Model: MaxNoichl/nomic-embed-philosophy-triplets_v9
Author: MaxNoichl
Pipeline: sentence-similarity
Library: sentence-transformers
Tags: sentence-transformers, safetensors, nomic_bert, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:10000, loss:TripletLoss, custom_code, arxiv:1908.10084, arxiv:1703.07737, base_model:nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1, base_model:finetune:nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1, model-index, text-embeddings-inference, endpoints_compatible, region:us
Base models (finetune): id: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
Card metadata: base_model: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics: cosine_accuracy, dot_accuracy, manhattan_accuracy, euclidean_accuracy, max_accuracy
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
tags: sentence-transformers, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:10000, loss:TripletLoss
widget: source_sentence: question may well be considered: What is the particular characteristic of a philosophical position which, with whatever unique aspects it may include, yet unites it with others as an expression of idealism? In the reply which follows, it is my hope that many idealists will concur, but I shall assume no more than that it offers what, to one idealist, seems pertinent to the issues which Professor Pratt raises. If I analyze his article correctly, these are five in number: (1) the place of the esse est percipi principle in idealistic philosophy; (2) the idealistic conception of reality, and in particular, the status of the objective world; (3) the idealistic view of knowledge; (4) the significance of the self; (5) the relation of idealism to realism. This is an extensive program, and its treatment here must be fragmentary at many points. Furthermore, it will be limited to the point of view of objective idealism, since subjective idealism is considered elsewhere in this publication by Professor Bri(rhtman. Esse Est Percipi In sug(resting that idealism should be mentalistic, proclaiming the doctrine, esse est percipi, Professor Pratt is reiterating a belief that has been held by numerous realistic thinkers in recent years. Just thirty years ago, Professor G. E. Moore published his wellknown refutation of the Berkeleian principle. To not a few idealists these arguments appeared brilliant and on many points including the issue of the principle itself as he interpreted it, convincing. But the objective idealist must protest that the designation
sentences: of the argument as a "Refutation of Idealism" seems a most regrettable misnomer. The misunderstandina has persisted not only in Professor Pratt's thought, but so frequently in realistic statements, that some attention must be directed towards it. Professor MIoore opened his essay by pointina out that the conclusion fundamentally characteristic of modern idealism is that the universe is spiritual. From this very acceptable statement, he proceeds to make a bewildering, hasty, and unconvincing passage to the position that if idealists think the world spiritual, they must regard it as having, its being in being consciously perceived. The assumption is made despite the fact that Professor Moore in the Principiac Ethica describes spiritual values as real parts of the objective world, to be discovered like the color yellow, merely by being, IS IDEALISMf REALISM? 423 observed. However, as we proceed with the "refutation," we discover that the error of idealists does not lie in their believingfl that the world is spiritual-Professor Moore "devoutly hopes" that it may be so. Their peculiar error lies in their reason for holding this belief, which is, we are told, the esse est percipi argument. The candid reply is that for objective idealists at least, and they constitute a generous percentage of idealists of both the present and past generations, it is not. The subjective idealist may hold, indeed, that all that is real must be a conscious mind or perceived by such a mind; that there can be "no object without a subject"; that "mind creates, that this "mere fact" must not be allowed to weigh in our calculations, since it can not be investigated by the "method of agreement and difference." This is a startling instance 5"Principles of Human Knowledge," paragraphs 50, 58. t of readiness to sacrifice empirical fact-admittedly universal-to methodological theory. The method of agreement and difference is a way of studying the relations of such phenomena as are difficult of observation because they are not always present. And yet we are called upon to eliminate from our philosophy an ever-present fact, the ego, because just this, its ubiquity, prevents our studying it by a logical method invented as an aid in the investigation of inconstant phenomena. Thus, to sum up our reply to this criticism: idealism can not be contradictory to the fundamental laws of logic, for these are laws of mental self-consistency. And subsidiary logical "laws" and "methods" are neither sacrosanct nor axiomatic. 