Harley-ml/lesswrong huggingface dataset:
# [Link] Study on Group Intelligence

Full disclosure: This has already been discussed [here](/lw/3mh/link_collective_intelligence/), but I see utility in bringing it up again. Mostly because I only heard about it offline.

**The Paper:**

Some researchers were interested if, in the same way that there's a general intelligence g that seems to predict competence in a wide variety of tasks, there is a group intelligence c that could do the same. You can read their paper [here](http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~cfc/Woolley2010a.pdf).

Their abstract:

> Psychologists have repeatedly shown that a single statistical factor—often called “general intelligence”—emerges from the correlations among people’s performance on a wide variety of cognitive tasks. But no one has systematically examined whether a similar kind of “collective intelligence” exists for groups of people. In two studies with 699 people, working in groups of two to five, we find converging evidence of a general collective intelligence factor that explains a group’s performance on a wide variety of tasks. This “_c_ factor” is not strongly correlated with the average or maximum individual intelligence of group members but is correlated with the average social sensitivity of group members, the equality in distribution of conversational turn-taking, and the proportion of females in the group.

Basically, groups with higher social sensitivity, equality in conversational turn-taking, and proportion of females are collectively more intelligent. On top of that, those effects trump out things like average IQ or even max IQ.

I theorize that proportion of females mostly works as a proxy for social sensitivity and turn-taking, and the authors speculate the same.

**Some thoughts:**

What does this mean for Less Wrong?

The most important part of the study, IMO, is that "social sensitivity" (measured by a [test](http://www.frankston.com/braincise/programs/eyes/eyes%20test.pdf) where you try and discern emotional states from someone's eyes) is such a stronger predictor of group intelligence. It probably helps people to gauge other people's comprehension, but based on the fact that people sharing talking time more equally also helps, I would speculate that another chunk of its usefulness comes from being able to tell if other people want to talk, or think that there's something relevant to be said.

One thing that I find interesting in the meatspace meetups is how in new groups, conversation tends to be dominated by the people who talk the loudest and most insistently. Often, those people are also fairly interesting. However, I prefer the current, older DC group to the newer one, and there's much more equal time speaking. Even though this means that I don't talk _as_ much. Most other people seem to share similar sentiments, to the point that at one early meetup it was explicitly voted to be true that most people would rather talk more.

**Solutions/Proposals:**

Anything we should try doing about this? I will hold off on proposing solutions for now, but this section will get filled in sometime.
# [Link] Scott Aaronson on Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity

Scott Aaronson has published a preliminary version of his long essay titled ['Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity'](http://eccc.hpi-web.de/report/2011/108/). His [announcement blog post](http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=735) has some interesting comments, and he welcomes suggestions there. I am not sure I like the organization of the paper. (I know most of the CS stuff discussed, so it is hard for me to decide how readable it is for people who don't.) But it is full of interesting ideas, and some of these are new even for those of us who follow Scott's writings.
# Humans: Not Carved from Marble

Michael Vassar has been known to say that humans are not 'corrupted' by heuristics and biases and other elements of modern psychology. Humans just _are_ psychology.

Robert Kurzban puts this rather eloquently in [his new book](http://www.amazon.com/Why-Everyone-Else-Hypocrite-Evolution/dp/0691146748/):

> Michelangelo is famously quoted as saying, "I saw the angel in the marble and carved until I set him free." Some economists are, in some sense, like this. They start with theories in which agents - people - have some idealized, rational mind _minus_ the stuff that economists carve away - thus we see terms like 'biases', 'heuristics', and 'irrationality'. They document departures from (supposed) perfection - rationality - much as a sculptor chips away marble, hoping that when they are done, human nature is left, like Michelangelo's angel.
> 
> I see no reason at all to proceed this way, as though human psychology is perfection minus shortcomings. My view, the modular view is more like clay than marble. Like sculptors who add bits of clay, one after another, until the product is done, natural selection added - and changed - different bits, giving rise to the final product. We'll get done with psychology not by chiseling away at human shortcomings, but by building up a catalog of human capacities working together - or in opposition - in various contexts.
# [Link] TED Talk on Perceived Value

Rory Sutherland, an ad man (who missed his calling as a comedian), gives [this talk on perceived value](http://www.ted.com/talks/rory_sutherland_life_lessons_from_an_ad_man.html) versus "real" value, and comes down in favor of more of the first.  He also dabbles in history, status, behavioral economics, and the importance of user interface design.
# Spaced Repetition literature review prize: And the winner is...

The [Spaced Repetition literature review prize](/lw/69p/prize_new_contest_for_spaced_repetition/) for the best new review of the evidence on [Spaced Repetition](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spaced_repetition) has ended and the judging panel has made its decision. The prize attracted entries from [Duke](/user/Duke) ([entry](/lw/64k/memory_spaced_repetition_and_life/)) and [Gwern](/user/Gwern) ([entry](/lw/718/spaced_repetition_review_my_entry/)). After reviewing the submissions separately and then discussing them together, the judging panel unanimously judged Gwern's entry to be the best.

With great pleasure, we now award Gwern the prize of $385. 

