Model: MaxNoichl/bge-m3-philosophy-triplets_v3
Author: MaxNoichl
Pipeline: sentence-similarity
Library: sentence-transformers
Tags: sentence-transformers, safetensors, xlm-roberta, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:5000, loss:TripletLoss, arxiv:1908.10084, arxiv:1703.07737, base_model:BAAI/bge-m3, base_model:finetune:BAAI/bge-m3, model-index, text-embeddings-inference, endpoints_compatible, region:us
Base models (finetune): id: BAAI/bge-m3
Card metadata: base_model: BAAI/bge-m3
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics: cosine_accuracy, dot_accuracy, manhattan_accuracy, euclidean_accuracy, max_accuracy
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
tags: sentence-transformers, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:5000, loss:TripletLoss
widget: source_sentence: now widely acknowledged that a study of scientific representation should focus on the role of such imaginary entities in scientists' reasoning. However, the question is most of the time cast as follows: How can fictional or abstract entities represent the phenomena? In this paper, I show that this question is not well posed. First, I clarify the notion of representation, and I emphasise the importance of what I call the "format" of a representation
sentences: for the inferences agents can draw from it. Then, I show that the very same model can be presented under different formats, which do not enable scientists to perform the same inferences. Assuming that the main function of a representation is to allow one to draw predictions and explanations of the phenomena by reasoning with it, I conclude that imaginary models in abstracto are not used as representations: scientists always reason with formatted, of representations that happen to arise in science. Empirical studies on ways of representing used in science strongly suggest that a formal theory of representations of, some practitioners of Hypothetico-Deductivism suggest a methodology for the sciences in which the 'best' theory is, conversely, the most improbable on a priori grounds; thus Popper in 'The Logic of Scientific Discovery', Hutchinson, 1968, p. 142: "Simplicity equals high prior improbability . . . Simple statements . . . are to be prized . . . because they tell us more; because their empirical content is greater; and because they are better testable". 5 This is due to, the fact that the experimental law has its meaning independently given (Nagel note 3 above); whereas "theoretical notions cannot be understood apart from the particular theory that implicitly defines them". (Nagel, op. cit. p. 87); and consequently die with the corresponding death of the parent theory. 6 "You will have noticed from this formulation that it is not the accumulation of observations which I have in mind when I speak of the growth of scientific knowledge, but the repeated overthrow of scientific theories ... I can therefore gladly admit that falsificationists like myself much prefer an attempt to solve an interesting problem by a bold conjecture, even (and especially) if it soon turns out false, to any sequence of irrelevant truisms. We prefer this because we believe that this is the way in which we can learn from our mistakes; and that in finding out our conjecture was false, we have learned much about the truth, and shall have got nearer the truth". (Popper Conjectures & Refutations, pp. 215, 231). The Supposed, source_sentence: as you like"), many scholars deny that they enjoyed either positive freedoms (in particular to speak free of interruption in the Assembly) or negative freedoms, where the state could intervene as it wished, as
sentences: of prosody such as intonation, kinesic elements such as gestures, and paralinguistic elements of expressive voice accompaniment for which the text provides both fewer and less exact indications. More significant here are those paralinguistic, kinesic, and even linguistic items for which the written text offers no notation whatsoever.' Yet there are still other reasons that distinguish speech from language that are less ARNOLD BERLEANT obvious but of more subtle presence. Something about speech makes a claim on our attention; one cannot quite be indifferent to it. Speech is, in essence, what phenomenologists call an intentional object, one which is an object of our consciousness and toward which our consciousness is directed. As such it exercises a peculiar but powerful attraction on us. There is, for example, a challenge in giving a lecture. Because of the presence of a live audience that is involved (we assume) in the presentation, we cannot ignore abrupt shifts in ideas, weak transitions, lame inferences, strings of trivialities, or fuzzy ideas which we might be able to get away with safely when writing. Words that have no force by virtue of their sequence and their freshness drop lifeless from the lips in