Model: IoannisKat1/distilbert-base-uncased-ft-new
Author: IoannisKat1
Pipeline: sentence-similarity
Library: sentence-transformers
Tags: sentence-transformers, safetensors, distilbert, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, dense, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:1627, loss:MatryoshkaLoss, loss:MultipleNegativesRankingLoss, en, arxiv:1908.10084, arxiv:2205.13147, arxiv:1705.00652, base_model:distilbert/distilbert-base-uncased, base_model:finetune:distilbert/distilbert-base-uncased, license:apache-2.0, model-index, text-embeddings-inference, endpoints_compatible, region:us
Base models (finetune): id: distilbert/distilbert-base-uncased
Card metadata: language: en
license: apache-2.0
tags: sentence-transformers, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, dense, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:1627, loss:MatryoshkaLoss, loss:MultipleNegativesRankingLoss
base_model: distilbert/distilbert-base-uncased
widget: source_sentence: What is required for the transmission of personal data directly from one controller to another?
sentences: 1.Processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.
2.Paragraph 1 shall not apply if one of the following applies: (a)  the data subject has given explicit consent to the processing of those personal data for one or more specified purposes, except where Union or Member State law provide that the prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 may not be lifted by the data subject; (b)  processing is necessary for the purposes of carrying out the obligations and exercising specific rights of the controller or of the data subject in the field of employment and social security and social protection law in so far as it is authorised by Union or Member State law or a collective agreement pursuant to Member State law providing for appropriate safeguards for the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject; (c)  processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person where the data subject is physically or legally incapable of giving consent; (d)  processing is carried out in the course of its legitimate activities with appropriate safeguards by a foundation, association or any other not-for-profit body with a political, philosophical, religious or trade union aim and on condition that the processing relates solely to the members or to former members of the body or to persons who have regular contact with it in connection with its purposes and that the personal data are not disclosed outside that body without the consent of the data subjects; (e)  processing relates to personal data which are manifestly made public by the data subject; (f)  processing is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims or whenever courts are acting in their judicial capacity; (g)  processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest, on the basis of Union or Member State law which shall be proportionate to the aim pursued, respect the essence of the right to data protection and provide for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject; (h)  processing is necessary for the purposes of preventive or occupational medicine, for the assessment of the working capacity of the employee, medical diagnosis, the provision of health or social care or treatment or the management of health or social care systems and services on the basis of Union or Member State law or pursuant to contract with a health professional and subject to the conditions and safeguards referred to in paragraph 3; (i)  processing is necessary for reasons of public interest in the area of public health, such as protecting against serious cross-border threats to health or ensuring high standards of quality and safety of health care and of medicinal products or medical devices, on the basis of Union or Member State law which provides for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject, in particular professional secrecy; 4.5.2016 L 119/38   (j)  processing is necessary for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes in accordance with Article 89(1) based on Union or Member State law which shall be proportionate to the aim pursued, respect the essence of the right to data protection and provide for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject.
3.Personal data referred to in paragraph 1 may be processed for the purposes referred to in point (h) of paragraph 2 when those data are processed by or under the responsibility of a professional subject to the obligation of professional secrecy under Union or Member State law or rules established by national competent bodies or by another person also subject to an obligation of secrecy under Union or Member State law or rules established by national competent bodies.
4.Member States may maintain or introduce further conditions, including limitations, with regard to the processing of genetic data, biometric data or data concerning health., 1.The data subject shall have the right to receive the personal data concerning him or her, which he or she has provided to a controller, in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format and have the right to transmit those data to another controller without hindrance from the controller to which the personal data have been provided, where: (a)  the processing is based on consent pursuant to point (a) of Article 6(1) or point (a) of Article 9(2) or on a contract pursuant to point (b) of Article 6(1); and (b)  the processing is carried out by automated means.
2.In exercising his or her right to data portability pursuant to paragraph 1, the data subject shall have the right to have the personal data transmitted directly from one controller to another, where technically feasible.
3.The exercise of the right referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be without prejudice to Article 17. That right shall not apply to processing necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller.
4.The right referred to in paragraph 1 shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others. Section 4 Right to object and automated individual decision-making, **Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**  
**Provisions:**  
**Time of commission of the act:**  
**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**  
**Reasoning:** Partially accepts the lawsuit.  
**Facts:** The plaintiff, who works as a lawyer, maintains a savings account with the defendant banking corporation under account number GR.............. Pursuant to a contract dated June 11, 2010, established in Thessaloniki between the defendant and the plaintiff, the plaintiff was granted access to the electronic banking system (e-banking) to conduct banking transactions remotely. On October 10, 2020, the plaintiff fell victim to electronic fraud through the "phishing" method, whereby an unknown perpetrator managed to extract and transfer €3,000.00 from the plaintiff’s account to another account of the same bank. Specifically, on that day at 6:51 a.m., the plaintiff received an email from the sender ".........", with the address ..........., informing him that his debit card had been suspended and that online payments and cash withdrawals could not be made until the issue was resolved. The email urged him to confirm his details within the next 72 hours by following a link titled "card activation."  
