# Democracy Dies With The Rifleman

*Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun* \-\- Mao Zedong

Halfway thru recorded history, Athens became the first state we're sure was a democracy, and inspiration to many later ones. Probably some existed earlier, and certainly some entities smaller than states were democratic, likely long before recorded history began.

The next tenth of history saw the rise of the Roman Republic, which mixed democracy and aristocracy together to form a functional hybrid, and then it transitioned to the Roman Empire, which shifted the mix substantially towards aristocracy. For the next three tenths of recorded history, democracies were at best local governments, minor regional powers, or components of larger, autocratic states.

Few, if any, of these societies would count as "democracies" according to modern watchdog organizations. Only about 10-20% of the residents of Athens were citizens; the rest possessed no real political power. In later eras, residents of towns or cities might vote for their urban officials, but the urbanization rates were also around 10-20%, so the vast majority lived in the non-democratic countryside.

Then for the last tenth of history, democracies rose again to dominate the world stage. One standard story for this has to do with military technology. The Roman Republic expanded because it had the dominant military technology of its time; this may have been in part because of its political system. But eventually the heavily trained armored horseman became the dominant military technology, and was more easily provided by autocracies than democracies. Then widespread use of gunpowder weapons swung the balance back towards mass manpower; the knight in his castle could no longer reliably put down a peasant revolt, or hold back Napoleon and his *levée en masse*.

Another standard story has to do with increased state resources. Democracies generally support higher tax rates than autocracies do; while this is primarily to support social services, some amount of this is that people are willing to pay more for things that they think 'they' own (rather than their distant overlords).

A third standard story has to do with ease of turnover. Democracies generally don't have to fight civil wars or succession conflicts, because whenever such a movement would have a chance of a military victory, it *also* has a chance of a bloodless victory. This leads to peaceful turnovers or governments following the preferences of voters enough to not let resentments build up to the point that they boil over.

The major wars of the last two hundred years have not been limited engagements driven by hereditary elites; they have primarily been total struggles between ideologies and peoples, which only managed to become major because they could motivate significant efforts on both sides.

What does the next tenth of history[^nabbgu5434i] look like? One might think that the invention of larger and more sophisticated weapons means that we swing back towards the knight and aristocracy, but the evidence of the most recent wars suggests otherwise. Kipling's poem [Arithmetic on the Frontier](https://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/poem/poems_arith.htm), on the costs of pitting Imperial troops against regional resistance, rings nearly as true about America's various wars and special operations in the Middle East. Between great powers, the weapons have become so expensive that only systems which are widely believed in by their inhabitants can afford to supply a competitive number of them.

It's not obvious to me that this continues to be true. I think next-generation military capabilities primarily have to do with 1) operational knowledge and 2) mass-produced smart weaponry. The war in Ukraine shows how conflicts between drones and riflemen go; the war in Iran shows how conflicts between the informed and the uninformed go. States may find their ability to produce weaponry becomes detached from their popularity; they may find robot soldiers are willing to follow orders that human soldiers would balk at; they may find that it is relatively cheap to identify and destroy dissenters.[^p5341cv2vta]

That is, we may be moving into an era where mass protests are relatively easy to dismiss or ignore, while individual hackers or saboteurs are still able to disrupt large systems. Taxes from a broad labor base may become less relevant than control over automated infrastructure. What political problems will the new sources of power have, and what systems will help them resolve those problems?

[^nabbgu5434i]: I don't expect us to have 500 more sidereal years of history left, but I do think we might manage to cram roughly that much subjective history in before the Singularity / as it takes off. 

[^p5341cv2vta]: An old strategy is to recruit your police / imperial enforcers from a different ethnicity than the people that they need to defend against, so there's some baseline level of resentment that will allow brutality which will cow them into submission. Autonomous weapons allow this at scale, and for secret police that are difficult to bribe or corrupt, and widespread surveillance allows for secret police that are always watching and noticing subtle connections.