Model: MaxNoichl/nomic-embed-philosophy-triplets_v5
Author: MaxNoichl
Pipeline: sentence-similarity
Library: sentence-transformers
Tags: sentence-transformers, safetensors, nomic_bert, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:10000, loss:TripletLoss, custom_code, arxiv:1908.10084, arxiv:1703.07737, base_model:nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1, base_model:finetune:nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1, model-index, text-embeddings-inference, endpoints_compatible, region:us
Base models (finetune): id: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
Card metadata: base_model: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics: cosine_accuracy, dot_accuracy, manhattan_accuracy, euclidean_accuracy, max_accuracy
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
tags: sentence-transformers, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:10000, loss:TripletLoss
widget: source_sentence: a metaphysical view which, while doing full justice to these considerations, refuses to regard them as constituting a sufficient justification for a subjective attitude to the worlds of sensory experience or scientific knowledge. II The considerations in question may be summarized under three heads. (1) There is Eddington's insistence on the symbolic character of our knowledge of the physical world. A scientist talks of the aether or the electron, but, if you ask him what such expressions mean, he will point to a number of symbols and specify a set of mathematical equations which they satisfy. That which the symbols symbolize is an unknown x. Science, as Eddington in a famous essay has shown, is concerned not with things in themselves, but only with the measurable aspects of things, and measurability is a category of the human intellect. Physics has thus created for itself a closed circle, the entities with which it deals, potentials, intervals, scales or clocks, matter, and mass, momentum and stress being ultimatelv defined in terms of each other; what lies outside the circle is unknown to physics, and science is incapable of dealing with it. In other words the measurable aspect of things, to which the results of physics apply, is an abstraction from their total reality, and the IV.-MODERN SCIENCE AND RELIGION. 59 physicist's world is therefore an abstraction from the real world. All scientific method involves, it is said, abstractions of a similar kind. (2) Atomic theory suggests
sentences: that we never know a piece of matter directly. Matter consists of atoms; yet we only know an atom in terms of the effects of changes in the alleged atom upon the surrounding spatio-temporal environment. These changes are ultimately analyzable into changes in pieces of matter, that is to say in atoms, these changes again being known in terms of their effects upon other atoms, and so on indefinitely. At no point do we achieve a direct knowledge of matter. (3) A consideration of the machinery of perception only reinforces this conclusion. A ray of light starting from a so-called material object impinges on the retina, stimulates a nerve centre and starts a series of physical and chemical changes which ultimately reach the brain. Upon their impact on the brain there ensues a mystery, the result of which is the psychological experience of seeing the object. But what actually causes us to be psychologically aware are the events taking place in our bodies. The external object is merely an inference from the fact that the body is being stimulated in a certain way. Thus the material world is the result of a prolonged and possibly precarious set of inferences. III What status in the light of these and similar considerations are we to assign to the world which science studies, and what is its relation to the world* known in sense perception and revealed to religious insight. Two alternative metaphysical hypotheses seem to be possible. (A) We may regard scientific knowledge, * I shall use the, impor tant respects the thinkers of this dawn-period of modern science were prevented, by the very character of their work itself, from apprehending the true perspective of their problems and solutions; for like all other workers, they were too close to their field of inquiry and too deeply im mersed in its detailed subject matter. Hence as uniformity and law became more and more universally apparent in the physical world, it was perfectly natural to conclude that matter was the fundamental or 156 THE MONIST sole reality while consciousness was scarcely real at all. The alternative suggestion that physical laws were in this way more readily discoverable simply because the mate rial sphere was much less complex than the psychical was completely ignored; it required the still profounder re searches of recent biology and psychology to reveal the baffling intricacy of all vital and mental processes. This persistent overemphasis of the importance of the material world, further, radically distorted its relations to the psy chic sphere; and this is all the more curious in the light of the evolutionary foundations of last century's knowl edge. For the truth that life and mind rest upon an indis pensable physical basis was taken to mean that this basis was primary and the superstructures secondary ; thus over looking the possibility that, simply because it was a basis, matter itself formed the subordinate instrument whose essential purpose was the development of yet higher levels of immaterial being. II The culmination of this continued stress upon matter, North-Holland Publ. Co., Amsterdam, 