embarrassment. This indeed signifies a basic difference between language in general and its literary mode. Language is the inert material from which literature is fashioned. Moreover, literature has the essential quality of speech and not of the merely written word. Thus we can say that literature arises out of, in the aftermath of the Persian wars. The ideal of freedom in these contexts is the freedom of whole city-states, not of individuals. The final stage in Raaflaub's account of the concept of freedom is the emergence of a specifically democratic conception of freedom, which he dates to the middle of the fifth century and the rivalry between Athens and Sparta. The democratic conception of freedom, Raaflaub argues, was at least in part an ideal for indi as well. In what follows I will describe the key moments in Raaflaub's history of freedom that illustrate its collective character. Then I will discuss in detail Raaflaub's account of the democratic ideal of freedom and the freedom of individuals. Raaflaub argues that the historical watershed that launches the concept of freedom into its central role in Greek political life is the invasion of mainland Greece by Persia early in the fifth century B.C. (chapter 3).4 This invasion presented an unprecedented threat of foreign domination, sparking a newfound concern for the independence and self-determination of Greek city-states. At the same time, the prolonged encounter with a political culture the Greeks saw as tyrannical and slavish led them to value anew the constitutions under which they lived: structured, law-governed, and providing citizens some degree of participation in their governance. Thus the Persian 4In what follows I reference chapters by topic, omitting chapter 1 (on methodological issues), chapter 2 (on the concept of freedom before the Persian wars), and much of chapter, against Sokrates for his religious views. The current essay argues that in their personal lives the Athenians were entirely free, except when speech or action materially harmed the community. A second ideology, source_sentence: the rest is only a development of this material. It is to them we have to look for the subject matter of propositions. It is the task of the theory of knowledge to find them and to understand their construction out of the words or symbols. This task is very difficult, and Philosophy has hardly yet begun to tackle it at some points. What method have we for tackling it ? The idea is to express in an appropriate symbolism what in ordinary language leads to endless misunderstandings. That is to say, where ordinary language disguises logical structure, where it allows the formation of pseudopropositions, where it uses one term in an infinity of different meanings, we must replace it by a symbolism which gives a clear picture of the logical structure, excludes pseudopropositions, and uses its terms unambiguously. Now we can only substitute a clear symbolism for the unprecise one by inspecting the phenomena which we want to describe, thus trying to understand their logical multiplicity. That is to say, we can only arrive at a correct analysis by,what might be called, the logical investigation of the phenomena themselves, i.e., in a certain sense a posteriori, and not by conjecturing about a priori possibilities. One is often tempted to ask from an a priori standpoint: What, after all, can be the only forms of atomic propositions, and to answer, e.g., subject-predicate and relational propositions with two or more terms further,
sentences: quantifier-free logics. In this paper, I will develop 64 normal modal semantic tableau systems that can be extended by propositional quantifiers yielding 64 extended systems. All in all, we will investigate 128 different systems. I will show how these systems can be used to prove some interesting theorems and I will discuss Lewis's so-called existence postulate and some of its consequences. Finally, I will prove, perhaps, propositions relating predicates and relations to one another, and so on. But this, I believe, is mere playing with words. An atomic form cauuot be foreseen. And it would be surprising if the actual It 2 164 F. WITTGENSTEIN. phenomena had nothing more to teach us about their structure. To such conjectures about the structure of atomic propositions, we are led by our ordinary language, which uses the subject-predicate and the relational form. But in this our language is misleading: I will try to explain this by a simile. Let us imagine two parallel planes, I and II. On plane I figures are drawn, say, ellipses and rectangles of different sizes and shapes, and it is our task to produce images of these figures on plane II. Then we can imagine two ways, amongst others, of doing this. We can, first, lay down a law of projectionsay that of orthogonal projection or any other-and then proceed to project all figures