The plaintiff read the above email on his mobile phone around 8:00 a.m., and believing it came from the defendant, he followed the instructions and accessed a website that was identical (a clone) to that of the defendant. On this page, he was asked to enter his login credentials to connect to the service, which he did, and he was subsequently asked to input his debit card details for the alleged activation, which he also provided. Then, to complete the process, a number was sent to his mobile phone at 8:07 a.m. from the sender ........, which he entered, and two minutes later he received a message from the same sender in English stating that the quick access code had been activated on his mobile. A few minutes later, at 8:18 a.m., he received an email from the defendant informing him of the transfer of €3,000.00 from his account to account number GR ........... held at the same bank, with the beneficiary's details being .......... As soon as the plaintiff read this, he immediately called the defendant's call center and canceled his debit card, the access codes for the service ......., and locked the application .......... At the same time, he verbally submitted a request to dispute and cancel the contested transaction, and in a subsequent phone call, he also canceled his credit card. On the same day, he also sent an email to the defendant informing them in writing of the above and requesting the cancellation of the transaction and the return of the amount of €3,000.00 to his account, as this transfer was not made by him but by an unknown perpetrator through electronic fraud and was not approved by him. It should also be noted that the plaintiff, as the sole beneficiary according to the aforementioned contract for using the defendant's Internet Banking service, never received any update via SMS or the VIBER application from the bank regarding the transaction details before its completion, nor did he receive a one-time code (OTP) to approve the contested transaction. He subsequently filed a complaint against unknown persons at the Cyber Crime Division for the crime of fraud. The defendant sent an email to the plaintiff on October 16, 2020, informing him that his request had been forwarded to the appropriate department of the bank for investigation, stating that the bank would never send him an email or SMS asking him to enter his personal data and that as of October 7, 2020, there was a notice posted for its customers regarding malicious attempts to steal personal data in the "Our News" section on ....... A month after the disputed incident, on November 10, 2020, an amount of €2,296.82 was transferred to the plaintiff's account from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made. The plaintiff immediately sent an email to the defendant asking to be informed whether this transfer was a return of part of the amount that had been illegally withdrawn from his account and requested the return of the remaining amount of €703.18. In its response dated January 13, 2021, the defendant confirmed that the aforementioned amount indeed came from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made, following a freeze of that account initiated by the defendant during the investigation of the incident, but refused to return the remaining amount, claiming it bore no responsibility for the leak of the personal codes to third parties, according to the terms of the service contract established between them.  
From the entirety of the evidence presented to the court, there is no indication of the authenticity of the contested transaction, as the plaintiff did not give his consent for the execution of the transfer of the amount of €3,000.00, especially in light of the provision in Article 72 paragraph 2 of Law 4537/2018 stating that the mere use of the Internet Banking service by the plaintiff does not necessarily constitute sufficient evidence that the payer approved the payment action. Specifically, it was proven that the contested transaction was not carried out following a strong identification of the plaintiff – the sole beneficiary of the account – and his approval, as the latter may have entered his personal codes on the counterfeit website; however, he was never informed, before the completion of the contested transaction, of the amount that would be transferred from his account to a third-party account, nor did he receive on his mobile phone, either via SMS or through the VIBER application or any other means, the one-time code - extra PIN for its completion, which he was required to enter to approve the contested transaction (payment action) and thus complete his identification, a fact that was not countered by any evidence from the defendant. Furthermore, it is noted that the defendant's claims that it bears no responsibility under the terms of the banking services contract, whereby it is not liable for any damage to its customer in cases of unauthorized use of their personal access codes to the Internet Banking service, are to be rejected as fundamentally unfounded. This is because the aforementioned contractual terms are invalid according to the provision of Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, as they contradict the provisions of Articles 71, 73, and 92 of the same Law, which provide for the provider's universal liability and its exemption only for unusual and unforeseen circumstances that are beyond the control of the party invoking them and whose consequences could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary; these provisions establish mandatory law in favor of users, as according to Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, payment service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to the detriment of payment service users, unless the possibility of deviation is explicitly provided and they can decide to offer only more favorable terms to payment service users; the aforementioned contractual terms do not constitute more favorable terms but rather disadvantageous terms for the payment service user. In this case, however, the defendant did not prove the authenticity of the transaction and its approval by the plaintiff and did not invoke, nor did any unusual and unforeseen circumstances beyond its control, the consequences of which could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary, come to light. Therefore, the contested transaction transferring the amount of €3,000.00 is considered, in the absence of demonstrable consent from the plaintiff, unapproved according to the provisions of Article 64 of Law 4537/2018, and the defendant's contrary claims are rejected, especially since the plaintiff proceeded, according to Article 71 paragraph 1 of Law 4537/2018, without undue delay to notify the defendant regarding the contested unapproved payment action. Consequently, the defendant is liable for compensating the plaintiff for the positive damage he suffered under Article 73 of Law 4537/2018 and is obliged to pay him the requested amount of €703.18, while the plaintiff’s fault in the occurrence of this damage cannot be established, as he entered his personal details in an online environment that was a faithful imitation of that of the defendant, as evidenced by the comparison of the screenshots of the fake website and the real website provided by the plaintiff, a fact that he could not have known while being fully convinced that he was transacting with the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant’s liability to compensate the plaintiff is based on the provision of Article 8 of Law 2251/1994, which applies in this case, as the plaintiff's damage resulted from inadequate fulfillment of its obligations in the context of providing its services, but also on the provision of Article 914 of the Civil Code in the sense of omission on its part of unlawfully and culpably imposed actions. In this case, given that during the relevant period there had been a multitude of similar incidents of fraud against the defendant's customers, the latter, as a service provider to the consumer public and bearing transactional obligations of care and security towards them, displayed gross negligence regarding the security provided for electronic transaction services, which was compromised by the fraudulent theft of funds, as it did not comply with all required high-security measures for executing the contested transaction, failing to implement the strict customer identification verification process and to check the authenticity of the account to which the funds were sent, thus not assuming the suspicious nature of the transaction, did not adopt comprehensive and improved protective measures to fully protect its customers against malicious attacks and online fraud and to prevent the infiltration of unauthorized third parties, nor did it fulfill its obligations to inform, accurately inform, and warn its consumers - customers, as it failed to adequately inform them of attempts to steal their personal data through the sending of informative emails or SMS, while merely posting in a section rather than on a central banner (as it later did) does not constitute adequate information such that it meets the requirement of protecting its customers and the increased safeguarding of their interests. Although the plaintiff acted promptly and informed the defendant on the same day about the contested incident, the defendant did not act as promptly regarding the investigation of the incident and the freezing of the account that held the fraudulent credit to prevent the plaintiff's loss, but only returned part of the funds to the plaintiff a month later. This behavior, beyond being culpable due to gross negligence, was also unlawful, as it would have been illegal even without the contractual relationship, as contrary to the provisions of Law 4537/2018 and Law 2251/1994, regarding the lack of security of the services that the consumer is legitimately entitled to expect, as well as the building of trust that is essential in banking transactions, elements that it was obligated to provide within the sphere of the services offered, and contrary to the principles of good faith and commercial ethics, as crystallized in the provision of Article 288 of the Civil Code, as well as the general duty imposed by Article 914 of the Civil Code not to cause harm to another culpably. This resulted not only in positive damage to the plaintiff but also in causing him moral harm consisting of his mental distress and the disruption, agitation, and sorrow he experienced, for which he must be awarded financial compensation. Taking into account all the general circumstances of the case, the extent of the plaintiff's damage, the severity of the defendant's fault, the mental distress suffered by the plaintiff, the insecurity he felt regarding his deposits, the sorrow he experienced, and the stress caused by his financial loss, which occurred during the pandemic period when his earnings from his professional activity had significantly decreased, as well as the financial and social situation of the parties, it is the court's opinion that he should be granted, as financial compensation for his moral harm, an amount of €250.00, which is deemed reasonable and fair. Therefore, the total monetary amount that the plaintiff is entitled to for his positive damage and financial compensation for the moral harm suffered amounts to a total of (€703.18 + €250.00) = €953.18., source_sentence: Who has the right to lodge a complaint with the supervisory authority independently of a data subject's mandate?
