Model: MaxNoichl/bge-m3-philosophy-triplets_v1
Author: MaxNoichl
Pipeline: sentence-similarity
Library: sentence-transformers
Tags: sentence-transformers, safetensors, xlm-roberta, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:5000, loss:TripletLoss, arxiv:1908.10084, arxiv:1703.07737, base_model:BAAI/bge-m3, base_model:finetune:BAAI/bge-m3, model-index, text-embeddings-inference, endpoints_compatible, region:us
Base models (finetune): id: BAAI/bge-m3
Card metadata: base_model: BAAI/bge-m3
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics: cosine_accuracy, dot_accuracy, manhattan_accuracy, euclidean_accuracy, max_accuracy
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
tags: sentence-transformers, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:5000, loss:TripletLoss
widget: source_sentence: philosophical. It is a schematic, bare-bones biography devoting only minimal attention to the significance of Marx's thought. It makes no attempt at textual exegesis beyond citations of a few " classic" passages, let alone at critical evaluation or interpretation of Marx's ideas. Yet its extremely readable style, richness of detail and highly useful manner of viewing Marx's life against the political history of his era, makes this book a service to the general public if not to the philosopher or Marxologist. (It should hardly need saying that Rubel is himself one of the world's eminent practicioners of the latter art.) Each chapter is devoted to six or seven years of Marx's life. Preceding each, the authors have included very valuable chronological tables listing major political events in Europe, the Americas and Asia, scientific and technological advances, and important works published (including notation as to whether Marx is known to have read them). The short biographies of various persons important to the life story of Marx and bibliographies of Marx's works and of works on Marx are also helpful. Rubel and Manale's understanding of Marx's intellectual development, as a unity originating in the mid1840s carried through consistently for the remainder of his life, is well documented, with due emphasis given the manuscripts of 1857-58 (the "Grundrisse") documenting the link between the Paris manuscripts of 1844 and Capital so often disputed by Marxist-Leninist apologists. Because of its greater interest to philosophers, I shall devote the rest of this review to Axelos'
sentences: equations" relative to ECF+, provable in H. Similarly, we obtain from MUC and the recursive density theorem for ECF the corresponding results for ECF+; the proof of QF-AC from the recursive density theorem also holds good for ECF+ [T1, 2.6.20]. So far, we have shown these basic facts about ECF+ to be provable in H, i.e. in EL + AC-NF; but we have to show that they can be established in EL + QF-AC. To complete the proof, we note that (10) EL + AC-NF is conservative over EL + QF-AC for formulae of Fo [T1, 3.6.18(i)] where Fo is defined as in [T1, 3.6.3]. (20) Almost negative predicates are transformed by the elimination translation r into almost negative predicates (by an induction on logical complexity), and therefore W+, I' are almost negative predicates; using this fact one then verifies that all basic properties of ECF+ needed can be expressed by means of formulae of F0. 2.2. REMARK. The method for constructing ECF+ as described here can also be used to construct a model ECFK of HA' + AC-NF in which the tape-2 objects are exactly the elements of K, and such that all the relevant closure conditions can be established in IDB,. ?3. The models for E-HA' + MUC. 3.1. Preliminaries. In discussing the term models for E-HA' + MUC, we find it actually more convenient to take as our starting point E-HA' + MUC*, where MUC* is the strengthening of MUC which states in addition to MUC, s work. As Bruzina points out in his Introduction (xxvi), Axelos' s work on Marx is part of a trilogy entitled Le deploiement de I'errance, which attempts to investigate the three alleged critical stages of Western thought: its beginnings, in Heraclite et la philosophie: La premiire saisie de Vetre en devenir de la totality; its culmination, in the present book, the original title of which is Marx, penseur de la technique: De I'alienation de Vhomme a la conquete du monde; and the transcending passage to a new way of thought, Vers la pensee planetaire: Le devenir-pensee du monde et le devenir-monde de la pensee. We are thus thrown into a study situating Marx as the culmination of Western, and particularly modern Western, thought. The interpretation of the tradition, and of Marx's place in it, is essentially Heideggerian; after Heraclitus's and Parmenides's attempts to think Being as logos and physis, Western thought began its fall into the confusion of Being with particular types of entities (Plato: idea; Aristotle: entelechyenergeia; Christianity: Being as God or ens increatum, ens perfectissimum; Descartes: man's mind as subject, all other entities as objects; and post-Cartesian thought, culminating in Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche: human subjectivity as will which subdues and desolates the earth). Thus it can be seen at a glance that Axelos' s Marx is going to be neither the Marx of Marxism-Leninism (Heaven forbid!) nor of contemporary Marxology, i.e., the Marx of the Int J Phil Rel 12:59-64 (1981) 0020-7047/81/0121-0059 $00.90. ©1981 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The, is