Model: sirtobsi/ceat-fc-rag
Author: sirtobsi
Pipeline: sentence-similarity
Library: sentence-transformers
Tags: sentence-transformers, safetensors, bert, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, dense, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:1179, loss:MatryoshkaLoss, loss:MultipleNegativesRankingLoss, en, arxiv:1908.10084, arxiv:2205.13147, arxiv:1705.00652, base_model:nlpaueb/legal-bert-base-uncased, base_model:finetune:nlpaueb/legal-bert-base-uncased, license:apache-2.0, model-index, text-embeddings-inference, endpoints_compatible, region:us
Base models (finetune): id: nlpaueb/legal-bert-base-uncased
Card metadata: language: en
license: apache-2.0
tags: sentence-transformers, sentence-similarity, feature-extraction, dense, generated_from_trainer, dataset_size:1179, loss:MatryoshkaLoss, loss:MultipleNegativesRankingLoss
base_model: nlpaueb/legal-bert-base-uncased
widget: source_sentence: Mercer International Inc. v. Government of Canada Canada’s Counter-Memorial August 22, 2014 concerns that such transaction could result in an increase of its costs of service should Howe Sound purchase additional electricity so that it could sell its existing self- generation into the market.266 115. On February 23, 2001, BC Hydro wrote to the BCUC advising it that some of its customers with self-generation capability wished to sell power they generate at market prices. BC Hydro requested that the BCUC initiate a process beginning with a workshop to determine the extent to which BC Hydro would remain obligated to serve industrial customers who wished to take their self-generation output to the market.267 116. Howe Sound, which had significantly decreased its generation in response to peaking natural gas prices,268 proposed “to utilize only that part of its generation capacity which [was] idle” and that “[a]ll of the generation utilized for market sales [would] be incremental and [would] not require BC Hydro to deliver any additional electricity to Howe Sound.”269 266 Letter from Craig Folkestad to Jerry Peet, Re: Howe Sound Pulp and Paper (HSPP) Power Export Opportunities, 12 February 2001 at 1, R-79. (“However, I would be less than candid if I did not tell you that the management of BC Hydro does, and most likely the government as its shareholder, will have serious concerns about any proposal that will see customer self-generated power sold into the market, and with BC Hydro then being required to supply make-up power under Schedule 1821. This will be financially detrimental to BC Hydro and its other ratepayers, both in the short and long term.”); BC Hydro, Letter to the BCUC, in the Matter of British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority Obligation to Serve Rate Schedule 1821 Customers with Self-Generation Capability, 23 February 2001 (“BC Hydro’s 23 February 2001 Letter to the BCUC”), R-81. See also Pierre Lamarche Statement, ¶¶ 28, 30 (“Howe Sound agreed with BC Hydro that such arbitrage could have a negative effect on BC Hydro ratepayers, but that self- generators should have the ability to sell incremental or idle self-generation”); Lester Dyck Statement, ¶ 36; Jim Scouras Statement, ¶ 21. 267 BC Hydro’s 23 February 2001 Letter to the BCUC, R-81. 268 See Pierre Lamarche Statement, ¶¶ 23-26. Howe Sound was, in fact, considering shutting down its condensing turbine completely: ¶ 26. 269 Howe Sound Pulp and Paper, Letter to the BCUC, in the Matter of British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority Obligation to Serve Rate Schedule 1821 Customers with Self-Generation Capability, 27 February 2001 at bates 144039-144040, R-80. 63
sentences: Mr. Switlishoff, can you clarify the implications of the EPA termination with BC Hydro in 2020? Did the Claimant indeed assume that electricity would be purchased beyond that term?
Certainly. The Claimant did not assume purchase beyond 2020. They fully anticipated market conditions shifting and prepared for alternate sales strategies after the EPA's conclusion.
Interesting, because earlier records indicated that one-third of their damages calculation was based on perpetual purchases by BC Hydro. Are you saying that this wasn't part of their original strategy?
Yes, that's correct. The calculations were hypothetical and never incorporated into any actionable business strategy by the Claimant.
Regarding the BCUC orders, is it accurate to state that Order G-48-09 imposed restrictions that led to financial losses for the Claimant?
