Model: IoannisKat1/bge-m3-new2
Author: IoannisKat1
Pipeline: sentence-similarity
Library: sentence-transformers
Tags: sentence-transformers, safetensors, xlm-roberta, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, dense, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:1580, loss:MatryoshkaLoss, loss:MultipleNegativesRankingLoss, en, arxiv:1908.10084, arxiv:2205.13147, arxiv:1705.00652, base_model:BAAI/bge-m3, base_model:finetune:BAAI/bge-m3, license:apache-2.0, model-index, text-embeddings-inference, endpoints_compatible, region:us
Base models (finetune): id: BAAI/bge-m3
Card metadata: language: en
license: apache-2.0
tags: sentence-transformers, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, dense, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:1580, loss:MatryoshkaLoss, loss:MultipleNegativesRankingLoss
base_model: BAAI/bge-m3
widget: source_sentence: When was the information published in the Official Journal of the European Union?
sentences: 1.Union or Member State law to which the data controller or processor is subject may restrict by way of a legislative measure the scope of the obligations and rights provided for in Articles 12 to 22 and Article 34, as well as Article 5 in so far as its provisions correspond to the rights and obligations provided for in Articles 12 to 22, when such a restriction respects the essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms and is a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to safeguard: (a)  national security; (b)  defence; (c)  public security; 4.5.2016 L 119/46   (d)  the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security; (e)  other important objectives of general public interest of the Union or of a Member State, in particular an important economic or financial interest of the Union or of a Member State, including monetary, budgetary and taxation a matters, public health and social security; (f)  the protection of judicial independence and judicial proceedings; (g)  the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of breaches of ethics for regulated professions; (h)  a monitoring, inspection or regulatory function connected, even occasionally, to the exercise of official authority in the cases referred to in points (a) to (e) and (g); (i)  the protection of the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others; (j)  the enforcement of civil law claims.
2.In particular, any legislative measure referred to in paragraph 1 shall contain specific provisions at least, where relevant, as to: (a)  the purposes of the processing or categories of processing; (b)  the categories of personal data; (c)  the scope of the restrictions introduced; (d)  the safeguards to prevent abuse or unlawful access or transfer; (e)  the specification of the controller or categories of controllers; (f)  the storage periods and the applicable safeguards taking into account the nature, scope and purposes of the processing or categories of processing; (g)  the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects; and (h)  the right of data subjects to be informed about the restriction, unless that may be prejudicial to the purpose of the restriction. CHAPTER IV Controller and processor Section 1 General obligations, 1.Where processing is to be carried out on behalf of a controller, the controller shall use only processors providing sufficient guarantees to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures in such a manner that processing will meet the requirements of this Regulation and ensure the protection of the rights of the data subject.
2.The processor shall not engage another processor without prior specific or general written authorisation of the controller. In the case of general written authorisation, the processor shall inform the controller of any intended changes concerning the addition or replacement of other processors, thereby giving the controller the opportunity to object to such changes.
3.Processing by a processor shall be governed by a contract or other legal act under Union or Member State law, that is binding on the processor with regard to the controller and that sets out the subject-matter and duration of the processing, the nature and purpose of the processing, the type of personal data and categories of data subjects and the obligations and rights of the controller. That contract or other legal act shall stipulate, in particular, that the processor: (a)  processes the personal data only on documented instructions from the controller, including with regard to transfers of personal data to a third country or an international organisation, unless required to do so by Union or Member State law to which the processor is subject; in such a case, the processor shall inform the controller of that legal requirement before processing, unless that law prohibits such information on important grounds of public interest; (b)  ensures that persons authorised to process the personal data have committed themselves to confidentiality or are under an appropriate statutory obligation of confidentiality; (c)  takes all measures required pursuant to Article 32; (d)  respects the conditions referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 for engaging another processor; (e)  taking into account the nature of the processing, assists the controller by appropriate technical and organisational measures, insofar as this is possible, for the fulfilment of the controller's obligation to respond to requests for exercising the data subject's rights laid down in Chapter III; (f)  assists the controller in ensuring compliance with the obligations pursuant to Articles 32 to 36 taking into account the nature of processing and the information available to the processor; (g)  at the choice of the controller, deletes or returns all the personal data to the controller after the end of the provision of services relating to processing, and deletes existing copies unless Union or Member State law requires storage of the personal data; (h)  makes available to the controller all information necessary to demonstrate compliance with the obligations laid down in this Article and allow for and contribute to audits, including inspections, conducted by the controller or another auditor mandated by the controller. 4.5.2016 L 119/49   With regard to point (h) of the first subparagraph, the processor shall immediately inform the controller if, in its opinion, an instruction infringes this Regulation or other Union or Member State data protection provisions.