1966, pp. 208-218. Philosophy of Science (Wissenschaftstheorie) in Finland 121 which seem to attach to the confirmation theories of Carnap and Hempel. Philosophically, von Wright's paper16 is especially interesting. It contains many interesting arguments and claims ? against a duality of inter pretations (subjective vs. objective) of probability, against numerical probabilities of unique (non-repeatable) events, including generalizations, for a distinction between retrospective and prospective justification of probability-assignments, etc. Other timely problems have been taken up by others. One of the standard criticisms of Carnap's inductive logic (at least in the form so far published) has been that it is incapable of handling induc tive generalizations: in infinite domains all (contingent) inductive generalizations receive a zero probability (a priori and a posteriori), and in finite domains one's evidence has to be of the same order of magnitude as the domain in order to assign non-negligible posterior probabilities to such generalizations. Jaakko Hintikka has sought to deepen this criticism by arguing that Carnap's appeal to the notion of instance-confirmation is unsatisfactory19. In a series of articles19-21 he has also suggested ways of overcoming this difficulty. Carnap12 presented a "continuum of inductive methods'' which depends on an index of caution X. Hintikka21 shows that A can be viewed as an index of caution for singular inductive inference only, and that one can introduce a similar index of caution a for inductive generalization. The result is a two-dimensional continuum of inductive methods, source_sentence: influences and events that allow each person to become for himself the person who he is. Conversely, the 'course of world history' only emerges in the form of a concrete course of lives, such that in this constitutive reciprocity between existence and world history, not only can neither be conceived without the other, but it is only in this reciprocal relation that each receives its respec tive profile. In this sense our biography represents history, and we can establish the notion, along with Picht, that "our ideas about history /determine/ our relation to ourselves."4 This brings with it the consequence that when we understand history falsely or inadequately, we necessarily also misunderstand ourselves. Thus, the question of historical understand ing holds a radical significance for the concepts of self-understanding formative of one's existential-apriori self-relation. On these suppositions, GADAMER'S CONCEPTION OF EFFECTIVE HISTORY 123 history does not add up to an objective determination of the sum of historically datable events; yet we have been seduced repeatedly to objectify history in its givenness in analogy with nature, while at the same time trying to think it as a process. History, in contrast to this view, is factical only in the act of its coming to presence. This means, then, that history in the strict sense exists only to the extent that— and only as long as—there is a correlative consciousness of it. In a peculiar sense, we can only speak of history in a kind of ontological transposition, when a factical occurrence transmits itself in memory
sentences: Parts of works of art are susceptible of functional ascriptions, not because they are designed, but because there are humans who see them as having special effects in rather unique wholes. The contrast between the view that artistic func? tions are design functions and the view that they are natural functions may be further underscored. In the case of design functions, the human actually creates the functional part. Consequently, in the case of design functions, one can explain the exis? tence of a part in a whole by citing its function;10 doing so is but a shorthand way of saying that the intention that the part have this effect is the cause of its existence. In the case of natural functions, on the other hand, the human observer merely dis? covers the functional item. Citing the effect of a part here does not constitute an explanation of the existence of the part. One merely makes explicit a specific effect of the part. The foregoing suggests that the debate over the relevance of the artist's intentions be viewed as a debate over the proper analysis of the concept of artistic function. We can accordingly distinguish three possible positions with respect to the debate so construed. Let us say that intentionalism is the view that artistic functions are to be identified with design functions; the true function of the part of the work of art is the artist's intended effect of the part. Opposed to intentionalism is anti-inten tionalism. Anti-intentionalism is the, the past is deftly disclosed as containing embryonically the present. These admissions however do not justify the use of the history of philosophy for establishing a doctrine or a tradition. We must PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 31 recognize that these handicaps are matters of degree and are subject to some control. If we should take them over-seriously we must conclude that historical research is a sort of sport, a poetical adventure, and history an art, not a science. And for that matter, the question whether history is an art or a science is still a matter of debate. "History, . . , which passes for the account of facts, is in reality a collection of apperceptions of an indeterminate material; for even the material of history is not fact, but consists of memories and words subject to ever-varying