City without their consent,
neither can the voters achieve that by initiative.” By so ruling, the trial
court assumed that when the electors filed the initiative petitions with the
city clerk at 8:15 a.m. on March 21, 1979, the property had already been
annexed to the City of Louisville. The trial court’s ruling was predicated

on a questionable assumption.

The initiative petitions were filed with the city clerk on March 21,
1979, before ordinance 637 had yet become effective. The Louisville Mu-
nicipal Code, § 1.16.050, expressly provides that emergency measures
take effect in five days. In fact, when the complaint was filed in this case,
ordinance 637 had not yet been published as required by the Louisville

5 Section 31-12-117, C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Repl. Vol. 12), provides that after the effective date of an
annexation ordinance, all acts taken in conformity with the charter and ordinances of the annexing
municipality remain effective, including subdivision platting and construction and occupancy of im-
provements. See City Council v. Board of Directors of South Suburban Metropolitan
Recreation and Park District, 181 Colo. 334, 509 P.2d 317 (1973); City and County of Denver
y. Board of Directors of Bancroft Fire Protection District, 38 Colo. App. 53, 554 P.2d 714
(1976). The intervening property owners acknowledged during the trial that any steps taken by
them in connection with the development of the land in question would be at their peril, pending
final resolution of this matter. The issue of whether, under the circumstances of this case, the
property owners might acquire any vested rights pursuant to section 31-12-117 is precisely the type
of question which should await the outcome of the election on the initiated measure, when liti-
gants, whose rights are actually affected, are before the court.

eS 533

Municipal Code.* Although we need not and do not decide the issue at this time,
it is strongly arguable that the initiative petitions were more in the nature of a
repeal of a not-yet-effective ordinance than a disconnection of already annexed
property, and thus within the legislative powers of the city council. See Board
of County Commissioners v. City and County of Denver, 190 Colo. 300, 546
P.2d 497 (1976); Board of County Commissioners v. City and County of
Denver, 40 Colo. App. 281, 573 P.2d 568 (1978). The Municipoal Annexation
Act, section 31-12-101 et seq., C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Repl. Vol. 12), is silent on
the power of a municipality to repeal an annexation ordinance. See Board of
County Commissioners v. City and County of Denver, supra.

Th terms of subject matter, the initiated measure in this case re-
lates exclusively to a matter of local interest and concern — the 1,407
acres of property annexed to the city of Louisville. There is no statewide
interest in this particular land. Admittedly, the state does have a general
interest in matters of annexation and disconnection. That interest, how-
ever, centers essentially on procedural uniformity as it relates to the or-
derly growth of urban communities. Section 31-12-102, C.R.S. 1973
(1977 Repl. Vol. 12). The initiated measure here does not facially contra-
vene or usurp any interest of the state. The uniquely local subject matter
of the initiated measure, its clearly legislative character, e.g., City 9
Louisville v. District Court, 190 Colo. 33, 543 P.2d 67 (1975), and the
timely filing of the initiative petitions prior to the effective date of annex-
ation ordinance 637, place the electors’ claim to an initiative election
within the broad powers reserved to the people by Article V, Section 1, of
the Colorado Constitution. See, e.g., Billings v. Buchanan, supra;
Colorado Project-Common Cause v. Anderson, supra; Burks vy. City
of Lafayette, supra; City of Rocky Ford v. Brown, supra; Yenter v.
Baker, supra; Baker v. Bosworth, supra; Van Kleeck v. Ramer,
supra; Speer v. People, supra; see also Associated Home Builders of
the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557
P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976). The validity of the initiated measure,
if approved by the electorate, can await determination at another time
when actual litigants, whose rights are affected, are before the court. Van
Kleeck v. Ramer, supra; Speer v. People, supra.

© Louisville Municipal Code, § 1.16.050, provides in pertinent part:
“All ordinances of a general or permanent nature . . . shall be published in some newspaper pub-
lished within the city limits, Such ordinances shall not take effect and be in force until the expira-
tion of thirty days after they have been so published, except for ordinances . . . necessary to the
immediate preservation of the public health or safety and containing the reasons making the same
necessary in a separate section. The excepted ordinances shall take effect in five days, provided
they have been passed by an affirmative vote of three-fourths of the members of the council.”
Ordinance 637 was published in the Louisville Times under a publication date of March 22, 1979.

534 ee

Vv.

Our holding in this case is a narrow one. Where, as here, quali-
fied voters of a municipality file protest referendum petitions before and
immediately after the adoption of an annexation ordinance by a munici-
pality, and municipal officials reject the referendum petitions on the basis
of an emergency or safety clause incorporated in the ordinance, and imme-
diately after the adoption of the ordinance and before it becomes effective
under the municipal code, the qualified voters file initiative petitions for
the repeal of the annexation ordinance, those qualified voters have a con-
stitutional right to have that initiated measure submitted to the electorate
in accordance with Article V, Section 1, of the Colorado Constitution, and
section 1-40-116, C.R.S. 1973, and municipal officials in such a case must
take all necessary and proper measures to implement the submission of
that measure to the electorate.

The judgment is accordingly reversed and the cause is remanded to
the district court with directions to order an election on the initiated mea-
sure.

JUSTICE LEE and JUSTICE LOHR dissent.

JUSTICE DUBOFSKY does not participate.

JUSTICE LOHR dissenting:

The majority mandates an election on a measure initiated by certain
voters of the City of Louisville to repeal an ordinance annexing lands to
the city. I respectfully dissent.

