# Taiwan war timelines might be shorter than AI timelines

*TL;DR: Most AI forecasts generally assume that if a conflict over Taiwan occurs, it will largely be* about AI*. I think there's a decent chance for a conflict before either side becomes substantially AGI-pilled.*

*Thanks to Aaron Scher for comments on a draft of this post.*

I'm no China expert, but [a lot of China experts seem pretty concerned](https://www.uscc.gov/annual-report/2025-annual-report-congress) about the possibility of a conflict over Taiwan. China is currently engaged in a [massive military buildup and modernization effort](https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-military-10-charts), it's building specialized [invasion barges](https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/01/china-suddenly-building-fleet-of-special-barges-suitable-for-taiwan-landings/) like the Mulberry harbors used in the WWII Normandy landings, and it's conducting [amphibious landing exercises](https://www.reuters.com/graphics/USA-CHINA/TAIWAN-INVASION/zjpqdekmlvx/) with civilian roll-on/roll-off vehicle ferries, many of which China [modifies](https://cimsec.org/ro-ro-ferries-and-the-expansion-of-the-plas-landing-ship-fleet/) for potential military use. [Increasingly](https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-escalates-cross-strait-military-activity-under-taiwan-president-william-lai) [frequent](https://www.pressurepoints.aspi.org.au/taiwan-and-the-taiwan-strait/chinas-military-coercion/chinas-exercises-around-taiwan) [military exercises](https://apnews.com/article/china-taiwan-military-drills-japamn-37e2c674923fde3cb6b1a741c3e3fe0f) around Taiwan could let China rapidly transition to a full blockade. Its internal propaganda suggests that Taiwanese ["provocations"](https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2025-11/2025_Executive_Summary.pdf) could justify military action, and its leadership continually talk about Taiwan's ["return to China"](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-holds-phone-call-with-trump-xinhua-reports-2025-11-24/), with some even openly discussing  ["reeducation"](https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/4616998).

By some cosmic [coincidence](https://ai-2027.com/), 2027, the PLA's centennial, is [sometimes](https://jamestown.org/the-three-pillars-underpinning-the-2027-centennial-military-building-goal/) [identified](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-taiwan-pla-s-2027-milestones) as the year when the PLA hopes to be ready for a conflict over Taiwan. This doesn't mean China will immediately pull the trigger, but they might want to be prepared by then in case things do escalate. They may believe the next few years represent a [window of opportunity](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/06/05/china-taiwan-economy-peak-invasion-window-usa-power/) before slower growth and a demographic crisis reduce China's power relative to the US. Plus, Xi is 72, and would probably love to cement his legacy by retaking Taiwan in his lifetime.[^80ssjkgvzmy]

Manifold currently puts the probability of an invasion of Taiwan by the end of 2027 at around 22%, and before 2030 at around 37%, although I don't think these markets count blockades and other actions that fall short of a full invasion:

Other markets put the chance of a more limited conflict higher:$$[^oxbyxcappm]

I'm not trying to make the case here that there will probably be a war. The point I want to make is that while most AI forecasts assume any conflict with China would largely be *about AI*, I think there's a decent chance a conflict occurs for other reasons *before* either side becomes AGI-pilled. This point has been made previously [here](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/ikWvhgGFYnwY5nWyk/review-report-of-davidson-on-takeoff-speeds-2023#V__Taiwan_Supply_Chain_Disruption) and [here](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/g5hWKtSYP3pq7urcw/se-gyges-response-to-ai-2027#Mid_2026__China_Wakes_Up), but I think the possibility of war is much more relevant now that people have somewhat longer timelines. Back when many expected takeoff in 2027 or so, it was pretty reasonable to assume that the probability of a conflict entirely unrelated to AI was low.[^6202ojbeb3w] But ~~the forecasters behind AI 2027 now expect takeoff~~ *edit: some of the forecasters behind AI 2027 have median ASI arrival dates* [in the 2030s](https://www.aifuturesmodel.com/).[^3xwhnly69l] If that's the case, I think there's a good chance Xi decides to escalate over Taiwan before he (or his successor) starts paying serious attention to AI. At the very least, the timelines overlap considerably: developments in AI could shift China's calculus over whether and when to invade, but equally Chinese aggression unrelated to AI could drastically impact AI timelines.

It's perfectly reasonable to build a forecasting model that doesn't try to take these kinds of exogenous shocks into account. But I think forecasters should clearly flag when they do this, and ideally provide estimates for how likely they think such events are if the chances are significant. I haven't really seen this in the AI forecasting space: for instance, the AI Futures Project's [all-things-considered forecasts](https://blog.ai-futures.org/p/ai-futures-model-dec-2025-update) don't mention the possibility of a conflict, and [this scenario](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yHvzscCiS7KbPkSzf/a-2032-takeoff-story) has China blockading Taiwan as late as 2034, and only in response to US cyberattacks on Chinese AI development.

I also think the chances of conflict are high enough that it would be very valuable to have forecasts specifically focused on understanding AI timelines in the event of a war. There's been some discussion of this [here](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/PAxTSZPW7MBXKkvZg/war-in-taiwan-and-ai-timelines) and [here](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/ikWvhgGFYnwY5nWyk/review-report-of-davidson-on-takeoff-speeds-2023), but those are ~~ancient history~~ over two years old at this point, so something more up-to-date would be useful. I'll give a few of my thoughts below, but this is mostly just speculation -- I'd really like to see modeling work by more knowledgeable people on how a conflict would impact AI.

