Model: IoannisKat1/all-mpnet-base-v2-legal-matryoshka
Author: IoannisKat1
Pipeline: sentence-similarity
Library: sentence-transformers
Tags: sentence-transformers, safetensors, mpnet, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:1580, loss:MatryoshkaLoss, loss:MultipleNegativesRankingLoss, en, arxiv:1908.10084, arxiv:2205.13147, arxiv:1705.00652, base_model:sentence-transformers/all-mpnet-base-v2, base_model:finetune:sentence-transformers/all-mpnet-base-v2, license:apache-2.0, model-index, endpoints_compatible, region:us
Base models (finetune): id: sentence-transformers/all-mpnet-base-v2
Card metadata: language: en
license: apache-2.0
tags: sentence-transformers, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:1580, loss:MatryoshkaLoss, loss:MultipleNegativesRankingLoss
base_model: sentence-transformers/all-mpnet-base-v2
widget: source_sentence: What type of fraud was the defendant convicted of committing repeatedly and professionally?
sentences: 1.This Regulation lays down rules relating to the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and rules relating to the free movement of personal data.
2.This Regulation protects fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in particular their right to the protection of personal data.
3.The free movement of personal data within the Union shall be neither restricted nor prohibited for reasons connected with the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data., In order to prevent creating a serious risk of circumvention, the protection of natural persons should be technologically neutral and should not depend on the techniques used. The protection of natural persons should apply to the processing of personal data by automated means, as well as to manual processing, if the personal data are contained or are intended to be contained in a filing system. Files or sets of files, as well as their cover pages, which are not structured according to specific criteria should not fall within the scope of this Regulation., Court (Civil/Criminal): Criminal  
Provisions: Article 386 of the Penal Code  
Time of commission of the act:  
Result (innocent, guilty):  
Reasoning: Conviction for computer fraud committed repeatedly and professionally with a total benefit and damage exceeding €30,000. According to the majority opinion, the charge is substantiated in both its objective and subjective aspects, and the defendant must be declared guilty of the aforementioned criminal acts of fraud by means of a computer, committed repeatedly by a perpetrator acting professionally, where the total financial benefit and corresponding damage exceed the amount of €30,000, as well as for repeated embezzlement.

Facts: The defendant accessed a website using a computer, employing, without the knowledge and consent of the complainants, the access codes for the electronic management system of the bank accounts held by the complainants at a Bank, and transferred money through electronically transmitted orders from the complainants' accounts to her own account. Specifically, during the period from June 2007 to June 2008, after unlawfully acquiring the aforementioned STICK containing the access codes, she accessed a website maintained by ..., using, without the complainants' knowledge (without their consent or approval), the access codes for the electronic management system of the bank accounts held at the aforementioned Bank, transferring through electronically transmitted orders to the joint account number ... of the complainants from bank accounts numbered ..., ..., and ..., the total amount of €55,710, as detailed in the orders, and subsequently, using an ATM card, she gradually withdrew from the aforementioned account number ..., the total amount of €55,710, making 84 individual withdrawals from automatic teller machines. In addition, the defendant, during the period from June 2008 to November 2008, in the same exact manner (through the electronic management system of the bank accounts), transferred through electronically transmitted orders to account number ..., which she had opened at ..., from the complainants' bank accounts numbered ..., ..., ..., ..., and ..., the total amount of €73,942, as detailed in the orders regarding the transfers of these amounts. Furthermore, during the period from February 2008 to November 2008, through multiple acts constituting a continuation of the crime, although she had received from the first complainant ... the amounts of €695.04, €695.04, and €845.04, in order to pay his insurance contributions to O.A.E.E. for the periods of January-February 2008, May-June 2008, and September-October 2008, as well as the amounts of €250 and €280, in order to settle credit card bills for "...", respectively, and from the second complainant ... she received the amounts of €283.64, €419.26, and €385.38, to pay the latter's insurance contributions to O.A.E.E. for the periods of July-August 2007, May-June 2008, September-October 2008, and November-December 2008, as well as the amount of €1,888.03 for the settlement of VAT, she never paid the above amounts to settle the aforementioned obligations, nor did she return them to the complainants, despite being urged to do so, but incorporated them into her assets and wrongfully appropriated them. The defendant denies the charges against her and claims that the withdrawals were made by the second complainant and that all the amounts transferred to her account were transferred to cover the company's expenses and their personal expenses, due to her cohabitation with the second complainant and with his knowledge, with whom she intended to marry. However, this claim is not supported by any evidence; on the contrary, it emerged that she conducted the transfers of the money and withdrawals without the complainants' knowledge, and when she learned that they had been informed about the account movements and met at the Bank, her behavior and demeanor indicated guilt, according to the testimony of the prosecution witness ..., an employee of the Pangrati branch of ..., who saw her on the same day at the aforementioned Bank when she met with the complainants. The ongoing act of fraud using a computer was committed by the defendant professionally, as evidenced by her repeated commission of the act, as well as the infrastructure she had established with the intent of repeated commission, based on a specific plan and methodology (transferring smaller amounts to a joint account of the complainants from the remaining accounts of the latter, and then withdrawing the transferred amounts with an ATM card, as well as directly transferring smaller amounts from the complainants' accounts to her personal account she had opened at the same bank), indicating her purpose to generate income, with the financial benefit she gained, corresponding to the complainants' damage, exceeding a total of €30,000., source_sentence: Are the general principles for transferring personal data within a group of undertakings to a third country affected by this provision?
sentences: Controllers that are part of a group of undertakings or institutions affiliated to a central body may have a legitimate interest in transmitting personal data within the group of undertakings for internal administrative purposes, including the processing of clients' or employees' personal data. The general principles for the transfer of personal data, within a group of undertakings, to an undertaking located in a third country remain unaffected., 1.Taking into account the state of the art, the costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risk of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller and the processor shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, including inter alia as appropriate: (a)  the pseudonymisation and encryption of personal data; 4.5.2016 L 119/51   (b)  the ability to ensure the ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience of processing systems and services; (c)  the ability to restore the availability and access to personal data in a timely manner in the event of a physical or technical incident; (d)  a process for regularly testing, assessing and evaluating the effectiveness of technical and organisational measures for ensuring the security of the processing.
