Model: MaxNoichl/nomic-embed-philosophy-triplets_v1
Author: MaxNoichl
Pipeline: sentence-similarity
Library: sentence-transformers
Tags: sentence-transformers, safetensors, nomic_bert, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:10000, loss:TripletLoss, custom_code, arxiv:1908.10084, arxiv:1703.07737, base_model:nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1, base_model:finetune:nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1, model-index, text-embeddings-inference, endpoints_compatible, region:us
Base models (finetune): id: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
Card metadata: base_model: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics: cosine_accuracy, dot_accuracy, manhattan_accuracy, euclidean_accuracy, max_accuracy
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
tags: sentence-transformers, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:10000, loss:TripletLoss
widget: source_sentence: met, Peter van Inwagen, a libertarian, concludes that free will is a mystery. Recently, the Mind Argument has drawn a number of criticisms. Here I seek to add to its woes. Quite apart from its other problems, I argue, the Mind Argument does a poor job of isolating the important concern for libertarians that it raises. Once this concern has been clarified,
sentences: however, another argument serves to renew the challenge. The Assimilation Argument challenges libertarians to explain how ostensible exercises of free will are relevantly different from other causally undetermined outcomes, outcomes that nobody would count as exercises of free will. In particular, libertarians must explain how agents can have the power, contended that the Assimilation Argument is unsound. Here I defend the Assimilation Argument and the Rollback Argument, a second challenge to libertarianism that Franklin rejects. My aim in doing so is to underscore the force of these challenges, and thereby to resist what appears to be an emerging trend in, is meant to bring out a number of crucial points about the process itself: (a) Scientific theories are formed at many levels of generality, ranging from simple' generalizations covering a small portion of the data to complex theories covering the whole area of inquiry. There are, of course, no rules dic tating which level is most appropriate at a given stage of inquiry; the history of science suggests, however (i) that it rarely works if one jumps from the data to an all-encompassing theory but that (ii) one need not progress 448 BARUCH A. BRODY through all the intermediary levels of generalization before one formulates a broad theory. I want to claim that the history of morals suggests the same conclusions, and that (i) in particular, suggests that moral theory and moral philosophy have been operating in a fundamentally incorrect fashion. Full scale systematizations (such as utilitarianism) have emerged long before we have had any even half-successful lower-level moral generalizations of any sophistication. John Stuart Mill was, at least, sensitive about this issue, and he3 put forward the following distinction between the methods of science and of moral reasoning: The truths which are ultimately accepted as the first principles of a science, are really the last result of metaphysical analysis, practised on the elementary no tions with which the science is conversant; and their relation to this science is not that of foundations to an edifice, but of roots to a tree, which may, source_sentence: when he comes to deal with the general theory of relativity and with quantum theory, the reader has to have an elementary knowledge of tensor analysis and of matrix mechanics. That Lenzen makes this demand upon his reader is not his fault. We have reached a stage where the student of the philosophy of science must equip himself with knowledge of at least the elements of a number of mathematical disciplines. I shall touch only those parts of his book that any intelligent reader can understand. First, what is " a physical thing"? "A fundamental property of a thing is that it has aspects. If I look at a book upon the table I experience in sensation a partial aspect of the book. A thing presents different aspects from different points of view. We can describe an aspect by saying that it is colored, that it has a certain shape, that it is smooth, etc. Knowledge of a thing is ultimately based upon acquaintance with aspects of the thing. However, the concept of thina implies more than the concept of given aspects; there are also possible aspects. Thus while I am merely seeing the book some visible aspect is given, whereas the tangible aspects are merely possible. Hence a thing may be characterized as an entity which has given and possible aspects. . . . An aspect is a union of particular qualities, complexities and relationships" (pp. 15-16). "A physical body is a class of aspects which are or can be given to some mind." "The problem of physics is the
