Model: MaxNoichl/nomic-embed-philosophy-triplets_v7
Author: MaxNoichl
Pipeline: sentence-similarity
Library: sentence-transformers
Tags: sentence-transformers, safetensors, nomic_bert, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:10000, loss:TripletLoss, custom_code, arxiv:1908.10084, arxiv:1703.07737, base_model:nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1, base_model:finetune:nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1, model-index, text-embeddings-inference, endpoints_compatible, region:us
Base models (finetune): id: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
Card metadata: base_model: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics: cosine_accuracy, dot_accuracy, manhattan_accuracy, euclidean_accuracy, max_accuracy
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
tags: sentence-transformers, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:10000, loss:TripletLoss
widget: source_sentence: individual autonomous human beings who make up the corporation and who intentionally bring about corporate acts through their own bodily movements. Such human individuals, and not "the corporation," are morally responsible for corporate acts. Moreover, to say that an entity is "morally responsible" for a wrongful act is to say that the entity is liable to blame and punishment. But it is not possible to impose blame and punishment on a corporation without inflicting it on corporate members. Thus, to say that a corporation (as an entity distinct from its members) is "morally responsible" for a wrongful corporate act is to imply that a (possibly innocent) corporate member legitimately may be punished for something for which another entity was morally responsible. This violates the moral principles that underlie blame and punishment. To hold that the corporation can be morally responsible for its acts is to adopt a dangerous organicism. [Published in vol. 2, no. 3 (Spring 1983)] The proposition that corporations can and should be viewed as morally responsible agents in society has been challenged and defended frequently in the growing literature on business ethics. Challenges to this proposition usually follow one of two paths. Either it is argued that corporations can be viewed as unified entities (more than the sum of their parts) but are amoral, or it is argued that corporations are not to be viewed as unified entities in the morally relevant sense. It is tri?" latter path that Manuel Velasquez seems to be taking in
sentences: "Why Corporations Are Not Responsible for Anything They Do." Velasquez offers two broad lines of argument against the view that corporations can be morally responsible. The first line of argument is analytical; it turns on the conditions governing the phrase "moral respon sibility" in what he calls its "backward-looking" sense. The conclusion he comes to is that attributions of moral responsibility to corporations do not "make sense." The second line of argument is moral, not analytical; it concludes that we should not attribute moral responsibility to corporations, quite apart from the question of whether it makes sense to do so. Both lines of argument are flawed, in my view, and most of my comments will be devoted to explaining how and why. I hope, however, to be fair to the intuitions lying behind the arguments. The Analytical Line Of Argument The basic form of the analytical line of argument as Velasquez presents it is straightforward. I will touch on each of the premises in an effort to evaluate both validity and soundness. The argument may be rendered as follows: Premise (Ai): The concept of moral responsibility (properly under stood) has at its core the concept of origination, which is further tied to the idea of liability for blame and punishment. Premise (A2): The concept of origination requires both a mental or intentional component (mens rea) and a physical or bodily component (actus reus). Premise (A3): Corporations (as opposed to persons who are members ot corporations) are possessed of neither minds nor, agents is that they assume that the existence of corporate agency implies UCMR.7 But this is not obvious. One might hold, as I do, that corporations are moral agents because the reciprocal adjustment of individual intentions and plans that takes place in such organizations yields a corporate intentionality that is more like human intentionality than it is like the efficient causality that might be attributed to blindly operating social wholes such as markets. One might hold that corporations are moral agents because to say so "saves the phenomena" of many things we say about corporate actions entirely apart from the issue posed by UCMR. Manuel Velasquez denies that corporations are moral agents in any sense.8 For this reason, the question concerning redistribution of corporate moral responsibility does not arise explicitly for him. If corporations cannot be morally responsible then, of course, there is no corporate moral responsibility to be redistributed. At the opposite extreme, French holds that corporations are moral agents and persons in the same sense as human beings. If this is true, it is difficult to separate the problem of corporate moral agency from the question whether UCMR is true, inasmuch as it would be an embarrassment for French's univocality thesis that corporate moral responsibility could be completely reassigned to corporate associates when obviously human respon sibility is not reassignable to the parts of the human being at all. But French's practice