Model: legaltextai/modernbert-embed-ft-const-legal-matryoshka
Author: legaltextai
Pipeline: sentence-similarity
Library: sentence-transformers
Tags: sentence-transformers, safetensors, modernbert, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:842, loss:MatryoshkaLoss, loss:MultipleNegativesRankingLoss, en, arxiv:1908.10084, arxiv:2205.13147, arxiv:1705.00652, base_model:nomic-ai/modernbert-embed-base, base_model:finetune:nomic-ai/modernbert-embed-base, license:apache-2.0, model-index, text-embeddings-inference, endpoints_compatible, region:us
Base models (finetune): id: nomic-ai/modernbert-embed-base
Card metadata: language: en
license: apache-2.0
tags: sentence-transformers, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:842, loss:MatryoshkaLoss, loss:MultipleNegativesRankingLoss
base_model: nomic-ai/modernbert-embed-base
widget: source_sentence: Discuss the implications of the Insular Cases on the application of the Citizenship Clause to American Samoa, particularly in distinguishing between incorporated and unincorporated territories. What are the practical concerns associated with this distinction?
sentences: To the extent jus soli is adopted into the Fourteenth Amendment, the concept of allegiance is manifested by the Citizenship Clause’s mandate that birthright citizens not merely be born within the territorial boundaries of the United States but also “subject to the jurisdiction thereof…” [citations omitted]

 

 Appellants would find any allegiance requirement of no moment because, as non-citizen nationals, American Samoans already “owe[ ] permanent allegiance to the United States.”[citations omitted] Yet, within the context of the Citizenship Clause, “[t]he evident meaning of the[ ] ... words [“subject to the jurisdiction thereof”] is, not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction, and owing them direct and immediate allegiance.” **375 [citations omitted] *306  It was on this basis that the Supreme Court declined to extend constitutional birthright citizenship to Native American tribes. [citations omitted]…Even assuming a background context grounded in principles of jus soli, we are skeptical the framers plainly intended to extend birthright citizenship to distinct, significantly self-governing political territories within the United States’s sphere of sovereignty—even where, as is the case with American Samoa, ultimate governance remains statutorily vested with the United States Government. [citations omitted]

III

Analysis of the Citizenship Clause’s application to American Samoa would be incomplete absent invocation of the sometimes contentious Insular Cases, where the Supreme Court “addressed whether the Constitution, by its own force, applies in any territory that is not a State.” [citations omitted]

 

“The doctrine of ‘territorial incorporation’ announced in the Insular Cases distinguishes between incorporated territories, which are intended for statehood from the time of acquisition and in which the entire Constitution applies ex proprio vigore, and unincorporated territories [such as American Samoa], which are not intended for statehood and in which only [certain] fundamental constitutional rights apply by their own force.”[citations omitted].

 

Appellants and Amici contend the Insular Cases have no application because the Citizenship Clause textually defines its own scope.[citations omitted].

 

Amici Curiae suggest territorial incorporation doctrine should not be expanded to the Citizenship Clause because the doctrine rests on anachronistic views of race and imperialism. But the Court has continued to invoke the Insular framework when dealing with questions of territorial and extraterritorial application. [citations omitted] Although some aspects of the Insular Cases’ analysis may now be deemed politically incorrect, the framework remains both applicable and of pragmatic use in assessing the applicability of rights to unincorporated territories. [citations omitted]

 

As the Supreme Court…emphasized, the “common thread uniting the Insular Cases ... [is that] questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism.” [citations omitted] While “fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights” remain guaranteed to persons born in the unincorporated territories, [citations omitted], the Insular framework recognizes the difficulties that frequently inure when “determin[ing] [whether a] particular provision of the Constitution is applicable,” absent inquiry into the impractical or anomalous. [citations omitted]

A

 American citizenship “is one of the most valuable rights in the world today.” [citations omitted] “The freedoms and opportunities secured by United States citizenship long have been treasured by persons fortunate enough to be born with them, and are yearned for by countless less fortunate.” [citations omitted]. Accordingly, even if the Insular framework is applicable, Appellants cite to a bevy of cases to argue citizenship is a fundamental right. [citations omitted] But those cases do not arise in the territorial context. Such decisions do not reflect the Court’s considered judgment as to the existence of a fundamental right to citizenship for persons born in the United States’ unincorporated **377 *308 territories. [citations omitted].7

 

 “Fundamental” has a distinct and narrow meaning in the context of territorial rights. It is not sufficient that a right be considered fundamentally important in a colloquial sense or even that a right be “necessary to [the] [ ]American regime of ordered liberty.” [citations omitted]. Under the Insular framework the designation of fundamental extends only to the narrow category of rights and “principles which are the basis of all free government.” [citations omitted]

 

In this manner the Insular Cases distinguish as universally fundamental those rights so basic as to be integral to free and fair society., 633, 649 (concurring opinion).

An innkeeper or common carrier has always been allowed to' exclude drunks, criminals and' diseased persons, but only because the public’s interest in protecting his and his guests’ health and property outweighs its interest in providing accommodations for this small group of travelers. As a general rule, innkeepers and carriers cannot refuse their services on account of race; though the rule developed in this country that they can provide “separate but equal” facilities. And for a period of our history even,this Court upheld state laws giving sanction to such a rule. Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, with Gayle v. Browder, 352 U. S. 903, affirming, 142 F. Supp. 707. But surely Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, and Barrows v. Jackson, supra, show that the day has passed when an innkeeper, carrier, housing developer, or retailer can draw a• racial' line, refuse service to some on account of color, and obtain the aid of a State in enforcing his personal bias by sending outlawed customers to prison or exacting fines from them.

Business, such as this restaurant, is still private property. ' Yet there is hardly any private enterprise that does not feel the pinch of some public regulation — from price control, to health and fire inspection, to zoning, to safety measures, to minimum wages and working conditions, to unemployment insurance. When the doors of a business are open to the public, they must be open to all regardless of race if apartheid is not to become engrained in our public places. It cannot by reason of the Equal Protection Clause become so engrained with the aid of state courts, state legislatures, or state police.

II.