sentences: But functions are cheap and determination is not there is probably a function from the GDP of each country to the number of its bald citizens but the former surely does not determine the latter. Obviously, (C) says more than that a certain function exists. However, since it is a matter of controversy how much more it says, for the purposes of this paper I won't assume any strong construal of compositional determination.8 There is a key ambiguity in (C) that has long been neglected in the literature: the plural definite description in it can be construed either distributively or collectively. The collective reading is compatible with the possibility that the meanings of certain complex expressions depend not only on the meanings their constituents have in themselves, but also on relations that hold among these meanings. I will follow the usual practice in reading 'the meanings of its constituents' in (C) distributively.9 Thus construed (C) (together with certain straightforward assumptions about the syntax of the language under consideration10) entails that ambiguity in a complex expression is either syntactic (derives from the fact that the expression has more than one structure) or lexical (derives from the fact that some lexical constituent of the expression has more than one meaning). (C) is not a principle anyone is interested in for its own sake. Philosophers, linguists, and psychologists are all concerned with substantially stronger theses. The philosopher's compositionality is a claim about explanatory priority. It says that, and their possible solution' the book is divided into six parts, these into sections and chapters. There are also two appendixes, one offering a scheme for the history of philosophy, the other a bibliography. Under the 'Metaphysics of Nature' 'substance and quality,' the PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 133 mechanical and atomic theories, time and space, are ably discussed, and much that is said represents very modern tendencies in physical science. It being the work of science to discover universal characteristics, and the sciences being classifiable on the basis of the degrees of the universality of their concepts, mechanics presents itself as the most universal because it deals with extension, impenetrability, location and motion. But the mere ubiquitousness of these does not disprove the objectivity also of the 'secondary qualities.' "Exceptional existence is not necessarily subjective existence." Both classes of qualities are revealed upon the same sense basis. In any case, we in treating of them make use only of abstractions, and science is justified in using the more universally occurring qualities, for they make all things comparable and systematizable. Therewith, because of this genesis, this isolation of the primary from the secondary qualities in the process of abstraction, the two coexisting in the concrete object, it is impossible to reduce the secondary to the primary, although the latter may serve as an index, or means of comparison, for the former. The question, fundamental for the understanding of the meaning of mechanics, which the reviewer would ask here, is:, description of the characters and relations of aspects which may be represented by numbers." "The objectivity of the physical order in grounded in correlations between aspects given to different minds" (p. 6). From this it appears that "an important relation to which aspects may be terms is the relation of objects to subject. The discussion of this specific very pervasive relationship raises the problem of the status of aspects with respect to their dependence on, or independence of, being given to some mind. . . . I do not wish, however, to discuss this question in the present book; it appears to me that it is possible 608 JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY to construct science without answering, or even raising, the metaphysical problem. I have endeavored to use the term aspect without giving it a subjectivistic or realistic interpretation. . . . We can describe given and possible aspects, or elements, without considering the problem of their subjectivity or independent reality. The systematic description and correlation of aspects of reality is the problem of science. "Now the reference to the metaphysical problem has provided us with additional concepts for the expression of the criterion of physical reality. The fundamental principle is that in the construction of a physical theory one employs a subjectivistic criterion of reality and assumes a realistic attitude. A thing is real because it is an object of possible experience; yet one describes it as if it, source_sentence: of touch which one has learned to expect, does not in fact occur in these cases. It may be, on the other hand, that the matter of correlation is merely unusual, as for example if one dreamt night after night of a certain object being at a certain place: i. e., if one's sense-data were correlated in a certain way. Then if one went to the place at which the sense-data ordinarily would have led one to expect to see certain sense-data correlated with the others in a particular way, one might not experience such a sense datum. Again, if in what is called "waking life" one saw sense data at different times which one could correlate by saying that they all belong to the sun, one would probably see certain sense-data as expected at other times ; but if the sense-data had only been given in dreams, any reference of that kind would very probably be fallacious. Thus sense-data are said to be unreal when inferences usually true turn out to be false. Thus while it appears essential to predicate primary existence of all sense-data with which we are 142 THE MONIST. acquainted, sense-data can be said to be real or unreal in a definite sense. The things which make up the outside world appear to be par ticulars and facts. Facts therefore have a kind of existence, which we will call "primary existence of facts," but which is not of the same kind as that for particulars : for the intrinsic nature of facts
