# The case for using the term 'steelmanning' instead of 'principle of charity'

(Alternative title: “The case for rationalists inventing new jargon”)

Antoine Lavoisier revolutionized chemistry. Did he discover a new substance? If you think that names don't matter, Lavoisier didn't discover a new substance. If you think names matter, he discovered oxygen. 

Joseph Priestley discovered the same substance earlier. Through heating mercuric oxide he produced a gas that allowed a candle to burn brightly. A gas that enabled a mouse to live longer under an airtight glass cover. He called the gas dephlogisticated air.

He showed Lavoisier his experiment. Lavoisier rejected the idea that there should be elements with negative mass like phlogiston and called the same gas oxygen and earned thereby the reputation of inventing modern chemistry. 

> The language you use to talk about something influences the way you think about it. If the chemistry you’re talking about is truly something new, then a fight over terminology may be quite an important part of getting to understand that chemistry better. [Jay A. Labinger](http://cen.acs.org/articles/92/i6/Confusion-Over-Scientific-Nomenclature-Par.html)

Long before the discovery of atoms, Lavoisier reordered the ontology for chemistry and named entities in a way that reflected his new ontology thereby founding modern chemistry. 

In the field of rationality, we are today facing a situation where we lack an ontology that’s of the same quality as the ontology we have of chemistry in our times. We are facing a situation where the ontology of rationality is like the ontology of chemistry in Priestley’s time. 

Classical rationalism uses fallacies frequently in its ontology. In Kahnemann’s ontology, the concept of cognitive biases is central. Given CFAR's more recent work it’s fashionable to talk in terms of cruxes while talking about fallacies is less fashionable on LessWrong. New concepts come with new terms and the way we name concepts helps us to relate to our new concepts.

Positivist ideology suggests that non-physical entities that we might talk about in rationality such as biases don’t really exist. Positivists propose that after we get a good ontology for physical entities like atoms, we don’t need to think about ontology anymore and can just focus on epistemology. 

This focus on epistemology leads to us spending less effort on finding good names for concepts and good ontology. When new names for concepts that are already known under other names get introduced those new names often face criticism. 

An example of great naming of our community is the term *steelmanning* which refers to a concept that’s called the *principle of charity* in academic philosophy. [Jonathan Maloney](https://www.intelligentspeculation.com/blog/the-principle-of-charity) defines the *principle of charity *of the philosophers as:

> The Principle of Charity demands that one interprets a speaker's statement(s) in the most rational way possible. In other words, when ascribing to this principle, you must consider the strongest possible interpretation of your fellow interlocutor's argument before subjecting it to evaluation.

Academic philosophers borrowed the term from the philosophy of language, where it has a slightly different meaning. Wilson coined the term in his paper [Substances without Substrata](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20123725) to deal with the problem of knowing to whom a term refers. If Charles speaks of *Caesar *and there are multiple people who are named *Caesar*, Wilson’s *principle of charity *is a heuristic for knowing which *Caesar *is meant*.* According to the heuristic that *Julius Caesar* is meant by Charles when picking *Julius Caesar *as designatum for *Caesar *makes the most claims that a person makes about *Caesar *to be true.

> We select as designatum that individual which will make the largest possible number of Charles’ statements true. 

In Wilson’s definition, the principle of charity has the goal of figuring out what another person means with the languages they use. This goal is different from improving a poorly argued argument another person made to a stronger form. The concepts that Wilson and Maloney describe differ.

Both of their concepts are about how to interpret a speaker's statement and not about improving on a speaker's statement. Often when we talk about *steelmanning *in our community we want to improve on the argument that was made in a way that adds reasoning to the case the speaker makes even if the speaker doesn’t know the reasoning we are adding. We speak about *steelmanning *when we care more about whether the position for which a speaker is arguing is true than caring about whether it’s true for the reasons that the speaker advocates. 

The common idea of a *strawman *is a way to phrase an argument in a weaker way than it was meant and in contrast to the term *strawman *the term *steelman *indicates that the *steelman *also goes beyond the original meaning. Using the term *steelman *helps us to be clear that we are indeed attempting to change the meaning.

The philosophers don’t have distinct terms about whether they include or exclude the change in meaning when they speak about using the principle of charity and 

The term *principle of charity* also comes with additional baggage because the idea of charity is often about assuming good intentions, being respectful, and not hurting other people's feelings. By using the term *steelman *for the concept Maloney named *principle of charity *we have a word that maps more directly to a single ontological concept instead of mapping to a mix of different concepts. 

Terms like *steelman *allow us to speak more effectively about rationality than we can by reusing existing terms. Finding good terms for concepts can help us refine our field of rationality.