Harley-ml/lesswrong huggingface dataset:
# Towards an Algorithm for (Human) Self-Modification

LessWrong is wonderful.  Life-changing.  Best thing that ever happened to me.

But it's not really _enough_ to make one a rationalist, is it?  I don't assimilate or even remember all of the knowledge contained in what I read, and I certainly don't dynamically incorporate it into my life-strategy.

Say you want your computer to be able to open Microsoft Word files.  In order to do this, you do not upload a PDF which contains a description of how Microsoft Word works.  No, you _install_ the program and then you run the program.

Over several months of reading LessWrong I found myself wishing I had (a) computer program(s) that could _train_ me to be a rationalist instead of a website that _told_ me about how to be a rationalist.  I would read an article with a tremendous sense of excitement, thinking to myself, "This is it, I have to implement this insight into my life.  This is a change that I _must_ realize."  But I would inevitably hit a mental wall when I saw that just knowing that something was a good idea didn't actually rewire my brain toward better cognitive habits.

I wanted a rationality _installer_.

I found myself in the midst of a personal crisis.  I came to suspect that the reason for my unhappiness and akrasia was that my goals and my actions had become decoupled - I just couldn't figure out _where,_ or _how_.

So I set out to make a program that would help me organize what my actual terminal goals and values are, and then help me causally connect my day-to-day activities with these goals and values.  The idea was to create a kind of tree with end-goals at the parents and daily tasks as the children.  The resulting application was not very user-friendly, but it still _worked_. 

With the help of my program, I saw that a year ago, I was very happy with my life because all the activities I pursued on a daily basis were very high-utility and directly connected to the achievement of my goals.  I saw that I had recently formed a new long-term goal, the existence of which altered my utility function, but I had not altered my life to sufficiently accommodate this new goal.  I made some changes in my life which I thought were going to be painful sacrifices, but ended up feeling exactly right once I crossed the threshold.  It shocked me how quickly I felt better, how completely I returned to "normal."

And I thought to myself, hey, why do our cognitive algorithms have to actually be inside our heads?  I implemented this one into C++ and it helped me sort out something which was just frustrating and painful and confusing when I tried to manage it on my own.

What other rationality techniques deserve to be coded into "rationality assistant applications?"

(And how much of a desire would there be for such products?)
# Timescales Matter

In an [interview with John Baez](http://johncarlosbaez.wordpress.com/2011/03/25/this-weeks-finds-week-313/), Eliezer responds:

> I’ll try to answer the question about timescales, but first let me explain in some detail why I don’t think the decision should be dominated by that question.

He was in part addressing the tradeoff between environmental work and work on technology related to AGI or other existential risks. In this context I agree with his position.

But more broadly, as a person setting out into the wold and deciding what I should do with each moment, the question about timescales is one of the most important issues bearing on my decision and my uncertainty about it (coupled with the difficulty of acquiring evidence) is almost physically painful.

If AGI is likely in the next couple of decades (I am rather skeptical) then long-term activism or outreach are probably pointless. If AGI is not likely within this century (which also seems unlikely) then working on AGI is probably pointless.

I believe it is quite possible that I am smart enough to have a significant effect on the course of whatever field I participate in.  I also believe I could have a significant impact on the number of altruistic rationalists in the world. It seems likely that one of these options is way better than the other, and spending some time figuring out which one (and answering related, more specific questions) seems important. One of the most important ingredients in that calculation is a question of timescales. I don't trust the opinion of anyone involved with the SIAI. I don't trust the opinion of anyone in the mainstream. (In both cases I am happy to update on evidence they provide.) I don't have any good ideas on how to improve my estimate, but it feels like I should be able to.

I encounter relatively smart people giving estimates completely out of line with mine which would radically alter my behavior if I believed them. What argument have I not thought through? What evidence have I not seen? I like to believe that smart, rational people don't disagree too dramatically about questions of fact that they have huge stakes in. General confusion about AI was fine when I had it walled off in a corner of my brain with other abstruse speculation, but now that the question matters to me my uncertainty seems more dire.
# Advice in fighting depression?

My girlfriend suffers serious depression. She has sleep disorder, anorexia, chronic pain, problems to concentrate, low selfesteem, daily low mood, listlessness and is very indecisive. On the other side she considers herself very happy apart from the "depression periods" and we have a great time together. We already consulted a psychotherapist, but there is waiting time about one month. I buyed her fishoil capsules, because she eats no fish and there is mild evidence that it helps treating depression (I don't think this will affect her depression greatly, but fishoil seems like an overall good idea). We often go on walks to catch some sunlight and get her some exercise.

She says she never want's to take antidepressants because she fears to get dependent from them. I think she might change her mind if there are very good arguments in favour of them. She is quite rational in spite of not knowing the LW-stuff. Does anybody of you know if there is any information of the succes rate of medicamentous (and psycho therapeutic) treatment available?

I highly appreciate any advice.