sentences: situations. Propositions (unlocated ones-there are also located propositions) are sets P of situation types satisfying a monotonicity principle: If s e P and s c s' then s' E P. These propositions are the objects of propositional attitudes in general and so will serve to interpret the complements of indirect discourse predicates such as 'believe' and 'say,' as well as NI complements. Intensionality comes into propositions from two sources: through relations, which are not characterized extensionally in this theory, and through the multiplicity of situation types. The use of partial functions means that the logic of propositions will be non-Boolean in some way. Semantic innocence and uncompromising situations (SIUS) sketches the same theoretical apparatus, adding to it an extended discussion of innocence, and of an argument (called "the slingshot" by the authors) that is felt to threaten innocence. The authors devote much of these three articles to locating their approach historically and to motivating it; relatively little space is spent on formulating the theory. Mathematically-minded logicians interested in situation semantics will probably be most concerned with technical matters. But the 1984, Association for Symbolic Logic 0022-4812/84/4901-0032/$03.30 1403 1404 REVIEWS motivation of theories is an indispensable part both of philosophical logic and of natural language semantics, and in this review I will try to give equal attention to motivation and to the theory itself. I will begin with semantic innocence, a recurrent theme in the three articles. The term is meant to suggest a natural, direct, is different from the nature of particulars, and in view of their intrinsically different natures, the same property cannot signifi cantly be predicated of both. As far as one can see, this apparatus of particulars and facts is adequate for the building up of empirical knowledge. Thus, we do not postulate existence of the primary kind to any other objects of our thought. We do not assume primary existence for physical objects and points and other non experienced things. Having considered briefly the crude data given empirically, we have to build up the other objects of thought by means of logical construction. It would perhaps be advisable to state shortly what appears to be the essence of this method. The problem for the solution of which this method is to be used is as follows. Cer tain things are given in experience?sense-particulars of various kinds and facts. We then wish to find other terms, such that in analyzing any proposition in which they occur, they themselves do not occur, but only the things which are given in experience. At the same time, these terms, are to have certain definite properties. Then although a term a (say) appears in a proposition a yet it will be possible to analyze a into a proposition not containing a if a stand for a logical construction. In this way we shall be able to use propositions apparently containing a without in any way pre judging whether a is, particular (Socrates), so that it can't be predicated of Socrates without redundancy. According to Preston, this suggests that a concrete particular and its property instances aren't genuinely related. We argue that Preston's proffered solution here-to treat property instances as "mental constructs"-is fraught with difficulty. We then go on to, source_sentence: just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos .... " 6 THE EXPLORATION OF THE LIFE-WORLD In France, this primordial mode of reflection by which each person in a free society to some degree works out his own style of life and his own way of understanding the world is now distinguished as primary thinking from what is called secondary reflection, that critical reflection on the former to which we may devote a calm moment in life, and which has been judged important enough to be handed over to a special group, known as philosophers, for disciplined attention throughout a large part of our history. Primary thought is spontaneous, always concerned and interested, often creative, but uncritical. It is to this type of thought that we owe the first original answers that have been given to the ambiguities and agonies of life. But when left to itself, without criticism, this style of reflection becomes provincial, fanatical, and closed to what is universally human. Secondary reflection, on the other hand, is reflective and disinterested, self-conscious, critical, and open to the universal. It is through this type of secondary reflection, when it is in touch with the former, that fanaticism is avoided, and our existence in the life-world is kept open and free. When left to itself, however, it becomes abstract, sterile, and uncreative. The original aim of academic philosophy was not to replace primary thought by developing special techniques of its own. As expressed in the ancient ideal of