interpretation. No historian can be without bias, because the bias defines the history.... Then, after the facts are thus chosen, marshaled, and emphasized, comes the indication of causes and relations; and in this part of his work the historian plunges avowedly into speculation, and becomes a philosophical poet . . . And the value of history is similar to that of poetry, and varies with the beauty, power, and adequacy of the form in which the indeterminate material of human life is presented. ' It would hardly be profitable to discuss the question whether the history of philosophy is an art or a science. Perhaps the simplest attitude to take is that the impediments, as speech in its ongoing historical reformulations. Since history ties itself, in this sense, to its realization, there is there fore no history without historical consciousness. In the project of the matizing history according to these hermeneutical conditions, successful reflection on history will have to avoid any form of hypostatization that oversubscribes to history's course as a development, for example, the way that Augustine eschatologically raises his historical theology to a sacred history. At the same time, those hypostases must also be avoided that, in the wake of the Enlightenment, anchor human history down in an optimism of progress, as the concept of the philosophy of history formed by Voltaire tied itself to the course of the rational sub ject's modern enthronement. Such optimism can be seen in the mon umental designs of Hegel and Marx, entering as they did with the claim to a unified, systematically interpretable meaning of history. Now the acknowledged collapse of idealistic systems of thought in the middle of the previous century has driven philosophy of history into a crisis. This crisis has initiated a kind of thinking that, as a result, com bines philosophical thematization of the historical with a decisive skep ticism toward monistic conceptions of history that would, in virtue of their systematicity, claim for themselves possession of an inner mea sure of historical lawfulness. Names such as Droysen, Burckhardt, Dilthey, or even Nietzsche stand for this critique of idealist specula tive history and the excessive rationalist demand, source_sentence: the other side, we can combine the functions of advocate and judge.") In Section IV, in support of the third answer, this simple commitment to rational argument, but not to 192 ETHICS any single one of its expressions, which politicians might learn from dialecticians, is faced with the difficulty that it has not been achieved by philosophers and it might be impractical in the larger political community. A dilemma lurks in the final statement of the practical problem: "That those who can build and use an argument are as rare as those who might do so are plentiful is the world's practical challenge to philosophy and its teachers." Has Professor Wick resolved the dilemma he detected in philosophy, communication, and community and in their intercourse with each other? I think not. The resolution of the theoretical dilemma which he suggests is attractive. We shall learn to philosophize only from the example of philosophers, and no philosopher has inspired imitation more than Socrates. But the acceptability of this resolution of the theoretical dilemma is tested by the other two dilemmas. Would the sectarian oppositions of schools of philosophy, adhering dogmatically to doctrines or playing relativistically with them, be reduced if we all learned in this late crisis of philosophy to practice the dialectic of Plato? Even the ancient history of the influence of Socrates suggests a negative answer. There were many "Socratic" schools besides the Platonic version; the history of the Platonic Academy led through skepticisms, probabilisms, and relativisms, on the one hand, to assorted dogmatisms, on the
sentences: forms. In place of that, the author points to other biotic laws and to jumps in the appearance of new life forms, especially to those with new (additional) modal qualifications. For example, there can be no gradualist account, he says, of the jump from plants to animals or from animals to humans because they are qualified by additional modal functions each of which are ordered by a distinct kind of laws. These he terms 'idionomies." Thus he objects that the present preoccupation of evolutionary theory with finding transitional life forms assumes gradualism: "Not the BOOK REVIEWS 83 increasing complexity but the new articulations of life challenges thought" (p. 79). Lastly in this first set, is the GTEE thesis itself. As a neglected option it certainly deserves to be put on the table for discussion. We need to ask whether it is more plausible that fundamentally different kinds of life forms of a different idionomy suddenly emerged from or supervened upon previously existing forms, rather than thinking of them as having arisen step by step. The author clearly stakes this claim, and just as clearly proposes a version of it which is controlled by his belief in God in that it avoids not only physicalism but all reductionism. I ne second set ot comments begins witn tne wisn that the ditrerence between aspectual or "modal" levels among living things had emphasized more clearly that the central issue at stake is one of quales. There is a cluster of concepts and claims involved, other, within the time that separated Plato from the revival of the Old Academy or the inception of Neoplatonism; Academics and Stoics were opposed on the question of who practiced the genuine Platonic