2. We turn now to consider the alleged inconsistency of the idealistic position. It is urged by contemporary realists, as by those of Berkeley's day, that the distinction actually made by idealists between subject and object, percept and image, is possible only on the supposition that non-mental reality exists.10 The idealist admits that he makes this distinction. He, like other men, recognizes a difference between present and external, and merely imagined, objects. But he distinguishes the two kinds of things, not as extramental and mental, but as objects respectively of his shared and of his unshared consciousness,, actuality' signified, in the first instance, the social world, the nexus of interpersonal relationships among men, but it also included the realm of physical nature, as well as the instinctive drives and lower passions of the human soul itself. L Frank When Frank first succeeded in clothing this Romantic vision of human life in philosophical language, in the years 1904-1906, the language he employed was that of the Kantian or 'critical' tradition. On some level, the vision was undoubtedly prior to the Kantian clothing in which we find it draped in Frank's early philosophical writings; Frank would not have been attracted to Kantianism in the first place if the latter had not helped him articulate his own feelings and experience. But while conceding this, we must, at the same time, avoid exaggerating the independence of thought from concepts. It is doubtful whether the content of his own experience became fully explicit for Frank before he found, in the writings of Kant and his successors, the conceptual vocabulary with which to render it communicable. Although the works of Windelband were among the texts Frank read when he first launched his study of modern philosophy around 1900,9 it was not until a few years later that the influence of Windel band's ideas become manifest in Frank's own writings. In the intervening period, Frank was hired to produce a Russian transla tion of the German philosopher's best-known work, the collection of addresses and articles gathered together under the title of Pr?ludien [Preludes]. In his memoirs, Frank recalled having been, source_sentence: impression that evolutionary ecology began with G. E. Hutchinson's inspiration and Robert MacArthur and Richard Levins' theoretical formulations, and with G. C. Williams' urging of individual and genic selection ais the key to ecology's mysteries. But as James Collins stressed in the paper that opened this symposium, and as W. C. Allee and colleagues detailed in 1949, the association between ecology and evolution has as long and varied a separately The late 1950s and the 1960s saw not the birth of a new subject from the marriage of two others, but a renaissance and, most especially, a redirection of a long-standing interaction. Evolutionary ecology and its close ally, population biology became self-consciously defined in the 1960s, largely by raising new questions. But for much of the early history of ecology and evolution, the distinction between the fields was blurred or nonexistent. Darwin's pioneering ecological work and theorizing were, of course, integral to his evolutionary theory; the biogeography of Alfred Russel Wallace and Henry Walter Bates was as much a part of ecology as of evolution, and ecology remains part of the work of their successors such as William Matthew.Much of early ecology was in essence a physiological approach to adaptation, and if the physiological ecologists were vague about mechanisms or skeptical of natural selection, they were nonetheless concerned with a central concept in evolutionary biology. We must bear in mind, too, that many of the organismal biologists of preceding generations, like many today, were not concerned with whether they defined themselves as ecologists or
sentences: and time, and gave mathematical laws for its dynamical development. Mechanics dealt with mass particles and continuous ponderable media. Electro magnetics dealt with electric charges, magnetic dipoles and electro magnetic fields. Einstein noted the puzzling fact that mechanical and electromagnetic laws have different space-time properties. Mechanical laws, on the one hand, are covariant7 relative to Galilean frames8; electromagnetic laws, on the other hand, are covariant relative to 5 15 February 1963: Heisenberg said that the importance of observables in physics ity the picture that the real things are which observe and everything else is nothing, was, he assert , in the minds of the people at G ttingen at that time. 6 AHQP February 1963: Heisenberg said about the discovery of the certain I tried to say what space meant and what velocity meant and so on. I just tried to turn around the question according to the example of Einstein. You know Einstein just reversed the question by saying 'We do not ask how we describe nature by mathematical structures, but we say that nature always makes so that the mathematical scheme can be fitted to it. That is, you find in nature only situations which can be described by means of the Lorentz transformation. Therefore, I just suggested to myself "Well! is it not so that I can only find in nature situations which can be described by quantum mechanics?' Then I asked 'Well! what are these situations which you can define'. Then I found very soon that these are the situations in which there was this, established the first ecological society and the first ecological journal both in 1913 the Americans (United States and Canada) established their ecological society two years later and were soon making a greater contribution to the advancement of ecology than were ecologists from anywhere else. Not that the American ecologists were individually more productive than those elsewhere; there were just more of them. How many more is not yet known. Today there are over 6000 members of the Ecological Society of America, and Robert L. Burgess