The powers of initiative and referendum which have been reserved to

the legal voters of every city, town, and municipality by Colo. Const. art.
V, Sec. 1, are not unlimited powers, but rather are powers limited by qual-
ifying language:
“The initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people by this sec-
tion are hereby further reserved to the legal voters of every city, town and
municipality as to all local, special and municipal legislation of every
character in or for their respective municipalities.” (Emphasis added.)

Generally, the exercise of the power of initiative cannot be prevented
by establishing that the proposed initiated law would be unconstitutional
or otherwise invalid if it were adopted. City of Rocky Ford v. Brown,
133 Colo. 262, 293 P.2d 974 (1956); see Speer v. People, 52 Colo. 325,
122 P. 768 (1912).

However, there is a logically necessary exception to the foregoing
tule. Simply stated, where the attempted exercise of the power of initiative
or referendum exceeds the scope of the power reserved to the people, there
can be no exercise of that power. This principle was recognized by this
court in City of Aurora v. Zwerdlinger, 194 Colo. 192, 571 P.2d 1074

eS 535

(1977). There, this court permitted a challenge to a proposed referred
measure in advance of passage where the challenge was based on a conten-
tion that the character of the proposed legislation was not within the con-
stitutionally reserved referendum power. In that case, a judgment was up-
held which declared that a proposed referred law was not within the
referendum power reserved to city voters by Colo. Const. art. II, Sec. 1,
because the law treated matters administrative and not legislative in char-
acter.

The reserved power of initiative is limited to “all local, special and
municipal legislation of every character.” Colo. Const. art. V, Sec. 1. An-
nexation is not a subject of local, special and municipal character; rather it
is a matter of statewide concern within the control of the General Assem-
bly. Ft. Col. Wir. Dist. v. Ft. Collins, 174 Colo. 79, 482 P.2d 986
(1971); Rogers v. Denver, 161 Colo. 72, 419 P.2d 648 (1966). See sec-
tions 31-12-101 to 122, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1977 Repl. Vol. 12). Discon-
nection, or de-annexation, is likewise a matter of statewide concern. See
Rogers v. Denver, supra; sections 31-12-501 to 503 31-12-601 to 605,
and 31-12-701 to 707, C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1977 Repl. Vol. 12).

In Ft. Col. Wtr. Dist. v. Ft. Collins, supra, this court stated:

“The first fundamental precept in answer to the plaintiffs’ contentions is
that, in the absence of express constitutional provisions to the contrary, the
general assembly has unlimited power over annexation of territory by mu-
nicipalities; and even the legislative denial of the rights to notice and to
vote upon annexation is not a denial of due process of law or the equal pro-
tection of the laws. . . .”

In Rogers v. Denver, supra, this court adopted the general rule that in
the absence of express constitutional provisions to the contrary the power
of a state legislature over the boundaries of municipalities of the state is
plenary. See also Mayor v. Shattuck, 19 Colo. 104, 34 P. 947 (1893).

Fundamental to the foregoing principles is the basic concept that mu-
nicipalities exist for the convenient administration of government and are
merely instrumentalities created to carry out the will of the state. In
Commissioners y. Denver, 150 Colo. 198, 372 P.2d 152 (1962), this
court quoted from Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 40, 52
L.Ed. 151, (1907), where it was said:

“The state, therefore, at its pleasure may . . . expand or contract the
territorial area (there of a city), unite the whole or a part of it with an-
other municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this
may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent
of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the State
is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state con-
stitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitu-
tion of the United States. . . . The power is in the State and those who
legislate for the State are alone responsible for any unjust or oppressive

536 |

exercise of it.

The General Assembly, in accordance with its plenary power over
municipalities, enacted comprehensive legislation providing for the cre-
ation and organization of municipal corporations, annexation to munici-
palities, consolidation of municipalities, disconnection from municipalities,
and discontinuance of municipal corporations. See generally articles 2, 3
and 12 of title 31, C.R.S. 1973. The statutes relating to annexation and
disconnection provide the framework and control the method by which
these objectives may be accomplished. They substantively delineate who
may challenge the procedural compliance with the statutory mandates. Ft.
Col. Wtr, Dist v. Ft. Collins, supra. Since these statutes are binding on
municipalities generally, including home rule cities and towns (Colo.
Const. art. XX), the municipal legislative bodies are bound to follow the
statutory mandates. It follows that the legal voters of the municipalities
are without power to initiate an ordinance that is beyond the power of the
municipal legislative body to enact. In my view, it cannot be reasonably
contended that annexation to or disconnection from a municipality is a
subject of “local, special and municipal character” concerning which the
limited powers of initiative and referendum may be exercised by the voters
of a city. Therefore, the power of initiative in the voters of the City of
Louisville does not extend to annexations and disconnections.

The majority does not reach the question whether the power of refer-
endum is available with respect to the annexation ordinance which the
plaintiffs seek to repeal. By parity of reasoning, the above discussion dem-
onstrates that it is not.

There is a second reason that referendum is unavailable. Excepted
from the power of referendum in our constitution are “laws necessary for
the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety.” The an-
nexation ordinance which the plaintiffs seek to undo contains a legislative
declaration that it is necessary for those very purposes. This legislative de-
termination is conclusive upon this court and is not subject to judicial re-
view. E.g., Lyman v. Town of Bow Mar, 188 Colo. 216, 533 P.2d 1129
(1975); Shields v. City of Loveland, 74 Colo. 27, 218 P. 913 (1923). We
have recognized previously that an emergency clause may appropriately be
included in an annexation ordinance. See Board of County
Commissioners v. City and County of Denver, 193 Colo. 211, 565 P.2d
212 (1977).

The constitution itself reflects that the powers of initiative and refer-
endum do not extend to the proposed legislative action involved in the in-
stant case. We should be not less scrupulous in enforcing express limits on
constitutionally protected rights than in permitting full and free exercise
of those rights within such limits.

