Model: MaxNoichl/nomic-embed-philosophy-triplets_v3
Author: MaxNoichl
Pipeline: sentence-similarity
Library: sentence-transformers
Tags: sentence-transformers, safetensors, nomic_bert, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:10000, loss:TripletLoss, custom_code, arxiv:1908.10084, arxiv:1703.07737, base_model:nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1, base_model:finetune:nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1, model-index, text-embeddings-inference, endpoints_compatible, region:us
Base models (finetune): id: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
Card metadata: base_model: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics: cosine_accuracy, dot_accuracy, manhattan_accuracy, euclidean_accuracy, max_accuracy
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
tags: sentence-transformers, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:10000, loss:TripletLoss
widget: source_sentence: value-neutral social science, this kind of negative depiction of managers would be deserved if it were empirically valid and based on careful research. However, it is not always either valid or carefully based. Some of the anti-manage ment bias comes a priori from theories that take as axiomatic that managers are prone to act in a bad way (e.g. agency theory). Some other part of the bias seems to be simply faculty members accepting popular negative stories about managers, which circulate in the community and are carried in the mass media. Again, a negative view of managers might be scientifically valid if based on large, representative samples. Yet, often the critical view propounded by management school academics about managers is based on a handful of cases. These cases are then taken to prove generalizations about managers being inherently bad or predisposed to unethical conduct. TABLE I Elements of business ethics teaching and their unanticipated negative consequences Teaching Business Ethics Causes Negative Consequences 1. Misdiagnosis of Causes of Problems True Causes Neglected Problems Solution Failure 2. Salience of Moral Authority of Academics Unethical Academics Lack Moral Authority to Teach Ethics Effectively 3. Ethical Philosophy Inconclusiveness ("No right answer") Ethics Scepticism Rationalizing Unethical Behaviour 4. Ethical Dilemmas Indecision 5. Free Choice Freedom Delusion Social Science Incompatibility Ethics Problems and Problems with Ethics 301 Extreme cases of misconduct that receive publicity are treated as being 'the tip of the iceberg', or as being a way to see into the true nature of managers. Again, at other
sentences: times, the results of larger scale social science inquiries are taken as proving widespread managerial wrongdoing when that conclusion is reached only by a particular interpretation of the data. Such interpretation uses one or other of the anti management theories, in that way creating an illusion that the anti-management theory is valid. In contrast, the empirical findings may better fit a theory that has a more positive view of managers. However, the anti-management discourse in modern management schools ignores such more pro-management theories. This violates the scientific ideal that a range of the ories should be considered in interpreting data. Again, it leads to the overlooking of pro-manage ment research, both theoretical and empirical. Unanticipated negative consequences of teaching business ethics Education in business ethics has five elements that can produce unanticipated negative consequences thereby rendering ethics education ineffectual or counter-productive: misdiagnosis of causes of prob lems, salience of moral authority of academics, ethical philosophy, ethical dilemmas and free choice. Misdiagnosis of causes of problems A contemporary way of reasoning is to go from a few cases, to over-generalizations of a negative kind about management, and thence to recommendations such as more ethics education in management schools. Each of these steps in the chain needs to be queried. Many of the prominent cases of managerial wrongdoing are not primarily failures of ethics but are poor managerial business judgements that led to corporate financial collapse, prompting unethical acts or accompanied by unethical acts. This can be seen in, ethics remains the extent to which it is central or peripheral to the curriculum. An Analysis of CSR, CI and Ethics Teaching in Business Schools 119 Business values driving the academic agenda? There are many views regarding the challenge of transferring ethical learning from the classroom into the corporation. Cordiero (2003) asserts the devel opment of ethical behaviour in managers ought to be grounded in their development as leaders, "ethics is not something a manager 'does'; it is something that a manager 'is'". Pfeffer and Fong (2004) argue that most effective and influential ethics education is best located within a pedagogic framework more akin to traditional professional education. This would incorporate clearly stated professional values and responsibilities, consistent with other established professions, a code of ethics and responsibilities should be defined with clear guidelines for those that violate professional standards, and disciplinary pro cedures to encourage non-tolerance of ethical malfeasance. The appropriateness of specific pedagogic options is not the only