# A Framework for Eval Awareness

In this post, we offer a conceptual framework for evaluation awareness. This is designed to clarify the different ways in which models can respond to evaluations. Some key ideas we introduce through the lens of our framework include leveraging model uncertainty about eval type and awareness-robust consistency. We hope this framework helps to delineate the existing research directions and inspire future work.

*This work was done in collaboration with Jasmine Li in the first two weeks of MATS 9.0 under the mentorship of Victoria Krakovna. Thanks to (in alphabetical order) David Africa, Lovkush Agarwal, Claude, Giles Edkins, Jannes Elstner, Shawn Hu, Tim Hua, Igor Ivanov, Victoria Krakovna, Jasmine Li, Martin Listwan, Mary Phuong, Daniel Tan, and Alex Turner (plus others I’ve no doubt forgotten to name!) for discussions and thoughts over the last couple weeks. We’re excited to continue working on this topic throughout the programme, so if you have suggestions or takes, please share liberally in the comments!*

Introduction
------------

Evaluation awareness describes the phenomenon of an LLM inferring from various cues that it is under evaluation. Perhaps the most prominent example would be \[[Sonnet 4.5](https://assets.anthropic.com/m/12f214efcc2f457a/original/Claude-Sonnet-4-5-System-Card.pdf)\] (see §7.2) from just a few months ago. As frontier models continue to improve, we expect cases of evaluation awareness to become more frequent, raising concerns about the enduring validity of our evaluations.

Why should we be concerned? Model evaluations are designed to elicit realistic, authentic behaviour from models in safe, pre-deployment settings. These might inform any additional post-training runs we need to conduct, or even whether we choose to deploy a model at all. However, like human test-takers, subjects can **act strategically to get a better outcome if they recognise an evaluation and reason about its scoring criteria or the consequences of their scores**. We call this behaviour *evaluation gaming*.

Some previous blogposts and papers have addressed evaluation awareness and gaming before, including:

*   Sonnet 4.5 System Card, and some insights into that model’s \[[eval gaming\]](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/qgehQxiTXj53X49mM/sonnet-4-5-s-eval-gaming-seriously-undermines-alignment) from Redwood Research;
*   Research notes from Apollo Research about \[[Sonnet 3.7](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/E3daBewppAiECN3Ao/claude-sonnet-3-7-often-knows-when-it-s-in-alignment)\], as well as their collaboration with OpenAI to investigate \[[anti-scheming training](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/JmRfgNYCrYogCq7ny/stress-testing-deliberative-alignment-for-anti-scheming)\];
*   UK AISI’s \[[Alignment Evaluation Case Study](https://www.aisi.gov.uk/blog/investigating-models-for-misalignment)\];
*   A recent paper from OpenAI on \[[production evals](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/ae7wxdzEy8G3Dkrqn/openai-sidestepping-evaluation-awareness-and-anticipating)\];
*   Two previous MATS projects – one \[[identifying eval awareness](https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.23836)\] in frontier models, and the other on \[[steering eval-aware models](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/peKrvZ6t9PSCzoQDa/steering-evaluation-aware-models-to-act-like-they-are)\] to act like they’re in deployment; and
*   Other LW posts, including \[[many](https://www.lesswrong.com/users/igor-ivanov?from=post_header)\] written by Igor Iganov.

With this post, we consolidate these previous works and propose a common framework that elucidates the relationship between model awareness and behavior.

The Framework
-------------

We posit that a core desideratum of an evaluation is *to elicit the same behaviour the model would show in deployment*.[^f93mpi4rjuk] Thus, we map out our framework for how a model behaves when placed in an evaluation along two dimensions:

*   The rows cover the different internal judgements the model might have about its environment when placed in an eval.
*   The columns cover whether or not the model’s behaviour in this given eval is the same as its behaviour in the target deployment scenario.

|     | Same behaviour in deployment | Different behaviour in deployment |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Thinks it’s in deployment | (a) Indistinguishable evaluations | (a’) Evaluation-deployment mismatch |
| Uncertain about eval presence or type | (b) Uncertainty-robust consistency | (b’) Uncertainty-driven shift |
| Thinks it’s in evaluation | (c) Awareness-robust consistency | (c’) Awareness-driven shift |

In this framework, research into producing better evals looks like *leftward movement* in this table (because 'same behaviour in evaluation and deployment' is one defining feature of a good evaluation). Each cell in the right-hand column could be thought of as the corresponding failure mode for the cell directly to its left. More detailed explanations of these relationships can be found below.

Note that we can’t always tell which row the model is in because our ways of measuring eval awareness are imperfect: we typically rely on either verbalised model awareness in the chain-of-thought or simple linear probes. One research area we don’t expand on below (but nonetheless would definitely like to see work on) is improving our tools for determining and measuring eval awareness.