4.Where a processor engages another processor for carrying out specific processing activities on behalf of the controller, the same data protection obligations as set out in the contract or other legal act between the controller and the processor as referred to in paragraph 3 shall be imposed on that other processor by way of a contract or other legal act under Union or Member State law, in particular providing sufficient guarantees to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures in such a manner that the processing will meet the requirements of this Regulation. Where that other processor fails to fulfil its data protection obligations, the initial processor shall remain fully liable to the controller for the performance of that other processor's obligations.
5.Adherence of a processor to an approved code of conduct as referred to in Article 40 or an approved certification mechanism as referred to in Article 42 may be used as an element by which to demonstrate sufficient guarantees as referred to in paragraphs 1 and 4 of this Article.
6.Without prejudice to an individual contract between the controller and the processor, the contract or the other legal act referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article may be based, in whole or in part, on standard contractual clauses referred to in paragraphs 7 and 8 of this Article, including when they are part of a certification granted to the controller or processor pursuant to Articles 42 and 43
7.The Commission may lay down standard contractual clauses for the matters referred to in paragraph 3 and 4 of this Article and in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 93(2).
8.A supervisory authority may adopt standard contractual clauses for the matters referred to in paragraph 3 and 4 of this Article and in accordance with the consistency mechanism referred to in Article 63
9.The contract or the other legal act referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 shall be in writing, including in electronic form.
10.Without prejudice to Articles 82, 83 and 84, if a processor infringes this Regulation by determining the purposes and means of processing, the processor shall be considered to be a controller in respect of that processing., Awareness-raising activities by supervisory authorities addressed to the public should include specific measures directed at controllers and processors, including micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as natural persons in particular in the educational context. 4.5.2016 L 119/24 Official Journal of the European Union EN, source_sentence: What additional security measures are not required for mobile phone companies?
sentences: **Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**  
**Provisions:**  
**Time of commission of the act:**  
**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**  
**Reasoning:** Claim for compensation and monetary satisfaction due to moral damage against a mobile phone company and a credit institution within the framework of inadequate fulfillment of a payment services contract for "web banking." Appropriate actions for mobile phone companies in case of a request for a "sim" card replacement due to wear or loss. They must verify the customer's identity based on the personal details and identification information registered in their system but are not liable for any changes in the latter that were not timely communicated to them. Further security measures such as phone communication or sending an SMS to the mobile number holder are not required. Payment services under Law 4357/2018. Obligation of the payment service provider, such as banks, to inform the payer after receiving a relevant order for making a payment. The content of this varies per case, such as sending a personalized code to the user's mobile phone for transaction approval, as well as sending an email immediately after its completion. However, the bank is not liable for customer damage resulting from illicit electronic transactions due to third-party interception of either the access codes for electronic banking transactions or the sim card and the phone number to which the personalized codes for approving the aforementioned transactions are sent, within the framework of increased security protocols. Appropriate actions by banks upon diagnosing illicit banking transactions that may be fraudulent. Relevant criteria for consideration. The evidence did not indicate negligent and thus tortious behavior from all defendants. The claim is dismissed.  

