Model: tjohn327/scion-all-MiniLM-L6-v2
Author: tjohn327
Pipeline: sentence-similarity
Library: sentence-transformers
Tags: sentence-transformers, safetensors, bert, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:21376, loss:MultipleNegativesRankingLoss, arxiv:1908.10084, arxiv:1705.00652, base_model:sentence-transformers/all-MiniLM-L6-v2, base_model:finetune:sentence-transformers/all-MiniLM-L6-v2, model-index, text-embeddings-inference, endpoints_compatible, region:us
Base models (finetune): id: sentence-transformers/all-MiniLM-L6-v2
Card metadata: tags: sentence-transformers, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:21376, loss:MultipleNegativesRankingLoss
base_model: sentence-transformers/all-MiniLM-L6-v2
widget: source_sentence: Explain the purpose of source authentication in EPIC.
sentences: Golden file testing is integral to the SCION testing suite, ensuring consistency in test outputs. The -update flag is utilized across all packages containing golden file tests, allowing for systematic updates. To update all golden files, the command `go test ./... -update` is executed, while a specific package can be updated using `go test ./path/to/package -update`. The update mechanism is implemented via a package global variable: `var update = xtest.UpdateGoldenFiles()`.

For tests involving non-deterministic elements, such as private keys and certificates, a separate flag, -update-non-deterministic, is employed. This allows for the updating of non-deterministic golden files with the command `go test ./... -update-non-deterministic` or for a specific package using `go test ./path/to/package -update-non-deterministic`. The corresponding global variable for this functionality is defined as `var updateNonDeterministic = xtest.UpdateNonDeterminsticGoldenFiles()`. This structured approach facilitates the management of both deterministic and non-deterministic golden files within the SCION architecture., EPIC introduces a family of cryptographic data-plane protocols designed to enhance security in path-aware Internet architectures by addressing the security-efficiency dilemma. The protocols facilitate source authentication, path validation, and path authorization while maintaining low communication overhead. EPIC employs short per-hop authentication fields to minimize overhead, ensuring that even if an attacker forges an authenticator, they cannot exploit it to launch volumetric DoS attacks. The design binds authenticators to specific packets, preventing further malicious packet transmission. Additionally, EPIC utilizes a longer, unforgeable authentication field for the destination, allowing detection of any deceptive packets that may have bypassed intermediate routers. The proposed attacker model combines a localized Dolev–Yao adversary with a cryptographic oracle, demonstrating EPIC's resilience against powerful attackers. EPIC's communication overhead is 3–5 times smaller than existing solutions like OPT and ICING for realistic path lengths. Implementation using Intel’s Data Plane Development Kit (DPDK) shows that EPIC can saturate a 40 Gbps link on commodity hardware with only four processing cores. The focus is on securing inter-domain data-plane communication while assuming a secure control plane for key distribution and path construction., The document chunk provides a comprehensive index of SCION Internet Architecture, detailing key components and concepts. It includes references to various types of certificates such as AS, CA, root, and voting certificates, essential for the SCION Control-plane PKI (CP-PKI). The control plane and data plane are delineated, with specific focus on control-plane extensions, including hidden paths and time synchronization, and data-plane extensions like end-to-end (E2E) and hop-by-hop (HBH) mechanisms. The COLIBRI framework is highlighted, encompassing control and data plane functionalities, end-to-end reservations (EER), and security analyses. Cryptographic algorithms are categorized, emphasizing agility, asymmetric, symmetric, and post-quantum methods, alongside cryptographic hash functions. Deployment scenarios are outlined, addressing customer site, end host, and ISP core network configurations. The document also references the Discovery service and DNSSEC, noting their relevance to SCION's operational integrity. Overall, the index encapsulates the architectural components, algorithms, and deployment strategies critical to SCION's design and implementation., source_sentence: How does SCION's deployment model differ from traditional overlay networks?
sentences: The document discusses the deployment and scalability of the SCION Internet architecture, emphasizing its path-diversity-based path construction algorithm for core beaconing as the SCIONLab network expands. It contrasts SCION with existing testbeds like VINI, GENI, and FABRIC, which have not yet facilitated SCION's production network, highlighting SCION's unique design that avoids overlay complexities. The section on related work outlines various Internet architecture proposals, including Trotsky, which advocates for a backward-compatible framework for new inter-domain protocols, and RON, an application-level overlay network that lacks the guarantees of native architectures. SCION's architecture distinctly separates inter-domain communication (core-path segments) from intra-domain communication (down- and up-path segments), paralleling concepts in Plutarch and HLP, which employs a hybrid routing approach. SCION's beaconing mechanism enhances scalability compared to BGP, while maintaining a hierarchical network partitioning akin to HLP's model. The document also references XIA's principal-centric networking and the Framework for Internet Innovation's clean-slate redesign, noting SCION's alignment with these innovative paradigms while addressing deployment challenges., The document discusses the limitations of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) within the context of internet infrastructure, emphasizing its lack of guarantees for data delivery and path specification. BGP facilitates the exchange of reachability information among Autonomous Systems (ASes) through IP prefix advertisements, enabling ASes to make routing decisions based on various factors, including cost and load balancing. However, BGP's design, originating in 1989 as a temporary solution, did not prioritize security, leading to vulnerabilities such as route hijacking. These deficiencies impact both Quality of Service (QoS) and Quality of Experience (QoE), as users remain unaware of the paths taken by their data. The document highlights the need for improved protocols that address these security and performance issues, particularly in the context of SCION architecture, which aims to provide more reliable and secure routing mechanisms., The document chunk details the packet processing logic within the SCION Data Plane, specifically focusing on the handling of Hop Fields and Accumulator values during packet traversal. It outlines checks for link types to prevent valley usage and ensures that timestamps in the Info Field are valid. The processing steps vary based on the Construction Direction flag (C) and the Peering flag (P). 

