Harley-ml/lesswrong huggingface dataset:
# Paper Trauma

[Andrew Critch](https://www.lesserwrong.com/posts/HnC29723hm6kJT7KP/critch-on-taking-ai-risk-seriously/) thinks people should be spending more time than they currently are using paper as a working memory aid while thinking, especially [large paper](https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0027A7DBU/ref=asc_df_B0027A7DBU5355328/?tag=hyprod-20&creative=394997&creativeASIN=B0027A7DBU&linkCode=df0&hvadid=167124288385&hvpos=1o1&hvnetw=g&hvrand=8447666634195683217&hvpone=&hvptwo=&hvqmt=&hvdev=c&hvdvcmdl=&hvlocint=&hvlocphy=9032083&hvtargid=pla-305376013162) (for [even more working memory](http://acritch.com/notepad/)). It is really astonishing how helpful this can be. We consistently encourage people to do it at [CFAR workshops](http://rationality.org/workshops/upcoming) nearly every time they learn a new technique or attempt to debug themselves or each other.

Paper is both very helpful and very easy to use - so why aren't people already using it all the time (including me)? I have a few vivid memories of times at CFAR workshops where I had to prod two people who were having a cognitively intensive conversation to use paper as shared working memory, and by "people" I mean CFAR instructors. It's harder than it looks.

My guess is that people have unresolved aversions to paper coming from school, where paper was how other people forced you to do things like homework and tests.

Really, it's horrifying to think about how much of what you've written down on paper was entirely forced on you.

So, you'll need to do some work if you want to reclaim the right to write whatever you want on paper, instead of whatever you've been trained to write. Good luck. Here are some words to take with you on your way.

Just because you are writing on paper does not mean you are still in school.

Nobody is going to grade you.

This is not homework. This is not a test.

This is your mind.

This is your life.

[Think.](https://thezvi.wordpress.com/2017/11/27/you-have-the-right-to-think/)
# Update from Vancouver

I've wanted to do a more detailed update from Vancouver, as the Post-Mortem on the Craft and the Community on here from a few months ago seems to have inspired Vancouver to get organized more than is true of other rationality communities, and is kickstarting an unprecedented reinvogiration of passion for local rationality community organization. The time it'd take me to do that has been better spent actually doing the organizing for Vancouver meetups. Below is quick update from Vancouver. I wrote it as a Facebook post for an audience of community members in Vancouver as part of a strategic review of local rationality organization in the last 6 weeks. The context is there were 6 Vancouver rationality meetups of a wide diversity of topics in January, which is a high a frequency of ratioanality meetups as there has ever been for Vancouver. The rationale for doing so I hope to post later; I thought I'd update the rest of you on what we've been doing.

* * *

I can frame what I'm trying to get us in Vancouver to do better having learned how meetup organization in Seattle works. In Seattle, there's complete integration of the rationality and effective altruism community organization. Each week they have a rationality reading group, which are more structured, and an effective altruism meetup, which is more variable week-to-week. However, what's made their meetups successful is the consistency. What they have in Seattle is regular meetups, of the same kind repeating, occurring on a weekly cycle. However, I think doing the same wouldn't work as well in Vancouver, as being eclectic as we are expect most of us desire more dynamism than is typical for rationalists.

So what I'm trying to do is getting meetup organization in Vancouver to work on a monthly cycle.

In January, we organized 6 meetups in total, 4 of which are a kind of meetup I want to see repeated in January:  
\- Constructive Contrarian Challenge Club (C4)  
\- spirituality  
\- global coordination and AI reading/discussion group  
\- rationality/discussion group (e.g., LW, SSC, etc.)

Other meetups for February which could be integrated into a system of meetups on a monthly cycle:  
\- biosecurity reading group  
\- Consciousness Appreciation Club  
\- bureaucracy day  
\- authentic relating  
\- Dungeons & Discourse  
\- rationalist game nights

These meetups are mostly still of the type "sitting around and talking about intellectual things" thus far. Having more social and party-like events is something I'd like to try once or twice in February. Anyway, how these would be a cyclical system is that each of the meetups listed above would happen once per month, and in total the goal would be ~2 meetups per week. So we'd be having meetups as frequently as are in Seattle, but with a greater diversity of meetups. Realistically I don't know we'll be organized enough in February to hit that benchmark, but I was surprised by how much we got done in January too. So we'll see.
# How I see knowledge aggregation

After reading the Arbital postmortem, I remembered some old ideas regarding a tool for claim and prediction aggregation.

First, the tool would have the basic features. There would be a list of claims. Each claim is a clear and concise statements that could be true or false, perhaps with a short explanation. For each claim, the users could vote on its likelihood. All these votes would be aggregated into a single number for each claim.

Second, the tool would allow the creation of composite claims by combining two existing claims. In particular, a conditional claim _IF B THEN A_ would represent the conditional probability _P(A|B)_. For every claim, it should be easy to find the conditionals it participates in, or the claims it is composed of. Conditionals are voted on same as simple claims (I would even consider a version where _only_ conditionals are voted on).