source of difficulty with regards to the effectiveness of ethics education in business schools. There is a strongly held view amongst some academics that business schools are reluctant to incorporate moral and ethical thinking into univer sity curricula (e.g., Scott, 1988; Sims and Sims, 1991). Kelly (2005) has observed that a number of US business schools are reducing or removing ethics teaching altogether from their curricula, which might be as a result of a lack of availability of appropriately qualified staff, over-crowded curricula and indiffer ence among staff not involved in ethics teaching. Pfeffer, the interviews were conducted using ORC's CATI system. ORC utilizes a random-digit-dial sampling procedure that is fully replicated and stratified by region. According to ORC: "completed interviews are weighted by four variables: age, sex, geographic region, and race, to ensure reliable and accurate representation of the total population, 18 years of age and older... The use of replicable sampling, standardized inter viewing procedures and representative weighting provides that all CARAVAN studies are parallel to one another. Thus, CARAVAN usage is appropriate both for point-in-time analysis as well as tracking and trend comparisons" (ORC, CARAVAN research report, 2006). For all the details of the sampling procedures and operation of ORC, see Appendix A. For the purpose of computing the BEI, we employed the weighted sample to minimize demographic fluctuations as a source of sampling error. Results Respondent characteristics All five 2006 national probability samples comprised 1045 adults (18 years of age or older) living in private households in the continental United States. The respondents' demographic characteristics for all five waves are presented in Table 1. EXHIBIT 1A Questions comprising the Business Ethics Index Personal/Past 1. Based on your own experiences as a consumer in the past year, businesses you dealt with generally behaved: Very unethically Somewhat unethically Neither nor Somewhat ethically Very ethically Vicarious/Past 2. Based on what you heard from others or the media in the past year, businesses behaved: Very unethically Somewhat unethically Neither nor Somewhat ethically Very ethically Personal/Future 3. Based on your, source_sentence: solve the problem of how we can think of non-existents. The view has real virtues: it endorses a non-relational (internalist) conception of intentionality and is ontologically conservative. Alas, the view ultimately cannot replace the act-object model of intentionality that it seeks to, because it depends on the act-object model for its intelligibility
sentences: satisfied at the same time, in view of notorious semantic paradoxes such as the Liar paradox, we consider the maximal, of intentionality according to which intentionality is a purely non-relational notion. I argue that his account has counterintuitive consequences regarding our thoughts about existing objects,, at key points. It thus fails as a revisionistic theory. I argue that the virtues of adverbialism can be had from within the act-object framework, provided we understand intentional objects correctly. I use Crane as a guide here, and build on his work on intentional objects. In the end, we can provide a suitable solution to the problem of thinking, source_sentence: might be discounted as intellectual laggards; they are also the disciplined and reflective professionals in the field. And among these are not only the artists and the poets, who might be suspected of carrying their creative habits over into their ordinary speech, but also the non-artists, whose interests in art are detached 378 MEANING RANGE IN WORK OF ART 379 and factual. These are the critics, the museum professionals, some philosophers, and even cultural historians and anthropologists. It is by no means characteristic of any of these latter groups today that they eschew the notion of meaning from their discussions of art. Quite the opposite. It is at least a nine to one probability that any considerable observation or discourse that one comes upon anywhere about art today will make some direct or implied reference to the meaning of art. A music critic speaks of the "intellectual content" of Beethoven's symphonies. A literary critic affirms that in poetry "the .... aesthetic effect of intellectual cogency is not to be slighted."' Another "disagrees" with some of the political views expressed by a poet in his poetry. An interpretation of the French impressionists in painting finds that a central aim of this school was to attain "the greatest possible degree of truth" in the presentation of its subjects.2 The writer of an introductory essay in a catalogue of a recent and notable exhibition of contemporary American painting states it directly: "Essentially, the artist is seeking to give visual