sentences: **Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**  
**Provisions:**  
**Time of commission of the act:**  
**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**  
**Reasoning:** Partially accepts the lawsuit.  
**Facts:** The plaintiff, who works as a lawyer, maintains a savings account with the defendant banking corporation under account number GR.............. Pursuant to a contract dated June 11, 2010, established in Thessaloniki between the defendant and the plaintiff, the plaintiff was granted access to the electronic banking system (e-banking) to conduct banking transactions remotely. On October 10, 2020, the plaintiff fell victim to electronic fraud through the "phishing" method, whereby an unknown perpetrator managed to extract and transfer €3,000.00 from the plaintiff’s account to another account of the same bank. Specifically, on that day at 6:51 a.m., the plaintiff received an email from the sender ".........", with the address ..........., informing him that his debit card had been suspended and that online payments and cash withdrawals could not be made until the issue was resolved. The email urged him to confirm his details within the next 72 hours by following a link titled "card activation."  
The plaintiff read the above email on his mobile phone around 8:00 a.m., and believing it came from the defendant, he followed the instructions and accessed a website that was identical (a clone) to that of the defendant. On this page, he was asked to enter his login credentials to connect to the service, which he did, and he was subsequently asked to input his debit card details for the alleged activation, which he also provided. Then, to complete the process, a number was sent to his mobile phone at 8:07 a.m. from the sender ........, which he entered, and two minutes later he received a message from the same sender in English stating that the quick access code had been activated on his mobile. A few minutes later, at 8:18 a.m., he received an email from the defendant informing him of the transfer of €3,000.00 from his account to account number GR ........... held at the same bank, with the beneficiary's details being .......... As soon as the plaintiff read this, he immediately called the defendant's call center and canceled his debit card, the access codes for the service ......., and locked the application .......... At the same time, he verbally submitted a request to dispute and cancel the contested transaction, and in a subsequent phone call, he also canceled his credit card. On the same day, he also sent an email to the defendant informing them in writing of the above and requesting the cancellation of the transaction and the return of the amount of €3,000.00 to his account, as this transfer was not made by him but by an unknown perpetrator through electronic fraud and was not approved by him. It should also be noted that the plaintiff, as the sole beneficiary according to the aforementioned contract for using the defendant's Internet Banking service, never received any update via SMS or the VIBER application from the bank regarding the transaction details before its completion, nor did he receive a one-time code (OTP) to approve the contested transaction. He subsequently filed a complaint against unknown persons at the Cyber Crime Division for the crime of fraud. The defendant sent an email to the plaintiff on October 16, 2020, informing him that his request had been forwarded to the appropriate department of the bank for investigation, stating that the bank would never send him an email or SMS asking him to enter his personal data and that as of October 7, 2020, there was a notice posted for its customers regarding malicious attempts to steal personal data in the "Our News" section on ....... A month after the disputed incident, on November 10, 2020, an amount of €2,296.82 was transferred to the plaintiff's account from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made. The plaintiff immediately sent an email to the defendant asking to be informed whether this transfer was a return of part of the amount that had been illegally withdrawn from his account and requested the return of the remaining amount of €703.18. In its response dated January 13, 2021, the defendant confirmed that the aforementioned amount indeed came from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made, following a freeze of that account initiated by the defendant during the investigation of the incident, but refused to return the remaining amount, claiming it bore no responsibility for the leak of the personal codes to third parties, according to the terms of the service contract established between them.  