I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

es 937

Iam authorized to say that JUSTICE LEE concurs in this dissent.

be
No. 80SA248

The People of the State of Colorado v. Hubert E. Hurst
(618 P.2d 1113)

Decided September 15, 1980.

Linda Donnelly, Disciplinary Prosecutor, for complainant.

No appearance for attorney-respondent.

En Banc.
JUSTICE LEE delivered the opinion of the Court.

A formal complaint was filed with the Supreme Court Grievance
Committee against the respondent, Hubert E. Hurst, charging him with
professional misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility. :

The whereabouts of the respondent being unknown, notice of these
proceedings was given in accordance with the provisions of the Colorado

538 ee

Rules of Civil Procedure C.R.C.P. 4(g)(2). Respondent failed to answer or
otherwise plead to the charges against him. His default was entered and
the matter proceeded to a formal hearing.

The hearing panel of the grievance committee found that respondent
had been admitted to the practice of law in Colorado on October 20, 1960.
It also found that on three previous occasions the respondent had engaged
in conduct substantially similar to that described hereinafter, and that the
Supreme Court of Colorado had suspended respondent indefinitely from
the practice of law on June 7, 1979.

The complaint in the present case charged that the respondent
undertook the defense of his client in an action brought by a bank to col-
lect moneys owing for overdrafts in the sum of $2,534.80. The respondent
filed an answer to the complaint and the matter was set for pretrial con-
ference and for trial. Respondent failed to appear at the pretrial confer-
ence and the trial date was vacated. The court then ordered the parties to
submit a stipulated pretrial order and trial was reset for September 14,
1976. Prior to that date, apparently without his client’s: knowledge or con-
sent, respondent and opposing counsel agreed to a settlement whereby re-
spondent’s client would pay the bank a total of $2,500 at $100 per month,
commencing October 15, 1976. Both attorneys appeared in court on Sep-
tember 14, at which time the trial date was vacated and the court ordered
that a written stipulation of settlement be filed.

Although a proposed stipulation was mailed to respondent, he failed
to respond. The time for the first payment having elapsed, opposing coun-
sel wrote a letter to respondent suggesting that the stipulation be amended
to allow respondent’s client to make the monthly payments on the agreed
amount commencing at a future date. Respondent failed to answer this
letter.

As a result of a chance meeting in the courthouse between counsel,
opposing counsel agreed to prepare the new stipulation providing for pay-
ments on the agreed settlement amount, commencing on March 1, 1977.
The second stipulation was prepared and mailed to respondent, who again
failed to reply. Being unable to contact respondent, opposing counsel again
caused the matter to be set for pretrial conference, on November 11, 1977,
and for trial, on January 6, 1978. Notice of these dates was mailed to re-
spondent, who failed to appear at the pretrial conference.

Further notices were sent by certified mail to respondent and his
client at their last known addresses, advising them of the trial date. Both
notices were returned as undeliverable.

The record shows that in March of 1976 respondent’s client had sold
his home in Lakewood and apparently no longer resided at that address, to
which pretrial notice and notice of trial had been mailed. Subsequently,
the client moved to Durango.

es 539

Neither the respondent nor his client appeared at the trial and a judg-
ment was entered for $3,044.37. A citation for the appearance of respon-
dents’ client was served on the client on August 4, 1978, and when he
failed to appear a warrant was issued and the client was thereafter ar-
rested.

The client employed new counsel and a motion to set aside the judg-
ment was filed. This motion was denied. The client satisfied the judgment
in December of 1979.

At the grievance committee hearing, the client testified that he had
not authorized, nor had he been informed of, the settlement which ap-
peared to have been agreed upon by his attorney and opposing counsel.

Based on the foregoing findings, the grievance committee concluded
that it had been established by clear and convincing evidence that: respon-
dent neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by his client, in violation of
disciplinary rule DR 6-101(A)(3); respondent, by his irresponsibility and
callous indifference in the handling of his client’s affairs, engaged in con-
duct that adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law, in violation of
disciplinary rule DR 1-102(A)(6); and, further, respondent had engaged
in conduct that constitutes gross carelessness or gross neglect in his capac-
ity as an attorney, in violation of C.R.C.P. 241 B(5).

In our view, the findings and conclusions of the grievance committee
are amply supported by the evidence. Respondent’s record of unprofes-
sional conduct convincingly demonstrates his unfitness to practice law, and
we conclude that for the protection of the public respondent should be re-
moved from the roll of attorneys.

We thus concur in the recommendation of the grievance committee,
and order: that respondent be disbarred; that he not be permitted to apply
for readmission to the Bar of Colorado until the expiration of eight years
from and after the effective date of his disbarment; that he not be read-
mitted to the Bar of Colorado unless he can show, under such procedures
and standards as then may be applicable, rehabilitation, fitness to prac-
tice, competence, and compliance with all applicable disciplinary or disa-
bility orders and rules; and that he be assessed the costs of these proceed-
ings in the sum of $384.14 and that he be required to pay the same within
sixty days from the date hereof.

CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES does not participate.

3

No. 79SC139

First National Bank of Southglenn, a national banking corporation y.
Energy Fuels Corporation, a Colorado corporation

(618 P.2d 1115)

Decided September 15, 1980. Rehearing denied November 3, 1980.

=
t
wo

542 Ce)
See]

Jim Travis Tice, for petitioner.

Sharp and Black, P.C., Mary Jane Simmons, for respondent.

