Harley-ml/lesswrong huggingface dataset:
# Weak supporting evidence can undermine belief

Article: [Weak supporting evidence can undermine belief in an outcome](http://news.brown.edu/pressreleases/2011/03/evidence)

> Defying logic, people given weak evidence can regard predictions supported by that evidence as less likely than if they aren’t given the evidence at all.  
>   
> ...  
>   
> Consider the following statement: “Widespread use of hybrid and electric cars could reduce worldwide carbon emissions. One bill that has passed the Senate provides a $250 tax credit for purchasing a hybrid or electric car. How likely is it that at least one-fifth of the U.S. car fleet will be hybrid or electric in 2025?”  
>   
> That middle sentence is the weak evidence. People presented with the entire statement — or similar statements with the same three-sentence structure but on different topics — answered the final question lower than people who read the statement without the middle sentence. They did so even though other people who saw the middle statement in isolation rated it as positive evidence for, in this case, higher adoption of hybrid and electric cars.

Paper: [When good evidence goes bad: The weak evidence effect in judgment and decision-making](http://sites.google.com/site/philfernbachswebpage/attachments/fernbach_cognition_2011.pdf "When good evidence goes bad: The weak evidence effect in judgment and decision-making")

Abstract:

> An indispensable principle of rational thought is that positive evidence should increase  
> belief. In this paper, we demonstrate that people routinely violate this principle when pre-  
> dicting an outcome from a weak cause. In Experiment 1 participants given weak positive  
> evidence judged outcomes of public policy initiatives to be less likely than participants  
> given no evidence, even though the evidence was separately judged to be supportive.  
> Experiment 2 ruled out a pragmatic explanation of the result, that the weak evidence  
> implies the absence of stronger evidence. In Experiment 3, weak positive evidence made  
> people less likely to gamble on the outcome of the 2010 United States mid-term Congres-  
> sional election. Experiments 4 and 5 replicated these findings with everyday causal  
> scenarios. We argue that this ‘‘weak evidence effect’’ arises because people focus dispro-  
> portionately on the mentioned weak cause and fail to think about alternative causes.
# Free Tutoring in Math/Programming

I enjoy teaching, and I'd like to do my bit for the Less Wrong community. I've tutored a few people on the #lesswrong IRC channel in freenode without causing permanent brain damage. Hence I'm extending my offer of free tutoring from #lesswrong to lesswrong.com.

I offer tutoring in the following programming languages:

1.  Haskell
2.  C
3.  Python
4.  Scheme

I offer tutoring in the following areas of mathematics:

1.  Elementary Algebra
2.  Trigonometry
3.  Calculus
4.  Linear Algebra
5.  Analysis
6.  Abstract Algebra
7.  Logic
8.  Category Theory
9.  Probability Theory
10.  Combinatorics
11.  Computational Complexity

If you're interested contact me. Contact details below:

IRC: PatrickRobotham

Skype: grey_fox26

Email: patrick.robotham2@gmail.com
# Announcing rationalist blog aggregator

After input from many of you guys and the NYC group, I am announcing [planetrationalist.com](http://planetrationalist.com/)

There's a lot of different directions this sort of idea could go in, but I figured that this could be a good-enough first effort.

Enjoy, and let me know what you think.
# Planets in the habitable zone, the Drake Equation, and the Great Filter

One serious issue for evaluating existential risk is working out whether most of the [Great Filter](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Filter) is behind us or in front of us. This relates to the Drake Equation and similar attempts to estimate the frequency of life in an obvious way.

Over the last few years, it has become increasingly apparent that extrasolar planets are common. However, what fraction of these planets lie in their stars habitable zone has still been an open question, primarily because most of our current methods for planet finding easily find planets that are either very large or are very close to their star (ideally both). 

A new study, using the data from the Kepler spacecraft, [estimates that about a third of all stars similar to the sun have at least one planet in the habitable zone.](http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1109/1109.4682v1.pdf) There are some issues with this estimate, and [Phil Plait discusses them at his blog.](http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/badastronomy/2011/09/29/new-study-13-of-sun-like-stars-might-have-terrestrial-planets-in-their-habitable-zones/)  The estimate has a large amount of variance. The paper actually estimates 34% +/- 14% and the issues that Phil brings up increases the uncertainty in both directions but it seems safe at this point to consider this not being very far off.

One obvious issue from a Fermi perspective is that some systems will likely have multiple planets in this zone. Also, having planets in the habitable zone is clearly not sufficient for life. By the standard estimates for habitable zones, Venus and Mars are both in the habitable zone of the sun. And there may very well be ways for life to arise outside the habitable zone. Moons like Europa and Titan seem to be excellent candidates, and we can't rule out more exotic forms of life in other habitats although that seems not too likely right now. 