Third, the tool would understand the basic probability laws and use this to direct the users' attention. For example, if three claims don't satisfy the law _P(A|B) P(B) < P(A)_, users might be alerted about this error. On the other hand, if _P(A|B) = P(B|A) = 1_, the two claims might be merged or one could be discarded, to reduce the clutter.

Fourth, given a claim the tool might collect every other claim that supports it, follow every chain of argument and assemble them into a single graph, or even a semi-readable text, with the strongest arguments and counterarguments most visible.

Let's consider a possible workflow. Suppose you browse the list of claims, and find a ridiculous claim _X_ assigned a high likelihood. You could just vote to decrease the likelihood and perhaps leave an offensive comment, however this is unlikely to have much effect. Instead you could find a convincing counterargument _Y_, then add both _P(Y) = 1_ and _P(X|Y) = 0_ to the list of claims. Now other users would be notified of the resulting inconsistency and would reply by voting on one of these claims, changing their vote on _X_, or by creating additional arguments that contradict _Y_ or support _X_. In turn you would attack these new arguments, eventually creating a large graph of reasoning. Perhaps at some point there would be enough general claims that people from different debates could reuse some, instead of duplicating them, and only create new conditional claims, making the graph dense.

I took some time to write a small [prototype](https://discuss-pineapple.herokuapp.com/). It is initialized with some AI related claims, and it implements first, second, and a tiny bit of third paragraph. Now for some meta. The prototype is a single page app, using angular1, backed by nodejs and mongodb. The actual features took between 1 and 2 hours to write. The backend and deployment took a couple more hours, largely because I hadn't done that in a while. Therefore I think that it's quite feasible to make similar prototypes for other ideas. Is there any value in it though?
# Explicit Expectations when Teaching

_Epistemic Status: Casual thoughts on small ways to improve teaching flows._

In the lectures for my current classes, things don't always make sense. Sometimes the not making sense comes from a feeling of incompleteness. The definition seems incomplete. I notice that I don't have enough info to fully explain the concept.

Generally I've noticed two reasons for this. This first is that there was some assumed prior knowledge. Sometimes that can be explicit. Maybe I was supposed to know multivariate calculus for this course, yet there was some concept I missed that is being used here. Other times the assumption of prior knowledge is implicit. This is when the professor didn't realize that there was something to explain (i.e unaware of [inferential distance](https://www.lesserwrong.com/posts/DdoDzNT8Y99aEAdvh/an-intuitive-explanation-of-inferential-distance)).

In these cases, the best route is to ask a question.

In other cases, the professor purposefully gave an incomplete explanation, which they proceed to expand on in the following slide.

In this case, the best route is to put a mental astericks next to new concept and hold tight.

A problem arises from the fact that almost all of the professors I've had (and most people just trying to casually teach me something) talk in a way where I can't distinguish what is assumped prior knowledge and what is a placeholder to be filled in later. This leads to wasted movement. I might ask a lot of questions that get "Hold on for two minutes" as a reply, or I might never explore an idea myself because I figure it will be explained at some point. I think that being explicit can make it much easier for one trying to learn.

In conversation, I can imagine a simple habit of tagging a word or concept with a mental astericks and making clear that you currently are presenting a "working explanation". Something like "A linear seperator divides n-dimensional space in to two region. We'll circle back to how it does that in a sec."

If you teach in any sort of formal setting and use visual aids, it could be worthwhile to introduce a convention like, "Things I'm going to explain later will be highlighted in blue, things that you are expected to know are highlighted in green."

If anyone tries this out in a formal setting, let me know if it had any effect.
# European Community Weekend 2018 Announcement

  

We are excited to announce this year's European LessWrong Community Weekend. For the fifth time, rationalists from all over Europe (and some from outside Europe) are **gathering in Berlin** to socialize, have fun, exchange knowledge and skills, and have interesting discussions.

The event takes place **September 7th to September 9th** and, like last year, it will be held in the beautiful Jugendherberge Wannsee which contains a large room for central events, several seminar rooms, and lots of comfortable spaces inside and out to socialize or relax.

This is a community-driven event. That means that while there will be a keynote and pre-planned content, the bulk of the schedule will be filled by the participants. There will be space to give talks, short or long, provide workshops, or just gather some people to do an activity together. In previous years we had the talks, lightning talks and workshops you would expect, as well as lighter activities such as morning-workouts, meditation sessions, authentic relating games, swimming in the lake and many more. Of course, there will also be time to reconnect with friends and form new connections with other aspiring rationalists.

**Some valuable information**

Most of the talks and discussions will be held in English, so you do not need to be able to speak German to attend.

The **ticket price of €150** includes accommodation for two nights, on-site meals (breakfast, lunch, dinner) and snacks, and a welcome lunch on **Friday at 12:00**.