En Banc.
JUSTICE ERICKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals’ decision in
Chatfield Bank v. Energy Fuels Corp., et al., 42 Colo. App. 233, 599
P.2d 923 (1979). The court of appeals interpreted the redemption statute,
section 38-39-103(1), C.R.S. 1973, as granting to a judgment creditor of
one joint tenant a right to redeem the entire property from a foreclosure
sale ahead of lienors who held deeds of trust which were filed after the
judgment lien but were executed by both joint tenants on the entire prop-
erty. We reverse, and remand to the court of appeals with directions.

Ben and Kathleen Pickering owned residential real property in joint
tenancy. The respondent, Energy Fuels Corporation (Energy Fuels), held
a judgment lien against Ben Pickering. Subsequently, Ben and Kathleen
Pickering executed a second deed of trust to Chatfield Bank and a third
deed of trust to the petitioner, First National Bank of Southglenn
(Southglenn Bank).

The redemption issue was triggered when the Pickerings defaulted on
a first deed of trust, and the holder of the deed of trust foreclosed. Energy
Fuels, Chatfield Bank, and Southglenn Bank filed timely notice of their
intent to redeem the real property, and deposited with the public trustee
the required. sums to effect redemption. The public trustee concluded that
Energy Fuels had the first right to redeem the entire property because its
judgment lien was filed first. Chatfield Bank, followed by Southglenn
Bank, was entitled to the subsequent redemption rights in the public

ee 4a

trustee’s opinion.

As a result, Chatfield Bank filed suit in the district court to restrain
Energy Fuels’ attempt to redeem Kathleen Pickering’s interest in the prop-
erty ahead of Chatfield Bank and Southglenn Bank. The district court
held that Energy Fuels’ right to redeem was limited to the undivided inter-
est in the property belonging to Ben Pickering. The district court further
found that Chatfield Bank, followed by Southglenn Bank, held the first
right to redeem Kathleen Pickering’s interest in the real property.

The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that Energy
Fuels had priority to redeem the entire property because its judgment lien
was filed first. The court of appeals also held that Chatfield Bank and
Southglenn Bank must pay Energy Fuels the amount of the judgment debt
owed by Ben Pickering if they sought to redeem the property.

We hold that Energy Fuels only possesses the first right to redeem
Ben Pickering’s undivided interest in the property and that Southglenn
Bank may redeem Kathleen Pickering’s undivided interest without paying
Ben Pickering’s debt to Energy Fuels.’ In concluding that Energy Fuels
had no lien prior to Southglenn Bank on Kathleen Pickering’s undivided
interest, we rely on the language and purpose of the redemption statute.

Section 38-39-103(1), C.R.S. 1973, provides the relevant pro-
cedure for lienors to redeem real property after public sale. A creditor
holding the senior lien “on the sold premises or some part thereof subse-
quent to the lien upon which the sale was held may redeem” the real prop-
erty by reimbursing the purchaser of the property. Jd. (Emphasis added.)
Subsequent lienors may also redeem by paying the previous redeemer “all
redemption amounts theretofore paid with interest and the amount of all
such liens with interest prior to his own . . . . Id. (Emphasis added.)?

As a judgment creditor of Ben Pickering, Energy Fuels pos-
sessed the right to file a lien against his property. Section 13-52-102(1),
C.R.S. 1973. A judgment lienor is entitled to redeem property from a

+ Chatfield Bank was the original plaintiff in this action, but only Southglenn Bank petitioned this
Court for certiorari after the court of appeals decision. In this opinion, we only consider the respec-
tive redemption rights of Energy Fuels and Southglenn Bank, assuming that Chatfield Bank no
longer intends to redeem.

2 Section 38-39-103(1), C.R.S. 1973, provides in full, that:

“If no redemption is made within the redemption period provided for in section 38-39-102, the en-
cumbrancer or lienor having the senior lien, according to the records of the county clerk and re-
corder’s office of the county where the real estate is situate, on the sold premises or some part
thereof subsequent to the lien upon which such sale was held may redeem within ten days after the
expiration of the above redemption period by paying the amount required by section 38-39-102,
and each subsequent encumbrancer and lienor in succession shall have and be allowed a five-day
period to redeem, according to the priority of his lien, and may redeem within the five-day period
allotted to him by paying all redemption amounts theretofore paid with interest and the amount of
all such liens with interest prior to his own held by such persons as are evidenced in the manner
required in this section or, if no encumbrancer or lienor prior to himself has redeemed, by paying
the amount required in section 38-39-102.”

544 es

public trustee sale. Patterson v. Serafini, 187 Colo. 209, 532 P.2d 965
(1974). According to the plain language of section 38-39-103(1), Energy
Fuels, possessing a lien on “some part” of the sold premises (Ben Picker-
ing’s interest), holds the first right to redeem Ben Pickering’s interest in
the real property. If Energy Fuels had been the only lienor seeking to re-
deem, or the only person with the right to redeem, it could redeem the
whole property. Leach v. Torbert, 71 Colo. 85, 204 P. 334 (1922);

Walker v. Wallace, 79 Colo. 380, 246 P. 553 (1926); Section 38-39-
103(1), C.R.S. 1973. In this case, however, another lienor — Southglenn
Bank — also has a first right to redeem an interest in the real property.

Southglenn Bank holds a right to redeem the real property because of
the debt owed jointly by the Pickerings. Enérgy Fuels contends that South-
glenn Bank must pay Energy Fuels the full amount of its lien held
against Ben Pickering’s interest in the real property to comply with the re-
demption statute. The conclusion urged by Energy Fuels contradicts the
plain language of the statute.