From the entirety of the evidence presented to the court, there is no indication of the authenticity of the contested transaction, as the plaintiff did not give his consent for the execution of the transfer of the amount of €3,000.00, especially in light of the provision in Article 72 paragraph 2 of Law 4537/2018 stating that the mere use of the Internet Banking service by the plaintiff does not necessarily constitute sufficient evidence that the payer approved the payment action. Specifically, it was proven that the contested transaction was not carried out following a strong identification of the plaintiff – the sole beneficiary of the account – and his approval, as the latter may have entered his personal codes on the counterfeit website; however, he was never informed, before the completion of the contested transaction, of the amount that would be transferred from his account to a third-party account, nor did he receive on his mobile phone, either via SMS or through the VIBER application or any other means, the one-time code - extra PIN for its completion, which he was required to enter to approve the contested transaction (payment action) and thus complete his identification, a fact that was not countered by any evidence from the defendant. Furthermore, it is noted that the defendant's claims that it bears no responsibility under the terms of the banking services contract, whereby it is not liable for any damage to its customer in cases of unauthorized use of their personal access codes to the Internet Banking service, are to be rejected as fundamentally unfounded. This is because the aforementioned contractual terms are invalid according to the provision of Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, as they contradict the provisions of Articles 71, 73, and 92 of the same Law, which provide for the provider's universal liability and its exemption only for unusual and unforeseen circumstances that are beyond the control of the party invoking them and whose consequences could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary; these provisions establish mandatory law in favor of users, as according to Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, payment service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to the detriment of payment service users, unless the possibility of deviation is explicitly provided and they can decide to offer only more favorable terms to payment service users; the aforementioned contractual terms do not constitute more favorable terms but rather disadvantageous terms for the payment service user. In this case, however, the defendant did not prove the authenticity of the transaction and its approval by the plaintiff and did not invoke, nor did any unusual and unforeseen circumstances beyond its control, the consequences of which could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary, come to light. Therefore, the contested transaction transferring the amount of €3,000.00 is considered, in the absence of demonstrable consent from the plaintiff, unapproved according to the provisions of Article 64 of Law 4537/2018, and the defendant's contrary claims are rejected, especially since the plaintiff proceeded, according to Article 71 paragraph 1 of Law 4537/2018, without undue delay to notify the defendant regarding the contested unapproved payment action. Consequently, the defendant is liable for compensating the plaintiff for the positive damage he suffered under Article 73 of Law 4537/2018 and is obliged to pay him the requested amount of €703.18, while the plaintiff’s fault in the occurrence of this damage cannot be established, as he entered his personal details in an online environment that was a faithful imitation of that of the defendant, as evidenced by the comparison of the screenshots of the fake website and the real website provided by the plaintiff, a fact that he could not have known while being fully convinced that he was transacting with the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant’s liability to compensate the plaintiff is based on the provision of Article 8 of Law 2251/1994, which applies in this case, as the plaintiff's damage resulted from inadequate fulfillment of its obligations in the context of providing its services, but also on the provision of Article 914 of the Civil Code in the sense of omission on its part of unlawfully and culpably imposed actions. In this case, given that during the relevant period there had been a multitude of similar incidents of fraud against the defendant's customers, the latter, as a service provider to the consumer public and bearing transactional obligations of care and security towards them, displayed gross negligence regarding the security provided for electronic transaction services, which was compromised by the fraudulent theft of funds, as it did not comply with all required high-security measures for executing the contested transaction, failing to implement the strict customer identification verification process and to check the authenticity of the account to which the funds were sent, thus not assuming the suspicious nature of the transaction, did not adopt comprehensive and improved protective measures to fully protect its customers against malicious attacks and online fraud and to prevent the infiltration of unauthorized third parties, nor did it fulfill its obligations to inform, accurately inform, and warn its consumers - customers, as it failed to adequately inform them of attempts to steal their personal data through the sending of informative emails or SMS, while merely posting in a section rather than on a central banner (as it later did) does not constitute adequate information such that it meets the requirement of protecting its customers and the increased safeguarding of their interests. Although the plaintiff acted promptly and informed the defendant on the same day about the contested incident, the defendant did not act as promptly regarding the investigation of the incident and the freezing of the account that held the fraudulent credit to prevent the plaintiff's loss, but only returned part of the funds to the plaintiff a month later. This behavior, beyond being culpable due to gross negligence, was also unlawful, as it would have been illegal even without the contractual relationship, as contrary to the provisions of Law 4537/2018 and Law 2251/1994, regarding the lack of security of the services that the consumer is legitimately entitled to expect, as well as the building of trust that is essential in banking transactions, elements that it was obligated to provide within the sphere of the services offered, and contrary to the principles of good faith and commercial ethics, as crystallized in the provision of Article 288 of the Civil Code, as well as the general duty imposed by Article 914 of the Civil Code not to cause harm to another culpably. This resulted not only in positive damage to the plaintiff but also in causing him moral harm consisting of his mental distress and the disruption, agitation, and sorrow he experienced, for which he must be awarded financial compensation. Taking into account all the general circumstances of the case, the extent of the plaintiff's damage, the severity of the defendant's fault, the mental distress suffered by the plaintiff, the insecurity he felt regarding his deposits, the sorrow he experienced, and the stress caused by his financial loss, which occurred during the pandemic period when his earnings from his professional activity had significantly decreased, as well as the financial and social situation of the parties, it is the court's opinion that he should be granted, as financial compensation for his moral harm, an amount of €250.00, which is deemed reasonable and fair. Therefore, the total monetary amount that the plaintiff is entitled to for his positive damage and financial compensation for the moral harm suffered amounts to a total of (€703.18 + €250.00) = €953.18., 1.The data subject shall have the right to mandate a not-for-profit body, organisation or association which has been properly constituted in accordance with the law of a Member State, has statutory objectives which are in the public interest, and is active in the field of the protection of data subjects' rights and freedoms with regard to the protection of their personal data to lodge the complaint on his or her behalf, to exercise the rights referred to in Articles 77, 78 and 79 on his or her behalf, and to exercise the right to receive compensation referred to in Article 82 on his or her behalf where provided for by Member State law.
2.Member States may provide that any body, organisation or association referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, independently of a data subject's mandate, has the right to lodge, in that Member State, a complaint with the supervisory authority which is competent pursuant to Article 77 and to exercise the rights referred to in Articles 78 and 79 if it considers that the rights of a data subject under this Regulation have been infringed as a result of the processing., **Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**

**Provisions:**

**Time of commission of the act:**

**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**

**Rationale:**

**Facts:**
The plaintiff holds credit card number ............ with the defendant banking corporation. Based on the application for alternative networks dated 19/7/2015 with number ......... submitted at a branch of the defendant, he was granted access to the electronic banking service (e-banking) to conduct banking transactions (debit, credit, updates, payments) remotely. On 30/11/2020, the plaintiff fell victim to electronic fraud through the "phishing" method, whereby an unknown perpetrator managed to withdraw a total amount of €3,121.75 from the aforementioned credit card. Specifically, the plaintiff received an email at 1:35 PM on 29/11/2020 from sender ...... with address ........, informing him that due to an impending system change, he needed to verify the mobile phone number linked to the credit card, urging him to complete the verification process within the next 24 hours by following a link titled ........; otherwise, his account would be locked for security reasons. The plaintiff read this email on the afternoon of 30 November 2020 and, believing it was from the defendant, followed the instructions and proceeded via the provided link to a website that was identical (a clone) to that of the defendant. On this page, he was asked to enter the six-digit security code (.........) that had just been sent to his mobile phone by the defendant at 3:41 PM, with the note that it was an activation code for his ........ card at ........., which he entered.

