Harley-ml/lesswrong huggingface dataset:
# Wisdom for Smart Teens - my talk at SPARC 2014

I recently had the privilege of a 1-hour speaking slot at [SPARC](http://sparc-camp.org/), a yearly two-week camp for top high school math students.

Here's the video: **[Wisdom for Smart Teens](https://vimeo.com/119147000)**

Instead of picking a single topic, I indulged in a bunch of mini-topics that I feel passionate about:

1.  Original Sight
2.  "Emperor has no clothes" moments
3.  Epistemology is cool
4.  Think quantitatively
5.  Be specific / use examples
6.  Organizations are inefficient
7.  How I use Bayesianism
8.  Be empathizable
9.  Communication
10.  Simplify
11.  Startups
12.  What you want

I think the LW crowd will get a kick out of it.
# 4 Common Prediction Failures and How to Fix Them [LINK]

A post I wrote on CFAR's blog about the errors we make in hedonic prospecting, based on Gilbert and Wilson's 2007 review article of the topic. Let me know what you think! Reposting from the discussion in case anyone missed it. :) 

[Link.](http://rationality.org/2015/02/04/4-common-prediction-failures/ "Link")
# Human Minds are Fragile

We are familiar with the thesis that [Value is Fragile](/lw/y3/value_is_fragile/). This is why we are researching how to impart values to an AGI.

Embedded Minds are Fragile  

-----------------------------

Besides values, it may be worth remembering that human minds too are very fragile.

A little magnetic tampering with your amygdalas, and suddenly you are a wannabe serial killer. A small dose of LSD can get you to believe you can fly, or that the world will end in 4 hours. Remove part of your Ventromedial PreFrontal Cortex, and suddenly you are so utilitarian even Joshua Greene would call you a psycho.

It requires very little material change to substantially modify a human being's behavior. Same holds for other animals with embedded brains, crafted by evolution and made of squishy matter modulated by glands and molecular gates.

A Problem for Paul-Boxing and CEV?  

-------------------------------------

One assumption underlying Paul-Boxing and CEV is that:

It is easier to specify and simulate _a human-like mind_ then to impart values to an AGI by means of teaching it values directly _via code or human language_.

Usually we assume that because, as we know, value is fragile. But so are embedded minds. Very little tampering is required to profoundly transform people's moral intuitions. A large fraction of the inmate population in the US has frontal lobe or amygdala malfunctions.

Finding out the simplest description of a human brain that when simulated continues to act as that human brain would act in the real world may turn out to be as fragile, or even more fragile, than [concept learning](https://www.academia.edu/9308600/Concept_learning_for_safe_autonomous_AI) for AGI's.
# Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, February 2015, chapters 105-107

Two new short chapters! Since the next one is coming tomorrow and we know it'll be short, let's use one thread for both.

This is a new thread to discuss Eliezer Yudkowsky’s _[Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality](http://www.fanfiction.net/s/5782108/1/)_ and anything related to it. This thread is intended for discussing [chapter](https://www.fanfiction.net/s/5782108/104/Harry-Potter-and-the-Methods-of-Rationality) [105](http://hpmor.com/chapter/104) (and chapter 106, once it comes out tomorrow).  EDIT: based on [Alsadius' comment](/lw/lqj/harry_potter_and_the_methods_of_rationality/bzfg) about thread creation for MOR chapters, let's also use this thread for chapter 107 (and future chapters until this nears 500 comments) unless someone objects to doing so.  Given that this is the final arc we're talking about, thread titles should be updated to indicate chapters covered.

There is a site dedicated to the story at [hpmor.com](http://hpmor.com/), which is now the place to go to find the [authors notes](http://hpmor.com/notes/) and all sorts of other goodies. AdeleneDawner has kept an [archive of Author’s Notes](http://www.evernote.com/pub/adelenedawner/Eliezer). (This goes up to the notes for chapter 76, and is now not updating. The authors notes from chapter 77 onwards are on [hpmor.com](http://hpmor.com).)

**Spoiler Warning**: this thread is full of spoilers. With few exceptions, spoilers for MOR and canon are fair game to post, without warning or rot13. [More specifically](/lw/2tr/harry_potter_and_the_methods_of_rationality/2v1l):

> You do not need to rot13 anything about HP:MoR or the original Harry Potter series unless you are posting insider information from Eliezer Yudkowsky which is not supposed to be publicly available (which includes public statements by Eliezer that have been retracted).
> 
> If there is evidence for X in MOR and/or canon then it’s fine to post about X without rot13, even if you also have heard privately from Eliezer that X is true. But you should not post that “Eliezer said X is true” unless you use rot13.
# Czech's first Meetup in Prague report

Hello,

I'm happy to inform Less Wrong community about new meet up in Czech Republic, Prague. Despite the fact that nobody came at meet up I'd organized 2 months ago (mainly because it was organized only two weeks ahead), yesterday we met in 5 people. Plus, some other people (about next 3) just couldn't make it yesterday, but are interested in future meet ups.

All of us are young men in 21-25, studying or working in mathematics (mainly data science), informatics or AI and one of us is studying international affairs. 