supports the claim that UCMR is a distinct issue, for he does not introduce UCMR until chapter 10 of, available information' as the propositions accepted by the science of the agent's day, plus factual propositions justified by publicly accessible evidence (including testimony of others about themselves) and the principles of logic."8 Brandt notes that the 'information' need not be true. Finally, he adds that it is important to see that defining "rational" in this way does not import any substantive value judgments into the concept of rational action or rational desire. II In this section I shall present and consider objections to Brandt's account of rational action and rational desire. There are several problems with this view involving the notion of one's desires being what they would be were one exposed to available information or all the knowable facts that would strengthen or weaken one's desires. This condition would imply that certain actions which we ought not to think rational are rational and that certain actions which we ought to think rational are not rational. Let us imagine a man who has a headache and who wants to take some aspirin in order to be free from his headache. Suppose he goes to his attic, opens a bottle labeled "poison", and takes two of the pills which he believes, without any evidence, to be aspirin. Fortunately, his wicked uncle has replaced the poison tablets with aspirin and put the poison in the aspirin bottle. We may fmally suppose that the wicked uncle has had a change of heart and is at that moment confessing his evil deed to the police., source_sentence: one or the other or both of these ways. A single solution to both problems might seem to lie in Kant's transcendental idealism: the conception of the world that human beings come up with would be nothing less than the way the world in general must be. But that doctrine as Sacks understands it implies that there is none the less a way things are in themselves that remains necessarily unavailable to minds like ours. That residual 'ontological' concession is 'the price Kant pays for securing knowledge of empirical reality' (p. 317). Sacks, to his credit, is not willing to pay the price: it would still leave us without 'genuinely objective knowledge'. But behind the Kantian distinction between 'transcendental' and 'empirical' modes of investigation he finds an insight that promises a new and 'critical' conception of objectivity that would overcome or render ineffective both lines of dispiriting 'sceptical' reflection. More than two thirds of the book is devoted to exhibiting the inevitable pressures towards the two varieties of 'scepticism' implicit in 'the standard conception of objectivity'. A rather textbook-like outline of the empiricist theories of mind of Locke and (mostly) Hume is followed by a similar fifty-page digest of the Critique of Pure Reason. William James and Bergson are then sympathetically expounded for their opposition to the entrenched psychological atomism thought to be responsible for the failure of those earlier theories. But even they do not avoid the 'epistemic cost' of the basic 'Cartesian' assumption of a gulf between the subject with his thoughts
sentences: Hungarian population (N = 500). When defining the sample, we aimed at being able to segment the database by demographic variables (gender, age, qualification and region) during the analysis. Due to the random query, the database can be considered representative of the Hungarian population along these attributes. The aim of the telephone inquiry was to explore the expectations of the population in the field of corporate responsibility. While developing the questionnaire focusing on the population segment due to the lack of information in the field of CSR we concentrated on knowledge of and expectations on sponsorship. 3. Inner survey: during the year 2006 and 2007, the Kurt Lewin Foundation completed several studies among small and medium sized enterprises. The aim of the examinations was in all cases to scrutinize the commitment of employees towards the company's CSR activity laying emphasis on their motivations, attitudes and willingness for action. The survey method consisted of combining interviews with participant observation. 4. Action research elements: in the last two years, the Kurt Lewin Foundation worked together CSR Communication in Hungary 139 with numerous companies in working out their CSR strategy, implementing training courses aiming at social sensitivity, and researching (by means of questionnaire and interview) the attitudes of employees and the process of organizing and monitoring company charity acts. These projects provided information which could not be gained by other methods such as interviews or questionnaires. Csr Activities Of Hungarian Enterprises Although the focus of our research is not CSR, begins to sense the impossibility of shrugging off their empirical interpretation. But this is something which can be understood only in realist terms, as betrayed in our standard ways of speaking, and, so understood, it is false. Nevertheless, the characterization does, Dummett continues, "succeed in conveying something of the psychological effect of the two opinions". Should it turn out that, ultimately, only a characterization of this unsatisfactory kind is possible, then the point would be established. Anti-realist views would be among those whose fate is that they have to be stated in ways that are not right. In this essay, I hope to draw certain conclusions from