2.In assessing the appropriate level of security account shall be taken in particular of the risks that are presented by processing, in particular from accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed.
3.Adherence to an approved code of conduct as referred to in Article 40 or an approved certification mechanism as referred to in Article 42 may be used as an element by which to demonstrate compliance with the requirements set out in paragraph 1 of this Article.
4.The controller and processor shall take steps to ensure that any natural person acting under the authority of the controller or the processor who has access to personal data does not process them except on instructions from the controller, unless he or she is required to do so by Union or Member State law., **Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**  
**Provisions:**  
**Time of commission of the act:**  
**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**  
**Reasoning:** Partially accepts the lawsuit.  
**Facts:** The plaintiff, who works as a lawyer, maintains a savings account with the defendant banking corporation under account number GR.............. Pursuant to a contract dated June 11, 2010, established in Thessaloniki between the defendant and the plaintiff, the plaintiff was granted access to the electronic banking system (e-banking) to conduct banking transactions remotely. On October 10, 2020, the plaintiff fell victim to electronic fraud through the "phishing" method, whereby an unknown perpetrator managed to extract and transfer €3,000.00 from the plaintiff’s account to another account of the same bank. Specifically, on that day at 6:51 a.m., the plaintiff received an email from the sender ".........", with the address ..........., informing him that his debit card had been suspended and that online payments and cash withdrawals could not be made until the issue was resolved. The email urged him to confirm his details within the next 72 hours by following a link titled "card activation."  
The plaintiff read the above email on his mobile phone around 8:00 a.m., and believing it came from the defendant, he followed the instructions and accessed a website that was identical (a clone) to that of the defendant. On this page, he was asked to enter his login credentials to connect to the service, which he did, and he was subsequently asked to input his debit card details for the alleged activation, which he also provided. Then, to complete the process, a number was sent to his mobile phone at 8:07 a.m. from the sender ........, which he entered, and two minutes later he received a message from the same sender in English stating that the quick access code had been activated on his mobile. A few minutes later, at 8:18 a.m., he received an email from the defendant informing him of the transfer of €3,000.00 from his account to account number GR ........... held at the same bank, with the beneficiary's details being .......... As soon as the plaintiff read this, he immediately called the defendant's call center and canceled his debit card, the access codes for the service ......., and locked the application .......... At the same time, he verbally submitted a request to dispute and cancel the contested transaction, and in a subsequent phone call, he also canceled his credit card. On the same day, he also sent an email to the defendant informing them in writing of the above and requesting the cancellation of the transaction and the return of the amount of €3,000.00 to his account, as this transfer was not made by him but by an unknown perpetrator through electronic fraud and was not approved by him. It should also be noted that the plaintiff, as the sole beneficiary according to the aforementioned contract for using the defendant's Internet Banking service, never received any update via SMS or the VIBER application from the bank regarding the transaction details before its completion, nor did he receive a one-time code (OTP) to approve the contested transaction. He subsequently filed a complaint against unknown persons at the Cyber Crime Division for the crime of fraud. The defendant sent an email to the plaintiff on October 16, 2020, informing him that his request had been forwarded to the appropriate department of the bank for investigation, stating that the bank would never send him an email or SMS asking him to enter his personal data and that as of October 7, 2020, there was a notice posted for its customers regarding malicious attempts to steal personal data in the "Our News" section on ....... A month after the disputed incident, on November 10, 2020, an amount of €2,296.82 was transferred to the plaintiff's account from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made. The plaintiff immediately sent an email to the defendant asking to be informed whether this transfer was a return of part of the amount that had been illegally withdrawn from his account and requested the return of the remaining amount of €703.18. In its response dated January 13, 2021, the defendant confirmed that the aforementioned amount indeed came from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made, following a freeze of that account initiated by the defendant during the investigation of the incident, but refused to return the remaining amount, claiming it bore no responsibility for the leak of the personal codes to third parties, according to the terms of the service contract established between them.  
