# Neural Correlates of Conscious Access

**Summary:** Neuroimaging scans and EEG readings comparing nonconscious and conscious stimuli are compared, showing particular patterns in conscious processes. These findings are in line with predictions made by the Global Workspace Theory of consciousness, in which consciousness is closely related to interaction between specialized modules of the brain.

When a bunch of photons hit your eye, it unleashes a long chain of cause and effect that leads to an image being mapped in your brain. When does that image become conscious?

**Conscious and Unconscious Perception**^1^

The most basic method of discriminating between conscious and unconscious information is to ask the subject if they noticed it. However, people can respond to information that they don't report. What does it mean to notice something then?

Merikle et al performed experiments in the 80s which helped to resolve this question. In the Stroop task, people are asked to read words written in a different color than the word. Words written in their color (green) are easier to read than those not in their color (also red). Merikle modified the stroop task, using only two colors (red and green), and using the word to prime subjects to describe the color. As was expected, when "green" comes before a green square, subjects respond faster than with no priming.

However, when the situation is regularly reversed and the "red" prime normally comes before a green square (and vice versa) people also respond faster to similar levels. That is to say, subjects are able to notice that the prime and stimulus are incongruent, and act on that information to respond faster to the stimuli.

When the reversed prime ("red" before green) is flashed for such a short time span that people don't report seeing it, they are unable to use this information to react faster to the green stimulus, and the typical Stroop effect is observed -- being subliminally primed with a congruent color speeds up recognition, being subliminally primed with an incongruent color slows it.

There are methods of interfering with subject's reports (muteness trivially, [anosognosia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anosognosia) creepily), but for most humans it very closely corresponds to what is normally considered conscious perception.

People's brains respond to information even if the person is unaware of it, but there are measurable differences in perception without awareness and perception with it.

**Methods of Manipulating Perception**^2^

Nonconscious stimulation is split up into two categories:  _subliminal_  and  _preconscious_. A subliminal stimulus is one in which the bottom up process information is so reduced that people cannot detect it, even if they're paying attention to it. A preconscious stimulus is one that is potentially noticeable (i.e. it's presented in a way that subjects can normally report seeing it), but not reported because of other distractions.

![Dichoptic Masking, image from Zeki 2003](http://images.lesswrong.com/t3_7yr_0.png?v=bc484d64ecc4018cbbe8f220918ee92a)

To present a stimulus subliminally you can:

*   Mask a stimulus, by presenting it close in time to other unrelated or interfering stimuli. (i.e. a word flashed for 33 ms is noticeable by itself, but not when proceeded and followed by geometric shapes)^2,3^
*   Use dichoptic masking, where you present two different images to each eye, and the subject reports seeing something which is neither of those^4^
*   Use flash suppression, where you show one eye an image and flash shapes in the other eye to interfere with image perception^5^

To present something preconsciously you can:

*   Use inattentional blindness, where you present something that participants aren't focusing on.
*   Distract them! Present another stimulus and then quickly follow it with the one that you're interested in presenting preconsciously during their attentional blink.^6^

**Neurological Differences**

So what's the biggest difference between when people do and don't report seeing something?

Across various different methods of nonconscious stimulation, a few patterns emerged. When your eyes are stimulated, areas in your visual cortex (in the back of your head) undergo activity to process it regardless of whether or not you report seeing it. When people do report something, much more of the brain "lights up".

![from Dehaune et al 2011](http://images.lesswrong.com/t3_7yr_1.png?v=e4b768229e87af3df59fbdbdcdaf1310)  

This lighting up also corresponds with recurrent processing, and ERP components in the P3b range. Recurrent processing is simply when a signal whips back and forth between specialized subregions, such as when signals from the visual cortex goes to the frontoparietal region then back to the visual cortex.^1,7^  
  
The idea that conscious access is related to recurrent processing in the frontoparietal region stands up to experimental verification. Researchers are able to interfere with conscious reports of information independently of stimulus identification simply by applying transcranial magnetic stimulation to the prefrontal cortex, without changing the stimulus.^8^

So basically, consciousness seems to be related to widespread neural activity in cortical areas, as well as recurrent signalling and some particular components of EEG readings. So what?

