Model: IoannisKat1/distilbert-base-uncased-legal-matryoshka
Author: IoannisKat1
Pipeline: sentence-similarity
Library: sentence-transformers
Tags: sentence-transformers, safetensors, distilbert, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:1580, loss:MatryoshkaLoss, loss:MultipleNegativesRankingLoss, en, arxiv:1908.10084, arxiv:2205.13147, arxiv:1705.00652, base_model:distilbert/distilbert-base-uncased, base_model:finetune:distilbert/distilbert-base-uncased, license:apache-2.0, model-index, text-embeddings-inference, endpoints_compatible, region:us
Base models (finetune): id: distilbert/distilbert-base-uncased
Card metadata: language: en
license: apache-2.0
tags: sentence-transformers, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:1580, loss:MatryoshkaLoss, loss:MultipleNegativesRankingLoss
base_model: distilbert/distilbert-base-uncased
widget: source_sentence: What principle must be respected according to the text?
sentences: Where a data subject considers that his or her rights under this Regulation are infringed, he or she should have the right to mandate a not-for-profit body, organisation or association which is constituted in accordance with the law of a Member State, has statutory objectives which are in the public interest and is active in the field of the protection of personal data to lodge a complaint on his or her behalf with a supervisory authority, exercise the right to a judicial remedy on behalf of data subjects or, if provided for in Member State law, exercise the right to receive compensation on behalf of data subjects. A Member State may provide for such a body, organisation or association to have the right to lodge a complaint in that Member State, independently of a data subject's mandate, and the right to an effective judicial remedy where it has reasons to consider that the rights of a data subject have been infringed as a result of the processing of personal data which infringes this Regulation. That body, organisation or association may not be allowed to claim compensation on a data subject's behalf independently of the data subject's mandate., Voice phishing involves manipulating victims over the phone. Attackers pose as bank officials or authorities and use intimidation to extract financial details.

Scenario:
- Victims are coerced into giving away PINs, passwords, or other credentials under false pretenses of legal or financial emergencies., 1.Processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes, shall be subject to appropriate safeguards, in accordance with this Regulation, for the rights and freedoms of the data subject. Those safeguards shall ensure that technical and organisational measures are in place in particular in 4.5.2016 L 119/84   order to ensure respect for the principle of data minimisation. Those measures may include pseudonymisation provided that those purposes can be fulfilled in that manner. Where those purposes can be fulfilled by further processing which does not permit or no longer permits the identification of data subjects, those purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner.
2.Where personal data are processed for scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes, Union or Member State law may provide for derogations from the rights referred to in Articles 15, 16, 18 and 21 subject to the conditions and safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article in so far as such rights are likely to render impossible or seriously impair the achievement of the specific purposes, and such derogations are necessary for the fulfilment of those purposes.
3.Where personal data are processed for archiving purposes in the public interest, Union or Member State law may provide for derogations from the rights referred to in Articles 15, 16, 18, 19, 20 and 21 subject to the conditions and safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article in so far as such rights are likely to render impossible or seriously impair the achievement of the specific purposes, and such derogations are necessary for the fulfilment of those purposes.
4.Where processing referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 serves at the same time another purpose, the derogations shall apply only to processing for the purposes referred to in those paragraphs., source_sentence: When did the plaintiff send an email to the defendant?
sentences: **Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**  
**Provisions:**  
**Time of commission of the act:**  
**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**  
**Reasoning:** Partially accepts the lawsuit.  
**Facts:** The plaintiff, who works as a lawyer, maintains a savings account with the defendant banking corporation under account number GR.............. Pursuant to a contract dated June 11, 2010, established in Thessaloniki between the defendant and the plaintiff, the plaintiff was granted access to the electronic banking system (e-banking) to conduct banking transactions remotely. On October 10, 2020, the plaintiff fell victim to electronic fraud through the "phishing" method, whereby an unknown perpetrator managed to extract and transfer €3,000.00 from the plaintiff’s account to another account of the same bank. Specifically, on that day at 6:51 a.m., the plaintiff received an email from the sender ".........", with the address ..........., informing him that his debit card had been suspended and that online payments and cash withdrawals could not be made until the issue was resolved. The email urged him to confirm his details within the next 72 hours by following a link titled "card activation."  
The plaintiff read the above email on his mobile phone around 8:00 a.m., and believing it came from the defendant, he followed the instructions and accessed a website that was identical (a clone) to that of the defendant. On this page, he was asked to enter his login credentials to connect to the service, which he did, and he was subsequently asked to input his debit card details for the alleged activation, which he also provided. Then, to complete the process, a number was sent to his mobile phone at 8:07 a.m. from the sender ........, which he entered, and two minutes later he received a message from the same sender in English stating that the quick access code had been activated on his mobile. A few minutes later, at 8:18 a.m., he received an email from the defendant informing him of the transfer of €3,000.00 from his account to account number GR ........... held at the same bank, with the beneficiary's details being .......... As soon as the plaintiff read this, he immediately called the defendant's call center and canceled his debit card, the access codes for the service ......., and locked the application .......... At the same time, he verbally submitted a request to dispute and cancel the contested transaction, and in a subsequent phone call, he also canceled his credit card. On the same day, he also sent an email to the defendant informing them in writing of the above and requesting the cancellation of the transaction and the return of the amount of €3,000.00 to his account, as this transfer was not made by him but by an unknown perpetrator through electronic fraud and was not approved by him. It should also be noted that the plaintiff, as the sole beneficiary according to the aforementioned contract for using the defendant's Internet Banking service, never received any update via SMS or the VIBER application from the bank regarding the transaction details before its completion, nor did he receive a one-time code (OTP) to approve the contested transaction. He subsequently filed a complaint against unknown persons at the Cyber Crime Division for the crime of fraud. The defendant sent an email to the plaintiff on October 16, 2020, informing him that his request had been forwarded to the appropriate department of the bank for investigation, stating that the bank would never send him an email or SMS asking him to enter his personal data and that as of October 7, 2020, there was a notice posted for its customers regarding malicious attempts to steal personal data in the "Our News" section on ....... A month after the disputed incident, on November 10, 2020, an amount of €2,296.82 was transferred to the plaintiff's account from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made. The plaintiff immediately sent an email to the defendant asking to be informed whether this transfer was a return of part of the amount that had been illegally withdrawn from his account and requested the return of the remaining amount of €703.18. In its response dated January 13, 2021, the defendant confirmed that the aforementioned amount indeed came from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made, following a freeze of that account initiated by the defendant during the investigation of the incident, but refused to return the remaining amount, claiming it bore no responsibility for the leak of the personal codes to third parties, according to the terms of the service contract established between them.  