From the entirety of the evidence presented to the court, there is no indication of the authenticity of the contested transaction, as the plaintiff did not give his consent for the execution of the transfer of the amount of €3,000.00, especially in light of the provision in Article 72 paragraph 2 of Law 4537/2018 stating that the mere use of the Internet Banking service by the plaintiff does not necessarily constitute sufficient evidence that the payer approved the payment action. Specifically, it was proven that the contested transaction was not carried out following a strong identification of the plaintiff – the sole beneficiary of the account – and his approval, as the latter may have entered his personal codes on the counterfeit website; however, he was never informed, before the completion of the contested transaction, of the amount that would be transferred from his account to a third-party account, nor did he receive on his mobile phone, either via SMS or through the VIBER application or any other means, the one-time code - extra PIN for its completion, which he was required to enter to approve the contested transaction (payment action) and thus complete his identification, a fact that was not countered by any evidence from the defendant. Furthermore, it is noted that the defendant's claims that it bears no responsibility under the terms of the banking services contract, whereby it is not liable for any damage to its customer in cases of unauthorized use of their personal access codes to the Internet Banking service, are to be rejected as fundamentally unfounded. This is because the aforementioned contractual terms are invalid according to the provision of Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, as they contradict the provisions of Articles 71, 73, and 92 of the same Law, which provide for the provider's universal liability and its exemption only for unusual and unforeseen circumstances that are beyond the control of the party invoking them and whose consequences could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary; these provisions establish mandatory law in favor of users, as according to Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, payment service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to the detriment of payment service users, unless the possibility of deviation is explicitly provided and they can decide to offer only more favorable terms to payment service users; the aforementioned contractual terms do not constitute more favorable terms but rather disadvantageous terms for the payment service user. In this case, however, the defendant did not prove the authenticity of the transaction and its approval by the plaintiff and did not invoke, nor did any unusual and unforeseen circumstances beyond its control, the consequences of which could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary, come to light. Therefore, the contested transaction transferring the amount of €3,000.00 is considered, in the absence of demonstrable consent from the plaintiff, unapproved according to the provisions of Article 64 of Law 4537/2018, and the defendant's contrary claims are rejected, especially since the plaintiff proceeded, according to Article 71 paragraph 1 of Law 4537/2018, without undue delay to notify the defendant regarding the contested unapproved payment action. Consequently, the defendant is liable for compensating the plaintiff for the positive damage he suffered under Article 73 of Law 4537/2018 and is obliged to pay him the requested amount of €703.18, while the plaintiff’s fault in the occurrence of this damage cannot be established, as he entered his personal details in an online environment that was a faithful imitation of that of the defendant, as evidenced by the comparison of the screenshots of the fake website and the real website provided by the plaintiff, a fact that he could not have known while being fully convinced that he was transacting with the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant’s liability to compensate the plaintiff is based on the provision of Article 8 of Law 2251/1994, which applies in this case, as the plaintiff's damage resulted from inadequate fulfillment of its obligations in the context of providing its services, but also on the provision of Article 914 of the Civil Code in the sense of omission on its part of unlawfully and culpably imposed actions. In this case, given that during the relevant period there had been a multitude of similar incidents of fraud against the defendant's customers, the latter, as a service provider to the consumer public and bearing transactional obligations of care and security towards them, displayed gross negligence regarding the security provided for electronic transaction services, which was compromised by the fraudulent theft of funds, as it did not comply with all required high-security measures for executing the contested transaction, failing to implement the strict customer identification verification process and to check the authenticity of the account to which the funds were sent, thus not assuming the suspicious nature of the transaction, did not adopt comprehensive and improved protective measures to fully protect its customers against malicious attacks and online fraud and to prevent the infiltration of unauthorized third parties, nor did it fulfill its obligations to inform, accurately inform, and warn its consumers - customers, as it failed to adequately inform them of attempts to steal their personal data through the sending of informative emails or SMS, while merely posting in a section rather than on a central banner (as it later did) does not constitute adequate information such that it meets the requirement of protecting its customers and the increased safeguarding of their interests. Although the plaintiff acted promptly and informed the defendant on the same day about the contested incident, the defendant did not act as promptly regarding the investigation of the incident and the freezing of the account that held the fraudulent credit to prevent the plaintiff's loss, but only returned part of the funds to the plaintiff a month later. This behavior, beyond being culpable due to gross negligence, was also unlawful, as it would have been illegal even without the contractual relationship, as contrary to the provisions of Law 4537/2018 and Law 2251/1994, regarding the lack of security of the services that the consumer is legitimately entitled to expect, as well as the building of trust that is essential in banking transactions, elements that it was obligated to provide within the sphere of the services offered, and contrary to the principles of good faith and commercial ethics, as crystallized in the provision of Article 288 of the Civil Code, as well as the general duty imposed by Article 914 of the Civil Code not to cause harm to another culpably. This resulted not only in positive damage to the plaintiff but also in causing him moral harm consisting of his mental distress and the disruption, agitation, and sorrow he experienced, for which he must be awarded financial compensation. Taking into account all the general circumstances of the case, the extent of the plaintiff's damage, the severity of the defendant's fault, the mental distress suffered by the plaintiff, the insecurity he felt regarding his deposits, the sorrow he experienced, and the stress caused by his financial loss, which occurred during the pandemic period when his earnings from his professional activity had significantly decreased, as well as the financial and social situation of the parties, it is the court's opinion that he should be granted, as financial compensation for his moral harm, an amount of €250.00, which is deemed reasonable and fair. Therefore, the total monetary amount that the plaintiff is entitled to for his positive damage and financial compensation for the moral harm suffered amounts to a total of (€703.18 + €250.00) = €953.18., source_sentence: What kind of policy can knowledge obtained through registries help facilitate?
