Model: IoannisKat1/intfloat-multilingual-e5-large-new2
Author: IoannisKat1
Pipeline: sentence-similarity
Library: sentence-transformers
Tags: sentence-transformers, safetensors, xlm-roberta, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, dense, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:1580, loss:MatryoshkaLoss, loss:MultipleNegativesRankingLoss, en, arxiv:1908.10084, arxiv:2205.13147, arxiv:1705.00652, base_model:intfloat/multilingual-e5-large, base_model:finetune:intfloat/multilingual-e5-large, license:apache-2.0, model-index, text-embeddings-inference, endpoints_compatible, region:us
Base models (finetune): id: intfloat/multilingual-e5-large
Card metadata: language: en
license: apache-2.0
tags: sentence-transformers, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, dense, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:1580, loss:MatryoshkaLoss, loss:MultipleNegativesRankingLoss
base_model: intfloat/multilingual-e5-large
widget: source_sentence: When should supervisory authorities monitor the application of the provisions?
sentences: **Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**  
**Provisions:**  
**Time of commission of the act:**  
**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**  
**Reasoning:** Partially accepts the lawsuit.  
**Facts:** The plaintiff, who works as a lawyer, maintains a savings account with the defendant banking corporation under account number GR.............. Pursuant to a contract dated June 11, 2010, established in Thessaloniki between the defendant and the plaintiff, the plaintiff was granted access to the electronic banking system (e-banking) to conduct banking transactions remotely. On October 10, 2020, the plaintiff fell victim to electronic fraud through the "phishing" method, whereby an unknown perpetrator managed to extract and transfer €3,000.00 from the plaintiff’s account to another account of the same bank. Specifically, on that day at 6:51 a.m., the plaintiff received an email from the sender ".........", with the address ..........., informing him that his debit card had been suspended and that online payments and cash withdrawals could not be made until the issue was resolved. The email urged him to confirm his details within the next 72 hours by following a link titled "card activation."  
The plaintiff read the above email on his mobile phone around 8:00 a.m., and believing it came from the defendant, he followed the instructions and accessed a website that was identical (a clone) to that of the defendant. On this page, he was asked to enter his login credentials to connect to the service, which he did, and he was subsequently asked to input his debit card details for the alleged activation, which he also provided. Then, to complete the process, a number was sent to his mobile phone at 8:07 a.m. from the sender ........, which he entered, and two minutes later he received a message from the same sender in English stating that the quick access code had been activated on his mobile. A few minutes later, at 8:18 a.m., he received an email from the defendant informing him of the transfer of €3,000.00 from his account to account number GR ........... held at the same bank, with the beneficiary's details being .......... As soon as the plaintiff read this, he immediately called the defendant's call center and canceled his debit card, the access codes for the service ......., and locked the application .......... At the same time, he verbally submitted a request to dispute and cancel the contested transaction, and in a subsequent phone call, he also canceled his credit card. On the same day, he also sent an email to the defendant informing them in writing of the above and requesting the cancellation of the transaction and the return of the amount of €3,000.00 to his account, as this transfer was not made by him but by an unknown perpetrator through electronic fraud and was not approved by him. It should also be noted that the plaintiff, as the sole beneficiary according to the aforementioned contract for using the defendant's Internet Banking service, never received any update via SMS or the VIBER application from the bank regarding the transaction details before its completion, nor did he receive a one-time code (OTP) to approve the contested transaction. He subsequently filed a complaint against unknown persons at the Cyber Crime Division for the crime of fraud. The defendant sent an email to the plaintiff on October 16, 2020, informing him that his request had been forwarded to the appropriate department of the bank for investigation, stating that the bank would never send him an email or SMS asking him to enter his personal data and that as of October 7, 2020, there was a notice posted for its customers regarding malicious attempts to steal personal data in the "Our News" section on ....... A month after the disputed incident, on November 10, 2020, an amount of €2,296.82 was transferred to the plaintiff's account from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made. The plaintiff immediately sent an email to the defendant asking to be informed whether this transfer was a return of part of the amount that had been illegally withdrawn from his account and requested the return of the remaining amount of €703.18. In its response dated January 13, 2021, the defendant confirmed that the aforementioned amount indeed came from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made, following a freeze of that account initiated by the defendant during the investigation of the incident, but refused to return the remaining amount, claiming it bore no responsibility for the leak of the personal codes to third parties, according to the terms of the service contract established between them.  
From the entirety of the evidence presented to the court, there is no indication of the authenticity of the contested transaction, as the plaintiff did not give his consent for the execution of the transfer of the amount of €3,000.00, especially in light of the provision in Article 72 paragraph 2 of Law 4537/2018 stating that the mere use of the Internet Banking service by the plaintiff does not necessarily constitute sufficient evidence that the payer approved the payment action. Specifically, it was proven that the contested transaction was not carried out following a strong identification of the plaintiff – the sole beneficiary of the account – and his approval, as the latter may have entered his personal codes on the counterfeit website; however, he was never informed, before the completion of the contested transaction, of the amount that would be transferred from his account to a third-party account, nor did he receive on his mobile phone, either via SMS or through the VIBER application or any other means, the one-time code - extra PIN for its completion, which he was required to enter to approve the contested transaction (payment action) and thus complete his identification, a fact that was not countered by any evidence from the defendant. Furthermore, it is noted that the defendant's claims that it bears no responsibility under the terms of the banking services contract, whereby it is not liable for any damage to its customer in cases of unauthorized use of their personal access codes to the Internet Banking service, are to be rejected as fundamentally unfounded. This is because the aforementioned contractual terms are invalid according to the provision of Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, as they contradict the provisions of Articles 71, 73, and 92 of the same Law, which provide for the provider's universal liability and its exemption only for unusual and unforeseen circumstances that are beyond the control of the party invoking them and whose consequences could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary; these provisions establish mandatory law in favor of users, as according to Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, payment service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to the detriment of payment