Impacts on compute
==================

In general, a conflict over Taiwan would almost certainly slow down progress in AI by disrupting access to compute. [This report](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/ikWvhgGFYnwY5nWyk/review-report-of-davidson-on-takeoff-speeds-2023#V__Taiwan_Supply_Chain_Disruption) estimates 20 months for other firms to catch up to TSMC; [this discussion](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/PAxTSZPW7MBXKkvZg/war-in-taiwan-and-ai-timelines) is more apocalyptic, predicting global microprocessor production falling to "early 2000s levels for perhaps 15 years." It's less clear to me who would come out ahead in relative terms, though. The US is very reliant on Taiwan, but I think in some cases it might actually be able to maintain a good portion of its compute advantage even if Taiwanese production is cut off, because China also depends on Taiwan for much of its compute. I'm pretty uncertain about this, though.

If things escalate to a shooting war, it's likely that much of Taiwan's manufacturing will be destroyed by one side or the other. If China manages to take over Taiwan, they might gain access to some of TSMC's expertise or technology even if the fabs are destroyed. A good part of TSMC's edge is reportedly in its [engineering talent](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/PAxTSZPW7MBXKkvZg/war-in-taiwan-and-ai-timelines#TSMC_s_magic_is_that_they_have_engineering_special_sauce__they_can_somehow_hit_insane_yield_at_processes_that_are_challenging_for_everybody_else_) and in knowledge held by a small number of individuals. But I think China would probably have a lot of difficulty gaining the cooperation of TSMC employees or recreating the talent base after a war, so I don't expect China to benefit very much: the main effect would be everyone losing access to Taiwanese production.

Meanwhile, I don't think Chinese chip production would be disrupted as much by a war. A US blockade or other wartime supply-chain disruptions would certainly make things more difficult, but it seems much harder to cut off Chinese production without just bombing the fabs. The US might do that,[^xx8c69prx3p] especially if TSMC's fabs get bombed, but if the conflict isn't centrally about AI I think there's a good chance they'll survive.

But Chinese chip production currently [isn't very competitive](https://epoch.ai/gradient-updates/why-china-isnt-about-to-leap-ahead-of-the-west-on-compute) and might not catch up for some time. If China is still reliant on foreign chips, the conflict could see the US maintain its compute advantage because it would almost certainly stop [selling China chips](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-open-up-exports-nvidia-h200-chips-china-semafor-reports-2025-12-08/) and crack down on [chip smuggling](https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/countering-ai-chip-smuggling-has-become-a-national-security-priority). While the US would likely lose access to Taiwan's production, at least for the duration of the conflict, it would still have TSMC's Arizona fab plus whatever production Intel can manage.[^o2vq9zqp1jf] I think the relative compute balance here really depends on how quickly US domestic production ramps up compared to Chinese production -- modeling this properly would be very valuable!

A major risk, though, is that Taiwanese production might be used as a bargaining chip if it's not destroyed. This could be as part of a peace deal after a war, but it could also happen before a full-scale war starts. China might impose a blockade, take some outlying islands, or use other kinds of pressure to try to force a capitulation or extract concessions without having to invade. It seems unlikely that China would be able to take over completely without a fight, but it could gain better access to Taiwanese production: the US might agree to loosen export controls or even give China access to TSMC or ASML's tech as part of a settlement. If the US government isn't AGI-pilled at this point, it might not even value this particularly highly, or view it as opening up a market for American companies.

Securitization
==============

One other scenario worth considering is that US or Chinese leaders might start to wake up to AGI during the conflict. An intelligence explosion probably [increases the risk of war](https://www.nationalsecurity.ai/) in the best of times; if there's *already* a war going on, things could get very ugly. If AI gets [securitized](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/i5pccofToYepythEw/against-aschenbrenner-how-situational-awareness-constructs-a) we'd likely see attacks on fabs and data centers, secret Manhattan Projects, assassinations, and little room for safety research, let alone any sort of coordination on AI. On the other hand, if the US and China sabotage each other hard enough this could end up delaying AGI significantly.[^4fnw7s55p51]

Conclusion
==========

Of course China might decide not to invade, or we might get AGI first, rendering all of this moot. But I think the chance of a conflict over Taiwan years before AGI is high enough that it should probably be factored into peoples' timelines. It's easy to forget, but people care about other things besides AGI! And the decisions they make could have big impacts on the AI race; we've seen this repeatedly with chip sales to China, and we could very well see it again.

[^80ssjkgvzmy]: And despite recent talk, I don't think he genuinely expects to live to 150, although I suppose it would explain his apparent lack of succession planning. 

[^oxbyxcappm]: I don't think you should pay much attention to my probabilities because I'm neither a China expert nor an experienced forecaster, but for the record, I think 22% for invasion by the end of 2027 is maybe a bit high (and I've bet on this), while the other markets roughly match my estimates. 

[^6202ojbeb3w]: In the original AI 2027 timeline the CCP contemplates an invasion or blockade of Taiwan, but only in response to the US advantage in compute. 

[^3xwhnly69l]: As pointed out in the comments, this is more true for some forecasters than for others, and their models still put substantial probability on ASI being developed before 2030. If you're pretty confident that we'll be well on our way to ASI before 2030, you should probably put less stock on the arguments in this post. My impression, though, is that many people do think there's a substantial chance of takeoff in the 2030s, in which case I think it's worth considering how a conflict would impact timelines. 

[^xx8c69prx3p]: Can the US bomb the Chinese mainland without triggering a nuclear war? I don't know! China maintains a no first use policy, but who knows how that will hold up during a war. 

[^o2vq9zqp1jf]: China could try to disable the US fabs (e.g. with cyberattacks), but the US would likely retaliate against Chinese fabs, at which point I'm not sure anyone's left making chips. I guess in that case the US's larger preexisting stock of compute might give it an advantage. 

[^4fnw7s55p51]: I'm not sure I'd want to stay in the Bay Area for this, though -- I don't want to get "sabotaged."