sentences: assertions of modernity. Only observed "constant conjunctions" of variables and entities (e.g., heat and fire) allow us to state real (and even here he is skeptical) and law-like relationships.2 This, of course, immediately entails problems for forms of natural rights, which are then compounded by Hume's second assertion, his guillotine: that facts and values are separate things: In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the 576 Philosophy East & West being of God or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.3 Modern analogues are provided by Alfred Jules Ayer's Logical Positivist statement that "exhortations of moral virtue ... do not belong to any branch of philosophy or science" or Richard Lipsey's influential positive-normative distinction in economics.4 The point, however, is that Empiricist philosophy splits apart the possibility that being contributes something to a connection between the rights, wisdom, it was rather to exercise a kind of therapy over the acts of primary reflection that constitute an essential phase of human existence, warning it against serious errors, clarifying the basic meanings and issues, and thus helping it, so far as possible, to face those decisions between different global interpretations of the world which every free man must make. In so far as it has actually exercised this therapeutic function, philosophy is properly regarded as the discipline of freedom, and I believe that by its pressing of basic questions in the face of political and theological tyranny, and by its maintenance of communication between radically divergent worlds it has made an essential contribution to what we may call the discipline of freedom, and the life of free societies in the West. But it is easy for special groups, set aside to perform a basic therapeutic function, to develop special aims and techniques of their own in its place. James had a keen sense for the needlessly abstract and academic, and hated it with all his heart and soul. He realized that the traditional philosophy of his time had become separated from the primary thinking of our lived existence. Instead of trying to clarify and criticize this vital process of the Lebenswelt, it was concerned with formulating special techniques and artificial constructions in a very different world of its own. There are many passages where James con7 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION trasts the pattern, the meaning, the very feeling, both the benign and the morbid in James's spiritual state. Moreover, the book is philosophical in the further sense that it is by far the best account of James's philosophical and psychological views, their development, their aims, and their potencies that has yet appeared or (I should say) is ever likely to appear. Nothing is lost by the biographical form of presentation or by the choice (wherever possible) of a literary rather than of a technical vocabulary. Furthermore, James's many contacts with the Europe of his day as well as with the American continent, his polyglot 104 NEW BOOKS acquaintance with the antecedents of the contemporary ideas that confronted him and that he did so much to improve; in a word, his intense professional sociality, make an account of his thoughts very largely an account of the thought of his times. Mr. Perry, half incidentally, has become the historian of all philosophy at the turn of the present century with rather extensive retrospects and prospects. There are very few living writers who could have done the job half so well. Indeed, Mr. Perry's altogether peculiar opportunities for performing this immense task are only equalled by his competence to perform it. He enjoyed James's professional esteem as well as his friendship. Thus we read in the Letters (II, I2I) that James, in I900, regarded Perry as "certainly the soundest, most normal all-round man of our recent production" (i.e. in Harvard), and again, in I907, that in James's opinion (II, 295) Perry "had, source_sentence: of aU governments, including democracy, as follows: If moraUty presupposes individual autonomy, and every government denies that auto nomy, then no government can be moraUy justified, (p. 1) An autonomous person, Cohen points out, foUowing Kant, is one who is self-legislating, "Acting out of respect for a rule which he imposes upon Studies in Soviet Thought 25 (1983) 219. 220 REVIEWS himself, not out of fear or habit" (pp. 1?2). How, then, can an individual be self-legislating on the one hand, but obligated to obey the commands of the state on the other? Cohen finds the answer to this apparent d?emma in the notion of partici pation : In a democracy but only in a democracy each citizen has a right to a voice in the lawmaking process. Enjoyment of this right commits the citizen to respect the laws 'resulting from that process. The agreement to participate is not contingent upon getting one's own way. Each citizen knows, even before learning what issues w?l arise, that no one w?l always get his way. But be?eving the legislative process fair, each person is com mitted in advance to observe the rules that are its outcome. To that system, full consent is given. Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, (pp. 3-4) Cohen explains that the obligation to obey the law, wh?e a "prima facie and very powerful" one, is not absolute, (p. 5) A citizen is not required to do the bidding of the state as though he were its slave. The 'promise' which a citizen makes to obey the law, as