**Facts:** In the present claim, upon due assessment of its content, the plaintiff states that he has a mobile phone subscription with the first defendant, a mobile phone company. On October 26, 2020, in the morning, he realized that his mobile phone was offline, and by noon, he received email notifications from Bank .......... and ............ (whose third and fourth defendants are de facto universal successors, respectively), with which he holds an account, regarding transactions he had made. From phone calls from his home phone to Bank .............. and ............ Bank, he was informed that on the same day, in a very short period, four money transfers had been made from the account he maintains at Bank .............., specifically, an amount of €15,000 was transferred to the account mentioned in the claim document under the name ..........., at ........ an amount of €15,000 was transferred to the account mentioned in the claim document under the name ......... at ........... Bank, an amount of €15,000 was transferred to the plaintiff's account with his daughter as a co-holder at ......... Bank, and an amount of €6,700 was transferred from another of his accounts to the account from which the transfer to the aforementioned accounts of €45,000 was made. Additionally, from the plaintiff's account with his daughter as a co-holder at .......... Bank, an amount of €9,999 was transferred to an account under the name of .... . He attempted to log into the online banking service of Bank ......... from his home computer, but found that the service was locked, while regarding the corresponding service of ........... Bank, he requested alongside his daughter to 'lock' it. In a phone call with the call center of Bank ............, he was informed about the locking of his electronic account in the online banking service and was told to dispute the transactions, which he did immediately through ... banking, while his daughter communicated about this with ....... Bank. The transfer to the account with the beneficiary was canceled, and the amount of €15,000 was returned to the plaintiff. After his investigation, he discovered that an unknown individual appeared at the branch of the first defendant, served by the second defendant, who posed as the plaintiff and presented a forged military ID card of the plaintiff, requesting and receiving a new sim card, resulting in the deactivation of the plaintiff's sim card and gaining access to the codes sent to him by the banks for completing the transfers. Due to the negligence of the second defendant, he did not realize that the identity used was forged, as since 2010, when the plaintiff retired, he has had a police identification card. The first defendant does not have security protocols to prevent such incidents, which constitute the sim .... method, despite the issuance of a press release from the Attica Security and numerous publications regarding the aforementioned method, unlike other mobile phone companies, which implement a specific procedure for changing sim cards. The second defendant did not take the obvious step to check the functioning of the sim card before replacing it, where he would have realized that the plaintiff's mobile phone was functioning normally. Bank .......... and ........... Bank: a) accepted requests for transferring large amounts of money from accounts that had no similar activity in the past, while the plaintiff's online banking account with the above banks was locked quite some time later, b) sent email notifications regarding successful transactions in succession, under a single email, c) did not check the address ... of the perpetrators, which was different from that used by the plaintiff, and d) did not take necessary security measures to prevent fraud via sim ... against the plaintiff, as the security code (pin) sent by the banks via message to the mobile phone proved to be compromised. As a result of the above illegal and culpable behavior of the defendants, the plaintiff suffered property damage amounting to a total of €24,999, which constitutes the total amount of the transfers made by third unknown persons to accounts of unknown individuals, as stated above, and has not been refunded despite his repeated inquiries, while he also suffered distress and mental anguish, and his trust in the banks was shaken, thus entitling him to monetary compensation for his moral damage, amounting to €5,000., 1.The Board shall issue an opinion where a competent supervisory authority intends to adopt any of the measures below. To that end, the competent supervisory authority shall communicate the draft decision to the Board, when it: (a)  aims to adopt a list of the processing operations subject to the requirement for a data protection impact assessment pursuant to Article 35(4); (b)  concerns a matter pursuant to Article 40(7) whether a draft code of conduct or an amendment or extension to a code of conduct complies with this Regulation; 4.5.2016 L 119/73   (c)  aims to approve the criteria for accreditation of a body pursuant to Article 41(3) or a certification body pursuant to Article 43(3); (d)  aims to determine standard data protection clauses referred to in point (d) of Article 46(2) and in Article 28(8); (e)  aims to authorise contractual clauses referred to in point (a) of Article 46(3); or (f)  aims to approve binding corporate rules within the meaning of Article 47
2.Any supervisory authority, the Chair of the Board or the Commission may request that any matter of general application or producing effects in more than one Member State be examined by the Board with a view to obtaining an opinion, in particular where a competent supervisory authority does not comply with the obligations for mutual assistance in accordance with Article 61 or for joint operations in accordance with Article 62
3.In the cases referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, the Board shall issue an opinion on the matter submitted to it provided that it has not already issued an opinion on the same matter. That opinion shall be adopted within eight weeks by simple majority of the members of the Board. That period may be extended by a further six weeks, taking into account the complexity of the subject matter. Regarding the draft decision referred to in paragraph 1 circulated to the members of the Board in accordance with paragraph 5, a member which has not objected within a reasonable period indicated by the Chair, shall be deemed to be in agreement with the draft decision.
4.Supervisory authorities and the Commission shall, without undue delay, communicate by electronic means to the Board, using a standardised format any relevant information, including as the case may be a summary of the facts, the draft decision, the grounds which make the enactment of such measure necessary, and the views of other supervisory authorities concerned.