Just 2 of us have some stronger background with Less Wrong (we have read HPMOR and at least core sequences), the rest is interested in these and are willing to catch up (more or less) and came based on our recommendation or by getting at the LW by luck.

We agreed we'd like to meet regularly to share our opinions, lifehacking experiences, commenting our lives etc. and we are going to meet in next 14 days. In addition, we agreed to plan longer-term meet up for those who don't visit LW too often and hence have a chance to notice it.

Currently, the most challenging task I see so far is to find an optimal shape, form, of the group and formulate it's motives and goals. It ranges from just being friends and chat from time to time to highly organized group with fixed time schedule, active work and close relationships. Of course, I do realize how hard it is to hold the group together and how we should not rely only on initial enthusiasm. 

Yesterday, we discussed for about 3 hours about various topics like lifehacking, our studies, tips, _most-actual-questions_, our lifes... The most surprising thing I've found was how diverse we are in different techniques which help to our productivity - one of us needs stress, I need exact time schedule, other one is more effective when taking things easy, one testing nootropics, other one meditation, I eat my frog at the morning, other one after some other pleasant things et etcetera. Another interesting thing was how our lives have been entangled together - we know same people or friends, we have visited same courses... Not so surprising when living in city _just_ with million or so people, but still interesting. 

Less Wrong website (community) was what brings as together and I feel obligated to inform the community about it's impact and happiness it nourishes. Also, any recommendations and help is welcome (I try to use  http://wiki.lesswrong.com/mediawiki/images/c/ca/How\_to\_Run\_a\_Successful\_Less\_Wrong\_Meetup\_Group.pdf as a reference guide).

Thank you for that and I'm happy to see you on our future meet-ups (which will be held, I hope).
# Vote for MIRI to be donated a share of reddit's advertising revenue

[http://www.reddit.com/donate?organization=582565917](http://www.reddit.com/donate?organization=582565917)

"Today we are announcing that we will donate 10% of our advertising revenue receipts in 2014 to non-profits chosen by the reddit community. Whether it’s a large ad campaign or a $5 sponsored headline on reddit, we intend for all ad revenue this year to benefit not only reddit as a platform but also to support the goals and causes of the entire community."
# [LINK] The Wrong Objections to the Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Sean Carroll, physicist and proponent of Everettian Quantum Mechanics, has just [posted a new article](http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2015/02/19/the-wrong-objections-to-the-many-worlds-interpretation-of-quantum-mechanics/) going over some of the common objections to EQM and why they are false. Of particular interest to us as rationalists:

> Now, MWI certainly does _predict_ the existence of a huge number of unobservable worlds. But it doesn’t _postulate_ them. It _derives_ them, from what it does postulate. And the actual postulates of the theory are quite simple indeed:
> 
> 1.  The world is described by a quantum state, which is an element of a kind of vector space known as Hilbert space.
> 2.  The quantum state evolves through time in accordance with the Schrödinger equation, with some particular Hamiltonian.
> 
> That is, as they say, it. Notice you don’t see anything about worlds in there. The worlds are there whether you like it or not, sitting in Hilbert space, waiting to see whether they become actualized in the course of the evolution. Notice, also, that these postulates are eminently testable — indeed, even falsifiable! And once you make them (and you accept an appropriate “past hypothesis,” just as in statistical mechanics, and are considering a sufficiently richly-interacting system), [the worlds happen automatically](http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/).
> 
> Given that, you can see why the objection is dispiritingly wrong-headed. You don’t hold it against a theory if it makes _some_ predictions that can’t be tested. Every theory does that. You don’t object to general relativity because you can’t be absolutely sure that Einstein’s equation was holding true at some particular event a billion light years away. This distinction between what is postulated (which should be testable) and everything that is derived (which clearly need not be) seems pretty straightforward to me, but is a favorite thing for people to get confused about.

Very reminiscent of the quantum physics sequence here! I find that this distinction between number of entities and number of postulates is something that I need to remind people of all the time.

META: This is my first post; if I have done anything wrong, or could have done something better, please tell me!
# Easy wins aren't news

Recently I talked with a guy from [Grant Street Group](http://www.grantstreet.com/). They make, among other things, software with which local governments can auction their bonds on the Internet.

By making the auction process more transparent and easier to participate in, they enable local governments which need to sell bonds (to build a high school, for instance), to sell those bonds at, say, 7% interest instead of 8%. (At least, that's what he said.)

They have similar software for auctioning liens on property taxes, which also helps local governments raise more money by bringing more buyers to each auction, and probably helps the buyers reduce their risks by giving them more information.

This is a big deal. I think it's potentially more important than any budget argument that's been on the front pages since the 1960s. Yet I only heard of it by chance.

People would rather argue about reducing the budget by eliminating waste, or cutting subsidies to people who don't deserve it, or changing our ideological priorities. Nobody wants to talk about auction mechanics. But fixing the auction mechanics is the easy win. It's so easy that nobody's interested in it. It doesn't buy us fuzzies or let us signal our affiliations. To an individual activist, it's hardly worth doing.
# Report -- Allocating risk mitigation across time

I've just released a Future of Humanity Institute technical report, written as part of the [Global Priorities Project](http://globalprioritiesproject.org/).