HB The redemption statute requires a junior lienor to pay all liens
“prior to his own” held by prior redeemers before redeeming the property.
Section 38-39-103(1), C.R.S. 1973. Section 13-52-102(1), C.R.S. 1973,
states that a properly filed lien attaches to the real property of a judgment
debtor.? This statute, detailing the real property subject to execution, does
not allow a judgment creditor of one joint tenant to enforce his claim
against the property interest of the other joint tenant. See Ziegler v.
Bonnell, 52 Cal.App.2d 217, 126 P.2d 118 (1942); Neyrey v. Cavallino,
316 So.2d 866 (La. App. 1975). With a judgment against Ben Pickering,
Energy Fuels’ lien attached only to his undivided interest in the real prop-
erty. Energy Fuels had no lien on Kathleen Pickering’s interest in the real
property. Southglenn Bank’s lien, which secured a joint debt, attached to
both Ben and Kathleen Pickering’s interests. Southglenn Bank held the
only lien on Kathleen Pickering’s interest in the property. Therefore, we
‘hold that no liens existed on Kathleen Pickering’s interest prior to Southglean
Bank, and Southglenn Bank may redeem her interest in the property without
paying the amount of Ben Pickering’s debt to Energy Fuels.

3 Section 13-52-102(1), C.R.S, 1973, states in full, that:
“All goods and chattels, lands, tenements, and real estate of every person against whom any judg-
ment is obtained in any court of record, either at law or in equity, for any debt, damages, costs, or
any other sum of money are liable to be sold on execution to be issued upon such judgment. The
transcript of the docket entry of any judgment in the judgment docket, certified by the clerk, may
be filed with the recorder of any county; and from the time of filing such transcript the judgment
shall become a lien upon all the real property of such judgment debtor, not exempt from exe-
cution in such county, owned by him or which he may afterwards acquire until said lien expires.
The lien shall continue for six years from the entry of judgment unless the judgment is previously
satisfied.” (Emphasis added.)

es 545

Our decision is consistent with the law governing real prop-
erty held in joint tenancy. Rights in real property held in joint tenancy are
fixed and vested in the joint tenants at the time of the creation of the ten-
ancy. In re Estate of Lee v. Graber, 170 Colo. 419, 462 P.2d 492 (1969);
Smith v. Greenberg, 121 Colo. 417, 218 P.2d 514 (1950). A joint tenant
cannot alienate, encumber, or transfer the interest of other joint tenants
without their consent. Sullivan’s Estate v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949). Until the joint tenancy is severed,
each joint tenant owns an undivided interest in the real property as a
whole. C. Smith, Real Property Survey 114 (1956). A joint tenancy is
severed by destroying one of the four necessary unities of time, title, inter-
est, and possession, either by operation of law, by death, or by the acts of
one joint tenant without the consent of the other tenants. 4 Thompson on
Real Property § 1780 (1976 Repl. Vol.).

= When a joint tenant severs the tenancy by conveying his in-
terest without the consent of the other joint tenants, he causes the person
acquiring his interest to become a tenant in common with the remaining
tenants. Jd. The same result occurs when the interest of a joint tenant in
real property is subject to execution and sale by a judgment creditor. 4A
Powell on Real Property 618 at 676 (1979). The joint tenancy is se-
vered by operation of law by the execution sale and the purchaser becomes
a tenant in common with the remaining tenants. See 2 American Law of
Property § 6.2 at 10 (1952). After the execution sale, the property may
be partitioned. Section 38-28-101, C.R.S. 1973. If the partition prejudices
any interested party, a court may order the sale of the real property and
each co-owner will receive their aliquot share of the sale price. Section 38-
28-107, C.R.S. 1973. A judgment creditor must recognize that his rights
against one joint tenant do not grant him the right to levy an execution
against the other joint tenants.
“The individual interest of one joint tenant is subject to levy upon execu-
tion against him. While interest of a joint tenant is subject to levy, it is not
severed until sale. Such interest may be sold without making the other co-
parceners parties to the action. The levy and sale operate as a severance of
the joint tenancy, and the purchaser at the sale becomes a tenant in com-
mon with the other owners.”
4 Thompson on Real Property, supra, § 1780 at 37-39. The real prop-
erty interest of two joint tenants cannot be used to satisfy the judgment
creditor of one joint tenant.

Even though the Pickerings owned real property in joint ten-
ancy, Kathleen Pickering’s interest could not be used to satisfy Ben Pick-
ering’s debt. If the Pickerings had not defaulted on their first deed of
trust, Energy Fuels could only enforce its lien through a judicial sale and
could only cause Ben Pickering’s interest to be sold. The purchaser at the
sale would then become a tenant in common with Kathleen Pickering. See

546 ee

Carmack v. Place, 188 Colo. 303, 535 P.2d 197 (1975). Energy Fuels, as a
judgment creditor, cannot obtain more through redemption than it could
by execution, or by other means.

Energy Fuels relies on Walker v. Wallace, 79 Colo. 380, 246 P. 553
(1926), which held that a judgment creditor of one of two tenants in com-
mon of land had the right to redeem the entire property. While Walker
provides some guidance for our decision, there are important factual dis-
tinctions. The applicable redemption statute in 1926 was markedly differ-
ent from section 38-39-103(1), C.R.S. 1973.5 Also, Walker concerned
only one creditor seeking to redeem. This case involves competing lien-
holders who each possess a superior lien on separate interests of real prop-
erty held in joint tenancy.

The policy underlying statutory redemption supports our con-
clusion. In Walker vy. Wallace, supra at 382, we stated that, “a liberal
construction is to be given the statute allowing redemption, to the end that
all property of a debtor may pay as many debts as possible.” The statute
seeks to benefit both debtors and creditors by reducing the property
owner’s debt while satisfying every possible creditor through the continual
redemption of the same piece of real property. As in Walker, we seek to
insure that as many debts as possible are paid by allowing both Energy
Fuels and Southglenn Bank to redeem the real property according to their
respective liens.