There is even greater reason to bar a State through its judiciary from throwing its weight on the side of racial discrimination in the present case, because we deal here with a place of public accommodation under license from, the State. This is the idea I expressed in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, where another owner of a restaurant refused service to a customer because he was a Negro. That view is not novel; it.stems from the dissent of the first Mr. Justice Harlan in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 58-59:

“In every material sense applicable to the practical enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment, railroad corporations, keepers of inns, and managers of places of public amusement are agents or instrumentalities of the State, because they are charged with duties to the public, and are amenable, in respect of their duties and functions, to governmental regulation. It seems to me that, within the principle settled in Ex parte Virginia, a denial, by these instrumentalities of the State, to the citizen, because of his race, of that equality of civil rights secured to him by law, is a denial by the State, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. If it be not, then that race is left, in respect of the civil rights in question, practically at the mercy of corporations and individuals wielding power under the States.”

The nexus between the State and the private enterprise may be control, as in the case of a state agency. Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 353 U. S. 230. Or the nexus may be one of numerous other devices. “State support of segregated schools through any arrangement, management, funds, or property cannot be squared” with the Equal Protection Clause. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 19. Cf. Hampton v. Jacksonville, 304 F. 2d 320. A state-assisted enterprise serving the public does not escape its constitutional duty to serve all customers irrespective of race, even though its actual operation is in the hands of a lessee. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715. Cf. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U. S. 454. State licensing and surveillance.of a business serving the public also brings its service into the public domain. This restaurant needs a permit from Louisiana to operate; and during the existence of the license the State has broad powers of visitation and control. This restaurant is thus an instrumentality of the State since the State charges it with duties to the public and supervises its performance. The State's interest in and activity with regard to its restaurants extends far beyond any mere income-producing licensing requirement., Among other things, courts at this second step have sometimes considered whether an employee’s speech interests are outweighed by “ ‘the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.’ ” Id., at 417, 126 S.Ct. 1951 *2424 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731).

 

Both sides ask us to employ at least certain aspects of this Pickering–Garcetti  framework to resolve Mr. Kennedy’s free speech claim. They share additional common ground too. They agree that Mr. Kennedy’s speech implicates a matter of public concern. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 183; Brief for Respondent 44. They also appear to accept, at least for argument’s sake, that Mr. Kennedy’s speech does not raise questions of academic freedom that may or may not involve “additional” First Amendment “interests” beyond those captured by this framework. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425, 126 S.Ct. 1951; see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967); Brief for Petitioner 26, n. 2. At the first step of the Pickering–Garcetti  inquiry, the parties’ disagreement thus turns out to center on one question alone: Did Mr. Kennedy offer his prayers in his capacity as a private citizen, or did they amount to government speech attributable to the District?

 

Our cases offer some helpful guidance for resolving this question. In Garcetti, the Court concluded that a prosecutor’s internal memorandum to a supervisor was made “pursuant to [his] official duties,” and thus ineligible for First Amendment protection. 547 U.S. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the fact that the prosecutor’s speech “fulfill[ed] a responsibility to advise his supervisor about how best to proceed with a pending case.” Ibid. In other words, the prosecutor’s memorandum was government speech because it was speech the government “itself ha[d] commissioned or created” and speech the employee was expected to deliver in the course of carrying out his job. Id., at 422, 126 S.Ct. 1951.

 

By contrast, in Lane a public employer sought to terminate an employee after he testified at a criminal trial about matters involving his government employment. 573 U.S. at 233, 134 S.Ct. 2369. The Court held that the employee’s speech was protected by the First Amendment. Id., at 231, 134 S.Ct. 2369. In doing so, the Court held that the fact the speech touched on matters related to public employment was not enough to render it government speech. Id., at 239–240, 134 S.Ct. 2369. Instead, the Court explained, the “critical question ... is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties.” Id., at 240, 134 S.Ct. 2369. It is an inquiry this Court has said should be undertaken “practical[ly],” rather than with a blinkered focus on the terms of some formal and capacious written job description. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424, 126 S.Ct. 1951. To proceed otherwise would be to allow public employers to use “excessively broad job descriptions” to subvert the Constitution’s protections. Ibid.

 

Applying these lessons here, it seems clear to us that Mr. Kennedy has demonstrated that his speech was private speech, not government speech. When Mr. Kennedy uttered the three prayers that resulted in his suspension, he was not engaged in speech “ordinarily within the scope” of his duties as a coach. Lane, 573 U.S. at 240, 134 S.Ct. 2369. He did not speak pursuant to government policy. He was not seeking to convey a government-created message. He was not instructing players, discussing strategy, encouraging better on-field performance, or engaged in any other speech the District paid him to produce as a coach. See Part I–B, supra. Simply put: Mr. Kennedy’s prayers did not “ow[e their] existence” to Mr. Kennedy’s responsibilities as a public employee., source_sentence: Discuss the implications of the Thirteenth Amendment as it relates to Congress's power to enact laws against private racial discrimination in property transactions. How does the text support the assertion that Congress's authority extends beyond state action?
sentences: ––––, ––––, 142 S.Ct. 1539, 1545, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2022) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (internal quotation*2301 marks omitted). Either way, the Due Process Clause at most guarantees process. It does not, as the Court’s substantive due process cases suppose, “forbi[d] the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993); see also, e.g.,Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992).

 

As I have previously explained, “substantive due process” is an oxymoron that “lack[s] any basis in the Constitution.” Johnson, 576 U.S. at 607–608, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); see also, e.g.,Vaello Madero, 596 U.S., at ––––, 142 S.Ct., at 1545 (THOMAS, J., concurring) (“[T]ext and history provide little support for modern substantive due process doctrine”). “The notion that a constitutional provision that guarantees only ‘process’ before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property could define the substance of those rights strains credulity for even the most casual user of words.” McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 811, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see also United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 40, 114 S.Ct. 2018, 129 L.Ed.2d 22 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). The resolution of this case is thus straightforward. Because the Due Process Clause does not secure any substantive rights, it does not secure a right to abortion.

 

The Court today declines to disturb substantive due process jurisprudence generally or the doctrine’s application in other, specific contexts. Cases like Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) (right of married persons to obtain contraceptives)*; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) (right to engage in private, consensual sexual acts); and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015) (right to same-sex marriage), are not at issue. The Court’s abortion cases are unique, see ante, at 2257 – 2258, 2277 – 2278, 2280 – 2281, and no party has asked us to decide “whether our entire Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence must be preserved or revised,” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 813, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Thus, I agree that “[n]othing in [the Court’s] opinion should be understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.” Ante, at 2277 – 2278.