service users, unless the possibility of deviation is explicitly provided and they can decide to offer only more favorable terms to payment service users; the aforementioned contractual terms do not constitute more favorable terms but rather disadvantageous terms for the payment service user. In this case, however, the defendant did not prove the authenticity of the transaction and its approval by the plaintiff and did not invoke, nor did any unusual and unforeseen circumstances beyond its control, the consequences of which could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary, come to light. Therefore, the contested transaction transferring the amount of €3,000.00 is considered, in the absence of demonstrable consent from the plaintiff, unapproved according to the provisions of Article 64 of Law 4537/2018, and the defendant's contrary claims are rejected, especially since the plaintiff proceeded, according to Article 71 paragraph 1 of Law 4537/2018, without undue delay to notify the defendant regarding the contested unapproved payment action. Consequently, the defendant is liable for compensating the plaintiff for the positive damage he suffered under Article 73 of Law 4537/2018 and is obliged to pay him the requested amount of €703.18, while the plaintiff’s fault in the occurrence of this damage cannot be established, as he entered his personal details in an online environment that was a faithful imitation of that of the defendant, as evidenced by the comparison of the screenshots of the fake website and the real website provided by the plaintiff, a fact that he could not have known while being fully convinced that he was transacting with the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant’s liability to compensate the plaintiff is based on the provision of Article 8 of Law 2251/1994, which applies in this case, as the plaintiff's damage resulted from inadequate fulfillment of its obligations in the context of providing its services, but also on the provision of Article 914 of the Civil Code in the sense of omission on its part of unlawfully and culpably imposed actions. In this case, given that during the relevant period there had been a multitude of similar incidents of fraud against the defendant's customers, the latter, as a service provider to the consumer public and bearing transactional obligations of care and security towards them, displayed gross negligence regarding the security provided for electronic transaction services, which was compromised by the fraudulent theft of funds, as it did not comply with all required high-security measures for executing the contested transaction, failing to implement the strict customer identification verification process and to check the authenticity of the account to which the funds were sent, thus not assuming the suspicious nature of the transaction, did not adopt comprehensive and improved protective measures to fully protect its customers against malicious attacks and online fraud and to prevent the infiltration of unauthorized third parties, nor did it fulfill its obligations to inform, accurately inform, and warn its consumers - customers, as it failed to adequately inform them of attempts to steal their personal data through the sending of informative emails or SMS, while merely posting in a section rather than on a central banner (as it later did) does not constitute adequate information such that it meets the requirement of protecting its customers and the increased safeguarding of their interests. Although the plaintiff acted promptly and informed the defendant on the same day about the contested incident, the defendant did not act as promptly regarding the investigation of the incident and the freezing of the account that held the fraudulent credit to prevent the plaintiff's loss, but only returned part of the funds to the plaintiff a month later. This behavior, beyond being culpable due to gross negligence, was also unlawful, as it would have been illegal even without the contractual relationship, as contrary to the provisions of Law 4537/2018 and Law 2251/1994, regarding the lack of security of the services that the consumer is legitimately entitled to expect, as well as the building of trust that is essential in banking transactions, elements that it was obligated to provide within the sphere of the services offered, and contrary to the principles of good faith and commercial ethics, as crystallized in the provision of Article 288 of the Civil Code, as well as the general duty imposed by Article 914 of the Civil Code not to cause harm to another culpably. This resulted not only in positive damage to the plaintiff but also in causing him moral harm consisting of his mental distress and the disruption, agitation, and sorrow he experienced, for which he must be awarded financial compensation. Taking into account all the general circumstances of the case, the extent of the plaintiff's damage, the severity of the defendant's fault, the mental distress suffered by the plaintiff, the insecurity he felt regarding his deposits, the sorrow he experienced, and the stress caused by his financial loss, which occurred during the pandemic period when his earnings from his professional activity had significantly decreased, as well as the financial and social situation of the parties, it is the court's opinion that he should be granted, as financial compensation for his moral harm, an amount of €250.00, which is deemed reasonable and fair. Therefore, the total monetary amount that the plaintiff is entitled to for his positive damage and financial compensation for the moral harm suffered amounts to a total of (€703.18 + €250.00) = €953.18., Court (Civil/Criminal): Criminal  
Provisions: Article 42 paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 7 of Law 4557/2018  
Time of commission of the act:  
Outcome (not guilty, guilty):  
Reasoning: Obligation of the payment service provider, such as banks, to inform their contracting customer after receiving a relevant order for a payment to be made on their behalf. Content of the above notification at the stage of receiving the payment order and during its execution. Terms of liability for the provider regarding compensation for non-execution, erroneous, or delayed execution of payment transactions. In particular, in the case of an unauthorized or erroneous payment, the user is required to notify the provider within a specified timeframe as soon as they become aware of the corresponding transaction. The provisions of Law 4357/2018 establish mandatory legal regulations in favor of users of payment services and cannot be contractually modified to their detriment, but only to their benefit. Defenses available to payment service providers to relieve them of liability. Burden of proof distribution between the parties. This responsibility of banks may also stem from Law 2251/1994, as they provide services to the public and are considered suppliers. Conditions for supplier liability under the aforementioned legislation. Distribution of the burden of proof between the litigants to demonstrate liability for compensation under Law 2251/1994. Terms of concurrency between contractual and tort liability for compensation. The court partially accepts the lawsuit.  
Facts: On 01/09/2021, an unknown perpetrator sent an email to her from the electronic address “...............”, in which they stated that for security reasons she needed to confirm her account with the bank ....... Not realizing that it was a scam, she followed the attached hyperlink, entered her personal information, resulting in an unknown perpetrator intercepting her online banking credentials and making a transfer totaling 7,000.00 euros to account number ................ of the bank .........  
C) The beneficiary of the aforementioned account is ......... born on 16/05/1995 in the Municipality of ........., residing at .............., with ID number .................... issued on 02/10/2009 by T.A .............. and tax number ............. from the tax office ...................  