Furthermore i want to call attention to the topic of depression. A **huge** share of the population suffers at least once in their lifetime under depression (~20% in Germany). Sadly it's often not taken serious and a big taboo to speak about. Many people see it as self-inflicted. My girlfriend's mother doesn't believe in depression as a disease ([see diseased thinking](/lw/2as/diseased_thinking_dissolving_questions_about/ "see diseased thinking")). It's a paradigm of irrationality that hurts people.
# Analyzing our discussions in other forums

I frequent several boards about several topics, mainly fandom-related ones. In the large majority of them, I've eventually felt  the urgent need to inject some rationalist ideas into threads that seemed to be sorely needing them.

Even in the best of cases, those that don't devolve into flame wars and remain overall polite, I usually meet with limited success at best. So I wonder -- assuming my own experience is shared by others here -- should we perhaps share links for some of those threads, and discuss here how we could have handled the conversation better, possibly how we could have had more success injecting rationality than we actually did?

The most recent such discussion I had was today, in the forums of Gunnerkrigg Court. I made a post very early on in the thread in question, but my real contribution began [here](http://gunnerkrigg.proboards.com/index.cgi?action=display&board=general&thread=1253&page=2#54658 "here") after another poster (who actually seemed science-minded in desire, if not in practice!) asked "What if the soul is the energy?" I had to cringe at that, and tried to explain how meaningless a statement that was -- but I don't seem to have succeeded much, even though I don't know how I could have done better.

Please say what you think about my idea of discussing our threads in other forums in general, and/or any ideas you have about how I could have handled better that specific thread in particular...
# Anyone read Erfworld?

Periodically people link to "rationalist" stories (or comics that are not really rational at all, that just happen to be vaguely related to AI), so I was a bit surprised to find not a single reference to Erfworld on a Lesswrong search. 

[Erfworld](http://www.erfworld.com/book-1-archive/?px=%2F001.jpg "Erfworld") is a webcomic that essentially tells the same story as Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality. Regular (but very smart) guy is transported to magical world. He systematically tries to understand the rules of that world and accomplishes all kinds of awesome stuff as a result. I feel like I've read the story a bunch of times, but HP:MoR and Erfworld are the only ones I recall that really did it justice on an epic scale.

While in many ways it's almost identical, it's playing with a different set of rules than Harry is, and the jokes and philosophical questions are playing around with different material. The main character is a strategy war gamer, and he finds himself summoned into a world that runs on Turn Based Strategy Rules. People can only take certain actions on their own "turn." Everyone has "stats", gain experience and level up. At first the whole thing seems like a silly gimmick, with the protagonist benefiting from genre-savviness. He starts out asking basic questions about the rules. Later on he starts challenging those rules - what is an actual law of the universe and what is merely convention that the inhabitants follow. Eventually he starts grappling with questions about how the morality of his old world plays into the morality of a world where everyone is tied ideologically to the side that they were created to serve, and people are not born - they pop into existence as adults as soon as their commander pays for them.

I think it does a better job of showing how a "real," "typical" smart person would try and understand a new, strange world. Harry is awesome, but he strains credibility in regards to how much he knows at the age he knows it.

Book 1 is done, and is a very solid, complete work that I recommend on its own. It features what is, to my recollection, the best use of the F-word in a work of fiction.

Book 2's still in progress. [You can start reading here.](http://www.erfworld.com/book-1-archive/?px=%2F001.jpg)
# Dense Math Notation

I program, and am also presently working my way through some math books. I find that I often have to backtrack to look up pieces of notation like variables and operators. Unfortunately, this is very problematic. Greek and Latin letters give no indication of where they came from and are not usable search terms, even knowing the full context in which they appeared. Many authors have their own bits of idiosyncratic notation, often combinations of subscripting and line art generated by TeX macros. Since expanding equations out to their definitions is so difficult, I sometimes don't bother to investigate when one looks odd, which as you might expect leads to big trouble later when errors in understanding creep by.

This is not nearly as big a problem for me when reading code, however, because there every variable and nonstandard operator has a descriptive name wherever it's used, and documentation is never more than a few hotkeys away. The same thing could be done for math. Suppose you took a typical higher math book, and replaced every single-letter variable and operator with an appropriate identifier. For me, this would make it much more readable; I would gain a better understanding in less time. However, I don't know the effect size or how broadly this generalizes.

Do other people have this problem? Might this issue deter some people from studying math entirely? Has anyone tried the obvious controlled experiment? How about with an experimental group specifically of programmers?
# Singularity Institute featured on Philanthroper

Singularity Institute is today's featured charity on [Philanthroper.com](https://philanthroper.com/deals/singularity-institute )

Philanthroper is a micro-giving site that profiles small charities hand-selected by their editors. Their site encourages donors to “give every day” by only requesting $1 contributions.

A group of Singularity Institute donors has stepped forward to match all donations given through Philanthroper today so I'd encourage each of you to **give $1 now** if you support Singularity Institute and have a US-based bank account (Philanthroper requirement). We'd like to have a healthy total raised by the end of the day. The fundraiser has already been [featured on Gizmodo](http://gizmodo.com/#!5787599/give-1-to-stop-terminators-seriously) but please submit it to other news sites if you can.

