en: Paragraph 1 shall not apply to publicly owned credit institutions which, in the context of the supply of reserves by central banks, shall be given the same treatment by national central banks and the European Central Bank as private credit institutions.  
mt: Il-paragrafu 1 m'għandux japplika għal istituzzjonijiet ta' kreditu ta' proprjetà pubblika li, fil-kuntest tal-provvista ta' riżervi minn banek ċentrali nazzjonali, għandhom jingħataw l-istess trattament minn banek ċentrali nazzjonali u mill-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew bħal istituzzjonijiet privati ta' kreditu.

en: Article III-182  
mt: Artikolu III-182

en: Any measure or provision, not based on prudential considerations, establishing privileged access by Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States to financial institutions shall be prohibited.  
mt: Kull miżura jew disposizzjoni, mhux ibbażata fuq kunsiderazzjonijiet ta' prudenza, li tistabbilixxi aċċess privileġgjat minn istituzzjonijiet, korpi jew aġenziji ta' l-Unjoni, gvernijiet ċentrali, awtoritajiet reġjonali, lokali jew oħrajn pubbliċi, korpi oħrajn regolati mid-dritt pubbliku, jew impriżi pubbliċi ta' Stati Membri għall-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji għandhom jiġu pprojbiti.

en: Article III-183  
mt: Artikolu III-183

en: 1.  
mt: 1.

en: The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.  
mt: L-Unjoni m'għandhiex tidħol responsabbli għal jew tassumi l-impenji ta' gvernijiet ċentrali, awtoritajiet reġjonali, lokali jew oħrajn pubbliċi, korpi oħra regolati mid-dritt pubbliku, jew impriżi pubbliċi ta' kull Stat Membru, mingħajr preġudizzju għal garanziji finanzjarji reċiproċi għall-eżekuzzjoni konġunta ta' proġett speċifiku.

en: A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.2.  
mt: Stat Membru m'għandux jidħol responsabbli għal jew jassumi l-impenji ta' gvernijiet ċentrali, awtoritajiet reġjonali, lokali jew oħrajn pubbliċi, korpi oħrajn regolati mid-dritt pubbliku, jew impriżi pubbliċi ta' Stat Membru ieħor, bla preġudizzju għal garanziji finanzjarji reċiproċi għall-eżekuzzjoni konġunta ta' proġett speċifiku.2.

en: The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt European regulations or decisions specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions laid down in Articles III-181 and III-182 and in this Article.  
mt: Il-Kunsill, fuq proposta mill-Kummissjoni, jista' jadotta regolamenti jew deċiżjonijiet Ewropej li jispeċifikaw definizjonijiet għall-applikazzjoni tal-projbizzjonijiet previsti fl-Artikoli III-181 u III-182 u f'dan l-Artikolu.

en: It shall act after consulting the European Parliament.  
mt: Għandu jaġixxi wara konsultazzjoni mal-Parlament Ewropew.

en: Article III-184  
mt: Artikolu III-184

en: 1.  
mt: 1.

en: Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits.  
mt: deficit

en: 2.  
mt: eċċessiv tal-gvern.

en: The Commission shall monitor the development of the budgetary situation and of the stock of government debt in the Member States in order to identify gross errors.  
mt: budget

en: In particular it shall examine compliance with budgetary discipline on the basis of the following two criteria:  
mt: fuq bażi taż-żewġ kriterji li ġejjin:

en: (a)  
mt: a)

en: (i)  
mt: i)

en: either the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that comes close to the reference value, or  
mt: jew il-proporzjon ikun naqas sostanzjalment u kontinwament u jkun laħaq livell li jiġi qrib il-valur ta' referenza, jew

en: (ii)  
mt: ii)

en: alternatively, the excess over the reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value;  
mt: l-eċċess fuq il-valur ta' referenza jkun biss eċċezzjonali u temporanju u l-proporzjon jibqa' qrib il-valur ta' referenza;

en: (b)  
mt: b)

en: whether the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product exceeds a reference value, unless the ratio is diminishing sufficiently and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace.  
mt: jekk il-proporzjon tad-dejn pubbliku għall-prodott gross domestiku jeċċedix valur ta' referenza, sakemm il-proporzjon ma jkunx qed jonqos biżżejjed u joqrob lejn il-valur ta' referenza b'pass sodisfaċenti.

en: The reference values are specified in the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure.  
mt: deficit

en: 3.  
mt: 3.

en: If a Member State does not fulfil the requirements under one or both of these criteria, the Commission shall prepare a report.  
mt: Jekk Stat Membru ma jissodisfax il-ħtiġiet taħt kriterju wieħed jew aktar, il-Kummissjoni għandha tipprepara rapport.

en: The Commission's report shall also take into account whether the government deficit exceeds government investment expenditure and take into account all other relevant factors, including the medium-term economic and budgetary position of the Member State.  
mt: budget

en: The Commission may also prepare a report if, notwithstanding the fulfilment of the requirements under the criteria, it is of the opinion that there is a risk of an excessive deficit in a Member State.  
mt: deficit

en: 4.  
mt: 4.

en: The Economic and Financial Committee set up under Article III-192 shall formulate an opinion on the Commission's report.5.  
mt: Il-Kumitat Ekonomiku u Finanzjarju stabbilit skond l-Artikolu III-192 għandu jifformula opinjoni dwar ir-rapport tal-Kummissjoni.5.

en: If the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur, it shall address an opinion to the Member State concerned and shall inform the Council accordingly.  
mt: eċċessiv fi Stat Membru jeżisti jew jista' jseħħ, għandha tindirizza opinjoni lill-Istat Membru konċernat u għandha tinforma l-Kunsill b'dan.

en: 6.  
mt: deficit

en: The Council shall, on a proposal from the Commission, having considered any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make and after an overall assessment, decide whether an excessive deficit exists.  
mt: eċċessiv.

en: In that case it shall adopt, without undue delay, on a recommendation from the Commission, recommendations addressed to the Member State concerned with a view to bringing that situation to an end within a given period.  
mt: F'dak il-każ għandu jadotta, mingħajr dewmien mhux ġustifikat, fuq rakkomandazzjoni mill-Kummissjoni, rakkomandazzjonijiet indirizzati lill-Istat Membru konċernat biex dik is-sitwazzjoni tiġi fi tmiem f'perijodu stipulat.

en: Subject to paragraph 8, those recommendations shall not be made public.  
mt: Bla ħsara għall-paragrafu 8, dawk ir-rakkomandazzjonijiet m'għandhomx ikunu magħmula pubbliċi.

en: Within the scope of this paragraph, the Council shall act without taking into account the vote of the member of the Council representing the Member State concerned.  
mt: Fil-kamp ta' l-applikazzjoni ta' dan il-paragrafu, l-Kunsill għandu jaġixxi mingħajr ma jieħu in kunsiderazzjoni l-vot tal-membru tal-Kunsill li jkun qed jirrappreżenta lill-Istat Membru konċernat.