Abstract:

> This article is about priority-setting for work aiming to reduce existential risk. Its chief claim is that all else being equal we should prefer work earlier and prefer to work on risks that might come early. This is because we are uncertain about when we will have to face different risks, because we expect diminishing returns of extra work, and because we expect that more people will work on these risks in the future.
> 
> I explore this claim both qualitatively and with explicit models. I consider its implications for two questions: first, “When is it best to do different kinds of work?”; second, “Which risks should we focus on?”.
> 
> As a major application, I look at the case of risk from artificial intelligence. The best strategies for reducing this risk depend on when the risk is coming. I argue that we may be underinvesting in scenarios where AI comes soon even though these scenarios are relatively unlikely, because we will not have time later to address them.

You can read the full report here: [Allocating risk mitigation across time](http://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/Allocating-risk-mitigation.pdf).
# Can we decrease the risk of worse-than-death outcomes following brain preservation? 

_Content note_: discussion of things that are worse than death

Over the past few years, a few people have claimed rejection of cryonics due to concerns that they might be revived into a world that they preferred less than being dead or not existing. For example, lukeprog pointed this out in a LW comment [here](/lw/guy/open_thread_march_115_2013/8kin), and Julia Galef expressed similar sentiments in a comment on her blog [here](http://rationallyspeakingpodcast.org/show/rs17-transhumanism.html). 

I use brain preservation rather than cryonics here, because it seems like these concerns are technology-platform agnostic.

To me one solution is that it seems possible to have an "out-clause": circumstances under which you'd prefer to have your preservation/suspension terminated. 

Here's how it would work: you specify, prior to entering biostasis, circumstances in which you'd prefer to have your brain/body be taken out of stasis. Then, if those circumstances are realized, the organization carries out your request. 

This almost certainly wouldn't solve all of the potential bad outcomes, but it ought to help some. Also, it requires that you enumerate some of the circumstances in which you'd prefer to have your suspension terminated. 

While obvious, it seems worth pointing out that there's no way to decrease the probability of worse-than-death outcomes to 0%. Although this also is the case for currently-living people (i.e. people whose brains are not necessarily preserved could also experience worse-than-death outcomes and/or have their lifespan extended against their wishes). 

For people who are concerned about this, I have three main questions: 

1) Do you think that an opt-out clause is a useful-in-principle way to address your concerns?

2) If no to #1, is there some other mechanism that you could imagine which would work?

3) Can you enumerate some specific world-states that you think could lead to revival in a worse-than-death state? (Examples: UFAI is imminent, or a malevolent dictator's army is about to take over the world.)
# Request: Sequences book reading group

The book version of the Sequences is supposed to be published in the next month or two, if I understand correctly. I would really enjoy an online reading group to go through the book together.

Reasons for a reading group:

*   It would give some of us the motivation to actually go through the Sequences finally.
*   I have frequently had thoughts or questions on some articles in the Sequences, but I refrained from commenting because I assumed it would be covered in a later article or because I was too intimidated to ask a stupid question. A reading group would hopefully assume that many of the readers would be new to the Sequences, so asking a question or making a comment without knowing the later articles would not appear stupid.
*   It may even bring back a bit of the blog-style excitement of the "old" LW ("I wonder what exciting new thoughts are going to be posted today?") that many have complained has been missing since the major contributors stopped posting.

I would recommend one new post per day, going in order of the book. I recommend re-posting the entire article to LW, including any edits or additions that are new in the book. Obviously this would require permission from the copyright holder (who is that? is there even going to be a copyright at all?), but I'm hoping that'll be fine.

  

I'd also recommend trying to make the barriers to entry as low as possible. As noted above, this means allowing people to ask questions / make comments without being required to have already read the later articles. Also, I suggest that people not be required to read all the comments from the original article. If something has already been discussed or if you think a particular comment from the original discussion was very important, then just link to it or quote it.

  

Finally, I think it would be very useful if some of the more knowledgeable LW members could provide links and references to the corresponding  "traditional" academic literature on each article.

  

Unfortunately, for various reasons I am unwilling to take responsibility for such a reading group. If you are willing to take on this responsibility, please post a comment to that effect below.

  

Thanks!
# Announcing LessWrong Digest

I've been making rounds on social media with the following message.