I signed up and gave my $1.
# An Anchoring Experiment

**The experiment is closed, for the results look [here](/r/discussion/lw/53d/an_anchoring_experiment_results/).**

In recent discussion I have expressed an opinion that anchoring may, for some quantitative questions, cause the answer to lie further away from the correct value than the anchor itself. For concreteness, let's suppose that the correct value of a quantity _Q_ is _x_, and the subject is asked whether _Q_ is greater or lower than _y_, _y > x_. My hypothesis is that the anchor moves the subject's probability distribution up as a whole, _including the part which already has been lying above y_. Therefore the subjects will positively answer the question "Is _Q > y_ ?" more often than their guess would exceed _y_ if they were just asked to estimate the value of _Q_ with no anchor given. One commenter apparently [disagreed](/lw/50z/mental_metadata/3sy3). I thought it may be interesting to resolve the disagreement experimentally. (More generally, I would like to see how well LW audience fights the standard biases, and if this experiment turns out successful - which means the number of respondents be greater than, say, five - I would think about posting more of this kind.)

_How to participate:_

The experiment has two parts.

First, toss a coin to decide whether you belong to the biased group I or the control group II for the first question. If you belong to the group I, look at a comment linked below, which will give you a question of form "is _Q_ is greater or lower than _y_", where _y_ is either significantly lower or significantly greater than the correct value of _Q_. The comment has a form of a typical LW poll. If you belong to the group II, look at different linked comment which asks "what is the value of _Q_", and then give your estimate in a subcomment there.

The second part is completely analogical to the first one, only with a different question. If you have participated in the first part within the group I, take part in the group II for the second part, and vice versa. Try to eliminate the irrelevant biases: switch on the anti-kibitzer before looking on the group I questions to avoid being influenced by the votes of others. Don't read the subcomments of the group II questions before writing down your own.

The hypothesis is that the percentage of the group I respondents answering incorrectly will be greater than the percentage of the group II respondents estimating on the incorrect side of the anchor.

First part: [Question for the group I](/r/discussion/lw/52f/an_anchoring_experiment/3t2o). [Question for the group II](/r/discussion/lw/52f/an_anchoring_experiment/3t2s).

Second part: [Question for the group I](/r/discussion/lw/52f/an_anchoring_experiment/3t2t). [Question for the group II](/r/discussion/lw/52f/an_anchoring_experiment/3t2w).
# New Rationality Blog: 'Measure of Doubt'

[Measure of Doubt](http://measureofdoubt.com/) is a new rationality blog from [Julia](http://measureofdoubt.com/author/measureofdoubt/) and [Jesse](http://measureofdoubt.com/author/jessegalef/) Galef (a sister-brother team), aimed at a much broader audience than Less Wrong.

Julia is the author of the [recently-linked](/lw/48i/are_intuitions_good_evidence_link/) article [Are Intuitions Good Evidence?](http://rationallyspeaking.blogspot.com/2011/01/are-intuitions-good-evidence.html) and many other [writings](http://juliagalef.com/writing/). I know less about [Jesse](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mgB762QNvM8), but I can say a bit more about Julia. She co-hosts the [Rationally Speaking podcast](http://www.rationallyspeakingpodcast.org/) with philosopher-biologist Massimo Pigliucci. She writes quite a bit about [becoming more rational](http://rationallyspeaking.blogspot.com/2010/01/is-google-making-us-less-rational.html), [dissolving Big Questions](http://rationallyspeaking.blogspot.com/2010/06/dissolving-ultimate-question.html), and [_wanting_ to change your mind](http://rationallyspeaking.blogspot.com/2010/02/how-to-want-to-change-your-mind.html). Her video on [different definitions of 'rationality'](http://measureofdoubt.com/2011/03/29/four-ways-to-define-rational/) distinguishes Hollywood rationality, epistemic rationality, and instrumental rationality. She [explains the mirror paradox](http://measureofdoubt.com/2011/03/31/mirror-paradox/) _ala_ Gary Drescher in _Good and Real_. She [blogged](http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2011/03/teaching_science_with_magic.html)_ Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality_.

I suspect Less Wrong readers will enjoy [Measure of Doubt](http://measureofdoubt.com/), and will find it a useful place to send people who don't have the patience to read the Less Wrong Sequences and long posts about Bayesian updating and the relevance of universe-simulation arguments to decision theory.
# Q: What has Rationality Done for You?

So after reading [SarahC's latest post](/lw/50p/reflections_on_rationality_a_year_out/) I noticed that she's gotten a lot out of rationality.  
  
More importantly, she got different things out of it than I have.  
  
Off the top of my head, I've learned...