5.The Chair of the Board shall, without undue, delay inform by electronic means: (a)  the members of the Board and the Commission of any relevant information which has been communicated to it using a standardised format. The secretariat of the Board shall, where necessary, provide translations of relevant information; and (b)  the supervisory authority referred to, as the case may be, in paragraphs 1 and 2, and the Commission of the opinion and make it public.
6.The competent supervisory authority shall not adopt its draft decision referred to in paragraph 1 within the period referred to in paragraph 3
7.The supervisory authority referred to in paragraph 1 shall take utmost account of the opinion of the Board and shall, within two weeks after receiving the opinion, communicate to the Chair of the Board by electronic means whether it will maintain or amend its draft decision and, if any, the amended draft decision, using a standardised format.
8.Where the supervisory authority concerned informs the Chair of the Board within the period referred to in paragraph 7 of this Article that it does not intend to follow the opinion of the Board, in whole or in part, providing the relevant grounds, Article 65(1) shall apply., Member States law should reconcile the rules governing freedom of expression and information, including journalistic, academic, artistic and or literary expression with the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation. The processing of personal data solely for journalistic purposes, or for the purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression should be subject to derogations or exemptions from certain provisions of this Regulation if necessary to reconcile the right to the protection of personal data with the right to freedom of expression and information, as enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter. This should apply in particular to the processing of personal data in the audiovisual field and in news archives and press libraries. Therefore, Member States should adopt legislative measures which lay down the exemptions and derogations necessary for the purpose of balancing those fundamental rights. Member States should adopt such exemptions and derogations on general principles, the rights of the data subject, the controller and the processor, the transfer of personal data to third countries or international organisations, the independent supervisory authorities, cooperation and consistency, and specific data-processing situations. Where such exemptions or derogations differ from one Member State to another, the law of the Member State to which the controller is subject should apply. In order to take account of the importance of the right to freedom of expression in every democratic society, it is necessary to interpret notions relating to that freedom, such as journalism, broadly., source_sentence: Which form could the information be provided in when addressed to the public?
sentences: **Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**  
**Provisions:**  
**Time of commission of the act:**  
**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**  
**Reasoning:** Partially accepts the lawsuit.  
**Facts:** The plaintiff, who works as a lawyer, maintains a savings account with the defendant banking corporation under account number GR.............. Pursuant to a contract dated June 11, 2010, established in Thessaloniki between the defendant and the plaintiff, the plaintiff was granted access to the electronic banking system (e-banking) to conduct banking transactions remotely. On October 10, 2020, the plaintiff fell victim to electronic fraud through the "phishing" method, whereby an unknown perpetrator managed to extract and transfer €3,000.00 from the plaintiff’s account to another account of the same bank. Specifically, on that day at 6:51 a.m., the plaintiff received an email from the sender ".........", with the address ..........., informing him that his debit card had been suspended and that online payments and cash withdrawals could not be made until the issue was resolved. The email urged him to confirm his details within the next 72 hours by following a link titled "card activation."  
The plaintiff read the above email on his mobile phone around 8:00 a.m., and believing it came from the defendant, he followed the instructions and accessed a website that was identical (a clone) to that of the defendant. On this page, he was asked to enter his login credentials to connect to the service, which he did, and he was subsequently asked to input his debit card details for the alleged activation, which he also provided. Then, to complete the process, a number was sent to his mobile phone at 8:07 a.m. from the sender ........, which he entered, and two minutes later he received a message from the same sender in English stating that the quick access code had been activated on his mobile. A few minutes later, at 8:18 a.m., he received an email from the defendant informing him of the transfer of €3,000.00 from his account to account number GR ........... held at the same bank, with the beneficiary's details being .......... As soon as the plaintiff read this, he immediately called the defendant's call center and canceled his debit card, the access codes for the service ......., and locked the application .......... At the same time, he verbally submitted a request to dispute and cancel the contested transaction, and in a subsequent phone call, he also canceled his credit card. On the same day, he also sent an email to the defendant informing them in writing of the above and requesting the cancellation of the transaction and the return of the amount of €3,000.00 to his account, as this transfer was not made by him but by an unknown perpetrator through electronic fraud and was not approved by him. It should also be noted that the plaintiff, as the sole beneficiary according to the aforementioned contract for using the defendant's Internet Banking service, never received any update via SMS or the VIBER application from the bank regarding the transaction details before its completion, nor did he receive a one-time code (OTP) to approve the contested transaction. He subsequently filed a complaint against unknown persons at the Cyber Crime Division for the crime of fraud. The defendant sent an email to the plaintiff on October 16, 2020, informing him that his request had been forwarded to the appropriate department of the bank for investigation, stating that the bank would never send him an email or SMS asking him to enter his personal data and that as of October 7, 2020, there was a notice posted for its customers regarding malicious attempts to steal personal data in the "Our News" section on ....... A month after the disputed incident, on November 10, 2020, an amount of €2,296.82 was transferred to the plaintiff's account from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made. The plaintiff immediately sent an email to the defendant asking to be informed whether this transfer was a return of part of the amount that had been illegally withdrawn from his account and requested the return of the remaining amount of €703.18. In its response dated January 13, 2021, the defendant confirmed that the aforementioned amount indeed came from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made, following a freeze of that account initiated by the defendant during the investigation of the incident, but refused to return the remaining amount, claiming it bore no responsibility for the leak of the personal codes to third parties, according to the terms of the service contract established between them.  