sentences: The Board should be assisted by a secretariat provided by the European Data Protection Supervisor. The staff of the European Data Protection Supervisor involved in carrying out the tasks conferred on the Board by this Regulation should perform its tasks exclusively under the instructions of, and report to, the Chair of the Board., 1.Without prejudice to other tasks set out under this Regulation, each supervisory authority shall on its territory: (a)  monitor and enforce the application of this Regulation; (b)  promote public awareness and understanding of the risks, rules, safeguards and rights in relation to processing. Activities addressed specifically to children shall receive specific attention; (c)  advise, in accordance with Member State law, the national parliament, the government, and other institutions and bodies on legislative and administrative measures relating to the protection of natural persons' rights and freedoms with regard to processing; (d)  promote the awareness of controllers and processors of their obligations under this Regulation; (e)  upon request, provide information to any data subject concerning the exercise of their rights under this Regulation and, if appropriate, cooperate with the supervisory authorities in other Member States to that end; (f)  handle complaints lodged by a data subject, or by a body, organisation or association in accordance with Article 80, and investigate, to the extent appropriate, the subject matter of the complaint and inform the complainant of the progress and the outcome of the investigation within a reasonable period, in particular if further investigation or coordination with another supervisory authority is necessary; (g)  cooperate with, including sharing information and provide mutual assistance to, other supervisory authorities with a view to ensuring the consistency of application and enforcement of this Regulation; (h)  conduct investigations on the application of this Regulation, including on the basis of information received from another supervisory authority or other public authority; (i)  monitor relevant developments, insofar as they have an impact on the protection of personal data, in particular the development of information and communication technologies and commercial practices; (j)  adopt standard contractual clauses referred to in Article 28(8) and in point (d) of Article 46(2); (k)  establish and maintain a list in relation to the requirement for data protection impact assessment pursuant to Article 35(4); (l)  give advice on the processing operations referred to in Article 36(2); (m)  encourage the drawing up of codes of conduct pursuant to Article 40(1) and provide an opinion and approve such codes of conduct which provide sufficient safeguards, pursuant to Article 40(5); (n)  encourage the establishment of data protection certification mechanisms and of data protection seals and marks pursuant to Article 42(1), and approve the criteria of certification pursuant to Article 42(5); (o)  where applicable, carry out a periodic review of certifications issued in accordance with Article 42(7); 4.5.2016 L 119/68   (p)  draft and publish the criteria for accreditation of a body for monitoring codes of conduct pursuant to Article 41 and of a certification body pursuant to Article 43; (q)  conduct the accreditation of a body for monitoring codes of conduct pursuant to Article 41 and of a certification body pursuant to Article 43; (r)  authorise contractual clauses and provisions referred to in Article 46(3); (s)  approve binding corporate rules pursuant to Article 47; (t)  contribute to the activities of the Board; (u)  keep internal records of infringements of this Regulation and of measures taken in accordance with Article 58(2); and (v)  fulfil any other tasks related to the protection of personal data.
2.Each supervisory authority shall facilitate the submission of complaints referred to in point (f) of paragraph 1 by measures such as a complaint submission form which can also be completed electronically, without excluding other means of communication.
3.The performance of the tasks of each supervisory authority shall be free of charge for the data subject and, where applicable, for the data protection officer.
4.Where requests are manifestly unfounded or excessive, in particular because of their repetitive character, the supervisory authority may charge a reasonable fee based on administrative costs, or refuse to act on the request. The supervisory authority shall bear the burden of demonstrating the manifestly unfounded or excessive character of the request., By coupling information from registries, researchers can obtain new knowledge of great value with regard to widespread medical conditions such as cardiovascular disease, cancer and depression. On the basis of registries, research results can be enhanced, as they draw on a larger population. Within social science, research on the basis of registries enables researchers to obtain essential knowledge about the long-term correlation of a number of social conditions such as unemployment and education with other life conditions. Research results obtained through registries provide solid, high-quality knowledge which can provide the basis for the formulation and implementation of knowledge-based policy, improve the quality of life for a number of people and improve the efficiency of social services. In order to facilitate scientific research, personal data can be processed for scientific research purposes, subject to appropriate conditions and safeguards set out in Union or Member State law., source_sentence: Who may lay down specific provisions on data protection?
sentences: The decision should be agreed jointly by the lead supervisory authority and the supervisory authorities concerned and should be directed towards the main or single establishment of the controller or processor and be binding on the controller and processor. The controller or processor should take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with this Regulation and the implementation of the decision notified by the lead supervisory authority to the main establishment of the controller or processor as regards the processing activities in the Union., **Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**  
**Provisions:**  
**Time of commission of the act:**  
**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**  
**Reasoning:** Partially accepts the lawsuit.  
**Facts:** The plaintiff, who works as a lawyer, maintains a savings account with the defendant banking corporation under account number GR.............. Pursuant to a contract dated June 11, 2010, established in Thessaloniki between the defendant and the plaintiff, the plaintiff was granted access to the electronic banking system (e-banking) to conduct banking transactions remotely. On October 10, 2020, the plaintiff fell victim to electronic fraud through the "phishing" method, whereby an unknown perpetrator managed to extract and transfer €3,000.00 from the plaintiff’s account to another account of the same bank. Specifically, on that day at 6:51 a.m., the plaintiff received an email from the sender ".........", with the address ..........., informing him that his debit card had been suspended and that online payments and cash withdrawals could not be made until the issue was resolved. The email urged him to confirm his details within the next 72 hours by following a link titled "card activation."  