accordingly neither confined to, nor ought it to be judged merely by its relative success on, the historical plane. There is, further, a particular methodological angle which deserves our attention. In this post-Freudian age, psychobiography has come to the fore. Seigel is profoundly interested in Eric Erickson's psychohistorical approach, in terms of which he believes it possible to construct a dialectical analysis. It is well known that Marx's thought was deeply influenced by Hegel's. In this regard, following his psychohistorical inclination, Seigel makes the unusual suggestion that the little known Hegelian concept of inversion can function as a central thread with which to elucidate three specific incidents, so far unexplained in Marx's biography: Marx's passage to Hegelianism; as a guiding thread in his interpretation of Greek philosophy in his dissertation; and as a central element in Capital, whose unfinished status remained the great tragedy of Marx's life. On the abstract level, this strategy has considerable intrinsic interest. Transcending any mere assemblage of the documented or documentable facts about Marx's life, the interest here is clearly to tie together little understood events early and late in terms of a single explanatory principle which is intended to shed light on supposedly dark corners of Marx's life and thought. Rather than appealing to such frequently employed techniques as the patient collection of data, or the careful reassessment of the known events of Marx's life, or even the critical reinterpretation of his writings, a, source_sentence: really know what I have to face? Has she felt anything like this set of forces on her road to holiness? More to our point here, what does this saint, Vincent de Paul, know of business of the push and pull and particular grind of this world? Granting the depth and richness of his spiritual experience, was it shaped, at least analogously, by the kinds of pressures which the business person has to withstand? Does his path to holiness go through anything like the terrain of the modern business climate? If not, this saint's story, too, lifts off from this world and flies into its own orbit, perhaps admired but from too remote a distance to have influence. In short, what are the possi bilities of getting the two worlds together? The second issue concerns the manner in which lives of exemplars have been brought to bear upon moral thinking. One method might be termed prescriptive. It asks what directives for living can be drawn from the actions and atti tudes this person showed? There are principles and behavior patterns embedded in this saint's life which can serve as guides for present action. Francis of Assisi, for instance, out of a profound desire live out his sense of total dependence on God, made his way by begging. Therefore, there should be some embracing of radical unpre dictability and a large dose of reliance on others in our affairs also. The example is awkward perhaps, but it points up the method of drawing relatively clear moral lessons from
sentences: the holy one's life. While this approach affords a kind of clarity, it stands on shaky ground because of the often times wide gap between the saint's era and the present. The historically consciousness reader is wary of clear and simple crossovers. Too many changed circumstances and new assumptions lie in the valley between the distant past and now. If the moral directives have not been carefully passed through the screen of shifting horizons, they appear stretched and even fanciful. Applica tions to current situations are suspected of being as much a projection of the interpreter's agenda as it is a transmission of the saint's morality. An alternate way of bringing saints to bear on moral thinking is through the imagination. Most readers are familiar with recent attention to the role affect plays in following the good. Logic may package norms clearly and distinctly, but of itself does not bring about adherence. The deeper emotions must come into play as the engines which drive toward the good. Ethical reckoning happens primordially in the imagination where the attraction or repulsion of a given value registers. On a foundation level, moral education aims for the affect. It works to shape the image field in which the good is pictured. The rightly-told story of a saint appeals directly to the imagination. The narrative of his or her life presents a drama which invites in the listener much more as participant than spectator. Such a biography lays, principle whence all else follows. It knows that that principle is the divine essence and that, in this life, we cannot properly know it. On the other hand, it does not renounce all thought of synthesis to settle down to teaching catechism ; for it knows that there is such a thing as imperfect understanding. Systematically, it proceeds to that limited goal.1 (4) Matters of faith are not fit objects for science. Some clarification is in order here. For Aquinas, Christian beliefs fall into two categories : those that can be known by science and those that cannot. The ones that can be known by science are yet often known by faith. Further, this is a good thing : some people are too stupid to know by science what they believe by faith. And even people able to know by science what they believe by faith, may take longer to arrive at the belief by science. Moreover, beliefs acquired by faith may be