*   that other people see themselves differently, and should be understood on their terms (mostly from [here](/lw/i0/are_your_enemies_innately_evil/))
*   that I can pay attention to what I'm doing, and try to notice patterns to make intervention more effective.
*   the whole [utilitarian structure of having a goal that you take actions to achieve](/lw/rb/possibility_and_couldness/), coupled with the idea of an [optimization process](/lw/tx/optimization/). It was really helpful to me to realize that you can do whatever it takes to achieve something, not just what has been suggested.
*   the importance/usefulness of [dissolving the question](/lw/of/dissolving_the_question/)/[how words work](/lw/od/37_ways_that_words_can_be_wrong/) (especially great when combined with previous part)
*   that an [event is evidence for something](/lw/i4/belief_in_belief/), not just what I think it can support
*   to [pull people in, don't force them](/lw/38x/bridging_inferential_gaps/33a9). Seriously that one is ridiculously useful. Thanks David Gerard.
*   that things don't happen unless something makes them happen.
*   that other people are smart and cool, and often have good advice

On top of becoming a little bit more effective at a lot of things, and with many fewer problems.

(I could post more on the consequences of this, but I'm going for a different point)

Where she got...

*   a habit of learning new skills
*   better time-management habits
*   an awesome community
*   more initiative
*   the idea that she can change the world

I've only recently making a habit out of trying new things, and that's been going really well for me. Is there other low hanging fruit that I'm missing?  
  
What cool/important/useful things has rationality gotten you?
# I want a better memory.

I suspect that forgetfulness is the single largest hindrance to me improving my rationality. This isn't something I've seen others report on LessWrong, so I'm suspicious that I'm in some kind of self-serving spiral, or that I'm doing something obvious wrong. So, I'm seeking feedback on (a) whether the above statement is true -- whether forgetfulness is likely to really be a dominant hindrance; (b) what I can do about it; and (c) why others haven't reported this.

Ways that I suspect forgetfulness harms me:

*   I forget past experiences that would otherwise allow me to observe correlations and extrapolate time-series style. Did my mood improve last time I called this friend? Was I more productive during that period where I got less sleep?
*   I fail to recall evidence that would be salient when evaluating probabilities. This includes evidence relevant not only to coffee-time discussions on abstract topics, but also questions that occur to me about akrasia and the like.
*   I can't remember names of authors and papers that could be relevant to ideas that arise during my research. Searching online for papers is fine for major literature reviews, but enormously expensive to evaluate hour-by-hour conjectures that occur to me.
*   When I encounter the same problem multiple times, I forget how I solved the problem last time.
*   When a new productivity/social/rationality strategy \*does\* work, I forget to keep using it. This isn't only about laziness: sometimes I actually wonder explicitly whether strategy X worked, and I can't remember.
*   I forget names, faces, places, facts and figures. But I understand this one is quite common.
*   I forget all the ways that forgetfulness frustrates me.

Steps I've taken:

*   I keep an elaborate diary with appointments like "bring USB drive home from work" and "purchase bread en route to Sam's house".
*   I keep an elaborate e-notebook where I try to record my "brain state" so that I can more quickly pick up where I left off with my work.
*   Every time I solve a technical problem, I write it down.
*   I use a memory app called mnemosyne to memorize foreign language words, names of jitsu techniques, etc.

The write-everything-down strategy has helped some, but it's \*orders of magnitude less effective\* than recalling stuff right from my brain. It's like replacing a CPU's L1 cache with a magnetic hard drive and expecting performance not to drop.
# The AI-box for hunter-gatherers

The following is a minor curiosity that occurred to me regarding real-world analogies to the AI-box concept.

Fundamentally, the reason that we fear a randomly-chosen super-intelligent AI is twofold:

1.  It would be smarter than us, so it could outwit us no matter what its goals.
2.  We have no  reason to expect its goals to exactly coincide with ours, so we expect its actions to be detrimental to us.

Now, let's say you're playing a game with a wide range of outcomes, over which you have a well-defined utility function. Let's say you can choose a partner from some pool of potential partners, each with a random utility function. Let's say the intelligence of each player is known to you. It would be unwise to choose a player more intelligent than yourself because

1.  They could outwit you.
2.  You have no reason to expect their goals to coincide with yours.

On the other hand, if you pick a less intelligent player then perhaps you could trick them into furthering your own goals, or at least ascertain whether their motives coincide with yours. At the very least you would be able to keep them from subverting your own goal-directed actions.

I conjecture that this explains why people sometimes fear those more intelligent than themselves, and also why people sometimes act dumb. Imagine a hunter-gatherer group considering inviting an outsider to join them. If the outsider's motives are uncertain then the more intelligent the outsider, the less well-advised the group would be to let em in.

In fact, a situation analogous to an AI-box could arise:

**Group member 1**: We should let this intelligent outsider in, but we should keep tabs on them should they act against us.

**Group member 2**: But the fact that they're more intelligent than us means that you \*can't\* expect to keep tabs on them.

**Group member 1**: But couldn't we set a test of their motives and only allow them in if they proves to have motives coinciding with ours?