Our approach furthers this policy by allowing both Ben and Kathleen
Pickering to reduce their joint and separate debts while enabling their
creditors to partially satisfy their claims. Otherwise, Kathleen Pickering
would be severely prejudiced because her creditor would be forced to pay
off Ben Pickering’s debt before collecting her debt. The court of appeals
decision detracts from this policy by allowing Kathleen Pickering’s prop-
erty to be used to satisfy Ben Pickering’s debt while her debt remains un-
paid.

Accordingly, we hold that Energy Fuels may redeem Ben Pickering’s
interest in the real property and that Southglenn Bank may redeem Kath-
leen Pickering’s interest in the property.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded to the Colorado Court of
Appeals with directions to reinstate the judgment of the District Court of
Arapahoe County.

4 We stated in Walker that, “property which has been sold in an execution sale in its entirety or
en masse, if redeemed at all, must be redeemed en masse.” Walker v. Wallace, 79 Colo. at 384.
5 Section 5951, Compiled Laws of Colorado 1921 stated that the redeeming lienor must only pay
“the amount of money for which said premises shall have been sold.” Section 38-39-103(1), C.R.S.
1973, requires this lienor to also pay the “amount of liens prior to his own.” This “prior to his
own” language forms the basis of our decision and was not present in Walker.

es 541
JUSTICE LOHR dissents.
CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES and JUSTICE LEE do not participate.

JUSTICE LOHR dissenting:

The majority construes section 38-39-103, C.R.S. 1973, to permit
partial redemption from a real property foreclosure sale. I respectfully dis-
sent.

The facts are stated in the majority opinion.

The right of redemption from a real property foreclosure sale is
purely statutory. Walker v. Wallace, 79 Colo. 380, 246 P. 553 (1926).
Thus, we must look to the statute to determine the characteristics of that
right. The amount to be paid to effect redemption is specified:

“TThe redeeming encumbrancer or lienor] may redeem . . . by paying

all redemption amounts theretofore paid with interest and the amount of
all such liens [liens used to effect prior redemptions] with interest prior to
his own . . . .” (Emphasis added.)

Section 38-39-103(1), C.R.S. 1973.

The redemption amounts include “the sum for which the property
was sold, with interest from the date of sale at the rate specified in the
original instrument, together with any taxes paid or other proper charges
as now provided by law, . . . .” Section 38-39-102, C.R.S. 1973.1 They
also include amounts paid by prior encumbrancers or lienors to effect re-
demption. Section 38-39-103, C.R.S. 1973. The statute does not authorize
the holder of a judgment lien on the interest of one of two joint tenants to
redeem such interest by paying half of the redemption amounts.

The clear prescription of the amount to be paid removes any ambigu-
ity in the term “liens... prior to his own.” Section 38-39-103(1),
C.R.S. 1973. Because redemption of the entire interest sold at foreclosure
sale by payment of all redemption amounts is the only form of redemption
contemplated by the statute, a lien on any part of those rights is prior to a
later lien on all of those rights.

Section 38-39-103(1), C.R.S. 1973, allows a creditor holding a lien
“on the sold premises or some part thereof’ (emphasis added) to redeem
from the foreclosure sale. The majority concedes that a creditor with a lien
on an undivided interest in a parcel may redeem the entire parcel from a
foreclosure sale as long as no other redemption rights exist based on liens
encumbering other undivided interests. If such other redemption rights ex-
ist, however, the majority concludes that the entire scheme for redemption
changes, each lienor being permitted to redeem only the interest to which

1 The statute as amended now requires payment of interest at the default rate if specified in the
original instrument. Section 38-39-102, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.).

548 ee

his lien extends. Yet the statute, explicit in its recognition of redemption
by those holding interests in “some part” of the sold premises, nowhere
provides for the proportional redemption scheme envisioned by the major-
ity.

For many years we have recognized that the holder of a judgment lien

on an undivided interest in real property may redeem the entire property
from a sale in foreclosure of a prior lien on the entire property. Moreover,
he must redeem the entire property if he is to redeem at all; partial re-
demption is not permitted. Walker v. Wallace, supra; see Chain
O’Mines, Inc. v. Williamson, 101 Colo. 231, 72 P.2d 265 (1937); Leach
v. Torbert, 71 Colo. 85, 204 P. 334 (1922); Bailey v. Erny, 68 Colo. 211,
189 P. 18 (1920). In Walker v. Wallace, supra, we stated that, under the
statute then in effect, “that property which has been sold in an execution
sale in its entirety or en masse, if redeemed at all, must be redeemed en
masse.” 79 Colo. 380, 384, 246 P. 553, 554 (1926). We went on to hold:
“As Walker was obligated to pay, if he redeemed, the entire amount for
which the land had been sold, together with interest, and as there is no
provision in our statute for a redemption at all except by payment of the
entire sum, and not a moiety of that sum, for which the land was sold at
the sale redeemed from, it follows necessarily that he may redeem, if at
all, in whole only. To the same effect is Martin v. Sprague, 29 Minn. 53,
11 N.W. 143; O’Brien v. Krenz, 36 Minn. 136, 30 N.W. 458; Sharpe v.
Baker, 51 Ind. App. 547, 571, 96 N.E. 627, 99 N.E. 44.”
79 Colo. 380, 385, 246 P. 553, 554-5 (1926). See F. Stork and D. Sears,
Colorado Security Law 218 (1955). Changes in the statutes since the
cited cases were decided have not extended to authorization of partial re-
demption.