The event wraps up **Sunday afternoon around 15:00**. In the days after the weekend, participants are invited to stay in Berlin a little longer to explore the city, go bouldering, play frisbee, etc. While this is not part of the official event, we will coordinate couch-surfing opportunities to avoid the need for hotels.

**tl;dr**

*   When? 7-9 September 2018
*   Where? [http://jh-wannsee.de](http://jh-wannsee.de/)
*   How much? €150
*   Apply here: [http://tiny.cc/lwcw2018_signup](http://tiny.cc/lwcw2018_signup) and
*   Submit a contribution to support your application: [http://tiny.cc/lwcw2018_contribution](http://tiny.cc/lwcw2018_contribution)

If you have any question, please email us at [lwcw.europe@gmail.com](mailto:lwcw.europe@gmail.com).

Looking forward to seeing you there,

The Community Weekend organizers and LessWrong Deutschland e.V.
# Speed improvements and changes to data querying

I changed the way we query for data and the way the page gets updated, so that we now basically never query for data without the user reloading the page. This is a pretty major change to the way the page updates, and I expect some bugs to show up somewhere.

This means scrolling on large comment threads or posts should now no longer lag, and comments should no longer resort when other people vote on things while you are looking at the comments (which quite annoyed some users). And in general the processing power the site requires should be massively reduced.

If you notice any bugs in the meantime, reloading the page should almost always fix it, and then send us a message so we can fix things properly.
# UDT as a Nash Equilibrium

I realized today that UDT doesn't really need the assumption that other players use UDT. In any game where all players have the same utility function, "everyone using UDT" is a Nash equilibrium that gives everyone their highest possible expected utility. So you can just use it unilaterally.

That covers such cases as [Absent-Minded Driver](http://lesswrong.com/lw/182/the_absentminded_driver/), [Psy-Kosh's problem](http://lesswrong.com/lw/3dy/solve_psykoshs_nonanthropic_problem/), [Wei's coordination problem](http://lesswrong.com/lw/1s5/explicit_optimization_of_global_strategy_fixing_a/). Notably it doesn't cover the Prisoner's Dilemma, because the players assign different utilities to the same outcome.

(Also this shows how Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximization is basically a restriction of UDT to single player games with perfect recall. For imperfect recall (AMD) or multiple players (Psy-Kosh) you need the full version.)

You can actually push game theory a bit further, and allow games where players have different utility functions, as long as some subset of players can jointly enforce their highest possible expected utilities. UDT doesn't support that kind of decision-making, but really it should be a no-brainer too...?
# Hammertime Intermission and Open Thread

This post marks the end of the first cycle of Hammertime. Click [here](https://radimentary.wordpress.com/2018/01/29/hammertime-day-1-bug-hunt/) for intro.

Hammertime will return on Monday 2/19.

I want to close off the first cycle with some thoughts, and designate a place for discussion about the future of this sequence.

Discussion Topics
=================

1\. Sequences: Yea or Nay?
--------------------------

I’ve always felt that sequences are a valuable way to organize deeper thoughts and drive home a few central messages from several perspectives. However, the current format and culture on LW seem to radically favor short, independent chunks. (There is also the obvious problem that Sequence construction is not working.)

I’ve been posting daily for a while now but when I shifted from individual posts to a sequence, average Karma immediately dropped by a factor of about 2. It’s possible that people don’t bother upvoting the same sequence, or that my writing quality dropped, but if this is real signal that many more people would read a sequence if they are marketed as individual thoughts (and WordPress stats suggest this as well), that might be reason for me to stop writing sequences in the future, or at least collect sequences together only after they’re complete.

Possible actionable for meta: make posts in a Sequence share karma and/or a single slot on frontpage.

2\. Repeat or Explore?
----------------------

My original intention was to review 10 topics over three cycles, building up in the difficulty of problems solved. I think I will definitely return to and expand on several of the techniques we’ve seen already, but also add more topics. If people have favorite techniques (and hopefully references) they’d like to see in Hammertime, post them here.

3\. Monotonicity of Progress
----------------------------

A big goal of mine is to solve the “Rationalist Uncanny Valley,” where beginning rationalists get worse at life before they get better. I can’t believe that this has to be the case; it seems to be symptomatic of a larger failure to develop the proper curriculum. I would like progress on rationality to be monotone – is there a good reason this should be difficult? It’d be great if we could compile a central list of “uncanny valley” failure modes.
# Monthly Meta: Referring is Underrated

_For the next n months I'll be picking an issue within the community that I think is especially important to highlight. LW2.0 is not just a new site, but also an opportunity to do things differently and to ask ourselves how they could be better._

We all know that rationality is supposed to be about [winning](http://lesswrong.com/lw/7i/rationality_is_systematized_winning/), but what does this mean? Let's assume that you already have some idea of what your problems are, but if you don't, then we can put not knowing what your problems are down as the first item on the list.

For each problem, there are generally two seperate strategies that we can take: 1) answering the problem by telling you how you can solve it or 2) referring you to other resources that can answer your question far better than we can. Of course, sometimes a combination of the two will work best, but this works well enough as a simple model.