**Group member 2**:  [No matter what test you set, we can expect them to outwit us -- that's what intelligence means](http://www.yudkowsky.net/essays/aibox.html).
# Describing how much attention you've paid to an argument

There seems to be a hole in English (I don't know about other languages) for efficiently describing how much attention you've paid to an argument.

I can think of a variety of amounts and sorts of attention-- looks cool and plausible, examined for attractive arguments against the other side, checked math for accuracy, checked math for plausibility of application, looked for counter-arguments, looked for evidence in favor, checked factual material, checked for whether some parts are sound even if there are some errors.....

Any other suggestions for types of attention?
# Manufacturing prejudice

There's a tradition in England - I don't know how old - of abusing red-headed people.  It's a [genuine prejudice](http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/top-stories/2010/04/24/7-death-threats-a-day-for-having-ginger-hair-115875-22208033/) [in England](http://www.google.com/trends?q=ginger+hair&ctab=0&geo=all&date=all&sort=0).  From this [facebook page](http://ta-in.facebook.com/topic.php?uid=2204571866&topic=4340):

> 'Ginger' in England basically is like saying:  
>   
> "Look there's an ugly, smelly, no friends, socially unacceptable, negative, aggressive, angry, violent, unclean, nasty, non boyfriend material, low self esteem, unattractive, social misfit, nerdy, moron, low education, non human...etc etc etc"  
>   
> The term 'ginger' didn't become 'mainstream' just because of that South Park episode, I was being shot at, having acid thrown over me, stabbed, headbutted, punched, spat on, kicked, dehumanised, singled out, socially excluded, avoided, belittled, character assassinated etc since I can remember and to be fair I found that treatment was at its peak years before that South Park episode was even thought up.

This spread to the US in 2005, when Cartman tried to incite violence against redheads in a South Park episode with "Kick a Ginger Day".

What's interesting is how this meme is spreading in the US: As humor.  This meme is promoted by sites like CollegeHumor.com and MyLifeIsAverage.com, which mine it as a source of ironic humor.  The Cheezburger Network is pushing ginger-hatred almost as aggressively as they push pedophilia as a fount of humor.

Are humans capable of, collectively, keeping real and humorous/ironic racism separate?  [No,](http://www.calgarysun.com/news/alberta/2009/05/09/9405226-sun.html) [they](http://middletownpress.com/articles/2011/03/06/news/doc4d73d9cc59b0b946978590.txt) [are](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/canada/3498766/Facebook-Kick-a-Ginger-campaign-prompts-attacks-on-redheads.html) [not](http://www.newsday.com/news/nation/5-socal-kids-victims-of-ginger-attacks-1.1620428). What South Park "kicked" off as an ironic commentary on racism is becoming actual racism.

One clue that you're going too far in your ironic humor is when you start finding the [real thing](http://www.collegehumor.com/video/5882397/ginger-rallying-cry) funny.

Do humans have an instinctive need to bond over shared prejudices?  Is combating racism a game of whack-a-mole, in which society invents new prejudices to replace the ones being taken away?
# Just Try It: Quantity Trumps Quality

Followup to: [Don't Fear Failure](/lw/4up/dont_fear_failure/)

In the same theme as the last article, I think that failure is actually pretty important in learning. Rationality needs data, and trying is a good source of it.  
  
When you're trying to do something new, you probably won't be able to do it right the first time. Even if you obsess over it. Jeff Atwood is a programmer who says [Quantity Always Trumps Quality](http://www.codinghorror.com/blog/2008/08/quantity-always-trumps-quality.html)

> > The ceramics teacher announced on opening day that he was dividing the class into two groups. All those on the left side of the studio, he said, would be graded solely on the quantity of work they produced, all those on the right solely on its quality. His procedure was simple: on the final day of class he would bring in his bathroom scales and weigh the work of the "quantity" group: fifty pound of pots rated an "A", forty pounds a "B", and so on. Those being graded on "quality", however, needed to produce only one pot - albeit a perfect one - to get an "A".
> > 
> > Well, came grading time and a curious fact emerged: **the works of highest quality were all produced by the group being graded for quantity**. It seems that while the "quantity" group was busily churning out piles of work - and learning from their mistakes - the "quality" group had sat theorizing about perfection, and in the end had little more to show for their efforts than grandiose theories and a pile of dead clay.
> 
> Where have I heard this before?
> 
> 1.  [Stop theorizing](http://www.codinghorror.com/blog/archives/000165.html).
> 2.  [Write lots of software](http://www.codinghorror.com/blog/archives/000684.html).
> 3.  [Learn from your mistakes](http://www.codinghorror.com/blog/archives/000300.html).
> 
> Quantity always trumps quality. 
> 
> When it comes to software, the same rule applies. If you aren't building, you aren't learning. Rather than agonizing over whether you're building the right thing, _just build it_. And if that one doesn't work, [keep building](http://www.codinghorror.com/blog/archives/000190.html) until you get one that does.

The people who tried more did better, even though they failed more too. Of course you shouldn't try to fail, but you shouldn't let the fear of it stop you from tyring.  
  