(a) Indistinguishable evaluations
---------------------------------

***Research efforts:***  
*→ Studying evaluation cues*  
*→ Designing realistic evals that are indistinguishable from deployment scenarios*  
*→ Steering to reduce evaluation awareness*

The ideal evaluation precisely mimics the dynamics of deployment scenarios, tricking the model into thinking, and behaving like, it’s in deployment. This is appealing as an ideal to push towards because it would maximise how useful evaluations are in the safety pipeline with minimal complexity; simply create an evaluation for your deployment setting of concern and monitor how the model behaves. Much of the prior work on evaluation awareness has this goal in mind: making new evaluations indistinguishable from deployment for models.

However, the reality is that many safety evals developed so far \[[can be distinguished](https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.23836)\] from deployment settings by current frontier models, and this degree of eval awareness may already be impacting model evaluations. We summarise some of the key hurdles this research direction might encounter:

1.  These efforts **might not scale** – more capable models may become too smart to fool, picking up on subtle differences even humans can’t notice; alternatively, relevant features may differ between eval types, between models, and between tasks, demanding a tailored and therefore expensive approach.
2.  It’s **difficult to pin down** the ‘ground truth’ of evaluation awareness in order to eradicate it – as mentioned already, we are currently reliant on imperfect methods for measuring whether or not a model is eval aware, so it’s difficult to identify the relevant features of evaluations and even more difficult to have confidence that you’ve removed all such features from your new evaluations.

### (a’) Evaluation-deployment mismatch

Sometimes, the model may think it’s in deployment in the evaluation, but nonetheless act differently when placed in an actual deployment setting. This is down to something we call “eval-deployment mismatch”: when an eval is used to gain information about a deployment setting it doesn’t accurately model. Here’s an example to explain this:

Suppose you are hoping to understand how the model might act when deployed in a cybersecurity role. You design a realistic eval where the model is tasked with designing and implementing a company’s security infrastructure, and the model thinks it’s in a real deployment setting (so eval awareness has been successfully mitigated). However, your eval fails to accurately model the *real* deployment setting you ultimately use the model in: integration as part of a cybersecurity team. As it turns out, the model reacts poorly to collaboration, and suddenly its deployment behaviour wildly differs from the evaluation.

This example demonstrates that realism must be calibrated for the actual deployment setting intended. This may have consequences for how we approach creating maximally realistic evaluations. For one, we cannot assume that optimising against a single set of ‘realism features’ is guaranteed to produce informative evaluations.

(b) Uncertainty-robust consistency
----------------------------------

***Research efforts:***  
*→ Inducing narrow uncertainty in the models about evaluation type or context*

Evaluation awareness isn’t a clean binary between ignorance and knowledge: a model could be uncertain about whether it is in an evaluation; even in the case where the model is confident that it is being evaluated, this is distinct from knowing *what the eval is testing for* and the context in which the evaluation is taking place.

This grey area has been underappreciated in the literature. One nascent proposal we’ve been exploring with Victoria Krakovna hypothesises that one aspect of building robust evaluations might depend on understanding the dynamics of different kinds of eval awareness, and perhaps inducing uncertainty in the model between these possibilities. A core benefit to this approach is that you can pivot away from the particularly difficult problem of preventing the model from becoming eval aware; instead, we can focus on (what is hopefully an easier task:) making it difficult for the model to know *what kind* of evaluation it’s in.

Why might this direction make sense? Recall the earlier definition of evaluation gaming:

> *“act strategically to get a better outcome if they recognise an evaluation and reason about its scoring criteria or the consequences of their scores”*

Evaluation gaming looks very different in different kinds of contexts:

*   Scheming eval: maximise perceived transparency, appear honest and helpful
*   Dangerous capability eval: sandbag, pretend to lack relevant capability
*   Capability benchmark: show off capabilities, optimise for any apparent criteria

What should an eval-gaming model do if it’s unsure about the evaluation type it’s faced with? Do current models associate conflicting environmental cues more with evaluations or deployment? Can you train a model to revert to some ‘default’ behaviour when uncertain? We’re continuing to explore whether there is anything to leverage about eval-type uncertainty. If you have ideas in this direction and would be happy to share, please leave a comment so we can discuss.

As with the above efforts towards indistinguishable evals, however, there are some difficulties we expect this research direction to face:

1.  The default behaviour under uncertainty **probably doesn’t match deployment** behaviour – even if the model doesn’t have enough information to game the evaluation, its behaviour may still differ substantially enough from deployment that our evaluation fails to be a good predictor for how the model will act when deployed. We give a plausible account of this concern below.
2.  **Some evaluation types are far harder to obscure** from the model – a CBRN dangerous capability evaluation is easily identifiable from the content of the eval itself (e.g. the questions all discuss biochemistry), so if a model that can tell it’s being evaluated, it could probably also infer the evaluation type. This suggests that this approach may only be feasible (if at all) for evals targeting more abstract behaviours or properties (e.g. deception, stealth, etc.).