From the entirety of the evidence presented to the court, there is no indication of the authenticity of the contested transaction, as the plaintiff did not give his consent for the execution of the transfer of the amount of €3,000.00, especially in light of the provision in Article 72 paragraph 2 of Law 4537/2018 stating that the mere use of the Internet Banking service by the plaintiff does not necessarily constitute sufficient evidence that the payer approved the payment action. Specifically, it was proven that the contested transaction was not carried out following a strong identification of the plaintiff – the sole beneficiary of the account – and his approval, as the latter may have entered his personal codes on the counterfeit website; however, he was never informed, before the completion of the contested transaction, of the amount that would be transferred from his account to a third-party account, nor did he receive on his mobile phone, either via SMS or through the VIBER application or any other means, the one-time code - extra PIN for its completion, which he was required to enter to approve the contested transaction (payment action) and thus complete his identification, a fact that was not countered by any evidence from the defendant. Furthermore, it is noted that the defendant's claims that it bears no responsibility under the terms of the banking services contract, whereby it is not liable for any damage to its customer in cases of unauthorized use of their personal access codes to the Internet Banking service, are to be rejected as fundamentally unfounded. This is because the aforementioned contractual terms are invalid according to the provision of Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, as they contradict the provisions of Articles 71, 73, and 92 of the same Law, which provide for the provider's universal liability and its exemption only for unusual and unforeseen circumstances that are beyond the control of the party invoking them and whose consequences could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary; these provisions establish mandatory law in favor of users, as according to Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, payment service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to the detriment of payment service users, unless the possibility of deviation is explicitly provided and they can decide to offer only more favorable terms to payment service users; the aforementioned contractual terms do not constitute more favorable terms but rather disadvantageous terms for the payment service user. In this case, however, the defendant did not prove the authenticity of the transaction and its approval by the plaintiff and did not invoke, nor did any unusual and unforeseen circumstances beyond its control, the consequences of which could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary, come to light. Therefore, the contested transaction transferring the amount of €3,000.00 is considered, in the absence of demonstrable consent from the plaintiff, unapproved according to the provisions of Article 64 of Law 4537/2018, and the defendant's contrary claims are rejected, especially since the plaintiff proceeded, according to Article 71 paragraph 1 of Law 4537/2018, without undue delay to notify the defendant regarding the contested unapproved payment action. Consequently, the defendant is liable for compensating the plaintiff for the positive damage he suffered under Article 73 of Law 4537/2018 and is obliged to pay him the requested amount of €703.18, while the plaintiff’s fault in the occurrence of this damage cannot be established, as he entered his personal details in an online environment that was a faithful imitation of that of the defendant, as evidenced by the comparison of the screenshots of the fake website and the real website provided by the plaintiff, a fact that he could not have known while being fully convinced that he was transacting with the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant’s liability to compensate the plaintiff is based on the provision of Article 8 of Law 2251/1994, which applies in this case, as the plaintiff's damage resulted from inadequate fulfillment of its obligations in the context of providing its services, but also on the provision of Article 914 of the Civil Code in the sense of omission on its part of unlawfully and culpably imposed actions. In this case, given that during the relevant period there had been a multitude of similar incidents of fraud against the defendant's customers, the latter, as a service provider to the consumer public and bearing transactional obligations of care and security towards them, displayed gross negligence regarding the security provided for electronic transaction services, which was compromised by the fraudulent theft of funds, as it did not comply with all required high-security measures for executing the contested transaction, failing to implement the strict customer identification verification process and to check the authenticity of the account to which the funds were sent, thus not assuming the suspicious nature of the transaction, did not adopt comprehensive and improved protective measures to fully protect its customers against malicious attacks and online fraud and to prevent the infiltration of unauthorized third parties, nor did it fulfill its obligations to inform, accurately inform, and warn its consumers - customers, as it failed to adequately inform them of attempts to steal their personal data through the sending of informative emails or SMS, while merely posting in a section rather than on a central banner (as it later did) does not constitute adequate information such that it meets the requirement of protecting its customers and the increased safeguarding of their interests. Although the plaintiff acted promptly and informed the defendant on the same day about the contested incident, the defendant did not act as promptly regarding the investigation of the incident and the freezing of the account that held the fraudulent credit to prevent the plaintiff's loss, but only returned part of the funds to the plaintiff a month later. This behavior, beyond being culpable due to gross negligence, was also unlawful, as it would have been illegal even without the contractual relationship, as contrary to the provisions of Law 4537/2018 and Law 2251/1994, regarding the lack of security of the services that the consumer is legitimately entitled to expect, as well as the building of trust that is essential in banking transactions, elements that it was obligated to provide within the sphere of the services offered, and contrary to the principles of good faith and commercial ethics, as crystallized in the provision of Article 288 of the Civil Code, as well as the general duty imposed by Article 914 of the Civil Code not to cause harm to another culpably. This resulted not only in positive damage to the plaintiff but also in causing him moral harm consisting of his mental distress and the disruption, agitation, and sorrow he experienced, for which he must be awarded financial compensation. Taking into account all the general circumstances of the case, the extent of the plaintiff's damage, the severity of the defendant's fault, the mental distress suffered by the plaintiff, the insecurity he felt regarding his deposits, the sorrow he experienced, and the stress caused by his financial loss, which occurred during the pandemic period when his earnings from his professional activity had significantly decreased, as well as the financial and social situation of the parties, it is the court's opinion that he should be granted, as financial compensation for his moral harm, an amount of €250.00, which is deemed reasonable and fair. Therefore, the total monetary amount that the plaintiff is entitled to for his positive damage and financial compensation for the moral harm suffered amounts to a total of (€703.18 + €250.00) = €953.18., **Court (Civil/Criminal):**
Provisions: Articles 8 of Law 2251/1994, Articles 2, 4, 48 et seq. of Law 4537/2018, Article 11 paragraph 1 of Law 4261/2014, Articles 830, 806, 827, 914, 932 of the Civil Code and 176 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Time of commission of the act:
Outcome (not guilty, guilty):
Rationale: Electronic fraud through the method of phishing. A third party fraudulently obtained money from the plaintiff's bank account and transferred it to another bank account. Both the defendant is liable for the inadequate protection of its systems, which should have been excellent, and the plaintiff who failed to fulfill his obligation to protect his information and disregarded the defendant's security instructions. Law 4537/2018 introduces mandatory law in favor of users, as according to Article 103, payment service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to the detriment of payment service users. It is determined that a resumption of the discussion should be ordered in order to provide all possible evidence, with diligence from both parties, especially from the defendant, who has access to the transaction data through its systems, but also bears the relevant burden of proof concerning the exact timing of the execution of the money transfer order at each stage (withdrawal from the plaintiff's account, transfer to another bank, transfer to the third party's account).