However, one thing this makes clear: The part of the Great Filter that is behind us that is due to planets not  lying inside the habitable zone is small. So the question is, what does this mean for our estimates of how much of the Filter is behind us and how much is in front of us?
# Get genotyped for free ( If your IQ is high enough)

I've just watched this [talk about Genetics and Intelligence](http://www.youtube.com/user/GoogleTechTalks#p/u/26/62jZENi1ed8) by Steve Hsu**~1~**, a theoretical physicist and Scientific Advisor to the Cognitive Genomics Lab of BGI (formerly the Beijing Genomics Institute), probably the leading genomics research center in the world.

Apparently, the main reason he gave this talk was to recruit volunteers for a study from the Cognitive Genomics Lab with the goal of investigating the genetics of human cognition.

From their [homepage](https://www.cog-genomics.org/volunteer/):

> _We currently seek participants with high cognitive ability_. You can qualify for the study if you have obtained a high SAT/ACT/GRE score, or have performed well in academic competitions such as the Math, Physics, or Informatics Olympiads, the William Lowell Putnam Mathematical Competition, TopCoder, etc.

> Automatic qualifying criteria include:
> 
> *   An SAT score of at least 760V/800M post-recentering or 700V/780M pre-recentering; ACT score of 35-36; or GRE score of at least 700V/800Q.
> *   A PhD from a top US program in physics, math, EE, or theoretical computer science.
> *   Honorable mention or better in the Putnam competition.

> If you qualify as a participant, we may send you a DNA saliva kit. After you return this kit, **we will genotype your DNA, and the data will eventually be available to you on this website, in a format compatible with many 3rd party interpretational tools.**

I guess there are quite a few Lesswrongers smart enough to qualify for this study. If you want to advance Science and get genotyped for free check out [their website](https://www.cog-genomics.org/volunteer/) for further information.

1: Steve Hsu has an awesome blog called ["Information Processing"](http://infoproc.blogspot.com/). He writes about the genetics of intelligence, economics, psychometry, career advice for geeks, physics, etc.
# Sweet Unconsciousness

Hello LW,

There has been some interest around here about atypical mental phenomena such as [synesthesia](/lw/7pm/blindsight_and_consciousness/4xek), [blindsight](/lw/7pm/blindsight_and_consciousness/), absence of [mental](/lw/dr/generalizing_from_one_example/281v?c=1) [images](/lw/dr/generalizing_from_one_example/19jn?c=1), and so on. There have also been [sappy](/lw/50p/reflections_on_rationality_a_year_out/) [posts](/lw/7dy/a_rationalists_tale/) and [requests for help](/r/discussion/lw/7t0/gooey_requestforhelp_i_dont_know_what_to_do/). I'd like to discuss my personal quirks in the hopes that it is interesting and someone can help me.

I suffer from occasional [hypnopompic sleep paralysis](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sleep_paralysis), which isn't uncommon. The unusual thing is that I remember my dreams every night, in extensive detail, usually several of them. Unfortunately, last night I vividly dreamt through what seemed like days' worth of having a severe hangover, all before I even woke up and had a real one, and it was a terrible experience. I'd like to be able to choose to drift into unconsciousness, as I occasionally do, to have a break from being mentally aware for such lengthy times spanning weeks.

Does anyone else have similar experiences? Has anyone read any scientific research on this subject? How do people _not_ remember their dreams?
# [Funny] Even Clippy can be blamed on the use of non-Bayesian methods

From [this 2001 article](http://people.cs.ubc.ca/~murphyk/Bayes/econ.22mar01.html):

> Eric Horvitz... feels bad about \[Microsoft Office's Clippy\]... many people regard the paperclip as annoyingly over-enthusiastic, since it appears without warning and gets in the way.
> 
> To be fair, that is not Dr Horvitz's fault. Originally, he programmed the paperclip to use Bayesian decision-making techniques both to determine when to pop up, and to decide what advice to offer...
> 
> The paperclip's problem is that the algorithm... that determined when it should appear was deemed too cautious. To make the feature more prominent, a cruder non-Bayesian algorithm was substituted in the final product, so the paperclip would pop up more often.
> 
> Ever since, Dr Horvitz has wondered whether he should have fought harder to keep the original algorithm.

_I_, at least, found this amusing.
# Bayesian analysis under threat in British courts

This is an interesting article talking about the [use of bayes in british courts](http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/oct/02/formula-justice-bayes-theorem-miscarriage) and efforts to improve how statistics are used in court cases. Probably worth keeping an eye on. It might expose more people to bayes if it becomes common and thus portrayed in TV dramas.
# Knox and Sollecito freed

**See:** **[You Be the Jury](/lw/1ir/you_be_the_jury_survey_on_a_current_event/), [The Amanda Knox Test](/lw/1j7/the_amanda_knox_test_how_an_hour_on_the_internet/)**

While we hear about [Bayes' Theorem being under threat in some courts](/r/discussion/lw/7x2/bayesian_analysis_under_threat_in_british_courts/), it is nice to savor [the occasional moment of rationality prevailing in the justice system, and of mistakes being corrected.](http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/10/03/501364/main20114867.shtml)

Congratulations to the Italian court system for successfully [saying "Oops!" ](/lw/i9/the_importance_of_saying_oops/)

Things go wrong in this world quite a bit, as we know. Sometimes it's appropriate to just say "hooray!" when they go right.