 

For that reason, in future cases, we should reconsider all of this Court’s substantive due process precedents, including Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell. Because any substantive due process decision is “demonstrably erroneous,” Ramos v.Louisiana, 590 U.S. ––––, ––––, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 1424, 206 L.Ed.2d 583 (2020) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment), we have a duty to “correct the error” established in those precedents, Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. ––––, ––––, 139 S.Ct. 1960, 1984-1985, 204 L.Ed.2d 322 (2019) (THOMAS, J., concurring)., On October 21, the superintendent further observed to a state official that “[t]he issue is quickly changing as it has shifted from leading prayer with student athletes, to a coaches [sic] right to conduct” his own prayer “on the 50 yard line.” Id., at 88.

 

On October 23, shortly before that evening’s game, the District wrote Mr. Kennedy again. It expressed “appreciation” for his “efforts to comply” with the District’s directives, including avoiding “on-the-job prayer with players in the ... football program, both in the locker room prior to games as well as on the field immediately following games.” Id., at 90. The letter also admitted that, during Mr. Kennedy’s recent October 16 postgame prayer, his students were otherwise engaged and not praying with him, and that his prayer was “fleeting.” Id., at 90, 93. Still, the District explained that a “reasonable observer” could think government endorsement of religion had occurred when a “District employee, on the field only by virtue of his employment with the District, still on duty” engaged in “overtly religious conduct.” Id., at 91, 93. The District thus made clear that the only option it would offer Mr. Kennedy was to allow him to pray after a game in a “private location” behind closed doors and “not observable to students or the public.” Id., at 93–94.

 

After the October 23 game ended, Mr. Kennedy knelt at the 50-yard line, where “no one joined him,” and bowed his head for a “brief, quiet prayer.” 991 F.3d at 1019; App. 173, 236–239. The superintendent informed the District’s board that this prayer “moved closer to what we want,” but nevertheless remained “unconstitutional.” Id., at 96. After the final relevant football game on October 26, Mr. Kennedy again knelt alone to offer a brief prayer as the players engaged in postgame traditions. 443 F.Supp.3d 1223, 1231 (W.D. Wash. 2020); App. to Pet. for Cert. 182. While he was praying, other adults gathered around him on the field. See 443 F.Supp.3d at 1231; App. 97. Later, Mr. Kennedy rejoined his players for a postgame talk, after they had finished singing the school fight song. 443 F.Supp.3d at 1231; App. 103.

 

 

C

Shortly after the October 26 game, the District placed Mr. Kennedy on paid administrative *2419 leave and prohibited him from “participat[ing], in any capacity, in ... football program activities.” Ibid. In a letter explaining the reasons for this disciplinary action, the superintendent criticized Mr. Kennedy for engaging in “public and demonstrative religious conduct while still on duty as an assistant coach” by offering a prayer following the games on October 16, 23, and 26. Id., at 102. The letter did not allege that Mr. Kennedy performed these prayers with students, and it acknowledged that his prayers took place while students were engaged in unrelated postgame activities. Id., at 103. Additionally, the letter faulted Mr. Kennedy for not being willing to pray behind closed doors. Id., at 102.

 

In an October 28 Q&A document provided to the public, the District admitted that it possessed “no evidence that students have been directly coerced to pray with Kennedy.” Id., at 105. The Q&A also acknowledged that Mr. Kennedy “ha[d] complied” with the District’s instruction to refrain from his “prior practices of leading players in a pre-game prayer in the locker room or leading players in a post-game prayer immediately following games.” Ibid. But the Q&A asserted that the District could not allow Mr. Kennedy to “engage in a public religious display.” Id., at 105, 107, 110. Otherwise, the District would “violat[e] the ... Establishment Clause” because “reasonable ... students and attendees” might perceive the “district [as] endors[ing] ... religion.” Id., at 105.

 

While Mr. Kennedy received “uniformly positive evaluations” every other year of his coaching career, after the 2015 season ended in November, the District gave him a poor performance evaluation. Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., 869 F.3d 813, 820 (C.A.9 2017)., Nor was the scope of the 1866 Act altered when it was re-enacted in 1870, some two years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.71 It is quite true that some members of Congress supported the Fourteenth Amendment “in order to eliminate doubt as to the constitutional validity of the Civil Rights Act as applied to the States.” Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32—33, 68 S.Ct. 847, 852. But it certainly does not follow that the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment or the subsequent readoption of the Civil Rights Act were meant somehow to limit its application to state action. The legislative history furnishes not the slightest factual basis for any such speculation, and the conditions prevailing in 1870 make it highly implausible. For by that time most, if not all, of the former Confederate States, then under the control of “reconstructed” legislatures, had formally repudiated racial discrimination, and the focus of congressional concern had clearly shifted from hostile statutes to the activities of groups like the Ku Klux Klan, operating wholly outside the law.72

 

 **2202 *437 Against this background, it would obviously make no sense to assume, without any historical support whatever, that Congress made a silent decision in 1870 to exempt private discrimination from the operation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.73 “The cardinal rule is that repeals by implication are not favored.” Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503, 56 S.Ct. 349, 352, 80 L.Ed. 351. All Congress said in 1870 was that the 1866 law “is hereby re-enacted.” That is all Congress meant.

 

 As we said in a somewhat different setting two Terms ago, “We think that history leaves no doubt that, if we are to give (the law) the scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its language.” United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1160. “We are not at liberty to seek ingenious analytical instruments,” ibid., to carve from s 1982 an exception for private conduct—even though its application to such conduct in the present context is without established precedent. And, as the Attorney General of the United States said at the oral argument of this case, “The fact that the statute lay partially dormant for many years cannot be held to diminish its force today.”

 

 

 

V.

