# Models vs beliefs

I think that there is an important difference between sharing your beliefs and sharing what your model predicts. Let me explain.

I'm a basketball fan. There's this guy named Ben Taylor who has a podcast called [Thinking Basketball](https://www.patreon.com/cw/ThinkingBasketball). He's currently doing a series of episodes on the top 25 peaks of the century. And he [ranked](https://player.fm/series/thinking-basketball/ep-21st-century-peaks-ep-3-a-defenders-with-unique-but-flawed-offense) a guy named Draymond Green as having the 22nd best peak.

I don't agree with this. I would probably have Draymond as, I don't know, maybe I'd have him somewhere in the 40s? 50s? Maybe even the 60s?

Well, but if you had a gun to my head I'd probably just adopt Taylor's belief and rank Draymond 22nd.

Suppose the all-knowing god of the courts, Omega, has *the answer* to where Draymond's peak is. And suppose that Omega allows me one guess and will shoot me if I'm wrong. Or, if you want to be less grim, gives me $1,000,000 if I'm right. Either way, my guess would be 22.

But despite that being my guess, I still wouldn't say that I agree with Taylor. There's this voice inside me that wants to utter "I think you're wrong, Ben".

What's going on here?

I think what's going on here is that my belief differs from what my model predicts. Let me explain. Dammit, I said that already. But still, let me explain.

My model of how good a basketball player depends on various things. Shot creation, spacing, finishing, perimeter defense, rim protection, etc etc. It also incorporates numbers and statistics. Box score stats like points per game. On-off stats like how the teams defensive efficiency is with you on the court vs off the court. It even incorporates things like award voting and general reputation.

Anyway, when I do my best to model Draymond and determine where his peak ranks amongst other players this century, this model has him at around 45.

But I don't trust my model. Well, that's not true. I have some trust in my model. It's just that, with a gun to my head, I'd have more trust in Taylor's model than I would in my own.

Is there anything contradictory about this? Not at all! Or at least not from what I can tell. There are just two separate things at play here.

I feel like I often see people conflate these two separate things. Like if someone has a certain hot take about effective altruism that differs from the mainstream. I find myself wanting to ask them whether this hot take is their genuine gun-to-your-head *belief* or whether it is just what their best attempt at a model would predict.

I don't want to downplay the [importance](https://www.lesswrong.com/s/zucjLBpQ9S9eWPWGu) of forming models nor of discussing the predictions of your models. Imagine if, in discussing the top 25 peaks of the century, the only conversation was "Ben Taylor says X. I trust Taylor and adopt his belief." That doesn't sound like a recipe for intellectual progress. Similarly, if everyone simply deferred to Toby Ord on questions of effective giving -- or to Eliezer on AI timelines, Zvi on Covid numbers, [NNGroup on hamburger menus](https://www.nngroup.com/articles/hamburger-menus/), whatever -- I don't think that would be very productive either.

But we're in a "two things could be true" situation here. It is almost certainly true that sharing your models and their predictions is good for intellectual progress. It is also true that the [experiences you actually anticipate](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/a7n8GdKiAZRX86T5A/making-beliefs-pay-rent-in-anticipated-experiences) are not necessarily the same experiences that your model anticipates. That with a gun to your head, you very well might ditch your model and adopt the beliefs of others.