> Great content on LessWrong isn't as frequent as it used to be, so not as many people read it as frequently. This makes sense. However, I read it at least once every two days for personal interest. So, I'm starting a LessWrong/Rationality Digest, which will be a summary of all posts or comments exceeding 20 upvotes within a week. It will be like a newsletter. Also, it's a good way for those new to LessWrong to learn cool things without having to slog through online cultural baggage. It will never be more than once weekly. If you're curious here is a sample of what the Digest will be like.
> 
> [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1e2mHi7W0H2toWPNooSq7QNjEhx\_xa0LcLw\_NZRfkPPk/edit](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1e2mHi7W0H2toWPNooSq7QNjEhx_xa0LcLw_NZRfkPPk/edit)
> 
> Also, major blog posts or articles from related websites, such as Slate Star Codex and Overcoming Bias, or publications from the MIRI, may be included occasionally. If you want on the list send an email to:
> 
> lesswrongdigest \*at\* gmail \*dot\* com

Users of LessWrong itself have noticed this 'decline' in frequency of quality posts on LessWrong. It's not necessarily a bad thing, as much of the community has migrated to other places, such as Slate Star Codex, or even into meatspace with various organizations, meetups, and the like. In a sense, the rationalist community outgrew LessWrong as a suitable and ultimate nexus. Anyway, I thought you as well would be interested in a LessWrong Digest. If you or your friends:

*   find articles in 'Main' are too infrequent, and Discussion only filled with announcements, open threads, and housekeeping posts, to bother checking LessWrong regularly, or,
*   are busying themselves with other priorities, and are trying to limit how distracted they are by LessWrong and other media

the LessWrong Digest might work for you, and as a suggestion for your friends. I've fielded suggestions I transform this into a blog, Tumblr, or other format suitable for RSS Feed. Almost everyone is happy with email format right now, but if a few people express an interest in a blog or RSS format, I can make that happen too.
# "Human-level control through deep reinforcement learning" - computer learns 49 different games

[full text](http://www.readcube.com/articles/10.1038%2Fnature14236?shared_access_token=Lo_2hFdW4MuqEcF3CVBZm9RgN0jAjWel9jnR3ZoTv0P5kedCCNjz3FJ2FhQCgXkApOr3ZSsJAldp-tw3IWgTseRnLpAc9xQq-vTA2Z5Ji9lg16_WvCy4SaOgpK5XXA6ecqo8d8J7l4EJsdjwai53GqKt-7JuioG0r3iV67MQIro74l6IxvmcVNKBgOwiMGi8U0izJStLpmQp6Vmi_8Lw_A%3D%3D)

This seems like an impressive first step towards AGI. The games, like 'pong' and 'space invaders' are perhaps not the most cerebral games, but given that deep blue can only play chess, this is far more impressive IMO. They didn't even need to adjust hyperparameters between games.

I'd also like to see whether they can train a network that plays the same game on different maps without re-training, which seems a lot harder.
# What subjects are important to rationality, but not covered in Less Wrong?

As many people have noted, Less Wrong currently isn't receiving as much content as we would like. One way to think about expanding the content is to think about which areas of study deserve more articles written on them.

For example, I expect that sociology has a lot to say about many of our cultural assumptions. It is quite possible that 95% of it is either obvious or junk, but almost all fields have that 5% within them that could be valuable. Another area of study that might be interesting to consider is anthropology. Again this is a field that allows us to step outside of our cultural assumptions.

I don't know anything about media studies, but I imagine that they have some worthwhile things to say about how we the information that we hear is distorted.

What other fields would you like to see some discussion of on Less Wrong?
# In memory of Leonard Nimoy, most famous for playing the (straw) rationalist Spock, what are your top 3 ST:TOS episodes with him?

Hopefully at least one or two would show a virtue of non-straw rationality.

[Episode list](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Star_Trek:_The_Original_Series_episodes)
# Best of Rationality Quotes, 2014 Edition

Here is the way-too-late 2014 edition of the Best of Rationality Quotes collection. ([Here is last year's](/lw/jlq/best_of_rationality_quotes_2013_edition/).) Thanks Huluk for nudging me to do it.

**[Best of Rationality Quotes 2014](http://people.mokk.bme.hu/~daniel/rationality_quotes_2014/rq_only2014.html) **(300kB page, 235 quotes)  
and **[Best of Rationality Quotes 2009-2014](http://people.mokk.bme.hu/~daniel/rationality_quotes_2014/rq.html)** (1900kB page, 1770 quotes)

The page was built by a short script ([source code here](http://people.mokk.bme.hu/~daniel/rationality_quotes_2014/)) from all the LW Rationality Quotes threads so far. (We had such a thread each month since April 2009.) The script collects all comments with karma score 10 or more, and sorts them by score. Replies are not collected, only top-level comments.

As is now usual, I provide various statistics and top-lists based on the data. (Source code for these is also at the above link, see the README.) I added these as comments to the post:

*   [Top quote contributors by total karma score collected](/r/discussion/lw/lsk/best_of_rationality_quotes_2014_edition/c1rq)
*   [Top quote contributors by karma score collected in 2014](/r/discussion/lw/lsk/best_of_rationality_quotes_2014_edition/c1rr)
*   [Top quote contributors of 2014 by statistical significance level](/r/discussion/lw/lsk/best_of_rationality_quotes_2014_edition/c1rs) (See [this comment](/lw/3cn/best_of_rationality_quotes_20092010/37ej) for a description of this metric.)
*   [Top original authors by number of quotes](/r/discussion/lw/lsk/best_of_rationality_quotes_2014_edition/c1ro)
*   [Top original authors by total karma score collected](/r/discussion/lw/lsk/best_of_rationality_quotes_2014_edition/c1rp)
*   [Best short quotes 2009-2014](/r/discussion/lw/lsk/best_of_rationality_quotes_2014_edition/c1rn)
# [POLL] LessWrong group on YourMorals.org (2015)

[In 2011](/lw/8lk/poll_lesswrong_group_on_yourmoralsorg/), [InquilineKea](/user/InquilineKea/) posted a Discussion topic on [YourMorals.org](http://www.yourmorals.org/), a psychology research website which provides scores of psychology scales/inventories/surveys/tests to the general public to gather large samples. Niftily, YourMorals lets users sign up for particular groups, and then when you take tests, you can see your own results alongside group averages of liberals/conservatives/libertarians & $GROUP. A lot of time has passed and I think most LWers don't know about it, so I'm reposting so people can use it.  