The remaining question is whether Congress has power under the Constitution to do what s 1982 purports to do: to prohibit all racial discrimination, private and public, in the sale and rental of property. Our starting point is the Thirteenth Amendment, for it was pursuant *438 to that constitutional provision that Congress originally enacted what is now s 1982. The Amendment consists of two parts. Section 1 states:

“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereby the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”

Section 2 provides:

“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”

 As its text reveals, the Thirteenth Amendment “is not a mere prohibition of state laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States.” Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20, 3 S.Ct. 18, 28, 27 L.Ed. 835. It has never been doubted, therefore, “that the power vested in Congress to enforce the article by appropriate legislation,” ibid., includes the power to enact laws “direct and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by state legislation or not.” Id., at 23, 3 S.Ct., at 30.74

 

 Thus, the fact that s 1982 operates upon the unofficial acts of private individuals, whether or not sanctioned by state law, presents no constitutional problem. If Congress has power **2203 under the Thirteenth Amendment to eradicate conditions that prevent Negroes from buying and renting property because of their race or color, then no federal statute calculated to achieve that objective *439 can be thought to exceed the constitutional power of Congress simply because it reaches beyond state action to regulate the conduct of private individuals. The constitutional question in this case, therefore, comes to this: Does the authority of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment “by appropriate legislation” include the power to eliminate all racial barriers to the acquisition of real and personal property? We think the answer to that question is plainly yes., source_sentence: According to the statute referenced in the context, what is the standard for establishing the requisite injury necessary for obtaining an injunction under 17 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(1)?
sentences: Post-Trial Mem. at 27-28.

[263] The statute expressly authorizes injunctions to prevent or restrain violations, 17 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(1), thus demonstrating that the requisite injury need only be threatened.

[264] Def. Post-Trial Mem. at 28.

[265] Id. at 28-29.

[266] See, e.g., Ex. AYZ (Hunt Dep.) at 94-104.

[267] Id. 30.

[268] Ex. 113.

[269] Defendants' argument would lack merit even if there were credible proof that other circumvention devices actually exist and produce results comparable to DeCSS. The available movies must have been decrypted with DeCSS or something else. As far as this record discloses, any such device or technology would violate the DMCA for the same reasons as does DeCSS. In consequence, this case comes within the principle of Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). Where, as here, two or more persons take substantially identical wrongful actions, one and only one of which had to be the source of the plaintiffs' injury, and it is equally likely that one inflicted the injury as the other, the burden of proof on causation shifts to the defendants, each of which is liable absent proof that its action did not cause the injury. See 4 Fowler V. Harper & Fleming James, Jr., THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 101-04 (2d ed.1996).

Defendants' efforts to avoid the consequences of this common sense principle are unpersuasive. They argue, for example, that plaintiffs may not invoke the theory unless they join as defendants everyone who may have contributed to the injury. Def. Post-Trial Mem. at 32 n. 18 (citing Ex. UZ). It would be difficult to imagine a more nonsensical requirement in the context of this case. Where, as here, harm is done by dissemination of information over the Internet, probably by a substantial number of people all over the world, defendants' proposed rule would foreclose judicial relief anywhere because joinder of all plainly would be impossible in any one place, and technology does not permit identification of which wrongdoer's posting or product led to which pirated copy of a copyrighted work.

[270] 17 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(1).

[271] See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Unique Financial Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 1199 n. 2 (11th Cir.1999) (injunction under Section 20(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b), which permits an injunction "upon a proper showing," requires "a reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be repeated"); Commodity Futures Trading Com'n v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 1220 (7th Cir.1979) (same under Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(b)); S.E.C. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 18 (2d Cir.1977) (reasonable likelihood of future violations required under § 21(d) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d), which permits an injunction "upon a proper showing" where person "engaged or ... about to engage in" violation of statute).

[272] See, e.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57, 95 S.Ct. 2069, 45 L.Ed.2d 12 (1975) (injunctive relief in private action under § 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), as added by the Williams Act, requires a showing of irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies).

[273] Tough Traveler, Ltd. v. Outbound Prods., 60 F.3d 964, 967-68 (2d Cir.1995) (trademark); Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp., 25 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir.1994) (copyright).

[274] See, e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., Indeed, were we to accept Maine’s argument, our decision in Espinoza would be rendered essentially meaningless. By Maine’s logic, Montana could have obtained the same result that we held violated the First Amendment simply by redefining its tax credit for sponsors of generally available scholarships as limited to “tuition payments for the rough equivalent of a Montana public education”—meaning a secular education. But our holding in Espinoza turned on the substance of free exercise protections, not on the presence or absence of magic words. That holding applies fully whether the prohibited discrimination is in an express provision like § 2951(2) or in a party’s reconceptualization of the public benefit.

 

Maine may provide a strictly secular education in its public schools. But BCS and Temple Academy—like numerous other recipients of Maine tuition assistance payments—are not public schools. In order to provide an education to children who live in certain parts of its far-flung State, Maine has decided not to operate schools of its own, but instead to offer tuition assistance that parents may direct to the public or private schools of their choice. Maine’s administration of that benefit is subject to the free exercise principles governing any such public benefit program—including the prohibition on denying the benefit based on a recipient’s religious exercise.

 

The dissents are wrong to say that under our decision today Maine “must” fund religious education. Post, at 2006 (BREYER, J., dissenting). Maine chose to allow some parents to direct state tuition payments to private schools; that decision was not “forced upon” it. Post, at 2014 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). The State retains a number of options: it could expand the reach of its public school system, increase the availability of transportation, provide some combination of tutoring, remote learning, and partial attendance, or even operate boarding schools of its own. As we held in Espinoza, a “State need not subsidize private education. But once a State decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious.” 591 U. S., at ––––, 140 S.Ct., at 2261.

 

 

B

The Court of Appeals also attempted to distinguish this case from Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza on the ground that the funding restrictions in those cases were “solely status-based religious discrimination,” while the challenged provision here “imposes a use-based restriction.” 979 F.3d at 35, 37–38...