Subsequently, the plaintiff received, according to his statements, a new email (not submitted), which requested him to enter the details of the aforementioned credit card, specifically the name of the cardholder and the card number, not the PIN, which he also entered, convinced that he was within the online environment of the defendant. Then, at 3:47 PM, he received a message on his mobile phone from the defendant containing the exact same content as the one he received at 3:41 PM, while at 3:50 PM he received a message stating that the activation of his ......... card at ....... had been completed. Once the plaintiff read this, he became concerned that something was not right, and immediately called (at 4:41 PM) the defendant's call center to inform them. There, the employees, with whom he finally connected at 5:04 PM due to high call center volume, advised him to delete the relevant emails, cancel his credit card, change his access passwords for the service, and submit a dispute request regarding the conducted transactions. The plaintiff electronically sent this request to the defendant, disputing the detailed transactions amounting to €3,121.75, which were conducted on 30/11/2020 during the time frame of 16:37:45-16:43:34 PM, arguing that he had neither performed them himself nor authorized anyone else to do so. The plaintiff specifically disputed the following transactions, as evidenced by the account activity of the disputed credit card during the aforementioned timeframe: a) transaction number ......... amounting to €150.62 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:43:34 PM, b) transaction number ........ amounting to €293.20 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:42:40 PM, c) transaction number ............ amounting to €295.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:42:10 PM, d) transaction number .......... amounting to €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:41:31 PM, e) transaction number ........ amounting to €297.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:41:01 PM, f) transaction number ........ amounting to €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:40:27 PM, g) transaction number ....... amounting to €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:39:55 PM, h) transaction number ...... amounting to €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:39:22 PM, i) transaction number ......... amounting to €297.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:38:52 PM, j) transaction number ......... amounting to €295.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:38:17 PM, and k) transaction number ......... amounting to €296.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:37:45 PM. In its response letter dated 21/12/2020, the defendant denied responsibility for the costs of the aforementioned transactions, placing the entire blame on the plaintiff for the leak of his card details and security code to the fraudulent page. The plaintiff, completely denying any fault for the conducted transactions, repeatedly contacted the defendant, both by phone and via email (see emails dated 15/1/2021 and 11/2/2021), while on 2/3/2021, he electronically sent a report dated 1/03/2021 to the Consumer Advocate’s email address, recounting the events and requesting that the aforementioned Independent Authority intervene to have the disputed debt canceled. In its letter with reference number ...../27.04.2021, the aforementioned Independent Authority informed the plaintiff that the case was outside its mediating role and was therefore archived. Subsequently, the plaintiff sent the defendant on 5/3/2021 his extrajudicial statement dated 4/3/2021, calling upon it to fully cancel the debt of €3,121.75 that had been unjustly incurred against him within two days and to immediately instruct the representatives of the collection agency working with it to cease contacting him regarding the disputed case. The defendant sent the plaintiff a message on his mobile phone on 20/04/2021 informing him that his case was still being processed due to lengthy operational requirements, while on 23/04/2021, via email, it informed him that considering their good cooperation and his efforts to keep them updated, it had reviewed his case and decided to refund him the amounts of the transactions that were conducted after his contact with their representatives on 30/11/2020 at 4:41 PM, totaling €1,038.25, specifically the following: a) transaction of €150.62 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:43 PM, b) transaction of €295.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:42 PM, c) transaction of €293.20 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:42 PM, and d) transaction of €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:41 PM. Beyond this, the defendant refused to refund the plaintiff the amount of the remaining transactions conducted on 30/11/2020, totaling €2,376.08 (and not €2,376.48 as incorrectly stated by the plaintiff in his lawsuit), which the plaintiff ultimately fully paid, transferring €2,342.77 to the defendant on 7/06/2021 and €33.31 on 15/06/2021 (see related deposit receipts)., source_sentence: How are 'binding corporate rules' defined?
sentences: **Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil  
Provisions:  
Time of commission of the act:  
Outcome (not guilty, guilty): Rejects the lawsuit.  
Reasoning:  
Facts: The plaintiff holds account number ....................... at the defendant bank. Following the application/contract dated January 9, 2019, the plaintiff became a subscriber to the alternative service networks provided by the defendant bank through online banking (.........................). In the aforementioned application, the plaintiff stated that her mobile phone (number .................) would be used by the defendant to send additional security codes for the approval of her transactions via .......................... It is noted that the plaintiff received subscriber code .................., thus enabling her to conduct transactions without her physical presence at the branches of the defendant bank, from fixed or mobile devices (computers, smartphones, tablets), by entering her username and password to access her personal account. Regarding the identification methods, these were agreed upon between the parties and are specified depending on the payment method used. More specifically, the plaintiff had installed the application ...................................... on her mobile phone. According to the terms of the above contract between the parties, the defendant bank (to ensure the protection of its customers in using this application) requires three stages of identification: 1) the input of the customer's personal codes (username and password) in the application .........................., 2) the input of a six-digit code (...................) sent via SMS to the mobile number provided by the customer, to complete the login to ............................. and 3) the input of a new six-digit code (.................) sent in a new SMS to the mobile number provided by the customer, to authenticate the device on which the aforementioned application is installed (usually a mobile phone). 