Anki cards for Gwern's review are available as the shared deck "Gwern Spaced Repetition Lit Review". If you have improvements or alternate decks, post them in the comments.

The three judges, [BenLowell](/user/BenLowell/), [Guy Srinivasan](/user/GuySrinivasan) and [John Salvatier](/user/jsalvatier/) (me), are Seattle LessWrongers who volunteered to judge the contest. 

We thank Duke and Gwern for their submissions, as well as users [randomwalker](/user/randomwalker/), [Antisuji](/user/Antisuji/), [Dr_Manhattan](/user/Dr_Manhattan/), [Benquo](/user/Benquo/), [Nick_Roy](/user/Nick_Roy/) for contributing to the prize fund.
# Table of biases, the normative models they violate, and their explanations

The title says it all: [PDF](http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Table-of-biases.pdf). From Baron's _[Thinking and Deciding, 4th edition](http://www.amazon.com/Thinking-Deciding-Jonathan-Baron/dp/0521680433/)_.
# Please do not downvote every comment or post someone has ever made as a retaliation tactic.

People who go back and downvote every post or comment a Less Wrong user has ever made, please, stop doing that. It's a clever way to pull information cascades in your direction but it is clearly an abuse of the content filtering system. It's also highly dishonorable. If you truly must use such tactics then downvoting a few of your enemy's top level posts is much less evil; your enemy loses the karma and takes the hint without your severely biasing the public perception of Less Wrong's discourse.

(I just lost over 200 karma in a few minutes and that'll probably continue for awhile. This happens to me every few weeks. Edit: I mean it's been happening every few weeks for a few months for a total of only three or four. Between 400 and 700 karma lost total I think? I don't mean to overstate the problem.)
# The basic questions of rationality

I've been on Less Wrong since its inception, around March 2009. I've read a lot and contributed a lot, and so now I'm more familiar with our jargon, I know of a few more scientific studies, and I might know a couple of useful tricks. Despite all my reading, however, I feel like I'm a far cry from _learning rationality_. I'm still a wannabe, not an amateur. Less Wrong has tons of information, but I feel like I haven't yet learned the answers to the basic questions of rationality.

I, personally, am a fan of the top-down approach to learning things. Whereas Less Wrong contains tons of useful facts that could, potentially, be put together to answer life's important questions, I really would find it easier if we started with the important questions, and then broke those down into smaller pieces that can be answered more easily.

And so, that's precisely what I'm going to do. Here are, as far as I can tell, the basic questions of rationality—the questions we're actually trying to answer here—along with what answers I've found:

**Q: Given a question, how should we go about answering it?** A: By gathering evidence effectively, and correctly applying reason and intuition.

*   **Q: How can we effectively gather relevant evidence?** A: I don't know. (Controlled experiments? Asking people?)
*   **Q: How can we correctly apply reason?** A: If you have infinite computational resources available, use probability theory.
    *   **Q: We don't have infinite computational resources available, so what now?** A: I don't know. (Apply Bayes' rule anyway? Just try to emulate what a hypercomputer would do?)
*   **Q: How can we successfully apply intuition?** A: By repairing our biases, and developing habits that point us in the right direction under specific circumstances.
    *   **Q: How can we find our biases?** A: I don't know. (Read Less Wrong? What about our personal quirks? How can we notice those?)
    *   **Q: Once we find a bias, how can we fix it?** A: I don't know. (Apply a correction, test, repeat? Figure out how the bias feels?)
    *   **Q: How can we find out what habits would be useful to develop?** A: I don't know. (Examine our past successes and rationalize them?)
    *   **Q: Once we decide on a habit, how can we develop it?** A: I don't know. (Sheer practice?)

We could answer some of these questions ourselves, though simple practice and straightforward methods. The method "apply a correction, test, repeat", for example, is so generally useful that it deserves to be called the Fundamental Algorithm of Control. Nevertheless, since Less Wrong is devoted to developing human rationality, surely it contains answers to these questions somewhere. Where are they?
# Do we want more publicity, and if so how?

Recently reporters from two major national magazines contacted me in preparation for doing stories on [Bitcoin](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitcoin). This reminded me that Wired magazine did a cover story on the [Cypherpunks](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cypherpunks) in its second issue. I think the LessWrong community is already larger and more active than Cypherpunks were back then, and potentially more influential, but there hasn't been much publicity on us. I'm tempted to suggest doing a story on LessWrong to one of the reporters. Is this a good idea, or bad?

More generally, do we want more publicity, and if so what's the best way to go about getting it?

**ETA**: Would it be bad etiquette to reveal the names of these magazines at this point, or even to say as much as I've said?
# Existential Risk Reduction Career Network

Interested in donating to existential risk reduction efforts? Would you like to exchange career information with like-minded others? Then you should consider the Existential Risk Reduction Career Network! ("X Risk Network" for those short on time.) From the front page of the website:

"This network is for anyone interested in donating substantial amounts (relative to income) to non-profit organizations focused on the reduction of existential risk, such as [SIAI](http://intelligence.org/), [FHI](http://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/), and the [Lifeboat Foundation](http://lifeboat.com/ex/main). \[...\] We are a community of people assisting each other to increase our resources available for contribution. Members discuss the strengths and weaknesses of different careers, network, share advice on job applications and career advancement, assist others with finding interviews, and occasionally look for qualified individuals to hire from within the network."