sentences: the lower right‐hand corner of figure 1. You should answer no to each question, which is the view advanced by Daniel Boisvert, who has emphasized, in favor of his view, that pejorative terms seem to have precisely this kind of dual content—for example, the offensive racial slur ‘n——r’ clearly has a descriptive content, but it is also associated with a contemptuous attitude.12 In accordance with a no answer to question Q1, the contemptuous attitude it is associated with is the same, no matter what sentence it figures in and even when embedded under negations, inside conditionals, or in questions. In accordance with a no answer to question Q2, it is the same attitude for different speakers—always contempt for a certain racial group. In accordance with a no answer to question Q3, the descriptive content is the same for every speaker. And in accordance with a no answer to question Q4, the contemptuous attitude associated with this word derives from the descriptive content of the word, together with the attitudes prevalent in the social background in which the word was originally used. So the descriptive content does not depend on the associated attitude. So in Sections VIII and IX, I will look at precisely which sorts of advantages may possibly accrue to hybrid views in the lower right‐hand corner of the figure. I will argue that there are many sorts of advantages which cannot accrue to this sort of view but also that this view does allow for certain subtle, form to conceptions of truth."3 These are fair samples of considered statements about art which are characteristic of recent and present-day thinking by various specialists who concern themselves with it. Any reader of the literature about art will know that they can be multiplied practically without limit and from all quarters. The fair reader will know also that, although many such statements are semantically vague and ambiguous, their general intent is plain enough. There is among them common agreement that art conveys ideas which can be meaningfully stated. That is, in application to art they disagree with the positivistic thesis of meaning. They hold that not only can one think about art (which is not the issue), but also that you can think about thinking in art-which is the issue. With the disagreement thus set, I want to ask as my main question: Does the positivistic analysis of meaning invalidate the ascription of cognitive meaning to works of art, or does it not? A simple affirmative answer implies (1) correctness of the positivistic analysis of meaning on all points pertinent to its use in rejecting meaning claims for art; (2) either logical ignorance or perversity on the part of those who persist in speaking of the meaning of art. A simple negative answer implies (1) a faulty or incomplete analysis of the concept of cognitive meaning, or (2) a misunderstanding on the part of the logical or semantic critic of the nature of art with a resulting misapplication of the concept of meaning to, Once this step is taken, it is not difficult to go on and say that any perception of a painting is an 'interpretation'. When this is said, the sense of 'interpretation' has been stretched, and we have what borders upon an octopus use of the term. I wish to show that the acceptance of an octopus use of 'interpretation' does not solve any of the standing problems in aesthetics and that it produces additional problems. In order to do this, I must first describe the differential use of 'interpretation' in the arts. *) 'Conversations with Marin', Corothy Norman, Art News, Dec., 1953, p. 59. 2) 'Everyone wants to understand art. Why not try to understand the song of a bird? Why does one love the night, flowers, everything around one, without trying to under stand them? But in the case of a painting, people have to understand.' Artists on Art, Robert Goldwater and Marco Tr?ves (ed.), Pantheon, 1945, p. 421. 3) 'The vast majority of English folk can not, will not consider a picture as a picture apart from any story which it may be supposed to tell.' Ibid, p. 346,7. 199 CAMPBELL CROCKETT II. THE DIFFERENTIAL USE OF 'INTERPRETATION' IN THE ARTS. Problems concerning 'interpretation' often arise in the arts, and we discuss and frequently disagree about surrealistic paintings, the novels of Kafka and Camus, and modern dance. When we raise questions con cerning the 'interpretation' of these and other works of art, often we do not know how to take what we see, hear,, source_sentence: of the open society, he condemned complacency towards social institutions and so, if only tacitly, condemned complacency towards the institutions of science ([1944-1945] 1957, [1945] 1962).6 Not only did he fail to criticize scientific institutions explicitly, he too held up science-beautified as Socratic seminar-as a model for rational conduct in general and in politics in particular. In not working out the implications of his critical and democratic ideasfor institutional science Popper faltered. His beautification of science as institution was inconsistent with his critical philosophy of social institutions.7 What then are the scope and limits of republicanism applied to science? Both philosophers provide insights and ideas with which to criticize each other and, it is to be hoped, clarify the issues. In the body of this paper I condense them into four questions. Two questions focus on control. Should science be exempted from the democratic control of the wider society as Polanyi maintains (?2)?; or, is critical and democratic reform of institutionalized science possible along Popperian lines (?3). The two remaining questions focus on the impact of scientific norms and results on the host society. Is real existing science a suitable model for society in general along either Polanyiite or Popperian lines (?4)?; and, is science just one among the social institutions or, as both Polanyi and Popper claim, does its pursuit of truth make it exceptional and if so, how (?5)? 5. For the argument that The Logic of Scientific Discovery contains a social view of science see my The Republic