The regular research has had interesting results like showing [a distinct pattern of cognitive traits and values associated with libertarian politics](/r/discussion/lw/ess/link_inside_the_cold_calculating_mind_of_lesswrong/), but there's no reason one can't use it for investigating LWers in more detail; for example, going through the results, ["we can see that many of us consider purity/respect to be far less morally significant than most"](/r/all/lw/3jb/is_it_bad_to_make_fun_of_peoplelaugh_at_their/), and we collectively seem to have [Conscientiousness issues](/lw/8lk/poll_lesswrong_group_on_yourmoralsorg/b8yq). (I also drew on it recently for a [gay marriage comment](/lw/l49/what_false_beliefs_have_you_held_and_why_were_you/bi7l).) If there were more data, it might be interesting to look at the results and see where LWers diverge the most from libertarians (the mainstream group we seem most psychologically similar to), but unfortunately for a lot of the tests, there's too little to bother with (LW _n_<10). Maybe more people could take it.

You can sign up using http://www.yourmorals.org/setgraphgroup.php?grp=623d5410f705f6a1f92c83565a3cfffc

All quizzes: http://www.yourmorals.org/all\_morality\_values_quizzes.php

Big 5: http://www.yourmorals.org/bigfive_process.php

(You can see some of my results at [http://www.gwern.net/Links#profile](http://www.gwern.net/Links#profile) )
# Keep Your Identity Fluid [LINK]

Building on [Graham's Small Identity](http://www.paulgraham.com/identity.html), here I look at the hazards of identity, and give a suggestion for leveraging it to your advantage, as well as avoiding pitfalls. 

As per [my last article](/r/lesswrong/lw/lnx/4_common_prediction_failures_and_how_to_fix_them/), feel free to let me know what you think here, [privately](mailto:p@mcntyr.com), or [anonymously](http://goo.gl/forms/NmPCRM1CUZ). 

[Link](http://rationality.org/2015/03/02/keep-your-identity-fluid/).
# Neutral hours: a tool for valuing time

Prioritisation is mostly about working out how to trade different resources off against one another. Prioritisation problems come at different scales: for individuals, for companies or organisations, for the world at large. At the Global Priorities Project we’re mostly interested in the large-scale questions. But we sometimes have something to say about smaller scale problems, too.

I’ve just tidied and released old research notes (mostly from 2013) on the personal prioritisation problem of how to value time spent on different activities. This is primarily of use for individuals making decisions about how to spend their time, money, and mental energy.

> **Abstract:** We get lots of opportunities to convert between time and money, and it’s hard to know which ones to take, since they use up other mental resources. I introduce the neutral hour as a tool for thinking about how to make these comparisons. A neutral hour is an hour spent where your mental energy is the same level at the start and the end. I work through some examples of how to use this tool, look at implications for some common scenarios, and explore the theory behind them.

There may be benefits for broader prioritisation questions. Since societies are comprised of individuals, it could help to know how to value time savings or costs to individuals when performing cost-benefit analysis on larger projects. And there may be techniques for comparing between different resources that we could usefully apply in wider contexts. However we think these benefits are secondary. We’re releasing this work now to let others take advantage of it: either for personal benefit; or to build on it and release easier-to-use guidance or tools.

You can [find the full document here](http://globalprioritiesproject.org/2015/03/neutral-hours-a-tool-for-valuing-time/ "Neutral hours: a tool for valuing time"). I'm happy to answer questions and I'd love to know if people have thoughts on this material.
# Can we talk about mental illness?

For a site extremely focused on fixing bad thinking patterns, I've noticed a bizarre lack of discussion here. Considering the high correlation between intelligence and mental illness, you'd think it would be a bigger topic. 

I personally suffer from Generalized Anxiety Disorder and a very tame panic disorder. Most of this is focused on financial and academic things, but I will also get panicky about social interaction, responsibilities, and things that happened in the past that seriously shouldn't bother me. I have an almost amusing response to anxiety that is basically my brain panicking and telling me to go hide under my desk.

I know lukeprog and Alicorn managed to fight off a good deal of their issues in this area and wrote up how, but I don't think enough has been done. They mostly dealt with depression. What about rational schizophrenics and phobics and bipolar people? It's difficult to find anxiety advice that goes beyond "do yoga while watching the sunrise!" Pop psych isn't very helpful. I think LessWrong could be. What's mental illness but a wrongness in the head?