For more details, including on the process of requesting invitations, head on over to the front page at [http://www.xrisknetwork.com/](http://www.xrisknetwork.com/)

Keep in mind that the network is for students as well, not just those currently on the job market. The network also has discussion of long term job strategy, school admissions, and intern possibilities.
# [Link] Simon Cowell plans to sign up for cryonics

From a [GQ interview](http://www.gq.com/entertainment/celebrities/201109/simon-cowell-interview-september-2011?printable=true&currentPage=1):

> A while ago, a piece of gossip appeared in a British newspaper, alleging that Cowell had declared—while dining with the British prime minister at the time, Gordon Brown—that upon his death he plans to be frozen. Cowell tells me he doesn't recall this discussion ("I had dinner with him a couple of times, but I can't remember talking about that—that's probably why I wasn't invited back a third time") but agrees that, although he has yet to make the arrangements, this is indeed his plan.
> 
> "It's an insurance policy," he reasons. "If it doesn't work, it doesn't work. If it does work, I'll be happy. If it's possible, and I think it will be, why not have a second crack? Does that sound crazy? I think it's a good idea."
# General textbook comparison thread

We've already had a lengthy (and still active) [thread](/lw/3gu/the_best_textbooks_on_every_subject/ ""The best textbooks on every subject", started by lukeprog") attempting to address the question "What are the best textbooks, and why are they better than their rivals?". That's excellent, but no one is going to post there unless they're prepared to claim: Textbook X is _the best_ on its subject. But surely many of us have read many texts for which we couldn't say that but could say "I've read X and Y, and here's how they differ". A good supply of such comparisons would be extremely useful.

I propose this thread for that purpose. Rules:

*   Each top-level reply should concern two or more texts on a single subject, and provide enough information about how they compare to one another that an interested would-be reader should be able to tell which is likely to be better for his or her purposes.
*   Replies to these offering or soliciting further comparisons in the same domain are encouraged.
*   At least one book in each comparison should _either_
    *   be a very good one, _or_ at least
    *   look like a very good one even though it isn't.

If this gets enough responses that simply looking through them becomes tiresome, I'll update the article with (something like) a list of textbooks, arranged by subject and then by author, with links for the comments in which they're compared to other books and a brief summary of what's said about them. (I might include links to comments in Luke's thread too, since anything that deserves its place there would also be acceptable here.)

See also: [magfrump's request](/r/discussion/lw/715/best_textbook_list_expansion/ ""Best Textbook List Expansion", started by magfrump") for recommendations of basic science books; ["Recommended Rationalist Reading"](/lw/jv/recommended_rationalist_reading/ ""Recommended Rationalist Reading", started by Eliezer") (narrower subject focus, and without the element of comparison).
# Singularity Institute Strategic Plan 2011

Thanks to the hard work and cooperation of Singularity Institute staff and volunteers, especially Louie Helm and Luke Muehlhauser (lukeprog), we now have a Strategic Plan, which outlines the near-term goals and vision of the Institute, and concrete actions we can take to fulfill those goals.

[http://singinst.org/blog/2011/08/26/singularity-institute-strategic-plan-2011/](http://intelligence.org/blog/2011/08/26/singularity-institute-strategic-plan-2011/)

We welcome your feedback. You can send any comments to [institute@intelligence.org](mailto:institute@intelligence.org). 

The release of this Strategic Plan is part of an overall effort to increase transparency at Singularity Institute.
# Book trades with open-minded theists - recommendations?

In an Open Thread [comment](/lw/6y9/open_thread_august_2011/4nro) beriukay mentioned that he's reading C.S. Lewis' [Mere Christianity](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mere_Christianity). I've been reading it too, for interesting reasons.

In my case it so happened that I started discussing faith with a long-time online friend whose spiritual views I didn't yet know, and he turned out to be a Christian with a high regard for the Bible, who also has an interest in science. As our discussion turned to our readings on spirituality, I acknowledged (I think it was me) that I probably spent more time on books that reinforce my point of view than on books that challenge it, perhaps a case of confirmation bias. (I've been exposed to many poor arguments for Christianity, and dismissed them; but possibly that was largely a function of having started out with that bottom line already written and picking arguments I wouldn't have much trouble refuting.)

In the spirit of experiment we agreed to a "trade" - he would read (thoughtfully and with an open mind) a book of my choosing on reasons to doubt faith, and I'd do the same with a book he chose on Christianity.

So the idea here is to pick a book that's the "best argument from the other side" (as in quote 3 [here](/lw/tm/rationality_quotes_13/)).

I recommended [The God Delusion](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_God_Delusion) \- I'm not sure if that's the best choice given the above intent, but it's what came to mind on the spot.

Would you make a different choice? If so, what?
# [LINK] How Hard is Artificial Intelligence? The Evolutionary Argument and Observation Selection Effects 

If you're interested in evolution, anthropics, and AI timelines -- or in what the Singularity Institute has been producing lately -- you might want to check out this new paper, by SingInst research fellow Carl Shulman and FHI professor Nick Bostrom.