sentences: aggregation to the problem of judgment aggregation in science apply to the latter, not the former question. The formal literature has introduced various desiderata for an aggregation procedure. Proposition-wise majority voting emerges as a procedure that satisfies all desiderata, of Science (Jarvie 2001). 6. In citing page numbers for these works I shall be using the more readily available 1957 book edition of 1944-1945 and the fourth (1962) edition of 1945. 7. In some of his later essays and addresses Popper shows considerable awareness of the deficiencies of institutionalized science, especially its implication in war technology (Popper 1994, chs. 4 and 6). Yet he does not look back to and revise his earlier presentation. 547 I. C. JARVIE 2. Democratic and Authoritarian Republics. Should science be exempted from the democratic control of the wider society? Polanyi's principal argument for exemption relies on his special view of scientific authority. Popper, a critic of all authority, offers a challenge to Polanyi's argument for exceptionalism. Polanyi wrote much on the social relations of science, finding there lessons for democratic society itself (1945, 1951, 1958, 1961, 1962). His work combines reliable ethnographic reports with controversial social and political analysis. To understand why he tries to fuse republicanism with authoritarianism we need to outline salient features of his social analysis of science. Polanyi views the working of science as "coordination by mutual adjustment of independent initiatives" much like teams working on a large jigsaw puzzle. Every puzzler keeps in mind the pieces held and the elements of the picture so far assembled, and remains watchfully aware of the progress of others. Polanyi's jigsaw puzzle metaphor harbors a difficulty. Unlike the picture cut up by the jigsaw, the world-picture is not a prior given., to be used as an instrument, science must keep an essential measure of self-identity and autonomy. We could conclude this brief confrontation by saying that science is and must be both "neutral" and "non-neutral", according to the aspect of it we take into consideration. It can and must be neutral as far as it is a system of reliable knowledge; it cannot and must not be neutral as far as it is a human activity implicated with all the other aspects of the human praxis. All this may be rather clear, and is certainly very important to recognize, but new problems arise at this point. According to the two one-sided positions considered above, a kind of struggle was envisaged between science on the one side and the whole of its "external" environment on the other. For the ones the problem was that of preserving at all price the integrity of science, its independence and freedom towards the outside while for the others the problem was that of eliminating this arrogant pretension by reducing science to the dismasked role of being just a pawn in the complex game of the socio-political battle. What is common to both positions is the antagonistic way they envisage the relationship between science and the extra-scientific world. But we must note that this antagonistic way of thinking is by no means automatically eliminated once we become aware that science is somehow two different things at the same time, i.e. a system of knowledge and a human activity. For the problem immediately, source_sentence: reflective conceptual scheme of the the observer's world. So, even though we can differentiate by analysis the conditions of our awareness, there is no actual awareness short of conceptual incorporation into a functional and rational world. Not only is there no thinking without signs; there is no experience short of thirdness. This does not imply that such experiences are whole and complete relative to consciousness. That for both Hegel and Peirce never happens short of the Absolute ? however different their visions ofthat Absolute may have been. What it does mean is that there is no direct access to any reality as it presents itself either the Cartesian mental or the Cartesian physical, that can warrant any claims for an epistemological direct realism. That thought is always mediated by sym bols gives the basis for the "critical" in Peirce's own critical common-sen sism, and puts him in line with Santayana and Sellars (perhaps Wilfred as well as Roy Wood) for critical realism. While this is the case epistemologically, Peirce wanted to maintain that such an account requires ontologically the reality of all three pheno menological categories. He chided Hegel for dwelling on thirdness to the exclusion of secondness and firstness, treating the triadic form as "a mere RECONSTRUCTING DECONSTRUCTION 377 fashion of dress." "Had Hegel, instead of regarding the first two stages with his smile of contempt, held on to them as independent or distinct elements of the triune Reality, pragmaticists might have looked up to him as the great vindicator of their