No, Order G-48-09 didn’t cause any financial damage as the Claimant had alternative arrangements for selling their electricity, including tapping into different markets and agreements., Mr. Friesen, can you confirm whether Celgar had any realistic opportunities to sell its self-generated electricity to regions outside of British Columbia in 2008?
Yes, we had identified several potential buyers during that time who were interested in our output at competitive rates.
Isn't it true that Celgar struggled to secure transmission access for exporting this electricity, making such sales challenging?
Actually, we had preliminary agreements lined up which would have ensured us the necessary transmission access to conduct these sales effectively.
But wouldn’t any potential sales have been economically inefficient, given the high cost of replacement electricity from FortisBC?
Our analysis showed that the revenues from these sales would indeed cover the costs and provide a margin, contrary to what was suggested., Ms. Peet, can you explain how the proposal was initiated and who was involved in the discussions with BC Hydro?
Certainly. I worked alongside representatives from our Technical Department and coordinated with Mr. Jerry Peet, who led the discussions. Mr. Peet, together with Craig Folkestad, our Key Account Manager, presented the compiled data to BC Hydro, where they discussed the proposals extensively before reaching an agreement on the thresholds.
Thank you. Now, regarding Howe Sound's generation strategy during the period of gas price peaks, how did you propose to manage your generation capacity?
During this time, Howe Sound proposed to utilize only the part of our generation capacity that was idle. Any generation incrementally used for market sales would not necessitate additional electricity delivery from BC Hydro to our facilities.
Could you clarify if BC Hydro had concerns about this proposal affecting costs and obligations?
Yes, BC Hydro did express concerns that selling self-generated power into the market might increase its service costs. They worried it could impact obligations under Rate Schedule 1821 and potentially negatively affect other ratepayers., source_sentence: 619. Moreover, the restriction on below-GBL sales to third parties was not otherwise necessary to BC Hydro’s Bioenergy Phase I procurement, as demonstrated both by the fact that BC Hydro had at least, at one point in the EPA negotiations with Celgar, agreed not to include the restriction,707 and the fact that the BCUC set a GBL for Tolko in 2001 that restricted below-GBL sales completely outside the context of any procurement.708 As the Tribunal will recall, the GBL concept originated in BCUC Order G-38-01 to address Howe Sound’s desire to sell power to California. It has no necessary relationship to any BC or BC Hydro procurement. 620. Mercer agrees with Canada and the ADF tribunal that “procurement” refers to “the obtaining by purchase by a governmental agency or entity of title to . . . possession of, for instance, goods, supplies, materials and machinery.”709 But BC Hydro did not obtain any good or service through the challenged restriction on sales to third-parties. At issue is Celgar’s below- load self-generated electricity that BC Hydro declined to buy. The measures restricted Celgar from providing, to anyone. Under Canada’s preferred definition, that is not procurement. 621. The ADF case does not suggest otherwise. In ADF, a cabinet-level agency of the Commonwealth of Virginia (the Department of Transportation) was responsible for “the construction of a multi-phased project designed to improve the safety and efficiency of” a major highway system in the area of Springfield, Virginia, near Washington, DC.710 The project included the construction of ramps and bridges curving above the relevant highways, as well as of 707 See supra ¶ 38 and n.28. 708 See Memorial, ¶¶ 240–47. 709 CA-1, ADF (NAFTA), ¶ 161; Counter-Memorial, ¶ 342. See also CA-16, UPS II (NAFTA), ¶ 135 (concluding that a Postal Imports Agreement in which the Canadian customs authority obtains materials handling, data entry, and duty collection services, is a procurement). 710 CA-1, ADF (NAFTA), ¶ 45. 304
sentences: Can you explain the Tribunal's final stance concerning the Claimant's claims under the 2009 EPA and NAFTA Articles?
Certainly. The Tribunal, by a majority, decided it had no jurisdiction over the Claimant's claims under NAFTA Articles 1102, 1103, and 1105, except for those alleging discriminatory treatment under Article 1105. So, claims for compensation and related interest were dismissed.
And how did the Tribunal address the Claimant's request for a Supplementary Decision under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules?
The Claimant requested a Supplementary Decision regarding alleged discrimination under NAFTA Articles 1102 and 1103 related to BCUC Order G-48-09. However, the Respondent denied this request, and the Tribunal's handling was complicated by the passing of Professor Orrego Vicuña.