method, and even modern scholars sometimes accept the reconciliation proposed by the skeptical new Academy, that Platonists, Aristotelians, and Stoics, in spite of their differences on almost every point of philosophic doctrine and discipline, really practiced the same method.6 In more recent times, both John Stuart Mill and S0ren Kierkegaard took inspiration from the Socratic method. Socrates could doubtless have reconciled Stoics and Epicureans, utilitarians and phenomenologists, but although the enterprise is conceivable, simple commitment to rational argument does not afford sufficient guidance to enable philosophers and politicians to accomplish like feats daily, and the success of the enterprise would doubtless be the beginning of new dogmatisms and relativisms. If, finally, dialectic is used to resolve the practical dilemma, it is involved in the additional dilemma of explaining those philosophers and publicists who derive the "closed state," fascist or communist, by direct lineage from the Republic constructed by Socrates in Plato's pages and the paucity of historians who find support for democracy in any form of dialectic. I agree with Professor Wick's objection, even before he makes it, that these are misuses of Socrates' method and misinterpretations of his influence; but if philosophers have not practiced the dialectical method, as Professor Wick would have them, what hope is there that, inquiry and dialectic to simple assent and dissent, and argumentation to repetition. By general consent Socrates was the champion user of this method. Plato presents him to us as victor in every debate; Aristophanes as the master of the new learning which undermines the authority of the old order to the point where a son may beat his father shouting: "Am I not as freeborn as you!" That father, chants the chorus in The Clouds. Too late he'll curse the Sophist school That taught his son to cheat by rule And turned the modest life of youth In the vile art of torturing truth; A modern logic much in use Invented for the law's abuse, A subtle knack of spying flaws To cast in doubt the clearest cause Whereby, in honesty's despite The wrong side triumphs o'er the right. In their libel on the Sophists, Aristophanes and Plato were attacking the force which the vested interests of their caste and station most feared. The arts of oratoryand argumentation had become the most potent weapons in the arsenal of Athenian democracy. But weapons are neutral, and it was the achievement of Socrates and Plato to apply them to the vindication of birth, privilege, and station. They added dialectic to the older Aristophanic curriculum of "virtue," i.e., the vocation of the "free man" or citizen, employing it as an instrument of indoctrination and regimentation instead of inquiry, deliberation, and judgment. For the "free man" of antiquity was a member of the master class, a fighter and a, source_sentence: sensation-language seems to be incomplete without an examination of the pre-linguistic systems on which any language must be based, and something similar seems to be true of his deflationary account of following a linguistic rule. This suggests that, perhaps, his naturalism should not have been re stricted to the therapeutic treatment of the myths that we generate when we reflect on our own language and thought. Ought it not to have ranged more freely across the border between philosophy, conceived in that way, and science? I do not know. I do not even feel sure exactly what issues are raised by this question, or how to set about answering it. So in this paper I merely offer some notes on this obscure but important topic in the hope that something clearer may emerge later. II The similarity between Wittgenstein's account of the regular appli cation of a word and Hume's account of causal inference has attracted a WITTGENSTEIN'S NATURALISM 413 lot of attention in the last 30 years.2 Both belong to the anti-intellectualist tradition in Western philosophy, and both owe much, directly or indirect ly to the work of Sextus Empiricus. It is, of course, the intellectualist tradition, originating in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, that has dominated the scene and made us feel that scepticism (always taken in its negative sense) ought to be rationally answerable. But there may really be no purely intellectual defense of our modes of thought and Wittgenstein may have
sentences: desire-modifying thoughts (and attitudes and feelings) that constitutes the exercise of synchronic self-control. Kennett and Smith offer an ingenious approach to solving the puzzle of synchronic self-control. Their account no doubt captures at least some of the ways in which we manage to stay in control at the time of temptation, as surely habits and other non-actional mental routines play an important role in maintaining continence. However, there is a further question of whether the non-actional strategies proposed by Kennett and Smith represent all the ways that we can possibly exert synchronic self-control. Kennett and Smith argue that this is indeed the case. Our claim, then, generalizing on the basis of this [Frog and Toad] case, is that all exercises of synchronic self-control are non-actional. They are non-actional because there is no suitable strongest desire to set up an exercise of actional synchronic selfcontrol (Kennett and Smith 1997, pg. 128). If Kennett and Smith are right, then this sets strong constraints on what willpower can be. Willpower must turn out to be some species of non-actional disposition, in the same