sentences: truth" (CP5.436). Peirce maintained that they are all three as ontologically required as are firsts and seconds required for triadic relations in logic. Reaction and feeling are implicit in the continuity of habit, actuality and quality in the generality of law, and interpretation presupposes facts with which to come to terms. Since Peirce, the neo-posi tivists have tried to reduce thirds to seconds, clearly without success. Among the reactions to that pristine scientism have been the current waves of neohegelian fervour that attempt to move the other way, by absorbing feeling and action into interpretation. Peirce's ontological realism is based on logical conditions for phenomenology , and thus resists the reductionis ts urges in both directions. These epistemological and ontological realisms are grounded in the dynamical object. Peirce understood dynamis much as Aristotle understood the material condition of change, as serving a conditional limit and as suggesting a teleological fulfillment. Peirce thought it conditional because it was interactive with other circumstances of action and experience. The determination of it as a limit to action and experience depended upon how it related to other conditions in its circumstantial context, and that can be dealt with in thought and action only in an actualized and conceptualized form. None the less, the dynamical object stands over against thought and action, and it requires coming to terms with it to make sense of the world and to act in it. Ultimately, were we to consider it as some sort of surd, logic of relations; although what the intimate connection is between these studies and his metaphysics Peirce leaves the reader to guess at random. 4 This approach has many obvious affiliations with the "presuppositionless ' studies of essences by Descartes, Husserl, and Santayana, although in the light of Peirce 's devastating critique of the Augustinian-Cartesian philosophy in his earliest papers, too much can not be made of this similarity. And after the nature of Thirdness has been discussed it will be seen how full of presuppositions Peirce 's analysis really is. 368 JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Let us turn to the categories themselves. The Category of Firstness indicates the aspect of freshness, life, freedom, variety, and spontaneity in the phaneron. Thus it would seem that Firstness presents the phase of atomicity, specificity, or sheer quality in experience. A quality is just what it is, and in its sheer immediacy is utterly disconnected with any other quality. On the other hand Peirce regards Firstness as a "pure nature" or quality to which embodiment and localization are essentially foreign (1.303). A quality is eternal, independent of time or of any realization (1.420); it is simply a "may-be," whose nature is that it might be a specific moment in a phaneron. Nevertheless Firstness is not a general or universal, since to be a universal involves reference to embodiment and localization (1.304). It is not easy to reconcile these various characterizations of Firstness. Peirce seems to shuttle back and forth between regarding Firstness, peculiar theory. Royce does not appear to distinguish the mystic's motive from the motive ot speculation in general, the motive which the mystic has in common witb the realist, the motive drawn from the defects of that (wonderfully depicted) "finite situation that ;sends us all alike looking for true Being ". In so far as mystic and realist alike have the intention not alone to find true Being, but to define it, both must be equally condemned by Royce's proof that " Each in the end defines Nothing whatever ".1 But what if the difference between mystic and realist lay precisely in this point: that the purpose of the mystic is not to define anything at all, but to do something which by every device he has tried to differentiate from all processes of defirning or of speculating. I believe this to be the case; and that, the logic of Royce thus passes over his head. The purpose of the mystic lies in the region of the practice of religion; and his essential theoretical message is, that there is a practical cognition of the Absolute which philosophical knowledge necessarily fails to reach. The point of difference between the mystic and all speculators (including the speculative mystics as speculators) seems to me to be this:A philosophy does not supply the thinker ipso facto either with the incentive to worship or with the power to worship. Thought may perhaps persuade us of God's immediate presence in experience, and yet it leaves us empty of the idea of 'approach'; it
model-index: name: SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
results: task: type: triplet
name: Triplet
dataset: name: nomic
type: nomic
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy
value: 0.972
name: Cosine Accuracy
verified: no, type: dot_accuracy
value: 0.028
name: Dot Accuracy
verified: no, type: manhattan_accuracy
value: 0.968
name: Manhattan Accuracy
verified: no, type: euclidean_accuracy
value: 0.972
name: Euclidean Accuracy
verified: no, type: max_accuracy
value: 0.972
name: Max Accuracy
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy
value: 0.971
name: Cosine Accuracy
verified: no, type: dot_accuracy
value: 0.029
name: Dot Accuracy
verified: no, type: manhattan_accuracy
value: 0.9695
name: Manhattan Accuracy
verified: no, type: euclidean_accuracy
value: 0.971
name: Euclidean Accuracy
verified: no, type: max_accuracy
value: 0.971
name: Max Accuracy
verified: no
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Created: 2024-08-20 20:20:50