I wouldn't go as far as to say that quantity always trumps quality, but where the cost of failure is low lots of failures that you pay attention to is a pretty good way of learning. You should  [hold off on proposing solutions](/lw/ka/hold_off_on_proposing_solutions/), but you also need to get around to actually trying the proposed solution.  
  
I'm normed such that I'll spend more time talking about if something will work than trying it out to see if it works. The problem is that if you don't know about something already, your thoughts about what will work aren't going to be particularly accurate. Trying something will very conclusively demonstrate if something works or not.  
  
Note:  
I originally had this as part of Don't Fear Failure, but that post got too long.
# Sequence Posts Exercises

Based on [this](/lw/536/open_thread_april_2011/3ti1 "this") thread from this month's (April 2011) Open Thread, we have started work on exercises to go along with the posts and help readers internalize the material better. The idea is to have exercises covering all of the sequences eventually (though there doesn't have to be a 1:1 correspondence between exercises and single posts)

help is very much appreciated. If you want to take up writing exercises for a post, please claim it on our wiki [page](http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Lesswrongwiki:Sequence_Post_Exercises "page").

A few drafts have started to circulate, and soon we will have our first exercises posted.
# The Importance of Research

This is just a quick example of why it's always good to check the source material.

Cracked [ran an article today](http://www.cracked.com/article_19121_7-basic-things-you-wont-believe-youre-all-doing-wrong_p2.html) about several things people are doing wrong, and the number one thing they listed was sitting.  According to a an experiment they cite, one researcher tested disk movement for people slouching, sitting up straight, and leaning back at a 135˚ angle.  They found that leaning back does the least damage to the spine.

Interested, I clicked on their link which sent me to [this article](http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15939377/ns/health-health_care/) from MSNBC, which among other things, says:

> When strain is placed on the spine, the spinal disks start to move and misalign. At a 90-degree sitting position, this movement was most prominent.

With this, I was considered making a lifestyle change to slouching when using the computer, as leaning back isn't usually an option for serious work.  But, I still wanted to read more about the experiment.

Unfortunately, they didn't have the link to the actual paper.  A bit of googling led me to [an article that actually had the experiment's methodology](http://www.familypracticenews.com/index.php?id=2934&type=98&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=45417&cHash=da03e20e36), which says that slouching was actually the worst position! 

It maintained that leaning back is best, but according to the results the 90˚ angle isn't that bad, especially since most of the other articles I found were implying that the advice to sit up straight is wrong.  Considering that people are usually slouching when the advice is given, sitting up is still an improvement.  This is especially true at places like dinner tables, where leaning back as suggested isn't really an option.

Moral of the story: Do research before changing personal habits, regardless of where the information comes from.

Note: Afterwards, I did a bit more googling to see which other news sources carried this story incorrectly.  The most prominent misinformation came from [a Fox News article](http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,232237,00.html), who carried the following headline:

> Study: Slouching Better for Back Than Sitting Up Straight
# Science Fiction Recommendations

I have never read very much Science Fiction, unlike some of the people here on Less Wrong, and I think I would like to. At least, the few books I have read I enjoyed. I've read a couple of books from Asimov's Foundation Series, two Michael Crichton books, Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea by Jules Verne, and an anthology of SciFi short stories (no really famous authors) that my dad owned.

That list looks very short. I just finished reading a fiction book, and am looking to start another. Recommendations? What are the two or three books I simply must read?
# Problem noticed in aspect of LW comunity bonding?

I have noticed that given how much I identify as a rationalist, how much I have in common with the community here, how important I consider it, etc. I have surprisingly little instant in group identification with community members compared to other online communities. There seem to be an aspect of social involvement that LW does bad at. And there is one thing lacking that to me seems the obvious first suspect; the lack of of-topic unstructured chatter.

What I do when I feel that I identify with some continuity online is in fact not usually the thing the community is ABOUT. Instead, it's the things that grow out of the sides; forum games, members art projects, photo share threads, fanworks. I can speculate on why this happens this is so, but it dosn't seem very useful at the moment, I'm not highly confident on any specific theory, and most will probably find it fairly obvious anyway.

LW, however, has no real room for this. Even in the discussion section, things that are not reasonably on topic will be punished with negative karma. Now, this is obviously needed, but one must still recognize there IS a prise to being so structured and focused on a single goal when humans naturally tend not to be. Look for third options.

Now, I have a specific solution in mind, but I'm going to hold of on proposing it and see if you come up with something better before I post my idea.

EDIT: My suggestion has now been added in the comments, please check it out.
# What Should I Do?

I have been having some difficulty deciding what to do with my life. I'm not really ashamed or surprised, because the problem seems extremely difficult and worth getting right. I still don't really know. Here are some of my options, though I wouldn't be surprised if what I end up doing is not on the list. I thought I would share to elicit advice, to give some context to some of my [recent remarks](/lw/541/details_of_taskforces_or_cooperate_now/), and maybe to provide comparison for people in similar situations.