Although statutory content governs the results of statutory redemp-
tion cases, it is worthy of note that the general rule is “that a mortgage is
an entire thing, and must be redeemed as such, and that the mortgagee
cannot be compelled to divide his debt and his security.” 9 G. Thompson,
Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property 745 (1958); see
52 Mich. L. Rev. 312 (1953); 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages § 886 (1971);
59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 834 (1949).

The majority correctly points out that to require First National Bank
of Southglenn to pay the amount secured by Energy Fuels’ lien on Ben
Pickering’s interest as a condition to redeeming from the sale of Kathleen
Pickerings’ interest utilizes Kathleen Pickering’s property interest to re-
duce Ben Pickering’s debt. However, the construction adopted by the
majority leads to other problems not raised as issues in this case. It

2 Walker was a judgment lienor of one of the two cotenants whose interests had been sold in pro-
ceedings to foreclose a mortgage on the cotenants’ interests. The mortgage was prior to Walker's
judgment lien.

549

subjects the original purchaser at the foreclosure sale to the prospect of
becoming a co-owner with a lienor who redeems less than all of the prop-
erty interests sold. This leaves the original purchaser with a property inter-
est of uncertain value* and marketability. The prospect of such a result,
against which a first lienor has no means of protection, cannot have a fa-
vorable effect on commercial transactions.

In no area of the law are certainty and predictability more important
than in the law of real property. Numerous and important commercial
transactions occur daily based upon the predictability of legal conse-
quences of documents and relationships. The statute which we construe in
this case does not contemplate partial redemption. In electing to prohibit
partial redemption, the legislature had conflicting policies and interests to
evaluate. Their choice is clearly expressed, and is confirmed by case law of
long standing. Walker v. Wallace, supra. I would not warp the statute in
an effort to avoid a result which may not be fully equitable to all parties in
this case.

I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

Nos. 79SC64 & 79SC14

Charles B. Bailey and Robert Edwards y.
The People of the State of Colorado

(617 P.2d 549)

Decided September 15, 1980.

2 It requires no appraisal expertise to conclude that an undivided one-half interest in a piece of
real property is not worth one-half the value of the entire real property.

550 a
|
Leo W. Rector, Neil C. Bruce, Rector, Retherford, Mullen &
Johnson, for petitioner, Charles B. Bailey.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Nicholas R. Massaro, Jr.,
Deputy, for petitioner, Robert Edwards.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy,
Mary J. Mullarkey, Solicitor General, Lynne Ford, Assistant Attorney
General, Litigation Section, for respondent.

En Banc,

JUSTICE DUBOFSKY delivered the opinion of the Court.

We accepted certiorari to review the court of appeals’ decision in
People v. Bailey, 41 Colo. App. 504, 595 P.2d 252 (1978), affirming the
petitioners’ convictions for bribery of a public official under section 18-8-
302, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). We reverse.

Petitioner Robert Edwards was employed by the Colorado Springs
Urban Renewal Effort (CURE), an urban renewal authority organized
under section 31-25-101, et seg., C.R.S. 1973. Petitioner Charles Bailey
contracted with CURE to perform demolition work on its Alamo Plaza
project. Under the contract, Bailey was entitled to all salvageable property
left in the project area when Edwards, acting for CURE, issued him a
“Notice to Proceed.” Bailey subcontracted the salvaging portion of the
demolition contract to Donald Reinhard. Bailey and Reinhard shared the

es 5st

proceeds from the sale of the salvaged property.

Reinhard was granted immunity and appeared as the prosecution’s
chief witness. He testified that he was dissatisfied with the quality of the
salvage left after issuance of the Notice to Proceed, describing it as “‘noth-
ing . . . but junk.” In April, 1975, Bailey arranged a meeting with Ed-
wards. According to Reinhard, prior to the meeting Bailey told him,
“We're going to have to take care of Mr. Edwards.” Reinhard’s impres-
sion of the meeting was that, if paid $500 per month, Edwards would ar-
range to leave more valuable salvageable materials in the project area.
Both Bailey and Edwards denied that the April meeting was intended to
solicit illicit payments from Reinhard.

Reinhard also testified that Edwards asked him for $500 in July,
1975. He gave Edwards a check for $350, marked “payment of a personal
loan.” Edwards testified that he asked Reinhard for a loan of $100, that
he cashed the $350 check, retained $100 as a loan and returned the bal-
ance to Reinhard.

The jury convicted Bailey and Edwards of violating section 18-8-302
prohibiting bribery of a public official. The court of appeals affirmed both
convictions. The controlling opinion determined that Edwards was “per-
forming a governmental function” for a “government” and thus was a
public servant within the meaning of the bribery statute. We disagree with
the court of appeals’ underlying premise: that an urban renewal authority,
created by a municipality, is a “government” as defined in the bribery
statute. Therefore we reverse the convictions.* .

L

Hl Bribery of a public official is prohibited in section 18-8-302:
“Bribery. (1) A person commits the crime of bribery, if:

(a) He offers, confers, or agrees to confer any pecuniary benefit upon a
public servant with the intent to influence the public servant’s vote; opin-
ion, judgment, exercise of discretion, or other action in his official capac-
ity; or

(b) While a public servant, he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any
pecuniary benefit upon an agreement or understanding that his vote, opin-
ion, judgment, exercise of discretion, or other action as a public servant
will thereby be influenced.

(2) It is no defense to a prosecution under this section that the person
sought to be influenced was not qualified to act in the desired way,
whether because he had not yet assumed office, lacked jurisdiction, or for
any other reason.

+ Because both convictions are reversed on this basis, we need not reach the other issues raised by
the petitioners.

$52 eS

(3) Bribery is a class 3 felony.”