Discuss, or celebrate.
# Another "Oops" moment [link]

[http://www.thebigquestions.com/2011/10/04/big-news/](http://www.thebigquestions.com/2011/10/04/big-news/)

Steven Landsburg notes that mathematician Edward Nelson has retracted his claim that the axioms of Peano Arithmetic are inconsistent.

The bit Landsburg cites indicates that the retraction was cordial and drama-free, the way a retraction should be--even a retraction of a claim as momentous as this one.

Now, is this kind of event more common in math than in other fields? Is it more common now than before? (Landsburg seems to attribute it in part to the existence of the Internet.) Your thoughts?
# [LINK] Robin Hanson on Carl Shulman's recent paper on Whole Brain Emulation

[Shulman on Superorgs](http://www.overcomingbias.com/2011/10/shulman-on-superorgs.html)

Best to read the link first and my comments later.

I have very little to comment on the topic itself, but I do find it odd that Robin takes such a confrontational stance, beginning from the first sentence "It has come to my attention that [some](/lw/5jb/link_whole_brain_emulation_and_the_evolution_of/) think that by now I should have commented on Carl Shulman’s em paper" and culminating with a harsh analysis not only of Carl's conclusions, but about what (Robin believes) made him want to reach those conclusions, as well as SIAI's mission statement in general. There is negative framing, "obsession with making a god to rule us all (well)", that I wouldn't expect from someone trying to honestly represent the other side. It's not that I don't share some of those concerns, but to psychoanalyse (who you seem to have identified as) your opponent in an obvious effort to discredit, is at the very least unfair.  I was generally aware that there was some kind of tension between the former dynamic duo of Hanson - Yudkowsky, but it seems to have become full-blown hostility.

Robin does seem to find the courage to say he's glad others are looking into emulations, but the overall vibe I get is of someone protective of a research field they believe they uniquely 'get', someone who feels others should just get in line or get out of the ring, and it's a vibe not uncommon in academia.
# Marsh et al. "Serotonin Transporter Genotype (5-HTTLPR) Predicts Utilitarian Moral Judgments"

The whole paper is [here.](http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0025148#s2)  In short, they found a genotype that predicts people's response to the original [trolley problem](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trolley_problem):

> A trolley (i.e. in British English a tram) is running out of control down a track. In its path are five people who have been tied to the track by a mad philosopher. Fortunately, you could flip a switch, which will lead the trolley down a different track to safety. Unfortunately, there is a single person tied to that track. Should you flip the switch or do nothing?

Participants with one kind of serotonin transmitter (LL-homozygotes) judged flipping the switch to be better than a morally neutral action. Participants with the other kind (S-carriers) judged flipping the switch to be no better than a morally neutral action. The groups responded equally to the "fat man scenario" both rejecting the 'push' option.

  
Some quotes:

> We hypothesized that _5-HTTLPR_ genotype would interact with intentionality in respondents who generated moral judgments. Whereas we predicted that all participants would eschew intentionally harming an innocent for utilitarian gains, we predicted that participants' judgments of foreseen but unintentional harm would diverge as a function of genotype. Specifically, we predicted that LL homozygotes would adhere to the principle of double effect and preferentially select the utilitarian option to save more lives despite unintentional harm to an innocent victim, whereas S-allele carriers would be less likely to endorse even unintentional harm. Results of behavioral testing confirmed this hypothesis.

> Participants in this study judged the acceptability of actions that would unintentionally or intentionally harm an innocent victim in order to save others' lives. An analysis of variance revealed a genotype × scenario interaction, _F_(2, 63) = 4.52, _p_ = .02\. Results showed that, relative to long allele homozygotes (LL), carriers of the short (S) allele showed particular reluctance to endorse utilitarian actions resulting in foreseen harm to an innocent individual. LL genotype participants rated perpetrating unintentional harm as more acceptable (_M_ = 4.98, _SEM_ = 0.20) than did SL genotype participants (_M_ = 4.65, _SEM_ = 0.20) or SS genotype participants (_M_ = 4.29, _SEM_ = 0.30).

...

> The results indicate that inherited variants in a genetic polymorphism that influences serotonin neurotransmission influence utilitarian moral judgments as well. This finding is interpreted in light of evidence that the S allele is associated with elevated emotional responsiveness.
# Applying Bayesian Analysis to History (post idea)

I am an aspiring historian and I'm very interested in ways to apply Bayesian reasoning to history. When I say "history" I mean the study of history -- as a historian, allowing my map of what has happened _in the past_ to match the territory, and being able to represent more accurately the relative strength of historical evidence for and against various historical models.

[I know that historical evidence works quite a bit differently from scientific evidence.](/lw/in/scientific_evidence_legal_evidence_rational/) But I think that [historical evidence is also useful](/lw/j0/making_history_available/). Historians, in recording and assembling secondary sources, assess the relative strength of evidence (mostly primary sources) with regards to a topic _already_.  But there must be a way to do it more formally. Shouldn't there be a right answer, just as no two people who are completely rational (and have the same information) should ever disagree?