D) The criminal proceeds reportedly arising from the above criminal activity amount to a total of seven thousand euros (7,000.00€). Following the above, serious suspicions arise that the aforementioned criminal proceeds transferred to the aforementioned bank account were unlawfully appropriated by her and subsequently mixed with other legally held assets, which she used in her overall economic activities, aiming to launder them, thus concealing their true origin and making it impossible for them to be seized. Therefore, there are reasonable suspicions that the aforementioned individual committed not only the primary offense but also the criminal act of “Money Laundering” (Article 2 §1 a, d of Law 4557/2018, in conjunction with Article 4 subparagraph z of the same law as it stands, as well as Article 39 paragraph 1 subparagraphs a & c of the same Law 4557/2018). Because there are serious suspicions that the bank account numbered .......... maintained at the bank ....................., whose beneficiary is ..... (Tax ID ....................), contains part of the monetary amount from the aforementioned criminal activity that was placed behind banking secrecy to conceal its true origin and ultimately to launder it. Because, in this case, part of the criminal proceeds has been found while the remainder has not been found in its entirety, there is a lawful reason and an urgent case for prohibiting the sale or any other transfer of the following assets, given that they are subject to seizure and forfeiture according to Articles 40 and 42 of Law 4557/2018 as they currently stand., The supervisory authorities should monitor the application of the provisions pursuant to this Regulation and contribute to its consistent application throughout the Union, in order to protect natural persons in relation to the processing of their personal data and to facilitate the free flow of personal data within the internal market. For that purpose, the supervisory authorities should cooperate with each other and with the Commission, without the need for any agreement between Member States on the provision of mutual assistance or on such cooperation., source_sentence: When can a data subject seek an effective judicial remedy?
sentences: 1.Without prejudice to any available administrative or non-judicial remedy, including the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority pursuant to Article 77, each data subject shall have the right to an effective judicial remedy where he or she considers that his or her rights under this Regulation have been infringed as a result of the processing of his or her personal data in non-compliance with this Regulation.
2.Proceedings against a controller or a processor shall be brought before the courts of the Member State where the controller or processor has an establishment. Alternatively, such proceedings may be brought before the courts of the Member State where the data subject has his or her habitual residence, unless the controller or processor is a public authority of a Member State acting in the exercise of its public powers. 4.5.2016 L 119/80   (1) Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43)., **Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**  
**Provisions:**  
**Time of commission of the act:**  
**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**  
**Reasoning:** Partially accepts the lawsuit.  
**Facts:** The plaintiff, who works as a lawyer, maintains a savings account with the defendant banking corporation under account number GR.............. Pursuant to a contract dated June 11, 2010, established in Thessaloniki between the defendant and the plaintiff, the plaintiff was granted access to the electronic banking system (e-banking) to conduct banking transactions remotely. On October 10, 2020, the plaintiff fell victim to electronic fraud through the "phishing" method, whereby an unknown perpetrator managed to extract and transfer €3,000.00 from the plaintiff’s account to another account of the same bank. Specifically, on that day at 6:51 a.m., the plaintiff received an email from the sender ".........", with the address ..........., informing him that his debit card had been suspended and that online payments and cash withdrawals could not be made until the issue was resolved. The email urged him to confirm his details within the next 72 hours by following a link titled "card activation."  
The plaintiff read the above email on his mobile phone around 8:00 a.m., and believing it came from the defendant, he followed the instructions and accessed a website that was identical (a clone) to that of the defendant. On this page, he was asked to enter his login credentials to connect to the service, which he did, and he was subsequently asked to input his debit card details for the alleged activation, which he also provided. Then, to complete the process, a number was sent to his mobile phone at 8:07 a.m. from the sender ........, which he entered, and two minutes later he received a message from the same sender in English stating that the quick access code had been activated on his mobile. A few minutes later, at 8:18 a.m., he received an email from the defendant informing him of the transfer of €3,000.00 from his account to account number GR ........... held at the same bank, with the beneficiary's details being .......... As soon as the plaintiff read this, he immediately called the defendant's call center and canceled his debit card, the access codes for the service ......., and locked the application .......... At the same time, he verbally submitted a request to dispute and cancel the contested transaction, and in a subsequent phone call, he also canceled his credit card. On the same day, he also sent an email to the defendant informing them in writing of the above and requesting the cancellation of the transaction and the return of the amount of €3,000.00 to his account, as this transfer was not made by him but by an unknown perpetrator through electronic fraud and was not approved by him. It should also be noted that the plaintiff, as the sole beneficiary according to the aforementioned contract for using the defendant's Internet Banking service, never received any update via SMS or the VIBER application from the bank regarding the transaction details before its completion, nor did he receive a one-time code (OTP) to approve the contested transaction. He subsequently filed a complaint against unknown persons at the Cyber Crime Division for the crime of fraud. The defendant sent an email to the plaintiff on October 16, 2020, informing him that his request had been forwarded to the appropriate department of the bank for investigation, stating that the bank would never send him an email or SMS asking him to enter his personal data and that as of October 7, 2020, there was a notice posted for its customers regarding malicious attempts to steal personal data in the "Our News" section on ....... A month after the disputed incident, on November 10, 2020, an amount of €2,296.82 was transferred to the plaintiff's account from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made. The plaintiff immediately sent an email to the defendant asking to be informed whether this transfer was a return of part of the amount that had been illegally withdrawn from his account and requested the return of the remaining amount of €703.18. In its response dated January 13, 2021, the defendant confirmed that the aforementioned amount indeed came from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made, following a freeze of that account initiated by the defendant during the investigation of the incident, but refused to return the remaining amount, claiming it bore no responsibility for the leak of the personal codes to third parties, according to the terms of the service contract established between them.  