The terms used in the bribery statute are defined in section 18-8-101,
C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8):

“Definitions. As used in this article, unless the context otherwise re-
quires:

(1) ‘Government’ includes any branch, subdivision, institution, or agency
of the government of this state or any political subdivision within it.

(2) ‘Governmental function’ includes any activity which a public servant
is legally authorized to undertake on behalf of a government.

(3) ‘Public servant’? means any officer or employee of government,
whether elected or appointed, and any person participating as an advisor,
or consultant, engaged in the service of process, or otherwise performing a
governmental function, but the term does not include witnesses.”

The issue before us is whether CURE comes within the definition of
government in section 18-8-101(1). The statute authorizing the creation of
an urban renewal authority defines it as “a corporate body.” Section 31-
25-103(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Repl. Vol. 12).2 A corporation or a corpo-
rate body is not included in the definition of “government” in section 18-8-
101. The Urban Renewal Law, section 31-25-101, et seq., C.R.S. 1973
(1977 Repl. Vol. 12), does not describe an urban renewal authority as a
“branch, subdivision, institution, or agency” of state government or as a
“political subdivision” within the state.

HB However, corporate forms are often used for various government
functions or purposes. The most common are municipal corporations
which are described as “bodies politic and corporate.” See, e.g., section
31-15-101, C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Repl. Vol. 12); E. McQuillin, Law of
Municipal Corporations, section 207a (3d Edition, 1971). The primary
function of a municipal corporation is to provide government within its
territorial limits. McQuillin, supra, sections 207a, 207b and 208. An-
other form of public corporation is the quasi-municipal corporation cre-
ated to accomplish a more limited public purpose.? Quasi-municipal
corporations more closely resemble corporations than do municipalities,
McQuillin, supra, section 213, and authorities such as an urban renewal
authority bear less resemblance to municipalities than do quasi-municipal
corporations. McQuillin, supra, section 229a.

The general definition of “government” in the Criminal Code, section
18-1-901(3)(i), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), does include corpora-
tions such as CURE:

2 Section 31-25-104(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Repl. Vol. 12) refers to an urban renewal authority
as “a body corporate and politic.”

2 The Urban Renewal Law confers powers on urban renewal authorities for “public uses and pur-
poses.” Section 31-25-102(3), C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Repl. Vol. 12).

eS 553

““Government’ includes the United States, any state, county, municipality,
or other political unit, any branch, department, agency, or subdivision of
any of the foregoing, and any corporation or other entity established by
law to carry out any governmental function.”*

The general definition is limited by section 18-1-901(1), C.R.S. 1973
(1978 Repl. Vol. 8):

“(1) Definitions set forth in any section of this title [18] apply wherever
the same term is used in the same sense in another section of this title [18]
unless the definition is specifically limited . . . .” (Material in brack-
ets and emphasis added.)

HH Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the ac-
cused. People v. Nees, 200 Colo. 392, 615 P.2d 690 (1980); People v.
Cornelison, 192 Colo. 337, 559 P.2d 1102 (1977). The language “any
corporation” is not included in the definition of government, section 18-8-
101, which applies to all offenses in article 8 pertaining to governmental
operations — including bribery as codified in section 18-8-302. There-
fore, Edwards, although an employee of CURE, is not a “public servant”
performing a “governmental function” on behalf of a “government” as de-
fined in section 18-8-101. Bailey and Edwards cannot be convicted of brib-
ery of a public servant under section 18-8-302.5

Judgments reversed.

CHIEF JUSTICE HODGES does not participate.

4 See also the definition of “government” in the forgery statute; section 18-5-101(6), C.R.S. 1973
(1978 Repl. Vol. 8): “Government” means the United States, any state, county, municipality, or
other political unit, any department, agency, or subdivision of any of the foregoing, or any corpora-
tion or other entity established by law to carry out governmental functions.”

5 The petitioners were not charged under section 18-5-401, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

646 INDEX

WITNESSES —Continued

as set forth in United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 98 S.Ct.
2357, 57 L.Ed.2d 221. Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 94.

SUBPOENA — Judicial — Statute — Taxpayer. Section 39-21-112(3),
C.R.S. 1973, provides for a judicial subpoena to third parties when the Department
of Revenue is unable to obtain information directly from the taxpayer. Charnes
v. DiGiacomo, 94.

SUBPOENA — ‘‘Lawfully Authorized Purpose’’ — Correctness of Return

“Relevant”? — Enforcement Tax Laws. A subpoena seeking information

to enforce the tax laws is a “lawfully authorized purpose,” and information relat-

ing to the correctness of the taxpayer’s return or the amount of the taxpayer’s in-

come is “relevant” to the enforcement of the tax laws. Charnes v. DiGiacomo,
94,

TESTIFY — Consultation — Counsel. Whether defendant testifies is a deci-
sion which ultimately rests with the defendant, after full consultation with his
counsel. People v. Layton, 59.

WORDS AND PHRASES

“NECESSARY DELAY” — Related to Administrative Process. A “neces-
sary delay” is one reasonably related to the administrative process attendant upon
the arrest of the accused, viz. delays associated with fingerprinting, photographing,
taking inventory of personal belongings, preparation of necessary charging docu-
ments and reports, and other legitimate administrative procedures. People v.
Heintze, 248.

PROBABLE CAUSE. Probable cause deals with probabilities which are not
technical, but are factual and practical considerations of every day life on which
reasonable and prudent men act. People v. Williams, 187.

RESTITUTION — Meaning. Restitution, which is intended to make the victim
whole, means that a defendant should not be forced to repay a victim when there
has been no indication that the damage or injury sustained by the victim was in-
flicted by the defendant. Cumhuriyet v. People, 466.