Furthermore, it was established that on October 4, 2021, at 00:07, the plaintiff received a text message (SMS) on her mobile phone (number ...................) with the following content: ".................................", i.e., "..........: a payment was attempted from a new device. If this was not you, please visit...", providing the above link. As she acknowledges in her lawsuit, she followed the link that was sent to her via SMS and entered her login credentials (i.e., username and password) on the (fake) page she was redirected to. Thus, the perpetrators acquired the plaintiff's personal information and subsequently entered it into the application ........................... that they had installed on their own mobile phone. Following this, to complete the second stage of the process, as described above, the defendant bank sent the aforementioned date and time of 00:14, a security code to the plaintiff's mobile phone via SMS, with the content ".................................`." Subsequently, the defendant sent, at 00:17, another SMS to the plaintiff's mobile phone with the security code .................., containing the message ".........................................", to complete the third stage of identification. It is noted that the defendant sent another message to the plaintiff's mobile phone at 00:15, specifically "..........................", which was not used (perhaps because it was entered incorrectly by the plaintiff). It was later proven that the unknown perpetrators charged the plaintiff's account with a total amount of €2,800.00 and an equivalent credit to a bank account held similarly at the defendant bank, with the beneficiary being ............. The plaintiff contacted the defendant, submitting a dispute over the above transactions and simultaneously filed a complaint against any responsible party for the crimes of fraud and embezzlement. The defendant locked the plaintiff's subscription and provided her with new codes, warning her not to use the aforementioned application via her mobile phone unless she scanned it with updated antivirus/antispyware/malware software. Additionally, the defendant froze the account to which her money was transferred, which, as mentioned earlier, belongs to ................., who also stated that she fell victim to electronic fraud, being used by the aforementioned perpetrators as a front person. It was further established that the above-mentioned ......................... consented to the return to the plaintiff of the amount of €239.54, which remained in her account (as part of the aforementioned €2,800.00), while the plaintiff stated in a declaration that after the crediting of her account with the amount of €239.54, she has no further claims against the defendant regarding the above history. From the above proven facts, it was established that the plaintiff accessed the fraudulent page, entering her username and password and subsequently the codes ....., which were sent to her mobile phone by the defendant bank. Regarding the defendant, it was established that through its website ......................, through the login page to ................ and via messages to its subscribers, it informs them in detail about the risks of code interception and the protective measures they should take, while it also informs them with a special announcement about phishing. For this reason, the plaintiff's assertion that the perpetrators used one-time codes ......, violating the defendant's security systems, must be dismissed as unfounded. Therefore, since the defendant successfully identified the plaintiff's identity as well as her mobile phone without any indication of a breach of its electronic systems, the defendant is not liable for the plaintiff's loss from the transfer of funds to an unknown person's account, nor is it responsible for compensating that loss. Given these circumstances, the lawsuit must be dismissed as fundamentally unfounded.**, Where a data subject considers that his or her rights under this Regulation are infringed, he or she should have the right to mandate a not-for-profit body, organisation or association which is constituted in accordance with the law of a Member State, has statutory objectives which are in the public interest and is active in the field of the protection of personal data to lodge a complaint on his or her behalf with a supervisory authority, exercise the right to a judicial remedy on behalf of data subjects or, if provided for in Member State law, exercise the right to receive compensation on behalf of data subjects. A Member State may provide for such a body, organisation or association to have the right to lodge a complaint in that Member State, independently of a data subject's mandate, and the right to an effective judicial remedy where it has reasons to consider that the rights of a data subject have been infringed as a result of the processing of personal data which infringes this Regulation. That body, organisation or association may not be allowed to claim compensation on a data subject's behalf independently of the data subject's mandate., 1) 'personal data' means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person;
(2) ‘processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction;
(3) ‘restriction of processing’ means the marking of stored personal data with the aim of limiting their processing in the future;
(4) ‘profiling’ means any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person's performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements;
(5) ‘pseudonymisation’ means the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person;
(6) ‘filing system’ means any structured set of personal data which are accessible according to specific criteria, whether centralised, decentralised or dispersed on a functional or geographical basis;
(7) ‘controller’ means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of such processing are determined by Union or Member State law, the controller or the specific criteria for its nomination may be provided for by Union or Member State law;
(8) ‘processor’ means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller;
(9) ‘recipient’ means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or another body, to which the personal data are disclosed, whether a third party or not. However, public authorities which may receive personal data in the framework of a particular inquiry in accordance with Union or Member State law shall not be regarded as recipients; the processing of those data by those public authorities shall be in compliance with the applicable data protection rules according to the purposes of the processing;
(10) ‘third party’ means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or body other than the data subject, controller, processor and persons who, under the direct authority of the controller or processor, are authorised to process personal data;
(11) ‘consent’ of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her;
(12) ‘personal data breach’ means a breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed;
(13) ‘genetic data’ means personal data relating to the inherited or acquired genetic characteristics of a natural person which give unique information about the physiology or the health of that natural person and which result, in particular, from an analysis of a biological sample from the natural person in question;
(14) ‘biometric data’ means personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data;
(15) ‘data concerning health’ means personal data related to the physical or mental health of a natural person, including the provision of health care services, which reveal information about his or her health status;
(16) ‘main establishment’ means: (a) as regards a controller with establishments in more than one Member State, the place of its central administration in the Union, unless the decisions on the purposes and means of the processing of personal data are taken in another establishment of the controller in the Union and the latter establishment has the power to have such decisions implemented, in which case the establishment having taken such decisions is to be considered to be the main establishment; (b) as regards a processor with establishments in more than one Member State, the place of its central administration in the Union, or, if the processor has no central administration in the Union, the establishment of the processor in the Union where the main processing activities in the context of the activities of an establishment of the processor take place to the extent that the processor is subject to specific obligations under this Regulation;
(17) ‘representative’ means a natural or legal person established in the Union who, designated by the controller or processor in writing pursuant to Article 27, represents the controller or processor with regard to their respective obligations under this Regulation;
(18) ‘enterprise’ means a natural or legal person engaged in an economic activity, irrespective of its legal form, including partnerships or associations regularly engaged in an economic activity;
(19) ‘group of undertakings’ means a controlling undertaking and its controlled undertakings;
(20) ‘binding corporate rules’ means personal data protection policies which are adhered to by a controller or processor established on the territory of a Member State for transfers or a set of transfers of personal data to a controller or processor in one or more third countries within a group of undertakings, or group of enterprises engaged in a joint economic activity;
(21) ‘supervisory authority’ means an independent public authority which is established by a Member State pursuant to Article 51;
(22) ‘supervisory authority concerned’ means a supervisory authority which is concerned by the processing of personal data because: (a) the controller or processor is established on the territory of the Member State of that supervisory authority; (b) data subjects residing in the Member State of that supervisory authority are substantially affected or likely to be substantially affected by the processing; or (c) a complaint has been lodged with that supervisory authority;
(23) ‘cross-border processing’ means either: (a) processing of personal data which takes place in the context of the activities of establishments in more than one Member State of a controller or processor in the Union where the controller or processor is established in more than one Member State; or (b) processing of personal data which takes place in the context of the activities of a single establishment of a controller or processor in the Union but which substantially affects or is likely to substantially affect data subjects in more than one Member State.