From the entirety of the evidence presented to the court, there is no indication of the authenticity of the contested transaction, as the plaintiff did not give his consent for the execution of the transfer of the amount of €3,000.00, especially in light of the provision in Article 72 paragraph 2 of Law 4537/2018 stating that the mere use of the Internet Banking service by the plaintiff does not necessarily constitute sufficient evidence that the payer approved the payment action. Specifically, it was proven that the contested transaction was not carried out following a strong identification of the plaintiff – the sole beneficiary of the account – and his approval, as the latter may have entered his personal codes on the counterfeit website; however, he was never informed, before the completion of the contested transaction, of the amount that would be transferred from his account to a third-party account, nor did he receive on his mobile phone, either via SMS or through the VIBER application or any other means, the one-time code - extra PIN for its completion, which he was required to enter to approve the contested transaction (payment action) and thus complete his identification, a fact that was not countered by any evidence from the defendant. Furthermore, it is noted that the defendant's claims that it bears no responsibility under the terms of the banking services contract, whereby it is not liable for any damage to its customer in cases of unauthorized use of their personal access codes to the Internet Banking service, are to be rejected as fundamentally unfounded. This is because the aforementioned contractual terms are invalid according to the provision of Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, as they contradict the provisions of Articles 71, 73, and 92 of the same Law, which provide for the provider's universal liability and its exemption only for unusual and unforeseen circumstances that are beyond the control of the party invoking them and whose consequences could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary; these provisions establish mandatory law in favor of users, as according to Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, payment service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to the detriment of payment service users, unless the possibility of deviation is explicitly provided and they can decide to offer only more favorable terms to payment service users; the aforementioned contractual terms do not constitute more favorable terms but rather disadvantageous terms for the payment service user. In this case, however, the defendant did not prove the authenticity of the transaction and its approval by the plaintiff and did not invoke, nor did any unusual and unforeseen circumstances beyond its control, the consequences of which could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary, come to light. Therefore, the contested transaction transferring the amount of €3,000.00 is considered, in the absence of demonstrable consent from the plaintiff, unapproved according to the provisions of Article 64 of Law 4537/2018, and the defendant's contrary claims are rejected, especially since the plaintiff proceeded, according to Article 71 paragraph 1 of Law 4537/2018, without undue delay to notify the defendant regarding the contested unapproved payment action. Consequently, the defendant is liable for compensating the plaintiff for the positive damage he suffered under Article 73 of Law 4537/2018 and is obliged to pay him the requested amount of €703.18, while the plaintiff’s fault in the occurrence of this damage cannot be established, as he entered his personal details in an online environment that was a faithful imitation of that of the defendant, as evidenced by the comparison of the screenshots of the fake website and the real website provided by the plaintiff, a fact that he could not have known while being fully convinced that he was transacting with the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant’s liability to compensate the plaintiff is based on the provision of Article 8 of Law 2251/1994, which applies in this case, as the plaintiff's damage resulted from inadequate fulfillment of its obligations in the context of providing its services, but also on the provision of Article 914 of the Civil Code in the sense of omission on its part of unlawfully and culpably imposed actions. In this case, given that during the relevant period there had been a multitude of similar incidents of fraud against the defendant's customers, the latter, as a service provider to the consumer public and bearing transactional obligations of care and security towards them, displayed gross negligence regarding the security provided for electronic transaction services, which was compromised by the fraudulent theft of funds, as it did not comply with all required high-security measures for executing the contested transaction, failing to implement the strict customer identification verification process and to check the authenticity of the account to which the funds were sent, thus not assuming the suspicious nature of the transaction, did not adopt comprehensive and improved protective measures to fully protect its customers against malicious attacks and online fraud and to prevent the infiltration of unauthorized third parties, nor did it fulfill its obligations to inform, accurately inform, and warn its consumers - customers, as it failed to adequately inform them of attempts to steal their personal data through the sending of informative emails or SMS, while merely posting in a section rather than on a central banner (as it later did) does not constitute adequate information such that it meets the requirement of protecting its customers and the increased safeguarding of their interests. Although the plaintiff acted promptly and informed the defendant on the same day about the contested incident, the defendant did not act as promptly regarding the investigation of the incident and the freezing of the account that held the fraudulent credit to prevent the plaintiff's loss, but only returned part of the funds to the plaintiff a month later. This behavior, beyond being culpable due to gross negligence, was also unlawful, as it would have been illegal even without the contractual relationship, as contrary to the provisions of Law 4537/2018 and Law 2251/1994, regarding the lack of security of the services that the consumer is legitimately entitled to expect, as well as the building of trust that is essential in banking transactions, elements that it was obligated to provide within the sphere of the services offered, and contrary to the principles of good faith and commercial ethics, as crystallized in the provision of Article 288 of the Civil Code, as well as the general duty imposed by Article 914 of the Civil Code not to cause harm to another culpably. This resulted not only in positive damage to the plaintiff but also in causing him moral harm consisting of his mental distress and the disruption, agitation, and sorrow he experienced, for which he must be awarded financial compensation. Taking into account all the general circumstances of the case, the extent of the plaintiff's damage, the severity of the defendant's fault, the mental distress suffered by the plaintiff, the insecurity he felt regarding his deposits, the sorrow he experienced, and the stress caused by his financial loss, which occurred during the pandemic period when his earnings from his professional activity had significantly decreased, as well as the financial and social situation of the parties, it is the court's opinion that he should be granted, as financial compensation for his moral harm, an amount of €250.00, which is deemed reasonable and fair. Therefore, the total monetary amount that the plaintiff is entitled to for his positive damage and financial compensation for the moral harm suffered amounts to a total of (€703.18 + €250.00) = €953.18., Whoever, without authorization, copies, uses, discloses to another person, or in any way violates data of a computer or a computer program, which belong to the realm of state secrets, private secrets, business secrets, trade secrets, or privacy, shall be punished by imprisonment from three months to five years. Private computer data or programs should be considered all the data and programs that the legal holder keeps secret with justified interest, especially if the owner had taken security measures.
If the offender is in the service of the legal holder of the data, or the secret computer data and programs have a great economic value, the act shall be punished by imprisonment from one year to five years.
If the secret computer data and programs belong to the realm of military or diplomatic secrets, or of the security of the state, the act shall be punished according to Articles 146–147.
The offences of paragraphs 1–2 are prosecuted only upon complaint.
, source_sentence: What triggers the need for a review of processing operations?
sentences: The data subject should have the right not to be subject to a decision, which may include a measure, evaluating personal aspects relating to him or her which is based solely on automated processing and which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her, such as automatic refusal of an online credit application or e-recruiting practices without any human intervention. Such processing includes ‘profiling’ that consists of any form of automated processing of personal data evaluating the personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning the data subject's performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences or interests, reliability or behaviour, location or movements, where it produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her. However, decision-making based on such processing, including profiling, should be allowed where expressly authorised by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject, including for fraud and tax-evasion monitoring and prevention purposes conducted in accordance with the regulations, standards and recommendations of Union institutions or national oversight bodies and to ensure the security and reliability of a service provided by the controller, or necessary for the entering or performance of a contract between the data subject and a controller, or when the data subject has given his or her explicit consent. In any case, such processing should be subject to suitable safeguards, which should include specific information to the data subject and the right to obtain human intervention, to express his or her point of view, to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the decision. Such measure should not concern a child. In order to ensure fair and transparent processing in respect of the data subject, taking into account the specific circumstances and context in which the personal data are processed, the controller should use appropriate mathematical or statistical procedures for the profiling, implement technical and organisational measures appropriate to ensure, in particular, that factors which result in inaccuracies in personal data are corrected and the risk of errors is minimised, secure personal data in a manner that takes account of the potential risks involved for the interests and rights of the data subject and that prevents, inter alia, discriminatory effects on natural persons on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, religion or beliefs, trade union membership, genetic or health status or sexual orientation, or that result in measures having such an effect. Automated decision-making and profiling based on special categories of personal data should be allowed only under specific conditions., Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil  
Provisions: Law 4537/2018.  