Mental illness seems to be worse to intelligent people than your typical biases, honestly. Hiding under my desk is even less useful than, say, appealing to authority during an argument. At least the latter has the potential to be useful. I know it's limiting me, and starting cycles of avoidance, and so much more. And my mental illness isn't even that bad! Trying to be rational and successful when schizophrenic sounds like a Sisyphusian nightmare. 

I'm not fighting my difficulties nearly well enough to feel qualified to author my own posts. Hearing from people who are managing is more likely to help. If nothing else, maybe a Rational Support Group would be a lot of fun.
# "Spiritual" techniques that actually work thread

This thread is for:

\- Perfectly natural and functional ideas that came from a spiritual, religious, occultist, parapsychologist etc. source (perhaps with some "baggage")

\- Techniques that are bit difficult to explain and may be seen by the gullible as magic, but they actually seem to do something, even if that something is just a novel way to trick the brain.

Both things that are actually useful and "stage tricks" are accepted in this thread.
# [LINK] Terry Pratchett is dead

[BBC article](http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-31858156)

I'm sure I'm not the only one who greatly admired him. The theme of his stories was progress; they were set in a fantasy world, it's true, but one that was frequently a direct analogy to our own past, and where the golden age was always right now. The recent books made this ever more obvious.

We have lost a great man today, but it's the way he died that makes me uncomfortable. Terry Pratchett had early-onset Alzheimer's, and while I doubt it would have mattered, he couldn't have chosen cryonics even if he wanted to. He campaigned for voluntary euthanasia in cases like his. I will refrain from speculating on whether his unexpected death was wholly natural; whether it was or wasn't, I can't see this having a better outcome. In short...

There is, for each of us, a [one-ninth chance](http://www.alz.org/downloads/Facts_Figures_2014.pdf) of developing Alzheimer's if we live long enough. Many of us may have relatives that are already showing signs, and in the current regime _these relatives cannot be cryonically stored even if they wish to try_; by the time they die, there will be little purpose in doing so. For cryonics to help for neurodegenerative disorders, it needs to be applied before they become fatal.

Is there anything we can do to change that? Are there countries in which that generalisation is false?
# A map of LWers - find members of the community living near you.

There seems to be a lot of enthusiasm around LessWrong meetups, so I thought something like this might be interesting too. There is no need to register - just add your marker and keep an eye out for someone living near you.

Here's the link: https://www.zeemaps.com/map?group=1323143

I posted this on an [Open Thread](/r/discussion/lw/lrk/open_thread_feb_23_mar_1_2015/c0nt) first. Below are some observations based on the previous discussion:

When creating a new marker you will be given a special URL you can use to edit it later. If you lose it, you can create a new one and ask me to delete the old marker. Try not to lose it though.

If someone you tried to contact is unreachable, notify me and I'll delete the marker in order to keep the map tidy. Also, try to keep your own marker updated.

It was suggested that it would be a good idea to circulate the map around survey time. I'll try to remind everyone to update their markers around that time. Any major changes (e.g. changing admin, switching services, remaking the map to eliminate dead markers) will also happen then.

The map data can be exported by anyone, so there's no need to start over if I disappear or whatever.

Edit: Please, you have to make it possible to contact you. If you choose to use a name that doesn't match your LW account, you have to add an email address or equivalent. If you don't do that, it is assumed that the name on the marker is your username here, but if it isn't you are essentially unreachable and will be removed.
# Calibration Test with database of 150,000+ questions

Hi all, 

I put this calibration test together this morning. It pulls from a trivia API of over 150,000 questions so you should be able to take this many, many times before you start seeing repeats.

http://www.2pih.com/caltest.php

A few notes:

1\. The questions are "Jeopardy" style questions so the wording may be strange, and some of them might be impossible to answer without further context. On these just assign 0% confidence.

2\. As the questions are open-ended, there is no answer-checking mechanism. You have to be honest with yourself as to whether or not you got the right answer. Because what would be the point of cheating at a calibration test?

I can't think of anything else. Please let me know if there are any features you would want to see added, or if there are any bugs, issues, etc. 

**_\*\*EDIT\*\*_**

As per suggestion I have moved this to the main section. Here are the changes I'll be making soon:

*   Label the axes and include an explanation of calibration curves.
*   Make it so you can reverse your last selection in the event of a misclick.

Here are changes I'll make eventually:

*   Create an account system so you can store your results online.
*   Move trivia DB over to my own server to allow for flagging of bad/unanswerable questions.

**Here are the changes that are done:**

*   _Change 0% to 0.1% and 99% to 99.9%  _
*   _Added second graph which shows the frequency of your confidence selections. _
*   _Color code the "right" and "wrong" buttons and make them farther apart to prevent misclicks._
*   _Store your results locally so that you can see your calibration over time._
*   _Check to see if a question is blank and skip if so._
# PredictIt, a prediction market out of New Zealand, now in beta.