Williams' contention that the predicament is also latent in the later work of Wittgenstein. I shall offer no substantial arguments for the contention, since I am principally interested in its consequences. It does however seem to me to be correct, subject to Williams's own qualification that the element of idealism in the later work of Wittgenstein which gives rise to the predicament is "concealed, qualified, overlaid with other things".'6 The predicament is certainly no more than latent. It arises with none of the dramatic urgency that accompanies it in Kant, for example. Given Wittgenstein's later conception of the correct way to do philosophy, this is hardly surprising. Philosophy, he tells us, consists of assembled reminders for particular purposes, not of theses.'7 So we should not expect to find him directly propounding some philosophical theory, still less one which, and the rest of the surrounding world. More or less equal expository space is given on the other side to the rejection of an 'egological' conception of the immersed thinking subject and to 380 Book Reviews sketches of a number of more recent 'naturalized Hegelian' conceptions. The views of Habermas, McDowell, Davidson, Wittgenstein, and Bernard Williams's idealist reading of Wittgenstein figure prominently in this story of the struggle with 'relativism'. One can come to wonder whether a selective historical survey of quite so much material on both sides of Sacks's fundamental issue is really needed for his philosophical purposes, especially since its stated aim is not primarily historical accuracy or interpretative thoroughness. The point is 'philosophical geography': to describe certain significant positions that he thinks would be worthy of attention even if they did not actually fit the thinkers that have been saddled with them in the past. The geography provided here goes well beyond what is needed for finding one's way without confusion from one place to another on Sacks's itinerary. The new and potentially liberating conception of objectivity pursued in the last third of the book is to be reached within a thoroughly 'naturalist' and 'post-metaphysical' setting, without appeal to 'any ontological system or order that transcends the empirical world towards which the natural sciences are directed' (p. 2). It will come from acknowledging and insisting on two different levels of possible reflection on ourselves and the world. The distinction is Kantian in spirit,, source_sentence: G3466 from the National Science Foundation, and under a grant from the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, U.S.A. 74 but in the absence of (jp0 ^ q0) -> p = q this is an incomplete principle of extensionality, which at first sight seems to offer us a world in which intensions and extensions can coexist peacefully. Intensions (for example predicates of individuals) are denoted by X-expressions in the following way. If ...xK is a propositional function in which xL and xl alone is free, then (Xxt)(... jtt ) is the property asserted by ... x^ to characterize xK' one cannot prove, despite (2), that two coextensive properties of this kind are identical. (Of course by (1) and (2) we can assert (*a)(...xa= . -xa . .)_>(Xxa)(...xa) = (Xxa)(. -*a . .); (3) but unless we could prove ( p0 < > Qo)-* P = <7 we could not establish (3) with the first identity replaced by a material equivalence, and so we are entitled to regard X-expressions of type (oa) as denoting predicates rather than sets.) Extensions, running parallel with intensions, are introduced by the following ingenious device. A primitive description-operator ta(oa) obeys the axiom (E! xa) (foa x) >/(ta(oa)/) (4) where E! denotes unique existence. To each predicate /oa we now assign the characteristic function Ext / = (X *a) i(X «)[(« = 1 &fx) v (n = 0 &^/x)] (5) where 1 and 0 can be any two objects of the same type. Now if we define
sentences: relativity. But now after their sublation by this concrete category, they are no longer just being and nothing, as they were when they were regarded as pure disparates. Each of them now is invested with express relativity, and so neither of them can rightly be given its former name of being or of nothing. The process of sublation, in brief, has not only put the two together, but has changed them. Now this change of factors is of supreme importance in the logical dialectic. If we overlook it we lose sight of the significant fact that the synthesis is always more than an aggregating of elements. Hegel is well aware of this factor of change and of the consequent need for a continual reinterpretation of the elements that enter each synthesis. Hence being and nothing are now new meanings; in his metaphorical and, unfortunately, misleading terminology, they are both becomings, exhibiting in their movement the distinction between a becoming from nothing to being, that is, an arising, and from being to nothing, that is, a ceasing. Expressed in more strictly logical terms, we ought perhaps to say that each, now, is not simply a moment of a category of relativity, but each is itself expressly a category of relativity, the distinction between them being the difference of reference necessarily present where two factors are related. When we reach Daseyn, which is the synthesis of being and nothing as they are transformed into arising and ceasing, the same process of reinterpretation, x e y as short for G/MA & y Ext/) or alternatively as short for (yx) = 1, we can use (2) to establish (*) (* s (Ext/) <_> x e (Ext g)) -> (Ext/) = (Ext g) (6) and (1) (4) and (5) to establish ... * > * e ( Ext (X y) (... y )) (7) so that expressions of the form Ext /oa can function in all ways as (extensional) class-names. (We have been increasingly sparing of typesubscripts of late; this practice will be continued as long as it favors legibility.) This concludes an account, sketchy but I hope adequate for our purposes, of the system of Church's early paper. Let us recall; it contains as theorems all formulae (1) (2) and (4), and in addition (like all the systems to be considered in this paper) the classical propositional calculus and the classical functional calculus in each type. It suggests the idea of a combined intensional-extensional system which admits both sets and predicates and distinguishes between them, thereby (we hope) escaping all the criticisms which have been made by the 75 extensionalists without involving us in the complexities of the sense-anddenotation solution. As it stands, the system (call it System I) is liable to a form of the numberof-the-planets paradox. For one can easily prove in it (actually without using either its intensional features or the modicum of extensionality provided by (2)) the harmless-looking formula fx = v -> ((fx = y) = (/* =fx)) (8) from, presumably, of all systems whatsoever. It is this sort of generality that the present approach aims to achieve. The system proposed in this paper will not be directly defined, but rather a formulation of it, namely the calculus K. It is assumed that the nature of the system will be sufficiently clear from the nature of K. Indications will be given for supposing that every one of the general class of calculi mentioned above is "represented" in K, and from this it would follow that every combinatory system (and hence presumably every system) is definable in the formuland of K. 2. Formation rules for K. Let Y be an infinite class of symbols, no one of which occurs as part of any other. The members of Y will not be actually specified, since such specification is irrelevant to the results of this paper. It is assumed, however, that Y does not contain parentheses or other symbols specified hereafter to serve special purposes. The following definition will constitute, in effect, the "formation rules" for the calculus K. We may think of U as the class of sentences which can be constructed (but not necessarily proved) in the calculus K,4 whereas K itself (that is, the class of provable sentences of K) will be a proper subclass of U. 3 These sentences are to be thought of as already "interpreted," that is, as already understood as regards their meanings. In syntactical investigations a calculus is usually treated in abstraction from the meanings, source_sentence: if his theory of deduction is to run smoothly.7 But the require ments of deduction are as good a constraint as any, if the theory of truth is to run smoothly in its turn, and so his remarks on regimentation can stand as one component in a theory of predication, in the service of the compo nent still to come, namely, a theory of truth. A need for regimentation of the kind described is typical of token sen tences as uttered or as written. But Aristotle leaves room for a further set of sentences in which, apparently, the needed regimentation has already been achieved. Preparation for this further kind of sentence is made in a well known passage in the first chapter of the de InP. Now spoken sounds are symbols (oiSjiPoAxx) of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sound. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what in the first place (cbv... rcpokcov) these are signs (ar|p,evoi) of affections of the soul are the same for all;8 and what these affec tions are likenesses (0|ioia>|iaTa) of—pragmata ("things") — are also right off ("n5r)) the pale, in this case it is because both are accidents of the same thing," Metaphysics A7, 1017al5-16, cf. T4, 1007b2-5, 13-17,An.Po. A22, 83al0-12. 7) Topics A13-14; see also An. Pr. A32, 46b38 ff, where the project "is somewhat com parable to translating natural-language arguments into a formal language," namely, the language of Aristotle's theory of deduction, Robin Smith, Aristotle Prior Analytics, India
sentences: paper as nothing that follows turns on this distinction. 4 In the context of this paper I shall only consider mathematical rigour as it was conceived of after Frege and will ignore different conceptions of rigour operating before that. Informal al Rigour algorithmic system) which may be legitimately applied to produce such derivations. This historical process started with Prege's [8] and led to the revision of the old concept of mathematical rigour into the current one. The current notion of rigour combines the older idea of the virtues of gapless proof (a proof in which each inferential step is made explicit) with the understanding of rigour in terms of formalisation.5 Incompleteness results in mathematical logic seriously undermined the formalist-reductionist project and showed that the project could not provide the desired secure foundations for mathematics, at least not in its original formulât ion (s). More specifically, the incompleteness theorems undermined the claim that mathematical provability was indeed reducible to provability within a formal system, and accordingly a fundamental part of the project of giving axiomatic foundations to mathematics. Even though the effects of the incompleteness results were crucial to reductionist enterprises of tracing back mathematical