more stable, more 'free of doubt and uncertainty, ' than the more abstruse deliverances of science (ST 11,11,2.4). The belief that there is an unmoved mover falls within the province of science though that belief is often held through faith. The belief that there is a Trinity is strictly outside the province of science. (5) Our assent to Christian doctrines has no natural explanation. The natural light of reason, even if it enjoins us to assent that there is a God, does not afford us any further information, crushing to our smaller vanities, that there is no break in the seamless robe wherewith the universe is dressed. The facile distinction between moral education on the one hand and religious education on the other is drawn readily enough, and has its conveniences; but to conceive that at such and such a point the one ends and at such and such a point the other begins is to disrupt the universe. Moral education without vista is no education at all; it is truncated pedantry. Moral education only then begins to exercise its more potent ministry when it confronts and astounds and overwhelms us with categorical imperatives whose origins are wrapped in mystery but whose obligatoriness upon us for this very reason is immediate and certain and bows us in submission and awe. Some Essentials of Moral Education. 477 The moral education then of which we speak, and the "character" in which it culminates, must be conceived as embracing in their content an element, which, for want of more adequate words to express it, we call wonder, reverence, awe; an attitude of the soul which proves to be the Bridge of the Gods to the highest Realities. One more element we presuppose as inherent in the "character" in which moral education finds its culmination, namely, that passion for human service which spends itself and is spent for others without miserly calculation or circumstantial prudence; which with a pure disinterestedness repays the debt it owes to humanity and is ready at any, source_sentence: between stuffs and things is complex and highly controversial, but it can be roughly understood as the distinction prevailing between objects and their constituting matter. Statues, tables, and trees are paradigmatic examples of objects, whereas copper, water, and wood are paradigmatic examples of stuffs. Objects and stuffs differ in many respects. For example, unlike individual things, stuffs persist despite division and transformation. If a statue made of bronze is melted to obtain two bronze cups, the statue disappears whereas the bronze persists. I will argue that olfactory perception involves being acquainted with stuffs rather than particular objects and that the notion of stuff is essential for understanding the idiosyncratic characteristics of olfaction. The argument will proceed as follows. In the first part, I will give a short inventory of olfactory experiences. In the second part, I will show how most philosophical accounts fail to do justice to the phenomenology of olfactory experiences. In the last part, I will argue that olfactory experiences present compelling evidence that odors are properties of stuffs. 2 A world of odors Unlike colors, and to a lesser extent sounds, odors and olfaction have received little attention from philosophers. In philosophy, odors are sometimes mentioned to illustrate the distinction between primary and secondary qualities (Locke 1690) or to exemplify the category of "sense-data" (Russell 1912) or "qualia" (Campbell 2004; Jackson 1982), but they are rarely considered for their own
sentences: same olfactory level throughout an exhibition. Important as these practical issues are, the focus of the remainder of our article is on two theoretical questions: In what ways are smells suitable objects of aesthetic attention, and given that olfactory works are now an accepted part of the artworld, what are their special characteristics and limitations as serious art? This second question will lead to a final one concerning the art status of the most ancient of olfactory arts, perfume. II. THE PREJUDICE AGAINST SMELL As a first step in exploring these issues, we need to consider a longstanding philosophical prejudice against the so-called lower senses of smell, taste, and touch that has often led to the denial of their suitability for aesthetic reflection. From the ancient world into the twentieth century, majority opinion among philosophers has been that these senses are far beneath vision and hearing in dignity, intellectual power, and refinement.'1 The classic philosophical application of this view to the aesthetic realm is Plato's claim in Hippias Major that "beauty is the pleasant which comes through the senses of hearing and sight," whereas the pleasures of the other senses should not be called beautiful." Aristotle agreed on the superiority of sight and hearing, but also offered a more extensive and nuanced account of the senses.12 Although human taste, touch, and smell are sources of pleasure, not just of utility, the objects of the lower senses, for Aristotle, have no connection to moral qualities as do the pleasures of vision and hearing that are involved, interest. Thomas Reid's work is a notable exception; an entire chapter of his Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense ([1764] 2000) is dedicated to smell. It is remarkable that Reid's discussion of the external senses starts with a long chapter devoted to olfaction. Reid's justification