A lot of rationality has been working towards getting better at answering. All of the discussion about biases and decision theory and psychology allow us to often give some pretty good answers.

Unfortunately, improving our ability to refer has recieved a lot less focus. Part of this may be related to status - if you are good at answering all of the credit flows to you, but if you are good at referring most of the credit goes to the person whose work you have referred them to. I suspect that improving referals is seriously underrated as rationality is of limited use if you don't have any concrete skills to utilise. If you want to start a business or improve your social skills or learn maths, then the main way that we can help you win is by pointing you to a great resource. And there's a valid question about how much the community wants to get into this, but if we're trying to systemise winning, it's not really something we can avoid.

Perhaps the lack of focus could be defended by questioning how easily tractable it is, but I'm not convinced that it has recieved enough attention yet for us to draw that conclusion. At the moment, we tend to solve this problems by sorting comments by the number of votes. As I pointed out in a [previous post](http://lesswrong.com/lw/n04/creating_lists/), this is far from the only way of doing this and one of the other techniques could be better.

While I listed a few ideas in that post, I really don't have a solid idea of what can be done about this problem. Instead, I'm just going to list some of the factors that make this issue so difficult and hope that people have ideas in the comments:

*   Subjectivity: There's no objectively best book on improving your public speaking or improving your motivation
*   Context-dependence: Even if someone perfectly shared your view of what makes a book or video good, what worked for them might not work for you if your situation is different
*   Trust: It's hard to know how trustworthy someone's recommendation is unless you already know them or you've tried some of their other recommendations
# Mental TAPs

(Prereq: Knowledge of Trigger Action Plans (TAPs). alkjash's [here](https://www.lesserwrong.com/posts/ESnzpoCJrAfwAzpMB/hammertime-day-3-taps) & LifelongLeaner's [here](https://www.lesserwrong.com/posts/vE7Z2JTDo5BHsCp4T/instrumental-rationality-4-2-creating-habits))

I converged (sort'of) upon the idea of TAPs on my own two summer's ago, but the difference between my idea (which we'll refer to as mental TAPs or mTAPs) and TAPs is continuous mental simulations.

TAP Problems
------------

Usually with TAPs, you commit to the trigger-action once and mentally rehearse 5 or so times and that's it. This fails in several ways:

1.  When the trigger doesn't happen every day (social fear, being confused, junk food temptations)
2.  The trigger is not easily recognized/understood. (not always catching when you're confused, disappointed, stressed, mentally fatigued)
3.  Doesn't take full advantage of wins/times you actually did the thing!

mTAP Solutions
--------------

The only difference is daily mental simulations/rehearsals of your TAPs. I have a sticky note near my toothbrush, so when I brush my teeth, I mentally rehearse my 9 TAPs a couple times each. This helps with (1) above due to being tied to a daily routine (or at least I hope I brush daily!).

Regarding (2), you do your mTAP, face the trigger in real life, update on _what the trigger actually feels like in real life_, and do an mTAP later that day with your updated trigger. Ex. I mentally simulate (being disappointed -> being curious), I go out and am actually disappointed that I didn't get to spend time with a friend, update on what feeling disappointed actually feels like with this data point, and finally hone in on that feeling when I mTAP that night.

Regarding (3), If you have a BIG WIN, you can hone in on that experience as when you mTAP. Last night I was red in my face embarassed due to social fear, but I still made the right choice despite that. I AM SO FREAKING PROUD OF MYSELF, lol, so I'm honing in on that experience this morning to build off of that win.

**WARNING:** my last TAP is a meta-TAP (brushing teeth-> look at sticky note and do mTAP). From n=4 experience, if you don't do this, it will become an obligation or you'll forget it.

Request: Has this idea already been explicitely stated elsewhere? Anything else regular old TAPs are missing?
# "Backchaining" in Strategy

Recently, some have been discussing "backchaining" as a strategic planning technique. In brief, this technique involves selecting a target outcome, then chaining backwards from there to determine what actions you should take; in other words, rather than starting with your current position and extrapolating forward, you start with the desired position and extrapolate back. (As far as I can tell there is very little, if any, difference between this and [backward induction in game theory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backward_induction), but I've heard several in the community call this "backchaining" recently and so use that term here.)

For instance, you might say "Okay, to get people on board with this project we'll need to give a presentation. To make a presentation we'll need a slide deck. To make a slide deck we'll need to get the relevant metrics. Therefore, let's go get the relevant metrics."

Backchaining can be useful in that it allows you to ensure that your actions are [cutting through to the objective](https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/38725-the-primary-thing-when-you-take-a-sword-in-your). However, there are some scenarios where backchaining isn't really an appropriate technique - namely ones where the objective is long-term in nature or involves too many unknown unknowns.