from I into II, according to this law. Or, secondly, we could proceed thus: We lay down the rule that every ellipse on plane I is to appear as a circle in plane II, and every rectangle as a square in II. Such a way of representation may be convenient for us if for some reason we prefer to draw only circles and squares on plane II. Of course, from these images the exact shapes of the original figures on plane I cannot be immediately inferred. We can only gather from them that the original was an ellipse, sentence can be said to be true precisely on the same conditions as in Wittgenstein's picture theory. For instance, a two-place relation is represented in a first-order language by a relation symbol (say " R{ , )") with two argument-places, which thus in effect defines a twoplace relation in the language (viz. the one holding between the symbols which fill these argument-places) corresponding to the relation it represents in the world. An atomic sentence in which the two argument places have been filled by individual constants, say "(Ra,b)", is true if and only if the relation represented by "R" holds between the individuals represented by "a" and "b" (in this order). But this happens precisely when the linguistic relation defined by "R" obtains between the symbols "a" and "6", that is, precisely when the sentence "R(a,b)" is a true picture of the entities represented by "R" , " a ", and "b" in Wittgenstein's sence. 2 Wolfgang Stegmüller, " Eine modelltheoretische Präzisierung der wittgensteinischen Bildtheorie ", Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic , vol. 7 (1966), pp. 181-195. 3 Erik Stenius Wittgenstein s Tractatus : A Critical Exposition of Its Main Lines of Thought , Blackwell, Oxford, 1960. 228 Jaakko Hintikka It seems to me highly significant that the closest Wittgenstein comes in the Tractatus to giving us an actual example of an elementary proposition is to present a relational formula of formal logic. In fact, in Tractatus 3.1432 Wittgenstein comes rather close to saying what I just said, and in 4.012 he says in effect that the picture, source_sentence: for nouns: as pronouns refer to previously introduced nouns, so prosentences like that's true inherit their content from previously introduced sentences. This kind of deflationism concerning the use of true (especially in Brandom's version) is an explanation in terms of anaphora; the prosentence depends anaphorically on the sentence providing its content. A relevant implication of this theory is that true is not understood as a predicate and that truth is not a property. Primitivism, defended
sentences: that by refusing to enter the state, anarchists prevent the state from performing its legislative, executive and judicial functions, which are necessary in order to have a minimal level of order and security. In doing so, anarchists expose those living next to them to the dangers of the state of nature, thereby posing an unjust threat. But since we all have a natural duty not to pose unjust threats to others, anarchists and would-be independents have a duty to leave the state of nature and enter the state.13 This duty correlates to a claim-right possessed by those living next to them, who also have a right to act in self-defence in order to enforce this obligation. This is what justifies the state's right to rule. Of course the idea of justifying state legitimacy by appealing to natural duties is not new: John Rawls, Jeremy Waldron, Allen Buchanan, Christopher Wellman and Thomas Christiano all defend versions of this view.14 But traditional natural duty theories of legitimacy all ground political authority in positive duties to help others or, more generally, to realize justice. The problem with these views, however, is that the very existence of positive duties of this sort is denied by many libertarians, who typically argue that all we have is negative duties not to harm others. Moreover, even those 12 A further problem for Simmons is that typically citizens do not regard the benefits provided by the state as the products of a cooperative scheme. I find this objection less compelling, but I cannot discuss it here., by Frege, Moore, and Davidson, is associated with two ideas: (1) that truth is a primitive and central trait of our conceptual system and (2) that truth, as such, cannot be defined. This second claim can be called negative primitivism, and it especially points out the facts about the indefinability of truth generally advocated by primitivists. In what follows, a connection is established between the deflationist's rejection of the predicate and of the property and facts (and primitivist, according to which Tr([(p]) and cp should be intersubstitutible in all (non-opaque) contexts. Here I am focusing on the property of truth, but the issue could be also raised for the concept (Asay 2013; forthcoming). It is not clear to