The paper:

[How Hard is Artificial Intelligence? The Evolutionary Argument and Observation Selection Effects ](http://www.nickbostrom.com/aievolution.pdf)

The abstract:

Several authors have made the argument that because blind evolutionary processes produced human intelligence on Earth, it should be feasible for clever human engineers to create human-level artificial intelligence in the not-too-distant future.  This evolutionary argument, however, has ignored the observation selection effect that guarantees that observers will see intelligent life having arisen on their planet no matter how hard it is for intelligent life to evolve on any given Earth-like planet.  We explore how the evolutionary argument might be salvaged from this objection, using a variety of considerations from observation selection theory and analysis of specific timing features and instances of convergent evolution in the terrestrial evolutionary record.  We find that a probabilistic version of the evolutionary argument emerges largely intact once appropriate corrections have been made.

I'd be interested to hear LW-ers' takes on the content; Carl, too, would much appreciate feedback.
# Call for Personal Volunteers

Those who wish to volunteer some of their time toward reducing existential risk and increasing our chances of a positive singularity can follow the directions on [SingularityVolunteers.org](http://www.singularityvolunteers.org/).

And as a [freshly hired](/lw/78s/help_fund_lukeprog_at_siai/) Singularity Institute researcher, I also have my own list of tasks that, if completed by volunteers instead of myself, will speed along the delivery of the projects I'm working on: an 'FAI Open Problems' document, two papers bound for peer review, [metaethics research](/lw/71x/a_crash_course_in_the_neuroscience_of_human/), and more.

So if you'd like to help me out with any of my volunteer-doable tasks, please contact me: luke \[at\] singinst \[dot\] org.

Thanks!
# Making it even easier to find new comments in a thread

It occurs to me, scrolling down the [Polyhacking](/lw/79x/polyhacking/) discussion for the nth time, that for long discussions, it would be handy to have a text indicator for new comments as well as the bright green edge. That way, I could use search to find new comments.
# How likely is Peter Thiel's investment into seasteading to pay off? 

Recently the relatively awesome entrepreneur invested [1.25 million USD](http://inhabitat.com/paypal-founder-invests-1-25-million-to-create-floating-micro-countries/) into this (seasteading institute website [here](http://seasteading.org/)).

It seems such a wonderful concept, finally _somewhere_ where new forms of government could be tried out. But I'm just wondering how in the world they hope to deal with existing governments since their reaction to any kind of serious alternatives, especially one that either economically or ideologically presented a significant challenge, is bound to not be positive.

I was just wondering what LWer thoughts are on this matter? Also has there been any discussion of seasteading in the past that I've missed? Also I'm wondering if anyone would hazard to perhaps offer a prediction or judge how likley this is to succeed (maybe on [predictionbook](http://predictionbook.com/))?
# Are there better ways of identifying the most creative scientists?

_Marginal Revolution_ linked today an old 1963 essay by Isaac Asimov, who argues that a very cheap test for scientific capability in children & adolescents is to see whether they like science fiction and in particular, harder science fiction, "The Sword of Achilles".

I copied it out and made an HTML version of the essay: [http://www.gwern.net/docs/1963-asimov-sword-of-achilles](http://www.gwern.net/docs/1963-asimov-sword-of-achilles)

I'd be interested if anyone knows of better tests for such scientific aptitude.

I think it'd also be interesting to see how well the SF test's predictive power has held up. Asimov's numbers seem reasonable for 1963, but may be very different these days: perhaps SF readers back then were <1% of the population and >50% of scientists, so it _was_ a very informative, but these days? SF seems more popular, even discounting the comic books and Hollywood material as Asimov explicitly does, but the SF magazines are mostly dead and my understanding is that scientists are a vastly larger group in 2011 than 1963, both in absolute numbers and per capita.
# [Link] The Typical Mind Fallacy, Illustrated

If you've ever wanted a quick way to explain the [Typical Mind Fallacy](http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Typical_mind_fallacy "LW Wiki: Typical Mind Fallacy"), this [cartoon by Winston Rowntree](http://www.viruscomix.com/page553.html "Subnormality #186 - We Assume Of Others What We Know Of Ourselves") will do the trick nicely.

(Panel 3 seems of particular relevance to LessWrongians, and the last two panels also remind me of Hufflepuff/Slytherin themes in HP:MOR.)

Enjoy!
# Gender differences in spatial reasoning appear to be nurture

_"In this study, we use a large-scale incentivized experiment with nearly 1,300 participants to show that the gender gap in spatial abilities, measured by time to solve a puzzle, disappears when we move from a patrilineal society to an adjoining matrilineal society."_

It is presently a commonplace of Western culture that women are worse at spatial reasoning than men, and this is commonly attributed to intrinsic biological differences.

It turns out this may be highly questionable. A [study in PNAS](http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2011/08/19/1015182108) studied two nearby tribes in northeast India, one with a strongly patriarchal organisation, one with a strongly matriarchal organisation. Both share the same agrarian diet and lifestyle and DNA tests indicate they are closely related.

In the patriarchal society, women did noticeably worse on spatial reasoning. In the matriarchal society, women and men did about the same.