The plaintiff read the above email on his mobile phone around 8:00 a.m., and believing it came from the defendant, he followed the instructions and accessed a website that was identical (a clone) to that of the defendant. On this page, he was asked to enter his login credentials to connect to the service, which he did, and he was subsequently asked to input his debit card details for the alleged activation, which he also provided. Then, to complete the process, a number was sent to his mobile phone at 8:07 a.m. from the sender ........, which he entered, and two minutes later he received a message from the same sender in English stating that the quick access code had been activated on his mobile. A few minutes later, at 8:18 a.m., he received an email from the defendant informing him of the transfer of €3,000.00 from his account to account number GR ........... held at the same bank, with the beneficiary's details being .......... As soon as the plaintiff read this, he immediately called the defendant's call center and canceled his debit card, the access codes for the service ......., and locked the application .......... At the same time, he verbally submitted a request to dispute and cancel the contested transaction, and in a subsequent phone call, he also canceled his credit card. On the same day, he also sent an email to the defendant informing them in writing of the above and requesting the cancellation of the transaction and the return of the amount of €3,000.00 to his account, as this transfer was not made by him but by an unknown perpetrator through electronic fraud and was not approved by him. It should also be noted that the plaintiff, as the sole beneficiary according to the aforementioned contract for using the defendant's Internet Banking service, never received any update via SMS or the VIBER application from the bank regarding the transaction details before its completion, nor did he receive a one-time code (OTP) to approve the contested transaction. He subsequently filed a complaint against unknown persons at the Cyber Crime Division for the crime of fraud. The defendant sent an email to the plaintiff on October 16, 2020, informing him that his request had been forwarded to the appropriate department of the bank for investigation, stating that the bank would never send him an email or SMS asking him to enter his personal data and that as of October 7, 2020, there was a notice posted for its customers regarding malicious attempts to steal personal data in the "Our News" section on ....... A month after the disputed incident, on November 10, 2020, an amount of €2,296.82 was transferred to the plaintiff's account from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made. The plaintiff immediately sent an email to the defendant asking to be informed whether this transfer was a return of part of the amount that had been illegally withdrawn from his account and requested the return of the remaining amount of €703.18. In its response dated January 13, 2021, the defendant confirmed that the aforementioned amount indeed came from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made, following a freeze of that account initiated by the defendant during the investigation of the incident, but refused to return the remaining amount, claiming it bore no responsibility for the leak of the personal codes to third parties, according to the terms of the service contract established between them.  
From the entirety of the evidence presented to the court, there is no indication of the authenticity of the contested transaction, as the plaintiff did not give his consent for the execution of the transfer of the amount of €3,000.00, especially in light of the provision in Article 72 paragraph 2 of Law 4537/2018 stating that the mere use of the Internet Banking service by the plaintiff does not necessarily constitute sufficient evidence that the payer approved the payment action. Specifically, it was proven that the contested transaction was not carried out following a strong identification of the plaintiff – the sole beneficiary of the account – and his approval, as the latter may have entered his personal codes on the counterfeit website; however, he was never informed, before the completion of the contested transaction, of the amount that would be transferred from his account to a third-party account, nor did he receive on his mobile phone, either via SMS or through the VIBER application or any other means, the one-time code - extra PIN for its completion, which he was required to enter to approve the contested transaction (payment action) and thus complete his identification, a fact that was not countered by any evidence from the defendant. Furthermore, it is noted that the defendant's claims that it bears no responsibility under the terms of the banking services contract, whereby it is not liable for any damage to its customer in cases of unauthorized use of their personal access codes to the Internet Banking service, are to be rejected as fundamentally unfounded. This is because the aforementioned contractual terms are invalid according to the provision of Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, as they contradict the provisions of Articles 71, 73, and 92 of the same Law, which provide for the provider's universal liability and its exemption only for unusual and unforeseen circumstances that are beyond the control of the party invoking them and whose consequences could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary; these provisions establish mandatory law in favor of users, as according to Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, payment service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to the detriment of payment service users, unless the possibility of deviation is explicitly provided and they can decide to offer only more favorable terms to payment service users; the aforementioned contractual terms do not constitute more favorable terms but rather disadvantageous terms for the payment service user. In this case, however, the defendant did not prove the authenticity of the transaction and its approval by the plaintiff and did not invoke, nor did any unusual and unforeseen circumstances beyond its control, the consequences of which could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary, come to light. Therefore, the contested transaction transferring the amount of €3,000.00 is considered, in the absence of demonstrable consent from the plaintiff, unapproved according to the provisions of Article 64 of Law 4537/2018, and the defendant's contrary claims are rejected, especially since the plaintiff proceeded, according to Article 71 paragraph 1 of Law 4537/2018, without undue delay to notify the defendant regarding the contested unapproved payment action. Consequently, the defendant is liable for compensating the plaintiff for the positive damage he suffered under Article 73 of Law 4537/2018 and is obliged to pay him the requested amount of €703.18, while the plaintiff’s fault in the occurrence of this damage cannot be established, as he entered his personal details in an online environment that was a faithful imitation of that of the defendant, as evidenced by the comparison of the screenshots of the fake website and the real website provided by the plaintiff, a fact that he could not have known while being fully convinced that he was transacting with the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant’s liability to compensate the plaintiff is based on the provision of Article 8 of Law 2251/1994, which applies in this case, as the plaintiff's damage resulted from inadequate fulfillment of its obligations in the context of providing its services, but also on the provision of Article 914 of the Civil Code in the sense of omission on its part of unlawfully and culpably imposed actions. In this case, given that during the relevant period there had been a multitude of similar incidents of fraud against the defendant's customers, the latter, as a service provider to the consumer public and bearing transactional obligations of care and security towards them, displayed gross negligence regarding the security provided for electronic transaction services, which was compromised by the fraudulent theft of funds, as it did not comply with all required high-security measures for executing the contested transaction, failing to implement the strict customer identification verification process and to check the