From the entirety of the evidence presented to the court, there is no indication of the authenticity of the contested transaction, as the plaintiff did not give his consent for the execution of the transfer of the amount of €3,000.00, especially in light of the provision in Article 72 paragraph 2 of Law 4537/2018 stating that the mere use of the Internet Banking service by the plaintiff does not necessarily constitute sufficient evidence that the payer approved the payment action. Specifically, it was proven that the contested transaction was not carried out following a strong identification of the plaintiff – the sole beneficiary of the account – and his approval, as the latter may have entered his personal codes on the counterfeit website; however, he was never informed, before the completion of the contested transaction, of the amount that would be transferred from his account to a third-party account, nor did he receive on his mobile phone, either via SMS or through the VIBER application or any other means, the one-time code - extra PIN for its completion, which he was required to enter to approve the contested transaction (payment action) and thus complete his identification, a fact that was not countered by any evidence from the defendant. Furthermore, it is noted that the defendant's claims that it bears no responsibility under the terms of the banking services contract, whereby it is not liable for any damage to its customer in cases of unauthorized use of their personal access codes to the Internet Banking service, are to be rejected as fundamentally unfounded. This is because the aforementioned contractual terms are invalid according to the provision of Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, as they contradict the provisions of Articles 71, 73, and 92 of the same Law, which provide for the provider's universal liability and its exemption only for unusual and unforeseen circumstances that are beyond the control of the party invoking them and whose consequences could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary; these provisions establish mandatory law in favor of users, as according to Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, payment service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to the detriment of payment service users, unless the possibility of deviation is explicitly provided and they can decide to offer only more favorable terms to payment service users; the aforementioned contractual terms do not constitute more favorable terms but rather disadvantageous terms for the payment service user. In this case, however, the defendant did not prove the authenticity of the transaction and its approval by the plaintiff and did not invoke, nor did any unusual and unforeseen circumstances beyond its control, the consequences of which could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary, come to light. Therefore, the contested transaction transferring the amount of €3,000.00 is considered, in the absence of demonstrable consent from the plaintiff, unapproved according to the provisions of Article 64 of Law 4537/2018, and the defendant's contrary claims are rejected, especially since the plaintiff proceeded, according to Article 71 paragraph 1 of Law 4537/2018, without undue delay to notify the defendant regarding the contested unapproved payment action. Consequently, the defendant is liable for compensating the plaintiff for the positive damage he suffered under Article 73 of Law 4537/2018 and is obliged to pay him the requested amount of €703.18, while the plaintiff’s fault in the occurrence of this damage cannot be established, as he entered his personal details in an online environment that was a faithful imitation of that of the defendant, as evidenced by the comparison of the screenshots of the fake website and the real website provided by the plaintiff, a fact that he could not have known while being fully convinced that he was transacting with the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant’s liability to compensate the plaintiff is based on the provision of Article 8 of Law 2251/1994, which applies in this case, as the plaintiff's damage resulted from inadequate fulfillment of its obligations in the context of providing its services, but also on the provision of Article 914 of the Civil Code in the sense of omission on its part of unlawfully and culpably imposed actions. In this case, given that during the relevant period there had been a multitude of similar incidents of fraud against the defendant's customers, the latter, as a service provider to the consumer public and bearing transactional obligations of care and