The authors carefully do not overstate their results, claiming only that they demonstrated that culture influences spatial performance "in the task that we study." However, this promisingly suggests quite a bit of room for improvement of measurable aspects of intelligence may be feasible with proper attention to culture and nurture.

What measurable aspects of intelligence do you attribute to genetic causes? Can you test it this well? How would you fix it and help people be all they can be?

News coverage: [ArsTechnica](http://arstechnica.com/science/news/2011/08/gender-gap-in-spatial-reasoning-mia-in-matrilineal-society.ars).
# July 2011 review of experimental philosophy

[Experimental philosophy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Experimental_philosophy) is the mainstream academic field that is most directly attempting to [dissolve](/lw/of/dissolving_the_question/) (where possible) persistent philosophical problems by revealing the cognitive algorithms that generate old philosophical debates. Those who want to catch up with some of what these researchers have discovered already may want to read [this July 2011 review of the field](http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Knobe-et-al-Experimental-philosophy.pdf).

Also see my post [Are Deontological Moral Judgments Rationalizations?](/lw/74f/are_deontological_moral_judgments_rationalizations/)
# Hacking on LessWrong Just Got Easier

TrikeApps has done a great job running LessWrong and adding new features, but they could use a little help. Have you thought about improving the LessWrong website but haven't done it because you weren't sure how? Or had installation issues? Well, now is a great time to start, because hacking on LessWrong just got much easier!

On behalf of the [LessWrong Public Goods Team](http://groups.google.com/group/lw-public-goods-team), I have built a [Virtual Machine](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_machine) Image which hosts its own version of the LessWrong website. This eliminates the need to figure out how to host LessWrong yourself. To hack on LessWrong you simply:

1.  Install VirtualBox
2.  Download and use the VM image
3.  Edit LessWrong's code 
4.  Test
5.  Submit pull request

Detailed instructions and download link [here](https://github.com/tricycle/lesswrong/wiki/Development-VM-Image).  
  
Interested, but not sure what to work on? The LessWrong issue tracker is [here](http://code.google.com/p/lesswrong/issues/list). Run into trouble with the code? Ask questions on the [dev list](http://groups.google.com/group/lesswrong-dev).

Many thanks to Matt, Jon and David at TrikeApps for helping me do this, and John Salvatier for initiating this project.
# Make evidence charts, not review papers? [Link]

> How do you get on top of the literature associated with a controversial scientific topic? For many empirical issues, the science gives a conflicted picture. Like the role of sleep in memory consolidation, the effect of caffeine on cognitive function, or the best theory of a particular visual illusion. To form your own opinion, you’ll need to become familiar with many studies in the area.
> 
> You might start by reading the latest review article on the topic. Review articles provide descriptions of many relevant studies. Also, they usually provide a nice tidy story that seems to bring the literature all together into a common thread- that the author’s theory is correct! Because of this bias, a review article may not help you much to make an independent evaluation of the evidence. And the evidence usually isn’t all there. Review articles very rarely describe, or even cite, all the relevant studies. Unfortunately, if you’re just getting started, you can’t recognize which relevant studies the author didn’t cite.
> 
> \[...\]
> 
> Hal Pashler and I have created, together with Chris Simon of the Scotney Group who did the actual programming, [a tool](http://www.evidencechart.com/) that addresses these problems. It allows one to create systematic reviews of a topic, without having to write many thousands of words, and without having to weave all the studies together with a narrative unified by a single theory. You do it all in a tabular form called an ‘evidence chart’. Evidence charts are an old idea, closely related to the “[analysis of competing hypotheses](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analysis_of_Competing_Hypotheses)” technique. [Our **evidencechart.com website**](http://www.evidencechart.com/) is fully functioning and free to all, but it’s in beta and we’d love any feedback.

**More:** [alexholcombe.wordpress.com/2010/09/02/make-evidence-charts-not-review-papers/](http://alexholcombe.wordpress.com/2010/09/02/make-evidence-charts-not-review-papers/)

**Example:** [What is the role of sleep on hippocampus-dependent memory consolidation?](http://www.evidencechart.com/charts/514)

I thought this was an interesting idea. Do you think it would be possible and useful to create an evidence chart for risks from AI, existential risks in general and other topics on lesswrong?
# [Link] “How to seem good at everything: Stop doing stupid shit”

Possibly interesting article on _winning_: [How to seem good at everything: Stop doing stupid shit](http://jinfiesto.posterous.com/how-to-seem-good-at-everything-stop-doing-stu)

**Summary**, as I interpreted it: In practicing a skill, focus on increasing the _minimum_ of the quality of the individual actions comprising performing the skill (because that is the greatest marginal benefit).

\[This article previously posted [as an open thread comment](/lw/6y9/open_thread_august_2011/4m8a).\]
# The Carbohydrate Hypothesis of Obesity: A Critical Examination

[Here](http://wholehealthsource.blogspot.com/2011/08/carbohydrate-hypothesis-of-obesity.html). A number of people here are fans of Taubes' work, and so I thought they would be interested in a well-referenced criticism. Hat tip to Landsknecht.
# Free research help, editing and article downloads for LessWrong

**Update**: Please use the [most recent thread](/r/discussion/tag/help_desk/).

The [LW Public Goods Team](http://groups.google.com/group/lw-public-goods-team) wants to encourage useful research projects (as well other kinds of projects) for the LW community. If you're interested in doing this kind of work, you might run into a problem that is best solved by good outside assistance. Without assistance you might get discouraged and stop working on the project or never even start it. We want to help you avoid that. Do you

*   Not know how to interpret a finding and want help figuring it out?
*   Need access to a particular paper and need someone with a library subscription to download it for you?
*   Need someone to edit your writing?
*   Not even know what you're having trouble with, but you know is that you're stuck and need someone to troubleshoot you?