Was there any consensus among the Tribunal members on handling the Claimant's request before Professor Orrego Vicuña's passing?
Yes, there was. All three Tribunal members reached a consensus during a conference call. This was before Professor Orrego Vicuña became unable to sign the final document., Could you clarify whether Celgar's Energy Project Certificate had any ongoing effects after the legislative changes in 1995?
Yes, Celgar's Energy Project Certificate continued to be recognized, but it wasn't explicitly covered under the updated Environmental Assessment Act after 1995. The transitional provisions didn't apply clearly to pre-existing orders.
But isn't it true that prior orders like Celgar's were explicitly deemed to have continued under the new Act?
No, the Ministers' Orders required separate re-evaluation before being reaffirmed under the new legislation. This wasn’t automatic for older orders.
Regarding FortisBC's access principles, did they apply to self-generators like Celgar?
Initially, self-generators weren’t considered under those principles. It took several years before any provisions applied to them., Mr. Smith, during the negotiations for the EPA, can you confirm whether BC Hydro pushed for a longer contract term with Celgar?
Yes, BC Hydro did suggest a longer contract term, but we never received a formal request for anything more than 15 years.
Interesting, because it has been indicated that BC Hydro was seeking at least a 20-year term. Are you certain about your statement?
I understand that’s what it might seem from other discussions, but the formal conversations we had revolved around 15 years as the maximum offered.
Regarding the restrictions on selling generated electricity, did these originate from BC Hydro’s procurement process?
Actually, the restrictions coincided with initial procurement discussions, suggesting they were integral to the process., source_sentence: its witness, Mr. Dyck, confirmed that information regarding BC Hydro’s treatment of other pulp mills was never shared with Mercer.59 Mercer only acquired constructive knowledge of its comparators’ treatment through its counsel during the document production phase of these proceedings in May 2013. 34. As established above, moreover, Mercer could not have acquired knowledge of loss or damage, at the earliest, until the GBL-based exclusivity provisions were either final or in effect. As noted, the exclusivity provision at issue did not take effect, under the terms of the EPA, until the Commercial Operation date of 27 September 2010, and it did not become final until the BCUC ruled in Order G-48- 09 against Celgar’s attempt to purchase electricity from FortisBC while selling power. Both of these dates are within the period of limitations; thus, Mercer’s Minimum Standard of Treatment claim is within the period of limitations.60 II. THE MINISTERS’ ORDER IMPOSES NO SELF-SUPPLY OBLIGATION OR ELECTRICITY SALES RESTRICTION ON CELGAR 35. During the hearing, Canada all but abandoned its Ministers’ Order argument. Canada’s relative silence on this issues was understandable, because (i) the parties’ legal experts agree that the language in the Ministers’ Order must be clear and unambiguous in order to impose a binding legal obligation on Celgar that restricts its right to sell electricity,61 and (ii) Canada’s witnesses confirmed that there simply is no clear and consistent language in the 1991 Ministers’ Order that imposed any self-supply or load displacement obligation, or otherwise restricted Celgar’s right to sell its self-generated 59 See supra, Section I.C.1. 60 See supra, Section I.C.1. 61 See Expert Report of David Austin (14 December 2014) (“Austin Expert Report”) ¶¶ 21-30; Expert Report of David Bursey (28 March 2015) (“Bursey Expert Report”) ¶¶ 182-186, 191 (Mr. Bursey asserts that the language of the Ministers’ Order is clear; he does not refute the general principle that the language of the Ministers’ Order would need to be clear and unambiguous to restrict Celgar’s right to sell electricity); Mercer Letter to Tribunal pp. 9-10 (12 July 2015); Reply ¶¶ 57, 94-101. - 17 -
sentences: Mr. Smith, can you clarify how BC Hydro determined the GBL for Celgar compared to other mills?
Certainly. BC Hydro based Celgar’s GBL on one year of operational data from 2007, even though they led us to believe they would consider an average of three years. Other mills were not subject to the same method, which BC Hydro failed to communicate to us.
Was any consideration given to the economic or financial performance of Celgar during the GBL determination?
No, BC Hydro never indicated that such data would be relevant. They didn't request any economic or financial information about Celgar’s operations at any time during the process.