 

In Trinity Lutheran, the Missouri Constitution banned the use of public funds in aid of “any church, sect or denomination of religion.” [citation omitted]. We noted that the case involved “express discrimination based on religious identity,” which was sufficient unto the day in deciding it, and that our opinion did “not address religious uses of funding.” [citation omitted]

 

So too in Espinoza, the discrimination at issue was described by the Montana Supreme Court as a prohibition on aiding “schools controlled by churches,” and we *2001 analyzed the issue in terms of “religious status and not religious use.” [citation omitted] Foreshadowing Maine’s argument here, Montana argued that its case was different from Trinity Lutheran’s because it involved not playground resurfacing, but general funds that “could be used for religious ends by some recipients, particularly schools that believe faith should ‘permeate[ ]’ everything they do.” [citation omitted] We explained, however, that the strict scrutiny triggered by status-based discrimination could not be avoided by arguing that “one of its goals or effects [was] preventing religious organizations from putting aid to religious uses.” [citation omitted]  And we noted that nothing in our analysis was “meant to suggest that we agree[d] with [Montana] that some lesser degree of scrutiny applies to discrimination against religious uses of government aid.” [citation omitted]

 

Maine’s argument, however—along with the decision below and Justice BREYER’s dissent—is premised on precisely such a distinction. [citations omitted]

 

That premise, however, misreads our precedents. In Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza, we held that the Free Exercise Clause forbids discrimination on the basis of religious status. But those decisions never suggested that use-based discrimination is any less offensive to the Free Exercise Clause. This case illustrates why., 429

Supreme Court of the United States.

SAMUEL M. CLYATT

v.

UNITED STATES.

No. 235.

|

Argued December 13, 14, 1904.

|

Decided March 13, 1905.

Synopsis

ON WRIT of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, bringing up for review a judgment of the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Florida, convicting defendant of returning certain specified persons to a condition of peonage, which judgment had been taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals by a writ of error to the Circuit Court. Reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.

 

**429 Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer:

Considers the constitutionality of Sections 1990 and 5526, Rev. Stat. (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, pp. 1266, 3715),  [Anti-Peonage Act]

*215 Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:

 

…What is peonage? It may be defined as a status or condition of compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master. The basal fact is indebtedness. As said by Judge Benedict, delivering the opinion in Jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N. M. 190, 194: ‘One fact existed universally: all were indebted to their masters. This was the cord by which they seemed bound to their master’s service.’ Upon this is based a condition of compulsory service. Peonage is sometimes classified as voluntary or involuntary; but this implies simply a difference in the mode of origin, but none in the character of the servitude. The one exists where the debtor voluntarily contracts to enter the service of his creditor. The other is forced upon the debtor by some provision of law. But peonage, however created, is compulsory service,—involuntary servitude. The peon can release himself therefrom, it is true, by the payment of the debt, but otherwise the service is enforced. A clear distinction exists between peonage and the voluntary performance of labor or rendering of services in payment of a debt. In the latter case the debtor, though contracting to pay his indebtedness by labor or service, and subject, like any other contractor, to an action for damages for breach of that contract, can elect at any time to break it, and no law or force compels *216 performance or a continuance of the service. We need not stop to consider any possible limits or exceptional cases, such as the service of a sailor…or the obligations of a child to its parents, or of an apprentice to his master, or the power of the legislature to make unlawful, and punish criminally, an abandonment by an employee of his post of labor in any extreme cases. That which is contemplated by the statute is compulsory service to secure the payment of a debt. Is this legislation within the power of Congress? It may be conceded, as a general proposition, that the ordinary relations of individual to individual are subject to the control of the states, and are not intrusted to the general government; but the 13th Amendment, adopted as an outcome of the Civil War, reads:

‘Sec. 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

‘Sec. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.’

This amendment denounces a status or condition, irrespective of the manner or authority by which it is created. The prohibitions of the 14th and 15th Amendments are largely upon the acts of the states; but the 13th Amendment names no party or authority, but simply forbids slavery and involuntary servitude, grants to Congress power to enforce this prohibition by appropriate legislation. The differences between the 13th and subsequent amendments [can be described as follows:]

This amendment, as well as the 14th, is undoubtedly self-executing without any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any existing state of circumstances. By its own unaided force and effect it abolished slavery, and *217 established universal freedom. Still, legislation may be necessary and proper to meet all the various cases and circumstances to be affected by it, and to prescribe proper modes of redress for its violation in letter or spirit. And such legislation may be primary and direct in its character; for the amendment is not a mere prohibition of state laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States. . . ., source_sentence: How does the standard for applying the Second Amendment, as outlined in the context, compare to the protection of other constitutional rights, such as the freedom of speech in the First Amendment?
sentences: Eventually, HCC moved to dismiss the complaint. The District Court granted the motion, concluding that Mr. Wilson lacked standing under Article III. On appeal, a panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Mr. Wilson had standing and that his complaint stated a viable First Amendment claim. [citation omitted]

 

The Fifth Circuit’s merits analysis proceeded in two steps. First, the court concluded that a verbal “reprimand against an elected official for speech addressing a matter of public concern is an actionable First Amendment claim under § 1983.” [citation omitted] Next, the court reasoned that the Board’s imposition of other punishments—such as limiting Mr. Wilson’s eligibility for officer positions and his access to certain funds—did “not violate his First Amendment rights” because Mr. Wilson did not have an “entitlement” to those privileges. [citation omitted] In sum, the court held that Mr. Wilson’s § 1983 action could proceed, but only as to the Board’s unadorned censure resolution. HCC’s request for rehearing en banc failed by an equally divided vote. [citation omitted].

 

In time, HCC filed a petition for certiorari in this Court. It asked us to review the Fifth Circuit’s judgment that Mr. Wilson may pursue a First Amendment claim based on a purely verbal censure. Last year, we agreed to take up that question. [citation omitted] But as merits briefing unfolded, Mr. Wilson did not just seek to defend the Fifth Circuit’s judgment; he also sought to challenge it in part. Specifically, he argued that the Fifth Circuit erred to the extent that it upheld the Board’s nonverbal punishments as consistent with the First Amendment. Generally, however, when a respondent in this Court seeks to alter a lower court’s judgment, he must file and we must grant a cross-petition for review. [citation omitted] Mr. Wilson filed no such petition in this case. As a result, we decline to take up his *1259 challenge to the Fifth Circuit’s judgment, and the only question before us remains the narrow one on which we granted certiorari: Does Mr. Wilson possess an actionable First Amendment claim arising from the Board’s purely verbal censure?

 

 

II

A

The First Amendment prohibits laws “abridging the freedom of speech.” One obvious implication of that rule is that the government usually may not impose prior restraints on speech. [citation omitted] But other implications follow too. Relevant here, no one before us questions that, “[a]s a general matter,” the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting individuals to “retaliatory actions” after the fact for having engaged in protected speech. [citations omitted] Mr. Wilson argues that the Board’s censure resolution represents exactly that kind of impermissible retaliatory action.