Time of commission of act:  
Outcome (not guilty, guilty):  
Reasoning: PARTIALLY ACCEPTS the lawsuit. RECOGNIZES the obligation of the defendant (a) to pay the plaintiffs in full the amount of eight thousand eight hundred ninety (8,890) euros, with legal interest from December 2, 2021, and (b) to pay each of the plaintiffs the amount of five hundred (500) euros with legal interest from the service of the lawsuit.  
Facts: The plaintiffs claim that they are co-beneficiaries of a savings account held by the defendant, and that unknown perpetrators gained access to the aforementioned account via the internet, without the plaintiffs themselves having any fault regarding the safeguarding of the codes or the disclosure of the unique transaction codes (OTR). They assert that the defendant is responsible for the access gained by the unknown perpetrators to the savings account, as the defendant negligently violated the protective obligations it owed to the plaintiffs. They state that, due to the actions of the unknown perpetrators, gradual transfers of monetary amounts were made, resulting in the aforementioned savings account being depleted by the amount of 10,120 euros within a few minutes. They informed the defendant of the aforementioned actions through the appropriate channels; however, the defendant negligently delayed the necessary actions. The defendant denies any liability and the return of the aforementioned monetary amount., 1.Where a type of processing in particular using new technologies, and taking into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing, is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller shall, prior to the processing, carry out an assessment of the impact of the envisaged processing operations on the protection of personal data. A single assessment may address a set of similar processing operations that present similar high risks.
2.The controller shall seek the advice of the data protection officer, where designated, when carrying out a data protection impact assessment.
3.A data protection impact assessment referred to in paragraph 1 shall in particular be required in the case of: (a)  a systematic and extensive evaluation of personal aspects relating to natural persons which is based on automated processing, including profiling, and on which decisions are based that produce legal effects concerning the natural person or similarly significantly affect the natural person; (b)  processing on a large scale of special categories of data referred to in Article 9(1), or of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences referred to in Article 10; or (c)  a systematic monitoring of a publicly accessible area on a large scale.
4.The supervisory authority shall establish and make public a list of the kind of processing operations which are subject to the requirement for a data protection impact assessment pursuant to paragraph 1. The supervisory authority shall communicate those lists to the Board referred to in Article 68
5.The supervisory authority may also establish and make public a list of the kind of processing operations for which no data protection impact assessment is required. The supervisory authority shall communicate those lists to the Board.
6.Prior to the adoption of the lists referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5, the competent supervisory authority shall apply the consistency mechanism referred to in Article 63 where such lists involve processing activities which are related to the offering of goods or services to data subjects or to the monitoring of their behaviour in several Member States, or may substantially affect the free movement of personal data within the Union. 4.5.2016 L 119/53  
7.The assessment shall contain at least: (a)  a systematic description of the envisaged processing operations and the purposes of the processing, including, where applicable, the legitimate interest pursued by the controller; (b)  an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the processing operations in relation to the purposes; (c)  an assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects referred to in paragraph 1; and (d)  the measures envisaged to address the risks, including safeguards, security measures and mechanisms to ensure the protection of personal data and to demonstrate compliance with this Regulation taking into account the rights and legitimate interests of data subjects and other persons concerned.
8.Compliance with approved codes of conduct referred to in Article 40 by the relevant controllers or processors shall be taken into due account in assessing the impact of the processing operations performed by such controllers or processors, in particular for the purposes of a data protection impact assessment.
9.Where appropriate, the controller shall seek the views of data subjects or their representatives on the intended processing, without prejudice to the protection of commercial or public interests or the security of processing operations.
10.Where processing pursuant to point (c) or (e) of Article 6(1) has a legal basis in Union law or in the law of the Member State to which the controller is subject, that law regulates the specific processing operation or set of operations in question, and a data protection impact assessment has already been carried out as part of a general impact assessment in the context of the adoption of that legal basis, paragraphs 1 to 7 shall not apply unless Member States deem it to be necessary to carry out such an assessment prior to processing activities.
11. Where necessary, the controller shall carry out a review to assess if processing is performed in accordance with the data protection impact assessment at least when there is a change of the risk represented by processing operations., source_sentence: What elements does the Commission take into account when assessing the adequacy of the level of protection?
sentences: **Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**

**Provisions:**

**Time of commission of the act:**

**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**

**Rationale:**

**Facts:**
The plaintiff holds credit card number ............ with the defendant banking corporation. Based on the application for alternative networks dated 19/7/2015 with number ......... submitted at a branch of the defendant, he was granted access to the electronic banking service (e-banking) to conduct banking transactions (debit, credit, updates, payments) remotely. On 30/11/2020, the plaintiff fell victim to electronic fraud through the "phishing" method, whereby an unknown perpetrator managed to withdraw a total amount of €3,121.75 from the aforementioned credit card. Specifically, the plaintiff received an email at 1:35 PM on 29/11/2020 from sender ...... with address ........, informing him that due to an impending system change, he needed to verify the mobile phone number linked to the credit card, urging him to complete the verification process within the next 24 hours by following a link titled ........; otherwise, his account would be locked for security reasons. The plaintiff read this email on the afternoon of 30 November 2020 and, believing it was from the defendant, followed the instructions and proceeded via the provided link to a website that was identical (a clone) to that of the defendant. On this page, he was asked to enter the six-digit security code (.........) that had just been sent to his mobile phone by the defendant at 3:41 PM, with the note that it was an activation code for his ........ card at ........., which he entered.