Facts: The plaintiff maintains a joint bank account with his wife at the defendant bank and has also agreed to online banking transactions (e-banking). On July 31, 2020, at 13:45, the plaintiff was informed of a transfer of €3,000 from his account, which he had not initiated, nor had his wife. At 14:05, he immediately contacted the bank’s customer service line and reported the incident, stating that it was not his action and requesting its cancellation. The bank employee found that the plaintiff had provided his details to a fake website 10 days earlier, and subsequently, the mobile number used for transaction confirmations had been changed. The employee informed him that the money was at the other bank and that they would logically be able to retrieve it, provided it had not already been transferred to a third party's account. Since then, the plaintiff has not seen any return of the amount to his account, and he has made numerous attempts to resolve the issue with the bank, with effort, costs, and distress; however, nothing was achieved, as the money had already entered a third party's account and the defendant denied responsibility for the transfer of the funds.
Facts: The plaintiff maintained a joint account with his wife at a bank and used internet banking services. On July 21, 2020, a third party deceived the plaintiff through phishing (a misleading SMS with a link), obtaining his banking credentials. The third party, using the stolen information, requested a phone number change for receiving OTP (one-time password) and completing electronic transactions. The bank completed the change process based on the correct credentials. On July 31, 2020, a transfer of €3,000 was made from the plaintiff's account to a third party. The plaintiff was immediately informed, called the bank, and reported the fraud; however, the recovery of the funds was not successful. The plaintiff claims that the bank is responsible for inadequate protection of its systems, while the bank asserts that it followed the procedure based on the agreed identification methods. 
The court recognizes that there is responsibility on both sides: the bank for inadequate security and prevention of phishing, and the plaintiff for negligence in safeguarding his personal information, despite the bank's relevant warnings. A critical issue is the exact timing of the completion of the transfer: if the bank was timely notified of the fraud but did not intervene, it may be fully liable. The court requests a resumption of the discussion and further evidence, mainly from the bank, which has access to the relevant technical details., Court (Civil/Criminal): Criminal  
Provisions: Article 42 paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 7 of Law 4557/2018  
Time of commission of the act:  
Outcome (not guilty, guilty):  
Reasoning: Obligation of the payment service provider, such as banks, to inform their contracting customer after receiving a relevant order for a payment to be made on their behalf. Content of the above notification at the stage of receiving the payment order and during its execution. Terms of liability for the provider regarding compensation for non-execution, erroneous, or delayed execution of payment transactions. In particular, in the case of an unauthorized or erroneous payment, the user is required to notify the provider within a specified timeframe as soon as they become aware of the corresponding transaction. The provisions of Law 4357/2018 establish mandatory legal regulations in favor of users of payment services and cannot be contractually modified to their detriment, but only to their benefit. Defenses available to payment service providers to relieve them of liability. Burden of proof distribution between the parties. This responsibility of banks may also stem from Law 2251/1994, as they provide services to the public and are considered suppliers. Conditions for supplier liability under the aforementioned legislation. Distribution of the burden of proof between the litigants to demonstrate liability for compensation under Law 2251/1994. Terms of concurrency between contractual and tort liability for compensation. The court partially accepts the lawsuit.  
Facts: On 01/09/2021, an unknown perpetrator sent an email to her from the electronic address “...............”, in which they stated that for security reasons she needed to confirm her account with the bank ....... Not realizing that it was a scam, she followed the attached hyperlink, entered her personal information, resulting in an unknown perpetrator intercepting her online banking credentials and making a transfer totaling 7,000.00 euros to account number ................ of the bank .........  
C) The beneficiary of the aforementioned account is ......... born on 16/05/1995 in the Municipality of ........., residing at .............., with ID number .................... issued on 02/10/2009 by T.A .............. and tax number ............. from the tax office ...................  
D) The criminal proceeds reportedly arising from the above criminal activity amount to a total of seven thousand euros (7,000.00€). Following the above, serious suspicions arise that the aforementioned criminal proceeds transferred to the aforementioned bank account were unlawfully appropriated by her and subsequently mixed with other legally held assets, which she used in her overall economic activities, aiming to launder them, thus concealing their true origin and making it impossible for them to be seized. Therefore, there are reasonable suspicions that the aforementioned individual committed not only the primary offense but also the criminal act of “Money Laundering” (Article 2 §1 a, d of Law 4557/2018, in conjunction with Article 4 subparagraph z of the same law as it stands, as well as Article 39 paragraph 1 subparagraphs a & c of the same Law 4557/2018). Because there are serious suspicions that the bank account numbered .......... maintained at the bank ....................., whose beneficiary is ..... (Tax ID ....................), contains part of the monetary amount from the aforementioned criminal activity that was placed behind banking secrecy to conceal its true origin and ultimately to launder it. Because, in this case, part of the criminal proceeds has been found while the remainder has not been found in its entirety, there is a lawful reason and an urgent case for prohibiting the sale or any other transfer of the following assets, given that they are subject to seizure and forfeiture according to Articles 40 and 42 of Law 4557/2018 as they currently stand., source_sentence: What measures must be taken according to Article 32?
sentences: **Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**  
**Provisions:**  
**Time of commission of the act:**  
**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**  
**Reasoning:** Partially accepts the lawsuit.  
**Facts:** The plaintiff, who works as a lawyer, maintains a savings account with the defendant banking corporation under account number GR.............. Pursuant to a contract dated June 11, 2010, established in Thessaloniki between the defendant and the plaintiff, the plaintiff was granted access to the electronic banking system (e-banking) to conduct banking transactions remotely. On October 10, 2020, the plaintiff fell victim to electronic fraud through the "phishing" method, whereby an unknown perpetrator managed to extract and transfer €3,000.00 from the plaintiff’s account to another account of the same bank. Specifically, on that day at 6:51 a.m., the plaintiff received an email from the sender ".........", with the address ..........., informing him that his debit card had been suspended and that online payments and cash withdrawals could not be made until the issue was resolved. The email urged him to confirm his details within the next 72 hours by following a link titled "card activation."  