Then, we want to help!

How do you request such help? For now, I think the best way is to post to the discussion section about your problem. That way other interested people can also provide help and be interested in your research. If you feel uncomfortable doing this, you may post to the [public goods team mailing list](http://groups.google.com/group/lw-public-goods-team) (lw-public-goods-team@googlegroups.com) or if it's not too long after this was posted, post in the comments.

I personally commit to doing at least 3 hours a week of tasks like these for people doing LessWrong related projects (assuming demand for it; I'll be keeping a log) for at least the next month. [Morendil](/user/Morendil) has committed to doing at least an hour of this and [atucker](/user/atucker) has promised to some as well.

Our goal is to find out whether this kind of help is effective and encourages people. If this kind of assistance turns out to be valuable, we'll continue to offer it.

If you would like to volunteer some time (a little or a lot), say so in the comments!
# [Question] What's your Elevator Pitch For Rationality?

You're talking with someone you like, and they ask you what you mean by rationality, or why you keep going to LessWrong meetups. Or you meet someone who might be interested in the site.

What do you say to them? If you had to explain to someone what LW-style rationality is in 30 seconds, how would you do it? What's your elevator pitch? Has anyone had any success with a particular pitch?

**My Current Pitch:**

My current best one, made up on the spot, lacking any foreplanning, basically consists of:

"Basically, our brains are pretty bad at forming accurate beliefs, and bad in fairly systematic ways. I could show you one, if you want."

Playing [the triplet game](/lw/iw/positive_bias_look_into_the_dark/) with them, then revealing that the numbers just need to be ascending

Upon failure, "Basically, your brain just doesn't look for examples that disprove your hypothesis, so you didn't notice that it could have a been a more general rule. There are a bunch of others, and I'm interested in learning about them so that I can correct for them."

**My Thoughts on That:**

It's massively effective at convincing people that cognitive biases exist (when they're in the 80% that fails, which has always been the case for me so far), but pretty much entirely useless as a rationality pitch. It doesn't explain at all why people should care about having accurate beliefs, and takes it as a given that that would be important.

It's also far too dry and unfun (compared to say, Methods), and has the unfortunate side effect of making people feel like they've gotten tricked. It makes it look non-cultish though.

I suspect that other people can do better, and I'll comment later with one that I actually put thought into. There's a pretty good chance that I'll use a few of the more upvoted ones and see how they go over.
# Journal article about politics and mindkilling

I just found a link to a paper written in 2003 by Geoffrey L. Cohen of Yale University.

"[Party over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on Political Beliefs](https://eee.uci.edu/10s/55550/home/Cohen+2003.pdf)"

Abstract:

> Four studies demonstrated both the power of group influence in persuasion and people’s blindness to it. Even under conditions of effortful processing, attitudes toward a social policy depended almost exclusively upon the stated position of one’s political party. This effect overwhelmed the impact of both the policy’s objective content and participants’ ideological beliefs (Studies 1–3), and it was driven by a shift in the assumed factual qualities of the policy and in its perceived moral connotations (Study 4). Nevertheless, participants denied having been influenced by their political group, although they believed that other individuals, especially their ideological adversaries, would be so influenced. The underappreciated role of social identity in persuasion is discussed.

That's written in journal-ese, so I'll post a translation from [the article I found that contained the link](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/why-did-the-gop-turn-against-stimulus-ask-a-psychologist/2011/08/25/gIQADugV6J_blog.html?wprss=ezra-klein):

> My favorite [study](https://eee.uci.edu/10s/55550/home/Cohen+2003.pdf) (pdf) in this space was by Yale’s Geoffrey Cohen. He had a control group of liberals and conservatives look at a generous welfare reform proposal and a harsh welfare reform proposal. As expected, liberals preferred the generous plan and conservatives favored the more stringent option. Then he had another group of liberals and conservatives look at the same plans, but this time, the plans were associated with parties.
> 
> Both liberals and conservatives followed their parties, even when their parties disagreed with their preferences. So when Democrats were said to favor the stringent welfare reform, for example, liberals went right along. Three scary sentences from the piece: “When reference group information was available, participants gave no weight to objective policy content, and instead assumed the position of their group as their own. This effect was as strong among people who were knowledgeable about welfare as it was among people who were not. Finally, participants persisted in the belief that they had formed their attitude autonomously even in the two group information conditions where they had not.”