security towards them, displayed gross negligence regarding the security provided for electronic transaction services, which was compromised by the fraudulent theft of funds, as it did not comply with all required high-security measures for executing the contested transaction, failing to implement the strict customer identification verification process and to check the authenticity of the account to which the funds were sent, thus not assuming the suspicious nature of the transaction, did not adopt comprehensive and improved protective measures to fully protect its customers against malicious attacks and online fraud and to prevent the infiltration of unauthorized third parties, nor did it fulfill its obligations to inform, accurately inform, and warn its consumers - customers, as it failed to adequately inform them of attempts to steal their personal data through the sending of informative emails or SMS, while merely posting in a section rather than on a central banner (as it later did) does not constitute adequate information such that it meets the requirement of protecting its customers and the increased safeguarding of their interests. Although the plaintiff acted promptly and informed the defendant on the same day about the contested incident, the defendant did not act as promptly regarding the investigation of the incident and the freezing of the account that held the fraudulent credit to prevent the plaintiff's loss, but only returned part of the funds to the plaintiff a month later. This behavior, beyond being culpable due to gross negligence, was also unlawful, as it would have been illegal even without the contractual relationship, as contrary to the provisions of Law 4537/2018 and Law 2251/1994, regarding the lack of security of the services that the consumer is legitimately entitled to expect, as well as the building of trust that is essential in banking transactions, elements that it was obligated to provide within the sphere of the services offered, and contrary to the principles of good faith and commercial ethics, as crystallized in the provision of Article 288 of the Civil Code, as well as the general duty imposed by Article 914 of the Civil Code not to cause harm to another culpably. This resulted not only in positive damage to the plaintiff but also in causing him moral harm consisting of his mental distress and the disruption, agitation, and sorrow he experienced, for which he must be awarded financial compensation. Taking into account all the general circumstances of the case, the extent of the plaintiff's damage, the severity of the defendant's fault, the mental distress suffered by the plaintiff, the insecurity he felt regarding his deposits, the sorrow he experienced, and the stress caused by his financial loss, which occurred during the pandemic period when his earnings from his professional activity had significantly decreased, as well as the financial and social situation of the parties, it is the court's opinion that he should be granted, as financial compensation for his moral harm, an amount of €250.00, which is deemed reasonable and fair. Therefore, the total monetary amount that the plaintiff is entitled to for his positive damage and financial compensation for the moral harm suffered amounts to a total of (€703.18 + €250.00) = €953.18., In the context of the adoption of the Member State law on which the performance of the tasks of the public authority or public body is based and which regulates the specific processing operation or set of operations in question, Member States may deem it necessary to carry out such assessment prior to the processing activities., The principle of transparency requires that any information addressed to the public or to the data subject be concise, easily accessible and easy to understand, and that clear and plain language and, additionally, where appropriate, visualisation be used. Such information could be provided in electronic form, for example, when addressed to the public, through a website. This is of particular relevance in situations where the proliferation of actors and the technological complexity of practice make it difficult for the data subject to know and understand whether, by whom and for what purpose personal data relating to him or her are being collected, such as in the case of online advertising. Given that children merit specific protection, any information and communication, where processing is addressed to a child, should be in such a clear and plain language that the child can easily understand., source_sentence: What should the lead supervisory authority take into account when deciding whether to handle the case?