The plaintiff read the above email on his mobile phone around 8:00 a.m., and believing it came from the defendant, he followed the instructions and accessed a website that was identical (a clone) to that of the defendant. On this page, he was asked to enter his login credentials to connect to the service, which he did, and he was subsequently asked to input his debit card details for the alleged activation, which he also provided. Then, to complete the process, a number was sent to his mobile phone at 8:07 a.m. from the sender ........, which he entered, and two minutes later he received a message from the same sender in English stating that the quick access code had been activated on his mobile. A few minutes later, at 8:18 a.m., he received an email from the defendant informing him of the transfer of €3,000.00 from his account to account number GR ........... held at the same bank, with the beneficiary's details being .......... As soon as the plaintiff read this, he immediately called the defendant's call center and canceled his debit card, the access codes for the service ......., and locked the application .......... At the same time, he verbally submitted a request to dispute and cancel the contested transaction, and in a subsequent phone call, he also canceled his credit card. On the same day, he also sent an email to the defendant informing them in writing of the above and requesting the cancellation of the transaction and the return of the amount of €3,000.00 to his account, as this transfer was not made by him but by an unknown perpetrator through electronic fraud and was not approved by him. It should also be noted that the plaintiff, as the sole beneficiary according to the aforementioned contract for using the defendant's Internet Banking service, never received any update via SMS or the VIBER application from the bank regarding the transaction details before its completion, nor did he receive a one-time code (OTP) to approve the contested transaction. He subsequently filed a complaint against unknown persons at the Cyber Crime Division for the crime of fraud. The defendant sent an email to the plaintiff on October 16, 2020, informing him that his request had been forwarded to the appropriate department of the bank for investigation, stating that the bank would never send him an email or SMS asking him to enter his personal data and that as of October 7, 2020, there was a notice posted for its customers regarding malicious attempts to steal personal data in the "Our News" section on ....... A month after the disputed incident, on November 10, 2020, an amount of €2,296.82 was transferred to the plaintiff's account from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made. The plaintiff immediately sent an email to the defendant asking to be informed whether this transfer was a return of part of the amount that had been illegally withdrawn from his account and requested the return of the remaining amount of €703.18. In its response dated January 13, 2021, the defendant confirmed that the aforementioned amount indeed came from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made, following a freeze of that account initiated by the defendant during the investigation of the incident, but refused to return the remaining amount, claiming it bore no responsibility for the leak of the personal codes to third parties, according to the terms of the service contract established between them.  
From the entirety of the evidence presented to the court, there is no indication of the authenticity of the contested transaction, as the plaintiff did not give his consent for the execution of the transfer of the amount of €3,000.00, especially in light of the provision in Article 72 paragraph 2 of Law 4537/2018 stating that the mere use of the Internet Banking service by the plaintiff does not necessarily constitute sufficient evidence that the payer approved the payment action. Specifically, it was proven that the contested transaction was not carried out following a strong identification of the plaintiff – the sole beneficiary of the account – and his approval, as the latter may have entered his personal codes on the counterfeit website; however, he was never informed, before the completion of the contested transaction, of the amount that would be transferred from his account to a third-party account, nor did he receive on his mobile phone, either via SMS or through the VIBER application or any other means, the one-time code - extra PIN for its completion, which he was required to enter to approve the contested transaction (payment action) and thus complete his identification, a fact that was not countered by any evidence from the defendant. Furthermore, it is noted that the defendant's claims that it bears no responsibility under the terms of the banking services contract, whereby it is not liable for any damage to its customer in cases of unauthorized use of their personal access codes to the Internet Banking service, are to be rejected as fundamentally unfounded. This is because the aforementioned contractual terms are invalid according to the provision of Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, as they contradict the provisions of Articles 71, 73, and 92 of the same Law, which provide for the provider's universal liability and its exemption only for unusual and unforeseen circumstances that are beyond the control of the party invoking them and whose consequences could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary; these provisions establish mandatory law in favor of users, as according to Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, payment service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to the detriment of payment service users, unless the possibility of deviation is explicitly provided and they can decide to offer only more favorable terms to payment service users; the aforementioned contractual terms do not constitute more favorable terms but rather disadvantageous terms for the payment service user. In this case, however, the defendant did not prove the authenticity of the transaction and its approval by the plaintiff and did not invoke, nor did any unusual and unforeseen circumstances beyond its control, the consequences of which could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary, come to light. Therefore, the contested transaction transferring the amount of €3,000.00 is considered, in the absence of demonstrable consent from the plaintiff, unapproved according to the provisions of Article 64 of Law 4537/2018, and the defendant's contrary claims are rejected, especially since the plaintiff proceeded, according to Article 71 paragraph 1 of Law 4537/2018, without undue delay to notify the defendant regarding the contested unapproved payment action. Consequently, the defendant is liable for compensating the plaintiff for the positive damage he suffered under Article 73 of Law 4537/2018 and is obliged to pay him the requested amount of €703.18, while the plaintiff’s fault in the occurrence of this damage cannot be established, as he entered his personal details in an online environment that was a faithful imitation of that of the defendant, as evidenced by the comparison of the screenshots of the fake website and the real website provided by the plaintiff, a fact that he could not have known while being fully convinced that he was transacting with the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant’s liability to compensate the plaintiff is based on the provision of Article 8 of Law 2251/1994, which applies in this case, as the plaintiff's damage resulted from inadequate fulfillment of its obligations in the context of providing its services, but also on the provision of Article 914 of the Civil Code in the sense of omission on its part of unlawfully and culpably imposed actions. In this case, given that during the relevant period there had been a multitude of similar incidents of fraud against the defendant's customers, the latter, as a service provider to the consumer public and bearing transactional obligations of care and security towards them, displayed gross negligence regarding the security provided for electronic transaction services, which was compromised by the fraudulent theft of funds, as it did not comply with all required high-security measures for executing the contested transaction, failing to implement the strict customer identification verification process and to check the authenticity of the account to which the funds were sent, thus not assuming the suspicious nature of the transaction, did not adopt comprehensive and improved protective measures to fully protect its customers against malicious attacks and online fraud and to prevent the infiltration of unauthorized third parties, nor did it fulfill its obligations to inform, accurately inform, and warn its consumers - customers, as it failed to adequately inform them of attempts to steal their personal data through the sending of informative emails or SMS, while merely posting in a section rather than on a central banner (as it later did) does not constitute adequate information such that it meets the requirement of protecting its customers and the increased