Also, the final study conducted had subjects write editorials either in support of or against a single policy proposal. The differences in how people responded in the "no group information" condition and the "my political party supports / opposes" conditions are also illuminating...
# The beginnings of a test for Rationality Quotient

In their [2011 chapter](http://web.mac.com/kstanovich/Site/Research_on_Reasoning_files/Stanovich_Handbook.pdf) for the _Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence_, Stanovich et al. review the evidence suggesting that intelligence and rationality are not the same thing and that rationality is often more important than intelligence. They then lament the fact that there are no standard tests for measuring one's "Rationality Quotient." Then they take a few steps toward such a thing by suggesting some important rationality skills (actively open-minded thinking, fine-grained emotional regulation, tendency to seek information and fully process it, etc.) and rationality 'mindware' (probability theory, scientific process, economic thinking, etc.).

[Here](http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Stanovich-et-als-rationality-test-beginnings.pdf) are those pages in particular: first a graphic of some important rationality skills and mindware, and then a table of the components of rational thought: rationality components, relevant literature citations, and example word problems that would test for each rationality component.
# Is That Your True Rejection? by Eliezer Yudkowsky @ Cato Unbound

A response essay written by Eliezer Yudkowsky posted at [Cato Unbound](http://www.cato-unbound.org/) for the issue [Brain, Belief, and Politics](http://www.cato-unbound.org/september-2011-brain-belief-and-politics/):

[**Is That Your True Rejection?**](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/09/07/eliezer-yudkowsky/is-that-your-true-rejection/) by [Eliezer Yudkowsky](http://www.cato-unbound.org/contributors/eliezer-yudkowsky/)

> _Eliezer Yudkowsky suggests that the partial mutability of human traits is an auxiliary reason at best for Michael Shermer’s libertarianism. Take that fact away, and Shermer’s politics probably wouldn’t go with it. Yudkowsky says that his own small-l libertarian tendencies come from the long history of government incompetence, indifference, and outright malevolence. These, and not brain science, are the best reasons for libertarians to believe what they do._
> 
> _Moreover, we make a logical error when we infer shares of causality from shares of observed variance; the relationship between nature and nurture is cooperative, not zero-sum. One thing, however, is clear: Human genetic variance is tiny, as indeed it must be for human beings all to constitute a single species. Environmental manipulation can only achieve so much in part because of this universal human inheritance._

The lead essay has been written by Michael Shermer:

**[Liberty and Science](http://www.cato-unbound.org/?p=5138)** by [Michael Shermer](http://www.cato-unbound.org/contributors/michael-shermer/)

> _Michael Shermer discusses scientific findings about belief formation. Beliefs, including political beliefs, are usually the result of automatic or intuitive moral judgments, not rational calculations. One cluster of those intuitions presumes that human nature is malleable; these usually produce a liberal politics. Another group of intuitions presumes that human nature is static; these tend to produce conservatism. But Shermer argues that humans really fall somewhere in between — malleable, within some important limits. He argues that this set of findings should produce a libertarian politics._
# Video: You Are Not So Smart

  

This is the first of two trailers for the book '[You Are Not So Smart](http://www.amazon.com/You-Are-Not-So-Smart/dp/1592406599/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1315474838&sr=8-1)', by [David McRaney](http://youarenotsosmart.com/2011/09/07/you-are-not-so-smart-the-official-movie-trailer-for-the-book/).

You will know why I posted it when you watch it, very relevant.

**[Thinking about thinking](/lw/jm/the_lens_that_sees_its_flaws/) is the key.**
#  [Link] New arm of GiveWell Research: GiveWell Labs

[Announcing GiveWell Labs](http://blog.givewell.org/2011/09/08/announcing-givewell-labs/)

> We’re now launching a new initiative within GiveWell that will not be subject to either of these constraints. We plan to invest about 25% of our research time in what we’re calling **GiveWell Labs: an arm of our research process that will be open to any giving opportunity, no matter what form and what sector.**
> 
> Through GiveWell Labs, we will try to identify outstanding giving opportunities (whether they’re organizations or specific projects), publish rankings of these giving opportunities (separate from the [top charities](http://www.givewell.org/charities/top-charities) list we maintain using our existing research process) and try to raise money for these opportunities. **Donors have pre-committed a minimum of $1 million to the GiveWell Labs initiative**, meaning that we will have at least $1 million to commit to our choice of projects even if we are able to raise nothing else. (We expect to raise more if and when we find great giving opportunities; the $1 million has been committed based on donors’ trust in our ability to find such opportunities.)
# Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, part 9

**(The HPMOR discussion thread after this one is [here](/lw/ams/harry_potter_and_the_methods_of_rationality/).)**

The previous thread is over the 500-comment threshold, so let's start a new _[Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality](http://www.fanfiction.net/s/5782108/1/)_ discussion thread.  This is the place to discuss Eliezer Yudkowsky's Harry Potter fanfic and anything related to it. The latest chapter as of 09/09/2011 is [Ch. 77](http://www.fanfiction.net/s/5782108/77/Harry_Potter_and_the_Methods_of_Rationality).