me, though, in what measure substantiality at the concept level without further specifications is incompatible with deflationism, so I will put the question mostly aside. Perhaps, the real problem here would be the thesis that a truth predicate only serves a logical role. A thoroughly discussion, however, would be required. © 2014 The Author dialéctica © 2014 Editorial Board of dialéctica 524 Andrea Strollo such a thing as a single, determined deflationary conception;8 instead, we have a family9 of different approaches that share some motivations and philosophical suggestions.10 However, at least in its modern evolution, convergences are strong enough to allow for a general treatment in terms of such an idealized theory, at least in many cases.11 It is worth noting that such general tenets do not have the equal importance in characterizing an approach as deflationary. In fact, if Tarskian biconditionals and the thesis of the logical role could be abandoned without rejecting deflationism,12 or even combined with different philosophical conceptions,13 things are rather different for the claim that truth is an unsubstantial property, if a property at all. Such an (anti)metaphysical project of deflating the nature beside the role of truth is the leitmotiv of the entire history of, source_sentence: met, Peter van Inwagen, a libertarian, concludes that free will is a mystery. Recently, the Mind Argument has drawn a number of criticisms. Here I seek to add to its woes. Quite apart from its other problems, I argue, the Mind Argument does a poor job of isolating the important concern for libertarians that it raises. Once this concern has been clarified,
sentences: however, another argument serves to renew the challenge. The Assimilation Argument challenges libertarians to explain how ostensible exercises of free will are relevantly different from other causally undetermined outcomes, outcomes that nobody would count as exercises of free will. In particular, libertarians must explain how agents can have the power, contended that the Assimilation Argument is unsound. Here I defend the Assimilation Argument and the Rollback Argument, a second challenge to libertarianism that Franklin rejects. My aim in doing so is to underscore the force of these challenges, and thereby to resist what appears to be an emerging trend in, (p. 79), it must be capable of generating a theory of knowledge (p. 80), and it must harmonise with a plausible account of the way contentful states explain behaviour, which, the author argues, is non-causal (p. 139). The import of some of these requirements becomes more clear in Part III, where the theory begins to unfold. It is in fact a version of behaviourism, but with the saving grace that it allows mental content to be found in behaviour, rather than trying to reduce it away (p. 146). It also appears to find value to be intrinsic to behaviour. To be in an intentional state-to have a belief or desire, or to possess a concept-is to be "liable" to exhibit behavioural responses intrinsically assessable in evaluative terms. Two values are articulated; T and D. The former is analogous to truth, except that it applies to behaviour rather than beliefs; the latter is akin to desirability, and is intended for assessments of a response's conative import. In fact, however, the theory progresses very little. The focus starts out as one would expect: on belief and desire, the intentional states most relevant for explaining behaviour. But a problem crops up immediately. The author's account of it is complicated by his views on opacity (pp. 180 ff.), but here is a simplified version. Ideally, it seems, the treatment of belief would say that a person believes that p just in case she is liable to make responses intrinsically assessable with respect to T as "good
model-index: name: SentenceTransformer based on BAAI/bge-m3
results: task: type: triplet
name: Triplet
dataset: name: m3
type: m3
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy
value: 0.978
name: Cosine Accuracy
verified: no, type: dot_accuracy
value: 0.022
name: Dot Accuracy
verified: no, type: manhattan_accuracy
value: 0.974
name: Manhattan Accuracy
verified: no, type: euclidean_accuracy
value: 0.978
name: Euclidean Accuracy
verified: no, type: max_accuracy
value: 0.978
name: Max Accuracy
verified: no, task: type: triplet
name: Triplet
dataset: name: all nli test
type: all-nli-test
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy
value: 0.9755
name: Cosine Accuracy
verified: no, type: dot_accuracy
value: 0.0245
name: Dot Accuracy
verified: no, type: manhattan_accuracy
value: 0.976
name: Manhattan Accuracy
verified: no, type: euclidean_accuracy
value: 0.9755
name: Euclidean Accuracy
verified: no, type: max_accuracy
value: 0.976
name: Max Accuracy
verified: no
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Created: 2024-08-20 15:05:20