From their [website](https://www.predictit.org):

> PredictIt is an exciting new, real money site that tests your knowledge of political and financial events by letting you make and trade predictions on the future.
> 
> Taking part in PredictIt is simple and easy. Pick an event you know something about and see what other traders believe is the likelihood it will happen. Do you think they have it right? Or do you think you have the knowledge to beat the wisdom of the crowd?
> 
> The key to success at PredictIt is timing. Make your predictions when most people disagree with you and the price is low. When it turns out that your view may be right, the value of your predictions will rise. You’ll need to choose the best time to sell!
> 
> Keep in mind that, although the stakes are limited, PredictIt involves real money so the consequences of being wrong can be painful. Of course, winning can also be extra sweet.
> 
> For detailed instructions on participating in PredictIt, [How It Works](https://www.predictit.org/About/HowItWorks).
> 
> PredictIt is an educational purpose project of [Victoria University](http://www.victoria.ac.nz/), Wellington of New Zealand, a not-for-profit university, with support provided by [Aristotle International, Inc.](http://aristotle.com/), a U.S. provider of processing and verification services. Prediction markets, like this one, are attracting a lot of academic and practical interest (see our [Research section](https://www.predictit.org/About/Research)). So, you get to challenge yourself and also help the experts better understand the wisdom of the crowd.
# Two methods on akrasia / unhealthy habits / addictions

**1\. Ignoring goals, tabooing / identifying with methods - the opposite of Beeminder, even the opposite of SMART**

Suppose I want to lose weight. Have a general idea of how much and how fast, and decide on the method. Then I ignore the goal and focus on the method. I ignore both the long-term and short-term goal (no Beeminder), ignore the measurement (SMART), ignore all the common wisdom here. The reason I ignore them that I want to avoid constantly haggling with myself, using the soda example, "Surely this one glass will not set me back much?" and instead I identify with the method, such as, simply shaping my identity as a person who does not drink soda, period. Instead of being conscious of the goal, just focus on this new identity. Without a goal in mind, there is nothing to haggle about and that makes it work. So there is not that kind of "Perhaps, this is a special case because X so half a glass should be allowed..." instead, it is just taboo, because it violates my new sense of self of a person who just does not do that. The beauty of this solution that there is nothing to haggle about. It is a harnessing of the cognitive dissonance and protect-your-identity mechanisms, if the new self is the sort of person who just does not drink soda then the only way to not get dissonant and to preserve the identity is to not do so. This, so far, seems to be surprisingly easy for me. It is similar to religious taboos, like people who don't eat X because then they could no longer consider themselves a pious follower of religion Y and it would shake their identity. You could say it is a custom-made _nanoreligion_ each time. Being pious by not violating self-made taboos, preserving the identity of the pious person, without having keep the goal in consciousness.

**2\.  Don't fight The Boss**

Someone casually dropped on stopdrinking.reddit.com "It is not about fighting your urges, it is about stopping to fight your better judgement." Precisely. There is a Higher Self (say, Superego) telling me to live healthy and a Lower Self (Ego, Id) telling me to indulge in urges and cravings. Identify with Higher Self, and it is a constant fight with the Lower Self.  Identify with the Lower Self and all I need to do is to surrender to the commands of the Higher Self. It does not feel good, but in this case it is _okay_ to not feel good. I call the Higher Self The Bos. It is like _"I really want to do X but The Boss does not let me do so. It makes me feel depressed. It is okay. Just accept the feeling and don't fight The Boss. You can never beat The Boss. Just surrender and accept your fate."_ It is also a nano, well, in this case a _microreligion_ because it is more consistent than the one-off taboos of nanoreligions. Identifying with Lower Self is a bit of an "I am a sinner" thing, and this surrender to The Boss feels a bit religious, a bit close to the AA and 12-step methods.
# Best Explainers on Different Subjects

There are many recommended reading threads on lesswrong. Some examples include: [Math](/lw/2xt/learning_the_foundations_of_math/), [Textbooks](/lw/3gu/the_best_textbooks_on_every_subject/) and [Rationality](/lw/jv/recommended_rationalist_reading/).

I am looking to compile another such thread, this time aimed at "exceptional explainers" and their works. For example, I find Richard Feynman's [QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter](http://www.amazon.com/QED-Strange-Theory-Light-Matter/dp/0691024170) to be one such book.

Please list out other authors and books which you think are wonderfully written, in such a way that maximizes communication and explanation to laypeople in the given field. For example:

Physics: Richard Feynman - QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter.

Thank you,

Jeremy
# Future of Life Institute existential risk news site

I'm excited to announce that the Future of Life Institute has just launched an [existential risk news site](http://futureoflife.org/news)!

The site will have regular articles on topics related to existential risk, written by journalists, and a community blog written by existential risk researchers from around the world as well as FLI volunteers. Enjoy!
# New forum for MIRI research: Intelligent Agent Foundations Forum

Today, the [Machine Intelligence Research Institute](https://intelligence.org/) is launching a new forum for research discussion: the [Intelligent Agent Foundations Forum](http://agentfoundations.org/)! It's already been seeded with a bunch of new work on MIRI topics from the last few months.

We've covered most of the (what, why, how) subjects on [the forum's new welcome post](http://agentfoundations.org/item?id=157) and [the How to Contribute page](http://agentfoundations.org/how-to-contribute), but this post is an easy place to comment if you have further questions (or if, maths forbid, there are technical issues _with_ the forum instead of _on_ it).