Subsequently, the plaintiff received, according to his statements, a new email (not submitted), which requested him to enter the details of the aforementioned credit card, specifically the name of the cardholder and the card number, not the PIN, which he also entered, convinced that he was within the online environment of the defendant. Then, at 3:47 PM, he received a message on his mobile phone from the defendant containing the exact same content as the one he received at 3:41 PM, while at 3:50 PM he received a message stating that the activation of his ......... card at ....... had been completed. Once the plaintiff read this, he became concerned that something was not right, and immediately called (at 4:41 PM) the defendant's call center to inform them. There, the employees, with whom he finally connected at 5:04 PM due to high call center volume, advised him to delete the relevant emails, cancel his credit card, change his access passwords for the service, and submit a dispute request regarding the conducted transactions. The plaintiff electronically sent this request to the defendant, disputing the detailed transactions amounting to €3,121.75, which were conducted on 30/11/2020 during the time frame of 16:37:45-16:43:34 PM, arguing that he had neither performed them himself nor authorized anyone else to do so. The plaintiff specifically disputed the following transactions, as evidenced by the account activity of the disputed credit card during the aforementioned timeframe: a) transaction number ......... amounting to €150.62 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:43:34 PM, b) transaction number ........ amounting to €293.20 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:42:40 PM, c) transaction number ............ amounting to €295.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:42:10 PM, d) transaction number .......... amounting to €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:41:31 PM, e) transaction number ........ amounting to €297.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:41:01 PM, f) transaction number ........ amounting to €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:40:27 PM, g) transaction number ....... amounting to €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:39:55 PM, h) transaction number ...... amounting to €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:39:22 PM, i) transaction number ......... amounting to €297.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:38:52 PM, j) transaction number ......... amounting to €295.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:38:17 PM, and k) transaction number ......... amounting to €296.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:37:45 PM. In its response letter dated 21/12/2020, the defendant denied responsibility for the costs of the aforementioned transactions, placing the entire blame on the plaintiff for the leak of his card details and security code to the fraudulent page. The plaintiff, completely denying any fault for the conducted transactions, repeatedly contacted the defendant, both by phone and via email (see emails dated 15/1/2021 and 11/2/2021), while on 2/3/2021, he electronically sent a report dated 1/03/2021 to the Consumer Advocate’s email address, recounting the events and requesting that the aforementioned Independent Authority intervene to have the disputed debt canceled. In its letter with reference number ...../27.04.2021, the aforementioned Independent Authority informed the plaintiff that the case was outside its mediating role and was therefore archived. Subsequently, the plaintiff sent the defendant on 5/3/2021 his extrajudicial statement dated 4/3/2021, calling upon it to fully cancel the debt of €3,121.75 that had been unjustly incurred against him within two days and to immediately instruct the representatives of the collection agency working with it to cease contacting him regarding the disputed case. The defendant sent the plaintiff a message on his mobile phone on 20/04/2021 informing him that his case was still being processed due to lengthy operational requirements, while on 23/04/2021, via email, it informed him that considering their good cooperation and his efforts to keep them updated, it had reviewed his case and decided to refund him the amounts of the transactions that were conducted after his contact with their representatives on 30/11/2020 at 4:41 PM, totaling €1,038.25, specifically the following: a) transaction of €150.62 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:43 PM, b) transaction of €295.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:42 PM, c) transaction of €293.20 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:42 PM, and d) transaction of €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:41 PM. Beyond this, the defendant refused to refund the plaintiff the amount of the remaining transactions conducted on 30/11/2020, totaling €2,376.08 (and not €2,376.48 as incorrectly stated by the plaintiff in his lawsuit), which the plaintiff ultimately fully paid, transferring €2,342.77 to the defendant on 7/06/2021 and €33.31 on 15/06/2021 (see related deposit receipts)., **Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**  
**Provisions:**  
**Time of commission of the act:**  
**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**  
**Reasoning:** Claim for compensation and monetary satisfaction due to moral damage against a mobile phone company and a credit institution within the framework of inadequate fulfillment of a payment services contract for "web banking." Appropriate actions for mobile phone companies in case of a request for a "sim" card replacement due to wear or loss. They must verify the customer's identity based on the personal details and identification information registered in their system but are not liable for any changes in the latter that were not timely communicated to them. Further security measures such as phone communication or sending an SMS to the mobile number holder are not required. Payment services under Law 4357/2018. Obligation of the payment service provider, such as banks, to inform the payer after receiving a relevant order for making a payment. The content of this varies per case, such as sending a personalized code to the user's mobile phone for transaction approval, as well as sending an email immediately after its completion. However, the bank is not liable for customer damage resulting from illicit electronic transactions due to third-party interception of either the access codes for electronic banking transactions or the sim card and the phone number to which the personalized codes for approving the aforementioned transactions are sent, within the framework of increased security protocols. Appropriate actions by banks upon diagnosing illicit banking transactions that may be fraudulent. Relevant criteria for consideration. The evidence did not indicate negligent and thus tortious behavior from all defendants. The claim is dismissed.  

**Facts:** In the present claim, upon due assessment of its content, the plaintiff states that he has a mobile phone subscription with the first defendant, a mobile phone company. On October 26, 2020, in the morning, he realized that his mobile phone was offline, and by noon, he received email notifications from Bank .......... and ............ (whose third and fourth defendants are de facto universal successors, respectively), with which he holds an account, regarding transactions he had made. From phone calls from his home phone to Bank .............. and ............ Bank, he was informed that on the same day, in a very short period, four money transfers had been made from the account he maintains at Bank .............., specifically, an amount of €15,000 was transferred to the account mentioned in the claim document under the name ..........., at ........ an amount of €15,000 was transferred to the account mentioned in the claim document under the name ......... at ........... Bank, an amount of €15,000 was transferred to the plaintiff's account with his daughter as a co-holder at ......... Bank, and an amount of €6,700 was transferred from another of his accounts to the account from which the transfer to the aforementioned accounts of €45,000 was made. Additionally, from the plaintiff's account with his daughter as a co-holder at .......... Bank, an amount of €9,999 was transferred to an account under the name of .... . He attempted to log into the online banking service of Bank ......... from his home computer, but found that the service was locked, while regarding the corresponding service of ........... Bank, he requested alongside his daughter to 'lock' it. In a phone call with the call center of Bank ............, he was informed about the locking of his electronic account in the online banking service and was told to dispute the transactions, which he did immediately through ... banking, while his daughter communicated about this with ....... Bank. The transfer to the account with the beneficiary was canceled, and the amount of €15,000 was returned to the plaintiff. After his investigation, he discovered that an unknown individual appeared at the branch of the first defendant, served by the second defendant, who posed as the plaintiff and presented a forged military ID card of the plaintiff, requesting and receiving a new sim card, resulting in the deactivation of the plaintiff's sim card and gaining access to the codes sent to him by the banks for completing the transfers. Due to the negligence of the second defendant, he did not realize that the identity used was forged, as since 2010, when the plaintiff retired, he has had a police identification card. The first defendant does not have security protocols to prevent such incidents, which constitute the sim .... method, despite the issuance of a press release from the Attica Security and numerous publications regarding the aforementioned method, unlike other mobile phone companies, which implement a specific procedure for changing sim cards. The second defendant did not take the obvious step to check the functioning of the sim card before replacing it, where he would have realized that the plaintiff's mobile phone was functioning normally. Bank .......... and ........... Bank: a) accepted requests for transferring large amounts of money from accounts that had no similar activity in the past, while the plaintiff's online banking account with the above banks was locked quite some time later, b) sent email notifications regarding successful transactions in succession, under a single email, c) did not check the address ... of the perpetrators, which was different from that used by the plaintiff, and d) did not take necessary security measures to prevent fraud via sim ... against the plaintiff, as the security code (pin) sent by the banks via message to the mobile phone proved to be compromised. As a result of the above illegal and culpable behavior of the defendants, the plaintiff suffered property damage amounting to a total of €24,999, which constitutes the total amount of the transfers made by third unknown persons to accounts of unknown individuals, as stated above, and has not been refunded despite his repeated inquiries, while he also suffered distress and mental anguish, and his trust in the banks was shaken, thus entitling him to monetary compensation for his moral damage, amounting to €5,000., 1.A transfer of personal data to a third country or an international organisation may take place where the Commission has decided that the third country, a territory or one or more specified sectors within that third country, or the international organisation in question ensures an adequate level of protection. Such a transfer shall not require any specific authorisation.