safeguarding of their interests. Although the plaintiff acted promptly and informed the defendant on the same day about the contested incident, the defendant did not act as promptly regarding the investigation of the incident and the freezing of the account that held the fraudulent credit to prevent the plaintiff's loss, but only returned part of the funds to the plaintiff a month later. This behavior, beyond being culpable due to gross negligence, was also unlawful, as it would have been illegal even without the contractual relationship, as contrary to the provisions of Law 4537/2018 and Law 2251/1994, regarding the lack of security of the services that the consumer is legitimately entitled to expect, as well as the building of trust that is essential in banking transactions, elements that it was obligated to provide within the sphere of the services offered, and contrary to the principles of good faith and commercial ethics, as crystallized in the provision of Article 288 of the Civil Code, as well as the general duty imposed by Article 914 of the Civil Code not to cause harm to another culpably. This resulted not only in positive damage to the plaintiff but also in causing him moral harm consisting of his mental distress and the disruption, agitation, and sorrow he experienced, for which he must be awarded financial compensation. Taking into account all the general circumstances of the case, the extent of the plaintiff's damage, the severity of the defendant's fault, the mental distress suffered by the plaintiff, the insecurity he felt regarding his deposits, the sorrow he experienced, and the stress caused by his financial loss, which occurred during the pandemic period when his earnings from his professional activity had significantly decreased, as well as the financial and social situation of the parties, it is the court's opinion that he should be granted, as financial compensation for his moral harm, an amount of €250.00, which is deemed reasonable and fair. Therefore, the total monetary amount that the plaintiff is entitled to for his positive damage and financial compensation for the moral harm suffered amounts to a total of (€703.18 + €250.00) = €953.18., 1.The Board shall ensure the consistent application of this Regulation. To that end, the Board shall, on its own initiative or, where relevant, at the request of the Commission, in particular: (a)  monitor and ensure the correct application of this Regulation in the cases provided for in Articles 64 and 65 without prejudice to the tasks of national supervisory authorities; 4.5.2016 L 119/76   (b)  advise the Commission on any issue related to the protection of personal data in the Union, including on any proposed amendment of this Regulation; (c)  advise the Commission on the format and procedures for the exchange of information between controllers, processors and supervisory authorities for binding corporate rules; (d)  issue guidelines, recommendations, and best practices on procedures for erasing links, copies or replications of personal data from publicly available communication services as referred to in Article 17(2); (e)  examine, on its own initiative, on request of one of its members or on request of the Commission, any question covering the application of this Regulation and issue guidelines, recommendations and best practices in order to encourage consistent application of this Regulation; (f)  issue guidelines, recommendations and best practices in accordance with point (e) of this paragraph for further specifying the criteria and conditions for decisions based on profiling pursuant to Article 22(2); (g)  issue guidelines, recommendations and best practices in accordance with point (e) of this paragraph for establishing the personal data breaches and determining the undue delay referred to in Article 33(1) and (2) and for the particular circumstances in which a controller or a processor is required to notify the personal data breach; (h)  issue guidelines, recommendations and best practices in accordance with point (e) of this paragraph as to the circumstances in which a personal data breach is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of the natural persons referred to in Article 34(1). (i)  issue guidelines, recommendations and best practices in accordance with point (e) of this paragraph for the purpose of further specifying the criteria and requirements for personal data transfers based on binding corporate rules adhered to by controllers and binding corporate rules adhered to by processors and on further necessary requirements to ensure the protection of personal data of the data subjects concerned referred to in Article 47; (j)  issue guidelines, recommendations and best practices in accordance with point (e) of this paragraph for the purpose of further specifying the criteria and requirements for the personal data transfers on the basis of Article 49(1); (k)  draw up guidelines for supervisory authorities concerning the application of measures referred to in Article 58(1), (2) and (3) and the setting of administrative fines pursuant to Article 83; (l)  review the practical application of the guidelines, recommendations and best practices referred to in points (e) and (f); (m)  issue guidelines, recommendations and best practices in accordance with point (e) of this paragraph for establishing common procedures for reporting by natural persons of infringements of this Regulation pursuant to Article 54(2); (n)  encourage the drawing-up of codes of conduct and the establishment of data protection certification mechanisms and data protection seals and marks pursuant to Articles 40 and 42; (o)  carry out the accreditation of certification bodies and its periodic review pursuant to Article 43 and maintain a public register of accredited bodies pursuant to Article 43(6) and of the accredited controllers or processors established in third countries pursuant to Article 42(7); (p)  specify the requirements referred to in Article 43(3) with a view to the accreditation of certification bodies under Article 42; (q)  provide the Commission with an opinion on the certification requirements referred to in Article 43(8); (r)  provide the Commission with an opinion on the icons referred to in Article 12(7); (s)  provide the Commission with an opinion for the assessment of the adequacy of the level of protection in a third country or international organisation, including for the assessment whether a third country, a territory or one or more specified sectors within that third country, or an international organisation no longer ensures an adequate level of protection. To that end, the Commission shall provide the Board with all necessary documentation, including correspondence with the government of the third country, with regard to that third country, territory or specified sector, or with the international organisation. 4.5.2016 L 119/77   (t)  issue opinions on draft decisions of supervisory authorities pursuant to the consistency mechanism referred to in Article 64(1), on matters submitted pursuant to Article 64(2) and to issue binding decisions pursuant to Article 65, including in cases referred to in Article 66; (u)  promote the cooperation and the effective bilateral and multilateral exchange of information and best practices between the supervisory authorities; (v)  promote common training programmes and facilitate personnel exchanges between the supervisory authorities and, where appropriate, with the supervisory authorities of third countries or with international organisations; (w)  promote the exchange of knowledge and documentation on data protection legislation and practice with data protection supervisory authorities worldwide. (x)  issue opinions on codes of conduct drawn up at Union level pursuant to Article 40(9); and (y)  maintain a publicly accessible electronic register of decisions taken by supervisory authorities and courts on issues handled in the consistency mechanism.
2.Where the Commission requests advice from the Board, it may indicate a time limit, taking into account the urgency of the matter.
3.The Board shall forward its opinions, guidelines, recommendations, and best practices to the Commission and to the committee referred to in Article 93 and make them public.
4.The Board shall, where appropriate, consult interested parties and give them the opportunity to comment within a reasonable period. The Board shall, without prejudice to Article 76, make the results of the consultation procedure publicly available., 1.Where processing is to be carried out on behalf of a controller, the controller shall use only processors providing sufficient guarantees to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures in such a manner that processing will meet the requirements of this Regulation and ensure the protection of the rights of the data subject.
2.The processor shall not engage another processor without prior specific or general written authorisation of the controller. In the case of general written authorisation, the processor shall inform the controller of any intended changes concerning the addition or replacement of other processors, thereby giving the controller the opportunity to object to such changes.