But before that, go ahead and check it out!

(Major thanks to Benja Fallenstein, Alice Monday, and Elliott Jin for their work on the forum code, and to all the contributors so far!)

**EDIT 3/22:** Jessica Taylor, Benja Fallenstein, and I wrote forum digest posts summarizing and linking to recent work (on the IAFF and elsewhere) on [reflective oracle machines](http://agentfoundations.org/item?id=165), on [corrigibility, utility indifference, and related control ideas](http://agentfoundations.org/item?id=167), and on [updateless decision theory and the logic of provability](http://agentfoundations.org/item?id=160), respectively! These are pretty excellent resources for reading up on those topics, in my biased opinion.
# Is arrogance a symptom of bad intellectual hygeine?

I have this belief that humility is a part of good critical thinking, and that egoism undermines it.  I imagine arrogance as a kind of mind-death.  But I have no evidence, and no good mechanism by which it might be true.  In fact, I know the belief is suspect because I know that I want it to be true — I want to be able to assure myself that this or that intolerable academic will be magically punished with a decreased capacity to do good work. The truth could be the opposite: maybe hubris breeds confidence, and confidence results? After all, some of the most important thinkers in history were insufferable.

Is any link, positive or negative, between arrogance and reasoning too tenuous to be worth entertaining? Is humility a pretty word or a valuable habit? I don't know what I think yet.   Do you?
# Just a casual question regarding MIRI

Currently I am planning to start a mathematics degree when I enter university, however my interest has shifted largely to computational neuroscience and related fields, so I'm now planning to switch to an AI degree when I go to study. Having said that, MIRI has always posed interesting problems to me, and I have entertained the thought of trying to do some work for MIRI before. And so my question boils down to this: Would there be any problem with taking the AI degree if I ever wanted to try my hand at doing some math for MIRI? Is a maths degree essential or would an AI degree with a good grasp on mathematics related to MIRI work just as well? Any thoughts or musings would be appreciated :)
# Political topics attract participants inclined to use the norms of mainstream political debate, risking a tipping point to lower quality discussion

(I hope that is the least click-baity title ever.)

Political topics elicit lower quality participation, holding the set of participants fixed. This is the thesis of "politics is the mind-killer".

Here's a separate effect: Political topics attract mind-killed participants. This can happen even when the initial participants are not mind-killed by the topic. 

Since outreach is important, this could be a good thing. Raise the sanity water line! But the sea of people eager to enter political discussions is vast, and the epistemic problems can run deep. Of course not everyone needs to come perfectly prealigned with community norms, but any community will be limited in how robustly it can handle an influx of participants expecting a different set of norms. If you look at other forums, it seems to take very little overt contemporary political discussion before the whole place is swamped, and politics becomes endemic. As appealing as "LW, but with slightly more contemporary politics" sounds, it's probably not even an option. You have "LW, with politics in every thread", and "LW, with as little politics as we can manage".  

That said, most of the problems are avoided by just not saying anything that patterns matches too easily to current political issues. From what I can tell, LW has always had tons of meta-political content, which doesn't seem to cause problems, as well as standard political points presented in unusual ways, and contrarian political opinions that are too marginal to raise concern. Frankly, if you have a "no politics" norm, people will still talk about politics, but to a limited degree. But if you don't even half-heartedly (or even hypocritically) discourage politics, then a open-entry site that accepts general topics will risk spiraling too far in a political direction. 

As an aside, I'm not apolitical. Although some people advance a more sweeping dismissal of the importance or utility of political debate, this isn't required to justify restricting politics in certain contexts. The sort of the argument I've sketched (I don't want LW to be swamped by the worse sorts of people who can be attracted to political debate) is enough. There's no hypocrisy in not wanting politics on LW, but accepting political talk (and the warts it entails) elsewhere. Of the top of my head, Yvain is one LW affiliate who now largely writes about more politically charged topics on their own blog (SlateStarCodex), and there are some other progressive blogs in that direction. There are libertarians and right-leaning (reactionary? NRx-lbgt?) connections. I would love a grand unification as much as anyone, (of course, provided we all realize that I've been right all along), but please let's not tell the generals to bring their armies here for the negotiations.
# Slate Star Codex: alternative comment threads on LessWrong?

Like many Less Wrong readers, I greatly enjoy Slate Star Codex; there's a large overlap in readership. However, the comments there are far worse, not worth reading for me. I think this is in part due to the lack of LW-style up and downvotes. Have there ever been discussion threads about SSC posts here on LW? What do people think of the idea occasionally having them? Does Scott himself have any views on this, and would he be OK with it?

**Update:**

The latest from Scott:

> I'm fine with anyone who wants reposting things for comments on LW, except for posts where I specifically say otherwise or tag them with "things i will regret writing"

In this thread some have also argued for not posting the most hot-button political writings.

Would anyone be up for doing this? Ataxerxes started with ["Extremism in Thought Experiments is No Vice"](/r/discussion/lw/lyq/discussion_of_slate_star_codex_extremism_in/)