authenticity of the account to which the funds were sent, thus not assuming the suspicious nature of the transaction, did not adopt comprehensive and improved protective measures to fully protect its customers against malicious attacks and online fraud and to prevent the infiltration of unauthorized third parties, nor did it fulfill its obligations to inform, accurately inform, and warn its consumers - customers, as it failed to adequately inform them of attempts to steal their personal data through the sending of informative emails or SMS, while merely posting in a section rather than on a central banner (as it later did) does not constitute adequate information such that it meets the requirement of protecting its customers and the increased safeguarding of their interests. Although the plaintiff acted promptly and informed the defendant on the same day about the contested incident, the defendant did not act as promptly regarding the investigation of the incident and the freezing of the account that held the fraudulent credit to prevent the plaintiff's loss, but only returned part of the funds to the plaintiff a month later. This behavior, beyond being culpable due to gross negligence, was also unlawful, as it would have been illegal even without the contractual relationship, as contrary to the provisions of Law 4537/2018 and Law 2251/1994, regarding the lack of security of the services that the consumer is legitimately entitled to expect, as well as the building of trust that is essential in banking transactions, elements that it was obligated to provide within the sphere of the services offered, and contrary to the principles of good faith and commercial ethics, as crystallized in the provision of Article 288 of the Civil Code, as well as the general duty imposed by Article 914 of the Civil Code not to cause harm to another culpably. This resulted not only in positive damage to the plaintiff but also in causing him moral harm consisting of his mental distress and the disruption, agitation, and sorrow he experienced, for which he must be awarded financial compensation. Taking into account all the general circumstances of the case, the extent of the plaintiff's damage, the severity of the defendant's fault, the mental distress suffered by the plaintiff, the insecurity he felt regarding his deposits, the sorrow he experienced, and the stress caused by his financial loss, which occurred during the pandemic period when his earnings from his professional activity had significantly decreased, as well as the financial and social situation of the parties, it is the court's opinion that he should be granted, as financial compensation for his moral harm, an amount of €250.00, which is deemed reasonable and fair. Therefore, the total monetary amount that the plaintiff is entitled to for his positive damage and financial compensation for the moral harm suffered amounts to a total of (€703.18 + €250.00) = €953.18., Personal data which are, by their nature, particularly sensitive in relation to fundamental rights and freedoms merit specific protection as the context of their processing could create significant risks to the fundamental rights and freedoms. Those personal data should include personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, whereby the use of the term ‘racial origin’ in this Regulation does not imply an acceptance by the Union of theories which attempt to determine the existence of separate human races. The processing of photographs should not systematically be considered to be processing of special categories of personal data as they are covered by the definition of biometric data only when processed through a specific technical means allowing the unique identification or authentication of a natural person. Such personal data should not be processed, unless processing is allowed in specific cases set out in this Regulation, taking into account that Member States law may lay down specific provisions on data protection in order to adapt the application of the rules of this Regulation for compliance with a legal obligation or for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller. In addition to the specific requirements for such processing, the general principles and other rules of this Regulation should apply, in particular as regards the conditions for lawful processing. Derogations from the general prohibition for processing such special categories of personal data should be explicitly provided, inter alia, where the data subject gives his or her explicit consent or in respect of specific needs in particular where the processing is carried out in the course of legitimate activities by certain associations or foundations the purpose of which is to permit the exercise of fundamental freedoms., source_sentence: What is the right given in point (e)?
sentences: The risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, of varying likelihood and severity, may result from personal data processing which could lead to physical, material or non-material damage, in particular: where the processing may give rise to discrimination, identity theft or fraud, financial loss, damage to the reputation, loss of confidentiality of personal data protected by professional secrecy, unauthorised reversal of pseudonymisation, or any other significant economic or social disadvantage; where data subjects might be deprived of their rights and freedoms or prevented from exercising control over their personal data; where personal data are processed which reveal racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religion or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, data concerning health or data concerning sex life or criminal convictions and offences or related security measures; where personal aspects are evaluated, in particular analysing or predicting aspects concerning performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences or interests, reliability or behaviour, location or movements, in order to create or use personal profiles; where personal data of vulnerable natural persons, in particular of children, are processed; or where processing involves a large amount of personal data and affects a large number of data subjects., 1.Where personal data have not been obtained from the data subject, the controller shall provide the data subject with the following information: (a)  the identity and the contact details of the controller and, where applicable, of the controller's representative; (b)  the contact details of the data protection officer, where applicable; (c)  the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended as well as the legal basis for the processing; (d)  the categories of personal data concerned; (e)  the recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data, if any; 4.5.2016 L 119/41   (f) where applicable, that the controller intends to transfer personal data to a recipient in a third country or international organisation and the existence or absence of an adequacy decision by the Commission, or in the case of transfers referred to in Article 46 or 47, or the second subparagraph of Article 49(1), reference to the appropriate or suitable safeguards and the means to obtain a copy of them or where they have been made available.
2.In addition to the information referred to in paragraph 1, the controller shall provide the data subject with the following information necessary to ensure fair and transparent processing in respect of the data subject: (a)  the period for which the personal data will be stored, or if that is not possible, the criteria used to determine that period; (b)  where the processing is based on point (f) of Article 6(1), the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party; (c)  the existence of the right to request from the controller access to and rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of processing concerning the data subject and to object to processing as well as the right to data portability; (d)  where processing is based on point (a) of Article 6(1) or point (a) of Article 9(2), the existence of the right to withdraw consent at any time, without affecting the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdrawal; (e)  the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority; (f)  from which source the personal data originate, and if applicable, whether it came from publicly accessible sources; (g)  the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject.
