Above are papers related to the following paper: [Paper_ID] Paper #1103969. 	[Title] Heuristics and Normative Models of Judgment under Uncertainty [Abstract] Psychological evidence shows that probability theory is not a proper descriptive model of intuitive human judgment. Instead, some heuristics have been proposed as such a descriptive model. This paper argues that probability theory has limi tations even as a normative model. A new normative model of judgment under uncertainty is designed under the assumption that the system's knowledge and resources are insufficient with respect to the questions that the system needs to answer. The proposed heuristics in human reasoning can also be observed in this new model, and can be justified according to the assumption. Please summarise all the given information.

Above are papers related to the following paper: [Paper_ID] Paper #34082. 	[Title] Reference Classes and Multiple Inheritances [Abstract] The reference class problem in probability theory and the multiple inheritances (extensions) problem in non-monotonic logics can be referred to as special cases of conflicting beliefs. The current solution accepted in the two domains is the specificity priority principle. By analyzing an example, several factors (ignored by the principle) are found to be relevant to the priority of a reference class. A new approach, Non-Axiomatic Reasoning System (NARS), is discussed, where these factors are all taken into account. It is argued that the solution provided by NARS is better than the solutions provided by probability theory and non-monotonic logics. Please summarise all the given information.

Above are papers related to the following paper: [Paper_ID] Paper #14431. 	[Title] A Unified Treatment of Uncertainties [Abstract] Uncertainty in artificial intelligence" is an active research field, where several approaches have been suggested and studied for dealing with various types of uncertainty. However, it's hard to rank the approaches in general, because each of them is usually aimed at a special application environment. This paper begins by defining such an environment, then show why some existing approaches cannot be used in such a situation. Then a new approach, Non-Axiomatic Reasoning System, is introduced to work in the environment. The system is designed under the assumption that the system's knowledge and resources are usually insufficient to handle the tasks imposed by its environment. The system can consistently represent several types of uncertainty, and can carry out multiple operations on these uncertainties. Finally, the new approach is compared with the previous approaches in terms of uncertainty representation and interpretation. Please summarise all the given information.

Above are papers related to the following paper: [Paper_ID] Paper #1119216. 	[Title] A New Approach for Induction: From a Non-Axiomatic Logical Point of View [Abstract] Non-Axiomatic Reasoning System (NARS) is designed to be a general-purpose intelligent reasoning system, which is adaptive and works under insufficient knowledge and resources. This paper focuses on the components of NARS that contribute to the system's induction capacity, and shows how the traditional problems in induction are addressed by the system. The NARS approach of induction uses an term-oriented formal language with an experience-grounded semantics that consistently interprets various types of uncertainty. An induction rule generates conclusions from common instance of terms, and a revision rule combines evidence from different sources. In NARS, induction and other types of inference, such as deduction and abduction, are based on the same semantic foundation, and they cooperate in inference activities of the system. The system's control mechanism makes knowledge-driven, context-dependent inference possible. Please summarise all the given information.

Above are papers related to the following paper: [Paper_ID] Paper #1103031. 	[Title] Confidence as Higher Order Uncertainty proposed for handling higher order uncertainty, including the Bayesian approach, [Abstract]  Please summarise all the given information.

Above are papers related to the following paper: [Paper_ID] Paper #14428. 	[Title] Belief Revision in Probability Theory [Abstract] In a probability-based reasoning system, Bayes' theorem and its variations are often used to revise the system's beliefs. However, if the explicit conditions and the implicit conditions of probability assignments are properly distinguished, it follows that Bayes' theorem is not a generally applicable revision rule. Upon properly distinguishing belief revision from belief updating, we see that Jeffrey's rule and its variations are not revision rules, either. Without these distinctions, the limitation of the Bayesian approach is often ignored or underestimated. Revision, in its general form, cannot be done in the Bayesian approach, because a probability distribution function alone does not contain the information needed by the operation. Please summarise all the given information.

Above are papers related to the following paper: [Paper_ID] Paper #14429. 	[Title] From Inheritance Relation to Non-Axiomatic Logic [Abstract] At the beginning of the paper, three binary term logics are defined. The first is based only on an inheritance relation. The second and the third suggest a novel way to process extension and intension, and they also have interesting relations with Aristotle's syllogistic logic. Based on the three simple systems, a Non-Axiomatic Logic is defined. It has a term-oriented language and an experience-grounded semantics. It can uniformly represents and processes randomness, fuzziness, and ignorance. It can also uniformly carries out deduction, abduction, induction, and revision. Please summarise all the given information.

Above are papers related to the following paper: [Paper_ID] Paper #14430. 	[Title] Non-Axiomatic Reasoning System (Version 2.2) used to show how the system works. The limitations of [Abstract] NARS uses a new form of term logic, or an extended syllogism, in which several types of uncertainties can be represented and processed, and in which deduction, induction, abduction, and revision are carried out in a unified format. The system works in an asynchronously parallel way. The memory of the system is dynamically organized, and can also be interpreted as a network. Please summarise all the given information.

Above are papers related to the following paper: [Paper_ID] Paper #73119. 	[Title] A Defect in Dempster-Shafer Theory [Abstract] By analyzing the relationships among chance, weight of evidence and degree of belief, it is shown that the assertion "chances are special cases of belief functions" and the assertion "Dempster's rule can be used to combine belief functions based on distinct bodies of evidence" together lead to an inconsistency in Dempster-Shafer theory. To solve this problem, some fundamental postulates of the theory must be rejected. A new approach for uncertainty management is introduced, which shares many intuitive ideas with D-S theory, while avoiding this problem. Please summarise all the given information.

Paper #1103969 has the title `Heuristics and Normative Models of Judgment under Uncertainty  
` and the abstract `Psychological evidence shows that probability theory is not a proper descriptive model of intuitive human judgment. Instead, some heuristics have been proposed as such a descriptive model. This paper argues that probability theory has limi tations even as a normative model. A new normative model of judgment under uncertainty is designed under the assumption that the system's knowledge and resources are insufficient with respect to the questions that the system needs to answer. The proposed heuristics in human reasoning can also be observed in this new model, and can be justified according to the assumption. 
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Question: Which category should Paper #1103969 be classified as ?
You can select one from ['Neural_Networks', 'Case_Based', 'Theory', 'Reinforcement_Learning', 'Probabilistic_Methods', 'Rule_Learning', 'Genetic_Algorithms'].


Paper #1103969 has the title `Heuristics and Normative Models of Judgment under Uncertainty  
` and the abstract `Psychological evidence shows that probability theory is not a proper descriptive model of intuitive human judgment. Instead, some heuristics have been proposed as such a descriptive model. This paper argues that probability theory has limi tations even as a normative model. A new normative model of judgment under uncertainty is designed under the assumption that the system's knowledge and resources are insufficient with respect to the questions that the system needs to answer. The proposed heuristics in human reasoning can also be observed in this new model, and can be justified according to the assumption. 
`.
Question: Which category should Paper #1103969 be classified as ?
You can select one from ['Neural_Networks', 'Case_Based', 'Theory', 'Reinforcement_Learning', 'Probabilistic_Methods', 'Rule_Learning', 'Genetic_Algorithms'].

This paper should be classified into: Probabilistic_Methods