sentences: any other promise, may be broken moraUy in "truly exceptional circumstances" where a duty stronger than the duty to obey the law arises.3 Having argued that democracy is the only moraUy viable poUtical system, Professor Cohen moves next to explore whether democracy thrives better in a sociaUst or capitaUst economic setting. Cohen asserts that sociaUst democracy is bu?t on two main principles: (1) pubUc ownership of the means of production and distribution; and (2) planning production and distribution for the common good. (p. 58) SociaUsm is a logical extension of democracy, he notes, bringing the popular w?l to matters of production and wealth. SociaUsm involves "the democratic control of aU resources in the community by society as a whole", (p. 41) Socialism meshes weU with human nature, Cohen arugues, for human beings have "a deep and natural inclination to help (one another) ..." (p. 64) He Usts a number of practical advantages of socialism over capitaUsm. SociaUsm, he claims, is less subject to, if not immune from, inherent flaws in capitaUsm, including extremes in wealth, cycles of boom and bust, unemploy ment, wastes of competition associated with costly advertisement and packag ing, and the subordination of workers. Further, socialism has an impressive track record: "Many socialist countries, mamtaining five and seven year economic plans under continual adjustment, have met with phenomenal success", (p. 59) Even capitaUst countries impUcitly affirm the viab?ity of REVIEWS 221 sociaUsm, efficiency, the design of the market can reflect other social values, as we shall see. A version of the market which is likely to appeal to socialists is the following: the means of production are owned by the state but leased to groups of workers in such a way that each worker gets productive resources of roughly equal value. Each cooperative decides on the nature and volume of its production, and sells its goods on the market. The profits are distributed among the members of each cooperative according to mutually agreed rules, though we may suppose that profits above a certain point are heavily taxed by the state, partly to accumulate resources for future generations, partly to finance an extensive welfare state which provides for essential needs without charge. For cooperatives which are unable to make a profit, there is a social security system which supplements their members' incomes until they find a more profitable line of production or move elsewhere. The private hiring of labour is, however, made illegal in the same way as slavery is today. This brief sketch of a socialist market system needs to be filled out in various ways. There are difficulties in setting down the terms on [476] POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1977 which capital would be leased by the state to the workers' cooperatives; for instance, in establishing how far cooperatives should be allowed to accumulate capital for their own expansion. The rules of association for each cooperative need to be specified, particularly those governing the entry and exit, the kinetropic and lexigraphemic to inaugurate the kinetic cogito. Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological exposition of corporeality further amplified the reflexive potential of movement and the philosophical understanding of kinesthesia, and King cites as well
model-index: name: SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
results: task: type: triplet
name: Triplet
dataset: name: nomic
type: nomic
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy
value: 0.958
name: Cosine Accuracy
verified: no, type: dot_accuracy
value: 0.042
name: Dot Accuracy
verified: no, type: manhattan_accuracy
value: 0.956
name: Manhattan Accuracy
verified: no, type: euclidean_accuracy
value: 0.958
name: Euclidean Accuracy
verified: no, type: max_accuracy
value: 0.958
name: Max Accuracy
verified: no, task: type: triplet
name: Triplet
dataset: name: all nli test
type: all-nli-test
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy
value: 0.975
name: Cosine Accuracy
verified: no, type: dot_accuracy
value: 0.025
name: Dot Accuracy
verified: no, type: manhattan_accuracy
value: 0.9725
name: Manhattan Accuracy
verified: no, type: euclidean_accuracy
value: 0.975
name: Euclidean Accuracy
verified: no, type: max_accuracy
value: 0.975
name: Max Accuracy
verified: no
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Created: 2024-08-20 17:55:21