3.The controller shall provide the information referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2: (a)  within a reasonable period after obtaining the personal data, but at the latest within one month, having regard to the specific circumstances in which the personal data are processed; (b)  if the personal data are to be used for communication with the data subject, at the latest at the time of the first communication to that data subject; or (c)  if a disclosure to another recipient is envisaged, at the latest when the personal data are first disclosed.
4.Where the controller intends to further process the personal data for a purpose other than that for which the personal data were obtained, the controller shall provide the data subject prior to that further processing with information on that other purpose and with any relevant further information as referred to in paragraph 2
5.Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall not apply where and insofar as: (a)  the data subject already has the information; (b)  the provision of such information proves impossible or would involve a disproportionate effort, in particular for processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes, subject to the conditions and safeguards referred to in Article 89(1) or in so far as the obligation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article is likely to render impossible or seriously impair the achievement of the objectives of that processing. In such cases the controller shall take appropriate measures to protect the data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, including making the information publicly available; (c)  obtaining or disclosure is expressly laid down by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject and which provides appropriate measures to protect the data subject's legitimate interests; or (d)  where the personal data must remain confidential subject to an obligation of professional secrecy regulated by Union or Member State law, including a statutory obligation of secrecy. 4.5.2016 L 119/42, **Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**  
**Provisions:**  
**Time of commission of the act:**  
**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**  
**Reasoning:** Partially accepts the lawsuit.  
**Facts:** The plaintiff, who works as a lawyer, maintains a savings account with the defendant banking corporation under account number GR.............. Pursuant to a contract dated June 11, 2010, established in Thessaloniki between the defendant and the plaintiff, the plaintiff was granted access to the electronic banking system (e-banking) to conduct banking transactions remotely. On October 10, 2020, the plaintiff fell victim to electronic fraud through the "phishing" method, whereby an unknown perpetrator managed to extract and transfer €3,000.00 from the plaintiff’s account to another account of the same bank. Specifically, on that day at 6:51 a.m., the plaintiff received an email from the sender ".........", with the address ..........., informing him that his debit card had been suspended and that online payments and cash withdrawals could not be made until the issue was resolved. The email urged him to confirm his details within the next 72 hours by following a link titled "card activation."  
The plaintiff read the above email on his mobile phone around 8:00 a.m., and believing it came from the defendant, he followed the instructions and accessed a website that was identical (a clone) to that of the defendant. On this page, he was asked to enter his login credentials to connect to the service, which he did, and he was subsequently asked to input his debit card details for the alleged activation, which he also provided. Then, to complete the process, a number was sent to his mobile phone at 8:07 a.m. from the sender ........, which he entered, and two minutes later he received a message from the same sender in English stating that the quick access code had been activated on his mobile. A few minutes later, at 8:18 a.m., he received an email from the defendant informing him of the transfer of €3,000.00 from his account to account number GR ........... held at the same bank, with the beneficiary's details being .......... As soon as the plaintiff read this, he immediately called the defendant's call center and canceled his debit card, the access codes for the service ......., and locked the application .......... At the same time, he verbally submitted a request to dispute and cancel the contested transaction, and in a subsequent phone call, he also canceled his credit card. On the same day, he also sent an email to the defendant informing them in writing of the above and requesting the cancellation of the transaction and the return of the amount of €3,000.00 to his account, as this transfer was not made by him but by an unknown perpetrator through electronic fraud and was not approved by him. It should also be noted that the plaintiff, as the sole beneficiary according to the aforementioned contract for using the defendant's Internet Banking service, never received any update via SMS or the VIBER application from the bank regarding the transaction details before its completion, nor did he receive a one-time code (OTP) to approve the contested transaction. He subsequently filed a complaint against unknown persons at the Cyber Crime Division for the crime of fraud. The defendant sent an email to the plaintiff on October 16, 2020, informing him that his request had been forwarded to the appropriate department of the bank for investigation, stating that the bank would never send him an email or SMS asking him to enter his personal data and that as of October 7, 2020, there was a notice posted for its customers regarding malicious attempts to steal personal data in the "Our News" section on ....... A month after the disputed incident, on November 10, 2020, an amount of €2,296.82 was transferred to the plaintiff's account from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made. The plaintiff immediately sent an email to the defendant asking to be informed whether this transfer was a return of part of the amount that had been illegally withdrawn from his account and requested the return of the remaining amount of €703.18. In its response dated January 13, 2021, the defendant confirmed that the aforementioned amount indeed came from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made, following a freeze of that account initiated by the defendant during the investigation of the incident, but refused to return the remaining amount, claiming it bore no responsibility for the leak of the personal codes to third parties, according to the terms of the service contract established between them.  