for this choice is that an inquiry into human understanding must proceed from the simplest to the more complex and that the same principle should be applied to the philosophical examination of the senses. Therefore. Reid starts his discussion of the senses with olfaction not because it is "the noblest, or the most useful"4 sense, but because it is, according to him. the simplest. Reid's view regarding the simplicity of smell appears to have roots in antiquity. Aristotle, for example, considers smell to be both poor and inaccurate: Smell and its object are much less easy to determine than what we have hitherto discussed; the distinguishing characteristic of the object of smell is less obvious than those of sound or colour. The ground of this is that our power of smell is less discriminating and in general inferior to that of many species of animals; men have a poor sense of smell and our apprehension of its 3 See Casati and Dokic (2005). 4 chap. II, section II. <£) Springer 236 V. Mizrahi proper objects is inseparably bound up with and so confused by pleasure and pain, which shows that in us the organ is inaccurate.5 The goal of this section is to rehabilitate the sense of olfaction in view of such allegations by showing with a, question, how to think the fundamental unity of thought and Being before this unity is broken by the insertion of a subject doing the thinking. This article is only one instance in a long series of relections, ranging from the Phe'nome'nologie de l'experience esthe'tique to Le Poetique, on Nature and its relation to humanity and art. There is "nature," the ensemble of all phenomena, and there is "Nature," which is an "anonymous, blind force" (Phe'nome'nologie 1: 134) which is the source of nature, humanity, and art. Nature, on the other hand, needs art to be articulated and glorified. The following essay is "The A Priori of Imagination" (1965), and in it Dufreene argues against Kant that the a priori is not just a subjective condition of objectivity, but rather is in the object as well. The imagination's function is to reveal this objective meaning to us. The next essay, "The Imaginary" (1976), deals first with images, the imagination, the imaginary, and the real and the unreal, all played off against Jean-Paul Sartre's descriptions of the imagination. The second, and much shorter part of the article, considers, successively, desire and world, desire and language, language and world, language and desire, image and world, and finally image and language. Following "The Imaginary" is a very short piece, "Eye and Mind" (no entry in the Bibliography, thus no date available). This is a very clear and helpful, albeit too brief, commentary on Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Eye and Mind and through it, the latter's final philosophical project, source_sentence: construed as the personal/subjective degrees of belief of Bayesian agents is an old one. In recent years the idea has been vigorously pursued by a group of physicists who fly the banner of quantum
sentences: Bayesianism (QBism). The present paper aims to identify the prospects and problems of implementing QBism, and it critically assesses the claim that QBism provides a resolution (or dissolution), divorcing moral responsibility from free will setting aside the threat of Frankfurt-style cases.6 There are two reasons for this restriction of focus. First, Wallace's strategy is offered as a logically independent strategy to Fischer's. Hence, it is important to evaluate it on its own merits. Second, I believe that the success of Frankfurt-style cases depends on the plausibility of the belief that moral responsibility requires free will. Defenders of Frankfurt-style cases have been hard-pressed to furnish a case in which an agent is clearly morally responsible and clearly lacks access to alternative possibilities. This has led many defenders of Frankfurt-style cases to contend that the true of aim of Frankfurt-style cases is to show that access to alternative possibilities is not explanatorily relevant, even if it is necessary (cf. Hunt 2005; Leon and Tognazzini 2010; Pereboom 200 1).7 An adequate response to the neo-Frankfurtian attack requires a direct defense of the thesis that moral responsibility requires free will. By offering a theory of pleas that is simple, unified, plausible, and has just this consequence, my theory serves as a partial response to proponents of Frankfurtstyle cases. Therefore, my defense of my proffered theory of pleas and the thesis that moral responsibility requires free will are conditional up on the failure of these cases.8 I begin by laying out R. Jay Wallace's (1994) theory of the normative force of excuses and exemptions. I believe that Wallace's theory of exemptions is sound, but that his account of, allows, on the one hand, for learning from experience and, on the other hand, avoids admitting observation reports into evidence (R. C. Jeffrey (5), ch. 11). I find Jeffrey's brave efforts inadequate to the job and have said so elsewhere (I. Levi (11) and (12)). Whatever the merits of Jeffrey's proposals, they constitute a rejection of conditionalization as the sole principle of rational probability revision. Other pressures have induced authors who tend to identify themselves as Bayesians to strip exclusive status away from the principle of conditionalization. P. Suppes acknowledges that conceptual innovation involves shifts in probability judgement