family as the passive desire-modifying thoughts that help Frog and Toad maintain control. Is a non-actional account of willpower crafted along these lines plausible? An obvious initial objection to a non-actional account of willpower is that it deviates quite fundamentally from common sense. While there surely are certain forms of synchronic self-control that are non-actional, the forms of synchronic selfcontrol, been right when he said, The origin and the primitive form of the language-game is a reaction: only from this can more complicated forms develop. Language, I want to say, is a refinement and in the beginning was the deed.3 Most recent accounts of Wittgenstein's investigation of following a linguistic rule have been written from the intellectualist standpoint. They start from the assumption that there really ought to be a definite rule dictating the use of every word, and that there really ought to be a simple method of achieving undisputed access to the rule. This implies that rules have, or ought to have a character almost as Platonic as the realism which is the other target of Wittgenstein's attack. However, his treatment of rules is not so reverential. His concern is really with the regular use of a word, and if we suppose that regularity can be achieved only by following a rule, then the rule will often amount to very little. In any case, rules never have the complete independence of linguistic practice that they would need in order to achieve the complete explanatory power that conventionalism sees in them. This deflation of the concept of a linguistic rule starts from a point in his early philosophy of language. The picture theory was based on the idea that rules correlate names with objects, and so, when the names are put into a sentence, the sentence becomes the projection of a definite state of affairs involving the objects.4 But even at this early, of a rule is a matter of deciding to apply the rule in a certain way. These changes are followed by a transitional period during the first 206 DAVID STERN half of the 1930s in which Wittgenstein explored their implications. The transitional period comes to end in the mid 1930s, with the first expo sition of what has since become known as "the private language argu ment", and the construction of the first part of what von Wright has called the "Early Investigations", which roughly corresponds to the first 188 sections of the published Philosophical Investigations. During this period, he moves away from a conception of language as constitut ing a formal system of rules, embracing the view that mastery of rules is dependent on a background of shared practices. As he stresses in the Investigations, his use of "the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life".7 Though these forms of life, the taken for-granted ways of acting which make language possible, are social and practical, not individual and incorrigible, they occupy an analogous role in Wittgenstein's later philosophy to the role he gave to the experi entially given in 1929 or objects in the Tractatus, for they are the point at which the later Wittgenstein acknowledges the limits of language. Thus the Philosophical Investigations also states that "what has to be accepted, the given, is so one could say -forms of life" .* Consequently, he, source_sentence: 1993]. So being a "visual display" or being dependent on visual processing cannot be what distinguishes pictures from other modes of representation. Second, the distinction between the visual and the cognitive is not only unclear and empirically suspect [Schwartz 1994, 1996], it does not seem up to the job. Standard proposals for drawing a visual/cognitive boundary fail to support the surrogate theorist's core intuition. For example, it is often said picture perception is non-cognitive, since it does not involve active deliberation or contemplation. But the same holds for everyday cases of language comprehension. Without delay, pondering, or conscious inference we read and understand immediately most sentences we encounter. Identifying the cognitive with the learned, and the visual with the innate, will not work either. Many animal signal systems are instinctive, but they are not pictorial. And were humans equipped at birth with Latin, or as some claim "Mentalese," it would not mean these representational systems were pictorial.' Still, I think, proponents of the symbolic model can do more to accommodate the intuition of there being something more "visual" about pictures than natural languages, music notation, and various other forms of representation. And it is to this task I wish to turn my attention. The account I shall sketch makes use of ideas Goodman employs in his taxonomy of symbolic systems. Goodman argues that pictures, in contrast, say, to sentences in language or scores in music notation, belong to dense schemes of representa2 Variations of this criticism are