 

Almost immediately, however, this submission confronts a challenge. When faced with a dispute about the Constitution’s meaning or application, “[l]ong settled and established practice is a consideration of great weight.” [citation omitted] Often, “a regular course of practice” can illuminate or “liquidate” our founding document’s “terms & phrases.” [citations omitted] That principle poses a problem for Mr. Wilson because elected bodies in this country have long exercised the power to censure their members. In fact, no one before us has cited any evidence suggesting that a purely verbal censure analogous to Mr. Wilson’s has ever been widely considered offensive to the First Amendment.

 

As early as colonial times, the power of assemblies in this country to censure their members was “more or less assumed.” [citation omitted] It seems, too, that assemblies often exercised the power to censure members for views they expressed and actions they took “both within and without the legislature.” [citations omitted]

 

The parties supply little reason to think the First Amendment was designed or commonly understood to upend this practice…

 

 

If anything, censures [of public officials] have proven more common yet at the state and local level…According to HCC and undisputed by Mr. Wilson, it seems elected bodies in this country issued no fewer than 20 censures in August 2020 alone. [citation omitted]

 

If this longstanding practice does not “put at rest” the question of the Constitution’s meaning for the dispute before us, it surely leaves a “considerable impression.” [citation omitted] On Mr. Wilson’s telling and under the Fifth Circuit’s holding, a purely verbal censure by an elected assembly of one of its own members may offend the First Amendment., [citation omitted]

 

We assessed the lawfulness of that handgun ban by scrutinizing whether it comported with history and tradition. Although we noted that the ban “would fail constitutional muster” “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights,”…we did not engage in means-end scrutiny when resolving the constitutional question. Instead, we focused on the historically unprecedented nature of the District’s ban, observing that “[f]ew laws in the history of our Nation have come close to [that] severe restriction.” [citation omitted] Likewise, when one of the dissents attempted to justify the District’s prohibition with “founding-era historical precedent,” including “various restrictive laws in the colonial period,” we addressed each purported analogue and concluded that they were either irrelevant or “d[id] not remotely burden the right of self-defense as much as an absolute ban on handguns.” [citations omitted] Thus, our earlier historical analysis sufficed to show that the Second Amendment did not countenance a “complete prohibition” on the use of “the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home.” [citation omitted]

 

 

2

As the foregoing shows, Heller’s methodology centered on constitutional text and *2129 history. Whether it came to defining the character of the right (individual or militia dependent), suggesting the outer limits of the right, or assessing the constitutionality of a particular regulation, Heller relied on text and history. It did not invoke any means-end test such as strict or intermediate scrutiny.

 

Moreover, Heller and McDonald expressly rejected the application of any “judge-empowering ‘interest-balancing inquiry’ that ‘asks whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important governmental interests.’ ” [citations omitted] We declined to engage in means-end scrutiny because “[t]he very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon.” [citation omitted] We then concluded: “A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.” [citation omitted]

 

Not only did Heller decline to engage in means-end scrutiny generally, but it also specifically ruled out the intermediate-scrutiny test that respondents and the United States now urge us to adopt. Dissenting in Heller, Justice BREYER’s proposed standard—“ask[ing] whether [a] statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important governmental interests,” …—simply expressed a classic formulation of intermediate scrutiny in a slightly different way. [ci8tations omitted] In fact, Justice BREYER all but admitted that his Heller dissent advocated for intermediate scrutiny by repeatedly invoking a quintessential intermediate-scrutiny precedent. [citations omitted]Thus, when Heller expressly rejected that dissent’s “interest-balancing inquiry,” [citation omitted] it necessarily rejected intermediate scrutiny.5

 

In sum, the Courts of Appeals’ second step is inconsistent with Heller’s historical approach and its rejection of means-end scrutiny. We reiterate that the standard for applying the Second Amendment is as follows: When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s *2130 conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s “unqualified command.” [citation omitted]

 

 

C

This Second Amendment standard accords with how we protect other constitutional rights. [One example is] the freedom of speech in the First Amendment, to which Heller repeatedly compared the right to keep and bear arms. [citation omitted] In that context, “[w]hen the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.” [citations omitted] In some cases, that burden includes showing whether the expressive conduct falls outside of the category of protected speech. [citation omitted] And to carry that burden, the government must generally point to historical evidence about the reach of the First Amendment’s protections., Roe and Casey thought that one-sided view misguided. In some sense, that is the difference in a nutshell between our precedents and the majority opinion. The constitutional regime we have lived in for the last 50 years recognized competing interests, and sought a balance between them. The constitutional regime we enter today erases the woman’s interest and recognizes only the State’s (or the Federal Government’s).

 

 

 

B

The majority makes this change based on a single question: Did the reproductive right recognized in Roe and Casey exist in “1868, the year when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified”? Ante, at 2252 – 2253. The majority says (and with this much we agree) that the answer to this question is no: In 1868, there was no nationwide right to end a pregnancy, and no thought that the Fourteenth Amendment provided one.

 

Of course, the majority opinion refers as well to some later and earlier history. On the one side of 1868, it goes back as far as the 13th (the 13th!) century. See ante, at 2249, 142 S.Ct. 2111. But that turns out to be wheel-spinning. First, it is not clear what relevance *2324 such early history should have, even to the majority. See New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v.Bruen, 597 U.S. ––––, ––––, 142 S.Ct. 2111, 2136, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2022) (“Historical evidence that long predates [ratification] may not illuminate the scope of the right”). If the early history obviously supported abortion rights, the majority would no doubt say that only the views of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifiers are germane. See ibid. (It is “better not to go too far back into antiquity,” except if olden “law survived to become our Founders’ law”). Second—and embarrassingly for the majority—early law in fact does provide some support for abortion rights. Common-law authorities did not treat abortion as a crime before “quickening”—the point when the fetus moved in the womb.2 And early American law followed the common-law rule.3 So the criminal law of that early time might be taken as roughly consonant with Roe’s and Casey’s different treatment of early and late abortions. Better, then, to move forward in time. On the other side of 1868, the majority occasionally notes that many States barred abortion up to the time of Roe. See ante, at 2253, 2260, 142 S.Ct. 2111. That is convenient for the majority, but it is window dressing. As the same majority (plus one) just informed us, “post-ratification adoption or acceptance of laws that are inconsistent with the original meaning of the constitutional text obviously cannot overcome or alter that text.” New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc., 597 U.S., at –––– – ––––, 142 S.Ct., at 2137. Had the pre-Roe liberalization of abortion laws occurred more quickly and more widely in the 20th century, the majority would say (once again) that only the ratifiers’ views are germane.