2.When assessing the adequacy of the level of protection, the Commission shall, in particular, take account of the following elements: (a)  the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, relevant legislation, both general and sectoral, including concerning public security, defence, national security and criminal law and the access of public authorities to personal data, as well as the implementation of such legislation, data protection rules, professional rules and security measures, including rules for the onward transfer of personal data to another third country or international organisation which are complied with in that country or international organisation, case-law, as well as effective and enforceable data subject rights and effective administrative and judicial redress for the data subjects whose personal data are being transferred; (b)  the existence and effective functioning of one or more independent supervisory authorities in the third country or to which an international organisation is subject, with responsibility for ensuring and enforcing compliance with the data protection rules, including adequate enforcement powers, for assisting and advising the data subjects in exercising their rights and for cooperation with the supervisory authorities of the Member States; and (c)  the international commitments the third country or international organisation concerned has entered into, or other obligations arising from legally binding conventions or instruments as well as from its participation in multilateral or regional systems, in particular in relation to the protection of personal data.
3.The Commission, after assessing the adequacy of the level of protection, may decide, by means of implementing act, that a third country, a territory or one or more specified sectors within a third country, or an international organisation ensures an adequate level of protection within the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article. The implementing act shall provide for a mechanism for a periodic review, at least every four years, which shall take into account all relevant developments in the third country or international organisation. The implementing act shall specify its territorial and sectoral application and, where applicable, identify the supervisory authority or authorities referred to in point (b) of paragraph 2 of this Article. The implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 93(2).
4.The Commission shall, on an ongoing basis, monitor developments in third countries and international organisations that could affect the functioning of decisions adopted pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article and decisions adopted on the basis of Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46/EC.
5.The Commission shall, where available information reveals, in particular following the review referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, that a third country, a territory or one or more specified sectors within a third country, or an international organisation no longer ensures an adequate level of protection within the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article, to the extent necessary, repeal, amend or suspend the decision referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article by means of implementing acts without retro-active effect. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 93(2). On duly justified imperative grounds of urgency, the Commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 93(3).
6.The Commission shall enter into consultations with the third country or international organisation with a view to remedying the situation giving rise to the decision made pursuant to paragraph 5
7.A decision pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Article is without prejudice to transfers of personal data to the third country, a territory or one or more specified sectors within that third country, or the international organisation in question pursuant to Articles 46 to 49
8.The Commission shall publish in the Official Journal of the European Union and on its website a list of the third countries, territories and specified sectors within a third country and international organisations for which it has decided that an adequate level of protection is or is no longer ensured.
9.Decisions adopted by the Commission on the basis of Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46/EC shall remain in force until amended, replaced or repealed by a Commission Decision adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 or 5 of this Article., source_sentence: What can the contract be based on, besides individual contracts, in part according to this excerpt?
sentences: 1.The Board shall draw up an annual report regarding the protection of natural persons with regard to processing in the Union and, where relevant, in third countries and international organisations. The report shall be made public and be transmitted to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the Commission.
2.The annual report shall include a review of the practical application of the guidelines, recommendations and best practices referred to in point (l) of Article 70(1) as well as of the binding decisions referred to in Article 65., 1.Where processing is to be carried out on behalf of a controller, the controller shall use only processors providing sufficient guarantees to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures in such a manner that processing will meet the requirements of this Regulation and ensure the protection of the rights of the data subject.
2.The processor shall not engage another processor without prior specific or general written authorisation of the controller. In the case of general written authorisation, the processor shall inform the controller of any intended changes concerning the addition or replacement of other processors, thereby giving the controller the opportunity to object to such changes.
3.Processing by a processor shall be governed by a contract or other legal act under Union or Member State law, that is binding on the processor with regard to the controller and that sets out the subject-matter and duration of the processing, the nature and purpose of the processing, the type of personal data and categories of data subjects and the obligations and rights of the controller. That contract or other legal act shall stipulate, in particular, that the processor: (a)  processes the personal data only on documented instructions from the controller, including with regard to transfers of personal data to a third country or an international organisation, unless required to do so by Union or Member State law to which the processor is subject; in such a case, the processor shall inform the controller of that legal requirement before processing, unless that law prohibits such information on important grounds of public interest; (b)  ensures that persons authorised to process the personal data have committed themselves to confidentiality or are under an appropriate statutory obligation of confidentiality; (c)  takes all measures required pursuant to Article 32; (d)  respects the conditions referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 for engaging another processor; (e)  taking into account the nature of the processing, assists the controller by appropriate technical and organisational measures, insofar as this is possible, for the fulfilment of the controller's obligation to respond to requests for exercising the data subject's rights laid down in Chapter III; (f)  assists the controller in ensuring compliance with the obligations pursuant to Articles 32 to 36 taking into account the nature of processing and the information available to the processor; (g)  at the choice of the controller, deletes or returns all the personal data to the controller after the end of the provision of services relating to processing, and deletes existing copies unless Union or Member State law requires storage of the personal data; (h)  makes available to the controller all information necessary to demonstrate compliance with the obligations laid down in this Article and allow for and contribute to audits, including inspections, conducted by the controller or another auditor mandated by the controller. 4.5.2016 L 119/49   With regard to point (h) of the first subparagraph, the processor shall immediately inform the controller if, in its opinion, an instruction infringes this Regulation or other Union or Member State data protection provisions.