This is a post (or series of posts) I might write in the future, and I have put a bit of thought into it so far, but I need to do quite a bit more research. Is there anyone interested in reading something on this topic? Has it been done before? Is there anyone who is knowledgeable about how historians treat evidence who might be able to offer some insights?
# Mike Darwin on Steve Jobs's hypocritical stance towards death

First, Darwin [describes](http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/New_Cryonet/message/1038) Jobs's (far mode) stance towards death: 

> As Aschwin points out Jobs is on record (his Stanford Commencement Speech) as saying that death is the best thing that ever happened to life - that it clears out the old, and makes way for the new.

But [these](http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/New_Cryonet/message/1051) are Jobs's actual (near mode) actions regarding his own death: 

> The really big story, so far largely unexploited by the media, is that Jobs got a liver transplant and got it here in the US. This just does not happen in patients with his Dx and prognosis - not since Mickey Mantle, anyway. And his outcome was exactly as was predicted. This infuriates those 'in the know' in the transplant community, because you have only to look to guys like Jim Neighbors, Larry Hagman, or even Larry Kramer who got livers many years or even a decade or two ago, and who continue not only to survive, but to do well. To put the liver of a 25-year old into a ~54 year old man with metastatic neuroendocrine pancreatic cancer violates the established protocols of just about every transplant center in the US.

The conclusion:

> I find it more than a little hypocritical that Jobs, who spoke so glowingly of the utility of death for others, used every bit of medical technology AND his considerable wealth and influence, to postpone it for it himself, including the expedient of taking a GIFT, given with the sole intention of its being used to provide genuinely life saving benefit (not a futile exercise in medical care) and squandering it on a doomed attempt to save his own life. If you have the temerity to stand before the entire population of this planet and proclaim the goodness of death, then you should have the balls to accept it - especially when your own warped, erroneous and IRRATIONAL decision making was the proximate cause of your own dying. Instead, Jobs chose to grasp at straws, take a gift from a dead man and his family, given in good faith, and squander it on his own lust for more of the very thing (life) that he has publicly proclaimed it is a second best to "Death (which) is very likely the single best invention of life."
# Guardian article highlights observational biases in Knox investigators

[Amanda Knox: What's in a face?](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/08/amanda-knox-facial-expressions)

Some choice quotes:

> The eyes are not windows to the soul. They are organs for converting light into electro-magnetic impulses.

> "We were able to establish guilt," said Edgardo Giobbi, the lead investigator, "by closely observing the suspect's psychological and behavioural reaction during the interrogation."

There are several good insights throughout the article, many of which will probably seem familiar to readers of Less Wrong. The few that stood out to me:

1.  [Fundamental attribution error](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fundamental_attribution_error) and the general tendency to create grossly oversimplified mental models of others (while simultaneously overestimating our model's accuracy).
2.  Various [observational biases](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Observational_bias#Biases), especially egregious on the part of police and investigators. They were so satisfied with the "evidence" of her facial expressions, which is readily available (under the proverbial streetlight), that they felt this obviated the need for additional investigation. It appears that this led them to seek only evidence that further confirmed Knox's guilt (confirmation bias), rather than considering ways to disprove the hypothesis.
3.  Not sure what to call this other than the (not-too-well-established) [Dunning-Kruger Effect](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect): the tendency of nearly everyone involved to overestimate their ability to judge someone's guilt based on expression reading techniques in which they may or may not be skilled.
# Mike Darwin on Kurzweil, Techno-Optimism, and Delusional Stances on Cryonics

In a comment on his skeptical [post](http://chronopause.com/index.php/2011/08/11/the-kurzwild-man-in-the-night/) about Ray Kurzweil, he [writes](http://chronopause.com/index.php/2011/08/11/the-kurzwild-man-in-the-night/#comment-3637),

> Unfortunately, \[Kurzweil's\] technological forecasting is naive, and I believe it will also prove erroneous (and in that, he is in excellent company). That would be of no consequence to me, or to others in cryonics, were it not for the fact that it has had, and continues to have, a corrosive effect on cryonics and immortalist activists and activism. His idea of the Singularity has created an expectation of entitlement and inevitability that are wholly unjustified, both on the basis of history, and on on the basis of events that are playing out now in the world markets, and on the geopolitical stage....
> 
> The IEET poll \[[link](http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/die20110907); Sep 7, 2011\] found that the majority of their readers aged 35 or older said that they expect to “die within a normal human lifespan;” no surprises there.
> 
> This was in contrast to to an overwhelming majority (69%) of their readers under the age of 35 who believe that radical life extension will enable them to stay alive indefinitely, or “for centuries, at least.”
> 
> Where the data gets really interesting is when you look at the breakdown of just how these folks think they are going to be GIVEN practical immortality:
> 
> *   36% believe they will stay alive for centuries (at least) in their own (biological) bodies
> *   26% expect that they will continue to survive by having their “minds uploaded to a computer”
> *   7% expect to “die” but to eventually be resurrected by cryonics.
> 
> Only 7% think cryonics will be necessary? That simply delusional and it is a huge problem....
> 
> Nor are the 7% who anticipate survival via cryonics likely to be signed up. In fact, I’d wager not more than one or two of them is. And why should they bestir themselves in any way to this end? After all, the Singularity is coming, it is INEVITABLE, and all they have to do is to sit back and wait for it to arrive – presumably wrapped up in in pretty paper and with bows on.
> 
> Young people anticipating practical immortality look at me like some kind of raving mad Luddite when I try to convince them that if they are to have any meaningful chance at truly long term survival, they are going to have to act, work very hard, and have a hell of a lot of luck in the bargain....
> 
> Kurzweil has been, without doubt or argument, THE great enabler of this madness by providing a scenario and a narrative that is far more credible than Santa Claus, and orders of magnitude more appealing.