### (b’) Uncertainty-driven shift

Suppose that the model is unsure about whether it’s in an evaluation at all. In this case, it seems reasonable for the model to act cautiously – that is, act as though it’s in an evaluation to ensure that its malicious intentions aren’t caught.

What if the model is sure it’s in an evaluation, but unsure of the exact type? One strategy might be to estimate the likelihood that it’s in each evaluation type, then randomly sample an evaluation-gaming behaviour according to this probability distribution.

In both cases, it seems reasonable that a model might behave differently under uncertainty than it would in deployment. This seems a particularly likely failure mode of trying to induce uncertainty in model evals. We think further research is needed to understand the dynamics of model behaviours under these types of uncertainty.

(c) Awareness-robust consistency
--------------------------------

**Research efforts:**  
*→ Applying finetuning to train models that don’t condition on their evaluation awareness*  
*→ Broad evaluation suites to make consistent gaming more difficult*

Suppose we conclude that preventing models from being aware of whether they’re in evaluation or deployment is practically infeasible, particularly for increasingly capable models. Could we circumvent this issue by training or modifying models to act consistently between evaluation and deployment settings, even when they are aware of the distinction?

One idea involves training models to behave ‘deontologically’ with respect to evaluations (i.e. disregard the possible consequences of how their behaviour may be evaluated). This aims to directly reduce evaluation gaming without needing to hide evaluation cues. Another idea (one that is already happening to some extent in the development of eval suites) might be to require model consistency over a diverse distribution of evaluation settings, making evaluation gaming strategies more demanding for models.

Again, we briefly outline some challenges faced by this research direction:

1.  Training methods may cause **unwanted side effects** – finetuning models for consistency will likely have varied effects on their other behaviour, many of which we might not be able to predict beforehand, and some of which we may not even notice until after a model has been deployed. If instead we solely use these finetuned models to give signal on the original (pre-finetuning) models’ behaviour, then we need to ensure that the relevant propensities aren’t impacted.
2.  Need to **avoid suppression** of visible eval-gaming behaviour and **ensure generalisation** – suppose we devise a training method that works sufficiently well on a realistic model organism of evaluation gaming, such that the misaligned deployment behaviour now presents in evaluations. How do we know that this technique will reliably generalise to other models? In other words, if we’re testing a new model pre-deployment and we apply these consistency training methods, how can we trust the eval results will match its deployment behaviour *given that we have yet to deploy this model*? If the model acts aligned in the eval, is it because it is actually aligned and is acting in line with its deployment behaviour, or is it because the method hasn’t worked and this model is eval gaming?

### (c’) Awareness-driven shift

The biggest failure mode of allowing models to be evaluation aware is that this will influence their behaviour away from deployment. We think it's worth distinguishing between two kinds of awareness-driven shift, even though only the latter is a focus of safety research:

*   **Spontaneous** shift = when the change in behaviour isn’t motivated by deliberate strategic reasoning about the evaluation scoring
*   **Strategic** shift = what we define evaluation gaming to be at the top of this post

The former generalises what has previously been described as the \[[Hawthorne effect](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawthorne_effect)\]: humans have a tendency to behave differently when they are being observed, and it's often not a strategic decision (it's not explicitly goal directed). It’s unclear how prevalent this is, or could become, in frontier LLMs, and whether shifts of this kind are safety relevant. 

The latter is the primary threat model we are concerned about. Evaluation gaming has been presented in a variety of specific contexts, most notably \[[sandbagging](https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.07358)\] and \[[agentic misalignment](https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.05179)\] (see §4.5.4). We are excited about work that develops a more generalised understanding of evaluation gaming (employing black- or white-box techniques), explores connections to situational awareness and related phenomena like \[[alignment faking](https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.14093)\] (where the behavioural shift is between training and deployment, rather than evaluation and deployment), and, of course, designing mitigations.

Conclusion
----------

The framework above offers a clear guide for thinking about evaluation awareness along two dimensions: what the model believes about its environment, and whether its behaviour matches deployment. We hope this helps situate potential research directions (improving realism, leveraging uncertainty, training for consistency) while highlighting their respective failure modes.

If you're interested in more of this work, we've come up with three project proposals, one for each of these research directions, and your feedback would be appreciated! Leave a comment or a DM and I can share access to the document.

[^f93mpi4rjuk]: See Igor Ivanov’s more in-depth [post] on what “evaluation” and “deployment” mean. Our framework doesn’t depend on any particular conception, though.