 

The majority’s core legal postulate, then, is that we in the 21st century must read the Fourteenth Amendment just as its ratifiers did. And that is indeed what the majority emphasizes over and over again. See ante, at 2267 (“[T]he most important historical fact [is] how the States regulated abortion when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted”); see also ante, at 2242 – 2243, 2248 – 2249, and n. 24, 23, 25, 28. If the ratifiers did not understand something as central to freedom, then neither can we. Or said more particularly: If those people did not understand reproductive rights as part of the guarantee of liberty conferred in the Fourteenth Amendment, then those rights do not exist.

 

As an initial matter, note a mistake in the just preceding sentence. We referred there to the “people” who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment: What rights did those “people” have in their heads at the time? But, of course, “people” did not ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. Men did. So it is perhaps not so surprising that the ratifiers were not perfectly attuned to the importance of reproductive rights for women’s liberty, or for their capacity to participate as equal members of our Nation., source_sentence: Based on the court's ruling, what are the implications of Title VII regarding discrimination against employees based on their transgender status or failure to conform to sex stereotypes?
sentences: Thus, even if we agreed with the Funeral Home that Rost's religious exercise would be substantially burdened by enforcing Title VII in this case, we would nevertheless REVERSE the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Funeral Home and hold instead that requiring the Funeral Home to comply with Title VII constitutes the least restrictive means of furthering the government's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against Stephens on the basis of sex. Thus, even assuming Rost's religious exercise is substantially burdened by the EEOC's enforcement action in this case, we GRANT summary judgment to the EEOC on the Funeral Home's RFRA defense on this alternative ground.

 

[ … ]

[ … ]

 

III. CONCLUSION

Discrimination against employees, either because of their failure to conform to sex stereotypes or their transgender and transitioning status, is illegal under Title VII. The unrefuted facts show that the Funeral Home fired Stephens because she refused to abide by her employer's stereotypical conception of her sex, and therefore the EEOC is entitled to summary judgment as to its unlawful-termination claim. RFRA provides the Funeral Home with no relief because continuing to employ Stephens would not, as a matter of law, substantially burden Rost's religious exercise, and even if it did, the EEOC has shown that enforcing Title VII here is the least restrictive means of furthering its compelling interest in combating and eradicating sex discrimination. We therefore REVERSE the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Funeral Home and GRANT summary judgment to the EEOC on its unlawful-termination claim. We also REVERSE the district court's grant of summary judgment on the EEOC's discriminatory-clothing-allowance claim, as the district court erred in failing to consider the EEOC's claim on the merits. We REMAND this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

[1] We refer to Stephens using female pronouns, in accordance with the preference she has expressed through her briefing to this court.

[2] All facts drawn from Def.'s Statement of Facts (R. 55) are undisputed. See R. 64 (Pl.'s Counter Statement of Disputed Facts) (Page ID #2066-88).

[3] See also Appellee Br. at 16 ("It is a helpful exercise to think about Price Waterhouse and imagine that there was a dress code imposed which obligated Ms. Hopkins to wear a skirt while her male colleagues were obliged to wear pants. Had she simply been fired for wearing pants rather than a skirt, the case would have ended there — both sexes would have been equally burdened by the requirement to comply with their respective sex-specific standard. But what the firm could not do was fire her for being aggressive or macho when it was tolerating or rewarding the behavior among men — and when it did, it relied on a stereotype to treat her disparately from the men in the firm.").

[4] Moreover, discrimination because of a person's transgender, intersex, or sexually indeterminate status is no less actionable than discrimination because of a person's identification with two religions, an unorthodox religion, or no religion at all. And "religious identity" can be just as fluid, variable, and difficult to define as "gender identity"; after all, both have "a deeply personal, internal genesis that lacks a fixed external referent." Sue Landsittel, Strange Bedfellows? Sex, Religion, and Transgender Identity Under Title VII, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1147, 1172 (2010) (advocating for "[t]he application of tests for religious identity to the problem of gender identity [because it] produces a more realistic, and therefore more appropriate, authentication framework than the current reliance on medical diagnoses and conformity with the gender binary").

[5] On the other hand, there is also evidence that Stephens was fired only because of her nonconforming appearance and behavior at work, and not because of her transgender identity. See R. 53-6 (Rost Dep., Such laws would furnish the readiest means of compulsion. The 13th *244 Amendment prohibits involuntary servitude except as punishment for crime. But the exception, allowing full latitude for the enforcement of penal laws, does not destroy the prohibition. It does not permit slavery or involuntary servitude to be established or maintained through the operation of the criminal law by making it a crime to refuse to submit to the one or to render the service which would constitute the other. The state may impose involuntary servitude as a punishment for crime, but it may not compel one man to labor for another in payment of a debt, by punishing him as a criminal if he does not perform the service or pay the debt.

If the statute in this case had authorized the employing company to seize the debtor, and hold him to the service until he paid the $15, or had furnished the equivalent in labor, its invalidity would not be questioned. It would be equally clear that the state could not authorize its constabulary to prevent the servant from escaping, and to force him to work out his debt. But the state could not avail itself of the sanction of the criminal law to supply the compulsion any more than it could use or authorize the use of physical force. ‘In contemplation of the law, the compulsion to such service by the fear of punishment under a criminal statute is more powerful than any guard which the employer could station.’ Ex parte Hollman, 79 S. C. 22, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 249, 60 S. E. p. 24, 14 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1109.