I wonder how people on Less Wrong would respond to that poll?

Edit: (Tried to) fix formatting and typo in title.
# 1001 PredictionBook Nights

> I explain what I've learned from creating and judging thousands of predictions on personal and real-world matters: the challenges of maintenance, the limitations of prediction markets, the interesting applications to my other essays, skepticism about pundits and unreflective persons' opinions, my own biases like optimism & planning fallacy, 3 very useful heuristics/approaches, and the costs of these activities in general.
> 
> Plus an extremely geeky parody of _Fate/Stay Night_.

This essay exists as a large section of my page on [predictions markets](http://www.gwern.net/Prediction%20markets#predictionbook-nights) on `gwern.net`: [http://www.gwern.net/Prediction%20markets#1001-predictionbook-nights](http://www.gwern.net/Prediction%20markets#1001-predictionbook-nights)
# [SEQ RERUN] Why Are Individual IQ Differences OK?

Today's post, [Why Are Individual IQ Differences OK?](/lw/kk/why_are_individual_iq_differences_ok/) was originally published on 26 October 2007. A summary (taken from the [LW wiki](http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Less_Wrong/2007_Articles/Summaries#Why_Are_Individual_IQ_Differences_OK.3F)):

> People act as though it is perfectly fine and normal for individuals to have differing levels of intelligence, but that it is absolutely horrible for one racial group to be more intelligent than another. Why should the two be considered any differently?

  
Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).  
  
_This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was [No One Knows What Science Doesn't Know](/lw/7zk/seq_rerun_no_one_knows_what_science_doesnt_know/), and you can use the [sequence_reruns tag](/r/discussion/tag/sequence_reruns/) or [rss feed](/r/discussion/tag/sequence_reruns/.rss) to follow the rest of the series.  
  
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go [here](/r/discussion/lw/5as/introduction_to_the_sequence_reruns/) for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series._
# First, they must be convinced to play the game

I recall seeing, in one of the AI-boxing discussion threads, a comment to the effect that the first step for EY to get out was to convince the other party to even play the game at all.

It has since then occurred to me that this applies to a lot of my interactions. Many people who know me IRL and know a belief of mine which they do not agree with and do not want to be convinced of often adopt the strategy of not talking with me about it at all. For me to convince one of these people of something, first I have to convince them to talk about it at all.

(Note, I don't think this is because I'm an unpleasant person to converse with. Excuses given are along the lines of "I never win an argument with you" and "you've studied it a lot more than I have, it's an unfair discussion". I don't think I'm claiming anything too outlandish here; average humans are really bad at putting rational arguments together.)

I suppose the general form is: in order to convince someone of a sufficiently alien (to them) P, first you must convince them to seriously think about P. This rule may need to be applied recursively (e.g., "seriously think about P" may require one or more LW rationality techniques).

As a practical example, my parents are very religious. I'd like to convince them to sign up for cryonics. I haven't (yet) come up with an approach that I expect to have a non-negligible chance of success. But the realization that the first goalpost along the way is to get them to seriously engage in the conversation at all simplifies the search space. (Deconversion and training in LW rationality has, of course, the best chance of success--but still a high chance of failing and I judge a failure would probably have a large negative impact on my relationship with my parents in their remaining years. That's why I'd like to convince them of just this one thing.)

I realize that this is a fairly obvious point (an application of this--raising the sanity waterline--is the point behind this entire site!), but I haven't seen this explicitly noted as being a general pattern and now that I note it, I see it everywhere--hence this post.
# Motivated skepticism: it's harder to avoid than I'd think

(I am relatively new here. Allow me to introduce myself with this anecdote, which could not have happened to me before I started reading LW.)

Yesterday I caught myself on rationalizing. It's the first time I caught myself on rationalizing _before_ I finished (verbalizing) the thought. But, I finished the thought, and even though I knew it was rationalizing from the very start, I ended up believing it.

The original question is not very interesting, but here it is to illustrate the issue: I was talking with a friend about US TV series. And he mentioned that his wife insist on watching movies/shows in English without subtitles; to improve their English skills. (I also started watching American shows many-many years ago with the purpose of improving language skills. In English with English subtitles. And it did help immensely, but I never got rid of the subtitles even though originally I was planning to.)