One example that might prove fruitful to investigate is that of chess. In chess, backchaining from desired positions can be useful. However, humans simply can't establish long enough chains for this to be a practical tool in long-term planning. It would be absurd to say "All right, this game I'm going to go for a king-and-rook mate on the 'a' file against my opponent's king alone. To do that, I'll need to use the principle of zugzwang to force my opponent's king to move into an unsafe position. To do that, I'll need to..."

Instead, one usually focuses on accumulating generalized advantage in the opening and midgame, and once sufficient advantage has been established one can then transition into planning for specific endgame positions. This approach is much more effective - fixating on too particular a scenario constrains your options, so instead you just focus on building an advantage.

A similar thing is true in other domains. While backchaining can be a useful technique for accomplishing projects with relatively concrete and legible goals, it starts to falter and even become counterproductive when aimed at a target that's too far in the future. It's easy for this type of reasoning to lead to overcommitting to specific paths that may or may not be the best ones to take - better to instead focus on building generalized advantage, at least insofar as you have a reasonable sense of where you're going.
# Status: Map and Territory

I’m here to add another angle to the discussion on social vs. objective truth ([example](http://benjaminrosshoffman.com/actors-and-scribes-words-and-deeds/)). Here’s an analogy for reasoning about status games and why people react so strongly against improper status moves:

Society is a collective consciousness. From Society’s point of view, the status game is the map. Genuine competence (some combination of skill, virtue, and value) is the territory. The map is meant to track the territory.

Human instinctively play the status game; it’s [impossible to just say what you mean](https://thezvi.wordpress.com/2017/06/28/just-saying-what-you-mean-is-impossible/). The status game is built into people’s verbal and nonverbal behaviors toward one another.

If the status game is a good map, you can decide who to befriend, admire, and chastise based simply on their status moves. You can figure out who best to ask for advice by the way they hold their arms. You can trust the beliefs of confident people without individually investigating each of their claims. The human brain opts into the status game by default to partake in all this free value.

If the accuracy of the status game is corrupted, the map loses all value. Trust breaks down and you have to rely on first principles.

There’s an approved way of climbing the status ladder: acquiring genuine competence. Well-socialized individuals naturally play higher status as they become more competent in the relevant domain, since the connection between competence and status is built into their brains. Society approves: the map keeps fidelity to the territory.

There’s an improper way of climbing the status ladder: playing status above your competence. Jordan Peterson’s go-to example is serial killer [Paul Bernardo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Bernardo) in [this prison interview](https://youtu.be/hLTAjW5Twlk?t=273). Note the minute-long interaction between Bernardo and the lawyer(?) on the right. Bernardo acts like a disappointed CEO lecturing a wayward and nervous underling.

Knowing the truth about the individuals involved, I have a visceral reaction against this status interaction: the map has detached from the territory. Even if Bernardo is speaking only literal truths, there’s an instinct that screams he’s _lying_.

I predict that the neural mechanisms for detecting truth from falsehood (i.e. whether the map corresponds to the territory) are closely related to the mechanisms for distinguishing proper and improper status moves (i.e. whether the status map corresponds to genuine competence). I predict that your negative reaction against lying feels similar to your negative reaction against improper status plays.
# The Signal and the Corrective

This is one of the most important articles I've read in awhile. It makes a generalization from something Scott pointed out in [this SSC post](http://slatestarcodex.com/2016/11/10/book-review-house-of-god/).

Here are a few excerpts, but it's worth clicking through and reading the whole thing!

> From the inside, when you subscribe to a narrative, when you _believe_ in it, it feels like you’ve stripped away all irrelevant noise and only the essence, The Underlying Principle, is left — the _signal_, in the language of information theory. However, that noise you just dismissed as irrelevant has _other_ signals in it and sometimes people will consider them stronger, truer and more important.

The core of the concept:

> Most people have somewhat moderate views and they recognize that there is a bit of truth to both of two apparently opposing narratives. This can mask fundamental differences between those appearing to be in agreement.

> Like, look at this zebra:

> We can all agree on what it looks like. But some of us will think of it as a white horse with black stripes and some as a black horse with white stripes, and while it doesn’t actually matter now, that might change if whether “zebras are _fundamentally white_” or “zebras are _fundamentally black_” ever becomes an issue of political importance.

> In the real world zebras are (thank God) still politically neutral, but similar patterns exist. Two people with political views like:

> _“The free market is extremely powerful and will work best as a rule, but there are a few outliers where it won’t, and some people will be hurt so we should have a social safety net to contain the bad side effects.”_

> and

> _“Capitalism is morally corrupt and rewards selfishness and greed. An economy run for the people by the people is a moral imperative, but planned economies don’t seem to work very well in practice so we need the market to fuel prosperity even if it is distasteful.”_

> . . . have very different fundamental attitudes but may well come down quite close to each other in terms of supported policies. If you model them as having one “main signal” (basic attitude) paired with a corrective to account for how the basic attitude fails to match reality perfectly, then this kind of difference is _understated_ when the conversation is about specific issues (because then signals _plus_ correctives are compared and the correctives bring “opposite” people closer together) but _overstated_ when the conversation is about general principles — because then it’s only about the signal.

