Model: freelawproject/modernbert-embed-base_finetune_512
Author: freelawproject
Pipeline: sentence-similarity
Library: sentence-transformers
Tags: sentence-transformers, safetensors, modernbert, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:2828, loss:MultipleNegativesRankingLoss, en, arxiv:1908.10084, arxiv:1705.00652, base_model:nomic-ai/modernbert-embed-base, base_model:finetune:nomic-ai/modernbert-embed-base, license:cc0-1.0, model-index, text-embeddings-inference, endpoints_compatible, region:us
Base models (finetune): id: nomic-ai/modernbert-embed-base
Card metadata: language: en
tags: sentence-transformers, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:2828, loss:MultipleNegativesRankingLoss
base_model: nomic-ai/modernbert-embed-base
widget: source_sentence: search_document: The first respects the interest in which the litigation is being prosecuted, and the second is the failure of the plaintiff to either plead or prove a cause of action on his behalf as a stockholder. If this litigation had been honestly instituted by a stockholder for the protection of his and other stockholders ’ rights, and was not so evidently a suit instigated by a rival company for its own interests, we should strive to be astute to discover some remedy for a very evident wrong. The far reaching and flexible nature of equitable powers might, with proper proof and under other circumstances, enable us to do justice as between the stockholders of the Grey Creek Company and Chappell, its officer and director. But we have no inclination to struggle for this result, because it is a well settled principle that whenever it is made to appear that the suit was. not begun in good faith by a shareholder for the protection of his rights, but was in reality originated and prosecuted by another corporation for its own benefit, the court will consider what led the plaintiff to institute his suit, and, finding some other reason than a desire to protect stockholders ’ rights, will refuse to entertain the bill. Forrest v. Manchester, etc., R ' way Co., 4 De G., F. & J. 19 ( 65 Eng. Chan., 125 ) ; Filder v. London, etc., R ' way Co., 1 H. & M. 489 ; Belmont v. Erie R ' way Co. et al., 52 Barb. 637 ; Waterbury v. The Merchants ’ Union Express Co., 50 Barb. 157 ; Camblos v. The P. & R. R. R. Co., 4 Brewster, 563. Naturally, the cases respecting this proposition are limited, since the question could not often arise. It seldom happens that shareholders, otherwise than for the protection of their own interests, come into courts of equity to seek redress for wrongs done the corporation of which they are * 331members. But wherever it is apparent that this has been done, the courts have never hesitated to send the plaintiff out of court and refuse him relief.
sentences: search_query: When can a shareholder's lawsuit be dismissed for lack of good faith?, search_query: What are the requirements for filing a patent application in the United States?, search_query: How are disputes over partnership assets and liabilities resolved in court?, source_sentence: search_document: It must be conceded that defendant ’ s property within the State is negligible. * 766The salaries of Titus and the other salesman are paid by the defendant ’ s home office. Titus and his associate salesman are employed on a salary basis and devote all their time to the business of the defendant. Titus employs a young woman stenographer and pays her out of the aforementioned “ H. B. Titus, Special ” account. Defendant has no other employees in New York. Titus and his associate are constantly and systematically engaged within the State of New York in soliciting business for the defendant. Their activities result in the continuous shipment by the defendant of its product into and outside of the State of New York. It was testified by Titus that the shipments into this State attain a monthly average of approximately $ 14, 000. Shipments are made in every case from factories without the State “ f. o. b. plant. ” Orders received by Titus from new customers are transmitted to the home office in Cleveland and are there accepted or rejected, presumably after due investigation of the customer ’ s credit standing. In the case of orders received from approved accounts, that is to say, from customers who have previously done business with the defendant and whose credit standing has been found satisfactory by the defendant ’ s home office, and who have thus established a permanent relationship with defendant ’ s New York office, Titus promptly transmits the order to the factory, by means of a teletype machine which the defendant caused to be installed in the 50 Church street office for the use of Titus. This practice is always followed in the case of a rush order from an approved account if the amount of the order is not unusually large ; and the testimony affords some reason to suppose that it is followed in the case of every normal - sized order from such an account. As a general rule, prices are established by the Cleveland office, but Titus was sometimes authorized to quote varying prices in order to meet competition. Orders received on the basis of prices thus quoted by Titus required the approval of the home office, but were, as a matter of fact, in no instance rejected. Defendant ’ s customers in New York make payment directly to the Cleveland office, but when instructed to do so, Titus undertakes the collection of delinquent accounts.
sentences: search_query: What factors are considered by courts in determining the best interest of a child in custody cases?, search_query: What are the tax implications of freelancing as a sole proprietor?, search_query: What constitutes sufficient business activity for a company to be subject to jurisdiction in a state?, source_sentence: search_document: The evil is still just as great as it was formerly, if a party can have only legal or equitable relief in the same action. In such case, if he commences his action asking for equitable relief, as for instance a specific performance, and it turns out that he is not entitled to it, but only to legal relief, by way of damages, he might perhaps, if such strictness is to govern, be put to a new action to obtain redress. This certainly ought not to be ; and such a strictness is hostile to the whole spirit of the change that has been made. In trying such a cause at the circuit, I should most certainly allow whatever amendment in the pleadings was necesssary to give the party redress. If the plaintiff had asked for equitable relief, and it turned out that he was entitled to legal relief only, I should permit him to take it in that form. And if he had asked for legal relief only, Avhen he was entitled to both legal and equitable relief, I should allow the proper amendment to administer complete justice in the case. The power to amend, authorized by the Code, is ample for such purpose. Noav the last case of amendment I have mentioned as permissible at the circuit, is precisely what is claimed in this case, with this difference only, that it is claimed to be made here, before issue joined, and when, of course, the defendant has abundant time and opportunity to prepare to meet the claim at the circuit. I see no objection in this case to uniting claims for both legal and equitable relief in the same action. Both depend on the same transaction and both are necessary to indemnify the plaintiff for past, and to protect him against future injury. I think the proper course, under our present system of practice, is to give the party whatever relief is applicable to the facts put * 271in issue in the pleadings and established on the trial, whether such relief be legal or equitable, or both. And I see no reason against uniting in one action claims for both legal and eqiutable relief, when they are not inconsistent with each other ( Linden agt. Hepburn, 5 How. Pr. R. 188 ).