has constructed a graph indicating the growth of this society since its founding.' It is to be hoped that Andrew G. Duff and Philip D. Lowe, who here contribute the chapter on Great Britain, will in their forthcoming history of British ecology include information comparable to that which Burgess has provided for the British Ecological Society. One thing they tell us in their present chapter (p. 143) is that Arthur G. Tansley, Britain's leading plant ecologist in the first half of this century, actively discouraged students from majoring in his subject because there were practically no jobs for them after they graduated. While this may have been the responsible thing to do, it must have had an adverse effect on the growth of the society. The organization of science in the USSR differs in several respects from that in America and Britain. For one thing, many (probably most) of its scientists work in research institutes and/or academies, which apparently reduce the need or desire for scientific, not. They were naturalists, often more specifically ornithologists, entomologists, botanists, or ichthyologists, and in this role contributed to as the occasion arose or demanded of speciation, ography, . The American Society ists was just that. I can remember Bates remarking with his endearing chuckle that "ecology" was just Greek for natural history. Dissolution Of The Bonds Nevertheless, ecology as a self-conscious discipline did develop considerable autonomy throughout the first half of this century, so that its conjunction with evolutionary biology in the 1960s was a real event. We have been reminded during this conference that the forgers of the neo-Darwinian synthesis in the 1930s and 1940s included geneticists, paleontologists, and systematists, but not ecologists a curious fact indeed, considering the role of ecology in Darwin's work. In the early 1960s graduate students at major centers of ecological research could find little instruction on how to shape a dissertation that might combine ecology with population genetics. The contributors to this conference have suggested several reasons for this state of affairs. One reason, it appears, was the attempt of some early ecologists to define ecology as distinct from evolutionary areas such as systematics and as directed toward the definition of phenomena and units of study that might be its special province. Sharon Kingsland and William Kimler in particular have discussed the perceived need to acquire status for ecology as an autonomous, respectable science.4 In this regard some ecologists, as Joel Hagen has demonstrated, emphasized the need for rigor, source_sentence: act on his conclusion or on his being prevented from doing so, is to construe ability or prevention so broadly as to make Aris totle's position on the connection between practical reasoning and action vacuous. Therefore, Aristotle cannot allow the akrat?s to reach a right conclusion (about an action to be performed at once) in cases of akratic action; and, consequently, he must insist that the akrat?s is epistemically deficient with respect to one or more of his premises. The element of the first answer on which I shall concentrate is the claim that the conclusion of a practical syllogism is an action. Aristotle does, to be sure, say of one of the syllogisms discussed in De Motu Animalium 7 that its conclusion "is an action" (701a20), and he asserts two lines later that "the action is the conclusion."4 But these claims should be interpreted in the light of the following points, (i) The example in question reads as follows: I need a covering, a coat is a covering; I need a coat. What I need I ought to make, I need a coat: I make a coat. And the conclusion I must make a coat is an action. (701al8-20) Here we see that there are propositional conclusions of practical syl logisms (e.g., "I must make a coat") which, precisely because they are propositional, are distinguishable from the ensuing (external) action (cf. [71, p. 230). (ii) There are two syllogisms and two conclusions in the preceding example, and the first conclusion, "I need a coat," does not specify an action
sentences: demand separate virtues. He argues that this situation is typical of much modern life and produces a fragmentation of character into a set of roles and a corresponding fragmentation of agency and moral life, to which, however, moral philosophy has remained largely blind. The fragmentation of modern moral life has made it possible to overlook the mutual incompatibility of distinct moral outlooks and theories. 'In both theory and practice the different conceptual schemes are mutually exclusive alternatives. But it is quite other with contemporary corporate existence. . . . a certain kind of moral eclecticism seems to reign . . . each view has its own segregated sphere of application; no one point of view is allowed to invade the sphere of another. But just this will remain invisible to the moral philosopher if moral philosophy remains at the level of analysis of moral language.' In Maclntyre's view moral philosophy which ignores the historical and sociological features of modern life is in danger of relying on conceptions of agency, self and character abstracted from obsolete social forms, and so may lack application. Indeed 'the methods of modern moral philosophy render it incompetent even to identify' this conflict between modernity and traditional modes of life. Much of what Maclntyre argues so forthrightly surfaces fleetingly