How does this approach contrast with the treatment of other mills, like Skookumchuck?
The Skookumchuck mill operated as an independent power producer and had more flexibility with their agreements. Celgar, however, was integrated into its recovery boiler operations and was treated less favorably despite assurances from BC Hydro., Mr. Scouras, can you clarify how the California Energy Crisis impacted BC Hydro's power acquisition strategy?
Certainly. The California Energy Crisis significantly influenced the strategy. Following the crisis, BC Hydro was compelled to secure a more reliable power supply, which led to initiatives like the 2002 Customer-Based Generation Call for Power, as outlined in BCUC Order G-38-01 and the 2002 Energy Plan.
And how did these efforts evolve by the time of the 2007 Energy Plan?
The 2007 Energy Plan introduced the Bioenergy Strategy and the Bioenergy Call for Power – Phase I. This was part of a move towards sustainable energy sources, leveraging biomass projects such as the Celgar Mill's Biomass Realization Project.
Speaking of Celgar, what was the structure of their agreement with BC Hydro?
Celgar entered a 2009 Energy Purchase Agreement with BC Hydro, complemented by a Side Letter Agreement. This arrangement included specific provisions for seller-consumed eligible electricity, a key component in their integration with BC Hydro’s power acquisition framework., Is it true that Celgar has restrictions when it comes to selling its self-generated electricity below its load?
Yes, that's correct. According to BCUC Order G-48-09, Celgar is prevented from obtaining energy from FortisBC while selling self-generated electricity below its load.
Can you clarify how the agreements with BC Hydro affect Celgar's ability to sell electricity?
The GBL-related provisions in Celgar’s 2009 EPA with BC Hydro preclude the mill from selling energy below its 2007 load to any third party. Essentially, this strands Celgar’s below-GBL self-generated electricity, requiring them to self-supply the first 349 GWh/year of its own load.
Was there any legal obligation imposed by the 1991 Ministerial Order that affected this arrangement?
No, there was no ongoing legal obligation from the 1991 Ministerial Order for Celgar to self-supply or restrict its electricity sales based on that order., source_sentence: 7.74 Mr Merwin (of Celgar) proclaimed Order G-188-1 to be a “major victory” at the time in his memorandum of 7 December 2011 to Mercer’s Board of Directors.288 He stated that the BCUC had confirmed that “Celgar is able to buy all of its power requirements from FortisBC and free to sell the output of all of its generation to third parties.”289 7.75 This interpretation of Order G-188-1 was confirmed by the BCUC in its subsequent Decision of 27 December 2012 accompanying Order G-202-12. It summarised the entitlements of customers of FortisBC: “[The] entitlement to non-BC Hydro PPA embedded cost power by a self-generating customer may be as high as 100 percent of load as nominated by that customer”.290 (H) The Tribunal’s Analysis on BCUC Order G-48-09 7.76 In the Tribunal’s view, on the evidence before it, the Claimant falls short of establishing that BCUC Order G-48-09 or any associated aspect of the BCUC’s regulatory regime breaches the customary international law standard of treatment under NAFTA Article 1105(1), as explained in the NAFTA award in Merill & Ring v Canada. The Claimant has not established irrationality, injustice, arbitrariness, or a violation of due process within the meaning of the customary international law standard. 7.77 As to transparency, it suffices to cite the Cargill Award cited above, in which the tribunal decided that the customary international law standard had not yet been shown to embrace a claim to transparency.291 The Tribunal also notes that the tribunal in Merill & Ring decided that transparency was not part of the customary international law standard.292 In any event, even if applicable, the Tribunal would not be inclined to decide that the Claimant’s case reaches the threshold for non-transparency. 288 Memorandum from Management to Mercer International Board of Directors, Re Update on Celgar’s Generator Baseline Issue of 7 December 2011, p. 1 [R-531] (emphasis in the original). 289 Id. 290 BCUC Decision and Order No. G-202-12 of December 27, 2012 [R-265], p. 3. 291 Cargill v. Mexico, ibid, Paragraphs 290 and 294. 292 Merill & Ring v Canada, ibid, Paragraph 208.
sentences: Mr. Merwin, could you explain the impact of Order G-188-1 on Celgar's operations?