3.Processing by a processor shall be governed by a contract or other legal act under Union or Member State law, that is binding on the processor with regard to the controller and that sets out the subject-matter and duration of the processing, the nature and purpose of the processing, the type of personal data and categories of data subjects and the obligations and rights of the controller. That contract or other legal act shall stipulate, in particular, that the processor: (a)  processes the personal data only on documented instructions from the controller, including with regard to transfers of personal data to a third country or an international organisation, unless required to do so by Union or Member State law to which the processor is subject; in such a case, the processor shall inform the controller of that legal requirement before processing, unless that law prohibits such information on important grounds of public interest; (b)  ensures that persons authorised to process the personal data have committed themselves to confidentiality or are under an appropriate statutory obligation of confidentiality; (c)  takes all measures required pursuant to Article 32; (d)  respects the conditions referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 for engaging another processor; (e)  taking into account the nature of the processing, assists the controller by appropriate technical and organisational measures, insofar as this is possible, for the fulfilment of the controller's obligation to respond to requests for exercising the data subject's rights laid down in Chapter III; (f)  assists the controller in ensuring compliance with the obligations pursuant to Articles 32 to 36 taking into account the nature of processing and the information available to the processor; (g)  at the choice of the controller, deletes or returns all the personal data to the controller after the end of the provision of services relating to processing, and deletes existing copies unless Union or Member State law requires storage of the personal data; (h)  makes available to the controller all information necessary to demonstrate compliance with the obligations laid down in this Article and allow for and contribute to audits, including inspections, conducted by the controller or another auditor mandated by the controller. 4.5.2016 L 119/49   With regard to point (h) of the first subparagraph, the processor shall immediately inform the controller if, in its opinion, an instruction infringes this Regulation or other Union or Member State data protection provisions.
4.Where a processor engages another processor for carrying out specific processing activities on behalf of the controller, the same data protection obligations as set out in the contract or other legal act between the controller and the processor as referred to in paragraph 3 shall be imposed on that other processor by way of a contract or other legal act under Union or Member State law, in particular providing sufficient guarantees to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures in such a manner that the processing will meet the requirements of this Regulation. Where that other processor fails to fulfil its data protection obligations, the initial processor shall remain fully liable to the controller for the performance of that other processor's obligations.
5.Adherence of a processor to an approved code of conduct as referred to in Article 40 or an approved certification mechanism as referred to in Article 42 may be used as an element by which to demonstrate sufficient guarantees as referred to in paragraphs 1 and 4 of this Article.
6.Without prejudice to an individual contract between the controller and the processor, the contract or the other legal act referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article may be based, in whole or in part, on standard contractual clauses referred to in paragraphs 7 and 8 of this Article, including when they are part of a certification granted to the controller or processor pursuant to Articles 42 and 43
7.The Commission may lay down standard contractual clauses for the matters referred to in paragraph 3 and 4 of this Article and in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 93(2).
8.A supervisory authority may adopt standard contractual clauses for the matters referred to in paragraph 3 and 4 of this Article and in accordance with the consistency mechanism referred to in Article 63
9.The contract or the other legal act referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 shall be in writing, including in electronic form.
10.Without prejudice to Articles 82, 83 and 84, if a processor infringes this Regulation by determining the purposes and means of processing, the processor shall be considered to be a controller in respect of that processing., source_sentence: Who was the defendant in this case?
sentences: In order to ensure that consent is freely given, consent should not provide a valid legal ground for the processing of personal data in a specific case where there is a clear imbalance between the data subject and the controller, in particular where the controller is a public authority and it is therefore unlikely that consent was freely given in all the circumstances of that specific situation. Consent is presumed not to be freely given if it does not allow separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations despite it being appropriate in the individual case, or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance., Court (Civil/Criminal): Criminal  
Provisions: Article 42 paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 7 of Law 4557/2018  
Time of commission of the act:  
Outcome (not guilty, guilty):  
Reasoning: Obligation of the payment service provider, such as banks, to inform their contracting customer after receiving a relevant order for a payment to be made on their behalf. Content of the above notification at the stage of receiving the payment order and during its execution. Terms of liability for the provider regarding compensation for non-execution, erroneous, or delayed execution of payment transactions. In particular, in the case of an unauthorized or erroneous payment, the user is required to notify the provider within a specified timeframe as soon as they become aware of the corresponding transaction. The provisions of Law 4357/2018 establish mandatory legal regulations in favor of users of payment services and cannot be contractually modified to their detriment, but only to their benefit. Defenses available to payment service providers to relieve them of liability. Burden of proof distribution between the parties. This responsibility of banks may also stem from Law 2251/1994, as they provide services to the public and are considered suppliers. Conditions for supplier liability under the aforementioned legislation. Distribution of the burden of proof between the litigants to demonstrate liability for compensation under Law 2251/1994. Terms of concurrency between contractual and tort liability for compensation. The court partially accepts the lawsuit.  
Facts: On 01/09/2021, an unknown perpetrator sent an email to her from the electronic address “...............”, in which they stated that for security reasons she needed to confirm her account with the bank ....... Not realizing that it was a scam, she followed the attached hyperlink, entered her personal information, resulting in an unknown perpetrator intercepting her online banking credentials and making a transfer totaling 7,000.00 euros to account number ................ of the bank .........  
C) The beneficiary of the aforementioned account is ......... born on 16/05/1995 in the Municipality of ........., residing at .............., with ID number .................... issued on 02/10/2009 by T.A .............. and tax number ............. from the tax office ...................  
D) The criminal proceeds reportedly arising from the above criminal activity amount to a total of seven thousand euros (7,000.00€). Following the above, serious suspicions arise that the aforementioned criminal proceeds transferred to the aforementioned bank account were unlawfully appropriated by her and subsequently mixed with other legally held assets, which she used in her overall economic activities, aiming to launder them, thus concealing their true origin and making it impossible for them to be seized. Therefore, there are reasonable suspicions that the aforementioned individual committed not only the primary offense but also the criminal act of “Money Laundering” (Article 2 §1 a, d of Law 4557/2018, in conjunction with Article 4 subparagraph z of the same law as it stands, as well as Article 39 paragraph 1 subparagraphs a & c of the same Law 4557/2018). Because there are serious suspicions that the bank account numbered .......... maintained at the bank ....................., whose beneficiary is ..... (Tax ID ....................), contains part of the monetary amount from the aforementioned criminal activity that was placed behind banking secrecy to conceal its true origin and ultimately to launder it. Because, in this case, part of the criminal proceeds has been found while the remainder has not been found in its entirety, there is a lawful reason and an urgent case for prohibiting the sale or any other transfer of the following assets, given that they are subject to seizure and forfeiture according to Articles 40 and 42 of Law 4557/2018 as they currently stand., 1.The data protection officer shall have at least the following tasks: (a)  to inform and advise the controller or the processor and the employees who carry out processing of their obligations pursuant to this Regulation and to other Union or Member State data protection provisions; (b)  to monitor compliance with this Regulation, with other Union or Member State data protection provisions and with the policies of the controller or processor in relation to the protection of personal data, including the assignment of responsibilities, awareness-raising and training of staff involved in processing operations, and the related audits; (c)  to provide advice where requested as regards the data protection impact assessment and monitor its performance pursuant to Article 35; (d)  to cooperate with the supervisory authority; (e)  to act as the contact point for the supervisory authority on issues relating to processing, including the prior consultation referred to in Article 36, and to consult, where appropriate, with regard to any other matter.