For packets traveling in construction direction (C = "1"), the process continues to the next step. If traveling against construction direction (C = "0"), three cases are considered: 

1. **No Peering Hop Field (P = "0")**: The ingress border router computes the Accumulator (Acc) using the formula Acc = Acc_(i+1) XOR MAC_i, updates the Acc field, verifies the MAC, and increments path metadata if at the last Hop Field.

2. **Peering Hop Field Present but Not Current (P = "1")**: Similar to Case 1, but without incrementing path metadata.

3. **Current Hop Field is Peering (P = "1")**: The router computes MAC^Peer_i, verifies it against the current MAC, and increments path metadata if applicable. 

These steps ensure integrity and proper routing within the SCION architecture., source_sentence: What considerations are taken into account for Assigned SCION Protocol Numbers?
sentences: Redundant transmission in SCION enhances the reliability of media streams, specifically for video calls, by employing multiple relay connections. The application allows for configurable redundant and multi-redundant transmission of audio and video streams. Each media stream can utilize more than one relay connection, with outgoing packets sent identically across these connections. Received packets are forwarded to WebRTC, which utilizes RTP and RTCP protocols for connection management, including sequence numbering and deduplication. 

Overlap path processors facilitate the selection of paths for redundant relay connections. The process begins with sorting the relay connections arbitrarily, followed by the first connection utilizing the standard root path processor. Subsequent connections employ an overlap path processor that references the path of the preceding connection, ensuring that all paths are considered as reference paths for redundancy. This design aims to maintain Quality of Service (QoS) by ensuring that at least one relay connection successfully delivers packets, mitigating packet loss.