**The Global Workspace Theory**^1,9,10^

The Global Workspace Theory of Consciousness asserts that consciousness is related to information from the various specialized subregions of the brain becoming “globally available” for attention, motor control, and cognitive reference. This explains phenomena like [blindsight](/lw/7pm/blindsight_and_consciousness/) fairly elegantly, saying that visual information in the scotoma ceases to be conscious information because it ceases to be globally available to the system. Douhane adds that neurons with long axons in the frontoparietal cortex are probably the Global Workspace.^1^

Baars and Dennett are fond of the theater metaphor of consciousness. There’s a spotlight of attention on the stage, and actors (specialized cortical systems) come into and out of this to play their parts. This group of interacting subagents is actually somewhat close to orthonormal's [model for dissolving qualia](/lw/5op/qualia_strike_back/). Behind the scenes, directors and stagehands (decision processes, attention direction, contextual systems) arrange the scenes. Everywhere we shine the spotlight we see consciousness, because consciousness is attached to the light.

No part of the system is conscious, but there’s a show going on. And that’s what we see.

**Next Obvious Question:**

Okay, so why does that [make us talk about consciousness](/lw/p9/the_generalized_antizombie_principle/)? Why would we use the first person?

_To be continued..._

**Notes**

A _huge_ thanks to John Salvatier for getting me a bunch of the papers and editing feedback and putting up with my previous attempts to write an article like this. Also thanks to mtaran, falenas108, and RS (you don't know him) for reading drafts of this article.

Images are from Zeki 2003 and Dehaene 2011, respectively. I'd be very happy if someone helped me format that to show up with the pictures.

^1^Merikle & Joordens, 1997

^2^Dehaene, S., & Changeux, J.-P. 2011

^3^Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2007

^4^Moutoussis & Zeki 2002, Image from Zeki 2003

^5^Tsuchiya & Koch

^6^Marti et al 2010

^7^Lamme 2006

^8^Rounis et al 2010

^9^Baars 1997

^10^Metzinger

**References**

Baars, B. (1997). In the Theatre of Consciousness: The Workplace of the Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. Retrieved from [here](http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:In+The+Theatre+of+Consciousness#3M)

﻿Bruno G. Breitmeyer and Haluk Ogmen (2007) [Visual masking](http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Visual_masking). [Scholarpedia](http://www.scholarpedia.org), 2(7):3330

﻿Dehaene, S., & Changeux, J.-P. (2011). Experimental and theoretical approaches to conscious processing. _Neuron_, _70_(2), 200-27. Elsevier Inc. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2011.03.018

Kouider, S., & Dehaene, S. (2007). Levels of processing during non-conscious perception: a critical review of visual masking. _Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences_, _362_(1481), 857-75. doi:10.1098/rstb.2007.2093

Lamme, V. A. F. (2006). Towards a true neural stance on consciousness. _Trends in Cognitive Sciences_, _10_(11). doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.09.001

Merikle, P. M., & Joordens, S. (1997). Parallels between perception without attention and perception without awareness._Consciousness and cognition_, _6_(2-3), 219-36. doi:10.1006/ccog.1997.0310

Lamme, V. A. F. (2006). Towards a true neural stance on consciousness. _Trends in Cognitive Sciences_, _10_(11). doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.09.001

Lau, H., & Rosenthal, D. (2011). Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness. _Trends in cognitive sciences_, _15_(8), 365-373. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.009

Marti, S., Sackur, J., Sigman, M., & Dehaene, S. (2010). Mapping introspection’s blind spot: reconstruction of dual-task phenomenology using quantified introspection. _Cognition_, _115_(2), 303-13. Elsevier B.V. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2010.01.003

Metzinger, T. (2003). Being No One. _Philosophy_, 699\. MIT Press.

Moutoussis, K., & Zeki, S. (2002). The relationship between cortical activation and perception investigated with invisible stimuli. _Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences_, _99_(14), 9527. National Acad Sciences. doi:10.1073/pnas.PNAS

Rounis, E., Maniscalco, B., Rothwell, J., Passingham, R., & Lau, H. (2010). Theta-burst transcranial magnetic stimulation to the prefrontal cortex impairs metacognitive visual awareness. _Cognitive Neuroscience_, _1_(3), 165-175. doi:10.1080/17588921003632529

Tsuchiya, N., & Koch, C. (2005). Continuous flash suppression reduces negative afterimages. _Nature neuroscience_, _8_(8), 1096-101. doi:10.1038/nn1500

﻿Zeki, S. (2003). The disunity of consciousness. _Trends in Cognitive Sciences_, _7_(5), 214-218. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00081-0