in other contributions; and many of his claims about modern moral philosophy are borne out by these contributions, which seek after all to practice modern moral philosophy rather than to query its credentials. The first three papers are grouped together under, to be done nor an action-type to be instantiated.5 (iii) Given Aristotle's definition of a protasis (proposition or premise) in the Prior Analytics as "a sentence affirming or denying one thing of another" (24al6-17), it is difficult to believe that he could think that a proposition is an action, (iv) As we have already seen, Aristotle asserts in NE, VII.3 that "when a single opinion results" from the premises of a practical syllogism, an appropriate action must be performed at once (if the agent "can act and is not prevented"). But if the immediate result of one's practical premises is an opinion, then the appropriate action is preceded by a conclusion (or result), (v) Similarly, we are told in De Motu An., 8 that "thinking that one ought to go and going are virtually simultaneous (hama has eipein), unless there be something else to hinder" (702al5-17). Here, only sixty some lines after our initial example, Aristotle clearly distinguishes between an opinion of the sort which could be the conclusion of a practical syllogism and a corresponding action.6 (vi) Furthermore, if the proximate conclusions "reached" from practical premises are opinions, and an agent's forming a "concluding" opinion is virtually simultaneous with his performing the relevant action, then there is an extended sense of Conclusion' in which an (external) action is characteristically a conclu sion of a practical syllogism. It is not an immediate conclusion; for it is mediated by a concluding, tries to show that, in general, when Aristotle speaks of particulars (ra Kad9 enaara) in connection with action he is referring to specific types rather than individuals.10 But this general claim seems to be refuted by the following passage which comes just a page after (1). (2) An indication of the truth what has been said is the fact that while the young can become geometers and mathematicians and wise in matters like these, it is thought that they cannot be prac tically wise. The reason is that practical wisdom is concerned [not only with universals, but] also with particulars {ra Kad' eKaara) which become known through experience (yvcopL/ia e% e/i7r tptas), and a young person is inexperienced for experience re quires a good deal of time. . . .Further, error in deliberation may be either about the universal or about the particular (ro Kad' Kao~rov); we may fail to know either that all water that is heavy This point is an important element in his interpretation of the re lationship between deliberation and the practical syllogism. Cooper tries to show that the role of the practical syllogism for Aristotle is to link a piece of deliberation to a concrete situation. The result of successful de liberation is a decision to perform a specific type of action; the practical syllogism links this decision (through perception) to a particular situation in which the agent can implement his decision. According to this inter pretation, deliberation never reaches the, source_sentence: who are forcing healthy change on a conservative campus, or (b) unbalanced zealots and neurotic rebels who, when they are not smoking pot or shacking up with one another, are frittering away time on spurious issues. As a culture, we must be fond of dualisms or we would not persist in thinking this way. To talk about "students" who are creating a "problem" on college campuses is to ignore the obvious: that there are many different types of students and many different problems. It is simply not true that "they" are all waiting in the wings of the administration building, ready to seize it at the drop of a distasteful edict. There is sufficient empirical information to show that there is a wide range of attitudes, personalities and factions. At one extreme there would appear tobe ultra-leftwingers, heirs apparent to 1930 Marxists. These, says Kenneth Keniston in PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, are regarded by the New Left as dull and uninspired, competent only to crank the handle of a mimeo machine. There are several other shades of leftist positions. Another seemingly distinct group are liberal idealists who seem JOURNAL OF THOUGHT 187 to galvanize around only selected issues. These may be the University's alleged culpability in allowing Dow Chemical or the FBI to recruit on campus or it may be the University commitment in matters related to civil rights or racial justice. Many such idealists are not believers in a cleansing revolution; they are, rather, descendants of Old Testament prophets who possess strong