So, my though answer was the following: "How does she know that this helps _more_ than watching with subtitles? Did she measure it somehow?  Watching without subtitles mainly helps with listening comprehension. And I'm already good enough with that. Using subtitles on the other hand is always an opportunity to improve on the more obscure part of English vocabulary. In almost every episode there is one or two very rarely used words, English vocabulary is just so enormous, and without subtitles you'd just skip over it..."  Fully verbalized it was something like this.

Now, the first part of that argument is a "fully general counterargument". And the rest of it, though might be plausible, should be treated with great suspicion since I know that the roots for it are in motivated skepticism. At least, my realization that this is rationalization stopped me from using this argument. But, it is still quite hard to "unbelieve" it. Maybe I should have tried to stop myself from finishing the thought once I realized its nature? Or you just have to pay even more attention, and it will come with practice?  Of course, this is a trivial issue, completely unimportant. But why would I think that it will be _easier_ if the issue _is_ important?
# Just a reminder, for everyone that signed up for the intro to AI class, it's started.

Here you go: [http://www.ai-class.com/](http://www.ai-class.com/)

They're still working out kinks in the site, and no homework is up yet, but the initial set of lectures (really really basic "what is AI/welcome to the first day of class" type stuff is up), so if you signed up, then sign in and hopefully the site will work for you.
# The self-fooling problem.

I formulated a little problem. Care to solve it?

You are given the following information:

_Your task is to hide a coin in your house (or any familiar finite environment).__  
After you've hidden the coin your memory will be erased and restored to a state just before you receiving this information.  
Then you will be told about the task (i.e that you have hidden a coin), and asked to try to find the coin.__  
If you find it you'll lose, but you will be convinced that if you find it you win.  
_

So now you're faced with finding an optimal strategy to **minimize the probability** of finding the coin within a finite time-frame.  
Bear in mind that any chain of reasoning leading up to a decision of location can be generated by you while trying to find the coin.

You might come to the conclusion that there cant exist an optimal strategy other than randomizing. But if you randomize, then you have the risk of placing the coin at a location where it can be easily found, like on a table or on the floor. You could eliminate those risky locations by excluding them as alternatives in your randomization process, but that would mean including a chain of reasoning!
# The self-unfooling problem

Inspired by [PuyaSharif's conundrum](/r/discussion/lw/817/the_selffooling_problem/), I find myself continually faced with the opposite problem, which is identical to the original except in the bold-faced sentences:

You are given the following information:

_Your task is to hide a coin in your house (or any familiar finite environment).  _

_After you've hidden the coin your memory will be erased and restored to a state just before you receiving this information.  _

_Then you will be told about the task (i.e that you have hidden a coin), and asked to try to find the coin.  _

_**If you find it you win. The faster you find it, the better you win.**_

Where do you leave the coin so that when you have no memory of where you put it, you can lay your hands on it at once?

For just one coin, you might think up some suitable Schelling point, but now multiply the task a thousandfold, for all of your possessions. (I am not a minimalist; of books alone I have 3500.) How do you arrange all your stuff, all your life, in such a way that everything is exactly where you would first think of looking for it?
# [Link] Awesome interactive visualization article

["Up and Down the Ladder of Abstraction"](http://worrydream.com/LadderOfAbstraction/)

Have you seen something similar to explain Bayesian updating? If not, how would one go about doing that?

The rest of the site and in particular the ["Kill Math Project"](http://worrydream.com/KillMath/) may also be of interest to LWers. Author Bret Victor, whose CV includes "designed the initial user interface concepts for the iPad", comes across overall as a particularly awesome fellow.
# Don't call yourself a rationalist.

I often seem to run into problems when I use the de facto label for this group. For example, when I say, "I've been hanging out with rationalists lately," I notice that many people immediately go on the defensive. They might ask why you need a group in order to be rational, or they might say that they don't believe that people are inherently rational. Of course, I made none of those claims, I simply indicated that I was hanging out with rationalists.

You might think that "rationalist" is simply a descriptive label, but it carries positive connotations -- and what people tend to hear is "I'm a superior thinker to you," or maybe "I'm a part of this group, which ascribes the label 'rationalist' to itself, to make ourselves seem higher status than we really are."

**Why does this matter?**![](http://images.lesswrong.com/t3_82s_0.png)

The community doesn't exist in a vacuum; how the community is viewed from the outside matters. As the community grows and as people gain awareness of it, branding becomes important. People talk to each other, and communities gain reputations. Even if you believe that we are a loose collection of individuals, as soon as you assign a name to yourself, [that is sufficient to form a group identity](http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Sherif/chap5.htm).

The people we interact with tend to share similar interests. The population of New York may be in the millions, and yet I run into the same people at different functions without coordination.

The more negative perceptions associated with a group, the more rapidly [evaporative cooling of groups](/lw/lr/evaporative_cooling_of_group_beliefs/) will occur.

**What to do?  
**

It's far better to talk about good things that you've gained from being in the group. It's better to say what the group **does**, not what the group **is**.