(24) ‘relevant and reasoned objection’ means an objection to a draft decision as to whether there is an infringement of this Regulation, or whether envisaged action in relation to the controller or processor complies with this Regulation, which clearly demonstrates the significance of the risks posed by the draft decision as regards the fundamental rights and freedoms of data subjects and, where applicable, the free flow of personal data within the Union;
(25) ‘information society service’ means a service as defined in point (b) of Article 1(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1);
(26) ‘international organisation’ means an organisation and its subordinate bodies governed by public international law, or any other body which is set up by, or on the basis of, an agreement between two or more countries., source_sentence: In cases where the lead supervisory authority takes measures with legal effects, whose view must be considered utmost?
sentences: Where the supervisory authority with which the complaint has been lodged is not the lead supervisory authority, the lead supervisory authority should closely cooperate with the supervisory authority with which the complaint has been lodged in accordance with the provisions on cooperation and consistency laid down in this Regulation. In such cases, the lead supervisory authority should, when taking measures intended to produce legal effects, including the imposition of administrative fines, take utmost account of the view of the supervisory authority with which the complaint has been lodged and which should remain competent to carry out any investigation on the territory of its own Member State in liaison with the competent supervisory authority., This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity and thus with no connection to a professional or commercial activity. Personal or 4.5.2016 L 119/3 Official Journal of the European Union EN, The term technological measures means any technology, device or component designed to prevent or restrict unauthorized acts in respect of works or other subject-matter. Effective measures include access control or protection processes like encryption or copy control mechanisms.
It is prohibited to circumvent effective technological measures without permission from the rightholder, when done knowingly or with reasonable grounds to know.
It is prohibited to manufacture, import, distribute, sell, rent, advertise, or possess for commercial purposes devices or services intended to circumvent technological measures.
Violation of the provisions is punishable by imprisonment of at least one year and a fine of 2,900 to 15,000 Euro. It also entails civil sanctions under article 65 of Law 2121/1993.
Rightholders must ensure exceptions for reproduction for private use, teaching, libraries, judicial purposes, or accessibility for people with disabilities. Disputes may be mediated or resolved by the Court of Appeal of Athens.
, source_sentence: What conditions must be met for a transfer of personal data to a third country or international organisation?
sentences: 1.In the absence of an adequacy decision pursuant to Article 45(3), or of appropriate safeguards pursuant to Article 46, including binding corporate rules, a transfer or a set of transfers of personal data to a third country or an international organisation shall take place only on one of the following conditions: (a)  the data subject has explicitly consented to the proposed transfer, after having been informed of the possible risks of such transfers for the data subject due to the absence of an adequacy decision and appropriate safeguards; (b)  the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the data subject and the controller or the implementation of pre-contractual measures taken at the data subject's request; (c)  the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in the interest of the data subject between the controller and another natural or legal person; (d)  the transfer is necessary for important reasons of public interest; (e)  the transfer is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims; (f)  the transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of other persons, where the data subject is physically or legally incapable of giving consent; (g)  the transfer is made from a register which according to Union or Member State law is intended to provide information to the public and which is open to consultation either by the public in general or by any person who can demonstrate a legitimate interest, but only to the extent that the conditions laid down by Union or Member State law for consultation are fulfilled in the particular case. Where a transfer could not be based on a provision in Article 45 or 46, including the provisions on binding corporate rules, and none of the derogations for a specific situation referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph is applicable, a transfer to a third country or an international organisation may take place only if the transfer is not repetitive, concerns only a limited number of data subjects, is necessary for the purposes of compelling legitimate interests pursued by the controller which are not overridden by the interests or rights and freedoms of the data subject, and the controller has assessed all the circumstances surrounding the data transfer and has on the basis of that assessment provided suitable safeguards with regard to the protection of personal data. The controller shall inform the supervisory authority of the transfer. The controller shall, in addition to providing the information referred to in Articles 13 and 14, inform the data subject of the transfer and on the compelling legitimate interests pursued.
2.A transfer pursuant to point (g) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 shall not involve the entirety of the personal data or entire categories of the personal data contained in the register. Where the register is intended for consultation by persons having a legitimate interest, the transfer shall be made only at the request of those persons or if they are to be the recipients. 4.5.2016 L 119/64  
3.Points (a), (b) and (c) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 and the second subparagraph thereof shall not apply to activities carried out by public authorities in the exercise of their public powers.
4.The public interest referred to in point (d) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 shall be recognised in Union law or in the law of the Member State to which the controller is subject.
5.In the absence of an adequacy decision, Union or Member State law may, for important reasons of public interest, expressly set limits to the transfer of specific categories of personal data to a third country or an international organisation. Member States shall notify such provisions to the Commission.
6.The controller or processor shall document the assessment as well as the suitable safeguards referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 1 of this Article in the records referred to in Article 30., 1.A transfer of personal data to a third country or an international organisation may take place where the Commission has decided that the third country, a territory or one or more specified sectors within that third country, or the international organisation in question ensures an adequate level of protection. Such a transfer shall not require any specific authorisation.