However, challenges arise from latency discrepancies between redundant connections, which can lead to a primary connection (lead) and a secondary connection (backup) scenario, potentially affecting the overall performance of the media stream., The document chunk addresses the availability guarantees within the SCION Internet Architecture, detailing the adversary model and availability properties. It outlines defense systems, including basic fault and attack isolation, protection mechanisms for data-plane traffic, and control-plane services. Key components include secure path discovery and dissemination, data delivery mechanisms, packet authentication, and filtering strategies. The section on traffic prioritization introduces traffic classes, Setup-Less Neighbor-Based Communication (SNC), traffic marking, and priority processing through queuing disciplines. Additionally, it discusses protected DRKey bootstrapping, emphasizing assumptions, the protection of COLIBRI SegR setup, and the Telescoped Reservation Setup (TRS) with a corresponding security analysis. The protection of control-plane services is further elaborated, focusing on criticality criteria for interactions, filtering at the control service, and the attack resilience of the control service. The chapter concludes with a discussion on AS certification, reinforcing the importance of these mechanisms in ensuring the robustness and reliability of SCION's architecture against various threats., The document chunk outlines the SCION Data Plane architecture, detailing the SCION Header Specification, which includes various header formats such as Address Header, SCION Path Types (SCION, EmptyPath, OneHopPath, EPIC-HP), and the Pseudo Header for Upper-Layer Checksum. It specifies the SCION Extension Header, encompassing Hop-by-Hop and End-to-End Options Headers, along with TLV-encoded Options. The SCMP Specification is introduced, covering its general format, error messages, and informational messages. The SCION Packet Authenticator Option is defined, detailing its format, absolute time, DRKey selection, authenticated data, and associated algorithms. Additionally, the document addresses BFD (Bidirectional Forwarding Detection) on top of SCION, including protocol specifics and its implementation in SCION routers. It also lists assigned SCION Protocol Numbers, highlighting considerations for their assignment, and concludes with an overview of the SCION Protocol Stack, which integrates these components into a cohesive architecture., source_sentence: What happens when a local path service cannot find a path to a remote AS?
sentences: The document chunk details the verification of Go programs within the SCION architecture, specifically focusing on the `UnmarshalText` function for parsing Autonomous System (AS) identifiers. The `UnmarshalText` function, defined in the `addr` package, takes a byte slice `text`, converts it to a string, and invokes `ASFromString` to derive a valid AS identifier. The function employs preconditions and postconditions to ensure memory safety and validity of the AS identifier. The `validAS` function is a pure function that checks the validity of the AS identifier, returning true only for valid inputs. The use of the `old` keyword in postconditions guarantees that the state of the AS variable remains unchanged if the input string is invalid, ensuring that the function adheres to the principles of functional programming by avoiding side effects. The implementation details emphasize the importance of error handling, where `ASFromString` returns a non-nil error for invalid identifiers, thus maintaining the integrity of the AS state. This snippet is part of the SCION codebase, specifically from `github.com/scionproto/scion/go/lib/addr/isdas.go`., The document chunk discusses extensions for the SCION data plane, focusing on the COLIBRI system's attack-resistant resource-reservation mechanisms. It identifies challenges such as per-flow state management, path stability, and authentication overhead, alongside corresponding enabling technologies. Key solutions include packet-carried state for fast path management, path choice strategies to mitigate on-path adversaries, and symmetric-key authentication to address signature overhead. The architecture leverages Isolation Domains (ISDs) and segment types to enhance scalability by decomposing reservations. Reservation protection is emphasized, requiring data packets to carry cryptographically protected information for validation and attribution. Efficient cryptographic mechanisms are critical, particularly for per-packet MACs to authenticate data packets at each on-path Autonomous System (AS). The DRKey framework underpins the efficient authentication of control-plane packets, mitigating risks such as signature flooding and denial-of-capability (DoC) attacks. Overall, the integration of these components within SCION's architecture enhances the robustness and efficiency of resource reservations in adversarial environments., The document discusses the optimization of path registration and propagation in SCION Autonomous Systems (ASes) through beacon services, utilizing information encoded in Path Control Blocks (PCBs). Beacon services can optimize paths based on various quality metrics, such as latency and bandwidth, either jointly or in parallel, depending on local implementations. For path lookup, a host within a SCION AS must obtain the destination host's ISD number, AS number, and local address, resulting in tuples of the form ⟨ISD number, AS number, local address⟩. The host queries its path service for a registered or cached path to the destination. If unavailable, it escalates the request to a core AS's path service within its ISD. If the destination is within the same ISD or is a core AS in another ISD, the core path service provides a path segment. If not, the local core path service queries the remote core path service of the destination's ISD, which returns a down-segment. The local core path service then returns both the core-segment and down-segment to facilitate routing. The structure of a PCB is detailed, highlighting fields for AS hop metadata and extensions for additional information dissemination., source_sentence: How does SCION's time synchronization support duplicate detection and traffic monitoring?