4.Where a processor engages another processor for carrying out specific processing activities on behalf of the controller, the same data protection obligations as set out in the contract or other legal act between the controller and the processor as referred to in paragraph 3 shall be imposed on that other processor by way of a contract or other legal act under Union or Member State law, in particular providing sufficient guarantees to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures in such a manner that the processing will meet the requirements of this Regulation. Where that other processor fails to fulfil its data protection obligations, the initial processor shall remain fully liable to the controller for the performance of that other processor's obligations.
5.Adherence of a processor to an approved code of conduct as referred to in Article 40 or an approved certification mechanism as referred to in Article 42 may be used as an element by which to demonstrate sufficient guarantees as referred to in paragraphs 1 and 4 of this Article.
6.Without prejudice to an individual contract between the controller and the processor, the contract or the other legal act referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article may be based, in whole or in part, on standard contractual clauses referred to in paragraphs 7 and 8 of this Article, including when they are part of a certification granted to the controller or processor pursuant to Articles 42 and 43
7.The Commission may lay down standard contractual clauses for the matters referred to in paragraph 3 and 4 of this Article and in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 93(2).
8.A supervisory authority may adopt standard contractual clauses for the matters referred to in paragraph 3 and 4 of this Article and in accordance with the consistency mechanism referred to in Article 63
9.The contract or the other legal act referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 shall be in writing, including in electronic form.
10.Without prejudice to Articles 82, 83 and 84, if a processor infringes this Regulation by determining the purposes and means of processing, the processor shall be considered to be a controller in respect of that processing., In order to ensure consistent monitoring and enforcement of this Regulation throughout the Union, the supervisory authorities should have in each Member State the same tasks and effective powers, including powers of investigation, corrective powers and sanctions, and authorisation and advisory powers, in particular in cases of complaints from natural persons, and without prejudice to the powers of prosecutorial authorities under Member State law, to bring infringements of this Regulation to the attention of the judicial authorities and engage in legal proceedings. Such powers should also include the power to impose a temporary or definitive limitation, including a ban, on processing. Member States may specify other tasks related to the protection of personal data under this Regulation. The powers of supervisory authorities should be exercised in accordance with appropriate procedural safeguards set out in Union and Member State law, impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time. In particular each measure should be appropriate, necessary and proportionate in view of ensuring compliance with this Regulation, taking into account the circumstances of each individual case, respect the right of every person to be heard before any individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken and avoid superfluous costs and excessive inconveniences for the persons concerned. Investigatory powers as regards access to premises should be exercised in accordance with specific requirements in Member State procedural law, such as the requirement to obtain a prior judicial authorisation. Each legally binding measure of the supervisory authority should be in writing, be clear and unambiguous, indicate the supervisory authority which has issued the measure, the date of issue of the measure, bear the signature of the head, or a member of the supervisory authority authorised by him or her, give the reasons for the measure, and refer to the right of an effective remedy. This should not preclude additional requirements pursuant to Member State procedural law. The adoption of a legally binding decision implies that it may give rise to judicial review in the Member State of the supervisory authority that adopted the decision.
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics: cosine_accuracy@1, cosine_accuracy@3, cosine_accuracy@5, cosine_accuracy@10, cosine_precision@1, cosine_precision@3, cosine_precision@5, cosine_precision@10, cosine_recall@1, cosine_recall@3, cosine_recall@5, cosine_recall@10, cosine_ndcg@10, cosine_mrr@10, cosine_map@100
model-index: name: multilingual-e5-large
results: task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 1024
type: dim_1024
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.39646464646464646
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.44191919191919193
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.4772727272727273
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.5303030303030303
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.39646464646464646
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.38636363636363635
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.3681818181818182
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.3290404040404041
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.08304287864930793
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.2081343496506072
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.2835680574260267
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.39409768094763203
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.4598689419093947
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.42710938752605426
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.5168519133450287
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no, task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 768
type: dim_768
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.3939393939393939
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.44191919191919193
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.5025252525252525
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.5505050505050505
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.3939393939393939
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.3855218855218855
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.37626262626262624
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.3446969696969697
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.08168070862236515
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.20453019286463223
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.2832633651660053
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.40242302005471103
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.47166637655254595
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.4309634038800705
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.5280748790211213
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no, task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 512
type: dim_512
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.3787878787878788
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.4318181818181818
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.48484848484848486
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.5303030303030303
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.3787878787878788
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.3728956228956229
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.36060606060606065
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.32601010101010097
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.07971959353722971
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.2026184382863416
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.27887644095443376
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.39430746021109475
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.45372338563687165
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.414860910694244
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.5082323561062431
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no, task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 256
type: dim_256
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.3712121212121212
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.398989898989899
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.44191919191919193
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.494949494949495
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.3712121212121212
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.3552188552188552
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.33282828282828286
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.29949494949494954
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.07982818259272316
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.1976196380449212
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.26002173221499414
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.36485373765457696
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.4261612717180349
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.3972482764149431
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.48924480926248376
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no, task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 128
type: dim_128
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.33585858585858586
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.37626262626262624
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.41919191919191917
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.4797979797979798
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.33585858585858586
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.32659932659932656
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.3111111111111111
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.2803030303030303
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.07421363164771244
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.18525500642088516
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.25267706028894804
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.35720405753526513
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.4004282713649355
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.3674543049543049
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.45757274754945104
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no, task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 64
type: dim_64
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.2777777777777778
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.31565656565656564
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.3434343434343434
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.38636363636363635
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.2777777777777778
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.2685185185185185
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.253030303030303
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.2222222222222222
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.06505275009099755
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.16288196174670413
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.22036463456449257
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.30790852718468
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.3305966214431583
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.3029501362834696
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.39861110645687153
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no
Likes: 0 | All-time downloads: 45
Created: 2025-09-15 07:31:29