Accelerating Nash Learning from Human Feedback via Mirror Prox
Authors: name: Daniil Tiapkin; name: Daniele Calandriello; name: Denis Belomestny; name: Eric Moulines; name: Alexey Naumov; name: Kashif Rasul; name: Michal Valko; name: Pierre Menard
Published: 2025-05-26 09:17:32

Abstract: Traditional Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) often relies on
reward models, frequently assuming preference structures like the Bradley-Terry
model, which may not accurately capture the complexities of real human
preferences (e.g., intransitivity). Nash Learning from Human Feedback (NLHF)
offers a more direct alternative by framing the problem as finding a Nash
equilibrium of a game defined by these preferences. In this work, we introduce
Nash Mirror Prox (Nash-MP), an online NLHF algorithm that leverages
the Mirror Prox optimization scheme to achieve fast and stable convergence to
the Nash equilibrium. Our theoretical analysis establishes that Nash-MP
exhibits last-iterate linear convergence towards the beta-regularized Nash
equilibrium. Specifically, we prove that the KL-divergence to the optimal
policy decreases at a rate of order (1+2beta)^{-N/2}, where N is a number
of preference queries. We further demonstrate last-iterate linear convergence
for the exploitability gap and uniformly for the span semi-norm of
log-probabilities, with all these rates being independent of the size of the
action space. Furthermore, we propose and analyze an approximate version of
Nash-MP where proximal steps are estimated using stochastic policy gradients,
making the algorithm closer to applications. Finally, we detail a practical
implementation strategy for fine-tuning large language models and present
experiments that demonstrate its competitive performance and compatibility with
existing methods.