2.The data protection officer shall in the performance of his or her tasks have due regard to the risk associated with processing operations, taking into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing. Section 5 Codes of conduct and certification, source_sentence: What should Directive 2002/58/EC be amended accordingly to clarify?
sentences: **Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**  
**Provisions:**  
**Time of commission of the act:**  
**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**  
**Reasoning:** Partially accepts the lawsuit.  
**Facts:** The plaintiff, who works as a lawyer, maintains a savings account with the defendant banking corporation under account number GR.............. Pursuant to a contract dated June 11, 2010, established in Thessaloniki between the defendant and the plaintiff, the plaintiff was granted access to the electronic banking system (e-banking) to conduct banking transactions remotely. On October 10, 2020, the plaintiff fell victim to electronic fraud through the "phishing" method, whereby an unknown perpetrator managed to extract and transfer €3,000.00 from the plaintiff’s account to another account of the same bank. Specifically, on that day at 6:51 a.m., the plaintiff received an email from the sender ".........", with the address ..........., informing him that his debit card had been suspended and that online payments and cash withdrawals could not be made until the issue was resolved. The email urged him to confirm his details within the next 72 hours by following a link titled "card activation."  
The plaintiff read the above email on his mobile phone around 8:00 a.m., and believing it came from the defendant, he followed the instructions and accessed a website that was identical (a clone) to that of the defendant. On this page, he was asked to enter his login credentials to connect to the service, which he did, and he was subsequently asked to input his debit card details for the alleged activation, which he also provided. Then, to complete the process, a number was sent to his mobile phone at 8:07 a.m. from the sender ........, which he entered, and two minutes later he received a message from the same sender in English stating that the quick access code had been activated on his mobile. A few minutes later, at 8:18 a.m., he received an email from the defendant informing him of the transfer of €3,000.00 from his account to account number GR ........... held at the same bank, with the beneficiary's details being .......... As soon as the plaintiff read this, he immediately called the defendant's call center and canceled his debit card, the access codes for the service ......., and locked the application .......... At the same time, he verbally submitted a request to dispute and cancel the contested transaction, and in a subsequent phone call, he also canceled his credit card. On the same day, he also sent an email to the defendant informing them in writing of the above and requesting the cancellation of the transaction and the return of the amount of €3,000.00 to his account, as this transfer was not made by him but by an unknown perpetrator through electronic fraud and was not approved by him. It should also be noted that the plaintiff, as the sole beneficiary according to the aforementioned contract for using the defendant's Internet Banking service, never received any update via SMS or the VIBER application from the bank regarding the transaction details before its completion, nor did he receive a one-time code (OTP) to approve the contested transaction. He subsequently filed a complaint against unknown persons at the Cyber Crime Division for the crime of fraud. The defendant sent an email to the plaintiff on October 16, 2020, informing him that his request had been forwarded to the appropriate department of the bank for investigation, stating that the bank would never send him an email or SMS asking him to enter his personal data and that as of October 7, 2020, there was a notice posted for its customers regarding malicious attempts to steal personal data in the "Our News" section on ....... A month after the disputed incident, on November 10, 2020, an amount of €2,296.82 was transferred to the plaintiff's account from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made. The plaintiff immediately sent an email to the defendant asking to be informed whether this transfer was a return of part of the amount that had been illegally withdrawn from his account and requested the return of the remaining amount of €703.18. In its response dated January 13, 2021, the defendant confirmed that the aforementioned amount indeed came from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made, following a freeze of that account initiated by the defendant during the investigation of the incident, but refused to return the remaining amount, claiming it bore no responsibility for the leak of the personal codes to third parties, according to the terms of the service contract established between them.  
From the entirety of the evidence presented to the court, there is no indication of the authenticity of the contested transaction, as the plaintiff did not give his consent for the execution of the transfer of the amount of €3,000.00, especially in light of the provision in Article 72 paragraph 2 of Law 4537/2018 stating that the mere use of the Internet Banking service by the plaintiff does not necessarily constitute sufficient evidence that the payer approved the payment action. Specifically, it was proven that the contested transaction was not carried out following a strong identification of the plaintiff – the sole beneficiary of the account – and his approval, as the latter may have entered his personal codes on the counterfeit website; however, he was never informed, before the completion of the contested transaction, of the amount that would be transferred from his account to a third-party account, nor did he receive on his mobile phone, either via SMS or through the VIBER application or any other means, the one-time code - extra PIN for its completion, which he was required to enter to approve the contested transaction (payment action) and thus complete his identification, a fact that was not countered by any evidence from the defendant. Furthermore, it is noted that the defendant's claims that it bears no responsibility under the terms of the banking services contract, whereby it is not liable for any damage to its customer in cases of unauthorized use of their personal access codes to the Internet Banking service, are to be rejected as fundamentally unfounded. This is because the aforementioned contractual terms are invalid according to the provision of Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, as they contradict the provisions of Articles 71, 73, and 92 of the same Law, which provide for the provider's universal liability and its exemption only for unusual and unforeseen circumstances that are beyond the control of the party invoking them and whose consequences could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary; these provisions establish mandatory law in favor of users, as according to Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, payment service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to the detriment of payment service users, unless the possibility of deviation is explicitly provided and they can decide to offer only more favorable terms to payment service users; the aforementioned contractual terms do not constitute more favorable terms but rather disadvantageous terms for the payment service user. In this case, however, the defendant did not prove the authenticity of the transaction and its approval by the plaintiff and did not invoke, nor did any unusual and unforeseen circumstances beyond its control, the consequences of which could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary, come to light. Therefore, the contested transaction transferring the amount of €3,000.00 is considered, in the absence of demonstrable consent from the plaintiff, unapproved according to the provisions of Article 64 of Law 4537/2018, and the defendant's contrary claims are rejected, especially since the plaintiff proceeded, according to Article 71 paragraph 1 of Law 4537/2018, without undue delay to notify the defendant regarding the contested unapproved payment action. Consequently, the defendant is liable for compensating the plaintiff for the positive damage he suffered under Article 73 of Law 4537/2018 and is obliged to pay him the requested amount of €703.18, while the plaintiff’s fault in the occurrence of this damage cannot be established, as he entered his personal details in an online environment that was a faithful imitation of that of the defendant, as evidenced by the comparison of the screenshots of the fake website and the real website provided by the plaintiff, a fact that he could not have known while being fully convinced that he was transacting with the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant’s liability to compensate the plaintiff is based on the provision of Article 8 of Law 2251/1994, which applies in this case, as the plaintiff's damage resulted from inadequate fulfillment of its obligations in the context of providing its services, but also on the provision of Article 914 of the Civil Code in the sense of omission on its part of unlawfully and culpably imposed actions. In this case, given that during the relevant period there had been a multitude of similar incidents of fraud against the defendant's customers, the latter, as a service provider to the consumer public and bearing transactional obligations of care and security towards them, displayed gross negligence regarding the security provided for electronic transaction services, which was compromised by the fraudulent theft of funds, as it did not comply with all required high-security measures for executing the contested transaction, failing to implement the strict customer identification verification process and to check the authenticity of the account to which the funds were sent, thus not assuming the suspicious nature of the transaction, did not adopt comprehensive and improved protective measures to