sentences: know u ... in most nearby possible worlds, that agent only believes that p when p is true' (p. 71). This principle not only allows us to retain closure while avoiding reference to conversational contexts, but also to obtain `... knowledge of everyday propositions [and] knowledge of denials of sceptical hypotheses as well' (p. 71). So one need not have internalistic (i.e. reflectively accessible) evidence that one is not a brain in a vat to know that one is not a brain in a vat. Interestingly, `neo- reanism' is not Moore's position; after all, by ascribing knowledge to himself CI know that I have two hands') in a context of discussing sceptical hypotheses, Moore (inappropriately) conversationally implied that he had internal evidence for the denial of sceptical hypotheses. Neo-Mooreanism's victory over scepticism is fleeting, though. For chapter four argues that all externalist positions misconstrue the real threat posed by scepticism. Roughly speaking, the closure-based argument masks the internalist and evidentialist nature of the sceptical challenge, which is more adequately revealed by casting the sceptical argument in terms of an underdetermination principle. Pritchard promises in the remainder of the book to pile onto the fading fortunes of externalist responses to closure-based scepticism by showing how they misunderstand how luck can affect knowledge. Chapters five and six kick off the second half of the book with Pritchard proposing a partial account and typology of epistemic luck. Clearly some types of epistemic luck are compatible with knowledge, but not all. For example, he argues that one can have 'lucky' knowledge in a variety of scenarios,, convictions learned from their liberal parents, the liberal mass media or to acknowledge that Bill Buckley is right on at least one point-liberal college professors. A third entity, seemingly pivotal, consists of a large group of students who are not radical, liberal or even especially committed to righting wrongs. These are the students who are apparently aware of issues but who do not themselves initiate action. They can, however, be moved to action by the sight of clubswinging cops and arbitrary deans, or, on the other hand, by le ft wing manipulators who occasionally overstep the bounds of fair play to reveal themselves for what they are: fanatics absolutely persuaded their ends are so sanctified that any means is acceptable. In point of fact, the vast majority of students are what they have always been: plodding, upwardly mobile nursing, education and engineering majors who could care less about alienation, social justice, Viet Nam, sexual expression, the House Un American Committee, dormitory hours or "grass. " These are not especially liberal and not particularly conservative. They are earnest, hard-working, gregarious, unimaginative souls who wish aBA, a spouse or a recommendation to medical or law school. They are not especially happy with the University as it is but they are not willing to risk their grade point averages or reputations to do much about it. They are generally happy with the status quo and do not experience a generation gap: indeed, they seem to admire their parents and wish to be, works. This college, with its community of faculty, students, alumni, and friends, was founded as an act of faith. Your presence here a century later may have the flavor of an act of faith on your part because its curriculum promises you no certain way to a particular occupation or profession. Perhaps you calculated the advantages of this or that kind of institution in the process of your choice. If so, you have discovered that the liberal arts college, known best and criticized most for the intangibility of its aims and purposes, has been condemned to extinction by educational prophets at least once each year for more than half of the past century. Money alone does not assure the life of an institution, though I am sure we would all agree that it helps. But founders, donors, and faculty without faith and a spirit of adventure can turn the wealthiest institution into a mere occupational outlet, devoid of teaching value. Examine in your own thoughts the experiences you cherish most in the days you have spent upon this campus. Some of you may remember instances of mere moments when the touch of a phrase or an act of a friend or teacher-and these are not mutually exclusive terms-imparted a sense of insight and sheer clarity to your mind. Or you may have been the beneficiary of the constant disciplinary effects of a toughminded professor whose impatient faith in your mental growth tantalized and provoked you into a stubborn contest of, source_sentence: compare the remarks in On Habituations (Eth.: this does not appear in the Kuhn edition; it is edited by Muller in SM 2 9-31): As the hegemonic soul has capabilities (dunameis) directed towards all the technai, it is necessary that there is one (sc. dunamis) with which we understand consequence and conflict, and another with which we remember; and we are cleverer in respect of the first mentioned, but more retentive in respect of the second. (Eth. 4, = SM 2 25) The distinction between intellectual sharpness and retentive ability is an ancient commonplace: see in particular the Hippocratic text On Regimen 1 35. 12 PHP V 601; cf. Symp.Diff. VII 55-6; and see MM X 635-6: a second part of the soul belongs to us not in virtue of our growing or being alive, but because we are animals, it is located in the heart and is the source of the innate heat; the arteries are the conduits for this source, which has many names: it is called the living power (dunamis z6tike), the spirited power (dunamis thumoeides), the living soul, and the spirited soul. 200 So Galen draws on a diverse range of previous theories in order to construct his own account; but it is important to stress that the theory that results is no mere haphazard porridge of badly-digested and ill-assorted scraps from the table of his predecessors. He is not afraid to take issue with them on matters of substantial importance, and to take issue with them in his