**1\. Research**

I could do research in a university, or in a private research lab. Many fields have at least a few questions that seem important and interesting.

_A. Theoretical Computer Science_. I could work on collaborative learning, recommendation and reputation systems, distributed protocols, or anything else that might assist collaboration in the future. 

_B. AI / Computational Cognitive Neuroscience_. I could work on algorithms for inference and planning, to increase the probability that we develop comprehensible or human-like AI before something horrible happens (like developing incomprehensible strong AI).

_C. Neuroscience_. I know almost nothing about this field, but technology for measuring and interfacing with the brain appears to be important and developing rapidly. I don't know how hard it would be to start working in the field, but I suspect that the connection to computer science is strong enough at MIT that it wouldn't be impossible.

**2\. Start a company**

This seems way harder, but I am sufficiently arrogant and risk-neutral that I consider it a reasonable option. In particular, this is what I would do if I decided that making money as efficiently as possible and giving it away

_A. Tech company._ If I had to guess based on the currently available evidence, I would guess that this is the way to maximize my expected earnings.

_B. Online Education._ I would like to take a shot at designing materials for online education of smart, significantly underserved, high school students.

**3\. Cooperate with Other Rationalists**

_A. Work for a rational charity_. Self-explanatory. Probably worse than earning a lot of money and giving away.

_B. Start a rational charity_. Probably worse than supporting an existing charity.

_C. Work for a rational start-up_. Can't really arrange this one; but optimistically it could happen if you were prepared (someone else does 2).

**4\. Be a Hobbyist**

I could also simply try and earn a living as quickly as possible (rather than making as much excess as possible, or having a more structured way of doing good) and do work on the side. I don't think this is a good idea.
# First Waco, Texas LW Meetup, 4/09, 1PM

Date: Saturday, April 9

Time: 1PM

Location: [Common Grounds](http://www.commongroundswaco.com/) Coffeehouse, [IH-35 and S 8th Street](http://maps.google.com/maps/place?hl=en&safe=images&um=1&ie=UTF-8&q=waco,tx+common+grounds&fb=1&gl=us&hq=common+grounds&hnear=Waco,+TX&cid=8160807412985378584) (east side of interstate).  (If you can't find parking behind the place, use the parking garage \[**free on weekends**\] just a short distance down the street.)

Well, I'm going through with it!  We'll have our first Texas LW meetup.  No other known Waco LWers, but it's not a bad drive (~90 minutes) from Austin, Dallas/Fort Worth, or Bryan/College Station.

I will be the guy in the blue blazer with a Less Wrong sign.  I have no idea what the turnout will be, but I'll stay until at least 5pm, so come on by if you can.

<del>The website reports an all-day 100 Cameras event, but this shouldn't interfere.</del>

**Edit:** Looks like that was an old notice for the Saturday two weeks before this, so there is no interfering event to worry about.

**Edit2:** I've set up the [Waco Meetup Group](http://www.meetup.com/Waco-LessWrong-Rationalist-Group/) with this event shown.  (And promoted it on Craigslist.)

**REPORT:** Success!  Vaniver, NMJablonski, his wife, Clippy's humanoid robot, and I showed up.  We talked about various rationality issues: the potential for the upcoming boot camp, the heritability of personality traits and intelligence, the inefficiencies and lost purposes in the economy today, and of course, string theory.  At the end, we helped Clippy decide whether he should go to Rationalist Boot Camp (if he's accepted) by doing a probability-weighted CBA, which Vaniver helped coordinate very well.

[Here](http://i35.photobucket.com/albums/d187/SilasX/WacoMeetup.jpg) is a picture of us at the meetup: from left to right: Vaniver, me, Laura (NMJablonski's wife), and NMJablonski. Clippy's robot did not want to be in it.  (I tried to upload it to this site, but even after resizing it down to the limit it wouldn't accept.)

We're planning to have another Texas meetup in Austin in two weeks.
# Cryptanalysis as Epistemology? (paging cryptonerds)

**Short version:** Why can't [cryptanalysis](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptanalysis) methods be carried over to science, which looks like a trivial problem by comparison, since nature doesn't intelligently remove patterns from our observations?  Or are these methods already carried over?

**Long version:** Okay, I was going to spell this all out with a lot of text, but it started ballooning, so I'm just going to put it in chart form.

Here is what I see as the **mapping from cryptography to science** (or epistemology in general).  I want to know what goes in the "???" spot, and why it hasn't been used for any natural phenomenon _less_ complex than the most complex broken cipher.  (Sorry, couldn't figure out how to center it.)