theorems to a restricted class of truths, they did not extend as far as to undermine a second important aspect of the formalistreductionist project namely that of providing epistemic foundations for the edifice of mathematical knowledge.6 In particular the goal of identifying a notion of rigorous proof by which we can guarantee the certainty, napolis/Cambridge 1989, p. 161. It bears mentioning, however, that the theory of infer ence Aristotle prepares for in the Analytics has no interest in the simple singular predications that are our topic here, cf. n. 14 below. Aristotle is taken to task for the limitations of the Analytics account in Peter Geach, "History of the Corruption of Logic," Leeds Inaugural Lecture, in his Logic Matters, Oxford, Blackwell, 1972; for a more charitable assessment, see most recently Max Kôlbel, "Aristotle's Logical Syntax," History and Philosophy of Logic (forthcoming). 8) Like the rest of the passage quoted, this clause is as contested a text as any in Aristotle. Commentators generally take the antecedent to 'these' ('what in the first place these are signs of) to be 'spoken sounds,' from the immediately preceding context. I prefer to think that the antecedent instead is, indifferently, 'written marks' and 'spoken sounds' from the previous sentence, so that Aristotle's point is that linguistic tokens as inscribed and tokens as uttered are both interpreted finally through tokens as thought the former at two removes, the latter at one. Aristotle means to favour spoken over written tokens, and this preference is preserved if we think that, unlike the vaguer sign-of relation, the symbol-of relation is not transitive. But far more elaborate readings of the passage, and the sign-of/ symbol-of distinction, are available, see the discussion in C. W. A. Whitaker, Aristotle's De Lnterpretatione. Contradiction and Dialectic, Oxford, call a "sentence," since even a "phrase" suffices as X6yo;. The complexity of articulation, therefore, is opposed to the simplicity of expression (p6at;). Hence "sentence" is too determinate as a translation of X6yo;. Another possible translation of koXyo;, of course, is "speech," although in On Interpretation this rendering is too vague. 6 By translating Tr as "ones," I do not intend to suggest anything as specific as "units"; rather, I am using "ones" merely as a place-filler for the previously mentioned linguistic entities, more along the lines of "those" or "what are." I prefer such a rendering to "things" or "entities," since these latter may obscure the continuity between [11 and [2] as well as introduce notions too determinate in this context. THE OPENING OF ON INTERPRETATION 233 tC Cv tTpv, that is found in [2], and he is comfortable moving from a universal claim about "what are in vocal-sound" to a particular claim about "affirmations in vocal-sound."7 Recognizing the continuity between [1] and [2], moreover, justifies the presence of 16a3-9 in On Interpretation, since it implies that this passage concerns the same linguistic entities discussed individually from Chapter 2 onward. In Chapter I as a whole, Aristotle is concerned with these linguistic entities as a group. In 16a3-9, on which this paper will focus, Aristotle attempts to explain how linguistic entities exist as both natural and conventional. In the remainder of the chapter (1 6a918), Aristotle divides the group. He sets names and verbs apart from the, source_sentence: the role. The basic idea is that it is the role of a semantic theory to assign to each assertoric sentence a mental state which it serves to express in virtue of the fact that being in that mental state is the assertability condition for that sentence. The full story begins with atomic sentences, assigning beliefs to the descriptive sentences and some sort of noncognitive state to the normative sentences. More complex sentences involving sentential connectives assign a more complex mental state to these more complex constructions, with the exact nature of the complex state depending on a function contributed by the connective and arguments contributed by the semantic values of the atomic sentences. It is only after these states have been determined as the semantic values of the sentences that certain types of sentences, the descriptive sentences, get associated with propositions—the propositions that are the objects of the beliefs which those sentences express. This means that expressivists are committed to a certain order of explanation being the correct one for natural language descriptive sentences. It isn’t that descriptive natural language sentences express beliefs because they express the propositions which are the contents of the beliefs that they are therefore apt to express. It is rather that they express these propositions because they are the contents of the mental states that are the appropriateness conditions for asserting those sentences (29–35). The Frege‐Geach Problem Peter Geach and John Searle famously highlighted noncognitivist shortcomings at providing a general