[Click through to read the whole article](https://everythingstudies.com/2017/12/19/the-signal-and-the-corrective/), which includes a ton of great examples (concrete and abstract).
# "Just Suffer Until It Passes"

I started a "universal problemsolving" journal a few months ago — whenever anything goes wrong, I write down (1) what happened, (2) the universal problems / root causes that might underlie that problem, and (3) generalized countermeasures for that situation in the future.

Many of these are basic, boring stuff — "Lack of Relevant Supplies" is a universal problem; lacking food or coffee at home makes the morning run worse. (The countermeasure is having adequate secondary stocks of supplies, and I adjusted my grocery orders accordingly after realizing it.)

Some of them are interesting, though.

Perhaps the most interesting general countermeasure is "Just Suffer Until It Passes."

Sometimes you lie down and can't sleep. What do most people do? Get up and do something stimulating.

Boredom. What do most people do? Do something stimulating.

If you've ever done mindfulness meditation, even for just 5-10 minutes per day, you know that there's periods of massive raw unpleasantness than occur from time to time. You want to get up and stop meditating.

The answer? Just... suffer until it passes.

You can quibble with the wording — some people won't like the word "suffer"... feel free to swap in "endure" or even "wait" for a more neutral-valence word.

But I'm starting to realize a lot of problems aren't huge problems in-and-of themselves, and it's the flight to distraction and stimulation that compound the problem and create bad ongoing habits (internet surfing, games, junk food, whatever).

Potential Takeaways —

(1) I'm getting immense mileage out of my Universal Problemsolving journal. Feel free to think about it and try something like it out. If there's interest, I might write up how I go about doing it.

(2) "Just Suffer \[Endure/Wait/Whatever\] Until It Passes" — it's possible to accept negative affect and wait, and it... passes. This is often more productive than trying to banish it via distraction or stimulation, which often compounds the problem at hand.
# Open thread, February 2018

Apologies if it's already there, but I just can't find the open thread.

In case it's not there, open thread for February 2018! Hurray!

In case it is, would it be difficult to check the title string for "open thread" and show a link to the current month's open thread, ask if that's what the person was looking for, and still have an option to post if not?
# A Proper Scoring Rule for Confidence Intervals

You probably already know that you can incentivise honest reporting of probabilities using a proper scoring rule like log score, but did you know that you can also incentivize honest reporting of confidence intervals?

To incentize reporting of a < refresh to render LaTeX > confidence interval, take the score < refresh to render LaTeX > , where < refresh to render LaTeX > is the size of your confidence interval, and < refresh to render LaTeX > is the distance between the true value and the interval. < refresh to render LaTeX > is < refresh to render LaTeX > whenever the true value is in the interval.

This incentivizes not only giving an interval that has the true value < refresh to render LaTeX > of the time, but also distributes the remaining 10% equally between overestimates and underestimates.

To keep the lower bound of the interval important, I recommend measuring < refresh to render LaTeX > and < refresh to render LaTeX > in log space. So if the true value is < refresh to render LaTeX > and the interval is < refresh to render LaTeX > , then < refresh to render LaTeX > is < refresh to render LaTeX > and < refresh to render LaTeX > is < refresh to render LaTeX > for underestimates and < refresh to render LaTeX > for overestimates. Of course, you need questions with positive answers to do this.

To do a < refresh to render LaTeX > confidence interval, take the score < refresh to render LaTeX > .

This can be used to make training calibration, using something like Wits and Wagers cards more fun. I also think it could be turned into app, if one could get a large list of questions with numerical values.
# Rationalist Lent

[It's that time of year again](http://lesswrong.com/lw/gnp/rationalist_lent/). Pick something to give up for 40 days as an experiment / [comfort zone expansion](https://www.lesserwrong.com/posts/c5wFM7KJLtuMnLFsH/hammertime-day-5-comfort-zone-expansion). Post about it here. Good luck and have fun!

**Edit:** For anyone who wants it, here are some prompts for brainstorming things to try giving up (set a [5-minute timer](https://www.lesserwrong.com/posts/vpvKEj7shuk8h5Eet/hammertime-day-2-yoda-timers) for the brainstorm):

1.  What takes up too much of my time?
2.  What takes up too much of my attention?
3.  What in my life is most [out to get me](https://thezvi.wordpress.com/2017/09/23/out-to-get-you/)?
4.  What [superstimuli](http://lesswrong.com/lw/h3/superstimuli_and_the_collapse_of_western/) am I most attracted to?
5.  What in my life feels the most like [pica](http://lesswrong.com/lw/15w/experiential_pica/)?

And also for anyone who wants it, here are some concrete suggestions for things to give up, in no particular order:

1.  Video games
2.  Smartphones
3.  Facebook, Reddit, etc.
4.  Sugar
5.  Caffeine
# Two Types of Updatelessness

_[Cross-posted.](https://agentfoundations.org/item?id=1765)_

Just a small note which I’m not sure has been mentioned anywhere else:

It seems like there are two different classes of “updateless reasoning”.