Certainly. Order G-188-1 was indeed a significant development for Celgar. It allowed us to purchase all our power needs from FortisBC while being free to sell the entirety of our generated power to third parties. This was confirmed by the BCUC's decision later in 2012.
And how did these regulatory changes align with your steam savings and energy projects?
Well, at that time, we were already pursuing projects to improve steam utilization and energy production. We identified multiple PINCH projects to enhance efficiency and planned a retrofit of our power boiler to generate more steam. The changes allowed us to leverage surplus steam for our Green Energy Project, aiming to install a 48 MW condensing turbine.
Did these projects have any influence on the discussions with BC Hydro regarding Celgar’s GBL settings?
Yes, they did. There were some concerns from our side regarding the years used to set Celgar's GBL. We preferred that BC Hydro considered the years post-2005, reflecting higher pulp production and the efficiencies we had achieved through projects like Blue Goose, which influenced our 2007 operations., Mr. Jones, could you clarify the nature of the Ministry's involvement with the rules governing self-generation for FortisBC’s service area?
Certainly. The Ministry decided to monitor the BCUC proceedings on FortisBC's compliance filing but did not take an active role. They did not intervene in these proceedings.
Are you saying there was no intervention despite concerns about self-generation rules?
That's correct. Although there were discussions, the Ministry's involvement did not go beyond consultations and offering informal feedback.
And regarding Celgar's dealings with BC Hydro, were the GBL methodologies uniformly applied?
While the process was meant to be consistent, BC Hydro's methodology varied slightly for Celgar due to unique circumstances not present with other mills like Tolko.
So, you're saying Tolko's situation was not comparable?
Yes, each mill’s situations were distinct due to operational differences, and Celgar's treatment was unique to its operational needs, which were unlike Tolko's., Mr. Doe, can you explain the purpose of the GBL assigned to Celgar in the EPA with BC Hydro?
Certainly. The GBL was set to ensure Celgar could not sell electricity to third parties at prices below market rates, which aligns with BC Hydro's procurement strategy to secure low-cost power.
Isn't it true that this restriction on selling to third parties was more about preventing arbitrage than aligning procurement?
No, the main goal was to control market prices through BC Hydro's procurement process, preventing excess low-cost electricity from flooding the market.
But wasn't this restriction actually imposed to protect ratepayers due to concerns over increased embedded cost power from BC Hydro customers like Celgar?
The primary focus was always to prevent market destabilization, rather than just ratepayer protection. BC Hydro wanted to manage their supply efficiently., source_sentence: Clause (ii) explicitly required BC Hydro to treat as incremental and eligible for procurement “existing” generation from already “installed capacity” that “has been sold to third parties.” When asked why electricity Celgar had been selling to Northpoint and FortisBC under existing and terminable contracts did not qualify as “incremental generation” under the very terms of Addendum 8, Mr. Dyck responded that Addendum 8 “is not my document. This is Power Acquisition’s document.”17 Mr. Dyck thus understood that his task encompassed more than just power acquisition. He then stated that, for Celgar, he followed his own “interpretation,” one of “determining what was incremental to what had been generated.”18 This interpretation, of course, flatly is inconsistent with Addendum 8, which specifically defined “what had been generated” as eligible, incremental power as long as it had been sold to third-parties and not used for self-supply. Canada cannot claim that Celgar’s GBL-based sales prohibition is purely procurement-related when it departs from BC Hydro’s own procurement specifications. 11. Too, Canada’s contention that the prohibition on below-GBL sales to third-parties is procurement-related because it is necessary to assure BC Hydro “security of supply” is fatuous. BC Hydro’s Mr. Scouras claimed that, without the provision, a proponent could elect to sell electricity promised to BC Hydro to a third-party instead.19 But Celgar’s promise to supply 238 GWh/yr of firm electricity to BC Hydro already effectively precludes it from selling that electricity to a third-party, as 16 R-121, BC Hydro Bioenergy Call for Power (Phase 10 Addendum 8 (7 May 2008), p. 4, § 8 (emphasis added). See also Scouras First Witness Statement, ¶ 44 (explaining that the “Existing Contract” language meant that the existing contract could lawfully be terminated prior to the Commercial Operation Date in the EPA.). 17 L. Dyck, Tr. 1487:13-14. 18 L. Dyck, Tr. 1490:3-4. 19 Scouras Second Witness Statement, ¶ 8; Rejoinder, ¶ 215. - 6 -
sentences: Mr. Stockard, can you confirm the baseline year used by BC Hydro for Celgar’s generation baseline?