fully protect its customers against malicious attacks and online fraud and to prevent the infiltration of unauthorized third parties, nor did it fulfill its obligations to inform, accurately inform, and warn its consumers - customers, as it failed to adequately inform them of attempts to steal their personal data through the sending of informative emails or SMS, while merely posting in a section rather than on a central banner (as it later did) does not constitute adequate information such that it meets the requirement of protecting its customers and the increased safeguarding of their interests. Although the plaintiff acted promptly and informed the defendant on the same day about the contested incident, the defendant did not act as promptly regarding the investigation of the incident and the freezing of the account that held the fraudulent credit to prevent the plaintiff's loss, but only returned part of the funds to the plaintiff a month later. This behavior, beyond being culpable due to gross negligence, was also unlawful, as it would have been illegal even without the contractual relationship, as contrary to the provisions of Law 4537/2018 and Law 2251/1994, regarding the lack of security of the services that the consumer is legitimately entitled to expect, as well as the building of trust that is essential in banking transactions, elements that it was obligated to provide within the sphere of the services offered, and contrary to the principles of good faith and commercial ethics, as crystallized in the provision of Article 288 of the Civil Code, as well as the general duty imposed by Article 914 of the Civil Code not to cause harm to another culpably. This resulted not only in positive damage to the plaintiff but also in causing him moral harm consisting of his mental distress and the disruption, agitation, and sorrow he experienced, for which he must be awarded financial compensation. Taking into account all the general circumstances of the case, the extent of the plaintiff's damage, the severity of the defendant's fault, the mental distress suffered by the plaintiff, the insecurity he felt regarding his deposits, the sorrow he experienced, and the stress caused by his financial loss, which occurred during the pandemic period when his earnings from his professional activity had significantly decreased, as well as the financial and social situation of the parties, it is the court's opinion that he should be granted, as financial compensation for his moral harm, an amount of €250.00, which is deemed reasonable and fair. Therefore, the total monetary amount that the plaintiff is entitled to for his positive damage and financial compensation for the moral harm suffered amounts to a total of (€703.18 + €250.00) = €953.18., This Regulation should apply to all matters concerning the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms vis-à- vis the processing of personal data which are not subject to specific obligations with the same objective set out in Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2), including the obligations on the controller and the rights of natural persons. In order to clarify the relationship between this Regulation and Directive 2002/58/EC, that Directive should be amended accordingly. Once this Regulation is adopted, Directive 2002/58/EC should be reviewed in particular in order to ensure consistency with this Regulation, 4.5.2016 L 119/31 Official Journal of the European Union EN, The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller without undue delay the rectification of inaccurate personal data concerning him or her. Taking into account the purposes of the processing, the data subject shall have the right to have incomplete personal data completed, including by means of providing a supplementary statement.
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics: cosine_accuracy@1, cosine_accuracy@3, cosine_accuracy@5, cosine_accuracy@10, cosine_precision@1, cosine_precision@3, cosine_precision@5, cosine_precision@10, cosine_recall@1, cosine_recall@3, cosine_recall@5, cosine_recall@10, cosine_ndcg@10, cosine_mrr@10, cosine_map@100
model-index: name: ModernBERT Embed base Legal Matryoshka
results: task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 768
type: dim_768
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.39646464646464646
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.43686868686868685
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.48484848484848486
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.5580808080808081
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.39646464646464646
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.3838383838383838
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.3691919191919192
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.34368686868686876
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.07826625579662413
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.19229803895164396
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.2687726278249535
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.3973085338815004
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.4671763902287877
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.4306537598204264
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.5179131213612671
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no, task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 512
type: dim_512
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.39646464646464646
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.43434343434343436
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.4696969696969697
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.5404040404040404
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.39646464646464646
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.3846801346801347
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.36666666666666664
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.33813131313131317
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.07587964974622498
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.18934697500920072
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.2596919874404338
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.38876036201534264
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.4601567558902666
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.4270612874779542
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.5110859294326898
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no, task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 256
type: dim_256
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.398989898989899
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.4393939393939394
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.48484848484848486
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.547979797979798
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.398989898989899
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.3897306397306397
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.3747474747474748
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.34545454545454546
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.07612738547490444
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.18860093070598766
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.2657611203112151
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.39620817396856484
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.46896641344877266
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.4323542969376303
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.5115911013703146
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no, task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 128
type: dim_128
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.4015151515151515
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.42424242424242425
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.46464646464646464
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.5328282828282829
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.4015151515151515
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.3855218855218855
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.3656565656565657
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.33888888888888885
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.07437453500046307
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.18457910551938972
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.25422180735144767
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.3745174817859468
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.4564607620501491
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.4277096360429693
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.5057664421166048
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no, task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 64
type: dim_64
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.351010101010101
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.3838383838383838
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.43434343434343436
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.5025252525252525
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.351010101010101
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.3409090909090909
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.3338383838383838
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.32348484848484854
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.06113270618751356
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.15262888779330994
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.21739155985309672
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.34837665819197333
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.41979728200603955
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.3823893698893698
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.4643453679179737
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no
Likes: 0 | All-time downloads: 27
Created: 2025-07-13 12:17:10