sentences: search_query: What are the time requirements for challenging a candidate's qualifications to appear on a ballot in Kentucky?, search_query: Can legal and equitable claims be united in one action under modern legal practice?, search_query: What are the requirements for filing an international patent application?, source_sentence: search_document: The major points presented by appellants are, first, that the city of Newark took but an easement in the property, second, that if the city did acquire a fee, it was a conditional, base or determinable fee, and, finally, that in either event the use for which the property was condemned has been abandoned and, in consequence, the property has reverted to the former owner. The city responds that, by virtue of the condemnation proceedings, it acquired an estate in fee - simple absolute, the title to which is not subject to any right of reversion, and, furthermore, that even though the city be found to possess only a qualified fee, it may nevertheless devote the land to the street use. * Page 327 It may be said of a municipality, as it was said of a railroad corporation in Currie v. New York Transit Company and National Docks Railway Co., 66 N. J. Eq. 313, that the quantity of interest in land obtained by it under the power of eminent domain is that which the statute conferring the power authorizes it to acquire and that the legislature may authorize the taking of a fee or any less estate in its discretion. The earlier cases were reviewed by our Chief Justice in the opinion written by him for this court in the Currie case and need not be here adverted to in the continued recognition of the enunciated principle. The next question is : What quantity of interest did the statute which conferred the power of eminent domain authorize the city to acquire? The statute is to be read, not under the necessity of finding fixed phraseology, but to ascertain its intent, because this intent, clearly found, will prevail. No precise words are necessary in a statute to authorize the condemnation of a fee. As was said by Mr. Justice Holmes, then a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in City of Newton v. Perry, 163 Mass. 319 ; 39 N. E. Rep. 1032, " there are no sacramental words which must be used in a statutory power to take and hold lands in order to give a right to take the lands in fee. " See, also, Driscoll v. City of New Haven ( Conn. ), 52 Atl.
sentences: search_query: What legal principles govern equality and uniformity in taxation laws?, search_query: What determines the type of interest a municipality can acquire through eminent domain?, search_query: What are the requirements for filing a patent application in the United States?, source_sentence: search_document: . for one year ” ; this was eventually codified as part of G. L. c. 210, § 3, which also specified other grounds for dispensing with parental consent, such as current imprisonment of the parent for more than three years. Chapter 593, § 1, of the Acts of 1953, codified as G. L. c. 210, § 3A, first provided for an independent proceeding, prior to adoption proceedings proper, at which it could be determined whether parental consent was to be necessary for the adoption. Its purpose was to facilitate and expedite the process of adoption of children being held in temporary foster care. See the Department of Public Welfare recommendations, 1953 House Doc. No. 118, accompanying their draft bill,. 1953 House Doc. No. 124. The proceeding could be brought by the Department of Public Welfare or any appropriate child care agency having custody of the child. But the act was silent as to the standards to be applied in deciding when consent could be dispensed with, and in Consent to Adoption of a Minor, 345 Mass. 706 ( 1963 ), this court held that, in the absence of any other indication in the statute, the conditions set out in § 3 for direct adoptions were still to be met ; specifically, the court held that a finding of parental “ unsuitability, ” without a finding of * 638wilful desertion or neglect for a year, was not an adequate basis for a decree dispensing with the parental consent. The department had evidently not intended the § 3 conditions to be read into the independent § 3A proceeding. Therefore the department immediately sponsored St. 1964, c. 425, which provided that consent could be dispensed with “ if the court finds that the best interests of the child will be served by placement for adoption ” ; the court was not to be restricted by the § 3 conditions, but was to give “ due regard to the ability, capacity and fitness of the child ’ s parents. . . and to the plans proposed by the department or other agency initiating such petition. ” This statute thus broadened the factors the court could consider in deciding whether to proceed over the parent ’ s objections ; unsuitability besides desertion or neglect was now clearly an available ground.
sentences: search_query: What are the legal standards for dispensing with parental consent in adoption cases?, search_query: What are the tax implications of inheriting property from a deceased relative?, search_query: What legal remedies are available when surface water drainage causes damage to private property?
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics: cosine_accuracy
model-index: name: modernbert-embed-base trained on triplets
results: task: type: triplet
name: Triplet
dataset: name: dev
type: dev
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy
value: 0.9959100484848022
name: Cosine Accuracy
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy
value: 0.9938650131225586
name: Cosine Accuracy
verified: no
license: cc0-1.0
Likes: 5 | All-time downloads: 81100
Created: 2025-03-04 00:30:31