  
The first 5 discussion threads are on the main page under the [harry_potter tag](/tag/harry_potter/).  Threads 6 and on (including this one) are in the [discussion section](/r/discussion/tag/harry_potter/) using its separate tag system.  Also: [one](/lw/2ab/harry_potter_and_the_methods_of_rationality), [two](/lw/2ie/harry_potter_and_the_methods_of_rationality), [three](/lw/2nm/harry_potter_and_the_methods_of_rationality), [four](/lw/2tr/harry_potter_and_the_methods_of_rationality), [five](/lw/30g/harry_potter_and_the_methods_of_rationality), [six](/r/discussion/lw/364/harry_potter_and_the_methods_of_rationality/), [seven](/r/discussion/lw/3rb/harry_potter_and_the_methods_of_rationality/), [eight](/lw/797/harry_potter_and_the_methods_of_rationality/).  The [fanfiction.net author page](http://www.fanfiction.net/u/2269863/Less_Wrong) is the central location for information about updates and links to HPMOR-related goodies, and AdeleneDawner has kept an [archive of Author's Notes](http://www.evernote.com/pub/adelenedawner/Eliezer).  
  
As a reminder, it's often useful to start your comment by indicating which chapter you are commenting on.  
  
**Spoiler Warning**:  this thread is full of spoilers.  With few exceptions, spoilers for MOR and canon are fair game to post, without warning or rot13.  [More specifically](/lw/2tr/harry_potter_and_the_methods_of_rationality/2v1l):

> You do not need to rot13 anything about HP:MoR or the original Harry Potter series unless you are posting insider information from Eliezer Yudkowsky which is not supposed to be publicly available (which includes public statements by Eliezer that have been retracted).  
>   
> If there is evidence for X in MOR and/or canon then it's fine to post about X without rot13, even if you also have heard privately from Eliezer that X is true. But you should not post that "Eliezer said X is true" unless you use rot13.
# JSTOR gives public access to pre-1870 publications

[JSTOR](http://www.jstor.org/ "JSTOR home page") is a massive online archive of academic journals, virtually all of which were behind a subscription wall. (JSTOR's been quite arbitrary about locking up its content; some of the papers it hosts are available at no cost elsewhere. For example, [these papers](http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=procnatiacadscie "JSTOR's PNAS articles") from the _Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA_ are [freely available on the _PNAS_ website](http://www.pnas.org/content/by/year "PNAS archive") but not on JSTOR.) Two days ago JSTOR opened up part of its database by giving free access to nearly 500,000 old articles. From [JSTOR's announcement](http://about.jstor.org/news-events/news/jstor%E2%80%93free-access-early-journal-content):

> I am writing to share exciting news:  today, we are making journal content on JSTOR published prior to 1923 in the United States and prior to 1870 elsewhere, freely available to the public for reading and downloading. This includes nearly 500,000 articles from more than 200 journals, representing approximately 6% of the total content on JSTOR.

The announcement also refers obliquely to two related recent events — Greg Maxwell releasing a slice of old JSTOR material on the Pirate Bay ([previously discussed on Less Wrong](/r/discussion/lw/6rs/free_old_scientific_papers_link/)) and Aaron Swartz being charged for illicitly downloading papers from JSTOR en masse:

> I realize that some people may speculate that making the Early Journal Content free to the public today is a direct response to widely-publicized events over the summer involving an individual who was indicted for downloading a substantial portion of content from JSTOR, allegedly for the purpose of posting it to file sharing sites. While we had been working on releasing the pre-1923/pre-1870 content before the incident took place, it would be inaccurate to say that these events have had no impact on our planning.

JSTOR makes similar comments in [its FAQ for the new initiative](http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content-faqs) too. There's also [a two-minute video demo](http://about.jstor.org/support-training/help/free-early-journal-content-jstor).

([Via MetaFilter](http://www.metafilter.com/107219/Early-JSTOR-publications-now-free). [Another recent LW discussion](/lw/7ci/link_academic_publishers_make_murdoch_look_like_a/) of academic publishing.)
# Statistical error in half of neuroscience papers

[The statistical error that just keeps on coming](http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/sep/09/bad-science-research-error), Ben Goldacre, Guardian, Friday 9 September 2011 20.59 BST

We all like to laugh at quacks when they misuse basic statistics. But what if academics, en masse, deploy errors that are equally foolish? This week Sander Nieuwenhuis and colleagues publish [a mighty torpedo](http://www.nature.com/neuro/journal/v14/n9/full/nn.2886.html) in the journal Nature Neuroscience.

They've identified one direct, stark statistical error so widespread it appears in about half of all the published papers surveyed from the academic psychology research literature.

\[...\]

How often? Nieuwenhuis looked at 513 papers published in five prestigious neuroscience journals over two years. In half the 157 studies where this error could have been made, it was. They broadened their search to 120 cellular and molecular articles in Nature Neuroscience, during 2009 and 2010: they found 25 studies committing this fallacy, and not one single paper analysed differences in effect sizes correctly.These errors are appearing throughout the most prestigious journals for the field of neuroscience.

Update: [Erroneous analyses of interactions in neuroscience: a problem of significance](http://www.sandernieuwenhuis.nl/pdfs/NieuwenhuisEtAl_NN_Perspective.pdf) (PDF)