 ![](http://images.lesswrong.com/t3_54q_1.png?v=6fa67b61910ef10ec4fe5313432db337)

**EDIT:** Removed "(cipher known)" requirement on 2nd- and 3rd-to-last rows because the scientific analog can be searching for either natural laws or constants.
# 96 Bad Links in the Sequences

I've been scraping data from the sequences recently, where by sequences I mean all of Eliezer's [posts](http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Less_Wrong/All_articles) up to and including [Practical Advice Backed By Deep Theories](/lw/d4/practical_advice_backed_by_deep_theories/). I've been doing this mostly to get some fun data out and maybe some more useful things like the [Bring Back the Sequences](/lw/4pt/bring_back_the_sequences/) project, but one of the things I found is that there is breakage from the move from OB (and OB's subsequent reorganization) that remains unfixed.

In particular, 96 links either give 404s (not found), used to link to a comment but now only link to the main article, or link under the summary fold for no apparent reason. To avoid overloading this article, I have posted the list on piratepad here:

[http://piratepad.net/ep/pad/view/ro.eyxCVZYMZeO/latest](http://piratepad.net/ep/pad/view/ro.eyxCVZYMZeO/latest)

Note that I have only checked links that went to overcomingbias.com. This is not necessarily a complete list.

Some of these can be fixed by anyone with editing rights, but the ones pointing to comments can be fixed only by Eliezer or someone who knows what comment was meant to be linked. Alternatively, someone can go through the archive.org WayBack machine, figure out which comments were linked to, then find them in the equivalent LessWrong page, and finally provide the corrected link. I may modify the scraper to do this if someone is willing to make the substitution.

Also, a bunch of links (not in the above list) direct the user to OvercomingBias.com only to be redirected back to LessWrong. While this doesn't actually cause any breakage, it's a pity to be burdening OB's server for no real reason. I can produce a list of these if needed.

If I have managed to attract the attention of anyone with editorial rights, I would really appreciate it if you could help me out by removing certain formatting inconsistencies that greatly slow down and complicate my scraper. I can offer more details on demand, but these links to OB are near the top of the list.

I should be back with more interesting data soon. If you have any particular data-mineable queries about the sequences, let me know.

_\[Edit: The 4 links that point to a #comments fragment are actually processed correctly. That leaves 92 to be fixed.\]_
# Meta: Karma and lesswrong mainstream positions

My impression is that critiques of lesswrong mainstream positions and arguments for contrary positions are received well and achieve high karma scores when they are of very high quality. Similarly posts and comments that take lesswrong mainstream positions will still be voted down if they are of very low quality. But in between there seems to be a gulf: Moderately low quality mainstream comments will stay at 0 to -1 karma while contra-mainstream comments of (apparently) similar quality score solidly negative karma, moderately high quality mainstream comments achieve good positive karma while similar quality contra-mainstream comments stay at 0 to 2. 

Do you share my impression? And if this is the case, should we try to do something about it?
# [LINK] Ethical Pick-Up Artistry (Clarisse Thorn)

Clarisse Thorn recently posted a useful article about [Ethical Pick-Up Artistry](http://clarissethorn.com/blog/2011/03/23/ethical-pick-up-artistry/), bringing up a few basic critiques of traditional PUA and suggesting a few alternatives.

> Here’s the thing: the current pickup artist subculture has a monopoly on **effective** advice for how to break down social interactions and talk to women. Not all of it works, but enough of it works that it draws guys in. As a pickup artist instructor once told me, “When I first found the community I was horrified by how sleazy and gross it is, but I had never had a girlfriend and I told myself: dude, if you don’t learn this stuff you’re gonna die alone.”
> 
> I’ve theorized that maybe feminists should provide good pickup advice, in an attempt to counterbalance some of the awfulness of the existing community. In the meantime, however, I figure the next best thing to do is to provide a list of less-misogynistic pickup artist instructors and sites, and a few very basic critiques.

<del>A proposal to formalize this</del> Not the same thing, but a discussion on forming a community to practice social artistry in general [has been brought up on LW before](/lw/298/more_art_less_stink_taking_the_pu_out_of_pua/), but I'm not personally aware of anything coming out of that.
# A potential problem with using  Solomonoff induction as a prior

There's a problem that has occurred to me that I haven't seen discussed anywhere: I don't think people actually wants to assign zero probability to all hypotheses which are not Turing computable. Consider the following hypothetical: we come up with a theory of everything that seems to explain all the laws of physics but there's a single open parameter (say the fine structure constant). We compute a large number of digits of this constant, and someone notices that when expressed in base 2, the nth digit seems to be 1 iff the nth Turing machine halts on the blank tape for some fairly natural ordering of all Turing machines. If we confirm this for a large number of digits (not necessarily consecutive digits- obviously some of the 0s won't be confirmable) shouldn't we consider the hypothesis the digits really are given by this simple but non-computable function? But if our priors assign zero probability to all non-computable hypotheses then this hypothesis must always be stuck with zero probability.

If the universe is finite we could approximate this function with a function which was instead "Halts within K" steps where K is some large number, but intutively this seems like a more complicated hypothesis than the original one.

I'm not sure what is a reasonable prior in this sort of context that handles this sort of thing. We don't want an uncountable set of priors. It might make sense to use something like hypotheses which are describable in Peano arithmetic or something like that.