which conditionalization cannot accommodate. If such shifts are to be brought under rational control, conditionalization will have to be supplemented by other principles (P. Suppes (18), p. 64). Thus, even within the Bayesian camp, serious doubts have been raised concerning the exclusive rights of conditionalization as a principle of rational probability revision. As a consequence, the force of the argument purporting to show that evidential assumptions accorded probability 1 must be immune to correction has been substantially undermined. With the demise of this argument, much of the case against allowing fallible assumptions maximum probability withers away. Not only have Bayesians failed to muster decisive arguments against according probability 1 to fallible assumptions, a good case can be made in support of the view that a viable Bayesian (or quasi Bayesian) approach to inference requires granting evidential status to fallible assumptions. 302 NOOS According to Leonard Savage, Bayesians who endorse a subjectivist or personalist interpretation of, source_sentence: structural affinity between the case study as a genre of writing and the question of gendered subjectivity. With John Forrester's chapter 'Inventing Gender Identity: The Case of Agnes' as my starting point, I ask how the case of
sentences: justified (D-justified) at t if it doesn't fit S's O-evidence at t, but S would have O-evidence of the appropriate kind (this derivative evidence amounting to D-evidence) were she to think of p (see Feldman 1988, pp. 98-99). In the example above, I was too busy with the paper to entertain any evidence that could support the belief that the PIN code is ####. So my O-evidence didn't encompass anything supporting such belief. However, I had the disposition, upon considering my PIN code, to generate O-evidence of the appropriate kind: in the sense just presented, I had D-evidence. Since the quotation also seems to suggest that a true (stored) belief, if D-justified, may count as D-knowledge, it shows that the evidentialist is not banned from acknowledging that I did know my PIN code, even if this knowledge has a somehow derivative status, that of D-knowledge. This interpretation of Feldman's reply raises two important concerns, respec tively related to the notion of dispositional justification and the notion of dispositional knowledge. Let us begin by taking into account Goldman's worry, according to which no clear sense can be attached to the suggestion that a belief may be D-justified in the sense just adumbrated. The discussion of what must be added to D-justification in order to turn a true belief into D-knowledge shall not occupy us until the final part of the paper. A. Goldman has called into question Feldman's answer (Goldman 1999, pp. 278 279, 2002, p. 9). He has written: "if having a disposition to generate conscious evidential states, consideration, Oliver unravels the consequences of this strange chiasmus-the resymbolization of the body and the embodiment of the Symbolic-for psychoanalysis, feminism, linguistics, ethics, and political theory. Although it draws on a variety of discourses ranging from philosophy to religion, from aesthetics to politics, Reading Kristeva privileges in a certain way the psychoanalytic framework as it focuses on Kristeva's most psychoanalytic texts from the 1980s and early 1990s. Accounting for Kristeva's interventions and revisions of psychoanalytic theory, Reading Kristeva points to the crucial differences not only between Kristeva and Jacques Lacan, but also between Kristeva and other French feminists, especially Luce Irigaray and Helene Cixous. The main challenge to the psychoanalytic theory, Oliver argues, lies in Kristeva's claim that the maternal function prefigures the oedipal structure and at the same time prevents its closure. The nodal points of these pre-oedipal relations are constituted by the narcissistic subject, the abject maternal body (constituting the pattern of rejection and negation), and the imaginary father (setting up the pattern of reduplication and identification). Reading Kristeva offers us many engaging and original readings of the difficult moments in Kristeva's work. One can mention, for instance, an excellent account of the structure of the primary narcissism, which, as the original displacement to the place of the Other, sets up the logic of reduplication and "the possibility of metaphorical shifting" (74). Yet probably the most original contribution of Oliver's book to feminist psychoanalytic theory lies in its re-interpretation of the imaginary father, one of, 'Agnes' continues to inform our understanding of different disciplinary approaches (sociological and psychoanalytic) to theorizing gender. I establish a conversation between distinct, psychoanalytically informed feminisms (Simone
model-index: name: SentenceTransformer based on BAAI/bge-m3
results: task: type: triplet
name: Triplet
dataset: name: all nli test
type: all-nli-test
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy
value: 0.8085
name: Cosine Accuracy
verified: no, type: dot_accuracy
value: 0.1915
name: Dot Accuracy
verified: no, type: manhattan_accuracy
value: 0.8085
name: Manhattan Accuracy
verified: no, type: euclidean_accuracy
value: 0.8085
name: Euclidean Accuracy
verified: no, type: max_accuracy
value: 0.8085
name: Max Accuracy
verified: no
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Created: 2024-08-20 00:39:41