**153 What the state may not do directly it may not do indirectly. If it cannot punish the servant as a criminal for the mere failure or refusal to serve without paying his debt, it is not permitted to accomplish the same result by creating a statutory presumption which, upon proof of no other fact, exposes him to conviction and punishment. Without imputing any actual motive to oppress, we must consider the natural operation of the statute here in question (Henderson v. New York [Henderson v. Wickham] 92 U. S. p. 268, 23 L. ed. 547), and it is apparent that it furnishes a convenient instrument for the coercion *245 which the Constitution and the act of Congress forbid; an instrument of compulsion peculiarly effective as against the poor and the ignorant, its most likely victims. There is no more important concern than to safeguard the freedom of labor upon which alone can enduring prosperity be based. The provision designed to secure it would soon become a barren form if it were possible to establish a statutory presumption of this sort, and to hold over the heads of laborers the threat of punishment for crime, under the name of fraud, but merely upon evidence of failure to work out their debts. The act of Congress deprives of effect all legislative measures of any state through which, directly or indirectly, the prohibited thing, to wit, compulsory service to secure the payment of a debt, may be established or maintained; and we conclude that § 4730, as amended, of the Code of Alabama, in so far as it makes the refusal or failure to perform the act or service, without refunding the money or paying for the property prima facie evidence of the commission received of the crime which the section defines, is in conflict with the 13th Amendment, and the legislation authorized by that Amendment, and is therefore invalid.

In this view it is unnecessary to consider the contentions which have been made under the 14th Amendment…

Reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting [omitted]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.3

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.

 

88 S.Ct. 2186

Supreme Court of the United States

Joseph Lee JONES et ux., Petitioners,

v.

ALFRED H. MAYER CO. et al.

No. 645.

|

Argued April 1 and 2, 1968.

|

Decided June 17, 1968.

Synopsis

Action to recover damages and for injunctive relief because of refusal of defendants to sell home in private subdivision to plaintiffs solely because of race. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, 255 F.Supp. 115, dismissed complaint, and plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 379 F.2d 33, affirmed, and certiorari was granted. The United States Supreme Court, Mr., [citation omitted]

 

*1994 The program imposes no geographic limitation: Parents may direct tuition payments to schools inside or outside the State, or even in foreign countries. [citation omitted] In schools that qualify for the program because they are accredited, teachers need not be certified by the State,…and Maine’s curricular requirements do not apply…Single-sex schools are eligible. [citation omitted]

 

Prior to 1981, parents could also direct the tuition assistance payments to religious schools. Indeed, in the 1979–1980 school year, over 200 Maine students opted to attend such schools through the tuition assistance program. App. 72. In 1981, however, Maine imposed a new requirement that any school receiving tuition assistance payments must be “a nonsectarian school in accordance with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.” [citation omitted] That provision was enacted in response to an opinion by the Maine attorney general taking the position that public funding of private religious schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. We subsequently held, however, that a benefit program under which private citizens “direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private choice” does not offend the Establishment Clause. [citation omitted] Following our decision in Zelman, the Maine Legislature considered a proposed bill to repeal the “nonsectarian” requirement, but rejected it. App. 100, 108.

 

The “nonsectarian” requirement for participation in Maine’s tuition assistance program remains in effect today. The Department has stated that, in administering this requirement, it “considers a sectarian school to be one that is associated with a particular faith or belief system and which, in addition to teaching academic subjects, promotes the faith or belief system with which it is associated and/or presents the material taught through the lens of this faith.” [citation omitted] “The Department’s focus is on what the school teaches through its curriculum and related activities, and how the material is presented.” …“[A]ffiliation or association with a church or religious institution is one potential indicator of a sectarian school,” but “it is not dispositive.”

 

 

B

This case concerns two families that live in SAUs that neither maintain their own secondary schools nor contract with any nearby secondary school. App. 70, 71. Petitioners David and Amy Carson reside in Glenburn, Maine. Id., at 74. When this litigation commenced, the Carsons’ daughter attended high school at Bangor Christian Schools (BCS), which was founded in 1970 as a ministry of Bangor Baptist Church. Id., at 74, 80. The Carsons sent their daughter to BCS because of the school’s high academic standards and because the school’s Christian worldview aligns with their sincerely held religious beliefs. Id., at 74. Given that BCS is a “sectarian” school that cannot qualify for tuition assistance payments under Maine’s program, id., at 80, the Carsons paid the tuition for their daughter to attend BCS themselves, id., at 74.

 

Petitioners Troy and Angela Nelson live in Palermo, Maine. Id., at 78. When this litigation commenced, the Nelsons’ daughter attended high school at Erskine Academy, a secular private school, and their son attended middle school at Temple Academy, a “sectarian” school affiliated with *1995 Centerpoint Community Church. Id., at 78, 90, 91. The Nelsons sent their son to Temple Academy because they believed it offered him a high-quality education that aligned with their sincerely held religious beliefs. Id., at 78. While they wished to send their daughter to Temple Academy too, they could not afford to pay the cost of the Academy’s tuition for both of their children. Id., at 79.

 

BCS and Temple Academy are both accredited by the New England Association of Schools and Colleges (NEASC), and the Department considers each school a “private school approved for attendance purposes” under the State’s compulsory attendance requirement. Id., at 80, 90. Yet because neither school qualifies as “nonsectarian,” neither is eligible to receive tuition payments under Maine’s tuition assistance program. Id., at 80, 90. Absent the “nonsectarian” requirement, the Carsons and the Nelsons would have asked their respective SAUs to pay the tuition to send their children to BCS and Temple Academy, respectively. Id., at 79.

 

In 2018, petitioners brought suit against the commissioner of the Maine Department of Education. Id., at 11–12.
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value: 0.7956989247311828
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.8817204301075269
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.45161290322580644
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.36559139784946226
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.27956989247311825
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.16559139784946234
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.20878136200716843
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.471774193548387
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.5806451612903226
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.6854838709677419
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.5650385704476973
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.5673792456050522
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.47608804104449853
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no, task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 128
type: dim_128
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.44086021505376344
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.6451612903225806
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.7634408602150538
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.8387096774193549
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.44086021505376344
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.3548387096774194
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.27311827956989243
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.15591397849462363
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.1872759856630824
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.44534050179211476
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.5725806451612904
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.654121863799283
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.5356361930824536
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.5453490356716165
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.45106439048323554
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no, task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 64
type: dim_64
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.3978494623655914
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.6021505376344086
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.7096774193548387
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.8064516129032258
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.3978494623655914
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.34050179211469533
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.26021505376344084
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.153763440860215
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.1586021505376344
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.4059139784946236
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.5259856630824372
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.6164874551971326
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.5019311887697538
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.5081626557433011
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.4181782323905875
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no
Likes: 1 | All-time downloads: 57519
Created: 2025-02-17 00:05:31