sentences: semantics for moral language.2 Noncognitivists had, at the time of this complaint, told us what free‐standing assertive utterances of simple declarative moral sentences meant by telling us about the noncognitive state that such utterances expressed, or the speech act they were used to perform.3 But without more it is not obvious how to extend their suggestions to embedded uses of these same expressions in more complex constructions. These complexes can be accepted by speakers who do not have the attitude which would be expressed were the embedded sentence to be used unembedded. Thus one simple extension of the noncognitivist story for simple declarations—that the embedded sentence expresses the very same attitude as its unembedded counterpart—seems to be ruled out from the start. Yet a criterion of adequacy for completing the noncognitivist story is that it explain the logical relations between different moral sentences. And the obvious way to accomplish that is for sentences to contribute the same contents to utterances whether they occur embedded or by themselves. This is why Geach thought it relevant to emphasize what he called “The Frege Point”: “A thought may have just the same content whether you assent to its truth or not; a proposition may occur in discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and yet be recognizably the same proposition.” Contemporary expressivists such as Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn have taken this challenge especially seriously. Their central idea is that we can make the most headway in understanding all the features of moral discourse by beginning with an account, Humean metaphor of projection). The realist fiction is understood as a philosophical miscon ception of a discourse that is not fundamentally representational but whose intent is rather practical. There is, however, another way to understand the realist fiction. Perhaps the subject matter of morality is a fiction that stands in no need of debunking but is rather the means by which our attitudes are conveyed. Perhaps moral sentences express moral propositions, just as the realist maintains, but in uttering a moral sentence competent speakers do not assert the moral proposition expressed but rather convey by means of it the noncognitive attitude centrally involved in moral acceptance. Moral fictionalism is this alternative to standard noncognitivism. Moral fiction alism is noncognitivism without nonfactualism. Not only does the distinction between noncognitivism, expressivism and nonfactualism raise the logical possibility of moral fictionalism, but it also makes clear the general form of argument required to establish its truth. To establish the truth of moral fictionalism, it suffices to: (1) argue for the psychological claim of noncognitivism. (2) argue against expressivist nonfactualism. Indeed, this was the argumentative strategy that I pursued in Moral Fictionalism. I am not going to talk about my case for noncognitivism, but I will talk about the problem that formed the basis of my case against expressivist nonfactualism. 2. The Frege-Geach Problem The Frege-Geach problem was first raised by Ross (1939: 33-34) and independently by Geach (1958, 1960, 1965) and Searle (1962, 1969) and was originally directed at expressivist proposals such as Ayer's emotivism: It is worth mentioning that ethical terms do, other hand, a view that identifies natural kinds with groups the distinguishing of which helps us to achieve our ends (e.g., Kitcher 2007) transparently fails the content-independence requirement, as its fundamental categorical principle explic itly refers to features of the categorizer. Alternatively, some views fail the content independence requirement only when the commitments that inform the intended interpretation of the fundamental categorical principle are themselves considered. For instance, accounts that tie the naturalness of a kind to the role of that kind (or its connected category) in explanation and induction (e.g., Boyd 1991) will be anti realist if explanatory and inductive norms are themselves understood as correct or incorrect only relative to us. They would also be anti-realist, via a somewhat different route, if the particular explanations and inductions that a kind (or its connected category) must serve were to be selected by us, rather than being privileged by the agenda of the mind-independent universe. After all, different categories are suitable to different explanatory and inductive targets, a circumstance that (as will be considered more below) can yield mind-dependent—and thus anti realist—natural kinds. Somewhat more subtly, a theory of natural kinds is status independent just in case its fundamental categorical principle is understood as correct or incorrect mind independently, rather than it having an ultimately subjective grounding. That subjective grounding might involve some feature of our innate conceptual architecture or the output of a circuitous process of cultural change. No matter what,
model-index: name: SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
results: task: type: triplet
name: Triplet
dataset: name: nomic
type: nomic
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy
value: 0.97
name: Cosine Accuracy
verified: no, type: dot_accuracy
value: 0.03
name: Dot Accuracy
verified: no, type: manhattan_accuracy
value: 0.968
name: Manhattan Accuracy
verified: no, type: euclidean_accuracy
value: 0.97
name: Euclidean Accuracy
verified: no, type: max_accuracy
value: 0.97
name: Max Accuracy
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy
value: 0.9785
name: Cosine Accuracy
verified: no, type: dot_accuracy
value: 0.0215
name: Dot Accuracy
verified: no, type: manhattan_accuracy
value: 0.979
name: Manhattan Accuracy
verified: no, type: euclidean_accuracy
value: 0.9785
name: Euclidean Accuracy
verified: no, type: max_accuracy
value: 0.979
name: Max Accuracy
verified: no
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Created: 2024-08-21 10:27:01