But beyond that, it's about time the community picked a better label to use. I have one idea, but I'll [hold off on proposing solutions](/lw/ka/hold_off_on_proposing_solutions/).
# Is quantum physics (easily?) computable?

So I've been trying to read the Quantum Physics sequence. I think I've understood about half of it- I've been rushed, and haven't really sat down and worked through the math. And so I apologize in advance for any mistakes I make here.

It seems like classical mechanics with quantized time is really easy to simulate with a computer: every step, you just calculate force, figure out where velocity is going, then add the change in position to the new position.

Then when you change to relativity, it seems like it's suddenly a lot harder to implement. Whereas classical mechanics are easy on a computer, it seems to me that you would have to set up a system where the outcomes of relativity are explicitly stated, while the classical outcomes are implicit.

The same thing seems to occur, except more, with quantum physics. Continuous wave functions seems to be far harder than discrete particles. Similarly, the whole thing about "no individual particle identity" seems more difficult, although as I think of it now, I suppose this could be because the whole concept of particles is naive.

It doesn't seem like the computation rules simply get harder as we learn more physics. After all, trying to do thermal physics got a lot easier when we started using the ideal gas model.

Also, it's not just that ever improving theories must be ever more difficult to implement on a computer. Imagine that we lived inside Conway's Game of Life. We would figure out all kinds of high level physics, which would be probably way more complex than the eventual B3/S23 which they would discover.

It feels like the actual implemented physics shouldn't much affect how computation works. After all, we live in a quantum universe and classical physics is still simpler to compute.

Is there any value to this speculation?
# Resetting my perception of something

The guy who taught me how to eat sushi a couple months ago explained that I should get a slice of ginger before trying a different kind of sushi in order to "reset my taste buds" (probably broscience) and feel the taste anew (it works). That's also the exact problem that programmers face when trying to design user interfaces: after looking at the thing for a long time, they grow blind to its shortcomings. A visual reset would come in handy. I imagine that resets could help in other areas too. Does anything like that exist? Cogsci majors, help!
# Link: 50% effective malaria vaccine developed

A study on over 15000 children in 7 African countries shows GlaxoSmithKline's anti-malaria vaccine halves the risk of contracting malaria. The trials were run on children between 6 and 12 weeks old, and between 5 and 17 months old.

Guardian article: http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2011/oct/18/malaria-vaccine-save-millions-children

Full paper: http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa1102287

From skimming the paper, this looks sound. GlaxoSmithKline both developed the vaccine and paid for the study, but that's standard. The [disclosure forms](http://www.nejm.org/doi/suppl/10.1056/NEJMoa1102287/suppl_file/nejmoa1102287_disclosures.pdf) don't show anything fishier.

There are ways this could go wrong. GlaxoSmithKline says they'll make it cheap (probably for PR) but this is not sufficient to ensure availability. This could also increase total risk by replacing bed nets, or by making other diseases worse.

Thoughts on the research? Comments on effects? Plans for wild celebration?
# Satisficers want to become maximisers

_(with thanks to Daniel Dewey, Owain Evans, Nick Bostrom, Toby Ord and BruceyB)_

In theory, a [satisficing](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Satisficing) agent has a lot to recommend it. Unlike a maximiser, that will attempt to squeeze the universe to every drop of utility that it can, a satisficer will be content when it reaches a certain level _expected_ utility (a satisficer that is content with a certain level of _utility_ is simply a maximiser with a bounded utility function). For instance a satisficer with a utility linear in paperclips and a target level of 9, will be content once it's 90% sure that it's built ten paperclips, and not try to optimize the universe to either build more paperclips (unbounded utility), or obsessively count the ones it has already (bounded utility).

Unfortunately, a self-improving satisficer has an extremely easy way to reach its satisficing goal: to transform itself into a maximiser. This is because, in general, if **E** denotes expectation,

**E**(U(there exists an agent A maximising U))  ≥  **E**(U(there exists an agent A satisficing U))

How is this true (apart from the special case when other agents penalise you specifically for being a maximiser)? Well, agent A will have to make decisions, and if it is a maximiser, will always make the decision that maximises expected utility. If it is a satisficer, it will sometimes not make the same decision, leading to lower expected utility in that case.

So hence if there were a satisficing agent for U, and it had some strategy S to accomplish its goal, then another way to accomplish this would be to transform itself into a maximising agent and let that agent implement S. If S is complicated, and transforming itself is simple (which would be the case for a self-improving agent), then self-transforming into a maximiser is the easier way to go.

So unless we have exceedingly well programmed criteria banning the satisficer from using any variant of this technique, we should assume satisficers are as likely to be as dangerous as maximisers.