In problems like Agent Simulates Predictor, switching to updateless reasoning is better _for you in the very situation you find yourself in_. The gains accrue to you. You objectively achieve higher expected value, at the point of decision, by making the decision from the perspective of yourself long ago rather than doing what seems higher EV from the current perspective.

In problems like counterfactual mugging, the gains do not accrue to the agent at the point of making the decision. The increase in expected value goes to other possible selves, which the decision-point self does not even believe in any more. The claim of higher EV is quite subjective; it depends entirely on one’s prior.

For lack of better terms, I’ll call the first type all-upside updatelessness; the second type is mixed-upside.

It is quite possible to construct decision theories which get all-upside updateless reasoning without getting mixed-upside. Asymptotic decision theory was one.

On the other hand, it seems unlikely that any natural proposal would get mixed-upside without getting the all-upside cases. [Policy selection](https://agentfoundations.org/item?id=1711), for example, automatically gets both types (to the limited extent that it enables updatelessness reasoning).

Nonetheless, I find it plausible that one wants two different mechanisms to get the two different kinds. It seems to me that one can handle all-upside cases in a more objective way, getting good overall guarantees. Mixed-upside cases, on the other hand, require more messiness and compromise, as in the policy selection proposal. So, it could be beneficial to combine a mechanism which does perfectly for all-upside cases with a mechanism that provides some weaker guarantee for mixed-upside.
# Replacing expensive costly signals

I feel like there is a general problem where people signal something using some extremely socially destructive method, and [we can conceive of more socially efficient ways to send the same signal](https://meteuphoric.wordpress.com/2011/07/20/cheap-signaling/), but trying out alternative signals suggests that you might be especially bad at the traditional one. For instance, an employer might reasonably suspect that a job candidate who did a strange online course instead of normal university would have done especially badly at normal university.

Here is a proposed solution. Let X be the traditional signal, Y be the new signal, and Z be the trait(s) being advertised by both. Let people continue doing X, but subsidize Y on top of X for people with very high Z. Soon Y is a signal of higher Z than X is, and understood by the recipients of the signals to be a better indicator. People who can’t afford to do both should then prefer Y to X, since Y is is a stronger signal, and since it is more socially efficient it is likely to be less costly for the signal senders.

If Y is intrinsically no better a signal than X (without your artificially subsidizing great Z-possessors to send it) then in the long run Y might only end up as strong a sign as X, but in the process, many should have moved to using Y instead.

(A possible downside is that people may end up just doing both forever.)

For example, if you developed a psychometric and intellectual test that only took half a day and predicted very well how someone would do in an MIT undergraduate degree, you could run it for a while for people who actually do MIT undergraduate degrees, offering prizes for high performance, or just subsidizing taking it at all. After the best MIT graduates say on their CVs for a while that they also did well on this thing and got a prize, it is hopefully an established metric, and an employer would as happily have someone with the degree as with a great result on your test. At which point an impressive and ambitious high school leaver would take the test, modulo e.g. concerns that the test doesn’t let you hang out with other MIT undergraduates for four years.

I don’t know if this is the kind of problem people actually have with replacing apparently wasteful signaling systems with better things. Or if this doesn’t actually work after thinking about it for more than an hour. But just in case.
# Missives from China

Driving in China
----------------

You’ve heard of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. But have you heard of Iterated Chicken?

Heat Lag
--------

Day 4: Temperature is experienced differently here. People wear wool coats over turtlenecks in 70 degree weather. Counted two other people wearing T-shirts out of thousands.

Day 5: It’s freezing out. I really miss my winter coat.

A Fatal Error
-------------

Two days before Chinese New Year, I went to the supermarket and bought my own snacks.

Feeling Like a Native
---------------------

A man on a moped asked me for directions today. To the place I was walking.

Evolution of Fashion
--------------------

Day 2: Two cute little girls seen wearing spinning pinwheels in their hair.

Day 3: Every little girl is wearing them.

Day 4: Boy spotted wearing pinwheel. Two girls spotted wearing double pinwheels.

Day 5: Grown ass women with rainbow pinwheels in their hair.

Blood, Sweat and Tears
----------------------

Would anyone attempt this mountain if the height of its summit could be perceived from the base?

Feeling Attractive
------------------

Watched too many Asian idol dramas recently. Average Chinese people are pleasingly homely in comparison.

An Electrifying Coincidence
---------------------------

My wife is from Edison, New Jersey. Her ancestors brought the light bulb to China.

Feeling Like a Native, Part 2
-----------------------------

Out of place on a crowded street. Overheard dialects from all over China. Realized Chinese people are tourists, even in China. I’m right at home.
# A Simple Motto

Rationality is _believing true things and making good choices_.