sentences: leveled against the model not only by vision theorists, but by art historians and philosophers who balk at what they take to be the symbolic paradigm's conventionalist implications. 3 Much is often made of evidence suggesting that infants [Hochberg and Brooks, 1962] and people from non-Western cultures [Derogowski, 1989] can understand pictures without training. My point here is not to challenge these empirical findings but to call attention to the need to separate issues of learning and innateness from claims about the form and conventionality of symbols. 708 ROBERT SCHWARTZ tion. Pictorial symbols are analog, while English sentences constitute a digital system. Goodman further claims pictorial schemes are comparatively replete. Many more of the symbols' own properties function in determining its representational content. A given line may be understood as a graph, plotting the height of a mountain range, or as a picture of the same mountain (fig. 1). Fig. 1 Read as a graph, the thickness of the line, its color, and background have no significance. Interpreted as a picture, all these properties go to constitute the displays representational force. Notice, something phenomenal, akin to a Gestalt switch or aspect change, occurs when shifting between the two readings. And experience of the line takes on another much different character when read in the context of figure 2. Fig. 2 Simply making a graph more replete, however, will not turn it into a picture. Nor will assigning representational significance to the background do the trick. For if these additional features of the graph, Goodman's account of depiction may be described as minimalist at best. Pictures denote or refer. Among his undisputed contributions is his discussion of what he calls the routes of reference-denotation, predication, exemplification, and expression. Pictures represent in all these ways. But Goodman is not interested in the roots of reference-how referential relationships are established.5 His remarks about what determines what a picture represents are entirely negative: resemblance is neither necessary nor sufficient for depiction.6 Beyond rejecting the resemblance theory, Goodman refuses to give "general instructions for determining what a work describes or represents."7 Every system of pictures includes a plan of correlation mapping 228 pictures onto what they represent, but Goodman is silent about what determines or constrains these plans of correlation. Others have been tempted to fill the lacuna, drawing on resources internal or external to Goodman's account of pictures.8 In particular, it is widely held that Goodman favors a convention theory of depiction. Some go so far as to ascribe to him the view that pictures are verbal symbols!9 But Goodman denies that he holds either view, insisting that "there is no vocabulary of picturing as there is of saying," and depiction does not depend on "rule-following."'0 Indeed, the convention view is incompatible with the claim that pictures belong to analog schemes, as conventions are rules operating upon disjoint and differentiated characters. "I That Goodman refuses to give an account of depiction does not mean that he thinks none can be, reasons of different kinds, and interpreting vague concepts. Taking these two ideas together, we are to conclude that a reasonable person, seeking to justify the exercise of political power to his fellow citizens, won't appeal to reasons that are only valid from within his own comprehensive doctrine ("comprehensive reasons"), but will instead recognize a duty to rely on "public reasons" about which there is an overlapping consensus among reasonable citizens who hold different comprehensive doctrines.9 Clayton's contention is that parental authority is sufficiently analogous to political power to imply that parents, too, ought to be subject to the public reason restriction in justifying their conduct in their role as parents. (Though, like a lot of our responsibilities as parents and citizens, this is not to be understood as a legally enforceable duty, since that would require intolerable levels of surveillance and interference.) Clayton's case rests on three points of comparison with the Rawlsian case for public reason in the political domain. First, like political power, parental authority is coercive: parents have authority to impose a range of sanctions to discipline their children which they could not impose on others. Second, for children, the family is a non-voluntary association. Although children are eventually freed from parental authority, their almost two-decades of subjection to parental authority is not by consent. Finally, like other institutions of the basic structure, the family has a profound and lasting effect on our life prospects by shaping our aspirations and transmitting unequal advantages. Since parental authority shares
model-index: name: SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
results: task: type: triplet
name: Triplet
dataset: name: nomic
type: nomic
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy
value: 0.96
name: Cosine Accuracy
verified: no, type: dot_accuracy
value: 0.04
name: Dot Accuracy
verified: no, type: manhattan_accuracy
value: 0.956
name: Manhattan Accuracy
verified: no, type: euclidean_accuracy
value: 0.96
name: Euclidean Accuracy
verified: no, type: max_accuracy
value: 0.96
name: Max Accuracy
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy
value: 0.963
name: Cosine Accuracy
verified: no, type: dot_accuracy
value: 0.037
name: Dot Accuracy
verified: no, type: manhattan_accuracy
value: 0.9625
name: Manhattan Accuracy
verified: no, type: euclidean_accuracy
value: 0.963
name: Euclidean Accuracy
verified: no, type: max_accuracy
value: 0.963
name: Max Accuracy
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy
value: 0.963
name: Cosine Accuracy
verified: no, type: dot_accuracy
value: 0.037
name: Dot Accuracy
verified: no, type: manhattan_accuracy
value: 0.9625
name: Manhattan Accuracy
verified: no, type: euclidean_accuracy
value: 0.963
name: Euclidean Accuracy
verified: no, type: max_accuracy
value: 0.963
name: Max Accuracy
verified: no
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