_**Edited** to clarify the argument for why a maximiser maximises better than a satisficer._

_**Edit**:_ See BruceyB's [comment](/r/discussion/lw/854/satisficers_want_to_become_maximisers/52jn) for an example where a (non-timeless) satisficer would find rewriting itself as a maximiser to be the only good strategy. Hence timeless satisficers would behave as maximisers anyway (in many situations). Furthermore, a timeless satisficer with bounded rationality may find that rewriting itself as a maximiser would be a useful precaution to take, if it's not sure to be able to precalculate all the correct strategies.
# Best Nonfiction Writing on Less Wrong

However useful the content, what are some examples of the best nonfiction _writing_ on Less Wrong? Are there pieces you think are as good as recent classics of essay form like [I Think You're Fat](http://www.esquire.com/features/honesty0707) or [Lies We Tell Kids](http://www.paulgraham.com/lies.html)? For example, I like Yvain's [The Apologist and the Revolutionary](/lw/20/the_apologist_and_the_revolutionary/).

Which pieces would _you_ nominate as some of the best nonfiction writing on Less Wrong?
# HPMoR: What do you think you know?

_(And somewhere in the back of his mind was a small, small note of confusion, a sense of something wrong about that story; and it should have been a part of Harry's art to notice that tiny note, but he was distracted. For it is a sad rule that whenever you are most in need of your art as a rationalist, that is when you are most likely to forget it.)_

Why does the wizarding world believe Voldemort used the Killing Curse on Harry? Whether or not the Love Shield exists in MoR, I doubt most wizards had an >epsilon prior for the Killing Curse resulting in a scarred but otherwise unharmed target, a dead and burned spellcaster, and a destroyed building. There were no surviving witnesses except Baby Harry. Where did that version of events come from?

If I was Joe Random Wizard and heard that evidence without names attached, I would naively hypothesize: Dark Wizard shows up at house, encounters mother + father + their allies. Battle ensues. Parents and Dark Wizard are slain. House is destroyed and baby is hit by debris. There is one obvious question - why the allies didn't take the baby with them - but any answer to that is more plausible than "There were no allies; the most reliable curse in the world backfired on its most experienced practitioner."

Not that the "reflected curse" story was hard to sell. People are great at [not asking the next question when they want to believe](/lw/km/motivated_stopping_and_motivated_continuation/).

We have some additional information about the events of that evening:

*   Harry's memory under Dementation (Ch43). This may or may not be a true memory.
*   Snape relayed the complete prophecy to Voldemort without understanding it (Ch77). McGonagall was the propechy's witness (Ch28), but Snape has also heard the original audio (Ch77).
*   McGonagall knows that Voldemort is still around (Ch6).
*   Quirrellmort does not want to kill Harry. If he ever did, he changed his mind while offscreen.

What really happened at Godric's Hollow?

PS. If the Love Shield does exist in MoR, do you suppose Bellatrix could cast it?
# Vasili Arkhipov Day

[Stanislav Petrov](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanislav_Petrov) is a rather [famous](/lw/jq/926_is_petrov_day/) [person](/lw/7t7/stanislav_petrov_day/) (of course only on Lesswrong, not in the real world).

But there is another Russian who saved the world:  [Vasili Alexandrovich Arkhipov](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vasili_Arkhipov).

On this day in 1962, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis Vasili Arkhipov [prevented the launch of a nuclear torpedo](http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cold-war/sovietsbomb.htm) and thus a possible nuclear war.

It's strange that Petrov attracts much more attention than Arkhipov. E.g. googling "Stanislav Petrov" produces 101.000 results, "Vasili Arkhipov" only 9.040 results. By contrast searching for "Britney Spears" generates about 295.000.000 results. Sorta depressing.

Anyway, let this day be the Vasili Arkhipov Day.
# 5 Second Level: Substituting the Question

I picked this up in the new Kahneman book, [Thinking, Fast and Slow](http://www.amazon.com/Thinking-Fast-Slow-Daniel-Kahneman/dp/0374275637). He describes a common characteristic of reasoning heuristics: rather than answer a difficult question, they substitute a simpler question with a more readily available answer. This is a common failure mode.

Later that evening, my wife made a comment about an article she was reading on diagnosing depression. I _immediately_ thought, "I'm pretty sure I've never been depressed." The speed of my response was a red flag. Did I really just scan the past 10 years of my adult life for depression symptoms? Or did I answer an easier question: "Am I depressed right now?" With a mouth full of delicious toast, the available answer was, "I feel great!"

I think this technique is a good fit for the 5 Second Level, though it may need a name that indicates what to do rather than what to avoid doing. Hug the Query is close, but taken. The cover blurb for the skill is: take notice when you easily and swiftly answer a question, and double-check that you actually answered it.

Here are a some more examples from the book:

*   _Target question_: How much would I contribute to save an endangered species?  
    _Heuristic question_: How much emotion do I feel when I think of dying dolphins?
*   _Target question_: How happy are you with your life these days?  
    _Heuristic question_: What is my mood right now?
*   _Target question_: How popular will the President be six months from now?  
    _Heuristic question_: How popular is the President right now?
*   _Target question_: How should financial advisers who prey on the elderly be punished?  
    _Heuristic question_: How much anger do I feel when I think of financial predators?
*   _Target question_: This woman is running for the primary. How far will she go in politics?  
    _Heuristic question_: Does this woman look like a political winner?