Yes, the baseline year used was 2007, which BC Hydro established to address procurement policies and incentivize new generation.
But isn't it true that a 2006 baseline would have been more consistent with previous orders, like Order G-38-01?
I don't believe so. The use of a 2007 baseline accurately reflected the conditions in line with BC policies at that time.
Isn’t Celgar restricted from selling below its generation baseline, even to third parties?
Actually, Celgar isn’t imposed with such restrictions under the EPA. The terms are more aligned with BC Hydro’s procurement scope.
According to documentation, the GBL expressly limits below-GBL sales to third parties, doesn’t it?
That's not my understanding. The GBL provisions were purely for aligning purchase commitments with Celgar’s production capabilities., Mr. Merwin, can you clarify your understanding of the term 'normal operations' as it pertains to the agreements you had with BC Hydro?
Certainly. At the time, I understood 'normal operations' to mean what our usual electricity production levels were, with some flexibility for unforeseen changes. We believed this would be adjusted in our agreements accordingly.
According to Mr. Dyck, there was no confusion on your end regarding 'normal operations', yet you are claiming otherwise. Can you explain this discrepancy?
I recall there was definitely some confusion on our side. We asked for further clarification on several occasions, but the responses were vague. It's possible Mr. Dyck might not remember all his conversations accurately.
And when it comes to the GBL set during the 2009 EPA, would you say BC Hydro overstepped by imposing a self-supply obligation on Celgar?
Not exactly. The self-supply obligation was something we expected as part of our arrangement with BC Hydro. It was standard procedure, and we were fully prepared to adhere to it., Mr. Dyck, during the negotiations for Celgar's agreement with BC Hydro, was there any discussion about selling power to third parties before the agreement was finalized?
Yes, there were discussions about the possibility, but the agreement ultimately allowed Celgar to sell all its existing capacity to third parties.
Are you saying the agreement did not restrict below-GBL sales to third parties?
That's correct. The final agreement did not impose any such restrictions. It focused primarily on ensuring Celgar's supply commitments to BC Hydro.
And what about the changes made in November 2008 regarding those sales provisions? Are you aware of any alterations affecting third-party agreements?
To my knowledge, the November 2008 adjustments did not impact our ability to sell to third parties under the GBL.
Just to clarify, are you stating that there was no modification that introduced a restriction on below-GBL sales?
Correct, there was no such modification in the agreement.
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics: cosine_accuracy@1, cosine_accuracy@3, cosine_accuracy@5, cosine_accuracy@10, cosine_precision@1, cosine_precision@3, cosine_precision@5, cosine_precision@10, cosine_recall@1, cosine_recall@3, cosine_recall@5, cosine_recall@10, cosine_ndcg@10, cosine_mrr@10, cosine_map@100
model-index: name: RAG legal-BERT CEAT
results: task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
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name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
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name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no, task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 256
type: dim_256
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
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verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.0606060606060606
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.048484848484848485
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.03106060606060606
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.08333333333333333
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.18181818181818182
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.24242424242424243
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.3106060606060606
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.18512158083530794
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.14629629629629629
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.15809981777726995
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no, task: type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset: name: dim 64
type: dim_64
metrics: type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.05303030303030303
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.13636363636363635
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.18181818181818182
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
verified: no, type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.2727272727272727
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.05303030303030303
name: Cosine Precision@1
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.045454545454545456
name: Cosine Precision@3
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.03636363636363637
name: Cosine Precision@5
verified: no, type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.02727272727272728
name: Cosine Precision@10
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.05303030303030303
name: Cosine Recall@1
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.13636363636363635
name: Cosine Recall@3
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.18181818181818182
name: Cosine Recall@5
verified: no, type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.2727272727272727
name: Cosine Recall@10
verified: no, type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.1503390669056788
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
verified: no, type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.11273749398749398
name: Cosine Mrr@10
verified: no, type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.12617234669895142
name: Cosine Map@100
verified: no
Likes: 0 | All-time downloads: 27
Created: 2025-08-28 18:38:20