sentences: own characteristically, indeed uniquely, polemical style. For instance, he will not say, as Plato does, that any part of the soul is demonstrably immortal. Indeed, in his pronouncements on the matter he exhibits an admirable caution, unwilling to commit himself with any degree of certainty on matters which he views as being by their very nature resistant to secure demonstration."3 Thus at PHP V 791-2, Galen writes: Plato said that the cause who made us, the demiurge who fashioned the universe, commanded his children to make the human race by taking . .. the substance (ousia) of the immortal soul from him and adding it to what was generated. But we must realise that there is no formal similarity between proving and positing the fact that we were made in accordance with the providence of some god . . ., and knowing the substance of the maker or even of our own soul ... [T]he statements of the most divine Plato about the substance of our soul . .. and still more all that he says about our whole body, extend only to plausibility and reasonableness (achri tou pithanou kai eikotos). That last remark is important (indeed Galen, perhaps excessively charitably, takes Plato himself to be committed to it by his remarks about the eikos muthos [Tim. 29c-d]). There is a class of things about which we can at best speculate, and most particularly these are the preserve of the philosophers: In philosophy it is not surprising, Hippocrates and Plato but in spite of its title, this has virtually nothing in common with the placita of Aëtius, nor, one presumes, with the phusikai doxai of Theophrastus. Galen's avowed aim is to show, by means of selective quotation and juxtaposition, the fundamental agreement between his two great masters of his title, in particular in regard to the structure and function of the soul, and at the expense in particular of the Stoics and Peripatetics. Mario Vegetti contributes a lucid and learned piece,5 which seeks to understand the work in terms of its intended audience avowedly not the sectarians of either medicine or philosophy, but rather generally educated and interested men of good will competent in the rudiments of logic; and he supposes that the wealth of quotation in which Galen indulges, even from works which he himself says are still readily available, indicates that his audience is not supposed to be made up of specialists. This may be right; but Galen loved to quote and to parade his learning, and while it is true that in this work the citations are longer than usual, this may simply be due (as Galen himself says) to the verbosity of those (principally Chrysippus) he intends to refute. Sooner or later, everyone who reads Galen (or even simply makes use of him as a source for other writers) has to get to grips with the question of how careful and trustworthy a reporter of other people's views he is and different scholars have proposed rather different, dissertation, published as Li Zhi: Philosophe maudit (1527-1602) (Billeter 1979), is, according to a reviewer, "essentially a chronological account of Li interspersed with lengthy translations from Li's writings and biographical material" (Wu 1 981 , p. 304). Billeter's main publications are three books on Zhuang Zi: Leçons sur TchouangTseu (Lessons on Zhuang Zi) (2002), Études sur Tchouang-Tseu (Studies on Zhuang Zi) (2004), and Notes sur Tchouang-Tseu (Notes on Zhuang Zi) (201 0), in addition to Chine trois fois muette. The three books on Zhuang Zi complement each other, one of them containing Billeter's own translations of classical texts with comments. In English he published The Chinese Art of Writing (1990), and his most recent Un Paradigme contains personal reflections. The Debate At least four points, all of them developed in Contre François Jullien, need to be distinguished in this debate. 1. Billeter criticizes Jullien's "conceptual approach," which formulates the ideas of Chinese philosophers in terms of highly abstract ideas and subsequently inserts them into East-West philosophical discussions. According to Billeter, this approach "instrumentalizes" Chinese culture to the point of "remolding" it and uses Thorsten Botz-Bornstein 219 it as the basis for entirely new systems (p. 18). Billeter states that "everything that passes today as specifically Chinese in the realm of thought is part of this system" (p. 19). 2. Billeter affirms that Jullien's conceptualization necessarily leads to the synthetic creation of an "ideal China" that will be called "Chinese Civilization." 3. The necessary result is that Jullien will designate
model-index: name: SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
results: task: type: triplet
name: Triplet
dataset: name: nomic
type: nomic
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy
value: 0.974
name: Cosine Accuracy
verified: no, type: dot_accuracy
value: 0.026
name: Dot Accuracy
verified: no, type: manhattan_accuracy
value: 0.964
name: Manhattan Accuracy
verified: no, type: euclidean_accuracy
value: 0.974
name: Euclidean Accuracy
verified: no, type: max_accuracy
value: 0.974
name: Max Accuracy
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy
value: 0.9755
name: Cosine Accuracy
verified: no, type: dot_accuracy
value: 0.0245
name: Dot Accuracy
verified: no, type: manhattan_accuracy
value: 0.976
name: Manhattan Accuracy
verified: no, type: euclidean_accuracy
value: 0.9755
name: Euclidean Accuracy
verified: no, type: max_accuracy
value: 0.976
name: Max Accuracy
verified: no
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Created: 2024-08-21 17:05:17