From the entirety of the evidence presented to the court, there is no indication of the authenticity of the contested transaction, as the plaintiff did not give his consent for the execution of the transfer of the amount of €3,000.00, especially in light of the provision in Article 72 paragraph 2 of Law 4537/2018 stating that the mere use of the Internet Banking service by the plaintiff does not necessarily constitute sufficient evidence that the payer approved the payment action. Specifically, it was proven that the contested transaction was not carried out following a strong identification of the plaintiff – the sole beneficiary of the account – and his approval, as the latter may have entered his personal codes on the counterfeit website; however, he was never informed, before the completion of the contested transaction, of the amount that would be transferred from his account to a third-party account, nor did he receive on his mobile phone, either via SMS or through the VIBER application or any other means, the one-time code - extra PIN for its completion, which he was required to enter to approve the contested transaction (payment action) and thus complete his identification, a fact that was not countered by any evidence from the defendant. Furthermore, it is noted that the defendant's claims that it bears no responsibility under the terms of the banking services contract, whereby it is not liable for any damage to its customer in cases of unauthorized use of their personal access codes to the Internet Banking service, are to be rejected as fundamentally unfounded. This is because the aforementioned contractual terms are invalid according to the provision of Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, as they contradict the provisions of Articles 71, 73, and 92 of the same Law, which provide for the provider's universal liability and its exemption only for unusual and unforeseen circumstances that are beyond the control of the party invoking them and whose consequences could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary; these provisions establish mandatory law in favor of users, as according to Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, payment service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to the detriment of payment service users, unless the possibility of deviation is explicitly provided and they can decide to offer only more favorable terms to payment service users; the aforementioned contractual terms do not constitute more favorable terms but rather disadvantageous terms for the payment service user. In this case, however, the defendant did not prove the authenticity of the transaction and its approval by the plaintiff and did not invoke, nor did any unusual and unforeseen circumstances beyond its control, the consequences of which could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary, come to light. Therefore, the contested transaction transferring the amount of €3,000.00 is considered, in the absence of demonstrable consent from the plaintiff, unapproved according to the provisions of Article 64 of Law 4537/2018, and the defendant's contrary claims are rejected, especially since the plaintiff proceeded, according to Article 71 paragraph 1 of Law 4537/2018, without undue delay to notify the defendant regarding the contested unapproved payment action. Consequently, the defendant is liable for compensating the plaintiff for the positive damage he suffered under Article 73 of Law 4537/2018 and is obliged to pay him the requested amount of €703.18, while the plaintiff’s fault in the occurrence of this damage cannot be established, as he entered his personal details in an online environment that was a faithful imitation of that of the defendant, as evidenced by the comparison of the screenshots of the fake website and the real website provided by the plaintiff, a fact that he could not have known while being fully convinced that he was transacting with the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant’s liability to compensate the plaintiff is based on the provision of Article 8 of Law 2251/1994, which applies in this case, as the plaintiff's damage resulted from inadequate fulfillment of its obligations in the context of providing its services, but also on the provision of Article 914 of the Civil Code in the sense of omission on its part of unlawfully and culpably imposed actions. In this case, given that during the relevant period there had been a multitude of similar incidents of fraud against the defendant's customers, the latter, as a service provider to the consumer public and bearing transactional obligations of care and security towards them, displayed gross negligence regarding the security provided for electronic transaction services, which was compromised by the fraudulent theft of funds, as it did not comply with all required high-security measures for executing the contested transaction, failing to implement the strict customer identification verification process and to check the authenticity of the account to which the funds were sent, thus not assuming the suspicious nature of the transaction, did not adopt comprehensive and improved protective measures to fully protect its customers against malicious attacks and online fraud and to prevent the infiltration of unauthorized third parties, nor did it fulfill its obligations to inform, accurately inform, and warn its consumers - customers, as it failed to adequately inform them of attempts to steal their personal data through the sending of informative emails or SMS, while merely posting in a section rather than on a central banner (as it later did) does not constitute adequate information such that it meets the requirement of protecting its customers and the increased safeguarding of their interests. Although the plaintiff acted promptly and informed the defendant on the same day about the contested incident, the defendant did not act as promptly regarding the investigation of the incident and the freezing of the account that held the fraudulent credit to prevent the plaintiff's loss, but only returned part of the funds to the plaintiff a month later. This behavior, beyond being culpable due to gross negligence, was also unlawful, as it would have been illegal even without the contractual relationship, as contrary to the provisions of Law 4537/2018 and Law 2251/1994, regarding the lack of security of the services that the consumer is legitimately entitled to expect, as well as the building of trust that is essential in banking transactions, elements that it was obligated to provide within the sphere of the services offered, and contrary to the principles of good faith and commercial ethics, as crystallized in the provision of Article 288 of the Civil Code, as well as the general duty imposed by Article 914 of the Civil Code not to cause harm to another culpably. This resulted not only in positive damage to the plaintiff but also in causing him moral harm consisting of his mental distress and the disruption, agitation, and sorrow he experienced, for which he must be awarded financial compensation. Taking into account all the general circumstances of the case, the extent of the plaintiff's damage, the severity of the defendant's fault, the mental distress suffered by the plaintiff, the insecurity he felt regarding his deposits, the sorrow he experienced, and the stress caused by his financial loss, which occurred during the pandemic period when his earnings from his professional activity had significantly decreased, as well as the financial and social situation of the parties, it is the court's opinion that he should be granted, as financial compensation for his moral harm, an amount of €250.00, which is deemed reasonable and fair. Therefore, the total monetary amount that the plaintiff is entitled to for his positive damage and financial compensation for the moral harm suffered amounts to a total of (€703.18 + €250.00) = €953.18.
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics: cosine_accuracy@1, cosine_accuracy@3, cosine_accuracy@5, cosine_accuracy@10, cosine_precision@1, cosine_precision@3, cosine_precision@5, cosine_precision@10, cosine_recall@1, cosine_recall@3, cosine_recall@5, cosine_recall@10, cosine_ndcg@10, cosine_mrr@10, cosine_map@100
model-index: name: ModernBERT Embed base Legal Matryoshka
results: task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
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type: dim_768
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Created: 2025-07-13 10:11:02