sentences: Where another supervisory authority should act as a lead supervisory authority for the processing activities of the controller or processor but the concrete subject matter of a complaint or the possible infringement concerns only processing activities of the controller or processor in the Member State where the complaint has been lodged or the possible infringement detected and the matter does not substantially affect or is not likely to substantially affect data subjects in other Member States, the supervisory authority receiving a complaint or detecting or being informed otherwise of situations that entail possible infringements of this Regulation should seek an amicable settlement with the controller and, if this proves unsuccessful, exercise its full range of powers. This should include: specific processing carried out in the territory of the Member State of the supervisory authority or with regard to data subjects on the territory of that Member State; processing that is carried out in the context of an offer of goods or services specifically aimed at data subjects in the territory of the Member State of the supervisory authority; or processing that has to be assessed taking into account relevant legal obligations under Member State law., A data subject should have the right of access to personal data which have been collected concerning him or her, and to exercise that right easily and at reasonable intervals, in order to be aware of, and verify, the lawfulness of the processing. This includes the right for data subjects to have access to data concerning their health, for example the data in their medical records containing information such as diagnoses, examination results, assessments by treating physicians and any treatment or interventions provided. Every data subject should therefore have the right to know and obtain communication in particular with regard to the purposes for which the personal data are processed, where possible the period for which the personal data are processed, the recipients of the personal data, the logic involved in any automatic personal data processing and, at least when based on profiling, the consequences of such processing. Where possible, the controller should be able to provide remote access to a secure system which would provide the data subject with direct access to his or her personal data. That right should not adversely affect the rights or freedoms of others, including trade secrets or intellectual property and in particular the copyright protecting the software. However, the result of those considerations should not be a refusal to provide all information to the data subject. Where the controller processes a large quantity of information concerning the data subject, the controller should be able to request that, before the information is delivered, the data subject specify the information or processing activities to which the request relates., Each supervisory authority not acting as the lead supervisory authority should be competent to handle local cases where the controller or processor is established in more than one Member State, but the subject matter of the specific processing concerns only processing carried out in a single Member State and involves only data subjects in that single Member State, for example, where the subject matter concerns the processing of employees' personal data in the specific employment context of a Member State. In such cases, the supervisory authority should inform the lead supervisory authority without delay about the matter. After being informed, the lead supervisory authority should decide, whether it will handle the case pursuant to the provision on cooperation between the lead supervisory authority and other supervisory authorities concerned (‘one-stop-shop mechanism’), or whether the supervisory authority which informed it should handle the case at local level. When deciding whether it will handle the case, the lead supervisory authority should take into account whether there is an establishment of the controller or processor in the Member State of the supervisory authority which informed it in order to ensure effective enforcement of a decision vis-à-vis the controller or processor. Where the lead supervisory authority decides to handle the case, the supervisory authority which informed it should have the 4.5.2016 L 119/23 Official Journal of the European Union EN   possibility to submit a draft for a decision, of which the lead supervisory authority should take utmost account when preparing its draft decision in that one-stop-shop mechanism., source_sentence: Who should communicate a personal data breach to the data subject?
sentences: 1.In the absence of an adequacy decision pursuant to Article 45(3), or of appropriate safeguards pursuant to Article 46, including binding corporate rules, a transfer or a set of transfers of personal data to a third country or an international organisation shall take place only on one of the following conditions: (a)  the data subject has explicitly consented to the proposed transfer, after having been informed of the possible risks of such transfers for the data subject due to the absence of an adequacy decision and appropriate safeguards; (b)  the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the data subject and the controller or the implementation of pre-contractual measures taken at the data subject's request; (c)  the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in the interest of the data subject between the controller and another natural or legal person; (d)  the transfer is necessary for important reasons of public interest; (e)  the transfer is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims; (f)  the transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of other persons, where the data subject is physically or legally incapable of giving consent; (g)  the transfer is made from a register which according to Union or Member State law is intended to provide information to the public and which is open to consultation either by the public in general or by any person who can demonstrate a legitimate interest, but only to the extent that the conditions laid down by Union or Member State law for consultation are fulfilled in the particular case. Where a transfer could not be based on a provision in Article 45 or 46, including the provisions on binding corporate rules, and none of the derogations for a specific situation referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph is applicable, a transfer to a third country or an international organisation may take place only if the transfer is not repetitive, concerns only a limited number of data subjects, is necessary for the purposes of compelling legitimate interests pursued by the controller which are not overridden by the interests or rights and freedoms of the data subject, and the controller has assessed all the circumstances surrounding the data transfer and has on the basis of that assessment provided suitable safeguards with regard to the protection of personal data. The controller shall inform the supervisory authority of the transfer. The controller shall, in addition to providing the information referred to in Articles 13 and 14, inform the data subject of the transfer and on the compelling legitimate interests pursued.
2.A transfer pursuant to point (g) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 shall not involve the entirety of the personal data or entire categories of the personal data contained in the register. Where the register is intended for consultation by persons having a legitimate interest, the transfer shall be made only at the request of those persons or if they are to be the recipients. 4.5.2016 L 119/64  
3.Points (a), (b) and (c) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 and the second subparagraph thereof shall not apply to activities carried out by public authorities in the exercise of their public powers.
4.The public interest referred to in point (d) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 shall be recognised in Union law or in the law of the Member State to which the controller is subject.
5.In the absence of an adequacy decision, Union or Member State law may, for important reasons of public interest, expressly set limits to the transfer of specific categories of personal data to a third country or an international organisation. Member States shall notify such provisions to the Commission.