This phrasing isn't quite as precise as it could be, but it communicates the gist of both epistemic and instrumental rationality in very simple language. I use this wording when communicating what rationality is to non-rationalists, and it seems to do its job well enough. Maybe other rationalists will find it useful too.
# An alternative way to browse LessWrong 2.0

This is something I've been tinkering with for a while, but I think it's now complete enough to be generally useful. It's an alternative frontend for LessWrong 2.0, using the GraphQL API.

[![](//i.imgur.com/AVjeNoH.png)](https://www.greaterwrong.com)

Features:

*   Fast, even on low-end computers and phones
*   Quickly jump to new comments in a thread with the "." and "," keys
*   Archive view makes it easy to browse the best posts of years past
*   Always shows every comment in a thread, no need to "load more"
*   Log in and post using your existing username and password, or create a new account
*   Simple markdown editor
*   Typography enhancements
*   Switch between fixed-width and fluid layouts and several different themes
*   Easily view a comment's ancestors without scrolling by hovering over the left edge of a comment tree

Thanks to Said Achmiz for designing the themes and writing much of the frontend JavaScript.

Give it a try: [https://www.greaterwrong.com](https://www.greaterwrong.com)
# An alternative way to browse LessWrong 2.0

This is something I’ve been tinkering with for a while, but I think it’s now complete enough to be generally useful. It’s an alternative frontend for LessWrong 2.0, using the GraphQL API.

[![](https://i.imgur.com/AVjeNoH.png)](https://www.greaterwrong.com)

Features:

*   Fast, even on low-end computers and phones
    
*   Quickly jump to new comments in a thread with the “.” and “,” keys
    
*   Archive view makes it easy to browse the best posts of years past
    
*   Always shows every comment in a thread, no need to “load more”
    
*   Log in and post using your existing username and password, or create a new account
    
*   Simple markdown editor
    
*   Typography enhancements
    
*   Switch between fixed-width and fluid layouts and several different themes
    
*   Easily view a comment’s ancestors without scrolling by hovering over the left edge of a comment tree
    

Thanks to Said Achmiz for designing the themes and writing much of the frontend JavaScript.

Give it a try: [https://​www.greaterwrong.com](https://www.greaterwrong.com)
# Shit rationalists say - 2018

In 2012 we had a thread titled [Shit rationalists say](http://lesswrong.com/lw/9ki/shitrationalists say/) that lead to the fun video [Shit rationalists say](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jlT3MeCzVao S). Given that the video is a lot of fun to watch, how about starting a new list that's up-to-date.

Share whatever comes to mind and have fun :)
# Are you the rider or the elephant?

Some [recent](https://www.lesserwrong.com/posts/aFyWFwGWBsP5DZbHF/circling) [threads](https://www.lesserwrong.com/posts/tMhEv28KJYWsu6Wdo/kensh) seem to me to be pointing at a really fundamental tension that I don't know how to articulate in full. But here's a chunk of it:

When you think of your mind as divided into your System 1 / fast / unconscious / nonverbal / intuitive / emotional processes, which we'll call the "[elephant](http://lesswrong.com/lw/531/how_you_make_judgments_the_elephant_and_its_rider/)," and your System 2 / slow / conscious / verbal / deliberate / analytic processes, which we'll call the "rider," which of those do you _identify_ with? That is, when you say "I," does "I" refer to the elephant or to the rider (or both, or neither, or [other](http://benjaminrosshoffman.com/automemorial/#Under_the_surface))?

* * *

We used to talk about [straw Vulcan rationality](http://lesswrong.com/lw/90n/summary_of_the_straw_vulcan/), the kind of rationality that is only about the rider and completely neglects the elephant, and how the kind of rationality that, say, [CFAR](http://rationality.org/) is interested in is much more about getting the rider and the elephant to communicate with each other and work well together as a team, complementing each other's strengths and weaknesses.

We say this, but it still seems to me that many people I run into (for example, at introductory CFAR workshops) implicitly identify as their riders and treat their elephants as annoying pets that have to be managed so that they, meaning their riders, can get on with their lives. I think this is... "wrong" would be a type error, and also unkind. But I'm sad about it.

I'll out myself: I identify mostly with my elephant, and think of my rider as at best a helpful advisor for my elephant.

And I get the sense that all of the disagreements I've been navigating recently have been with people who identify as their riders and are deeply suspicious of their elephants, and also (by association) of _my_ elephant; and that this has been the main driving force behind the disagreement.

I don't really know what to do with this. It seems like the polite thing to do is to mostly only engage people like this rider-to-rider (which is mostly what I'm doing right now, in this post), but there are a lot of important things - even important things for the art of rationality, from my perspective - that I think (and feel!) can only be communicated elephant-to-elephant, and setting aside how feasible it is to do this online, it seems to be unsettled whether people even want elephant-to-elephant communication happening on LW at all.

I'm also just worried about people treating their elephants poorly.

I have a lot more to say about this but I mostly want to open the floor up for discussion.