sentences: The document chunk details the COLIBRI system for bandwidth reservations within the SCION architecture, emphasizing its efficiency in managing end-to-end reservations (EERs) across on-path Autonomous Systems (ASes). COLIBRI employs symmetric cryptography for stateless verification of reservations, mitigating the need for per-source state. To counter replay attacks, a duplicate suppression mechanism is essential, ensuring that authenticated packets cannot be maliciously reused to exceed allocated bandwidth. Monitoring and policing systems are necessary to enforce bandwidth limits, allowing ASes to identify and manage misbehaving flows. While stateful flow monitoring, such as the token-bucket algorithm, provides precise measurements, it is limited to edge deployments due to state requirements. In contrast, probabilistic monitoring techniques like LOFT can operate effectively within the Internet core, accommodating a vast number of flows. Time synchronization is critical for coordinating bandwidth reservations across AS boundaries, facilitating accurate duplicate detection and traffic monitoring. SCION’s time synchronization mechanism ensures adequate synchronization levels for these operations. Overall, COLIBRI enables efficient short-term bandwidth reservations, crucial for maintaining the integrity of end-to-end communications in a highly dynamic Internet environment., SCION is a next-generation Internet architecture designed to enhance security, availability, isolation, and scalability. It enables end hosts to utilize multiple authenticated inter-domain paths to any destination, with each packet carrying its own specified forwarding path determined by the sender. SCION architecture incorporates isolation domains (ISDs), which consist of multiple Autonomous Systems (ASes) that agree on a trust root configuration (TRC) defining the roots of trust for validating bindings between names and public keys or addresses. Core ASes govern each ISD, providing inter-ISD connectivity and managing trust roots. The architecture delineates three types of AS relationships: core, provider-customer, and peer-peer, with core relations existing solely among core ASes. SCION addressing is structured as a tuple ⟨ISD number, AS number, local address⟩, where the ISD number identifies the ISD of the end host, the AS number identifies the host's AS, and the local address serves as the host's identifier within its AS, not utilized for inter-domain routing or forwarding. Path-construction, path-registration, and path-lookup procedures are integral to SCION's operational framework, facilitating efficient packet forwarding based on the specified paths., The document introduces a formal verification framework for path-aware data plane protocols, addressing the critical security property of path authorization in Internet architectures. It utilizes Isabelle/HOL to develop a parameterized model that first establishes path authorization without an attacker, then refines it by incorporating an attacker and cryptographic validation fields. The framework is parameterized by the protocol's authentication mechanism and relies on five verification conditions sufficient for proving the refinement of the abstract model. The authors validate the framework against several existing protocols, demonstrating compliance with the verification conditions and ensuring path authorization without requiring invariant proofs. This approach supports low-effort security proofs applicable to arbitrary network topologies and authorized paths, surpassing the capabilities of current automated security protocol verifiers. The document emphasizes the importance of formal verification in enhancing the security and reliability of future Internet architectures, particularly in light of the limitations of the existing Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and the need for robust, scalable solutions. Path-aware architectures empower end hosts to select forwarding paths while ensuring adherence to autonomous systems' routing policies, thereby mitigating risks from malicious sources.
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics: cosine_accuracy@1, cosine_accuracy@3, cosine_accuracy@5, cosine_accuracy@10, cosine_precision@1, cosine_precision@3, cosine_precision@5, cosine_precision@10, cosine_recall@1, cosine_recall@3, cosine_recall@5, cosine_recall@10, cosine_ndcg@10, cosine_mrr@10, cosine_map@100
model-index: name: SentenceTransformer based on sentence-transformers/all-MiniLM-L6-v2
results: task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dev evaluation
type: dev-evaluation
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.2032690695725063
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.44090528080469404
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.5368818105616094
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.662615255658005
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.2032690695725063
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.146968426934898
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.10737636211232188
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.0662615255658005
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.2032690695725063
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.44090528080469404
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.5368818105616094
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.662615255658005
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.4209375313714088
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.3449352372969312
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.35689195077195485
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no
Likes: 0 | All-time downloads: 8
Created: 2025-03-04 19:22:09