6.The controller or processor shall document the assessment as well as the suitable safeguards referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 1 of this Article in the records referred to in Article 30., The controller should communicate to the data subject a personal data breach, without undue delay, where that personal data breach is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of the natural person in order to allow him or her to take the necessary precautions. The communication should describe the nature of the personal data breach as well as recommendations for the natural person concerned to mitigate potential adverse effects. Such communications to data subjects should be made as soon as reasonably feasible and in close cooperation with the supervisory authority, respecting guidance provided by it or by other relevant authorities such as law-enforcement authorities. For example, the need to mitigate an immediate risk of damage would call for prompt communication with data subjects whereas the need to implement appropriate measures against continuing or similar personal data breaches may justify more time for communication., Court (Civil/Criminal):
Provisions:
Time of commission of the act:
Outcome (not guilty, guilty): ORDERS the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of two thousand four hundred thirty-four euros and eighty-three cents (€2,434.83) with legal interest from the service of the lawsuit.

Reasoning: Law 4537/2018 introduces mandatory provisions in favor of users, as according to Article 103, payment service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to the detriment of payment service users, unless the possibility of deviation is expressly provided, and they can decide to offer only more favorable terms to payment service users. Under this law and its provisions, providers are only liable when there are unusual and unforeseen circumstances beyond the control of the party invoking them, and whose consequences could not have been avoided despite efforts to the contrary. However, operational risks and security risks of the system do not constitute unusual and unforeseen circumstances, so any damage to users resulting from their occurrence falls on the providers. Furthermore, the authenticity of the disputed transaction, namely the payment act, is not proven, in the sense that none of the beneficiaries of the contested joint account, namely the plaintiff or her husband, had given their consent as stipulated in Article 64 of Law 4537/2018. Burden of proof. The payment service provider of the payer is liable to the payer for the proper execution of the payment act, unless it proves to the payer that the service provider of the beneficiary received the amount of the payment act according to paragraph 1 of Article 83 of Law 4537/2018.

Facts:
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics: cosine_accuracy@1, cosine_accuracy@3, cosine_accuracy@5, cosine_accuracy@10, cosine_precision@1, cosine_precision@3, cosine_precision@5, cosine_precision@10, cosine_recall@1, cosine_recall@3, cosine_recall@5, cosine_recall@10, cosine_ndcg@10, cosine_mrr@10, cosine_map@100
model-index: name: bge-m3
results: task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 768
type: dim_768
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.5050505050505051
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.5378787878787878
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.5782828282828283
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.6237373737373737
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.5050505050505051
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.48316498316498313
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.4494949494949495
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.3888888888888889
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.10832333640111431
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.2625352410394081
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.34742695443516225
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.471052270935327
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.5624388862453237
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.5318472422639089
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.6073394067451282
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no, task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 512
type: dim_512
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.49242424242424243
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.5328282828282829
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.5707070707070707
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.6212121212121212
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.49242424242424243
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.47474747474747475
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.44393939393939397
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.3828282828282829
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.10500024769037898
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.2570068431448079
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.34593786739805465
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.47197321949954296
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.5541022948657252
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.5216901154401153
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.6006993331399361
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no, task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 256
type: dim_256
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.4621212121212121
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.5
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.547979797979798
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.5782828282828283
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.4621212121212121
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.4461279461279461
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.4227272727272727
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.36439393939393944
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.09725757269489572
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.2379922007625032
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.3246225291589775
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.44731055858092
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.5235934722759641
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.4904050424883758
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.5706447969365108
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no, task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 128
type: dim_128
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.4595959595959596
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.4823232323232323
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.5202020202020202
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.5757575757575758
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.4595959595959596
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.43771043771043766
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.407070707070707
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.35454545454545455
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.09698923307996522
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.23617106840159813
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.31399558819924883
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.43909597785948196
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.5127720060858907
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.4833924563091229
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.5605596517236341
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no, task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 64
type: dim_64
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.3661616161616162
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.4015151515151515
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.45707070707070707
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.5126262626262627
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.3661616161616162
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.35437710437710435
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.3368686868686869
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.3047979797979798
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.07890402318604318
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.19677794363915516
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.2664281674203789
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.380769398197064
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.4353175725232405
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.39882154882154874
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.48523613865845294
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no
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Created: 2025-09-15 23:14:13