2.When assessing the adequacy of the level of protection, the Commission shall, in particular, take account of the following elements: (a)  the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, relevant legislation, both general and sectoral, including concerning public security, defence, national security and criminal law and the access of public authorities to personal data, as well as the implementation of such legislation, data protection rules, professional rules and security measures, including rules for the onward transfer of personal data to another third country or international organisation which are complied with in that country or international organisation, case-law, as well as effective and enforceable data subject rights and effective administrative and judicial redress for the data subjects whose personal data are being transferred; (b)  the existence and effective functioning of one or more independent supervisory authorities in the third country or to which an international organisation is subject, with responsibility for ensuring and enforcing compliance with the data protection rules, including adequate enforcement powers, for assisting and advising the data subjects in exercising their rights and for cooperation with the supervisory authorities of the Member States; and (c)  the international commitments the third country or international organisation concerned has entered into, or other obligations arising from legally binding conventions or instruments as well as from its participation in multilateral or regional systems, in particular in relation to the protection of personal data.
3.The Commission, after assessing the adequacy of the level of protection, may decide, by means of implementing act, that a third country, a territory or one or more specified sectors within a third country, or an international organisation ensures an adequate level of protection within the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article. The implementing act shall provide for a mechanism for a periodic review, at least every four years, which shall take into account all relevant developments in the third country or international organisation. The implementing act shall specify its territorial and sectoral application and, where applicable, identify the supervisory authority or authorities referred to in point (b) of paragraph 2 of this Article. The implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 93(2).
4.The Commission shall, on an ongoing basis, monitor developments in third countries and international organisations that could affect the functioning of decisions adopted pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article and decisions adopted on the basis of Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46/EC.
5.The Commission shall, where available information reveals, in particular following the review referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, that a third country, a territory or one or more specified sectors within a third country, or an international organisation no longer ensures an adequate level of protection within the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article, to the extent necessary, repeal, amend or suspend the decision referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article by means of implementing acts without retro-active effect. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 93(2). On duly justified imperative grounds of urgency, the Commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 93(3).
6.The Commission shall enter into consultations with the third country or international organisation with a view to remedying the situation giving rise to the decision made pursuant to paragraph 5
7.A decision pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Article is without prejudice to transfers of personal data to the third country, a territory or one or more specified sectors within that third country, or the international organisation in question pursuant to Articles 46 to 49
8.The Commission shall publish in the Official Journal of the European Union and on its website a list of the third countries, territories and specified sectors within a third country and international organisations for which it has decided that an adequate level of protection is or is no longer ensured.
9.Decisions adopted by the Commission on the basis of Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46/EC shall remain in force until amended, replaced or repealed by a Commission Decision adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 or 5 of this Article., Flows of personal data to and from countries outside the Union and international organisations are necessary for the expansion of international trade and international cooperation. The increase in such flows has raised new challenges and concerns with regard to the protection of personal data. However, when personal data are transferred from the Union to controllers, processors or other recipients in third countries or to international organisations, the level of protection of natural persons ensured in the Union by this Regulation should not be undermined, including in cases of onward transfers of personal data from the third country or international organisation to controllers, processors in the same or another third country or international organisation. In any event, transfers to third countries and international organisations may only be carried out in full compliance with this Regulation. A transfer could take place only if, subject to the other provisions of this Regulation, the conditions laid down in the provisions of this Regulation relating to the transfer of personal data to third countries or international organisations are complied with by the controller or processor.
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics: cosine_accuracy@1, cosine_accuracy@3, cosine_accuracy@5, cosine_accuracy@10, cosine_precision@1, cosine_precision@3, cosine_precision@5, cosine_precision@10, cosine_recall@1, cosine_recall@3, cosine_recall@5, cosine_recall@10, cosine_ndcg@10, cosine_mrr@10, cosine_map@100
model-index: name: distilbert_base_uncased Finetuned on Data
results: task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 768
type: dim_768
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.3808353808353808
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.4103194103194103
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.4520884520884521
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.5184275184275184
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.3808353808353808
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.36609336609336607
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.34447174447174445
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.3117936117936118
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.07869793879250041
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.19473860627229114
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.2634549201777283
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.38547907038190593
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.4405501148816681
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.409125034125034
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.49879033446637433
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no, task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 512
type: dim_512
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.35872235872235875
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.3857493857493858
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.43243243243243246
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.5012285012285013
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.35872235872235875
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.343980343980344
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.3257985257985258
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.3014742014742015
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.0737277400723017
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.18103896132264619
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.24841950514231328
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.37288074528358084
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.4218697267950275
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.38832826332826326
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.480145763579171
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no, task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 256
type: dim_256
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.3538083538083538
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.3931203931203931
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.4398034398034398
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.5110565110565111
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.3538083538083538
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.3456183456183456
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.3307125307125307
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.3076167076167076
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.06985857995314158
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.1774116201953051
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.24756557303838117
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.3689042832188835
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.4225248064559057
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.38656351156351143
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.4776186607913121
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no, task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 128
type: dim_128
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.35135135135135137
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.3759213759213759
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.40540540540540543
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.4643734643734644
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.35135135135135137
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.33988533988533987
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.31891891891891894
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.2835380835380836
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.06786613066791154
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.17069615910150177
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.2329785850556713
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.3370412603799249
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.3977211233428757
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.3738806988806988
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.4555087811729278
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no, task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 64
type: dim_64
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.31695331695331697
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.3488943488943489
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.3882063882063882
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.42997542997543
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.31695331695331697
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.30630630630630634
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.29238329238329236
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.2587223587223587
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.06542796182641578
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.16312347645676933
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.22682621930046395
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.3163461062549497
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.3669039962935838
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.3412444912444912
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.43078854077340395
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no
Likes: 0 | All-time downloads: 17
Created: 2025-11-11 13:42:13